OPPRESSED PEOPLES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By NOEL BUXTON

EUROPE AND THE TURKS

WITH THE BULGARIAN STAFF

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AND

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PART I

CHAPTER I

NATIONAL PROGRESS IN EUROPE AND ASIA

BUOYED up during the four terrible years of the War with the promise of a better world, Europe found itself disillusioned at its close with the realisation, in many respects, of a worse. The Versailles Settlement wrought ruin on Central Europe, injured its productive capacities, and reduced its peoples to semi-starvation. Russia, prostrate from prolonged participation in the Great War, followed by internal revolution, was invaded by her former Allies. Hunger stalked over a great part of the continent of Europe, while the policy of the Allies was such that vast markets were ruled out of our economic system. Among the victors disquieting symptoms appeared that boded ill for the future; the apportionment of the spoils of War in Africa, in the Middle East, in China, and in the Pacific, provided fresh causes of discord between the leading Powers. As a solvent of

great problems, the League of Nations was not called into play. This melancholy enumeration of the results of the "war to end war" might be elaborated were they not manifest to the most casual observer.

There is, notwithstanding, a less dismal side to the picture. It is true that during the years following the Armistice the industrial prosperity of Europe was destroyed by the deliberate ruination of Germany; that the Austrians subsisted on loans; and that Russia struggled to free herself from the effects of the series of disasters—invasion, blockade, famine—which constituted her lot since the Revolution. But observers who were capable of looking beyond these dark conditions were conscious of one great accomplishment, namely that after 1918 no single nation in Europe,* except Ireland, remained under the yoke of an alien domination.

This achievement followed the collapse of the Hohenzollern and Hapsburg dynasties and of the Tsardom, the three great despotic systems which afflicted the races of Central and Eastern

* The population of East Galicia can hardly be regarded as a nation.

Europe. It was generally assumed during the war that the defeat of the Central Powers was the necessary and sufficient condition of a settlement based upon the principle of national self-determination in Europe. But few people reflected upon the possibility of achieving aims which were foreign to the structure of one of the great Allied States. What would have happened to the settlement if the Tsardom had emerged triumphant from the struggle may be left to the speculations of the reader. The fact remains that to the circumstance of the Russian Revolution as much as to the defeat of the Central Powers must be attributed the framework of the Peace in so far as it affected the lot of the oppressed peoples in Europe.*

Poland, which suffered from the converging encroachments of three Empires, obtained its charter of liberation in the Treaty of Versailles, although one has to admit that its behaviour since its liberation has been conspicuous for chauvinism and political incapacity. These shortcomings are partly a legacy from its past history, in which few Poles gained experience in ad-

* See Map 1. Appendix D.

ministration and government; partly they are due to an emotional temperament; partly to causes over which the Poles had little or no control, such as French insistence on a greater Poland than the Poles themselves aspired to administer.

The Baltic States—Lithuania, Esthonia, Latvia—detached themselves from the Russian Empire and together with the Ukraine obtained recognition from the Soviet Government of Russia. The various nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire either formed new compact homogeneous States or attached themselves to the main body of their race in States already existing.

The Czechs of Moravia and Bohemia were joined by the Slovaks of Hungary, a race hardly distinguishable in dialect, to form Czecho-Slovakia. Of all the Succession States, Czecho-Slovakia appeared to the writers* the most promising and stable. The Czechs—a hard-working and practical people—lost no time in setting their house in order and had the good

*During a visit to Czecho-Slovakia and Yugo-Slavia, in October 1921.

fortune to possess in M. Benes a statesman who has already gained a European reputation. The wine of liberation has not in most cases gone to the head of the Czechs. Towards the three million Germans included in their frontiers, their policy is marked by a certain measure of tolerance. In Carlsbad and elsewhere in German Czecho-Slovakia, while one found evidence of dissatisfaction, the grievances related rather to such matters as the necessity of learning Czech than to governmental action which could be called oppressive.

Transylvania with its preponderant Rumanian population was transferred to Rumanian sovereignty. The South Slavs—the Croats and Slovenes—of the Hapsburg Monarchy saw their aspirations partly fulfilled in the creation of the Yugo-Slav State. We say *partly* because the Serbs of the ex-Monarchy and of Old Serbia proper, to whom the Slovenes and Croats are akin in race and language, gained a dominating position in the new State. The first years of its existence were characterised by an attempt on the part of the Serbs to bring about fusion of all the Croats and Slovenes and other Yugo-Slav peoples

in a Serbian mould, and not a union of Yugo-Slav peoples on a federal basis—which is in fact claimed by them, notably by the Montenegrins, whose historic political existence has been brought to an end. But unless violence carries the day, it is possible that a rearrangement of parties will prove sufficient to defeat the policy of pan-Serbism.

Difficulties remain. The avowed object of rearranging Europe along national lines has been lost sight of to a deplorable extent because of the wishes of the victors to cripple and punish enemy countries. In setting up national States, the Allies over-reached themselves by including far too large groups of racial minorities, as instanced in the transference of the Austrian Tyrol to Italy and Thrace to Greece. It is true that the existence of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe is unavoidable, because in many areas races are inextricably thrown together, and other considerations of an economic and geographical nature cannot be ignored when frontiers are being fixed. But the gigantic minorities of Germans, Hungarians and Bulgars constitute problems almost equal in importance to

those of nations completely under oppression. How these minorities can be democratically governed, and their rights and interests safeguarded, are questions which cannot easily be answered. They constitute a special problem, to the solution of which a later chapter is devoted.

Other difficulties of a more ephemeral kind are usually magnified by travellers who give gloomy accounts of the truculent and over-bearing behaviour of customs officials, the absence of smooth working and comfort. All the amenities of an Imperial civilisation have disappeared, we are told—often by those who shouted loudest during the war for the break-up of the "ramshackle Empire." A little tolerance and patience are here needed. Peoples, oppressed for centuries, suddenly find themselves free and endowed with unaccustomed power. It is only natural that details of administration should be carried out with the pomp and circumstance dear to newly fledged officials. It is easy to sniff at the principle of self-determination, as appears to be the fashion since the Armistice among progressives, and to make use of the term "a Balkanised Europe" as a parting fling. Time will show whether a

greater area for free trade will not be furnished by a common Zollverein between the Succession States than was afforded by the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Apart from the question of Minorities, it is clear that a basis for the solution of the numerous national problems of Europe has been laid by the Allied settlements. After the war, one case only of conspicuous national oppression remained in Europe, namely that of Ireland. The regime of terror adopted by the British Government during the years 1919, 1920, and the early part of 1921, disgraced the name of Great Britain, and the methods of brutality, condoned by the head of the Government, were unexampled in recent history. They were fast undermining the principles of the common law of England and had they been allowed to continue, the effect on British traditions and customs would have been incalculable. British repute abroad suffered and England's influence was impaired at a time when the future of many peoples depended upon justice and fair dealing in the Allied Conference chamber. Powers outside Europe openly justified their own tyrannies by comparing them with

British rule in Ireland. Fortunately there were forces in England, Wales and Scotland that proved too strong and too deeply rooted in traditions of freedom and humanity for the Government to withstand. It was believed that the King shared his subjects' intense dislike of the Government's regime of terror in Ireland. The official policy came to an abrupt conclusion and the last oppressed race in Europe secured an opportunity of self-government.

* * * * *

We are not here concerned with theorising about nationality. Nor do we attempt to define it, for few things elude definition more successfully than the conception of nationality. The factors which, in one particular case, may prove decisive—for example, language, religion or race —in another may prove of little or no significance. The Armenians are distinguished from the Turks in language religion and race; but the Americans are not distinguished from the British in any of these elements.

As practical persons we are content to note that particular groups here and particular groups there wanted to be free from oppression, and that

their aspirations took the form of a claim to exist as a self-governing nation. In most cases of national oppression in Europe, the subject group differed in race from its masters. After the war, each racial group—for example, the Czechs, the Poles, the Yugo-Slavs—secured a national home, and a racial centre of gravity in the national capital.

May we not say therefore that the national ideal has played its part in Europe? It has been the means of liberating the peoples from dominations they disliked. The best part it can play in the future is to retire into the background. For unless the European peoples can forget the habits of exploiting national differences which they have lately learned in the course of their struggle to be free, little hope can be entertained for them. Freedom through nationalism has been attained in Europe at a great price, so great indeed that the price may well be said to have endangered far more than the ideal was worth. It has well nigh brought about the destruction of European civilisation. The peoples of Europe can live their varied lives without undue interference in the future only if they accept the limitations imposed by the fact that they each form an interdependent part of the European system. National feeling must be damped down and its place taken in the public opinion of Europe by wider interests.

This consummation will in all likelihood be achieved. For when political ideals have been realised and political changes have not to be fought for, national feeling takes on a very mild aspect. The nationalism of the Welsh and Scotch is not of the type which could have made the problem of nationality one of political importance in the world to-day. What is of lasting value in literature, science, religion, music, or painting ignores national frontiers. Differences of language, approach and feeling are hardly more than differences of local colour. The keenest political idealism ignores nationalism altogether and appeals to the common interests of all lands. The nation, which began with the family, the clan and the tribe, is not the final stage of evolution. Splendid isolation is a thing of the past, and the tendencies of to-day are towards alliances, inter-dependence in communications and industry, and above all towards

federation and regard for world authority as represented by the League of Nations.

If one had to choose between the complete fulfilment of national aspirations, as now practically achieved in Europe, and their partial fulfilment without the war, the latter course should in our view have unhesitatingly been taken. The continuation of the Great War was too great a price to pay for the difference between complete independence and autonomy. These reasons led one of the writers to oppose in Parliament during the war the demand for the break-up of the Austrian Empire as a *sine qua non* of peace negotiations, and to propose an autonomous solution within the empire for the Czechs and the Yugo-Slavs. General Smuts' efforts in this direction would, if they had been allowed to succeed, have not only shortened the war, but would have produced a settlement at least as durable as the present one.

An oppressed nationality which will insist on sovereign and complete independence when war is the price cannot expect the unquestioning support of civilised opinion. It must also be remembered that an Empire which persists in

not meeting the aspirations of its subject peoples is equally a danger to peace. With these reservations in mind, we turn to the claims of the Eastern peoples.

* * * * * *

We have seen how nationalism in Europe has served to inspire men and women to strive for freedom. The leaders of thought among the subject races of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the Balkans found the only means to arouse the thirst for liberty to lie in memories of national glory in the dim past or the vision of national greatness in the future. Among the less conscious peoples in North Africa or Asia, liberation has been handicapped by the absence of national feeling. Wherever there is a sufficient degree of national consciousness, it becomes the main stimulant towards liberty. And this is the phenomenon which is now being witnessed in India, Egypt, Korea, Armenia and elsewhere. For this reason, the spread of the national ideal in Asia and North Africa is to be welcomed in spite of its manifest dangers and the difficulty of its application.

A new chapter in the history of nationality

is, in fact, being opened in the East. We find that the democratic idea which has largely triumphed in Europe is weakening the foundations of Imperialism in Asia and in North Africa. One of the first duties of the democracies of the West will be to confront the paradoxical fact of their ascendancy in the East. The last few decades of our era have been distinguished in the Western countries by a popular struggle for political and economic power, and this has partially obscured from the Western democracies the march of that pitiless movement which, in this century, has brought within the grasp of Western States direct or indirect dominion over almost all the peoples and regions of the earth. Having, after generations of conflict, overthrown their oppressors and evolved machinery, however imperfect, of self-government, the democracies of the West are faced with the fact that they, in their turn, are autocracies responsible to a greater or less degree for the governance of the rest of the world. Stated in round numbers, the position briefly is that 283 millions of white people can to-day exercise some kind of control, direct or indirect, over the destinies of 920 millions of people, and

these with the exception of 20 millions inhabiting the Near East and the Mediterranean basin, constitute what may be known as the coloured races, Japan with its subject peoples being excluded from the computation.

The penetration of the East by Europeans was confined to India until the close of the eighteenth century, but the last hundred years or so have witnessed the ascendancy of France established over Morocco, Tunis and Algeria, of Britain over the Sudan and Egypt, of Italy over Tripoli, of Russia over Central Asia, Siberia and the Caucasus. As a result of the Great War, the Ottoman Empire is thrown into the melting pot, and vast regions, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, and parts of Asia Minor have been transferred to European control, so that if we except China, where the Powers are rapidly digging themselves in, the list of "unallotted" territories of the earth is almost exhausted. Equipped with the scientific inventions of the nineteenth century—the telephone, the telegraph, the train and the steamship—and those of the twentieth—the aeroplane and the wireless—there is scarcely a corner of the globe to-day

where the white man has not made his influence predominant.

The scientific knowledge of the white man, his applied skill, and his superior weapons of destruction, enabled him to gain his rapid world-wide dominance over the coloured peoples. It may be suggested, in passing, that this technical knowledge, which has practically been in the exclusive possession of the white man, may have contributed more than any other factor to fostering the colour prejudices prevailing so strongly to-day. In the eighteenth century, before the period of applied science, this factor was not present to vitiate the relations between East and West. In those days many attributes of civilisation were common to the white and to coloured peoples of the East.

But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Asiatic peoples, confronted by this new factor, felt themselves to be in the grip of an irresistible force. Not until they saw they were as capable, in many cases, *e.g.* Japan, as the whites of acquiring this knowledge and of applying it, did they begin to challenge effectively the dominion of the white man. The European War

quickened the awakening of the East. Great engines of propaganda were brought to play on world opinion by the Allies and the effect was double-edged. The coloured peoples, some of whom fought side by side with the whites for the avowed objects of the war—the liberation of nationalities and the realisation of democracy—did not fail to learn the lesson.

The white man is reaping the fruits of his war propaganda. To-day the struggle of the Oriental peoples in many cases is being fought on the ground of national self-determination. In none of the regions which represent geographically the three Oriental civilisations, has the Western concept of nationality failed to exercise a profound influence.

In the Far East, the triumph of nationality is illustrated in the rise of Japan and its excesses in the subjugation of Korea.

India, with its 360 million inhabitants of diverse races and creeds is developing under British rule a unity or group-consciousness which is rapidly taking national shape.

The Middle East, whose civilisation is as distinct from that of the Far East as it is from that

of Europe, presents several national claims, mainly of historic races who were once founders of Empires. "Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions," declared the British Prime Minister to the Trades Union Congress on the 5th January, 1918. In the Middle East one should include the peoples inhabiting the northern coasts of Africa where the Mahomedan religion flourishes, and among the peoples enumerated by Mr. Lloyd George as being entitled to national recognition in some form, one must include the people of Egypt.

As to Persia, which naturally comes under the category of the Middle East, her national claims have perhaps been met to some extent by a forward policy on the part of Revolutionary Russia. The Bolshevik Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Chicherin, successfully ousted British Imperialism from this particular field by making astute overtures to Persia culminating in a recognition of her independence and the withdrawal of the Russian troops, the British having previously evacuated in order to avoid the Russian advance.

* * * * *

The problem of the future is to determine the attitude of the West towards these aspirations. A fresh approach to the national problem is required when we are dealing with a dominion whose motives and methods are radically different from those which marked the oppression of nationalities in Europe. Economic imperialism, for such is the apt name which has been given to European penetration of the East and of Africa, is the means by which the natural wealth of the world is being developed and utilised to-day, and indeed it is certain that many of the peoples of the Orient are not equipped to play their part in developing the world's resources. But it is equally certain that the prevailing methods bring tyranny and injustice in their train upon these peoples.

The evils of Imperialism are too obvious to need emphasis or elaboration. The infliction of cruelty, physical and moral, constitutes a formidable charge against the system. Peoples and territories have been regarded as the private property of the Imperialist Power, and the labour and the raw materials of the conquered lands have been exploited for the benefit of the dominating

race. Colour prejudices and arrogance amounting to insolence and brutality have fatally vitiated the relations of the intruders with the 'native' inhabitants.

The juxtaposition of white and black has usually had a demoralising effect on both. "The cruelties perpetrated by white men upon coloured men," states Prof. Gilbert Murray, "are, almost wherever and however they meet, stupendous. . . Let no one delude himself with the fancy that, though the German Dr. Peters may flog his concubines to death, though Frenchmen in the Hebrides may twist the flesh of their servants' backs with pincers, though our own newspapers may revel in reported horrors from the old Transvaal or the Congo Free State, Englishmen, Scotchmen and Irishmen are quite of another breed. Not to speak of strange and unpleasant dealings with black women, I myself well knew one man who told me he shot blacks at sight. I have met a man who boasted of having spilt poisoned meal along a road near a black fellows' camp, in order to get rid of them like rats. My brother was the guest of a man in Queensland who showed him a particular bend of a river

where he had once, as a jest, driven a black family, man, woman and children, into the water among a shoal of crocodiles. My father has described to me his fruitless efforts to get men punished in New South Wales in old days for offering hospitality to blacks and giving them poisoned meat. I received, while writing these notes, a newspaper from Perth, giving an account of a trial of some Coolgardie miners for beating to death with heavy bits of wood a black woman and boy who had been unable to show them the way. The bodies were found with the shoulder blades in shivers, and the judge observed that such cases were getting too common. These atrocities are not necessarily the work of isolated and extraordinary villains. Two of the men mentioned above were good rather than bad. Nor have I mentioned the worst class of outrages."*

Lord Bryce, writing on South Africa, instanced a case which occurred in the Eastern Province. "A white farmer—an Englishman, not a Boer—flogged his Kaffir servant so severely that the latter died; and when the culprit was put on his

**Liberalism and Empire*, Gilbert Murray.

trial and acquitted by a white jury, his white neighbours escorted him home with a band of music."

These statements appear incredible, but they are borne out by the investigations made by one of the writers during a prolonged stay in Australia, when he served as aide-de-camp to the Governor of South Australia. Apart from concrete evidence, he recalls, for instance, the remorse felt by a farmer in another Australian colony whose old age was darkened by memories of the days when he shot any black that he could find.

In Asia the conduct of Imperialism has been as a rule less frank than in Africa and elsewhere in its ruthless disregard of the welfare of the "natives." The Powers have "kept up appearances" to a greater extent in regard to coloured peoples who have an historical background and many of whom have contributed an epoch to civilisation. But, even in their case, oppression has been as heavy and as difficult morally to bear as in Africa, although its methods may differ.

Many of these peoples regarded as 'just natives' are as acutely sensitive and as civilised as

the European. "Save in the more recent development of the physical sciences," states Mr. J. A. Hobson, "and their application to industrial arts, it cannot be contended that these peoples are backward."

In dealing with national claims in the East, we are thus faced with a set of conditions differing widely from those which prevailed in Europe. In the foreground lies this question of economic Imperialism. Is its procedure inevitable, or can its main purpose be pursued by other means, guaranteeing to the Asiatic peoples not only an independent life, but the ability to acquire their rightful share in the world's resources and in the progress of civilisation?

CHAPTER II

NEO-MANCHESTERISM

To judge from resolutions frequently passed by certain sections of political opinion, and from the attitude of the extreme Labour Press, it would seem that nothing short of the immediate grant of these national claims would be satisfactory: such sections of opinion urge the immediate bestowal of full independence and immediate withdrawal by the dominating Power.

The following proposal, addressed to the Labour Party by one of its local branches, is couched in terms which illustrate the extreme attitude: "the granting to every dependency in the British Empire the absolute right of self-government."

Some credit should be given for the generous impulses which inspire this school of Socialists. But by an odd paradox these idealists, usually the most bitter opponents of the Manchester doctrine

of *laissez-faire*, become, by their advocacy of unqualified self-determination, the present day successors of that school.

Such neo-Manchesterist ideas can only be the result of muddled thinking, for which no doubt the current use of the word 'self-determination' is very largely responsible. Unfortunately for the principle it represents, the word has become a watch-word—if we were inclined to be disrespectful we might have said a catch-word—and may well be classed with such quasi-symbols as Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. It has gained in emotional significance, but has lost in clearness of outline, for as time goes on its relation to its context is being forgotten, and its implications missed.

When Woodrow Wilson introduced the expression during the War, he was crystallising the difference which separated the things for which the Allies stood from those which were the ideals and practices of the Central Powers. The enemy peoples, it was argued, were ruled by autocracies over which they had little or no control. The American President, whenever he attempted to attribute guilt for the outbreak of the War,

invariably distinguished between the German people and the Kaiser. Other peoples, moreover, alien in race to the dominating dynasties, suffered an even more unjust oppression. To bring this oppression to an end, Europe, it was argued, must be democratised. The oppressed nations would then be free to govern themselves. 'Self-determination' became the rallying cry of those who wished "to make the world safe for democracy." The expression of nationalism was a means to this end, and not an end in itself. 'Self-determination' was not to be construed as a right of a people to do what it pleased with itself irrespective of the rights of other peoples. It was not to be construed as a right of a people to substitute for an alien domination an autocratic dynasty not alien in race and invested with absolute powers.

If self-determination had any meaning at all, it stood for an essay in national democracy. The world would not tolerate the rise of another Power in Europe ruled by an absolutism, even if that absolutism would have been the choice of a misguided people, for it would inevitably prove in the future, as it had proved in the past, a menace to the rights and liberties of other peoples.

The conditions of peace offered by President Wilson on behalf of the Associated Powers indicated that it was generally agreed to be justifiable for other countries to press for a change in the internal Constitution of Germany. The best opinion in Europe and America, moreover, envisages the ideal of 'national democracy' as being liable to abuse unless qualified by a supranational authority such as the League of Nations.

When, therefore, extremists having in view the aspirations of many Eastern peoples advocate self-determination, they surely desire the promotion of the ideal along the lines of democracy. They cannot, if they are wise, urge an unconditional or undefined self-determination, which Europe, with centuries of political experience behind it, has rejected as a danger to peace and freedom.

If restrictions are necessary to national expression in Europe, they are imperative in the case of most Eastern peoples, as for example the Egyptians and Arabs, who whatever may be their capabilities in other respects are not equipped for an immediate experiment in democracy. Little encouragement is derived

from past experience. National democratic government has been tried both in Egypt and in Persia, in 1880 and 1906 respectively. In both cases the attempt met with failure. The so-called democratic Assemblies consisted of a narrow clique or its nominees representing anyone except the mass of the people. In Persia the Ulema or Moslem clergy, a notoriously reactionary body, held the reins, while in Egypt the official and propertied classes were in exclusive control. It is true that the masses were politically incapable, being for the most part illiterate, but the autocrats in control showed no desire to improve their lot: the evidence seemed to show that they were, indeed, interested in keeping them outside the scope of the franchise. Parliamentarism rather than democracy characterised their efforts to achieve self-government. A graver defect, which is encountered in geometric progression as one journeys across Eastern Europe to Asia Minor and the Middle East, lay in the racial chauvinism which made failure inevitable. This is well illustrated by the experiment in national democracy made by Turkey in 1908. Having got rid of one of the greatest oppressive forces in

history, the Young Turks made a good beginning by including in their Parliament the representatives of the alien races within their Empire, both in Europe and in Asia Minor. And if British diplomacy had not by its coldness compelled them to seek German protection, they might have been prevented from pursuing their subsequent illiberal policy. The seizure of Tripoli by the Italians naturally gave further encouragement to the tendency towards reaction, for very soon it became clear that the activities of the Young Turks aimed at nothing less than the denationalisation of the alien peoples under them. They began a programme of "turcification," involving the suppression of languages and religion other than Turkish and Moslem, both of which they tried to impose. If the Turkish State is to exist, it was held that the peoples within it must become Turks. Those who hold this view soon discover that their practice of self-government must degenerate rapidly into an intense and bitter racial conflict, causing great bloodshed and misery. In the Middle East where different races live—literally speaking—side by side in the village street, such an attitude of mind renders self-

government impossible of attainment. Where national passions and race obsessions are most pronounced, the militant nationalism of the Turks wrought irreparable havoc. Albania, Macedonia, Ionia, Armenia fell victims to their savagery.

