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Collected Materials for the Study of the War



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COMPILED BY

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Introduction

The World War has led to an intense sharpening of interest among Americans in international relations and world history. Races, countries, and policies hitherto almost unknown to the great body of American citizens, have in a moment become of vital importance to all. And with this new importance has come a truly American desire to understand the significance of the new world movements. Hence, from the public generally, from students in schools and colleges, from teachers, lecturers, and conductors of classes in clubs and camps, has come the demand for information and interpretation. The aim of the compiler of the following pages has been to present in brief compass such materials as will best meet this demand.

President Wilson's principal addresses in wartime have been included not only because they present the official statements upon the entrance of the United States into the war and upon the war aims of America, but also because of their incomparable style and diction. No condensations or omissions have been undertaken in any of the addresses.

In Part II is presented what is by far the best analysis of the immediate antecedents and principal events of the war which has yet been prepared. Professor Harding has adopted a topical form for his study of the war, but he has so woven together the evidence, and accompanied it with such telling quotations that he has made a most interesting narrative. This outline has already been made the basis of study in hundreds of classes throughout the country, and it will soon, doubtless, be adopted on a still wider scale.

Mr. Hoskins, in his Syllabus, in Part III, goes back to an earlier date in order to get an adequate background for the present conflict. Beginning with the Middle Ages he analyzes the steps by which modern Europe has come into existence and the manner in which its institutions have developed. Particular attention is called to the "problem questions" given under each topic. These thought-provoking questions will stimulate any intelligent person into a new attitude toward historical events and personages.

Next to a demand for information concerning the historical origins of the war has come that for an understanding of world geography. Places and districts hitherto unnoticed by even well-informed persons have in a day become of world-wide importance. German colonies in distant parts of the world have been seized by the Allies; battle-lines in Europe have shifted back and forth; and German armies have occupied great districts whose very names previously were hidden within the large bulk of the Russian state. Geography has helped in an understanding of the war by showing racial boundaries as well as political; it has brought us to realize the value of physical land and water features in the conduct of military campaigns; and of the economic background which has exercised such a deep influence upon German annexationists. Professors Harding and Lingelbach, in Part IV, have

prepared and described a series of maps bearing upon the military, economic, racial, and political aspects of the war. To these have been added a number of outline maps which may be used in depicting further military and political changes.

Professor Dutcher, in Part V, has prepared an extensive critical bibliography of the war. While the list of seven hundred titles may seem formidable to some, yet it is so closely sub-divided that the student can readily gain an appraisal of the books upon any phase of the war.

Part VI contains statutes and joint-resolutions of the Congress of the United States from April, 1917, to May, 1918. The aim has been to include those laws and parts of laws which show the manner in which the country has been legally reorganized to meet war conditions. It cannot be hoped that the selection of statutes will be satisfactory to all, but the list has been made as inclusive as space limitations would permit. No attempt has been made to include all the laws on a given subject, but rather to pick out typical statutes, from which the reader or student can gain an idea of the vastly important legislation of the Sixty-fifth Congress. It has been impossible, too, to print the full text of the longer statutes, some of which, like the Revenue Act of 1917, would occupy fifty of the large pages of the present work. The parts omitted have been indicated in the usual manner (. . .). The sections included are those which contain general principles of legislation; qualifying clauses and sections have in some cases been cut out. Persons desiring to consult the statutes for legal reasons rather than for general information or historical facts should read the official text published in the "Statutes at Large" or the "slip-laws" of the United States.


What has been said above concerning the laws, holds true also of the Executive Proclamations in Part VII. To save space the parts of proclamations which recite a statute or part of a statute have been omitted, as well as the usual form of subscription and seal by the President and Secretary.

The material in Parts II, IV, and V of this collection was prepared in co-operation with the National Board for Historical Service of Washington, D. C. It was first published in THE HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE for January, March, and April, 1918, and later reprinted in pamphlet form. Acknowledgment is cheerfully made of assistance in the preparation of Part IV received from Professor G. B. Roorbach, Mr. Randolph G. Adams, Messrs. Henry Holt and Co., the C. S. Hammond Co., and the Atlantic Monthly Press.

The several parts of this collection have been issued by the publishers in separate pamphlet form (except that Parts VI and VII are included in one pamphlet), and these separates may be obtained in single copies or in quantities for class use where the adoption of the entire collection is impracticable.

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Suggestions for the Use of the Materials

The President's addresses should, in the case of each, be studied in their entirety. Each should be comprehended as a complete work of art. But in addition to this they should be studied in a series with the purpose to discover (1) the immediate reasons for the entrance of the United States into the war; (2) the ultimate purpose of our intervention; (3) the change from our old policy of isolation (Monroe Doctrine); (4) our wishes concerning the Allies; (5) a plan for a better organization of the world than existed before the war. The text of the addresses may also be studied in connection with the study-outlines given in Part II and Part III.

The syllabus prepared by Professor Harding is designed as the basis for a connected study of the war and its immediate causes. The successive sections should be assigned for study and discussion. Members of the class or group should look up additional information in the references accompanying the several chapters.

The outline prepared by Mr. Hoskins lends itself to a more extensive study of the conditions leading up to the war. It is designed particularly for high school and college classes in which time is available to study more in detail the historic development of the modern world. The outline should be assigned in brief sections, and pupils should be required to prepare for the exercise by reading in the textbooks and general works. Their reading may be carried on with a view to obtaining answers to the "problem-questions" which the author has inserted under each subtopic.

The geography section should be made the basis of careful study. Too often students and teachers are content to use a map simply as a means of reference to locate a specified place. In addition to such use, maps should, in class instruction, be made the basis for propounding and answering definite problems. Such problems may deal with simple facts of locations and distances; or they may take up more subtle questions of the relation of geography to military, political, and economical activities. Thus the map showing the Pangermanist plan of 1895 (page 93) may be contrasted with the races (on colored map opposite page 92) to be subjugated, or with the map of the recent territorial redistribution in Russia (page 98). The map of the German drive of March, 1918, shows the alternate attack upon the center and the flanks of the Allied position; it shows also the gradual slowing down of the German advance. A number of excellent geographical problems are presented by Professor Lingelbach on page 85.

The bibliography of war literature is inserted in this volume because it is believed that it will prove useful not only in designating books for library purchase, but also because it gives an impartial valuation of each volume. Professor Dutcher's bibliography is the most complete work of this character which has appeared. With its careful subdivision into topics, it should be a continual help to the historical scholar.

The United States statutes and proclamations show the means by which a peaceful nation reorganized its military system, its trade and industries, and

its finance in order to devote all its energies to winning the war. Such material is somewhat difficult to use in school and college classes unless the assignments of topics and questions are most carefully made by the instructor. Occasionally the briefer statutes may be assigned entire for close study and analysis; but for the longer documents a more intensive method should be used. The following suggestions will illustrate how these and the other statutes may be so assigned to the class that the essential parts of the laws will not be overlooked by the careless reader.

From the text of the Selective Draft Act (page 137) answer the following questions:

What kinds of organizations and what numbers of each is the President authorized to raise by paragraphs 1-7 of Section 1? Which of these are to be raised by voluntary enlistment and which by selective draft?

What persons are liable to the draft? How are the drafted persons apportioned among the States? May a foreigner be drafted?

Contrast the bounty provision in Section 3 with the policy pursued in the Civil War. Which is the more democratic? Why?

Can you give satisfactory reasons why each of the classes of persons mentioned in Section 4 should be exempt?

Sketch the organization by which persons are registered for the draft, and the method by which exemptions are determined.