We are not suggesting that ultimate self-government is impossible in Egypt, Armenia, Turkey or Irak. But we do suggest that, in the light of the above examples, an unqualified self-determination is not the avenue of approach to the solution of these national problems. That avenue has not led in the past, and is scarcely able to lead in the future, to democracy and peace. And this may account for the fact that those who cry loudest for total independence are often the landlords and property owners, representing forces to which as a rule labour is distinctly hostile. That fact should at least give extremists pause and make them less inclined to accord an uncritical and whole-hearted support to any native faction that raises the cry of nationality. Would the granting of independence to such interests promote the spread of education and lead to the introduction of democratic methods?

Experience points the other way and affords a

lesson which has not been missed by Imperialists of the reactionary type. They recognise that certain kinds of self-determination not only are not at variance with, but actually promote, the anti-democratic ends they have at heart. Referring in the *Spectator*, on February 3rd, 1921, to the future of India, a writer asks whether it is an impossible ideal gradually to transform "British India into Native States, so that she should be governed by her own hereditary dynasties, which we have replaced, but whose representatives still in many cases exist, extending to them the principles which have so successfully qualified our relations with the Native States in the past?" The clue to this policy he gives later on when he says, "it is one thing to excite an ignorant peasantry against a foreign usurper, but quite another thing to challenge a native ruler."

In other words, the native masses can more easily be governed by the alien Power through native rulers. The gradual emergence to self-government of the weaker peoples proves a menace to plans of indefinite exploitation. To abandon the native masses, to scrap, for example in the case of India, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms which

would lead India to self-government, on the plea that immediate self-determination can be brought about by a mere stroke of a pen is, in these circumstances, worse than futile. The extremists find themselves associated with strange bed-fellows. Our reactionaries would like nothing better than the opportunity to turn such a demand to their profit.

A too high degree of political immaturity is clearly a considerable obstacle to the immediate fulfilment of the national claims of many Oriental peoples. But there are difficulties of a more formidable nature which cannot be surmounted in a day. These arise from the necessity of developing the natural wealth and resources of the world. "It is the great practical business of the century," declares Mr. Hobson, "to explore and develop, by every method that science can devise, the hidden natural and human resources of the globe."* That is an irresistible need, of which there is no gainsaying. Anti-Imperialists have to face the fact that their policy involves the running to waste of some of the richest portions of the earth. For many

* *Imperialism.* By J. A. Hobson.

of the Oriental peoples, as for example the Arabs in Irak, would, if left to themselves, be incapable of developing their country. Most of them are unequipped with the rudiments of Western technique, such as the methods of applied science in regard to cultivation, mining, transport and communications and are equally unacquainted with the methods of international commerce and finance—which for good or ill are organised on western lines. Does anyone contend that any people has the right to do what it likes with a given area of the globe, disregarding the direct and indirect consequences of their actions upon the rest of the world? A nationalism which allows a semi-civilised people like the Arabs to prevent the development of the granary potentialities of Irak is difficult to defend.

"Assuming that the arts of 'progress'" states Mr. Hobson, "or some of them, are communicable, there can be no inherent natural right in a nation to refuse that measure of compulsory education which shall raise it from childhood in the order of nationalities. The analogy furnished by the education of the child

is *prima facie* a sound one, and is not invalidated by the dangerous abuses to which it is exposed in practice." Until an Eastern people gains the required knowledge and experience for developing the natural riches of the country, the primary needs of the world must impose limitations upon its claim to full independence. It is a factor in the national problem which did not arise in Europe, where the subject peoples, comparatively well-educated and experienced, had only to remove despotic dynasties or dominations they disliked in order to set up national self-governing States. The views of Sir H. H. Johnston on this subject are explicit :

"But, if they only knew it—and some of them do—while they belong to the categories which are under 96 per cent. of efficiency, they are unfitted to form coherent states, to govern themselves and to maintain their place as independent nations in the Commonwealth of the World. It somehow shocks the sense of fairness of hard-headed white or yellow people that semi-savages should be driving ill-bred sheep, scraggy cattle, or ponies hardly fit for

polo over plains and mountains that are little else than great treasure vaults of valuable minerals and chemicals; or that they should roam with their blow pipes and bows and arrows through forests of inestimable value for their timber, dyes, drugs, latices, gums, oil-seeds, nuts or fruits; be turning this waiting wealth to no use, not allowing it to circulate in the world's markets. Whatever a few poets—dreamy enthusiasts sure of bed and board—theorists who write in a spirit of perversity—may pretend, the world at large is arriving at a pitch of intolerance of the lotus-eater. It wants him to can or cask his lotus berries and ship them overseas in exchange for manufactured goods. Therefore the backward peoples would be wise to accept for some time longer the advice, the guidance of those white nations which have the best home education, an unfettered press (the chief safeguard against abuse of power) and the beginnings, at least, of a national conscience of what is really right and really wrong according to the canons of Christianity. But they—the Arabs, Syrians, Berbers, Negroes, Somalis, Hindus, Chinese, Malays, Tibetans, and Amerindians—are right

to insist on good manners and probity in their instructors, and on being allowed to share in the administration of their own lands when they have fitted themselves for such work by their education and training." *

Moreover this knowledge and skill in application are important for other reasons. No modern State can dispense with them, and no democratic government can carry on without them. When Oriental peoples take up the cry of self-government, they have in mind the successful national States of the West. If they are inspired by the example of the American democracy, they usually miss the pregnant fact on which its successful government partly rests. This vast continent stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean, inhabited by over a hundred million people, presents an example of democratic government which owes its success largely to the fact that the country is penetrated by an infinite ramification of railroads and telegraphs and telephones. Communications are so elaborately organised that swift access can be obtained to any spot however remote,

* *Backward Peoples and our Relations with Them.* By Sir H. H. Johnston. Oxford University Press.

and conversations can be carried on at a distance of thousands of miles.

Transport and communication cannot be over-emphasised as factors of Government. China to-day with four times the population of the United States suffers precisely from the absence of these factors, which, combined with political incompetence in the face of foreign penetration, is threatening to disintegrate her country.

Thus the absence of Western technique, in addition to political immaturity of a high degree, is a factor which will gravely endanger an experiment in national democracy.

In support of our contention, we may again quote Mr. Hobson. "To those," states Mr. Hobson, "who utter the single cry of warning: 'Hands off. Let these people develop their resources themselves with such assistance as they ask or hire, undisturbed by the importunate and arrogant control of foreign nations,' it is sufficient answer to point out the impossibility of maintaining such an attitude."

The consequences, if such a policy be realised, are described in an eloquent passage:

"If organised Governments of civilised Powers

refused the task, they would let loose a horde of private adventurers, slavers, piratical traders, treasure hunters, concession mongers, who, animated by mere greed of gold or power, would set about the work of exploitation under no public control and with no regard to the future; playing havoc with the political, economic, and moral institutions of the peoples, instilling civilised vices and civilised diseases, importing spirits and firearms as the trade of readiest acceptance, fostering internecine strife for their own political and industrial purposes, and even setting up private despotisms sustained by organised armed forces. It is unnecessary to revert to the buccaneering times of the sixteenth century, when a 'new world' was thrown open to the plunder of the old, and private gentlemen of Spain or England competed with their Governments in the most gigantic business of spoliation that history records."

It must not be inferred for one moment that cruelty or injustice have not been also evident in areas effectively ruled by a strong Imperialist government. We have written enough in the first chapter to indicate that as a system of

government it cannot without radical modification both in motive and method embody adequate safeguards against abuse.

But, in many cases, the record of Imperialism in maintaining order and mitigating cruelty which otherwise would be unrestrained is worthy of note. It is difficult to generalise on this subject, not only because the methods of a given Imperialist Government depends so much on the peculiar genius, temperament and outlook of the dominating race, but also because the methods of a single Imperialism differs from place to place.

It is perhaps outside the scope of this book to discuss the effects of Imperialism upon the backward races of tropical Africa. But it is instructive to note that even in these cases governmental control has not been without beneficial results, thanks to the pressure of decent opinion in the home countries. In Great Britain, more perhaps than in any other Imperialist country, exists a strong, wideawake critical element which "furnishes a normal guarantee of decency," as Sir H. H. Johnston once stated.

"We can just say perhaps," writes Colonel Wedgwood in his recent book, *The Indo-British*

Commonwealth, "that we are less selfish than the empires of the past, that England and America have a larger altruistic element than other countries, that an Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society survives with a political and religious backing of some strength only in the English speaking lands."

This may partly account for the fact that the record against British Imperialism is not so heavy as in the case of Belgium, Portugal, Spain, or Japan. In few cases is British opinion forced to protest against flagrant acts of cruelty for which the Government itself is responsible; rather is it more concerned with the exclusion of the 'natives' from the higher offices of the administration and high legal posts. Usually the British regime, if unsympathetic, exercises a cold impartial justice; it is seldom cruel, and seldom if ever capricious. Corruption and bribery are rare.

On the other hand, if the French are on their part more corrupt, capricious and cruel in their dealings with the natives than the British, in another respect—a vital one—they appear at first sight to be superior. Seldom do they inspire

that acute sense of inferiority, which results from the colour prejudice of the Anglo-Indian. Indeed a 'native' may be kicked, cursed, and bribed by a Frenchman, and yet not feel he is so treated because of some fundamental inferiority which, as a coloured person, he is made to feel by the Englishman. This insolence on the part of the Anglo-Saxon and other white peoples is the kind of cruelty which the Eastern peoples, as for example the Indians and Egyptians, hate the most.

Has a strong Imperialist Government anything more to say for itself than to put forward a claim to have mitigated cruelty and maintained order? That is the only test by which some people feel that our regime, for example in India, can stand. "We have established," states Mr. Hobson, "a wider and more permanent peace than India had ever known from the days of Alexander the Great." The prevention of internecine strife, and the increase of population, might have been the only assets visibly to our credit in 1900. But to-day a more positive achievement can be claimed. The British administration of India has brought into being, partly by Western

education, partly through the inspiration and support of the democratic elements of the dominating race, partly by the unifying power of modern transport and communications, a popular native movement which will admit eventually of no denial of self-government. Moreover Indians have been given opportunities of training in administrative matters in increasing numbers and responsibility. Thus Britain has taught India to become a nation, has transmitted to her skill in applied arts and given her experience in political administration—the two factors essential to the successful running of the complex organisation of the modern self-governing State. "Along the tried way of Constitutional effort Dominion status lies in full view and not far," stated an honoured Indian in an article discussing the reality of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.

It is of course difficult not to sympathise with the spirit which prompts the devotion of Gandhi and inspires the movement for complete independence. Unfortunately many of the followers of Gandhi appear to be supporting him in the belief that under his regime factories and industries of the modern type will be scrapped and

a return to the spindle wheel assured; that there will be no taxation and that other unpleasant although necessary features of government will disappear. The Gandhi movement will probably fail because there is no constructive movement behind it. It is based on emotionalism which ignores the fact that the Continent of India is peopled not by one race, but by scores of widely differing races and civilisations, and three times as numerous as the population of the United States. To attempt to govern such a heterogeneous mass by preventing the growth of democratic institutions, of transport and communications, is a dream that can never be realised.

Obviously there is sane and insane Imperialism. The example of India shows what is possible when honourable motives are not entirely submerged in the usual welter of selfishness and an unenlightened domination. But the difficulty is to maintain the system within sane limits. To keep that end in view involves a hard and often bitter struggle at home with the materialists and investors and militarists to whom the bludgeon is the readiest argument. And,

more often than not, the insane policy gains the upper hand.

The national claims of the Eastern peoples, as for example the Arabs, the Egyptians and the Burmese, must therefore be met in the spirit which prompted Professor Gilbert Murray to ask whether "this subjection of the 'inferior' races is to be absolute and eternal, or is there any prospect of our educating them up to the point of freedom and self-government." That question, put in 1900, was asked with a note of despair. But civilised opinion has progressed rapidly since then, and the means of attaining that goal, and the will to attain it, are nearer to hand than people dreamt of in those days.

CHAPTER III

MANDATION

THE arguments which we have attempted to elaborate in the previous chapters indicate how inevitably contact on Imperialist lines has been established between East and West, affording the latter at least a temporary superiority. Critics usually devote themselves to giving reasons why this process ought not to have been allowed to develop. Much of their case one must approve. The sum-total of suffering, misery and bloodshed inflicted by the Imperialist Powers not only upon their subject races, but also upon their own peoples forced to fight other Imperial races in the struggle for expansion, weights the scales heavily against the Imperialist process. And were humanity in a position to turn back the hands of the clock and begin afresh, its verdict against Imperialism would be decisive. But humanity is confronted by the *fait accompli*. As

we indicated in the first chapter, empire in the East and in Africa has practically reached its limits. There are few more unallotted territories on the earth. We are thus faced with the problem of transforming empire into a gain for world civilisation. It is a question of placing checks on methods, and directing the motives of Imperialism into less selfish channels.

1. The first and most obvious condition should lay down that in no circumstance is cruelty or brutality permissible. Enough instances have already been given to show how widespread is the practice of brutal repression as an instrument of government by civilised and semi-civilised Powers. Examples exist in the methods employed at Amritsar, the aeroplane bombing of villages so as to destroy the innocent with the guilty, Japanese atrocities in Korea, and, to our peculiar shame, the Black and Tan regime in Ireland ; not to speak of the cruder savageries perpetrated in tropical Africa and other backward regions of the globe ; all happening in time of peace without the usual license to kill which war, in the minds of most people, is assumed to give.

2. The second condition should aim at obviating the exercise of undue discrimination by the dominating Power against the native or subject people.

This check is essential, if it is assumed that the chief motive of ascendancy is the " education to the point of freedom and self-government " of the subject peoples. To prevent natives from taking part in the administration, to withhold from them opportunities of education and training, to deny them full civil status on racial and not on educational grounds, indicate the kind of discrimination which is wrongly exercised and which contradicts our profession of trusteeship.

3. The third condition is not to withhold autonomy or independence when the subject people desire it and are adequately equipped to carry on.

The reluctance of Powers to grant autonomy to developed peoples is shown in the case of England and Ireland ; the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its subject Slav races ; as a borderline case approaching these, we may perhaps classify India.

These three conditions, if fulfilled, would

eliminate the three capital forms of oppression used against backward and more or less civilised peoples. The non-fulfilment of the second and third condition does not constitute oppression when the backward tribes of tropical Africa, for instance, are in question. Obviously discrimination in a large measure is necessary in a community which is so backward that even its chief can neither read nor write. But exercised against the civilised peoples of the East, discrimination is often one of the most powerful weapons of oppression. The Japanese, as the reader will see later, deny the Koreans access to higher education and block the avenues to the higher posts in Korean administration ; for they intend to crush out of existence the Korean movement for independence, and to deny the subject people even the prospect of autonomy.

It may be possible for the Imperial Government to bring about certain of these desirable ends without assistance from forces and institutions outside their particular Empire. It will be the function of British Labour, when it takes office, to ascertain what changes the Government can undertake on its own responsibility and initiative.

To "speed up" the progress of India towards self-government by giving wider scope to the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms might well be their task. It will be easier for Labour to give India its final form as a self-governing Dominion, because, under a Labour regime, reactionary forces will not be allowed much latitude. Colonel Wedgwood indeed characteristically remarks that "under the future Labour Government, born and bred in the chapel, the altruistic element would prevail still more strongly."

It is moreover our contention that in the British colonies to-day, and to a great extent in other Empires, these safeguards are so far realised that 'to cut the painter' would be a disaster for the country in question. The idealism of a Labour Government cannot be realised by a simple grant of independence or of autonomy with a wide suffrage. Responsibility is not so easily discharged. If the welfare of the natives be the chief aim in view, it is to a higher form of administration that we must look —to a system associated not with the thought of glory but with the spirit of duty, the spirit, for

instance, in which it was hoped that America would accept a mandate for Armenia.

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But can the Imperial race be trusted to look upon the interests of humanity and the good of the subject race as the first charge to which its private interests are strictly subordinated? Many cases within the British Empire do not bear examination. To trust to the caprices of a Government's will, which may be good or bad according as this or that party is in power, is to lean on a very slender reed. We are thus driven to the conclusion which is gradually gaining general acceptance, that the conditions of control cannot be effectively determined except by "some organised representation of civilised humanity." Only by some international sanction can interference be kept within legitimate limits. World opinion, expressing itself through a convenient institution, has the right to judge whether or not a particular ascendancy is proving a gain or a loss to world civilisation; it alone can effectively prevent cruelty, and safeguard the progress and development of the subject peoples, and secure their independence. Without such machinery,

competing imperialisms will pursue their narrow national aims and follow the old paths of conquest, re-conquest and war between Imperial peoples.

The evils of the European War of 1914-18, its incalculable waste and ruin, focussed the attention of the world upon the need of a radical change in international polity, if civilisation was to survive. Competing Imperialisms had led to the organised massacre of Europe, and public opinion was not going to tolerate a reversion to the deadly competition in grab and annexation. Statesmen and politicians—although not mostly aspiring to surpass current standards of morality—felt they could not ignore the demand for a new system. In the League of Nations Covenant an epoch-making Article indicated that the victors were not, as in the past, going to annex the territories and subject peoples of vanquished Empires. The "international sanction" for control by an alien Power gained statutory form in 1919 in the case of ex-German and ex-Ottoman territories. In this Article (Number 22 of the Covenant) it is stated that to "those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the

States which lately governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principles that the well-being and development of such people form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust be embodied in this Covenant."

The purposes expressed in this clause amply cover the three conditions which we laid down above as being necessary qualifications of domination. Allied statesmen in giving their adhesion to this Article signed a pact which, if realised, will undermine the basis of Imperialism. Empire in the past has been vitiated by the fact that annexed territories were looked upon as the private property of the victorious Power; henceforth they are to be held in trust, and the spirit of ascendancy is to give way to that of trusteeship exercised under the authority of a Mandate granted by the League of Nations. For the formulation of this principle credit must be given to General Smuts. He had stumbled across the principle that a Mandatory in Roman Law was a person "to whom a sacred charge was committed;

out of which he was precluded from making a personal profit, although he was entitled to recover any out-of-pocket expenditure involved in the Trust."

The two avowed objects of the Mandatory system as established by the Covenant are (1) to train and guide a rising people to take its place with the independent peoples of the world, (2) to prevent the economic exploitation of the territory involved or of the inhabitants for the exclusive benefit of the Mandatory Power or its allies.

The Covenant further provides that the nature of the mandate must vary with the stages of development of the peoples to whom it is applied.

A. "Certain communities belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance.

B. "Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only

to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic.

C. "There are territories, such as South West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from centres of civilisation, or their geographical contiguity, can best be administered as integral portions of its territory."

Mandates, classified as A.B.C., have been allocated as above to those three categories of undeveloped lands and peoples. The peoples who come within the scope of this book—that is the peoples who are putting forward national claims—being of the first category, we propose to consider the nature and application of Class A Mandates only.

In the case of A Mandates, it is specifically laid down that the independence of the mandated people is provisionally recognised. In other words, the sovereign rights of the people are not to be transferred to the Mandatory, but are to be retained by them. That at least appears to be a common sense corollary to the assumption of

provisional independence. In practice the Mandatory Powers have been found to vary in their interpretation of this Clause. There are grounds for believing (the formula is convenient) that the people in Japanese mandated areas are looked upon by the Japanese Government as Japanese subjects. How this reading differs from annexation it is difficult for the plain man to see. Great Britain, on the other hand, has declared that the proper status of the inhabitants of the mandated territories should be that of "protected persons," and not "subjects." This definition has been definitely chosen by the British Empire representatives in order that there may be no question of annexation involved in a Mandate. It was felt that were it to be "laid down that the inhabitants of a mandated territory take the nationality of the Mandatory Power, this would tend to give colour to the contention that a Mandate is a form of veiled annexation; whereas by making it clear from the beginning that inhabitants of the territory have a status and nationality entirely their own, no such confusion can arise."

Furthermore the A Mandated peoples by virtue

of their superior civilisation and capacity will be largely responsible for the administration and government of their country. The duty of the A Mandatory will be to advise more than to administer; to give assistance on financial and economic matters; to promote schemes for native education; to assist in raising a native defence force for local defence purposes. The only safeguard against abuse by the Mandatory is provided by the submission of an annual report to the Council of the League. "In every case of the Mandate," states Article 22 of the Covenant, "the Mandatory shall make to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge."

Such in theory are the duties and obligations involved in the administration of the A Mandates. Their practical application will reveal inherent deficiencies as well as gross violation of the terms of reference by certain of the Mandatories. The manner in which the Mandates were allocated and the terms drawn up is not encouraging. The Mandatory Powers were not even appointed by the League of Nations Assembly, nor by the Council of the League. The A Mandated

territories were actually allocated by the Supreme Council of the Allies to certain of their members. The Assembly, moreover, had no share in drawing up the terms of the mandates; this was done by the Mandatory Powers themselves and the drafts were then submitted to the Council of the League (of which the Mandatories were themselves the chief members) for approval. During the Assembly of the League, meeting in Geneva in September 1920, attempts were made to induce the great Powers to submit the terms of the Mandates to the League Assembly. But the Allied Powers failed to respond, and Great Britain held the view that the terms could only be published after being sanctioned by the Council of the League, this Council being at the time a pale reflection of the Allied Supreme Council. The cavalier treatment of the Assembly at its first session by the Allied Powers and by the Council of the League was a matter of notorious comment at Geneva. It was held that the right to define the terms of the Mandate belonged to the Assembly, as being the organ of world opinion. In Article 22 it had been laid down that the degree of authority, control or adminis-

tration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

The badly drafted Covenant—the ambiguity of its Clauses may have been deliberately designed by the authors of Versailles—led to controversy between the Assembly and the protagonists of the Council. Mr. Balfour's view, on behalf of Great Britain, stated in reply to criticism made by a Sub-Committee on the terms of the Mandates, was that behind "the actual recommendations of the Sub-Committee there is the view that this Assembly is really the responsible body under the Covenant for dealing with these difficult questions of the mandates . . . I believe that the view is technically erroneous."

Little wonder that in these circumstances many critics were eager to dismiss the Mandatory system as a cloak for the old Imperialism. One hasty writer stated that in effect the assumption of a mandate meant in practice only one thing: "Britain is to be called a Mandatory in Mesopotamia, France in Syria; and the world will go on as before, except that in practice Mesopotamia

will be part of the British, and Syria part of the French, Empire."

But while granting that manifest defects exist in the Constitution of the League and of the Mandatory system, it would be worse than futile to condemn the scheme outright as a sham. The motives that inspire men's actions are not wholly evil or wholly good, and the men who fashioned the Covenant were not more or less than human. They were representatives of nations that had conquered formidable enemies after a long and bitter struggle conducted on a scale unprecedented in history. It would have been very surprising if their policy had been inspired by magnanimity. Critics have been altogether too impatient. They expected the immediate success of the most difficult experiment yet attempted by mankind—international democratic government—and attempted moreover in an atmosphere of war passions that had not yet subsided and of war-weariness which dulled opinion. Our own Constitution in England was not developed without many failures and set-backs.

During its most tender years the League of Nations needs support, not abuse, from friends

of peace and freedom ; it has enemies enough in high quarters as we have seen. We should strive to remove the flaws in the instrument rather than wish to scrap something which however defective is the only existing safeguard against the abuses of Imperialism. Already it is a great gain that the ex-Ottoman territories in the Middle East, namely Syria and Mesopotamia, and the ex-German territories in Africa, are not frankly divided as spoil among the victors, while it cannot be too often repeated that the alternative to the Mandate system is pure annexation.

Some of the existing defects are of a temporary nature. It was natural enough that at the close of the War, the Council of the League of Nations should have been regarded as a barely disguised edition of the Supreme Council of the Allies. It will not remain so when Germany and Russia and U.S.A. have become members.

The weakening of the Entente with France which occurred within three years of the Armistice reacted beneficially on the effectiveness of the Council in carrying out its duties, as was indicated by the case of Albania. A few months after Albania had become a member of the

League (in 1920), she appealed to the Council to intervene and protect her integrity which was being menaced by Greek and Serb attacks. But as intervention would have upset the secret arrangements arrived at by the Allies in 1915 and between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in 1920, the chief members of the Council saw that no action was taken. Eighteen months afterwards, in November 1921, the Council received another appeal from Albania, stating that the Serb troops were advancing on her capital, Tirana ; and everyone acquainted with Balkan affairs was aware that the Serbs aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Albania and its fusion with Yugo-Slavia. The appeal on this occasion succeeded. The Council of the League, summoned at the instigation of the British Premier, heard both sides of the dispute and demanded the immediate evacuation by Serbia of Albanian territory. Yugo-Slavia complied with a bad grace.

Relations between France and Great Britain, having become somewhat strained owing to the action of the French making a separate peace with Turkey, the Council was no longer hampered

by a selfish alliance between two of its most powerful members, and a war was averted which might easily have developed into a conflagration, Italy backing Albania, and France supporting Yugo-Slavia.

If then the Council of the League is likely to prove a more effective instrument when alliances have been scrapped, so much the better for the mandated peoples under its charge.

The Council has seen fit to depute the task of examining the reports by the Mandatories of their wardship to a Permanent Mandates Commission. This Committee consists of men chosen for their special knowledge and experience, and is quasi-judicial in character.

At first sight it does not appear that this expedient, namely the submission of annual reports to the Mandates Commission, is at all an adequate provision against misuse of power by the Mandatory. The annual reports on Korea issued for the benefit of the English-speaking world by the Japanese Government give an attractive account of their administration in that country ; but it is an *ex parte* statement, and the reverse side of the coin, as painted by the Korean, presents an ugly

story. Yet while this example is instructive, it would be under-estimating the powers of the Mandates Commission not to recognise that an important part of its duties consists in publishing the annual reports side by side with its own comments and findings. It is unlikely that a Great Power could successfully hoodwink an expert Commission, even if it had the hardihood to try ; for there are informed and humane people in every country who, if their Government abused its power as Mandatory over a weak people, would deem it their duty to rouse opinion and "lobby" the League at Geneva during the Sessions of the Assembly. Public opinion which has hitherto shown a strong interest in the terms of the Mandates, would interest itself no less in the yearly findings of the Mandates Commission, and the Opposition parties and leaders in the Mandatory State would hardly ignore an exposure of the maladministration of the Government of the day in territory mandated to its charge.

Judged by the record of its first meeting, the Permanent Mandates Commission is of no little promise. Although the A Mandatories were not

legally bound to submit their reports (the Treaty of Sèvres not being ratified by which Syria and Mesopotamia were detached from the Turkish Empire), these were submitted spontaneously by the responsible Powers—a very good augury for the future. Being of an informal character the reports were not published by the Mandates Commission, which, however, expressed itself as "most gratified by the attitude adopted by the British Government towards the whole interpretation and execution of its obligations under Article 22 of the Covenant. Nothing could be more in harmony with the purpose of that Article than the manner in which the Mandates entrusted to the British Government are being carried out."

The conduct of the French is not so encouraging. By the agreement which they concluded with the Kemalist Turks,* they returned to Turkish sovereignty a portion of Syria from the territory mandated to them. This action cannot be squared with the principles of the Covenant, for no change in the political status of any of the mandated territories can be made without the

* In November 1921.

question being first submitted to the League of Nations.

These excesses by France would not have been possible if the terms of the Mandates had been drawn up by the Permanent Mandates Commission, or if the Assembly had the power to revise the terms. In the future, the Assembly should therefore win for itself, or for the Commission, these necessary powers, and in addition provide means for revoking the mandateship from a Power which persisted in abusing its trust.

A further safeguard is equally necessary. The League should inaugurate a system of supervision by its own inspectors who should, of course, not be nationals of the Mandatory. Impartial investigators under League authority should periodically visit the mandated areas and report on the outstanding grievances of the native populations. The suggestion has also been made, and it is a good one, that the question as to whether a Mandatory is exceeding its powers under the Covenant should be referred for settlement to the International Court of Justice established at the Hague—which is the permanent judicial body of the League.

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Far more progress would have been made, had the United States not stood aloof from the League of Nations. It is correct to say that America has more concern or less unconcern for the rights of subject peoples than any of the Great Powers. The United States, at the present time, may be compared to the position occupied by England in the days of W. E. Gladstone. But while it is scarcely probable that America would take action which conflicted with any of its interests, subject to these there is little doubt that its influence would be exercised against oppression.

The absence of America from the League has seriously hampered the beginnings of the experiment. On the other hand, the experience already gained by the League, and the elaborate machinery which is in being, and whose efficacy to prevent war we have already noted in one particular case, are far too valuable to be set on one side in favour of some new Association of Nations such as the United States appears to advocate. This reluctance to join the League will hardly continue when the reaction against

Woodrow Wilson has subsided. Even assuming, however, that the present Constitution of the League may have to yield to another more to the liking of the United States, the Mandatory System, which is being slowly built up, will still remain one of the cardinal features of the organisation. The co-operation of the United States with Great Britain would tend to maintain a decent sense of responsibility among the Powers entrusted with the Mandates, and safeguard the system from the excesses of defaulting Mandatories. The most hopeful international orientation of to-day is to be found in the closer relations between America and the British Empire,—which is perhaps the only solid outcome of the Washington Conference.

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Finally when the Mandatory system has been adequately tested, it should be extended to peoples and lands other than ex-Ottoman and ex-German Imperial territories, that is, to all weak peoples under alien sway. In the British Empire there are many colonies which do not rank with "the free peoples of the British federation," even apart from the tropical possessions in Africa. There is

no reason to differentiate in treatment between ex-German African peoples and those under French, British or Japanese Imperialisms which are incapable of standing alone. These should all eventually fall within the purview of the League of Nations, if the control of the weak by the strong (which as we have seen is unavoidable) is to be regularised on a basis of principle. The theory of property rights over an alien people and its land, based on conquest alone, cannot be reconciled with the conscience of the world. It is even less moral than the unbridled right of the State to attack its neighbours. And while it is theoretically indefensible, it is no less practically undesirable, for who can doubt that the system of mandation, bringing publicity to bear, would remove many dark spots even in the colonies of the most enlightened States?

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But meanwhile it is our task to devise means to satisfy the more urgent national claims, and to discover how far it is desirable to apply the Mandate System to their solution, and failing its application in a particular case, to suggest an alternative proposal more immediately applicable.

The snare of political idealists is the temptation to be doctrinaire. The immediate application of ideals may not necessarily be possible even if a British Government inspired by goodwill is placed in power. In all probability it will prove able to lay its plans for an efficient League of Nations, and for a general reform of tropical administration. But it cannot hold its hand until "capitalism" has been abolished at home, much less abroad. The urgencies of the moment will occupy much of its energy. "Politics," as one well-known statesman put it, "is just one damned crisis after another." The Labour Government will need to select the most crying evils for treatment, if it is to make the best use of its period of office. For these reasons the discussion of the more urgent cases of oppression is perhaps of greater practical importance than the advocacy of general theories. The world is not yet so free from intolerable scandals and suffering that we can afford to divert our energy from their alleviation, in favour of ideals which we hope will be realised in the future.

Nations or peoples may have to be relieved in unideal ways, if their acute suffering is to cease

quickly. The Caucasian oppressed peoples were in the nineteenth century saved by the Imperialistic advance of Russia and that solution may again prove their only hope. Similarly the Koreans, beyond the reach of mandation, may be relieved by skilful diplomacy on the part of England and America. The grand opportunity for Labour will be to introduce what even Mr. Gladstone hardly brought about for more than a moment—a reformed diplomacy. It was the cynicism of Disraeli in '78, * the failure of Lord Lansdowne and Sir Edward Grey to control the ingrained anti-altruism of the Foreign Office towards Turkish and Persian affairs in 1903, 1908 and 1913, which did in fact sacrifice the peoples of the Near East. The old diplomacy was disastrous to oppressed peoples. Labour will reverse the tradition of egoism ; and it will do so with the more ease and confidence because the old diplomacy has now been recognised as ineffective also, history having shown that it produced the Great War.

A diplomacy inspired by the international spirit will create a change of atmosphere even greater than that produced by the Irish settlement or the

* See page 154.

Washington Conference. It will create the conditions necessary not only for the solution of national and racial problems, but also for the progress of China, whose needs demand more help than is given by a simple policy of "hands off." A transformed diplomacy would indeed prepare the way to a solution of every one of the separate problems to which we must now turn.

PART II

CHAPTER IV

RACIAL MINORITIES IN EUROPE

As foreshadowed in the Introductory chapter, we are not in a position, in the course of our survey of national oppression, to write Europe off the slate, because cases still exist of an urgent character where injustice to large populations creates a serious problem. Blots unfortunately remain in the area redrawn after the European War by the victorious Powers. The frontiers of each of the ex-enemy States have been traced with little regard for the wishes of the peoples affected by the change. In the case of Germany and Austria, large blocks of population have been transferred partly as a punishment for taking part in the War, partly for reasons of military security in the future. Hungary has been reduced on another principle, namely on the more plausible ground that every possible group of Rumanians and Serbs should be included in their parent States,

whereas justice demanded an equal balance between Rumanians and Magyars in the one case, and between Magyars and Serbs in the other. Bulgaria has had to accept a settlement based on all the foregoing considerations—punishment for having been an enemy, the demand for military security against her in the future, and satisfaction to non-Bulgarian Irredentists.

How is a solution to be found? Failing diplomatic machinery, it will come by a resort to the old system of groupings of States with a view to redressing grievances through war. If peace is to be preserved, the League of Nations must acquire the power to re-adjust frontiers, according to the Covenant.

But even if the map were redrawn, oppression would not thereby necessarily have been removed. Whatever the frontiers and however ideally they would be drawn, populations will be found living side by side in every East European State differing in culture, race, religion and language. All that can be done is to reduce the extent of dissatisfied minorities to a minimum. The toleration which makes the position of foreigner

perfectly happy in Western States cannot be expected of the late subjects of Austria-Hungary or of the Balkan peoples. Memories of former oppression create bitter and intolerant traditions provoking outbursts of brutality. Moreover, the servitude in which the Imperial Power formerly kept the subject peoples tended only to foster divisions and emphasise differences, because it was to the interest of the Empire to foster them.

A table giving the figures of outlanders created by the Peace Settlements shows more effectively than any argument the seriousness of the problem.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RACIAL MINORITIES IN EUROPE PLACED UNDER ALIEN DOMINATION BY THE PEACE TREATIES.

According to the best information available, and gathered from various sources, the approximate numbers of outlanders placed under alien rule by the Peace Treaties are as follows :—

I. GERMAN MINORITIES

Ex-Germans of Germany.

In Poland	1,087,000
Danzig	308,000
Schleswig	9,000
Alsace-Lorraine	50,000
Saar Valley	649,000
Upper Silesia	600,000
Total ex-Germans of Germany	2,703,000

Total population of Germany (1919 Census) 60,900,000

Ex-Germans of Austria.

Tyrol and Trentino	229,000
In Yugo-Slavia	365,000
In Czecho-Slovakia	3,756,000
Total	4,350,000

Total population of Austria (1920 Census) 6,140,000.

Ex-Germans of Hungary.

In Rumania : Bessarabia	63,000
Bukovina	153,000
Transylvania	69,000
In Yugo-Slavia : Banat	256,000
Total ex-Hungarian Germans	541,000

Total number of Germans placed under alien rule : 7,594,000

II. HUNGARIAN MINORITIES (MAGYAR)

In Rumania	1,200,000
In Czecho-Slovakia	1,030,000
In Yugo-Slavia	573,000

Total number of Magyars under alien rule 2,803,000

Total number of ex-Hungarian Germans. (V. above) 541,000

Total number of ex-Hungarians under alien rule (Germans and Magyars) . . 3, 344,000

Population of Hungary (1921 Census) 7, 840,000

III. BULGARIAN MINORITIES

In Rumania	339,000
In Thrace (under Greece)	300,000
In Yugo-Slavia	700,000
Total under alien rule	1,339,000
Total population of Bulgaria	4,500,000

Proportion of Outlanders to population 29.7 per cent.

Total of Minorities* placed under alien rule

* Jewish minorities, which are considerable, have been omitted, as also small blocks of minorities of other races, from both the above pre-war and post-war totals. Our intention is to present a rough comparison of peoples under alien rule before the war, and those under alien rule after the war, for the purpose of appreciating the effects of the Allied Settlements

by the Peace Treaties :—

Germans	7,594,000
Magyars	2,803,000
Bulgarians	1,339,000
Yugo-Slavs (in Italy)	480,000
Ruthenes (in Czecho-Slovakia)	432,000
Ruthenes (in East Galicia under-Polish Military Occupation)	3,700,000
Ruthenes (in Rumania)	300,000
Poles (in Czecho-Slovakia)	167,000
Total Number of Racial Minorities	16,815,000

Before the European War, the total number of people in Europe under alien rule was, of course, far greater.

At least 20 millions were to be found in the Austro-Hungarian Empire alone, and these included $8\frac{1}{2}$ million Czechs and Slovaks, 3 million Croats and Slovenes, $8\frac{1}{2}$ million Poles (in Galicia).

In Germany (Prussian Poland) there were three million Poles.

In the Russian Empire, the racial minorities

on national problems in Europe. We do not attempt the very difficult task of giving an accurate estimate of the total number of minorities in Europe.

included the following :—Poles, 12 millions ; Lithuanians, 3 millions i.e. 70 per cent of total population of Lithuania ; Letts, 1,250,000, i.e. 80 per cent of the population of Latvia ; Esthonians, 1,500,000, i.e. 95 per cent of the population of Esthonia.

The status of Ukrainia is still ambiguous, but in the territory claimed by the Ukrainians there are at least 32 millions who were aliens under Russia before the war and are now autonomous.

As showing the distribution of minorities in a single State, we cite the following cases :

I. CZECHO-SLOVAKIA (census of 1910).

Racial Minorities in Czecho-Slovakia

	German	Magyar	Ruthene	Polish
Bohemia Moravia Silesia	3,495,000		2,000	158,000
Slovakia	199,000	802,000	111,000	9,000
Autonomous Ruthenia	62,000	169,000	319,000	
	3,756,000	971,000	432,000	167,000

Total number of Minorities of all races in Czecho-Slovakia is therefore 5,317,000.

Total population of Czecho-Slovakia		13,650,000
13,650,000	Total number of Czechs	6,600,000
	Total number of Slovaks	1,750,000
	Minorities	5,300,000

The proportion of racial minorities in Czecho-Slovakia to the total population of Czecho-Slovakia is over 39 per cent.

II. ITALY (census of 1910).

Racial Minorities in Italy

	Germans	Yugo-Slavs (Croats and Slovenes)
Tyrol and Trentino	229,000	—
Carinthia, Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Zara	—	480,000

These are not protected by the Minorities treaties, but the Allied reply to Austria quoted verbal declarations by Signor Orlando, granting religious and racial freedom to the Germans.

An interesting case is that of:

The Free State of FIUME (census of 1910).

Magyars	6,493
Germans	2,316
Rumans	137
Slovenes	192
Serbs and Croats . . .	13,351
Italians	22,488
Total population of Fiume .	44,977

It is more difficult to give an analysis in tabular form of the position of racial minorities

in Yugo-Slavia. Yet it is of vital importance that they should be squarely confronted for reasons to which reference has already been made. Yugo-Slavia contains large blocks of German and Magyar populations and seven hundred thousand Bulgaro-phil and Bulgar-speaking Macedonians who constitute no less a danger to peace than they did before the War. Moreover, unless the Serbs modify their military and centralising policy, the Croats, Montenegrins and Slovenes must inevitably regard themselves as oppressed minorities, so that we should arrive at the paradox that the minorities in Yugo-Slavia form the majority.

* * * * *

To safeguard the rights of minority populations in the newly created or expanded States, the Allies and U.S.A. adopted the plan of negotiating with Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, Greece, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, a Treaty* dealing exclusively with the rights of minorities and laying down guarantees that the populations shall be governed "in accordance with the principles of liberty and justice."

* See Appendix A,

The Treaty with Yugo-Slavia may be taken as a sample of the rest. The State undertakes to grant to its nationals—Austrian, Hungarian or Bulgarian ex-nationals—the right to choose another nationality provided they leave the country within twelve months. Secondly all the nationals of the State are declared to have the same civil and religious rights without distinction as to race, religion and language, and it is declared that differences of religion must not prejudice their admission to public employment.

There is to be no restriction on the free use of any language in private intercourse, commerce, religion, the Press or public meetings, although Serbian is to be in official use. Minorities are to have the right to establish schools where their language may be used in addition to the official tongue.

In regard to Mahomedans, matters of family and personal status are to be regulated in accordance with Mussulman usage.

These measures, in principle, afford the several races within the State the right to co-operate in carrying on its political and administrative activities, while guaranteeing to each group

freedom to remain a cultural entity. There can be no better solution of the Minorities problem; democratic self-government is only possible if the various races co-operate in the task of government; and national aspirations distinctive of each group can be fulfilled if they are limited in expression to culture, *i.e.* to language, education and religion. Intermigration is an attractive idea, but, as a practical solution, it must be ruled out on account of the attachment of the people to their homes and to perhaps still more binding economic interests.

* * * * *

How have the Minorities Treaties worked out in practice? The States have already widely differing records. The treatment of the German minorities in Czecho-Slovakia is full of promise of harmonious co-operation in the future. In the Assembly at Prague, the Germans hold 72 out of 300 seats, and in the Senate 37 out of 150 seats: and the Magyars ten and three respectively. Naturally the first sessions were not marked by an over-dose of cordiality between the Czech and German Deputies. No attempt was made to overcome difficulties of language. Most of the

Czech deputies spoke in the Czech language, which few of the German Deputies understand, and the speeches were not interpreted as is the practice in the Swiss parliament. But racial feeling between these two groups is already subsiding : a rapprochement has been effected between the Czech and German Socialist Parties, which had hitherto stood apart on national grounds, and there is every prospect that in the near future the various groups will learn successfully to work together.

The Czechs allow the Germans to retain their University at Prague, which is subsidised by the Czecho-Slovak Government. In addition, the Germans have at Prague two technical colleges, 72 out of 194 middle schools in Bohemia, and 3 industrial schools where there are 15 Czech.

* * * * * *

Yugo-Slavia gives a very different story. There the Minorities Treaty is practically a dead letter. The presence of four hundred thousand refugees in Bulgaria, most of whom have fled from Macedonia, is not a testimony to the good government of the Serbs. The executive

committee of the Macedonian colony in Bulgaria were forced to make representations to the League of Nations. They complained of the oppressive and terrorist measures resorted to by the Serbian government to procure a satisfactory vote at the elections, and furnished incontrovertible proof that numberless Bulgars, after the Serbian troops with artillery and cavalry had been brought to the district, were flogged and imprisoned. The same persecution is said to have continued after the elections, owing to the successes of the Communist Party, which was looked upon as a thinly disguised national and anti-Serb movement.

Terroristic notices posted in public places were indicative, to say the least, of the turbulent state of the country. Those Macedonians who resisted the assimilating methods of the Serbs were hunted down by the troops and shot at sight. Fugitives were offered a free pardon, if they gave themselves up, but this declaration was hedged round with an alarming number of conditions and reservations. Failure to surrender oneself was visited upon the fugitive, his family and the village in which he lived ; the "rebel" would be pursued by the gendarmerie and killed, his family deported and

the whole village evacuated should any attempt have been made to shelter or feed him.

Serbia has obviously not forgotten the traditions of violence created by centuries of Turkish domination and can hardly be expected to fulfil, as the Czechs in the main are fulfilling, her obligations towards racial minorities.

The best hope for the inhabitants of Serbian Macedonia is to be allowed some form of autonomy. Until this is achieved, not only can there be no justice for minorities in Yugo-Slavia but the future of Yugo-Slavia is gravely endangered. Indeed it was only on the promise of an autonomous basis that the Croats and the Slovenes consented to the formation of the Yugo-Slav State. Devolution in Yugo-Slavia would, moreover, be a step towards the ideal advocated in Croatia of the union of Yugo-Slavia with Bulgaria, so as to contain the Southern Slavs as a whole within one great federative State.

* * * * * *

The record of Greece is as bad as that of Serbia. The non-Greek populations of Greek Macedonia have suffered equally with those of Thrace. Evidence is afforded by the establishment of martial

law and by the appeals made both by Bulgars and Turks for a return to the comparative order which was exercised by the international administration in Thrace in 1919, before the Treaty of Sèvres replaced it by Greek rule. The allocation of Western Thrace to Greece has not only resulted in acute misery for its population, but is the grievance most likely to lead to war, because the transference of this territory to Greece cuts off Bulgaria from access to the Aegean Sea.

Since the establishment of Greek administration in Thrace in 1920, many thousand inhabitants were forced to leave their homes and take refuge in Bulgaria. Bulgarian schools, churches and other institutions in Thrace were closed, and Bulgarian teachers, priests, doctors and lawyers expelled. *Droit administratif* was the order of the day. A system of arbitrary arrest prevailed, and severe penalties were imposed often for charges that were false and fantastic. Bulgarians were forcibly conscripted into the Greek army and sent to the Asia Minor front, although the conference of Ambassadors virtually condemned this action as illegal. The Conference recognised that, owing to the fact that the Sèvres Treaty had not been

ratified, Greece had no right to act as sovereign in Thrace, and that were she legally in possession of that region a period of two years would have to elapse in order to enable the inhabitants to opt for their former nationality, as laid down by the Minority Treaty between Greece and the Principal Allied Powers.