What official persons may the President call upon for assistance in the draft? What penalties are imposed for refusal or neglect to perform such duty?

What powers are given to the President to safeguard the morals of the army?

Compare the text of this Act with the proclamation of the President for the registration on June 5, 1917 (page 171).

The following topics and problems are based upon the Act of August 10, 1917 (page 145), giving the President power to control food and fuel:

Give in brief the purposes of the Act.

What agencies may the President use to enforce the Act? What limitations concerning contracts are imposed upon these persons and agencies? Why are these imposed?

What acts are made unlawful by Section 4?

For what classes of acts may licenses be required under Section 5? What is the advantage of a license system? Who are exempt from the license system? Why so exempt?

What punishment may be inflicted upon hoarders? What becomes of the articles hoarded?

What powers does the President possess to seize and to sell necessities?

What control does he possess over the prices of necessities, especially wheat?

What restriction does the Act impose upon the manufacture of distilled liquors? Does this affect breweries?

When shall the provisions of this Act cease to have effect?

Outline the powers of the President over the fuel supply. State from your own knowledge or other sources how the food and fuel control has been exercised in your locality.

A similar treatment of the other statutes and of the Executive Proclamations will bring out the significant parts of each document. Only by such means can a class be led to use with profit legal documents of this character.

PART I

A Selection from President Wilson's Addresses

ADDRESS TO THE SENATE, UPON TERMS OF PEACE IN
EUROPE, JANUARY 22, 1917.

Gentlemen of the Senate:

On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identic note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended; but we owe it to candor and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended. The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms which will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged. We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant, and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late.

No covenant of co-operative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American governments, elements consistent with their political faith and with the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point. The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend. Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recog-

nize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt and abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable—because I wish frankly to uncover realities. Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the co-operation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult

question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find free voice and utterance. Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms as I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfillment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power; catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When

all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS UPON GERMANY'S RENEWAL OF
SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST MERCHANT SHIPS
FEBRUARY 3, 1917.

Gentlemen of the Congress:

The Imperial German Government on the thirty-first of January announced to this Government and to the governments of the other neutral nations that on and after the first day of February, the present month, it would adopt a policy with regard to the use of submarines against all shipping seeking to pass through certain designated areas of the high seas to which it is clearly my duty to call your attention.

Let me remind the Congress that on the eighteenth of April last, in view of the sinking on the twenty-fourth of March of the cross-channel passenger steamer *Sussex* by a German submarine, without summons or warning, and the consequent loss of the lives of several citizens of the United States who were passengers aboard her, this Government addressed a note to the Imperial German Government in which it made the following declaration:

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.

In reply to this declaration the Imperial German Government gave this Government the following assurance:

The German Government is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, to be in agreement with the Government of the United States.

The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

"But," it added, "neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interest, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it has been violated."

To this the Government of the United States replied on the eighth of May, accepting, of course, the assurances given, but adding,

The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that the Imperial German Government does not intend to imply that the maintenance of its newly announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's note of the 4th instant might appear to be susceptible of that construction. In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative.

To this note of the eighth of May, the Imperial German Government made no reply.

On the thirty-first of January, the Wednesday of the present week, the German Ambassador handed to the Secretary of State, along with a formal note, a memorandum which contains the following statement:

The Imperial Government, therefore, does not doubt that the Government of the United States will understand the situation thus forced upon Germany by the Entente-Allies' brutal methods of war and by their determination to destroy the Central Powers, and that the Government of the United States will further realize that the now openly disclosed intentions of the Entente-Allies give back to Germany the freedom of action which she reserved in her note addressed to the Government of the United States on May 4, 1916.

Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England and from and to

France, etc., etc. All ships met within the zone will be sunk.

I think that you will agree with me that, in view of this declaration, which suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind deliberately withdraws the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of the fourth of May, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which, in its note of the eighteenth of April, 1916, it announced that it would take in the event that the German Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare which it was then employing and to which it now purposes again to resort.

I have, therefore, directed the Secretary of State to announce to His Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will immediately be withdrawn; and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to His Excellency his passports.

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renunciation of its assurances, given this Government at one of the most critical moments of tension in the relations of the two governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to believe that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval program they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe it even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded; if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before the Congress, to ask that authority be given me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful and legitimate errands on the high seas. I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all neutral governments will take the same course.

We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it; and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true

alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people which I sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of wilful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS ADVISING THAT WAR BE
DECLARED AGAINST GERMANY, APRIL 2, 1917.

Gentlemen of the Congress:

I have called the Congress into extraordinary session because there are serious, very serious, choices of policy to be made, and made immediately, which it was neither right nor constitutionally permissible that I should assume the responsibility of making.

On the third of February last I officially laid before you the extraordinary announcement of the Imperial German Government that on and after the first day of February it was its purpose to put aside all restraints of law or of humanity and use its submarines to sink every vessel that sought to approach either the ports of Great Britain and Ireland or the western coasts of Europe or any of the ports controlled by the enemies of Germany within the Mediterranean. That had seemed to be the object of the German submarine warfare earlier in the war, but since April of last year the Imperial Government had somewhat restrained the commanders of its undersea craft in conformity with its promise then given to us that passenger boats should not be sunk and that due warning would be given to all other vessels which its submarines might seek to destroy, when no resistance was offered or escape attempted, and care taken that their crews were given at least a fair chance to save their lives in their open boats. The precautions taken were meagre and haphazard enough, as was proved in distressing instance after instance in the progress of the cruel and unmanly business, but a certain degree of restraint was observed. The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents. Even hospital ships and ships carrying relief to the sorely bereaved and stricken people of Belgium, though the latter were provided with safe conduct through the proscribed areas by the German Government itself and were distinguished by unmistakable marks of identity, have been sunk with the same reckless lack of compassion or of principle.

I was for a little while unable to believe that such things would in fact be done by any government that had hitherto subscribed to the humane practices of civilized nations. International law had its origin in the attempt to set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free high-

ways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity and because it had no weapons which it could use at sea except these which it is impossible to employ as it is employing them without throwing to the winds all scruples of humanity or of respect for the understandings that were supposed to underlie the intercourse of the world. I am not now thinking of the loss of property involved, immense and serious as that is, but only of the wanton and wholesale destruction of the lives of non-combatants, men, women, and children, engaged in pursuits which have always, even in the darkest periods of modern history, been deemed innocent and legitimate. Property can be paid for; the lives of peaceful and innocent people cannot be. The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind.

It is a war against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it. The choice we make for ourselves must be made with a moderation of counsel and a temperateness of judgment befitting our character and our motives as a nation. We must put excited feeling away. Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right, of which we are only a single champion.

When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity, indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend. The intimation is conveyed that the armed guards which we have placed on our merchant ships will be treated as beyond the pale of law and subject to be dealt with as pirates would be. Armed neutrality is ineffectual

enough at best; in such circumstances and in the face of such pretensions it is worse than ineffectual; it is likely only to produce what it was meant to prevent; it is practically certain to draw us into the war without either the rights or the effectiveness of belligerents. There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs: they cut to the very roots of human life.

With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.

What this will involve is clear. It will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the governments now at war with Germany, and, as incident to that, the extension to those governments of the most liberal financial credits, in order that our resources may so far as possible be added to theirs. It will involve the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country to supply the materials of war and serve the incidental needs of the nation in the most abundant and yet the most economical and efficient way possible. It will involve the immediate full equipment of the navy in all respects but particularly in supplying it with the best means of dealing with the enemy's submarines. It will involve the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States already provided for by law in case of war at least five hundred thousand men, who should, in my opinion, be chosen upon the principle of universal liability to service, and also the authorization of subsequent additional increments of equal force so soon as they may be needed and can be handled in training. It will involve also, of course, the granting of adequate credits to the Government, sustained, I hope, so far as they can equitably be sustained by the present generation, by well conceived taxation.