The figures relating to the number of Greeks, Bulgars and Turks in Thrace, quoted by M. Venizelos at San Remo, where he successfully claimed this region, are at least doubtful. The Greeks usually reckon Pomaks, that is Moslem Bulgars, as Turks, and Bulgarian Patriarchists as Greeks, and, thus manipulated, the figures give a clear majority in Eastern Thrace to the Greeks, but they show that in Western Thrace the Turks are overwhelmingly in the majority. The Bulgarian claim to Western Thrace is supported by the fact that according to the Turkish Census of 1910 Bulgars and Pomaks in this region numbered 227,000 and the Greeks 199,000. But the claim to Eastern Thrace having once been successfully established, the cession of the Western portion followed as a matter of course, owing to the demand for a continuous Greek frontier.

About one-third of the small Bulgarian nation of under five millions consists of outlanders who are left under alien rule by the Peace Treaty. The mother country is flooded with refugees to the number of 400,000, and it is idle to suppose that such a settlement can be permanent.

* * * * * *

The unwillingness of small Powers concerned to sign the Treaties binding them to protect minorities is well known and it is not surprising that the minorities themselves are not yet able to appreciate the benefits conferred by the Treaties, as little, if any, attempt has been made to respect their provisions. A contracting State has even been known to urge that the incorporation of the protective obligations in its Constitution is a sufficient discharge of its duty. It is, nevertheless, a positive gain that any Power which in the future desires to act effectively on behalf of the minorities has, in the Treaties, a legal ground for intervention against the guilty State.*

A very definite defect should be remedied

* See page 224.

without delay—namely, the absence of a Minorities Commission of the League of Nations which can deal with the complaints and grievances of the minorities. A proposal favouring its creation had been made in the first Assembly of the League, but was not adopted. The task which requires for its efficient execution the energy and knowledge of a special department was delegated to the Chairman of the Council of the League.

The report of the Council to the first Assembly of the League in 1920 describes the activities under this head and they constitute a meagre record. It stated that the Council noted its obligations and consented to guarantee the stipulations of Articles I-XI of the Minorities Treaties.*

The weakness of the League's position—its lack of executive authority—is revealed when the report deals with the appointment of Commissioners entrusted with the reciprocal emigration of minorities in Greece and Bulgaria. It points out that the best the League can do is to approve the nomination of two persons—nationals of disinterested states,—to serve on the Commission,

* See Appendix A.

and adds that, in view of the absence of any material means at the disposal of the League for enforcing a decision, it must be understood that the Commissioners would act under the authority of Greece and Bulgaria.

The report contains the following important declaration: "It is the right and duty of the Powers represented on the Council to call attention to any infraction or danger of infraction, of any of the obligations towards the minorities. Minorities may themselves petition or report to the League, but the Council is only competent to deal with the matter, if one of its members actually draws attention to it.

"The Council has decided that the Secretary-General, in conformity with the practice already adopted for all documents distributed for its information, shall forward all such petitions or reports to all the Members of the League, a proceeding which will ensure publicity for any case that may arise.

"The Council, during its session at Brussels, formally invited its Members to draw the special attention of their Government to the duties laid on the Powers represented on the

Council in connection with the protection of Minorities."

It is evident from the foregoing statements that a very urgent grievance might exist and yet no Member of the Council be instructed by his Government to draw attention to it. The machinery is not complete until some such provision is made (in particular a Permanent Commission) as is authorised by the Covenant in the case of the Mandates. And further, again as in the case of the Mandated peoples, the Minorities which suffer may be hampered by their Government in fully exposing the facts unless and until a system of Inspectors, responsible only to the League, is established.

The salutary effect exercised on the terrorism of the Hungarian Government by a Commission of the British Labour Party in 1920 furnishes an illustration of the value of such a system.

While the successful working of mandation has been too little provided for, that of Minority protection has, by comparison, been treated as negligible. Yet its importance is equally great, as measured by the extent of human happiness which depends on it, and far greater as involving

causes of war, amounting in the case of Greek and Serbian Macedonia to a danger which has not ceased to make South-Eastern Europe what Lord Lansdowne aptly characterised as "the powder magazine of Europe."

CHAPTER V

THE MIDDLE EASTERN PEOPLES

A.—Peculiar Factors of the Middle East

The geographic and economic importance of the regions which stretch from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, and those which lie on either side of the Suez Canal, is plainly shown by the fact that Western Empires have disputed in the past, and continue to dispute in the present, their sway over them. Russia, in the days of the Tsardom, impelled by the need of ice-free ports, extended her dominion southwards through Transcaucasia and reached out as far as Persia, lured by the outlet on the Persian Gulf. The fears of Great Britain for her security in India alone proved capable of stopping the advance, Persia being sacrificed to appease the rival Imperialism, Great Britain extending her rule into Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Russia made a parallel movement across the Caspian Sea into Turkestan and Bokhara. The Arab peoples of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine remained under the yoke

of Turkey. Towards these regions another Imperial Government turned its covetous attention. Germany, the virtual dictator of Central Europe, began her "Drang nach Osten." The occupation of Egypt in the early eighties by a British Liberal Government had led to a cooling of relations between England and Turkey, and Germany eventually took our place as the leading friend of the Turks. An opportunity of recovering her friendship was lost by Britain at the time of the Young Turk Revolution, but Germany only increased her attentions. Europe was perturbed by talk of a new road to the East through Asia Minor, across Syria and Mesopotamia, to the Persian Gulf. The Bagdad Railway was looked upon as the German route to India. France continued to urge her historic claims in Syria.*

These movements threatened the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and the Young Turks, in order to save themselves, played their traditional rôle of strengthening themselves by playing off one Power against the other. To pursue the Pan-Turanian ideal became one of the main

* See Map 2. (Appendix D.)

planks of their policy. A belt of Moslem peoples, united by a blood bond, extending from Anatolia, across Transcaucasia, and beyond the Caspian sea to Bokhara and Afghanistan, would have the double advantage of holding in check both Russian and British expansion. The Germans, who would obviously benefit from the scheme, gave it every assistance.

Such were the conditions which governed the politics of the Middle East prior to the outbreak of the European War, and such the designs to which the interests and welfare of the peoples of the Middle East were subordinated. They were rendered possible by the unfortunate character of the distribution of the peoples and races in these regions. In no substantial area of territory can there be said to exist a compact and homogeneous group of people. In Anatolia, the home country of the Turks, there are minorities of Greeks and Armenians, especially in Smyrna and its hinterland, not to speak of the remnants of ancient non-Turkish tribes in the interior. Where Armenians used to predominate before 1916 in north-east Asia Minor, there were always minorities of Turks and other Moslem races. An

Imperialist Power could therefore usually count on one section or other to welcome its designs, if not to help in promoting them. Again, on the highlands which look down upon Mesopotamia, a barbarous race of fighters—the Kurds—are ready to turn upon their neighbours at anyone's bidding, when there are prospects of loot.

This confusion of peoples is not the only difficulty. The populations which exist side by side are differentiated not solely by their race, but by the sharply varying stages of development in which they find themselves. This is true of Anatolia and of Arabia.

While there is neither homogeneity of blood nor a uniform standard of development amongst the races of the Middle East, they have—if we omit for the moment the Christians in Armenia and elsewhere—a common feature in Islam. The history of Islam under the Arabs in the remote past is dazzling enough. In the seventh century, the Arabian Empire under the successors of Mahomet stretched eastwards as far as China and westwards to Morocco. Held loosely together under the Prophet and his successors, the Caliphs, the Empire of Islam stood for a great civilisation

centring in the holy cities of Medina and Mecca and later at Bagdad.

Not that the Arabian civilisation drew its inspiration from the Moslem religion; it reached a high water mark in the Arabian Kingdoms before the coming of Mahomet, whose conquests served to extend its benefits beyond Arabia. Before the time of Mahomet, Arab writing was a fine art and poetry flourished. Eloquence was a much prized art. Every year assemblies assisted at contests of skill between orators and poets. The treatment of women was far superior to their position under the Koran. When Western Europe was too backward to receive the teachings of Greek philosophy a warm reception was given them in Arabia. To the studies of Arabian philosophers the later schoolmen in Western Europe owe their complete Aristotle. Arab medical works were translated into Latin in the twelfth century; renowned Arab mathematicians and alchemists taught in Europe. The influence of their civilisation left its mark not only in Europe (Malta and Spain) but also in China and Central Asia.

The service which Islam rendered was to

preserve this civilisation from total destruction when the Mongols swept across the Arabian Peninsula in the thirteenth century. The devastation wrought by them exceeded that suffered by the Roman Empire at the hands of the Huns. At that time the Turks, a tribe allied to the Mongols, were first heard of in those regions; the most mobile and adventurous of the Asiatic tribes, they formed a large part of the hordes of Genghiz Khan who laid waste Arabia.

Two hundred years later, the Turks descended once more on the Arabian Peninsula, but this time from Asia Minor, where already as Ottomans they had begun building up a military Empire. With no civilisation except what they had recently adopted from Persian sources, their sway at its zenith equalled if not surpassed in extent that of the Arabian Empire, extending from near the confines of Germany to those of Persia. The Turkish conversion to Islam did not modify the military character of their Imperialism or prevent their rule from blighting during the coming centuries the development of Arabic civilisation and reducing the Peninsula to its present backward condition. The title of Caliph—the successor

of Mahomet—was assumed by the Sultan in the sixteenth century. But under the regime of the Caliph-Sultans, Islam has not proved strong enough to secure the sympathies of all the various peoples under Ottoman dominion. In modern times, race feeling in the case of the Arabs asserted itself in the shape of revolts against Turkish rule.

And a still more disturbing factor has now appeared in the influence of modern education and the contagion of democratic aspirations. Educated Egyptians and Arabs may wish to retain their faith in the Moslem religion, but they elect to associate their intellectual, social, and political life with that of the modern world. This is especially plain in India, where Hindus and Moslems have sunk their religious policies in a common endeavour to attain self-government on Western lines. The Kaliphat agitation in India and elsewhere should deceive no one. In Asia Minor, the homeland of the Turks, the Kaliphat is not a vital issue. The Turks are more concerned with attaining their national rights, in the spirit which inspires other modern aggrieved peoples. There is of course an Islamic revival, but it is religious in character.

During and after the European War, the Western Powers were in fact confronted not with menaces of a medieval Pan-Islamic union, but with national claims advanced by groups of Turks, Arabs, Egyptians and Indians. The cry which became the war slogan of the Allies had not failed to impress them. The principles of the Allied cause, incessantly proclaimed as determining the peace, they had accepted with a naive simplicity. They saw Germany vanquished and every German trader, administrator and soldier withdrawn from the Middle East. Russian expansion was brought to a dramatic close by the Russian Revolution, and the Ottoman Empire, under whose yoke the Arabs, Armenians, and other non-Turks had lived since the sixteenth century, had crumbled away. The propaganda of the Allies and the collapse of their enemies and of Russia combined to produce a nationalist ferment which has, for the time at all events, eclipsed the influence of religion.

The Imperialist designs of the victors cannot, as in the past history of these regions, ignore the national claims of the peoples inhabiting them. The question at issue is how far can these claims be met.

B.—Irak, Palestine and Egypt

Both for geographical and for social reasons, Mesopotamia or Irak, as it is now called, presents a very difficult problem of political administration. Most of the 180,000 square miles of its fertile soil, perhaps the most fertile spot in the world, is a waste-land of malarial swamps or of arid dust. Hundreds of years of Ottoman misrule or lack of rule have reduced what was once known in ancient civilisations as the granary of the world to a state of primitive nature. Small areas of cultivation cluster on the banks of the Euphrates and near the canals, and less frequently on the banks of the Tigris. The peoples* inhabiting these regions present complex features. The dominant race—the Arabs—are themselves composed of sharply distinguished groups. Fully

*Rough estimate of population of Irak (Foreign Office figures).

Arabs	1,450,000	Armenians	57,000
Kurds	380,000	Yezidis	21,000
Turks and Turkomans	110,000	Chabaks	10,000
Persians	70,000	Circassians	8,000
Jews	60,000	Sabians	2,000
Syrian Christians	60,000	Miscellaneous	10,000
Total	2,238,000		

half of them are uncivilised. These are nomadic or semi-nomadic, retaining such customs as the tribal blood feuds. Under the leadership of Sheiks, who usually can neither read nor write, they can easily elude, as they have eluded in the past, government control by retreating towards the desert on the south-west or the hills on the north-east. In the towns, such as Bagdad and Basra, reside a comparatively educated class of landowners and a sprinkling of the professions, enlivened with an intelligentsia frequenting the coffee-houses whose interest in current politics is keen and vociferous. In Bagdad, the capital (population: about 200,000), the Jews (50,000) constitute an influential factor. The settled communities in Irak comprise this urban population and the agriculturists. The people of the towns have little sympathy with, or understanding of, the cultivators of the soil, from whose labour the wealth of Irak is derived. The Arabs are further divided in religion; although they are usually Moslems, the Sunni Moslems and the Shiah Moslems* dislike one

*The Shiahs do not recognise the Turkish Sultan as Caliph, and since the Shiah doctrine was also the national creed of

another more than together they dislike the Christians and other non-Moslems in Irak.

Finally almost the entire Arab population in Irak is illiterate.

Much work was accomplished in 1917-1918 by the British during their military occupation; under General Allenby's administration an Irrigation Department was set up, railway lines laid down, and vast sums were spent on the harbour at Basra. The inhabitants of Basra were not slow to appreciate a period of security when business could be developed and trading carried on.

After the Armistice, the British authorities, controlling not only the vilayet of Basra, but also those of Bagdad and of Mosul, the last rich in oil, acted as if it was intended to annex the country to the British Empire, although the British and French Governments had naively declared on the 9th November, 1918, that "it

Persia, the religious bond between Shiahs in Persia and Irak used to be a cause of trouble to the Turkish authorities. Nejef and Kerbela (40,000 and 50,000) are the chief pilgrim centres of the Shiahs and are situate in Irak. One of the chief Sunni centres is in Bagdad. The yearly influx of pilgrims amounts to 200,000 who come from all parts of the Mohammedan world.

was the intention of the two governments to establish among those peoples who had long been oppressed by the Turks national governments or administrations drawing their authority from the free choice of indigenous populations." A national movement had been initiated by a group of Arab Effendis who fought as officers with Lord Allenby in his Syrian campaign; and when the British Government, ignoring its declaration, introduced into Irak Anglo-Indian methods of government, discontent began to be organised, culminating in the rising of 1920, in which the tribes took part. It is not to be supposed that the ignorant Sheiks or their more ignorant tribesmen had risen in order that President Wilson's Fourteen Points, notably the principle of national self-determination, might be applied to Irak. To the tribes it meant that they were fighting for release from all government; it is said that the Sheiks on the Tigris above Bagdad wished to be assured that under the new order they would not be required to pay government dues. The less informed urban populations might have been roused to action by the false plea that their Moslem faith was in danger. The rising was

crushed at great cost both in life and treasure. It taught both the settled communities of Irak and the British Government a severe lesson. In getting the support of the tribes, the Nationalists saw that they had set in motion uncontrollable forces that played havoc with the property and stocks of corn of Arab cultivators. To the British Government it became evident that it would have been less onerous to allow the Arabs, with British guidance and advice, to undertake for themselves the responsibilities of government and administration rather than to "maintain a huge expensive and unpopular Anglo-Indian bureaucracy under what Lord Curzon used to call an Arab façade."

The British Government assumed the Mandate for Irak in June 1920 and, with the lesson of the rising fresh in its mind, it is far less likely to abuse its power as Mandatory, while the Arabs will be less prone to kick against an administration whose personnel under the Mandate is mainly Arab. Although the Covenant prescribes that the independence of the country is to be provisionally recognised until such time as the country can stand alone, the British Government

maintains that it can best carry out its obligations by setting up immediately an independent Kingdom in Irak whose relations with Britain are defined by treaty. This was created after some attempt had been made to obtain the views of the more civilised inhabitants of the towns and the rural communities. Britain's nominee to the throne of Irak, the Emir Feisal, a son of King Hussein of the Hedjaz, was elected by the Arab Council of Notables. That his accession was not welcomed by all sections of the Irak community goes without saying. It would be difficult if not impossible to find an Arab personality who would please all the groups, civilised and uncivilised, that make up the population of Irak. If Feisal pleases the Shiahs, it would not be surprising to find that he gave offence to the Sunnis. But obviously the British Government had to choose a Moslem who favoured contact with the British. The danger lies in relying too exclusively on the force of Feisal's attractive personality as a means of extending the region of law and order from Bagdad. He may fail 'to deliver the goods,' as Venizelos failed, through loss of prestige. After one year of his reign it is claimed that Feisal is

on the whole accepted by the settled communities in Irak. But who can guarantee that the Sheiks, if they have accepted Feisal as their chief, can be counted on to continue that loyalty?

The Permanent Mandates Commission approved the arrangement whereby Great Britain proposed to exercise its mandateship by means of a Treaty with the independent kingdom of Irak, and the British Government is no less responsible to the Mandates Commission for its doings and duties in Irak, although that country is technically independent. The duties of the British officials are formidable. Irrigation is the most stupendous task with which they are confronted. Sir William Willcocks estimated in 1909 that 11,000,000 acres could be irrigated in the three vilayets of Mosul, Bagdad and Basra (the three vilayets now forming Irak); that of these, seven millions could yield wheat and barley, and that one million acres of rice and three million acres of millet, etc., could also be cultivated. The British, however, are not attempting the impossible; they are proceeding slowly; in 1918, 300,000 acres were prepared for cultivation, and in 1919 it was expected that a million and a half would be under cultivation.

The main problem regarding irrigation and cultivation is the supply of labour. Irak is a sparsely populated land; although the Arabs are prolific, 75 per cent of the children die before they are a year old, syphilis being rife. The British have attempted to cope with this appalling death rate by introducing a medical service in Irak, and by recourse to educational measures, and some amelioration may be expected in the future. Imported labour had worked well, but it excited the hostility of the Arabs. The rate of recovery of the land from swamp and desert depends, therefore, as much on the supply of labour as on the finance which is available.

Prejudice has been aroused against the Irak policy by the reckless waste of our administration during the first three years after the Armistice. Much of the expenditure was pure extravagance and was incurred before the Mandate was assumed. The money spent in crushing the rising can never be recovered. But it is the expenses of the future, not of the past, which must be balanced against the disadvantage of the policy of abandonment. Under stable conditions, the progress of irrigation and cultivation must

increase the revenue of the Irak Kingdom and decrease the sums allocated from the Imperial Treasury. It is reasonable to expect that expenditure from the year 1922-1923, if kept within moderate limits, should be looked upon as a recoverable debt against the Irak Government. If ten million (less than half the expenditure for the years 1921-1922) might reasonably be allocated for 1922-23, and a proportionate reduction to $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions were possible for 1923-1924, with a further reduction to $1\frac{1}{2}$ million in the subsequent year the Mandate might very conceivably pay its way.

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We must not be diverted by the engrossing interest of the Arabian problem from the purpose of this volume, which is to examine and explore the cases where nationalities are suffering from oppression. Whether the motives of the Allies have been worthy or inspired by greed, it cannot be denied that the Arab race has, through their action, secured an opportunity which could have come to it in no other way. Treated as a colony of the Ottoman Empire, wholly undeveloped and fleeced to enrich Stamboul, Arabia

could entertain no vestige of hope that its ancient people would attain to a national life and expression. As a mandated entity, even if the Mandatory had been the most unenlightened of the Powers, they would have secured for the first time the chance of education and national development. Under a British Mandate, which gives them in addition an opening for exercising whatever political instinct they may possess, they have, compared with the past, met with a stroke of good fortune. This is not a case of oppression, but of relief from it. Such grievances as those to which the base elements in British Imperialism might in the future give rise it should not be difficult for alert opinion, such as is represented by the Anti-Slavery Society, to obviate.

It is not utopian to forecast a system of administration directly responsible to the League of Nations of the future, with a civil service recruited from the various States which are Members of the League. The advantage in point of governmental prestige is illustrated by the readiness of the Egyptians to accept the authority of the League, while they resent the subjection implied in subordination to an Imperial

State. The advantage in practical results of aid from the forces of a people more civilised than the natives of the land in question when not imposed by a Power claiming right of ownership, was shown by the success of the foreign gendarmerie organised in Persia before the war. But these solutions are not available to-day, and since the problem must be disposed of forthwith, we are, comparatively with the past, fortunate to have made the Mandate system available.

* * * *

Of Palestine, little at present can be foretold. Mr. Balfour's Declaration of November, 1917, pledged the British Government to the establishment there 'of a National Home for the Jewish People,' it being clearly understood 'that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.' The intention of the Zionist Movement is to create in Palestine a Jewish State where all Jews may settle in what they regard as their own country. This aim is regarded with extreme aversion by Effendis in Palestine and the first years of the British Mandateship in this region have been marked by

outbursts of hostility on the part of the Arab inhabitants, who vastly outnumber the Jewish colony.

Little sympathy can, however, be felt with the attitude of the Palestine Arab leaders, for they are flatly opposed to the idea of a Jewish home in Palestine. They would deny the Jews a "place in the sun," although the Arabs have obtained for themselves, with the help of Great Britain, independence and promise of development in Arabian territory.

There are grounds for stating that the Arab common people in Palestine are not averse, unless aroused by false agitation, from associating and co-operating with their cousins the Jews. Justice and equal rights are far more safely administered under a High Commissioner of the calibre of Sir Herbert Samuel than in the hands of an uncontrolled Arab Effendi, who would give little consideration to the Jews. Arab notables, supported by the Junkers of the British War Office, who disliked the democratic Jews, attempted by recourse to the usual bogey of the rise of Islam to frighten the British Government into withdrawing the policy of the Balfour

Declaration. They demanded the sacrifice of the Jews, just as other Moslems demanded the sacrifice of the Armenians, as the price of peace in India and Egypt. But there are no grounds for supposing that if we betrayed the Jews to the Arabs, the Moslems would be any the less disposed to dispute our position in Egypt and India than they do now. Moreover if Britain withdraws her Army from Egypt, as the Milner Proposal stipulates, and keeps only a small force near the Suez Canal, it is all the more necessary for the defence of the Canal that Palestine be inhabited by a people, such as the Jews, on whose friendship we can safely rely.

The independence of Egypt is thus intimately bound up with the future of Palestine. If the Jews have their national home in Palestine, and the Arabs co-operate, the latter will have removed a formidable obstacle from the path of Egyptian independence, and will have thus conferred a boon on their brother Moslems in Egypt, for whom they have been so ready to invoke the sacred principle of nationality.

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The administration of the British in Egypt

during and after the war brought relations between Great Britain and that country to a head and forced the British government to define its policy. However lamentable were the intentions of the government, it cannot be denied that the form of independence offered to Egypt, in the first place, by the Milner proposals with such limitations as are imposed by local conditions, imperial interests and international peace, was a credit to British statesmanship.

The same could not be said of the previous policy. The continued occupation of Egypt seemed a direct defiance of the pledge given by Lord Granville in the "eighties": "Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt, His Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing as soon as the state of the country and the organisation of the proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it." The declaration of the Protectorate on the outbreak of the War was objectionable to the Egyptians, and its continuation after the Armistice was a grave error. But equally provocative was the stern administration during the war and the sterner administration after the war. Undue blame

cannot be laid upon the government for declaring martial law in Egypt while the European war was in progress ; it was accepted philosophically by the Egyptians. They tolerated the extreme censorship, which like our own in Britain, was often stupid and savage. Feeling began to turn against the British when conscription was introduced, and over a million Egyptians were forced to serve in labour corps. Severity became greater after the Armistice. Martial law was continued and the censorship was used against national demands for independence. Propaganda advocating the removal of the Protectorate was treated as seditious. Native Egyptians expected the Wilson doctrine to be applied as soon as the Armistice was concluded. Restiveness was increased by the refusal to Egypt of representation at the Peace Conference, and when Zaglul Pasha, the head of the national delegation, was interned for three days at Malta, on his way to England.

Egyptian sentiment naturally crystallised into an uncompromising demand for independence. The folly of British policy was plainly manifest even to the government, and a mission under Lord Milner was despatched to Egypt to work out a

settlement. It was boycotted by those Egyptians who would entertain suspicions in regard to every move of the government. In spite of this conduct, Lord Milner was able to advance proposals that went a long way towards satisfying the claims of the Egyptians.

The proposals recognised " the independence of Egypt " as a " constitutional monarchy with representative institutions," and provided for the conclusion of an alliance between Great Britain and Egypt guaranteeing mutual defence in case of war, and the right of Egypt to representation in foreign countries. On the other hand, the independence was subject to restrictions, such as (a) the appointment of advisers to the ministries of finance and justice, (b) the maintenance of a British force on Egyptian soil for the protection of British Imperial communications, (c) the taking over by Great Britain of rights conferred by the Capitulations. The Zaglul delegation, authorised to investigate with the Milner Mission the lines of settlement, refused to agree to these proposals. They objected in particular to the presence of a British force on Egyptian soil, and insisted upon complete freedom in concluding economic agree-

ments with foreign Powers. They objected to the appointment of a financial adviser, although his scope would be limited to the administration of the public debt.

One sympathises with the objection to a foreign force on home soil. But a glance at the map will reveal how necessary it is that the Suez Canal should not pass into the exclusive possession of a small nation with few responsibilities beyond its own frontiers, but with infinite opportunities of menace, were the Canal in fact in its control. The Egyptians assert that they amply recognise this point of view when they propose an Egyptian force officered by Englishmen as being adequate. But the objections to this proposal are too obvious to need elaboration.

The Egyptian Nationalists appear, in one at least of their reservations to the Milner Scheme, to be overstepping the just limits of nationalism. It cannot be denied that Zaglul's demand for the effective sovereignty of the Soudan on the ground that "the Soudan has often been conquered and held by Egypt in the past" is somewhat disquieting. The Soudanese are a backward race recently delivered from barbarism. They

have no national movement and no Europeanised class; the Gordon College at Khartoum is barely superior to a primary school. The wide gulf which separates them from the civilisation of their British rulers ensures, as is frequent in such cases, comparative harmony between them. If Nationalist Egypt took over the country in its present state of development trouble would inevitably result.

People who enjoy the confidence of Zaglul Pasha assert, in his defence, that the more extreme reservations were put forward by him in order to strengthen his bargaining power and that he had no wish to insist upon them *à outrance*. Suspecting that the British Government were not ready to carry out the Milner Scheme, he mistakenly supposed that it would be good tactics to ask for more than could possibly be conceded. This was to play directly into the hands of the militarists, and Adly Pasha, Zaglul's successor as negotiator, found that his more moderate attitude failed to allay the reactionary mood of the British Government. Lord Milner's task became impossible, and his failure was the more regrettable because an agreement on the

basis of his scheme could have been achieved had wiser counsels prevailed in Whitehall.

But to the substance of the Milner solution the British Government, pressed by General Allenby, had in effect to return. Events forced the school of violence to give way to reason and a realist policy. While Egypt's independence is recognised, and the historic kingship of that country restored, the outstanding difficulties in the settlement between Great Britain and Egypt are to be held over, and determined in another treaty which is to be drawn up after agreement has been obtained between the British and the Egyptians in regard to its terms.

Of these difficulties, the greatest, given good-will on both sides, is not an insurmountable obstacle. The Egyptian question, as also that of Irak, has to be judged not on its merits alone, but on the important factor of strategy and air communications. For the present, a moderate garrison in the Canal Zone, as envisaged by the Milner Report, will afford, according to General Sir Frederick Maurice, all the necessary guarantees. As for air communications, Sir Frederick Maurice has well observed that, while it is true

that Egypt is such an admirable centre for air transport that it has been called the "Clapham Junction" of the air, the future can be secured by a friendly agreement with the Egyptian Government.

These restrictions to complete independence, which the British Government proposes to impose by Treaty with the Kingdom of Egypt, would best be exercised under a Mandate conferred by the League of Nations. The Mandate would dispose of some of the main objections of the Egyptian Delegation, referred to earlier. The Canal Zone would be placed under some form of international control under the League, or the administration of the waterway might be subject to an international commission following the precedent set up by the Danube Commission. The British would give up their possession of the Soudan in favour of the Mandate to be exercised by them under the authority and control of the League. This would dispel Egypt's fear for her water supply, which is based on the fact that when the irrigation works, now in contemplation, are completed it will be possible for a hostile Soudan to withhold from Egypt her

share of water, or even let loose devastating floods.

Moreover, under the Mandate, the difficult question of the Capitulations might be satisfactorily settled. The Capitulations, *i.e.* legal privileges enjoyed by Europeans in Egypt, weigh heavily against the Egyptians. There are about 150,000 Greeks, Italians, French and British who carry on most of the banking and industrial affairs of Egypt. These enjoy exemption from the jurisdiction of native courts, and are immune from taxation—excepting customs and land tax. These rights are to be held by Great Britain in lieu of the foreign Governments of the respective nationals. Distrustful of the British Government, the Nationalists withdrew their opposition to the onerous system of the Capitulations and proposed indeed to continue them, thereby intending to maintain contact with other Powers and play off one or other of them against England—a short-sighted and dangerous policy. Under the Mandate, genuinely applied, these difficulties would be overcome by transferring the working of the Capitulations to a Minorities Commission. It is no objection that such Commissions will be

exercised in looking after the interests of the oppressed or weak racial minorities recently included within the new frontiers of States in the Balkans and Central Europe. Their scope might be conveniently extended to meet the case of strong and wealthy minorities, such as the Europeans in Egypt.

C.—The Future of Turkey

Not by any strength of its own has the Turkish Empire survived as long as it has. The mutual jealousies of the Great Powers have, in the words of Lord Bryce, "prevented a normal development of those natural forces which destroy bad Governments." The rapidity of its decline, notwithstanding, has scarcely a parallel in the story of Empires. In 1800, its dominion extended over South-Eastern Europe, holding in thraldom, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania; across the Mediterranean Sea and along the northern coasts of Africa, the Sultan exercised his suzerainty over Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt, and directly administered Tripoli; extending a-

cross Asia Minor, his grasp held Armenia and stretching southwards, the Arab countries, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine. To-day, a hundred years later, Turkey stands almost completely stripped of her Empire. Nearly all her subject peoples are free of her yoke. Her capital, Constantinople, is under the control of the British and the French, and her Government there is one in name only. If Turkey lives, she lives around the banner of a military chief whose *de facto* Government at Angora, in the remote interior, has successfully withstood the invading armies of Greece. This swift collapse marks the culmination of a period of decay which set in with the rule of the Sultans late in the sixteenth century.

The first Turkish settlers in Asia Minor found the country mainly inhabited by Seljukians who had spread from Persia. The Seljukians had acquired some of the civilisation of Persia, which their savage ancestors had conquered two hundred years before, in the eleventh century, and it was from them that the Turks, in their turn, learned something of Persian culture—their first contact with civilisation. Indeed, whatever the Ottoman

Turks possessed of civilisation or of literary taste was derived in this way indirectly from Persia. Their writings, their poetry in form and metre, were Persian; their themes always of Persian mythology or of exploits of Persian heroes. The Turks were, and still remain, essentially a nation of soldiers without a culture of their own.

In 1517, they obtained for the Sultan and his successors the title of Caliph or Successor of the Prophet, and removed the sacred banner and other insignia of the Caliphate from Cairo to the Seraglio at Constantinople. It is curious to note that this assumption of the headship of Islam by the Turks has confused their sway in the popular mind with the splendid Arabian civilisation, which was a worthy upholder of the Moslem faith in the centuries that preceded.

The effects of the invasion of the Turks have been mainly destructive. An empire founded and maintained by the instincts of an alien military caste cannot be a durable fabric. A nation of soldiers can flourish only by wars and the sacking of cities and countries to provide riches and subjugated populations from whom taxes can be extorted. It is a process that burns itself out quickly.

The reign of Abdul Hamid, who was forced to abdicate in 1909, resulted in disaster and cruelty in the Christian provinces of the Empire, and opinion in England and other countries was roused against him. Not even the Marxian Socialist with his predilection for realism in politics could ascribe an ulterior motive to the political movement which, under Gladstone's leadership, had rallied to the 'bag and baggage' policy.

When in 1908 the Young Turks seized the reins of power the Western peoples looked to them to inaugurate an epoch of civilised Government. Great hopes were raised by the creation of a democratic Constitution and the convening of a National Assembly. The Great Powers which had forced the Sublime Porte to accept European officers for the gendarmerie in Macedonia at once withdrew them, although warned by such bodies as the Balkan Committee against over-confidence in Turkish professions of reform. The non-Turkish peoples in Turkey itself welcomed the democratic experiment in the hope that it would put an end to their oppression. But unfortunately the military instincts inherent in the

Turkish character and the habits acquired during the regime of the Sultans proved stronger than the nascent democratic impulse. The Tripoli War, as we have seen, was also a cause of the ruin of the Young Turks. Given the security of a democratic regime, the Young Turk Party feared that the more prolific non-Turkish races would eventually far outweigh the fast diminishing numbers of their own race. For, according to Sir Edwin Pears, more than half the population of Asia Minor "were the direct descendants of civilised peoples, of Assyrians, Chaldeans, Hittites, Greeks, Armenians, Arabs and European settlers." And even those among them who regarded themselves as Turks would through education discover their separate nationality.

In order to preserve their supremacy, the Young Turks substituted for the absolute rule of the Sultan, a Prussian form of nationalism. They made up their minds to "turcify" all the various races which still remained under their sovereignty. They attempted to suppress the use of any tongues other than the Turkish and adopted the usual methods of assimilation. They made war

on the Albanian and the Arab in order to enforce their measures; the Armenians who resisted all attempts at "turcification" they attempted to wipe out. Elaborate repressive organisations were set up. Local Committees of Young Turks were formed all over the Empire and carried on a reign of terror. If one despot had been suppressed in Constantinople, hundreds of "local Abdul Hamids" came into existence in the provinces. The years 1908 to 1914 were characterised by a series of revolts within the Turkish Empire against the tyranny of this "democratic experiment." The conduct of the Young Turks towards the Greeks and the Armenians during the War, especially in the years 1915 and 1916, proved that there was little to choose between the Government of Abdul Hamid and the Government of the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Balkan peoples finally succeeded in throwing off the Turkish yoke. It has been stated that the losses of territory and population incurred by the Young Turks rivalled those incurred by Abdul Hamid. Between 1908 and the outbreak of the European war, Macedonia,

Epirus and Albania, and a large part of Thrace, were detached from the Empire; the Turkish suzerainty was no longer recognised in Bulgaria or Bosnia and Herzogovina; in Africa, Tripoli was lost to Italy. Further shrinkage the Young Turks tried to prevent by their alliance with the Hohenzollerns.

The problem created by this melancholy record might have been solved by the Allies through their victory. But they have wasted a unique opportunity in adopting a policy dictated by self-interest and greed. When they allotted Smyrna to Greece, it was to please the chauvinism of M. Venizelos. When they proposed partially to control Turkey, not even employing the League of Nations for the purpose, they were suspected of aiming at capitalistic exploitation. A section of opinion is therefore inclined all the more vehemently to contend for complete Turkish independence.

Yet it is a hard fact that a certain measure of interference in Turkey is demanded by reason and justice. It would be unworthy of true internationalism to ignore history, to apply idealistic solutions in defiance of facts, above all, to hand

over large and suffering minorities, as part and parcel of our reaction against the Imperialism of the Allies, to an Imperialism infinitely more abominable. The Labour Party, to its credit, has not lost its head, and its reprobation of Turkish anarchy has been based on a sane judgment of the truth as it is. The non-Turkish subjects—and these are not confined to Armenians—have suffered far too much and far too frequently to justify further experiments in Turkish reform from within. It is true that we must guard ourselves against prejudice and religious bigotry. But, on the other hand, an equal danger has arisen, viz., an undue suspicion of everything remotely resembling Gladstonian idealism, and a contempt for those who are associated with the name of Christian. It is strange that our newest pro-Turks—Socialists and anti-Clericals—are not disconcerted at finding themselves running in harness with the Jingoes of the War Office, who are—as they have always been—backers of Turkey.

Granting that the population of Anatolia ("the homeland of the Turks") is Turkish or pro-Turkish, the problem remains to be solved: Can

a revived Turkey conform to the standards of the world in regard to economic development and the welfare of the subject races?

Both the 'Old' and the 'Young' variety of Turkish capacity have been tested. The Young Turks must be given every credit for the changes which they effected before the war. They abolished Abdul Hamid's passport system. They permitted schools and clubs. They attempted genuine postal service. But, as we have seen, subject races found their regime worse than the Hamidian. The Young Turks had secured political freedom for themselves, but denied personal security, not to speak of political equality, to others. No one would object to an independent Turkey if personal security were guaranteed to all its citizens. But an eye-witness in 1913 could not be blind to the fact that there was one law for the Turk and another law for the non-Turk. Punishment of a Moslem for a crime against a Christian was intolerable to the former.

Another grievance, especially affecting rural districts, arose out of the planting of Mahomedan colonies in or near Christian villages, which they robbed or cowed at their will. These

hired immigrants (known as mohajir) were brought even to European Turkey, transported thither from Asia Minor, and in 1912, when the Balkan armies drove the Turks out, they were the first to fly. The barracklike dwellings erected for them remained as a reminder of the infliction suffered by the non-Moslems. A still more cruel form was given to the plantation system in Armenia. There, in the semi-subterranean homes which are the only protection of the Armenian highlanders and of their farm stock against the rigours of winter, Kurds had been installed in large numbers, living on the Armenian farmers and insulting their women ; armed with revolvers while their unwilling hosts were forbidden fire-arms ; able to call in the authority of the Government to support their most capricious demands. Five years of nominally "Constitutional Government" failed to restore a single non-Turk to the land stolen from him at the time of the '95 massacres.

We are often told that the Turk is a good fellow and a clean fighter—less however to-day than before, for the world knows that British prisoners (privates not officers) died like flies

during captivity in Turkey. The Turkish peasant is "clean" enough. But our concern is with governments and it would be unjust to confuse the peasant with the official class which ill-uses him, or the soldier with the officer who flogs him. The Turkish peasant is quiet and truthful when his religious fanaticism is not aroused. But in no social circle that represents the governing class will one find a belief in equal rights. The Turks' fatalism, and his treatment of women—which is, after all, the final test of a civilisation—vitiate his capacity for political advancement. The outlook would be less hopeless if ideals prevailed among the best classes, however small. It is unhappily to the potentially best, the devout Turks, that the non-Moslem remain "rayah," i.e. "cattle."

Can we, in the circumstances, reasonably expect the Turks to confirm to the conditions of ascendancy laid down on page 48? Can we trust them to refrain from brutality and from discrimination against the subject races?

Few people who have an intimate knowledge of conditions in Turkey would dissent from the view that to place the administration under some form of external control by a disinterested Power,

if such could be found, would be a just and necessary measure.* The Armistice of 1918 offered a unique opportunity for control by an impartial State in the interests of the native peoples of Asia Minor—Turks and non-Turks, Moslems and Christians—as well as in the interest of world peace. Turkey was at that time powerless to make mischief and the Allied scramble had not begun. The United States would have been ready to undertake responsibilities. Had the offer of a Mandate over Turkey including territorities since allocated to the Allies been made to the United States of America, a happier chapter would have been begun not only in the history of the peoples of the Near East, but also in the history of the League of Nations, which President Wilson was bringing into being.

The choice would have been fortunate for

* Mr. Lloyd George in his Memorandum to the Peace Conference in 1919 included among his proposals (Cmd. 1614, p. 9, D. Turkish Section) :—

"Germany to recognise the cession by Turkey of the whole of her territory to mandatories responsible to the League of Nations,"

many reasons. The peoples of Turkey had for many years been familiar with the disinterested activities of Americans in their midst. Their educational institutions were centres of Western civilisation in European Turkey, Anatolia and Armenia. The traveller found few other sources of impartial imformation. The United States Government had thus ready to hand a body of men who had won the confidence and sympathy of the native peoples. It is doubtful whether the Turks themselves would have found the American Mandate as inacceptable as their actual plight. They had always enjoyed amicable relations with the United States, which, it may be recalled, maintained an official neutrality towards Turkey throughout its participation in the European War.

This policy, if realised, would have had a further very considerable advantage. The contact of the Great European Powers in the Near East constitutes a danger-spot from which war might at any time break out. Under American control there would have arisen a kind of buffer State sufficiently extra-European to obviate the friction involved in the convergence of Russia,

Great Britain and France. The objections which the doctrinaire autonomist is sure to advance would scarcely apply to this proposal. The United States is not hampered with traditions of Imperial dominion and oppression. Habits of that kind are foreign to her methods of government. In Colonel Shuster's financial mission to Persia, America had given clear proof that her methods of dealing with the weaker peoples were cast in a different mould.

The offer was never made mainly because the prey was too tempting. Syria was mandated to France; Palestine, Mesopotamia and the Mosul oil-fields to Great Britain; while the bulk of Asia Minor was divided into two commercial spheres for the benefit of France and Italy; America was offered the barren mountains of Armenia. Refusal inevitably followed. As Mr. Hoover said, the Allies had taken the bank, and offered America the slum. It is not to be wondered at that President Wilson's stock went down in the United States and that his successor decided to ignore the League of Nations whose Members had "collared the swag and hidden it under the Mandatory cloak."

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But even so, the position was not irretrievably lost. The Allies, if they had wished, had it in their power to bring about a reasonable settlement in the Middle East without the collaboration of the United States. It would have been possible, as in the case of Austria-Hungary, to effect a partition which approximated as closely as the difficult conditions permitted, to the dividing lines of nationality, and leave standing, after all the amputations had been made, a comparatively homogeneous Turkish State.

The conditions of settlement consistent with justice and fair treatment to the Turks would then have included:

1. The free use of the Straits for the trade and intercourse of the world, and their allocation for this purpose to impartial control such as might have been secured by the League of Nations.

2. Smyrna and its hinterland to be administered under the same international authority, thus giving an outlet to the rich lands of Anatolia, while at the same time affording adequate security to the Greeks and to the other

Europeans who have settled in Smyrna in such large numbers.

3. Thrace, Turkish Armenia, Cilicia, the Arab and Kurd territories to be detached from Turkish sovereignty, the future of these countries to be guaranteed by Mandatories appointed by the League of Nations.

4. What remained of Turkish territory, the bulk of Anatolia, might well constitute the foundation of an independent Turkey reduced to rank with the smaller States of the world.

In this eventuality, the railway system which, when completed, will connect Constantinople and Bagdad would obviously have to be placed, like the Straits, under international control. Other limitations would have to be envisaged. Anatolia is a rich land which, under the Romans, was one of the most important granaries in the world. Under the Turks, its riches for the most part remained untapped. Facilities would therefore have to be granted in any Turkish charter of independence to representatives of civilised or progressive nations who have the will and the ability to set their hands to the plough. Of course, the most important restrictive measure

on Turkish sovereignty would consist in the provision for the effective protection of racial minorities within the Turkish State. These are widespread, and would be included in any partition however honestly applied. It is in some ways fortunate that they are so distributed, for the Turk's inferiority lies in the fact that he has shown no capacity to maintain his own social economy. He lacks the elaborate technique without which trade and other activities of a highly organised kind cannot be carried on. The successful working of the social system consequently depends on the co-operation of Greeks, Armenians and other non-Turks who possess the necessary requirements. We cannot refrain from adding that the treatment of such peoples, who form so vital and integral a part of his community, indicates to the most unprejudiced mind the political incompetence of the Turk.

Subject to these reservations an independent Turkish State might be set up. But even assuming its realisation, its future would be precarious. The strictly Turkish population is neither prolific nor industrious. "A singularly observant British Consul," writes Sir Edwin Pears

in *Turkey and its Peoples*, "whose station was at Angora, told me that in frequent journeys from Ismidt to that city, before the railway was opened, he had passed the deserted sites of at least a dozen Moslem villages which he had formerly seen under occupation, and that in several others, where there had been two or three mosques, there was now only one. My late friend, Sir William Whittall, who died in 1910, was fond of telling of towns and villages, between Smyrna and Konia, which he had known in his youth as purely Moslem but which were now largely Christian. A Greek *bakal* would establish his huckster's shop in the town. It would be found of general use, and gradually other Greeks would follow until the Moslems would be in a minority. The population had neither increased nor decreased, but the elements had changed. Other residents in various parts of Turkey tell a similar tale." Other Englishmen who have lived many years in Asia Minor have remarked how the Turkish population seemed to fritter away as soon as industry and civilised activity entered into the life of the village or community. In these circumstances there would be little national life

in the new State. It would be based not on a preponderance of Turks but on the absence of any other preponderating nation.

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Peaceful conditions have not, however, been attained in Asia Minor, and, through the bungling of the Allies, Turkish nationalism has had a fresh stimulus in new wars. In many respects the Treaty of Sèvres did not fall far short of the settlement outlined above. It certainly did not err in limitation of the Turkish frontier, and compared with the constriction of Austria and Hungary it was generous. In those cases reduction was to the detriment of minorities as a whole. In the case of Turkey it would have been to their advantage. But the power to impose such a plan and secure the foundations of the Treaty had been thrown away at the Armistice by the Allies. The measures usually taken against a defeated enemy were neglected. The Allies were too intent on making fresh war against one of their number, namely Russia, needing for this purpose the immediate opening up of the Straits. The British Government was urged in vain to

occupy strategic points, but no troops could be spared from the Russian adventure. A further difficulty in controlling Turkey arose when Greek troops were despatched to Smyrna. This occupation, perhaps more than any other factor, rallied the Turks to the banner of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, an able military chief, who had placed himself at the head of a movement, growing fast in strength and numbers, aimed against the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres. The Kemalist rising ignored the Turkish Government at Constantinople which had signed the Treaty. Mustapha Kemal's 'nationalist' Government at Angora received diplomatic recognition from Soviet Russia, and promises of support. He carried war on a large scale into Transcaucasia in the autumn of 1920, to which reference will be made in a later chapter, biding his time for a more opportune moment to descend westwards against the Greeks. His strength was recognised when in March 1921 he was invited, together with representatives of the Porte, to attend the London Conference of the Allies. The demands then made by the Angora Turks included the restoration to the Turks of Thrace and Constantinople, the whole of the

Smyrna area, and the abolition of all effective guarantees for the freedom of the Straits.