I say sustained so far as may be equitable by taxation because it seems to me that it would be most unwise to base the credits which will now be necessary entirely on money borrowed. It is our duty, I most respectfully urge, to protect our people so far as we may against the very serious hardships and evils which would be likely to arise out of the inflation which would be produced by vast loans.

In carrying out the measures by which these things are to be accomplished we should keep constantly in

mind the wisdom of interfering as little as possible in our own preparation and in the equipment of our own military forces with the duty—for it will be a very practical duty—of supplying the nations already at war with Germany with the materials which they can obtain only from us or by our assistance. They are in the field and we should help them in every way to be effective there.

I shall take the liberty of suggesting, through the several executive departments of the Government, for the consideration of your committees, measures for the accomplishment of the several objects I have mentioned. I hope that it will be your pleasure to deal with them as having been framed after very careful thought by the branch of the Government upon which the responsibility of conducting the war and safeguarding the nation will most directly fall.

While we do these things, these deeply momentous things, let us be very clear, and make very clear to all the world what our motives and our objects are. My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress on the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states.

We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor states with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such

designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their native majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor.

One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United States. Even in checking these things and trying to extirpate them we have sought to put the most generous interpretation possible upon them because we knew that their source lay, not in any hostile feeling or purpose of the German people towards us (who

were, no doubt, as ignorant of them as we ourselves were), but only in the selfish designs of a Government that did what it pleased and told its people nothing. But they have played their part in serving to convince us at last that that Government entertains no real friendship for us and means to act against our peace and security at its convenience. That it means to stir up enemies against us at our very doors the intercepted note to the German Minister at Mexico City is eloquent evidence.

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and of fair play we profess to be fighting for.

I have said nothing of the governments allied with the Imperial Government of Germany because they have not made war upon us or challenged us to defend our right and our honor. The Austro-Hungarian Government has, indeed, avowed its unqualified endorsement and acceptance of the reckless and lawless submarine warfare adopted now without disguise by the Imperial German Government, and it has therefore not been possible for this Government to receive Count Tarnowski, the Ambassador recently accredited to this Government by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary; but that Government has not actually engaged in warfare against citizens of the United States on the seas, and I take the liberty, for the present at least, of postponing a discussion of our relations with the authorities at Vienna. We enter this war only where we are clearly forced into it because there are no other means of defending our rights.

It will be all the easier for us to conduct ourselves as belligerents in a high spirit of right and fairness because we act without animus, not in enmity towards a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck. We are, let me say again, the sincere friends of the German people, and shall desire nothing so much as the early re-establishment of intimate relations of mutual advantage between us—however hard it may be for them, for the time being, to believe that this is spoken from our hearts. We have borne with their present government through all these bitter months because of that friendship—exercising a patience and forbearance which would otherwise have been impossible. We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but, if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few.

It is a distressing and oppressive duty, gentlemen of the Congress, which I have performed in thus addressing you. There are, it may be, many months of fiery trial and sacrifice ahead of us. It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts, for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free people as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

PROCLAMATION CALLING UPON ALL TO SPEAK, ACT
AND SERVE TOGETHER.
APRIL 16, 1917.

My Fellow-Countrymen:

The entrance of our own beloved country into the grim and terrible war for democracy and human rights which has shaken the world creates so many

problems of national life and action which call for immediate consideration and settlement that I hope you will permit me to address to you a few words of earnest counsel and appeal with regard to them.

We are rapidly putting our navy upon an efficient war footing, and are about to create and equip a great army, but these are the simplest parts of the great task to which we have addressed ourselves. There is not a single selfish element, so far as I can see, in the cause we are fighting for. We are fighting for what we believe and wish to be the rights of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world. To do this great thing worthily and successfully we must devote ourselves to the service without regard to profit or material advantage and with an energy and intelligence that will rise to the level of the enterprise itself. We must realize to the full how great the task is and how many things, how many kinds and elements of capacity and service and self-sacrifice, it involves.

These, then, are the things we must do, and do well, besides fighting—the things without which mere fighting would be fruitless:

We must supply abundant food for ourselves and for our armies and our seamen not only, but also for a large part of the nations with whom we have now made common cause, in whose support and by whose sides we shall be fighting;

We must supply ships by the hundreds out of our shipyards to carry to the other side of the sea, submarines or no submarines, what will every day be needed there, and abundant materials out of our fields and our mines and our factories with which not only to clothe and equip our own forces on land and sea, but also to clothe and support our people for whom the gallant fellows under arms can no longer work, to help clothe and equip the armies with which we are co-operating in Europe, and to keep the looms and manufactories there in raw material; coal to keep the fires going in ships at sea and in the furnaces of hundreds of factories across the sea; steel out of which to make arms and ammunition both here and there; rails for worn-out railways back of the fighting fronts; locomotives and rolling stock to take the place of those every day going to pieces; mules, horses, cattle for labor and for military service; everything with which the people of England and France and Italy and Russia have usually supplied themselves but cannot now afford the men, the materials, or the machinery to make.

It is evident to every thinking man that our industries, on the farms, in the shipyards, in the mines, in the factories, must be made more prolific and more efficient than ever, and that they must be more economically managed and better adapted to the particular requirements of our task than they have been; and what I want to say is that the men and the women who devote their thought and their energy to these things will be serving the country and conducting the fight for peace and freedom just as truly and just as effectively as the men on the battlefield or in the trenches. The industrial forces of the country, men and women alike, will be a great national, a great

international, Service Army—a notable and honored host engaged in the service of the nation and the world, the efficient friends and saviors of free men everywhere. Thousands, nay, hundreds of thousands, of men otherwise liable to military service will of right and of necessity be excused from that service and assigned to the fundamental, sustaining work of the fields and factories and mines, and they will be as much part of the great patriotic forces of the nation as the men under fire.

I take the liberty, therefore, of addressing this word to the farmers of the country and to all who work on the farms: The supreme need of our own nation and of the nations with which we are co-operating is an abundance of supplies, and especially of food stuffs. The importance of an adequate food supply, especially for the present year, is superlative. Without abundant food, alike for the armies and the peoples now at war, the whole great enterprise upon which we have embarked will break down and fail. The world's food reserves are low. Not only during the present emergency but for some time after peace shall have come both our own people and a large proportion of the people of Europe must rely upon the harvests in America. Upon the farmers of this country, therefore, in large measure, rests the fate of the war and the fate of the nations. May the nation not count upon them to omit no step that will increase the production of their land or that will bring about the most effectual co-operation in the sale and distribution of their products? The time is short. It is of the most imperative importance that everything possible be done and done immediately to make sure of large harvests. I call upon young men and old alike and upon the able-bodied boys of the land to accept and act upon this duty—to turn in hosts to the farms and make certain that no pains and no labor is lacking in this great matter.

I particularly appeal to the farmers of the South to plant abundant food stuffs as well as cotton. They can show their patriotism in no better or more convincing way than by resisting the great temptation of the present price of cotton and helping, helping upon a great scale, to feed the nation and the peoples everywhere who are fighting for their liberties and for our own. The variety of their crops will be the visible measure of their comprehension of their national duty.