Later in 1921 France concluded, behind the backs of her Allies, Great Britain and Italy, an agreement with Kemal by which she hoped to steal a march on her Allied rivals, obtain for herself a monoply of concessions and commercial spheres in Asia Minor, and become practically the suzerain of Turkey, just as she was already aiming at hegemony in Europe. By this agreement France violated, not only the Treaty of Sèvres, but also the Covenant, for she agreed to return to Turkey territories which she had received under the Mandate of the League of Nations.

What then are the irreducible needs which can still be met in view of these developments? The first desideratum is an understanding and a common policy between the Allied Powers on Near Eastern policy.

If a lasting agreement is to be reached, discussion must centre round the administration of Constantinople and Smyrna, in both of which Turkey might be allotted her full share, provided she subscribed to the conditions already laid down, namely the guarantee of free outlet for

trade and protection for the minorities. The disposal of Eastern and Western Thrace should also be made a fitting subject for reconsideration. But at all costs the freedom of the Straits must be maintained. Any modification which places under Turkish sovereignty territories where non-Turkish peoples predominate, e.g. Cilicia, must be resisted. Adequate Armenian territory must be liberated. The Allies have enough diplomatic assets in their possession to be able to retrieve, in some measure, the disastrous results of their policy since the Armistice, and bring about a settlement which, while securing justice and independence for the Turks, makes possible the liberation of the non-Turkish peoples.

In all except one vital particular, namely Armenia, to which reference will be made in the next section, a settlement in which the above issues—Smyrna, Constantinople, the Straits, Thrace—were reconsidered was proposed by a conference of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy held in Paris (March 1922). Although the freedom of the Straits was maintained, it was proposed that the whole of Asia Minor, Smyrna

and Constantinople, and a larger hinterland in Eastern Thrace than had been vouchsafed by the Sèvres Treaty should be restored to Turkish sovereignty, in return for which the Turks were presumably to allow the Greek forces peacefully to evacuate Asia Minor and retire to Greek territory. M. Poincaré invited the Turks to ask for more, if these concessions were not enough. Once again the Allies lost an opportunity to secure a just settlement, wasting their valuable assets—the possession of Thrace, Smyrna, Constantinople, and the Straits—and getting no concession in return from the Turks in regard to his subject peoples.

The position of Turkey *vis à vis* the Allies remained entirely unaffected by the victory of the Turks over the Greeks in September, 1922. It was still in the power of the Allies, or indeed in that of the chief naval Power alone, to impose a settlement which justice dictates. The legitimate demands of the Turks are for a share in the control of the Straits, and in the administration of Constantinople, and a certain readjustment in Thrace. But they could not lift a finger to obtain them except by leave of the Allied Fleets. The Allies, on the other hand,

are pledged, and rightly pledged, to the freedom of the Straits, the protection of minorities and the liberation of Turkish Armenia. The Turkish claims may, and should be harmonised with these unquestioned rights.

D.—The Armenian Struggle for Independence

"Le grand crime international est de détruire une nationalité."—Brunetiere.

The sufferings of the Armenian people have long been familiar to the British public. At intervals world opinion has been shocked by detestable outrages committed upon them. But the attempts which have been made to bring them succour have up to the present proved vain, and although the plight of Armenia is to-day more compelling of sympathy than perhaps at any point in its history, opinion, wearied with the length of time the problem has lasted, has become apathetic. Assuredly, if Western statesmen had been genuine in their professed adhesion to the justice of the Armenian cause, a very different story would have to be told. Opportunities for liberation have

presented themselves—in 1878, when Turkey signed the treaty of San Stefano, and in 1920 the treaty of Sèvres; but the competing interests of the Powers annulled in the one case, and made inapplicable in the other, clauses which might well have led to the realisation of Armenian independence.

This failure is the more unfortunate because contemporary progressive opinion now assumes a cynical leer about anything which savours of the idealism of the "nineties." Is not Armenia, they say, an irrelevant pre-occupation of Christian politicians? Why bother about these worn-out cries to-day? Such is the impatience with which the question is regarded in super-intellectual circles. The ugly facts which disfigure the contemporary history of the question are dismissed with a shrug; they are too familiar and too frequent to arouse emotion, forming as they have done almost a weekly news item for the last thirty years or more. In the belief that this attitude is neither humane nor practical, we proffer no apology in dealing with a national problem, which however unfashionable it may be in intellectual circles, demands urgent attention.

The Armenian people belong to the Indo-European race and speak a language allied to ours. They were one of the earliest races to adopt Christianity, for which the efforts of Gregory, "the Illuminator," were responsible towards the end of the third century. For hundreds of years, they withstood the attacks of Persians and Arabs, while under the alien sway of the Turks, from the fourteenth century to the present day, they have lost little of the vigour and vitality of their race. They have proved themselves successful and industrious in the professions and in commerce. As doctors, teachers, actors, advocates, they were to be found in every important town in the Ottoman Empire. Their business enterprise flourished not only in Asia Minor, but all over the world. Influential groups of Armenian merchants have established themselves, e.g. in Manchester, London, New York, Calcutta. Yet it must be remembered that the Armenian people in its native land is a race of peasants. Their Western outlook and standards have naturally isolated them among the Moslem races of the Middle East, to whom the qualities and industry of the Armenians

are a constant source of jealousy and irritation.

To their national characteristics the Armenians clung with pertinacity. Over 150 years ago, the Armenian language was in many places proscribed, and the penalty for infraction was to have the tongue torn out. But repression has not succeeded; the vernacular remained the spoken and written word of every Armenian colony and newspaper. The Armenian Church, cut off from the rest of Christendom, developed along national lines. Administered by its own patriarchs and catholicus, it has none of the aggressive exclusiveness of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greeks have always presented a bitter front both to Rome and to Protestantism. But the Armenians are more open-minded in religion and have even attached themselves in large numbers to both those sections of Christendom.

Prior to the European War and before the massacres and deportations of 1915, the Armenian population was roughly distributed over the highlands in the north-east corner of Asia Minor, mainly inhabiting the Turkish provinces (vilayet) of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond, Diarbekir and Sivas,—vilayets conveniently included in the

term Turkish Armenia.* It overlapped across the Russian frontier into Transcaucasia, occupying territory flanked on the north by Georgia, and on the south-east by Azerbaidjan. Thus the Armenians have for long been divided between the dominion of the Tsar, and that of the Sultan. The sufferers were always those in Turkish Armenia, Russian rule in comparison allowing a tolerable existence. It was characterised by none of the savagery which marked the Turkish system. Indeed the Armenians experienced a bitter moment in their history when Disraeli, at the Berlin Conference of 1878, secured the abrogation of the San Stefano Treaty, by which, as a result of Russian intervention and the capture of Erzerum, Turkish Armenia was to be annexed by Russia. Had England been able to foresee what happened in Turkish Armenia in 1894 and in 1915, she might have lent a readier ear to the policy of Mr. Gladstone. "On every question that arose," declared Mr. Gladstone in reference to the Berlin Conference, "and that became a subject of serious combat in the Congress, or that could lead to any practical results, a

* See Map 2. Appendix D.

voice has been heard from Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury which sounded in the tones of Metternich, and not in the tones of Mr. Canning, or of Lord Russell. I do affirm that it was their part to take the side of liberty, and I do also affirm that, as a matter of fact, they took the side of servitude."

Nemesis came when Turkey began her friendship with Imperial Germany and Lord Salisbury had to admit that England 'had put her money on the wrong horse.'

Meanwhile the Turk, thanks to the policy of Disraeli, felt he could exercise a free hand over his non-Turkish subjects, in confidence that no Power would intervene. Abdul Hamid, the reigning Sultan, began a policy of persecution which was so malignant as to lead observers on the spot to suppose "an intention to exterminate all who belonged to the Armenian race." It should be noted that these barbarities, as also the massacres of Bulgarians in 1876, and of Armenians in 1895, were carried out in time of peace. Sir Edwin Pears, who for twenty-five years was known as the leading authority on the Turks, states in his book, *Turkey and its Peoples*, that

"these cold-blooded slaughters of men, women and children by inferior races, were perpetrated for the purpose of plunder and in the name of religion." All the evidence available collected in 1895 by travellers and observers of repute such as Sir William Ramsay, and Mr. G. H. Hepworth of the New York Herald, and Sir Edwin Pears, revealed an elaborately planned design to strike at a fixed date the Armenians in every part of the Empire. Organised with the utmost secrecy, the onslaught fell with complete suddenness upon them. The Turkish population was summoned to the mosque and then to the sound of trumpets the massacres began.

It is not our purpose to attempt a description of the methods instigated by the Turks. Ghastly incidents were recorded. Mr. Fitzmaurice, an official of the British Embassy at Constantinople, relates how at Ourfa "a certain Sheik ordered his followers to bring as many stalwart young Armenians as they could find. They were to the number of about a hundred thrown on their backs and held down by their hands and feet, while the Sheik with a combination of fanaticism and cruelty, proceeded while reciting verses of the

Koran, to cut their throats after the Mecca rite of sacrificing sheep."

When Abdul Hamid, loathed not only by the civilised world but by his own subjects, was deposed by the Young Turks, few rejoiced more than the Armenians. Hopes were raised of finding a *modus vivendi* between them and the Turks under the sovereignty of a democratic regime. Their co-operation with the Young Turkish bloc in the Turkish Parliament reinforced the expectations of Great Britain and France that the days of civilised government were at last drawing near in Asia Minor. We have already shown how these hopes were dashed. With the advent of the Young Turk Party the Armenians were, in fact, confronted with a much more formidable danger than the hostility of a corrupt despot. The instincts that lay behind the Sultan's policy, the fanatical intolerance of the Moslem towards the infidel, became the psychological foundation, in the hands of an efficient National Party, of a system of oppression well-organised enough to leave no loophole of escape. Reference has been made to the Young Turk policy of 'turcification.'

Their attempts at assimilating the Armenians proved a failure.

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There was an alternative to assimilation, and Turkish nationalism did not shrink from it when the opportunity came.

If anyone still entertained illusions about the Young Turk mentality, they must have been shattered by the events of 1915 when a crime which in extent and character has no precedent in history finally destroyed the last hope of a reformed Turkey. It is no exaggeration to say that they—the reformed Turkish Government—aimed at the obliteration by massacre and deportation of an entire race. Strong in their alliance with the Prussian Junkers, knowing that the democratic States of Europe had their hands full in a death struggle with the Central Powers, Talaat Pasha and Enver Bey, the two leaders of the Young Turk Party, felt that the moment was ripe for the fruition of their scheme. News of what was happening was carefully prevented from reaching the outside world. Most of the evidence became known in Western Europe when the deed was done. And the enormity of the crime

was such as to leave most people incredulous.

What the young Turk aimed at was not intermittent pogroms or occasional outbursts of brutality. Mr. Henry Wood, the Correspondent of the American United Press at Constantinople, declared at the time: "The decision has gone out from the Young Turk Party that the Armenian population of Turkey must be set back fifty years. This has been decided upon as necessary in order to secure the supremacy of the Turkish race in the Ottoman Empire, which is one of the basic principles of the Young Turk Party."

Orders were sent out from the Committee of Union and Progress to all departments of the Turkish Police system in the early part of May 1915, so as to ensure simultaneous descent on the Armenians in most parts of the Empire. The plan, devised by Talaat and Enver, was far more efficient than the methods of Abdul Hamid. Instead of attempting to murder the cream of the male population in every Armenian community, and leave the rest to remain for the most part at their homes, the Turkish Government was determined to remove by massacre and deportation,

every Armenian man, woman and child from the northern provinces of Asia Minor—their native highlands—and from the plains of Cilicia in the south. To uproot them from their homes, to set them on the march was the important thing. Exposure and starvation would reinforce the rifle and the bayonet : and when these had done their work, the bodies could the more easily be got rid of along the highways of the interior, and over the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris. The more attractive women and girls could be picked out on the march by Turks or Kurds assembled for the purpose in town squares along the route.

It might be worth while to preserve Armenian children from the convenient ages of from five to thirteen, and bring them up as Moslems. Those below five could be disposed of very simply and be made to die a merciful death. The young men, the men of military age, were saved the rigours of a march across the sultry interior. They had been disarmed long before the policy was timed to take place and transferred to labour battalions. At the appointed time, these battalions were set to trench digging. When they

had dug to a convenient depth, machine gun and rifle fire put an end to the digging and the diggers. In these and other ways the dispersion of families proceeded on an elaborate scale. Complete extermination was desirable, but difficult of accomplishment. Those who survived—a decreasing number from day to day—were driven ever south-eastwards. The Young Turks had marked out an objective for the remnant—the desert regions in the hinterland of Mesopotamia. Several days' journey beyond Aleppo lay the destination of the exiles in the neighbourhood of Der el Zor. This region specially selected by Talaat presents a sharp climatic contrast to the highlands of Armenia and Anatolia. Professor Toynbee points out that "climatically and geographically, Armenia and Anatolia are an integral part of Europe while Syria and Mesopotamia are the outer fringe of Arabia, and akin, like it, to the Sahara region of North Africa." It can therefore be imagined how this cruel change of environment affected the thousands of refugees, exhausted by months of travelling on foot over the roughest of roads and by cruelties of nameless kinds.

It is computed that between seven hundred thousand and one million Armenians perished through massacre and exposure. Only a few thousands reached Aleppo, Der el Zor and Damascus.

The policy of the Young Turks had been a complete success. They had "cleaned" their north-eastern provinces of the Armenians. The facts are not now disputed. Nothing can ever justify the crime, although the Turks had the effrontery to make excuses. They tried to defend themselves by alleging that the Armenians in 1914 began to conspire for the downfall of the Empire. The small and sporadic Armenian outbreaks that occurred in 1915 were caused precisely by the fact that the Young Turks had already begun their sinister operations. A widespread conspiracy was impossible, all the men of military age having been mobilised at the beginning of the war. Arms had been assiduously collected and given up on pain of physical torture in the winter of 1914. When the Russians crossed the Ottoman frontier in 1915 the Armenians did not—and could not—rise against the Turks. On the other hand they rightly refused to fight

against the Russians at the beginning of the war. When the Young Turk Party sent representatives to the Congress of Turkish Armenians early in 1915 at Erzerum and asked them if they would co-operate with the Turks in an advance into Russian Armenia, the reply was a flat refusal to participate in a fratricidal war. What efficient government would ever have been foolish enough to advance such a request, or to believe that if granted it would lead to success?

We are left with the main cause which inspired the Turkish policy. The war was not the cause, but the opportunity for the fruition of Turkish nationalism. The expression of the youngest, crudest and most ruthless national movement involved the extermination of other races within its midst. With the Turks, the idea of national self-government degenerated "into an implacable racial conflict." To let non-Turkish subjects—whose vitality and industry had been proved markedly superior—co-operate and live in peace under Turkish sovereignty was thought to be a standing menace to the future of Turkey. Therefore, "the idea of guaranteeing the existence of Turkey must outweigh every other

consideration," declared Talaat Bey. Documentary proofs of the aims and methods which inspired Talaat's policy were furnished at a Berlin law-court in June, 1921, when an Armenian student who had avenged his people by shooting Talaat dead in the streets of Berlin was acquitted. Talaat's original orders addressed to the departmental quarters at Aleppo were produced in court. They had been seized by the British during General Allenby's occupation. Translations of the orders appear in the Appendices.

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It is of course urged that when the policy to be adopted towards a State is in question, the odious argument from massacre is not relevant. But does this view hold water in regard to Turkey? Two facts prevent our accepting it. Firstly, although barbarity is not a monopoly of the Turks, and atrocities were committed by both sides during the war, the Turkish policy of 1915 was on a scale of cruelty so colossal that it differs not in degree only but in kind and intention from anything that has been charged to the Greeks in 1920 or 1921. The Turkish intention in 1915 was to exterminate the Armenians; the lamentable conduct of the

Greeks in 1920 was in the nature of reprisals. Secondly, and even more cogently, Turkey is the only State which practices massacre in peace time. This distinction is vital. The cold-blooded slaughter of 1876, 1895, 1909 *, 1920, (in Cilicia), 1921 (about Kars) and 1922 at Marsovan and elsewhere are an objective proof that some quality is present in the Turkish mind which marks it as lacking the political instinct needed for sovereignty. It is a profoundly regrettable fact, but fact it is.

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The hopes of the Armenian people lay in the victory of the Allied Powers. At first the Turks carried all before them in an advance into Transcaucasia, only to be rapidly thrown back by the Russians in the early summer of 1915. Hopes and aspirations rose and fell during the years that followed, until General Allenby's advance to Bagdad and northwestwards to Aleppo heralded

* The slaughters at Adana (Cilicia) in 1909 in which the British Consul, Col. Doughty Wyllie (afterwards killed while leading the assault at Gallipoli) was wounded, revealed the savagery of the Young Turks, although their responsibility was not proved until later.

the coming victory of the Allies. When the Armistice was declared in November 1918, Turkey lay prostrate, broken and powerless. But as we have seen, the Allies omitted to take the usual precautions against a defeated enemy. No attempt was made to disarm the Turks. For this negligence they have had to pay in the rise of the Kemalist movement and in the consequent undermining of the Peace Settlement.

But in November 1918 the Armenians saw a beginning at last of the consummation of their hopes. The declarations of Allied statesmen promising them an era of peace and independence were surely on the eve of fulfilment. On the strength of these promises thousands of Armenians had, in the later stages of the war, enlisted in the French Légion D'Orient, not to speak of the thousands of Russian Armenians who had fought from the beginning with the Russians.

A start had already been made early in 1918 when Russian Armenia, as the result of the Russian Revolution, became an independent State. The Republic of Erivan, as it is often called, was at first federated with the neighbouring States of Georgia and Azerbaidjan. But

later all three agreed to separate, their boundaries being fixed by treaty, although a long dispute began between the Erivan Republic and Azerbaidjan as to the allocation of certain intermediate regions. The Erivan Republic formed a nucleus of a larger Armenia in which Turkish Armenia, it was hoped, might later be included.

The Treaty of Peace with Turkey provided the framework for a practical settlement on the basis of these developments. Armenia was declared an independent State while provision was made for the inclusion of part or the whole of the four vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum and Trebizond within the new frontiers. President Wilson was charged with the task of delimitation —the Allies shirking the duty. On the whole, these clauses constituted on paper a moderate fulfilment of the legitimate aspirations of the Armenians. They looked upon the Treaty as their Magna Carta, their charter of freedom and independence. And if President Wilson's award had been translated into actual fact while the Allied fleets were still patrolling the Black Sea and before the Kemalist plans could be developed, it would have been easy to apply pressure to the

Turks and force them to evacuate the delimited territory.

A practical settlement, as we have shown, might then have been possible, given the good faith of the Allies. But to assume the latter was to assume too much, as events proved. The cloven hoof began to show itself only too soon. As in the days before "the war for civilisation and public right" was fought, the Middle East became the arena for the competing interests of rival Imperialisms. A new factor was supplied by a reviving Russia, whose challenge to the proletariat of the world aroused the enmity of foreign Powers. Great Britain had already espoused the cause of Denikin whose activities in the Caucasus she supported with money and munitions, and promises of help in restoring the Russian Empire, in which scant regard was paid to the fate of the citizens of the newly erected Erivan Republic. France, (though vehemently anti-Bolshevik,) began to adjust her relations with the Turks, in order to ease the workings of the tri-partite agreement * signed simultaneously with the Treaty of Sèvres between France, Great Britain and

* Subsequently superseded by the Franco-Turk agreement.

Italy, by which Anatolia was partitioned into commercial spheres of influence for the benefit of France and Italy.

These were conditions of the kind in which the opportunist Turk always flourishes, and Mustapha was not the man to miss an opportunity of strengthening himself by playing off one Power against the other. When he decided upon his offensive into Transcaucasia in the autumn of 1920, it was difficult to know whether his object was to effect a junction with the Bolsheviks who were now beginning to reassert themselves in the Caucasus (Denikin having been crushed), or whether his rôle was that of a new "white" adventurer backed by the Allies. Russia on her part was determined to forestall the latter eventually by making advances to the Kemalists. M. Kameneff, when head of the Russian Trade Delegation London, explicitly informed the writers that the Soviet Government looked with favour on the Kemalist movement as a "popular rising deserving of support."

In this network of intrigue and counter-intrigue, Armenia, in spite of the professions of the Allies on the one hand, and M. Chicherin on the other,

was a mere pawn to be sacrificed at the first opportunity. After a Council of War held in October, 1920, at Erzerum—the heart, be it noted, of Turkish Armenia—Mustapha Kemal Pasha decided to throw his forces across the old Russian frontier into Russian Armenia and crush the Erivan Republic. His avowed object was to apply the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (abrogated after the German Revolution) by which two Armenian provinces in Russian Armenia were ceded to Turkey, viz : Kars and Ardahan. Half the forces of the Armenians were immobilised on the northern frontier of the Erivan Republic. They were contained by a force of Russian and Tartar red troops, Russia looking upon Armenia with suspicion because of her sympathies with the Allies. The remainder of the Armenian troops fought with antiquated and useless Ross rifles—presented magnanimously by the British Government.

The first Assembly of the League of Nations was sitting at Geneva at the time. To it the world looked for action. For the moment Armenia had become the test case of the League. But while M. Viviani's eloquence swept the

Assembly and Lord Robert Cecil devised plans for succour, French and Italian traders were busily selling arms and munitions to the Kemalists. No action was taken and Mr. Balfour caustically presaged the end, which came quickly before the Assembly rose. The terms imposed by the Kemalists were such as to reduce the Erivan Republic to a barren strip of territory around Lake Gokcha and to give the Turks a permanent foothold in Transcaucasia. M. Chicherin became alarmed, for Azerbaidjan and the Baku oil-fields tempted the Turks, and France was already suggesting a new *cordon sanitaire* against Bolshevik Russia extending from Asia Minor across Armenia into Azerbaidjan. Russia thereupon secured some slight modification of the terms, and Armenia became Soviet in order to save herself from extinction. The Russo-Turkish agreement gave Kars and a large part of Ardahan to Turkey.

As if to mock Armenia, the Wilson award was published in this the darkest moment of her history. The new frontier included the four north-western provinces in Asia Minor, Van, Bitlis, Trebizond and Erzerum, which were to be added to the Erivan Republic, now prostrate and

mutilated. Never perhaps in the annals of any nation has so sudden and bitter a reversal of fortune been recorded as that suffered by the Armenians in December 1920.

In January 1921, the Supreme Council at the London Conference of the Allies put its seal on these developments. The Wilson award was rejected. "The march of events," declared Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, justified modification of the settlement. The Turkish advance and conquest was accepted as a *fait accompli*. Those who read Mr. George's later outburst on the Upper Silesian question will remember how he declared that the British Government would never accept a *fait accompli* where justice and treaty rights were at stake. Are we to assume that these principles are applicable only when they are not incompatible with material interests? For fear of offending Moslem opinion in their Empire both the French and British governments were glad to hit upon the device of charging Mr. Wilson with the task of delimiting the Armenian frontiers; which award, as we have seen, they summarily rejected.