The Government of the United States and the governments of the several States stand ready to co-operate. They will do everything possible to assist farmers in securing an adequate supply of seed, an adequate force of laborers when they are most needed, at harvest time, and the means of expediting shipments of fertilizers and farm machinery, as well as of the crops themselves when harvested. The course of trade shall be as unhampered as it is possible to make it, and there shall be no unwarranted manipulation of the nation's food supply by those who handle it on its way to the consumer. This is our opportunity to demonstrate the efficiency of a great Democracy and we shall not fall short of it!

This let me say to the middlemen of every sort, whether they are handling our food stuffs or our raw materials of manufacture or the products of our mills and factories: The eyes of the country will be especially upon you. This is your opportunity for signal service, efficient and disinterested. The country expects you, as it expects all others, to forego unusual profits, to organize and expedite shipments of supplies of every kind, but especially of food, with an eye to the service you are rendering and in the spirit of those who enlist in the ranks for their people, not for themselves. I shall confidently expect you to deserve and win the confidence of people of every sort and station.

To the men who run the railways of the country, whether they be managers or operative employees, let me say that the railways are the arteries of the nation's life and that upon them rests the immense responsibility of seeing to it that those arteries suffer no obstruction of any kind, no inefficiency or slackened power. To the merchant let me suggest the motto, "Small profits and quick service;" and to the ship-builder the thought that the life of the war depends upon him. The food and the war supplies must be carried across the seas no matter how many ships are sent to the bottom. The places of those that go down must be supplied and supplied at once. To the miner let me say that he stands where the farmer does: the work of the world waits on him. If he slackens or fails, armies and statesmen are helpless. He also is enlisted in the great Service Army. The manufacturer does not need to be told, I hope, that the nation looks to him to speed and perfect every process; and I want only to remind his employees that their service is absolutely indispensable and is counted on by every man who loves the country and its liberties.

Let me suggest, also, that everyone who creates or cultivates a garden helps, and helps greatly, to solve the problem of the feeding of the nations; and that every housewife who practices strict economy puts herself in the ranks of those who serve the nation. This is the time for America to correct her unpardonable fault of wastefulness and extravagance. Let every man and every woman assume the duty of careful, provident use and expenditure as a public duty, as a dictate of patriotism which no one can now expect ever to be excused or forgiven for ignoring.

In the hope that this statement of the needs of the nation and of the world in this hour of supreme crisis may stimulate those to whom it comes and remind all who need reminder of the solemn duties of a time such as the world has never seen before, I beg that all editors and publishers everywhere will give as prominent publication and as wide circulation as possible to this appeal. I venture to suggest, also, to all advertising agencies that they would perhaps render a very substantial and timely service to the country if they would give it widespread repetition. And I hope that clergymen will not think the theme of it an unworthy or inappropriate subject of comment and homily from their pulpits.

The supreme test of the nation has come. We must all speak, act, and serve together!

WOODROW WILSON.

FLAG DAY ADDRESS, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JUNE 14, 1917.

My Fellow Citizens:

We meet to celebrate Flag Day because this flag which we honor and under which we serve is the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought and purpose as a nation. It has no other character than that which we give it from generation to generation. The choices are ours. It floats in majestic silence above the hosts that execute those choices, whether in peace or in war. And yet, though silent, it speaks to us—speaks to us of the past, of the men and women who went before us and of the records they wrote upon it. We celebrate the day of its birth; and from its birth until now it has witnessed a great history, has floated on high the symbol of great events, of a great plan of life worked out by a great people. We are about to carry it into battle, to lift it where it will draw the fire of our enemies. We are about to bid thousands, hundreds of thousands, it may be millions, of our men, the young, the strong, the capable men of the nation, to go forth and die beneath it on fields of blood far away—for what? For some unaccustomed thing? For something for which it has never sought the fire before? American armies were never before sent across the seas. Why are they sent now? For some new purpose, for which this great flag has never been carried before, or for some old, familiar, heroic purpose for which it has seen men, its own men, die on every battlefield upon which Americans have borne arms since the Revolution?

These are questions which must be answered. We are Americans. We in our turn serve America, and can serve her with no private purpose. We must use her flag as she has always used it. We are accountable at the bar of history and must plead in utter frankness what purpose it is we seek to serve.

It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance—and some of those agents were men connected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself here in our own capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her—and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the Foreign Office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high

seas and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to their death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with suspicion and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. This flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand.

But that is only part of the story. We know now as clearly as we knew before we were ourselves engaged that we are not the enemies of the German people, and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has now at last stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us. The whole world is at war because the whole world is in the grip of that power and is trying out the great battle which shall determine whether it is to be brought under its mastery or fling itself free.

The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men have never regarded nations as peoples, men, women, and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller states, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. The statesmen of other nations, to whom that purpose was incredible, paid little attention; regarded what German professors expounded in their classrooms and German writers set forth to the world as the goal of German policy as rather the dream of minds detached from practical affairs, as preposterous private conceptions of German destiny, than as the actual plans of responsible rulers; but the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested, filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and make interest with her government, developing plans of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Serbia were a mere single step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad. They hoped those demands might not arouse Europe, but they meant to press them whether they did or not, for they thought themselves ready for the final issue of arms.

Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German

military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous states of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German states themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians—the proud states of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way.

And they have actually carried the greater part of that amazing plan into execution! Look how things stand. Austria is at their mercy. It has acted, not upon its own initiative or upon the choice of its own people, but at Berlin's dictation ever since the war began. Its people now desire peace, but cannot have it until leave is granted from Berlin. The so-called Central Powers are in fact but a single Power. Serbia is at its mercy, should its hands be but for a moment freed. Bulgaria has consented to its will, and Roumania is overrun. The Turkish armies, which Germans trained, are serving Germany, certainly not themselves, and the guns of German warships lying in the harbor of Constantinople remind Turkish statesmen every day that they have no choice but to take their orders from Berlin. From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf the net is spread.

Is it not easy to understand the eagerness for peace that has been manifested from Berlin ever since the snare was set and sprung? Peace, peace, peace has been the talk of her Foreign Office for now a year and more; not peace upon her own initiative, but upon the initiative of the nations over which she now deems herself to hold the advantage. A little of the talk has been public, but most of it has been private. Through all sorts of channels it has come to me, and in all sorts of guises, but never with the terms disclosed which the German Government would be willing to accept. That government has other valuable pawns in its hands besides those I have mentioned. It still holds a valuable part of France, though with slowly relaxing grasp, and practically the whole of Belgium. Its armies press close upon Russia and overrun Poland at their will. It cannot go further; it dare not go back. It wishes to close its bargain

before it is too late and it has little left to offer for the pound of flesh it will demand.

The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding see very clearly to what point Fate has brought them. If they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power both abroad and at home will fall to pieces like a house of cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about now more than their power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under their very feet; and deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military power or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now with the immense advantages still in their hands which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people; they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it: an immense expansion of German power, an immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside; a government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany as it has been in England, in the United States, in France, and in all the great countries of the modern time except Germany. If they succeed they are safe and Germany and the world are undone; if they fail Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression; if they fail, the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union.

Do you not now understand the new intrigue, the intrigue for peace, and why the masters of Germany do not hesitate to use any agency that promises to effect their purpose, the deceit of the nations? Their present particular aim is to deceive all those who throughout the world stand for the rights of peoples and the self-government of nations; for they see what immense strength the forces of justice and of liberalism are gathering out of this war. They are employing liberals in their enterprise. They are using men, in Germany and without, as their spokesmen whom they have hitherto despised and oppressed, using them for their own destruction—socialists, the leaders of labor, the thinkers they have hitherto sought to silence. Let them once succeed and these men, now their tools, will be ground to power beneath the weight of the great military empire they will have set up; the revolutionists in Russia will be cut off from all succor or co-operation in western Europe and a counter revolution fostered and supported; Germany herself will lose her chance of freedom; and all Europe will arm for the next, the final struggle.

The sinister intrigue is being no less actively conducted in this country than in Russia and in every country in Europe to which the agents and dupes of the Imperial German Government can get access. That government has many spokesmen here, in places high and low. They have learned discretion. They

keep within the law. It is opinion they utter now, not sedition. They proclaim the liberal purposes of their masters; declare this a foreign war which can touch America with no danger to either her lands or her institutions; set England at the centre of the stage and talk of her ambition to assert economic dominion throughout the world; appeal to our ancient tradition of isolation in the politics of the nations; and seek to undermine the government with false professions of loyalty to its principles.

But they will make no headway. The false betray themselves always in every accent. It is only friends and partisans of the German Government whom we have already identified who utter these thinly disguised loyalties. The facts are patent to all the world, and nowhere are they more plainly seen than in the United States, where we are accustomed to deal with facts and not with sophistries; and the great fact that stands out above all the rest is that this is a People's War, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the peoples who live upon it and have made it their own, the German peoples themselves included; and that with us rests the choice to break through all these hypocrisies and patent cheats and masks of brute force and help set the world free, or else stand aside and let it be dominated a long age through by sheer weight of arms and the arbitrary choices of self-constituted masters, by the nation which can maintain the biggest armies and the most irresistible armaments—a power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish.

For us there is but one choice. We have made it. Woe be to the man or group of men that seeks to stand in our way in this day of high resolution when every principle we hold dearest is to be vindicated and made secure for the salvation of the nations. We are ready to plead at the bar of history, and our flag shall wear a new lustre. Once more we shall make good with our lives and fortunes the great faith to which we were born, and a new glory shall shine in the face of our people.

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS UPON THE WAR AIMS AND
PEACE TERMS OF THE UNITED STATES
JANUARY 8, 1918.

Gentlemen of the Congress:

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible basis of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.

The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but

also an equally definite program of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific program of practical terms was added. That program proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power.

It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own people's thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war?

The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th of July last, the spirit and intention of the Liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have

laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definite terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain.

There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of Society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe.

They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secure once for all against their recurrence.

What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression.

All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety.
5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her

needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

11. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of

political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this program does remove.

We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this program that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing.

We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.

Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS UPON THE GERMAN AND
AUSTRIAN PEACE UTTERANCES
FEBRUARY 11, 1918.

Gentlemen of the Congress:

On the eighth of January I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on the fifth of January.

To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on the twenty-fourth and Count Czernin, for Austria, on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address of the eighth of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Governments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them; but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes, the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three states now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood. He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the people and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the de-

termination of all questions affecting the Balkan states he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

It must be evident to everyone who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag Resolutions of the nineteenth of July, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state and state. The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag Resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be

respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany, against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful governments which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles on peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish

compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern and must of course be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own Empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

Second, that people and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and

Fourth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible.

The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays. We are indomitable in our power of independent action and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for a new international order under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words, but a passion which, once set in action, must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT BALTIMORE ON THE OPENING
OF THE THIRD LIBERTY LOAN CAMPAIGN
APRIL 6, 1918.

Fellow-Citizens:

This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. The nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men, and, if need be, all that we possess.

The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction.

I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan. I have come only to give you, if I can, a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reasons for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means because the cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that if it should be lost, their own great nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow countrymen, that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purpose of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose.

We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes, without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power as with others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonor our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice, but dominion, and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present chancellor has said—in indefinite and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we should declare will be our own in the final settlement.

At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar tones, professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiance.

But action accompanied and followed the profession.

Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest.

They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They do not here set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement; and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be freed under their dominion.

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front, if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favorable and equitable terms to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the east?

Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition, and build upon that dominion an empire of force, upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy; an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe; an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India and the peoples of the far east.

In such a program our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not; that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That program once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world, a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded, and the old age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning.

Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind.

The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that the whole course and action the German armies have meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with un pitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that is sincerely proposed; a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you will accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in.

This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything we say, my fellow-countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our power shall fill the thought, and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honor and hold dear.

Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men; whether right, as America conceives it, or dominion, as she conceives it, shall determine the destinies of mankind.

There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit; the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

PART II. Topical Outline of the War

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PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION.*

I. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE WAR.

I. GENERAL FACTORS.

1. The constitution of the German Empire permits its foreign policy to be determined by the Emperor alone, who is at the same time, by "divine right," King of Prussia—the State which possesses an overwhelming territorial, political, and military predominance in the Empire.

"The Emperor declares war with the consent of the Bundesrat, the assent of the Reichstag not being required. Not even the Bundesrat need be consulted if the war is defensive, and as the Hohenzollerns have always claimed to make defensive warfare it is not surprising that even the unrepresentative Bundesrat was officially informed about the present war three days after the Emperor declared it." (Charles D. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*; Committee on Public Information publication.) (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Autocracy," "Kaiserism," "William II.")

2. Profit derived from war in the past by Prussia (Germany).

- Through increase of territory (cf. maps).
- Through indemnities (e. g., from France, 1871).
- Through increased prestige and influence. Hence justification of the "blood and iron" policy of Bismarck, and his predecessors. War as "the national industry" of Prussia.

"The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of his glorious ancestor. . . . None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. . . . The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911.)

3. Germany's demand for "a place in the sun."

- Meaning of the Kaiser's phrase ("a place in the sun") not clear. It covers vaguely colonies, commerce, and influence in international affairs in proportion to Germany's population, industrial importance, and military power.
- Obstacles. The German Empire was a late-comer in the family of nations; the best regions for colonization and exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, were already occupied by other Powers.
- Examples of the demand. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 6, 10; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Place in the Sun," "Pan-Germanism," etc.)

"We need colonies, and more colonies, than we have

already, to give vent to our surplus energies without losing them and to make the motherland economically independent." (Manifesto of the Colonial League.)

"We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect the colonies we now have, but to bring about the acquisition of others." (Manifesto of the Navy League.)

"A progressive nation like ours needs territory, and if this cannot be obtained by peaceful means, it must be obtained by war. It is the object of the Defense Association [*Wehrverein*] to create this sentiment." (Lieut.-General Wrochem in speech to the *Wehrverein* in March, 1913.)

"Without doubt this acquisition of new lands will not take place without war. *What world power was ever established without bloody struggles?*" (Albrecht Wirth, *Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte*, 1904. Quoted by Andler, *Le Pangermanisme continentale*, 1915, p. 308.)

"It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily. . . . Till the world comes to an end, the ultimate decision must rest with the sword." (German Crown Prince, in *Introduction to Germany in Arms*, 1913.)

4. Biological argument for war.

- Darwin's theory of the "struggle for existence" as a chief factor in the evolution of species.
- Development in Germany of the theory that States are of necessity engaged in such a "struggle for existence."
- Hence war is an "ordinance of God for the weeding out of weak and incompetent individuals and States." Corollary: "Might makes right."
- Examples of such arguments from Treitschke, Bernhardi, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 1, 2, 4; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bernhardi," "Treitschke," "War, German View;" Vernon Kellogg, "Headquarters' Nights," in *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1917.)

"War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. . . . 'To supplant or be supplanted is the essence of life,' says Goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favorable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. . . .

"Might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute

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as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, pp. 18, 23.)

"They fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really believe much of what they say." (Vernon Kellogg, in *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917.)

5. Idea of the German mission in the world, and the German demand for world influence and prestige (Pan-Germanism).

(a) Ardent belief in the superiority of the German race and German "Kultur" over all other races and civilizations.