The future of Armenia the Supreme Council

referred to the decision of the League of Nations Council, the terms of reference promising a guarantee of finding a "home" for the Armenians in the highlands of Asia Minor.

To set up an Armenian "home" in North East Asia Minor implies (a) evacuation of that district by the Turkish troops, (b) temporary civil and financial assistance. The first object cannot be achieved without diplomatic bargaining or military or economic pressure, and cannot be separated from wider international issues. The second object implies the acceptance of a mandate by one of the members of the League. But a mandatory was not forthcoming.

Who can blame the Armenians if they feel hopeless and disillusioned? They see little prospect of returning to their native land. Scattered in refugee camps in Mesopotamia, Cyprus and elsewhere, only their Russian compatriots remain in native territory. And Russian Armenia is already overburdened with thousands of refugees from Turkish Armenia.

What then should be done? If the Allies have the power by diplomacy, bargaining or otherwise, to establish a Free State in Turkish

Armenia, and an autonomous administration in Cilicia, it is their manifest duty to do so ; and to see that in other parts of Asia Minor adequate guarantees be required from the Turkish government for the treatment of non-Turkish minorities, for it cannot be too often repeated that the greatest charge against Turkish misrule is the withholding from the non-Turkish citizen security of life and property in time of peace.

But to complete the story of the betrayal, another retrograde step was taken by the Allies at the Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Paris in March, 1922. The British, French and Italian Foreign Ministers proposed, as the price of peace between Turkey and Greece, the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of Asia Minor, extending from the Caucasian frontiers to the eastern side of the Straits, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, thus surrendering at one fell stroke every square inch of the native land of the Turkish Armenians.

The Greek débacle * in September, 1922 gave an opportunity for the reversal of this decision. If, however, the Allies fail in effecting the

* See p. 149.

liberation of the northern vilayets and Cilicia the last hope of the Armenian race would lie in what is left of the Erivan Republic. For the Armenians, sold by the Allies, might still have found a protector in Russia, the only State which in point of fact has ever provided them (by her occupation of the Caucasus) with a chance of civilised life. But by encouraging the Armenians to rely on their promises of support, the Allies tended to alienate the Erivan Republic from Russia, who looked upon her as a possible Allied base. In spite of this, the best hope for Armenia, failing the League of Nations and the Western Powers, is now as it was before the war, the encroachment of Russian strength on Turkish weakness, "Red" Armenia being encouraged to recover Turkish Armenia.* Two solutions were possible with Russia—either the orderly solution of a world League acting with Russia on peaceful lines, or the solution through Russian Imperialism. The Allies, having rejected the first, should at least abstain from spoiling the second by embroiling Armenia with her natural parent.

* *Vide*, 'Travel and Politics in Armenia,' by Noel and Harold Buxton.

CHAPTER VI

JAPAN AND KOREA

THERE remains another conspicuous example of national oppression. It is the case of the Korean nation, whose country Imperial Japan annexed in recent years—in a manner which has caused bitter regret to those who, like ourselves and other members of the Japan Society, have been admirers of the Japanese, not only for their art but for their character.

How such an act could have taken place with little, if any protest, from democratic opinion in the West, can only be explained by the seclusion in which Korea has been shrouded. Of those hermit States which maintained against the rest of the world a policy of utter exclusion, Korea was the last to yield. Not before the 'eighties' did she succumb to the forcible opening of her ports to foreign ships, and even after that event Korea was soon isolated by an equally effective veil manufactured by the Japanese censorship. Apart from the Consuls and the missionaries who

entered Korea in the eighties, few Europeans or Americans knew the country. Fewer still penetrated into the interior and saw for themselves what methods were beingadopted by the Japanese against the natives. Travellers were usually in the hands of their Japanese guides, but in spite of this disadvantage the characteristic temper and conditions of the country were not overlooked by astute observers. Lord Curzon himself, afterwards Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, testified when on a visit to Korea in 1890 to the "race hatred between Koreans and Japanese as the most striking phenomenon in contemporary Chosen.* Civil and polite in their own country, the Japanese develop in Korea a faculty for bullying and bluster that is the result partly of national vanity, partly of memories of the past. The lower orders ill-treat the Koreans on every possible opportunity, and are cordially detested by them in return."

When news of misrule leaked out through the efforts of missionaries or American Consuls, it ominously failed to provoke action or even a sympathetic demonstration. The wider inter-

* *Chosen*, Japanese name for Korea.

national issues that centre round the Pacific precluded any protest by foreign States against the policy of Japan. The grievances of Korea would have been intolerably out of place in the British Press. European States had enough on their hands preparing for the coming war, and when it burst, Japan was the sole master of the Far East. The moment when the war is over and the League of Nations is in being may be less unpropitious for throwing light on the question. British citizens are, moreover, in duty bound to apply themselves to the problem. In the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, the British Government committed itself to respect Japan's special interests in Korea, while Japan disclaimed any desire for aggression. If Japan's special interests in Korea acquired through our friendship cannot be pursued without throttling her national life, it is relevant for the British people to consider whether it is not their duty to make effective protest.

Reasons of humanity alone should suffice to enlist the sympathy and help of democratic peoples. The Labour Party is sometimes charged with exaggerating the evils of Imperialism and the

sufferings of subject peoples. A similar objection could not be advanced in this case, for its wrongs have been vastly understated. The three capital methods which together complete the subjugation of a people have been applied by the Japanese in order to suppress Korean nationality; discriminatory treatment; brutal methods; denial of all prospect of autonomy and insistence upon ultimate assimilation.

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All the factors that tend to weld a people into a compact nationality are present in Korea.* A peninsular country, attached to the mainland of Manchuria only by a narrow neck of land, it is inhabited by a homogeneous race which became distinct from the Chinese over four thousand years ago, and its history has developed almost without interruption until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The fact, however, that the country was hemmed in by Japan on one side, and China, to whose suzerainty she was subject, on the other, tended to weaken rather than strengthen the qualities which made of her ancient history an honourable achievement. That history shows

* See Map. (Appendix D.)

that "the Japanese themselves first learned from Koreans the cultivation of the silk-worm, the weaving of cloth, the principles of architecture, the printing of books, the painting of pictures, the beautifying of gardens, the making of leather harness, and the shaping of more effective weapons. Koreans learned some of these arts from the Chinese but even so they showed their readiness to learn, while they themselves were the first makers of a number of important articles. Whereas the Chinese invented the art of printing from movable blocks, the Koreans invented metal type in 1403. They used a phonetic alphabet in the early part of the fifteenth century. They saw the significance of the mariner's compass in 1525. They devised in 1550 an astronomical instrument which they very properly called "a heavenly measurer." Money was used as a medium of exchange in Korea long before it was employed in northern Europe. They used cannon and explosive shells in attacking the invading Japanese in 1592. Korean paper has long been prized in the Far East."*

*From *The Mastery the of Far East*, p. 53, by Arthur Judson Brown. G. Bell, Publishers.

When Korea was opened to foreign influence, perhaps the most remarkable result was the readiness with which the people adopted the religion of the Christian missionaries. The United States supplied the chief quota of workers; mainly Protestant and Evangelical, they included those of the Roman Church. The social effects were not inconsiderable; reformation in the home, emancipation of the Korean women from zenana conditions of life, and increased efficiency. The missionaries had created a need for education and they were not slow to provide it. They established about eight hundred schools where Koreans were introduced to the learning and history of the West. No doubt to these forces must be partly attributed the rise of the democratic idea in Korea.

Commercial Treaties were concluded in 1876 with Japan, in 1882 and 1883 with England and America, and although for many centuries Korea had been governed by an absolute hereditary monarchy subject only to the nominal suzerainty of China, travellers in the early nineties found already in existence the germ of a democratic movement in the Independence Club at Seoul, a

spontaneous gathering of young Koreans who met regularly to discuss the doings of their monarch and the peril in which Korea lay from the rival interests of Russia, Japan and China.

* * * * * *

For centuries Japan had cast covetous eyes on Korea. In the sixteenth century, she attempted conquest by invasion, but her armies were beaten off after leaving in their train devastation and ruin, from the effects of which the country is still suffering to-day. With the rise of Japan to the position of a Power fitted with Western equipment and the spread of the Russian Empire to the coasts of the Pacific, Korea, as the Peninsula which reached from Manchuria on the confines of the Chinese and Russian Empires almost to the northern coasts of Japan, became of vital importance. For strategic reasons Japan concluded that its possession was essential to her security. Korea dominated the important sea-routes of the Far East. In the hands of Russia it would constitute a formidable Russian outpost within railway reach of Moscow and Petrograd. In the possession of Japan, on the other hand, it would prove a barrier against Russian Imperialism,

and provide both an outlet for the rapidly increasing population of Japan and a starting point for Imperial expansion on the mainland.

The country was doomed from the moment the first Japanese Minister set foot on Korean soil. At that time, Japan, with an amazing energy and facility of adaptation was consciously undergoing her Western transformation. Her rapid acquisition of Western technique involved the speeding up of all the processes, evil and good, that had contributed to the greatness of Western Powers. Other Empires had been built up slowly and could afford to be comparatively humane and show some respect for appearances. The Japanese had no time to lose; quick and effective action was essential. Obstacles were consequently not to be tolerated. The Japanese Legation did not shrink from participation in conspiracies which led to the assassination of half the members of the Korean Cabinet, and to the murder of the Empress and her companions.

Having defeated China in 1895 and abolished her suzerainty in Korea, Japan turned her attention to a more formidable obstacle to her goal, the Imperialistic designs of Russia. The

Russian Legation at Seoul had begun to counter the efforts of the Japanese, and, like the latter, took a hand in dominating the Court. Russia failed, because the requirements of high politics brought an unexpected ally to Japan, whose influence was decisive. In 1902 Great Britain, alarmed with the rapid expansion of Russia in the East, formed a defensive alliance with Japan.

The secret memoirs of Count Hayashi,* the Japanese Ambassador to the Court of St. James from 1900 to 1905, throw a flood of light on the aims of the Japanese in desiring the Alliance, and on the methods by which England was precipitated into signing the compact. While negotiations were being conducted by Lord Lansdowne, the Tokio Government despatched one of its greatest statesmen, the Marquis Ito, to Petrograd for the ostensible purpose of opening pour-parlers for a Russo-Japanese Treaty. Naturally the Russian bogey assumed alarming proportions which were not without effect on the Foreign Office. Its fears were intensified by another bluff when the Japanese sent M. Kurino to Paris

* *Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi.* Edited by A. M. Pooley. Eveleigh and Nash.

to talk about a Triple Alliance between France, Russia and Japan.

The preliminary discussions between Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi showed that Japan's foremost wish was to obtain a permanent footing in Korea, while Great Britain was anxious to protect her rights in China.

"My country," said Count Hayashi to Lord Lansdowne, "considers as its first and last wish the protection of its interests in Korea and the prevention of interference by any other Power." To embody such an intention in a Treaty "without incurring the hostility of outsiders," as Count Hayashi remarked, "was a difficult business." The British Government, moreover, were not at first willing to surrender their considerable trading interests in Korea. The first draft proposed by Lord Lansdowne was not liked. "We wanted," wrote Count Hayashi, "Great Britain to give us a free hand in Korea, and therefore when we presented the first amendments in December (1901) we inserted as a separate provision, 'Great Britain recognises Japanese privileges in Korea.' We considered this recognition most important. Indeed it was

for us the most important thing in the Treaty. The discussion of this amendment took up most of the time of the negotiations."*

Thus Korea became the corner-stone of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, for, as Count Hayashi explained to Lord Lansdowne, "if Russia should one day occupy a part of Manchuria and extend her influence in those parts, then she would be able to absorb Korea, against which Japan would be obliged to protest. What Japan wants is to prevent Russia from coming into Manchuria, and if to do this she would be involved in war with Russia she wants to prevent a third party coming to the help of Russia."

Lord Lansdowne stated that the inclusion of the special provision "would mean friction with Russia and possibly end in a war between all the Powers." The Japanese were quite aware of this possibility; it was their intention to make England "keep the ring" while they fought Russia.

An alternative plan might have preserved the peace. It was that Korea should be made a buffer State. Japan flatly rejected that proposal. Her reasons were illuminating.

*Ibid. p. 184.

"Now please tell me," asked Lord Lansdowne, "when Russia proposed to make Korea a buffer State, why did Japan refuse to agree?"

"With regard to Korea, it is quite useless," replied Hayashi, "to attempt to hold a neutral position. The Koreans are totally incapable of governing themselves, and we can never tell when civil war may not break out. In the event of civil war who will hold the reins of government?"

Precisely. Civil war gives the pretext for occupation by the military as a first step to annexation; and the Japanese, as the history of their Legation at Seoul shows, would not fail to foment strife when the opportune moment had come. This interpretation is made even more obvious by Marquis Ito's representations to Count Witte, in Petrograd in the same year. "If your country," declared Ito to Witte, "really wishes to work harmoniously with Japan, you must give us a free hand in Korea, commercially, industrially and politically, and, more than that, if civil war breaks out in Korea, we must have the right to send our troops over there to restore order." This, as Count Lams-

dorff remarked, "virtually amounted to a demand for a Protectorate over Korea from which Japan would gain everything and Russia nothing."

And it was to that policy that Great Britain committed herself, knowing full well that it made war with Russia inevitable, and that Korea would suffer. Thus, for the second time within one generation, Great Britain, in order to counter Russian Imperialism, became a party to a measure which involved the sacrifice of a people: Armenia at the Berlin Conference; Korea, by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

War between Russia and Japan followed, and Great Britain successfully "kept the ring," enabling the Japanese to achieve one of the most amazing victories of modern times. On its conclusion, Great Britain thought fit to renew the alliance, although the Russian bogey had been shattered; and sanctioned in explicit terms the fruit of victory, namely the Japanese Protectorate over Korea.

In the 1902 Treaty (see Appendix C) the territorial integrity of the Korean Empire was maintained subject to Japan's special rights. The

1905 Treaty transfers Korea to the "guidance, control and protection of Japan."

"The new Treaty," wrote Lord Lansdowne, to Sir Charles Hardinge, The British Ambassador at Petrograd, "at this point no doubt differs from that of 1902. It has, however, become evident that Korea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire and its inability to stand alone, must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan."

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Flushed with victory, Japan gave free reign to the military party which had brought glory and might to the country. The Japanese suddenly found themselves not only secure but an Imperial State. The year 1905 boded ill for Korea. The temptation to exhibit the strong hand proved too great for a young Asiatic race which had learnt how to use machine guns. Liberal principles, so feebly applied even in the West, could hardly be expected to prevail among Orientals.

Having removed the possibility of foreign interference, Japan was not likely to tolerate opposition at home, if it existed. But there was

none. The Japanese leader of the Liberals frankly admitted in June, 1921, that even progressive opinion is not yet capable of envisaging an "altruistic" foreign policy. "The weakness of Liberalism in Japan is revealed," he stated, "when the question arises of applying it internationally. Japanese Liberals have not yet developed this belief to the point of urging it on altruistic grounds. They would condone a foreign policy quite alien to their Liberalism on the excuse that other countries show no better disposition."

It is not the intention of the Japanese to repeat the "mistakes" of the British Empire, whose ideal when ultimately achieved might take form as a loose confederation of self-governing peoples. "I can only see," stated an influential Japanese at Seoul to an English journalist, "one end. This will take several generations, but it must come. The Korean people will be absorbed by the Japanese. They will talk our language, live our life, and be an integral part of us. There are only two ways of colonial administration. One is to rule over the people as aliens. This you British have done in India, and therefore

your Empire cannot endure. India must pass out of your rule. The second way is to absorb the people. This is what we will do. We will teach them our language, establish our institutions and make them one with us."

The events that have since taken place bear out this statement remarkably well, and striking confirmation of the methods employed is afforded by no less a person than the Japanese High Commissioner of Korea, M. Mizuno Rentaro. Writing in a great English Liberal newspaper, the Manchester Guardian,* it is surprising that his views provoked little comment.

"I have instituted inquiries," writes M. Rentaro, "into the real roots of evil existing in Korea, and have introduced many changes and improvements into the political system that had formerly prevailed in Korea. These changes, however, by no means affect the cardinal principle of Japan's administration of the Peninsula, which, while enjoining on the one hand the development of Korea and the promotion of her people, demands on the other, strict supervision over those elements that oppose themselves against

* Manchester Guardian, Japanese Supplement, June, 1921.

Japan's rights and prestige, so that Japan's benevolence and dignity may be maintained at the same time, in strict obedience to the spirit that had actuated her annexation of the Peninsula. . . We will deal most relentlessly with any portion of them (the Koreans) who elect to defy the existing laws and prohibitions. This the Japanese Government will do in the future, as it has done in the past. It is a mistake to suppose that improving their conditions is a contrivance to win over the Koreans' affection. Towards the recalcitrant the Government will assume the sternest and most rigorous attitude. . . The growing hostility of the Koreans towards the Japanese administration is by certain people regarded with much concern. It is true that the Koreans are no longer "as submissive as sheep." Various circumstances have conspired to create such a disagreeable situation. The radical change of the world's thought, the mistaken notion of national self-determination, spreading after the war, and the growing consciousness of the Koreans themselves of their own national existence, are among the principal causes of their hostile attitude towards Japan. But the intelligent class of the

Koreans is thoroughly convinced of the impossibility of regaining their independence. . . Of course there is no room for excessive optimism. Governing an alien race is always a difficult task. To assimilate it requires time and patience. . . To direct and educate the Korean people so that they will submit from their own conviction of Japanese rule and feel pride and satisfaction in becoming part and parcel of the Japanese nation—to accomplish this grand aim the utmost impartiality must characterise our doings with the Koreans. . . Far-sighted plans must be adopted that are timed for fruition a hundred years hence."

This frank utterance of Japanese aims relieves the writers of the necessity of arguing the case against the Japanese militarists. Their policy does not differ in any respect from that held by Prussian statesmen and military leaders before the War. The end they desire is not the national growth of self-government and industry freely developing within the Empire. They aim at the obliteration of Korean nationality and the assimilation of the people as an inferior kind of Japanese—the helots of their Empire. Their

deeds are a consistent expression of their theories.

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Three main phases divide the history of the annexation of Korea: (1) the Protectorate assumed in 1905; (2) the ruthless regime of Terauchi following the annexation of 1910; (3) the still more ruthless terrorism following the revolt of the Korean people in March 1919, when Korea was proclaimed an independent republic, adopting a constitution and, a month later, appointing a ministry under the eyes of the Japanese police in Seoul.

The terms of the Protectorate Treaty presented by Marquis Ito to the Emperor in November, 1905 included the control of foreign policy by Japan, the abolition of the Korean diplomatic service and the recall of her Foreign Ministers; the position of Supreme Administrator was to be assumed by the head of the Japanese Legation at Seoul, and the office of Resident Administrators was to be filled by Japanese Consuls. On the refusal of the Emperor to sign, Marquis Ito turned his attention to the Cabinet. While he bullied them singly and collectively, he filled the Palace square with Japanese soldiers, fully armed.

Memories of the massacre of an earlier Korean Council must have filled the Ministers with apprehension. They signed the Treaty, although the Emperor never yielded. Indeed, foreseeing the trend of events he had a month before appealed to the United States government for assistance, basing his action on the terms of the Treaty concluded between America and Korea in 1882 :—

"There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen and the citizens and subjects of their respective governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling."

In his letter to President Roosevelt, the Korean Emperor stated that "one of the gravest evils that will follow a Protectorate by Japan is that the Korean people will lose all incentive to improvement. No hope will remain that they can ever regain their independence. They need the spur of national feeling to make them determine upon progress and to make them

persevere in it. But the extinction of nationality will bring despair, and instead of working loyally and gladly with Japan, the old time hatred will be intensified and suspicion and animosity will result."

The bearer of the letter, Professor Hulbert, an American resident of Seoul, reached Washington the very day the Treaty was being forced upon the Korean Cabinet. But his coming was most unwelcome to the authorities, who kept him waiting until the Treaty was a *fait accompli*. Then he was admitted and told that since the letter had been entrusted to him, "the Emperor of Korea had made a new agreement disposing of the whole question to which the letter relates," and, "it seems impracticable that any action should be based on it." The Emperor's cables denouncing the Treaty were ignored.

The reasons which induced America to abandon her traditional policy were revealed to one of the writers by Mr. Roosevelt when on a visit to his home at Oyster Bay in 1916. The ex-President referred to the efforts made by him in 1905 to end the war between Japan and Russia. Japan at that time was in a position comparable to that of

the Allies late in 1916 when Mr. Lloyd George announced his "knock-out blow" policy against Germany. Japan felt a similar anxiety to prolong the war to a "knock-out" and drive Russia from the Pacific. In the hope therefore of putting a check on further conquest and removing prospects full of danger to her own security, America was prepared to offer Japan every kind of material inducement. The peace of Portsmouth resulted, in which Mr. Roosevelt took natural pride. But Korea was sacrificed.

One of the first acts of the Marquis Ito was to depose the old Emperor and place on the throne the Emperor's son, a youth of feeble intellect, who was crowned with the pomp and panoply dear to the Japanese, in the presence of the Foreign Ministers at Seoul, the Russian representative alone absenting himself from the puppet proceedings. The event was followed by the disbanding of the Korean army.

Independence was not given up without a fight. Helpless in the capital, the Koreans began to organise in the provinces. The young men formed a fighting force in the fastnesses of the interior. The parallel of the Irish Republican

Army may suggest itself. Badly equipped, badly clothed, with old-fashioned weapons, the "Righteous Army," as it was called, conducted a hopeless struggle with the Japanese troops. They could not prevent the well-organised battues of the latter. Whole villages were razed to the ground on the pretext that some members of the army had taken shelter there, or that the army had operated in the vicinity. Korean Christians were active in the struggle, but it does not appear that the missionaries encouraged their converts to take part. On the contrary, their efforts aimed, under Ito's regime, at inducing acquiescence in the administration.

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Ito's rule, bad as it was, could not be compared with the oppressive administration instituted by Count Terauchi in 1910. Having failed to secure the contentment and good-will of the Koreans under the Protectorate, the Japanese government in 1910 decided upon annexation pure and simple. The military party at Tokyo had been clamouring for a policy of "thorough," when the unfortunate assassination of Marquis Ito by a Korean fanatic gave them the pretext they

needed. According to the terms of the annexation treaty, the Japanese Emperor became sovereign of Korea, and the foreign Powers without a murmur withdrew their Legations from Seoul. The Japanese Minister assumed control as Governor-General.

From the year 1910, the administration was characterised by the worst features of *droit administratif*. The extraordinary powers vested in the police may be illustrated by the terms of the ordinances summarised in the official Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen: "The police authorities have to participate in judicial affairs; to act as public bailiffs in distraining property and often to serve as procurators (attorneys) in district courts. The police authorities can inspect the residence of any private individual wherever there is a suspicion of firearms or gunpowder, or when they deem it necessary."

Comment on the last phrase is needless.