(b) Hence the duty to promote the Germanization of the world, and to oppose the absorption of Germans by other nationalities.

(c) Examples of these ideas in writings of Treitschke, Rohrbach, Bernhardi, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 1, 2; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bernhardi," "Hegemony, German Ambition," "Kultur," "Pan-Germanism," "Treitschke," "William II.")

"I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said *Civis Romanus sum*, one may in the future need only to say, 'I am a German citizen.'"

"God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress."

"The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor." (Speeches of Emperor William II.)

"The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passive races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur." (Ludwig Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie*, 1913.)

"If people should ask us whether we intend to become a world power that overtops the world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that the will to world power has no limit." (Adolph Grabowsky, in *Das neue Deutschland*, Oct. 28, 1914.)

"By German culture the world shall be healed, and from their experience those who have only heard lies about German culture will perceive, will feel in their own bodies what German means and how a nation must be made up, if it wishes to rule the world." (Benedikt Haag, *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, 1914.)

"With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language." (Theodor Springman, *Deutschland und der Orient*, 1915.)

"Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall!' will be our rallying cry." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, p. 154.)

II. MILITARISM AND ARMAMENTS.

1. Definition of militarism. It is a state of mind; not the having of an army, no matter how large, but the exaltation of it to the chief place in the state, the subordination of it to the chief authorities. Joined to this is the reliance upon military force in every dispute. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Militarism," "Prussianism," etc.)

2. Militarism and the military class dominant in Germany.

(a) Historical reasons for this: lack of defensible frontiers; hostile neighbors, etc. Relation also to topics under heading I.

(b) The Zabern Incident (1913) as a practical example of military domination. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Zabern," "Luxemburg, Rosa.")

(c) Quotations showing German exaltation of war and army, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 4, 5.)

"Bec use only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high estimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy." (Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 1915.)

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common." (*Jung-Deutschland*, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913.)

"War is for us only a means, the state of preparation for war is more than a means, it is an end. If we were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews." (Ernst Hasse, *Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkstums*, 1908.)

"It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army." (Emperor William II.)

Otfried Nippold, a University professor and jurist, was shocked to observe, on his return to Europe from a residence of several years in Japan, the extraordinary growth in Germany of militarism and the "jingo" spirit. At the end of a book which he compiled, made up of statements by prominent Germans in 1912-13 advocating war and conquest, he said: "The evidence submitted in this book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on, based on the one hand on the wishes of the Pan-German League and on the other on the agitation of the Defense Association [*Wehrverein*]. . . . War is represented not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better. In the opinion of these instigators, the German nation needs a war; a long-continued peace seems regrettable to

them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. . . . The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. War as such is what really matters to them. For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the German nation would again be in danger of moral degeneration. The truth is that, to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse, and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts—not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity." (*Der deutsche Chauvinismus*, 1913, pp. 113-117; quoted in *Conquest and Kultur*, 137-139.)

3. The competition in armaments. Europe an "armed camp" following 1871, with universal military service, and constantly increasing military forces and expenditures. The trained forces at the beginning of the war were estimated approximately as follows: Russia, 4,100,000; Germany, 4,250,000; Austria, 3,600,000; France, 4,000,000; Great Britain (including its "Territorials" or trained militia), 707,000.

4. Germany, already the first of military powers, planned a Navy to rival that of England. Her first Naval Bill was introduced in 1898; Great Britain's reverses in the Boer War (1899-1902) greatly stimulated German naval activities.

III. FAILURE OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, AND OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON (1908-9).

1. History of the Hague conferences. Agency of Russia and the United States in calling them. Their positive results in formulating international law and establishing a tribunal at the Hague. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hague Conferences," "Hague Conventions," "Hague Regulations," "Hague Tribunal.")

2. Plans therein for disarmament and compulsory arbitration defeated by Germany and Austria.

3. General policy of Germany with reference to arbitration. Refusal to enter into an arbitration treaty with the United States. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 4, 5; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Peace Treaties.")

4. British vs. German views of the "freedom of the seas," as revealed at the Hague Conferences and the Naval Conference of London. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Freedom of the Seas," "Declaration of London," etc.)

"The German view of freedom of the seas in time of war was that a belligerent should have the right to make the seas dangerous to neutrals and enemies alike by the use of indiscriminating mines; and that neutral vessels should be liable to destruction or seizure without appeal to any judicial tribunal if in the opinion of the commander of a belligerent war-vessel any part of their cargo consisted of contraband. On the other hand, Germany was ever ready to place the belligerent vessels on the same footing as neutral vessels, and to forbid their seizure or destruction except when they were carrying contraband or endeavoring to force a blockade. In this way she hoped to deprive the stronger naval power of its principal weapon of offense—the attack upon enemy commerce—while preserving for the weaker power

every possible means of doing harm alike to enemy or neutral ships. At the same time she was anxious to secure to belligerent merchant-ships the right of transforming themselves into warships on the high seas." (Ramsey Muir, *Mare Liberum: The Freedom of the Seas*, pp. 8-13.)

IV. SOME SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT.

1. French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, taken by Germany in 1871. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Alsace-Lorraine," "Franco-German Rivalry.")

2. Desire of Italy to reclaim its "unredeemed" lands held by Austria. (See *Ibid.*, "Italia Irredenta.")

3. Colonial and commercial rivalry among the Great Powers over Central and Northern Africa (Morocco especially); Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Persia; China and the Far East; South America, etc. (See *Ibid.*, under "Morocco Question," "Franco-German Rivalry.")

4. Increased gravity of questions concerning the Balkan Peninsula after the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Plans for Austrian and German domination in these regions. (*Drang nach Osten*) conflicted with Russia's desire to secure Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean, and threatened the security of Great Britain's communications with India. (See *Ibid.*, "Balkan Problem," "Drang nach Osten," etc.)

5. Grouping of the Great Powers into the Triple Alliance (1882) and the Triple Entente. Germany's fear of being "hemmed in" (alleged policy of "encirclement"). (See *Ibid.*, "Encirclement, Policy of," "Triple Alliance," "Triple Entente.")

6. The Anglo-German Problem. (See Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, 1911; *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16.) Due to—

(a) Menace to Great Britain's industrial and maritime supremacy through Germany's rapid industrial development since 1870.

(b) Colonial and trade rivalry in Africa, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, etc.

(c) Hostility to Great Britain taught by Treitschke and others. Doctrine that England was decrepit—"a colossus with feet of clay"—and that her empire would fall at the first hostile touch. Toasts of German officers to "the Day"—when war with Great Britain should come. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Der Tag," "Treitschke," etc.)

"If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult." (Heinrich von Treitschke.)

(d) Attitude of Great Britain on the whole one of conciliation.

(e) Failure of the two Powers to arrive at an agreement as to naval armaments and mutual relations. Great Britain proposed (in 1912) to sign the following declaration:

"The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggressions upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which

England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."

Germany refused to sign a similar declaration unless Great Britain would agree to *stand aside and be neutral in any war which might break out on the Continent*, i. e., to abandon her new friends, France and Russia, and allow Germany to attack them unhampered by fear of British interference.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

For forty years political and economic theories and governmental policies, especially in Germany, had been bringing a great European war ever nearer. Forces making for peace were also in operation, and at times it seemed that these would continue to control the situation. But in 1914 the influences making for war definitely triumphed in Germany and Austria, and precipitated the Great World War.

For reading references on Chapter I, see page 62.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR (1870-1914).