Not only were men arrested without warrant, but in thousands of cases punished without trial. The total number of cases decided in this way by "police summary judgment reached 56,013 in

1916" (Japanese official figures). Most of these cases were punished by flogging. In the courts the chances against securing justice were great. They have been summarised tersely by Bishop Herbert Welch, formerly the President of Ohio Wesleyan University and subsequently Resident Methodist Bishop for Korea and Japan at Seoul: "first, arrest without due process of law: second, presumption of the guilt of any person arrested; third, no right of counsel until after the first hearing; fourth, secret investigations and torture by the police; fifth, unity of action between the procurator who hears the case and the police; sixth, judges biassed by the use of the written record from the procurator's examination before the hearing in their own court begins; seventh, the power of the judges to give absolute final decision as to the admission of any offered evidence."

Free speech, free press, free meeting were abolished as a matter of course. A network of spies was spread over the whole country, organised on an elaborate scale.

Torture was nominally illegal. It was notwithstanding frequently used to extract evidence from

convicted persons during the preliminary examinations. American missionaries who informed the New York Headquarters of the Presbyterian Church in America stated in 1919 that what they reported could be duplicated in scores of places in Korea and was known without a shadow of doubt to be true. They gave individual cases of boys being beaten, kicked and seared with hot irons to force them to confession.

The educational measures adopted by Count Terauchi aimed at the elimination of Korean culture; school children were compelled to receive instruction in Japanese. In the law courts only Japanese was allowed. Teaching of Korean history was prohibited. The ancient books of the Koreans—repositories of their age-long civilisation—were destroyed. By forbidding any courses higher than the middle schools, the Japanese intended to incapacitate the Koreans from taking a share in the higher forms of the administration and permanently degrade them to a state inferior to themselves. Christian schools were closely supervised and the work hampered by a net-work of regulations, lest Western culture and ideals should interfere with the nationalising

process. Hundreds of these schools were, in fact, closed.

The government set itself to make the lives of Christian students and preachers unbearable.

Wholesale arrests of men whose honesty and loyalty were known to the missionaries were made in 1911 on a trumped-up charge of attempting to assassinate the Governor-General. What disgraced the administration more perhaps than any other feature was well exemplified in the treatment which the arrested students underwent at the hands of the police. In order to obtain some show of evidence on which to proceed with the charge, new cruelties were devised. For days and weeks prisoners were repeatedly stripped, beaten, hung by the thumbs, subjected to degradations until they "confessed" complicity.

In the economic domain, the Koreans were equally open to oppressive measures. Men of wealth were obliged to have a Japanese overseer in their houses, controlling their properties and finance. Koreans with deposits in the banks—which are Japanese institutions—could not withdraw large amounts at one time without disclosing to the banks the purpose for which the money

was to be used. Land was expropriated for the benefit of Japanese immigrants. The *New York Times* of January 26th, 1919, wrote that the purpose "is to colonise Korea with Japanese who are unable to make a living in Japan proper. A Japanese immigrant receives free transportation to Korea and is provided with a home and a piece of land, together with implements and provisions." There are 80,000 square miles of land in Korea, supporting a population of twenty millions, mostly agriculturists. "The natives declined to part with their heritage. Here was where the aid of the Japanese Government was besought and secured, and the manner in which the solution of the problem was maintained was peculiarly Oriental in its subtlety. In Korea all the financial machinery centres in the Bank of Chosen, controlled by the Government and located at Seoul. Through all its branches the powerful financial institution, corresponding to the Bank of England or the Treasury of the United States, or the Bank of France perhaps, called in all the specie of the country, thus making, as far as a circulating medium was concerned, the land practically valueless. In order to pay taxes and to obtain

the necessaries of life the Korean must have cash, and in order to get it he must sell his land. Land values fell rapidly and in some instances land was purchased by the agents of the Bank of Chosen for one-fifth of its former valuation." . . "More than one-fifth of the richest lands in Korea are in the hands of the Japanese immigrants who have been sent over through the operation of the scheme."

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Confronted with these conditions and believing that President Wilson's pronouncements on self-determination implied independence for Korea, the people became united, as they had never been, in growing hostility against their oppressors. An independence movement sprang into being differing from the armed revolt of the "Righteous Army" in that it was peaceful in method. It envisaged a national demonstration, universal in character, embracing every section and age of the community and designed to prove to the world that the people of Korea were united in their desire for independence. A network of branches of the movement had gradually covered the entire country, and, when the appointed day came, the

people were ready. On the 1st March, 1919, activities ceased. Shopkeepers, workmen, farm labourers, women and school children, formed processions and marched to the city hall or square, where the Declaration of Independence was acclaimed with shouts of the national cry "Mansei."

The national act of defiance took the Japanese authorities completely by surprise. They opened fire upon the crowds and attacked them with fixed bayonets. Japanese firemen pursued the fleeing demonstrators with long iron hooks. Hundreds of girls were arrested and taken to the police stations where they were maltreated, stripped, beaten and tortured, according to good authority, by the application of lighted cigarette ends to their bodies. Many boys were flogged until they died of their injuries. All over the country villages were burnt and villagers beaten or shot. Christians were a special mark for their fury. At the town of Cheam-ni, forty-six miles from Seoul, Japanese soldiers assembled the male Christians in the Church and opened fire on them. Despatches of the Associated Press of America, March 1919, described how theological students "were seized,

stripped of all their clothing, and tied to rough wooden crosses which they were forced to carry, barefooted and nude, through the streets." As their Master bore a cross, the Japanese said, they should have the same privilege. Executions were carried out with a refinement of cruelty. Condemned persons were tied to wooden crosses along the wayside and then beheaded.

It would take too much space and inflict too painful a task on our readers were we to reproduce some of the documents laid before the United States Congress in July 1919, or the personal narratives of the missionaries made public by the Presbyterian Church of America and other religious organisations. The period of maximum brutality coincided singularly enough with the Black and Tan regime in Ireland.

With the advent of a new Governor-General late in 1919 there was no radical change of policy. We have seen how this official announced that he would deal most relentlessly with any portion of the Koreans who "elect to defy the existing laws and prohibitions. *This the Japanese Government will do in the future as it has done in the past.*"*

* See p. 192.

In the Japan Year Book for 1920 the acts of repression are not denied nor the unarmed character of the "rising." "The simultaneous risings at different places," states this official publication, "indicated that the movement must have been pre-arranged. The gendarmerie and police being utterly inadequate to keep order, troops were called out, and it was chiefly these troops that, impatient at the persistent law-defying behaviour of the mobs were too often led to repressive acts marked by unnecessary severity. The causes of the present rising is attributed to the Prussian system of administration enforced over the Peninsula, discrimination against the natives in the distribution of office, absence of freedom of speech and writing, etc. But it should be remembered at the same time that the districts on the Yellow Sea were a Korean Ireland even before the annexation; they were perpetual hot-beds of insurrectionary attempts to which all high officials gave wide berth for fear of assassination. The Korean Sinn Feiners have their headquarters at Shanghai and Vladivostock."

To make an analogy with Sinn Fein Ireland in the hope of enlisting the sympathy of the English-

speaking world is scarcely prudent. Apart from the fact that a *tu quoque* does not justify an evil deed, in this particular case it constitutes an admission of the charges. British opinion has recognised the claims of Sinn Fein Ireland to self-government. If, in the view of the Japanese, the Koreans are the Sinn Feiners of the East, the case of Korea can be more readily understood by Western opinion. The Japanese should make no mistake as to the side to which the democracies of the West adhere in the struggle of the Irish for liberation.

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The people of Korea have declared for a republic. When the persecution was at its height delegates from each of the thirteen provinces met in Seoul, framed a constitution creating a republic and elected a ministry. The analogy of the Dail Eirann is obvious, but whether the delegation will prove as effective as the Dail is at least doubtful.

It must be admitted that the demand for independence may be tactically unwise. The Japanese, as we have shown, do not even envisage the possibility of autonomy, their Government

being essentially militaristic in character aims and policy. The interests of America and Great Britain in the Far East are such as to preclude the probability of any sympathetic action by them on behalf of Korea. The Koreans attempted to place their claims before the Paris Conference in April 1919, but their delegate was not admitted to the Council, although its members, the delegates of Japan, Great Britain, the United States and other Powers, were pledging their adhesion to self-determination by the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Koreans again approached the Washington Conference in 1921 with equal unsuccess. Korea is the strategic centre of Japanese expansion. Since its annexation, South Manchuria has been placed within the Japanese sphere of influence, and special privileges have been obtained in Eastern Mongolia. The Washington Conference has not reversed this position.* Japan is still in Manchuria, and in

* The new situation has produced more criticism of Japan than has ever been known since the Alliance. For example, the *Times* in a leading article (April 5th, 1922,) referred in the following terms to Japan and the Washington Conference :

Vladivostock, while she enjoys partial control of the Shantung Railway.

Can Japan be induced to substitute for her purely military or Prussian policy in Imperial affairs a comparatively democratic one, accepting the principles that prevail in the British Commonwealth? Will she grant Korea autonomy within the Empire? Would she accept a Mandate, if the adoption of the mandate system became general, bringing to bear the influence of world opinion?

Whatever the ultimate status of Korea should be, the first function of democratic opinion throughout the world is to appeal to the Japanese people to end their Government's cruel oppression.

"The Washington Conference, far from having absolved the British people by its decisions from the necessity of keeping a careful watch on Far Eastern Affairs, has made imperative a deeper interest in all Pacific problems. The decisions of the Washington Conference will be nugatory unless the peoples observe unremittingly the manner of their execution. By the Quadruple Treaty signed at Washington the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been superseded. . . In the spirit of this new agreement, the opportunity is given to the British people to affirm without reserve its appreciation of the achievements of Japan and of her peculiar difficulties, and at the same time to regard

We are reluctant to believe that decent-minded people in Japan approve of the violent measures of subjugation used against the Koreans. The brutal methods, the discrimination exercised against the Korean and the system of assimilation must cease unless Japan is to forfeit the respect of civilised nations. The international situation which centres in the Pacific is not so stable as to remove the necessity for maintaining the goodwill of the peoples of the West.

The Japanese Government realises to some extent that the subjugation of an alien race of twenty millions is not a domestic question in regard to which the opinion of the outside world may be entirely ignored. In their annual reports,

critically those tendencies of Japanese policy which seem to contravene the principles agreed upon at Washington. We are aware that Japan is passing through a critical period of transition, and that sharply opposed tendencies are at work in her public life. There is a fear, confirmed by the news of the latest naval decisions, lest the militarist tendency which has hitherto dominated Japanese policy should find in the Washington Agreement some loophole which would enable it to carry out its former plans in the changed circumstances. Any efforts in that direction would, we are convinced, be strongly disapproved by British opinion. British sympathy for all th ⁂

published in English, they are careful to emphasise the "reforms" which have been instituted. These are undoubtedly considerable. In housing, sanitation and means of communication, progress must be credited to the Japanese. The public buildings in Seoul are said to give a Western appearance to the town, although unfortunately one of the most conspicuous is the official *maison tolérée*—an institution previously unknown in Korea—built by the Japanese on a prominent hill-side.

Material benefits may promote the well-being of the Empire of Japan, but they leave the main grievance of Korea unredressed. Indeed, under a despotic regime, scientific improvements serve

is best in Japan may express itself with greater freedom now that it is released from the ambiguities of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But this sympathy would be clouded by any events or decisions which might suggest that the Japanese Government were not acting in the spirit of that broader compact of friendship to which they subscribed in Washington. The development of Japanese policy in China is a matter of particular interest. China is at present in the throes of a confused process of internal reorganisation, which renders her largely defenceless in regard to the outside world. Even in this time of acute political distress the people have given

mainly to increase the efficiency of the oppressor. They make his arm felt in the remotest corners of the country; the operations of the police and of the spy system are greatly facilitated by the telephone and telegraph. They are of little value to the Korean deprived of his liberty. He is not likely to prove more contented because Seoul and Tokyo are linked by a regular service of train and steamships, while he is strictly forbidden to leave the country. Of what use to him are the elaborate cable services of Tokyo to which Seoul has access, when no news is allowed to reach him, or to go out from him, except when the Japanese authorities may be pleased to allow it. There may be improved printing presses in

proof of an extraordinary tenacity and cohesion which political strife can hardly affect. The various ephemeral Governments thrown up in the revolutionary process interest us little; but the Chinese people, with their great resources in the present and their great responsibilities in the future, possess for the whole world, and particularly for the British Empire, a growing importance. For many years past aggressive elements in the Japanese Government have exploited the disorders in China in order to secure thereby for Japan a position of overweening advantage, thereby retarding the development of the spiritual and material resources of

Korea imported from the West, but they serve only to mock the Korean who is compelled to study Japanese culture, language and history and abandon his own.

Sooner or later the Japanese Government will be forced to admit that the kind of "reform" without which Koreans can never be satisfied is of a more spiritual order. No people can be held down indefinitely. The solution least harmful to Japanese 'interests' is some kind of autonomy within the Empire.

Meanwhile, if the stain on their reputation is to be removed, they should at once abandon the repressive measures which hamper the mental, religious and political development of the Korean.

China for the benefit of all. There is in the Chinese people a force superior to such feverish ambitions, and that force will ultimately prevail. At Washington it appeared that the Japanese had fully recognised the wisdom of burying all ambitions of exclusive dominance in China, and there could be no greater stimulus to British sympathy for Japan than a succession of unmistakeable proofs that the old aggresive policy had been finally abandoned. The tendency of the latest naval decisions is, as we have pointed out, disquieting. News of the complete execution of the Shantung Agreement would have a reasoning effect. With our great British interests in

They should grant free speech ; opportunities of higher education ; liberty to travel and to leave the country ; access to the higher administrative posts ; abolition of the spy system ; legal reform and the *de facto* abolition of torture and flogging.

The Japanese are inclined to meet criticism of their administration in Korea by references to Egypt, Ireland or the Philippines. Egypt is about to enjoy independence and Ireland is entering upon her rights. Whether the Philippines can stand alone is already exercising the United States Government. It is profoundly to be hoped that the force of these examples may modify Japan's military policy and lead to the cessation of the miseries of Korea.

* * * * *

We have dwelt on Korea without any abatement of the admiration and liking that we have long felt towards the people of Japan. It is not they who are responsible (or indeed aware of the

China, and with our sympathy for the best in Japan, we could desire nothing better than that Great Britain and Japan should closely co-operate in frank and friendly agreement in all those great problems which the rapid changes in China are now creating."

facts) but the bureaucrats and militarists of the Japanese obligarchy. There are Japanese reformers who attack the Government for repression in Korea and who desire to see the question ventilated in the world at large.

It so happens that a prominent Japanese publicist has just published a book whose praise of Great Britain is actually strengthened by its severe condemnation of our policy towards Ireland, because that condemnation shows the writer to have a judgment that is not blind or superficial. No sensible Britisher resents such criticism, because when employed within proper limits, it is a sign of friendship rather than a danger to it.

Furthermore, the progressives of England and Japan desire to see the public opinion of the civilised world exercising its proper influence. Dependencies are not the exclusive property of the governing State. The world is moving towards the idea of an association of nations which would be concerned in the granting of Mandates for all subject territories alike, and to which, therefore, the conditions of those territories would be a normal subject of concern.

We may fitly close with the graceful words in which the Japanese writer alluded to above excuses his friendly attack on our Irish policy :

"I console myself by resorting to that old Chinese proverb : 'From Mount Ro, you cannot view Mount Ro,' which when paraphrased means that the onlooker sees most of the game. In order even to view Fuji at her best and in her completeness, we must at least be twenty or thirty miles away. Presumptuous and bold though I may be, I believe it is not altogether futile for one to discuss another nation's affairs, viewing the situation from a far off foreign strand."

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APPENDICES.

A. MINORITIES TREATIES.

B. ORDERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS RELATING TO THE MASSACRE AND DEPORTATION OF ARMENIANS IN 1915.

C. TEXT OF ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY, 1902.

D. MAPS.

1. THE NEW EUROPE.
2. THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. THE FAR EAST.

A. THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES.

Minority Treaties between the Principal Allied Powers, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the Associated Power, the United States of America, were concluded with

Poland	28th June, 1919.
Czecho-Slovakia Serb-Croat-Slovene State	10th September, 1919.
Rumania	9th December, 1919.
Greece	10th August, 1920.

(The Treaty with Greece was not signed by U.S.A.)

Armenia	10th August, 1920.

(The Treaty with Armenia was not signed by U.S.A.)

The protection of Minorities in Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Hungary was guaranteed by special clauses in the general Peace Treaties of St. Germain, Sèvres, Neuilly and Trianon :—

Austria	Articles 62 to 69, St. Germain	10th Sept. 1919.
Bulgaria	Articles 49 to 57, Neuilly	27th Nov. 1919.
Turkey	Articles 140 to 151, Sèvres	10th Aug. 1920.
Hungary	Articles 54 to 60, Trianon	4th June, 1920.

The Minorities Treaties and the special clauses were in each case * placed under the 'guarantee of the League of Nations,' and were declared to be 'obligations of international concern.'

* With the exception of the Treaties dealing with Turkey, Armenia and Greece which remained unratified.

TEXT OF MINORITIES TREATIES

The text of the Articles which are found in all the Treaties is given below. Selected from the text of the Polish Treaty, which served as a model for the others, it includes the main measures designed for the protection of minorities.

ARTICLE I.

Poland undertakes that the stipulations contained in Articles II to VIII of this Chapter shall be recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

ARTICLE II.

Poland undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland, without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

All inhabitants of Poland shall be entitled to the free exercise, both in public and private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order and public morals.

. . . . . .

ARTICLE VI.

All persons born in Polish territory, who are not born nationals of another State, shall ipso facto become Polish nationals.

ARTICLE VII.

All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of an official language, adequate facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

ARTICLE VIII.

Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Polish nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

ARTICLE IX.

Poland will provide in the public educational system in towns and districts in which a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are resident adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their own language. This provision shall not prevent the Polish Government from making the teaching of the Polish language obligatory in the said schools.

In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Polish nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may be provided out of public funds under the State, municipal or other Budget, for educational, religious or charitable purposes.

The provisions of this Article shall apply to Polish citizens of German speech only in that part of Poland which was German territory on August 1, 1914.

. . . . . .

ARTICLE XII.

Poland agrees that the stipulations in the foregoing Articles, so far as they affect persons belonging to racial religious or linguistic minorities, constitute obligations of international concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They

shall not be modified without the assent of a majority of the Council of the League of Nations. The United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their assent from any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a majority of the Council of the League of Nations.

Poland agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction, or any danger of infraction, of any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances.

Poland further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of these Articles between the Polish Government and any one of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers or any other Power, a Member of the Council of the League of Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Polish Government hereby consents that any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant.

. . . . . .

B. THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES OF 1915.

The guilt of the Young Turkish Government (whose leaders were Talaat Pasha and Enver Bey) was finally established by the following documents captured at Aleppo during General Allenby's occupation and produced at a Berlin law-court in June 1921, (see p. 164).

The first document, addressed to Jemal, Governor of Adana, afterwards of Aleppo, is signed by the Committee of the Young Turks of which Talaat was the head, and as its contents were referred to in frequent despatches signed by Talaat it was admitted as valid evidence in court :—

To Jemal Bey, Delegate at Adana March 25th, 1915.

It is the duty of all of us to effect on the broadest lines the realisation of the noble project of wiping out of existence the well-known elements who have for centuries been constituting a barrier to the empire's progress in civilization. For this reason, we must take upon ourselves the whole responsibitity, saying 'come what may,' and appreciating how great is the sacrifice which has enabled the Government to enter the world war, we must work so that the means adopted may lead to the desired end.

As announced in our despatch, dated February 18th, the Jemiet (Young Turk Committee) has decided to uproot and annihilate the various forces which have for centuries been an obstacle in its way, and to this end it is obliged to resort to very bloody methods. Be assured that we ourselves were horrified at the contemplation of these

methods, but the Jemiet sees no other way of insuring the stability of the work.

Ali Riza (the Committee Delegate at Aleppo) criticised us and called upon us to be merciful; such simplicity is nothing short of stupidity. For those who will not co-operate with us, we will find a place that will wring their delicate heart strings. I again recall to your memory the question of the property left. It is very important. Do not let its distribution escape your vigilance. Always examine the accounts and the use made of the proceeds.

Other documents included the following :—

To the Prefecture of Aleppo September 3rd 1915.

We recommend that you submit the women and children also to the orders which have been prievously described (ref. above document) as to be applied to the males of the intended persons and to designate for these functions employees of confidence.

Signed, Talaat, the Minister of the Interior.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo 16th September, 1915.

It has been previously communicated to you that the Government by order of the Jemiet, has decided to destroy all the indicated persons living in Turkey. Those who oppose this order and decision cannot remain on the official staff of the Empire. An end must be put to their existence, however tragic the measures may be and no

regard must be paid to either age or sex, or to conscientious scruples.

signed, The Minister of the Interior, Talaat.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo 18th November, 1915.

From interventions which have recently been made by the American Ambassador at Constantinople on behalf of his Government, it appears that the American Consuls are obtaining information by secret means. In spite of our assurances that the deportation will be accomplished in safety and comfort, they remain unconvinced. Be careful that events attracting attention shall not take place in connection with those who are near the cities and other centres. From the point of view of the present policy, it is most important that foreigners who are in those parts shall be persuaded that the expulsion of the Armenians is in truth only deportation. For this reason it is important that, to save appearances, a show of gentle dealing be taken in suitable places. It is recommended as very important that the people who have given such information shall be arrested and handed over to the military authorities for trial and court martial.

The Minister of the Interior, Talaat.

To the Prefecture of Aleppo 9th December, 1915.

We hear that foreign officers are encountering along the

roads the corpses of the intended persons and are photographing them. I recommend to you the importance of having these corpses buried at once and of not allowing them to be left near the roads.

The Minister of the Interior, Talaat.

To the Government of Aleppo 15th January, 1916.

We hear that certain orphanages which have been opened received also the children of the Armenians. Whether this is done through ignorance of our real purpose, or through contempt of it, the Government will regard the feeding of such children or any attempt to prolong their lives as an act entirely opposed to its purpose, since it considers the survival of these children as detrimental. I recommend that such children shall not be received into the orphanages, and no attempts are to be made to establish special orphanages for them.

Minister of the Interior, Talaat.

Telegram No. 830.

From the Ministry of the Interior to the Government of Aleppo.

Collect and keep only those orphans who cannot remember the terrors to which their parents have been subjected. Send the rest away with the caravans. Talaat.

C. TEXT OF ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY, 1902. (*Chief Articles*).

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND JAPAN RELATIVE TO CHINA AND KOREA.

Signed in London, January 30, 1902.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows :—

ARTICLE I.

The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognised the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognise that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High

Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

ARTICLE II.

If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

ARTICLE III.

If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

. . . . . .

ARTICLE VI.

The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from th day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shal have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

MAP I.—CENTRAL AND SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE.

MAP II.—THE COUNTRIES OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST.

Note:—The Armenian west frontier approximates to that defined by President Wilson in 1920 and exists only on paper.



MAP III.—THE FAR EAST.