I. FOUNDATION AND CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT GERMAN EMPIRE.

1. Franco-German War (1870-71), and the Treaty of Frankfurt. France to pay an indemnity of one billion dollars and to cede Alsace-Lorraine.
2. Formation of the German Empire; its undemocratic character. (See C. D. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Autocracy," "Bundesrat," "German Constitution," "Kaiserism," "Reichstag.")
 - (a) The number of States in the Empire is twenty-five, with one imperial territory (Alsace-Lorraine). The list includes four kingdoms, six grand duchies, five duchies, seven principalities, and three free cities. Each of these States has its separate State government, subordinate to that of the Empire.
 - (b) The king of Prussia is hereditary "German Emperor," with full direction of military and foreign affairs.
 - (c) The Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) is a council of ambassadors appointed by the rulers of the separate States, and responsible to them. It oversees the administration and initiates most legislation, and is the most powerful body in the Empire. The States are represented unequally in it. Prussia, which contains two-thirds of the population of Germany, has 17 votes out of a total of 61. (If we include the three votes allotted to Alsace-Lorraine in 1911, which are "instructed" by the Emperor, Prussia has 20 votes in the *Bundesrat*.) Bavaria has six votes, Saxony and Württemberg four each, and the other States fewer.
 - (d) The *Reichstag* is the representative chamber of the legislature. It is composed of 397 members, of whom Prussia elects 236. Representative districts are very unequal in population. "A Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 votes; a deputy of East Prussia, home of the far-famed Junkers, an average of 24,000." The members are elected by manhood suffrage for a term of five years; but the Emperor may (with the consent of the *Bundesrat*) dissolve the *Reichstag* at any time and order new elections.
 - (e) The administration of the Empire is in the

hands of a ministry, headed by the Imperial Chancellor. Unlike the ministers of true parliamentary governments, the German ministers are responsible to the Emperor, and not to the legislative chamber. They do not need, therefore, to resign their offices when defeated in the *Reichstag*.

II. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

1. The Triple Alliance formed by Germany, Austria, and Italy (1882). Germany's main object was to safeguard herself against an attempt by France to recover Alsace-Lorraine. As France recovered strength Germany plotted new aggressive designs against her.
2. Germany attempted in 1904-05 to form a secret alliance with Russia and France against Great Britain. Failure of the attempt owing to France's unwillingness to give up hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The evidence of this attempt was published in 1917, in a series of letters signed "Willy" and "Nicky" which passed between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and which were discovered in the Tsar's palace after his deposition. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Willy and Nicky Correspondence.")
3. Formation of the Triple Entente.
 - (a) Dual Alliance of France and Russia formed (1891-94) as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance.
 - (b) Settlement of England's disputes with France over certain African questions, etc. (1904), and with Russia over Persia, etc. (1907), established the Triple Entente ("good understanding") between those powers.

"France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe under German leadership was fastening their spurs and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They had decided not to fight, and the face of European things was changed." (Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 57.)

III. THREE DIPLOMATIC CRISES: 1905, 1908, 1911.

1. First Morocco crisis, 1905-06. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, 120-126; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Morocco Question," etc.)
 - (a) French interests in Morocco; slight interests of Germany.
 - (b) The Tangier incident. The Kaiser, landing from his yacht in Tangier, challenged France's policy in Morocco.
 - (c) Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dismissed on Germany's demand. "We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person, but his policy is a menace to Germany, and you may rest assured we shall not wait for it to be realized." (German ambassador to France, in published interview.)
 - (d) France brought to the bar of Europe in an international conference at Algieras—which, in the main, sanctioned her Moroccan policy.
 - (e) The purpose of Germany in this crisis, as in those which follow, was to humiliate France and to test the strength of the Triple Entente. These were struggles to increase German prestige.
2. Crisis over Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bosnia-Herzegovina," "Congress of Berlin," "Pan-Slavism," "Slavs," etc.)

- (a) These provinces freed from direct rule of the Turks by Serbia and Russia, but handed over by the Congress of Berlin to Austria to administer (1878).
- (b) Austria seized the occasion offered by the "Young Turk" Revolution of 1908 to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and refused to refer the question to a European congress for settlement.
- (c) Russia (as yet unrecovered from the Russo-Japanese War) was forced to acquiesce when the Kaiser "took his stand in shining armor by the side of his ally." Humiliating submission imposed on Serbia. (See below, ch. iv, I 2 a.)
2. Second Morocco crisis, in 1911. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, 120-126; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Morocco Question.")
 - (a) Agadir Affair: German cruiser "Panther" sent to Agadir as a protest against alleged French infractions of the Algieras agreement, and "to show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one side." (Speech of the German Chancellor to the Reichstag.)
 - (b) Great Britain, in spite of political difficulties at home, warned Germany that in case of war she would help France.
 - (c) Adjustment of the Moroccan question. Germany accepted compensation from France elsewhere in return for recognition of French protectorate over Morocco. (Treaty of November 4, 1911.)
 - (d) Furious resentment of the German military party at this outcome. "The humiliation of the Empire is so much the greater, since it is the Emperor himself who had engaged the honor of the German people in Morocco." (*Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*.)
3. Hardening of the German resolve not to accept another diplomatic defeat. "It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword." (Speech in Reichstag, applauded by the German Crown Prince.)

IV. BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE "MIDDLE EUROPE" PROJECT CONSTITUTE OTHER GROUNDS OF CONFLICT.

1. Germany supplants England as the protector of Turkey against Russia. Speech of the Kaiser at Damascus, 1898: "The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times."
2. The Bagdad Railway. Designed to connect Bagdad with Constantinople and the Central European railways. Germany obtains concession from Turkey for its construction in 1902-03. Political as well as economic motives involved. Threat to British rule in India by proposed extension to the Persian Gulf. (See the *President's Flag Day Address with Evidence of Germany's Plans*, note 15; *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 8; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Berlin to Bagdad," "Corridor," etc.)
3. The "Middle Europe" Project. This may be defined briefly as a plan for "a loosely federal combination for purposes of offense and defense, military and economic, consisting primarily of the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy [Austria-Hungary], but also including the Balkan States and Turkey, together with all the neutral States—Roumania, Greece, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and Holland—that can be drawn within its embrace." (W. J. Ashley, in Introduction to F. Naumann's *Central Europe*, translated by Christabel M. Meridith, 1916.)

The plan includes the domination of this group State by Germany through (a) its control of the common financial and economic policy, and (b) its control of the military forces, based on universal military service. (Compare Prussia's control within the German Empire.) (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 8; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Mittel-Europa," etc.; *The President's Flag Day Address*, notes 15-17.)

4. Union of the Middle Europe project and the Bagdad Railway project in a Berlin-to-Bagdad plan.

"Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous States of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German States themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians—the proud States of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way." (President Wilson, *Flag Day Address*, June 14, 1917.)

"Across the path of this railway to Bagdad lay Serbia—an independent country whose sovereign alone among those of southeastern Europe had no marriage connection with Berlin, a Serbia that looked toward Russia. That is why Europe was nearly driven into war in 1913; that is why Germany stood so determinedly behind Austria's demands in 1914 and forced war. She must have her 'corridor' to the southeast; she must have political domination all along the route of the great economic empire she planned. She was unwilling to await the process of 'peaceful penetration.'" (*The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans*, note 15.)

V. TRIPOLITAN AND BALKAN WARS, 1911-13. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Balkan Wars," "Constantinople," "Drang nach Osten," "Young Turks.")

1. War of Italy with Turkey over Tripoli (1911-12). Claims of Italy on Tripoli; weakness of Turkey following Young Turk revolution of 1908; unfavorable attitude of Italy's allies (Germany and Austria) to the war as endangering their relations with Turkey. Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 15, 1912) transfers Tripoli from Turkish to Italian rule.
2. War of Balkan Allies against Turkey (1912-13).
 - (a) Secret league of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro to expel Turkey from Europe and

liberate their fellow Christians from Turkish misrule. War declared Oct. 16, 1912.

- (b) Inability of the Great Powers, because of their own divergent aims, to restrain the Balkan allies.
- (c) Success of the allies. By the Treaty of London (May 30, 1913) Turkey was to surrender all territories in Europe except Constantinople and a small strip of adjacent territory (Enos-Midia line).

2. War among the Balkan Allies (June 30 to July 21, 1913).

- (a) Bulgaria (with Austria's support) attacked her allies as a result of disputes over division of conquered territory.
- (b) Roumania joined Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro in defeating Bulgaria. Turkey recovered Adrianople.
- (c) Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 10, 1913). Most of the conquered territory was given to Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, though Serbia was denied (through Austrian, German, and Italian pressure) an outlet to the Adriatic. A smaller share was given Bulgaria. Roumania secured a slice of Bulgarian territory. Albania was made a principality under a German ruler.

3. Some wider features of these conflicts:

- (a) A general European war was prevented (though with difficulty) by statesmen of the different countries working through the agency of (1) diplomatic notes, and (2) diplomatic conferences held especially at London. Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief agent in maintaining peace. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Grey, Viscount.")
- (b) Austrian and German influence was seriously impaired, for they "had guessed badly and supported the losing side—first Turkey and then Bulgaria." Their Balkan domination and Middle Europe project alike were threatened by the events of 1912-13. Corresponding increase of Russian and Serbian power.
- (c) A new assertion of power on the part of Germany and Austria, principally against Russia and Serbia, to recover the ground lost through the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest was made practically certain.

For reading references on Chapter II, see page 63.

III. INDICATIONS THAT GERMANY AND AUSTRIA PLANNED AN AGGRESSIVE STROKE BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914.

I. AUSTRIA PROPOSED AN ATTACK ON SERBIA IN 1913. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Austria and Serbia, 1913."

1. Austria's Proposal to Italy (Aug. 9, 1913—the day before the Peace of Bucharest.)

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *causis foederis* of the Triple Alliance. . . ." (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in dispatch of Aug. 9, 1913. Revealed by ex-Prime Minister Giolitti in speech of Dec. 5, 1914. See *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 401.)

2. Italy declined the proposal, as (apparently) did Germany also. The declination of the latter was probably due to the fact that German military preparations were not yet completed. (See below, V 1.)

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a *causis foederis* cannot be established. It is a

step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade from this most perilous adventure." (Reply of Prime Minister Giolitti to above dispatch, *Ibid.*)

II. SECRET MILITARY REPORT ON STRENGTHENING THE GERMAN ARMY (MARCH 19, 1913).

This report came into the possession of the French Minister of War in some unexplained way soon after it was drawn up; it is published in *French Yellow Book*, No. 2; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 130-133.

The following extracts occur in the part headed "Aim and Obligations of Our National Policy, of Our Army, and of the Special Organizations for Army Purposes":

1. Minds of the people must be prepared. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 15-16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," etc.)

"We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. . . . We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak [of war] should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 131.)

2. "Stir up trouble in the North of Africa and in Russia."

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. . . . The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated." (*Ibid.*, p. 132.)

3. Small states to be coerced. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Neutralized State," "Netherlands, German View," etc.)

"In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland; so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark and Scandinavia. . . . In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank." (*Ibid.*, p. 132.)

4. No guarantee to Belgium for security of her neutrality

(See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 11; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Neutralization of.")

"Our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. . . . If we could induce these States [on our northwestern frontier] to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. . . . If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantage to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

5. Short-term ultimatum to be issued. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")

"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

6. Prizes of the war. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 17.)

"We will . . . remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy [Franche Comté, acquired by Louis XIV] and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces [of Russia] are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

III. CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE KAISER: INTERVIEW WITH KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM (NOVEMBER, 1913).

1. Circumstances of the interview; held in the presence of General von Moltke (chief of the German General Staff) and reported to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, "from an absolutely reliable source." Published in *French Yellow Book*, No. 6; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 142-3. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Albert I," "William II," etc.)

2. War with France regarded by the Kaiser as inevitable. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "William II, Ambitions.")

"This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I [Cambon] am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

"The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later. . . .

"General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 'for,' he said to the King [Albert], 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresisti-

ble enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.'" (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 142.)

3. Cambon's comment on the interview.

"As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German Army [German army law of 1913, cited below; France met this by increasing her military service from two years to three years], the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. . . ." (*Ibid.*, p. 143.)

IV. GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AS REPORTED BY FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS (JULY 30, 1913). (In *French Yellow Book*, No. 5; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 136-142.)

1. The Moroccan settlement considered a diplomatic defeat. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16.)

" . . . Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 136.)

2. Forces making for peace.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain." Those favoring peace included "the bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct," etc. But the classes which prefer peace to war "are only a sort of make-weight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling" (*Ibid.*, p. 137-138.)

3. Forces making for war. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Disarmament, German Attitude," "German Military Autocracy, Propaganda for War," "Militarism or Disarmament," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," "War, German View," etc.)

"There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 139.) It included the following:

- (a) Those who regard war as inevitable, and hence "the sooner the better."
- (b) Those influenced by economic reasons—"over-population, over-production, the need for markets and outlets," etc.
- (c) Those influenced by "Bismarckism." "They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force."
- (d) Those influenced by "a mystic hatred of revolutionary France," and others who acted from "a feeling of rancor."

2. Social classes included in the war party. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Coal and Iron as Cause of War," "German Diplomacy," "Junker," "Peace Terms, German Industrialists on," "Peace Terms, German Opinion as to," "Peace Terms, German Professors on," "Treitschke," etc.)

- (a) The country squires (junkers), who wish to escape the imposition of inheritance taxes ("death duties") "which are bound to come if peace continues. . . . This aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. . . . This social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 140.)
- (b) The capitalist class ("higher bourgeoisie"), including the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, and all who "regard war as good business." Among these are "doctrinaire manufacturers" who "declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown." (*Ibid.*, p. 140.)
- (c) University professors, etc. "The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. . . . *Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession.*" (*Ibid.*, p. 140-1.)
- (d) Diplomats and others "whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment.

. . . German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact." (*Ibid.*, p. 141.)

5. Must war be considered inevitable?

"The opinion is fairly widely spread even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.

"Must war then be considered as inevitable? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained." (*Ibid.*, pp. 141-143.)

V. EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY MEASURES OF GERMANY TAKEN BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Egypt," "German Army Act, 1913," "German Intrigue Against American Peace," "Kiel Canal," "Sinn Fein," "South Africa," etc.)

1. Laws of 1911, 1912, and especially 1913, increased the German army in time of peace from 515,000 to 866,000 men. Great increase of machine-gun corps, aviators, etc. Enormous stocks of munitions prepared. Exceptional war tax levied of \$225,000,000. Special war fund (for expense of mobilization, etc.) increased from \$30,000,000 to \$90,000,000.
2. Reconstruction of Kiel canal (connecting Baltic and North Sea) hastened so as to be ready in early summer of 1914. Fortifications of Helgoland, etc., improved.
3. Strategic railways constructed leading to Belgian, French, and Russian frontiers.

"Germany had made ready, at heavy outlay, to take the offensive at a moment's notice, and to throw enormous forces across the territories of two unoffending and pacific neighbors [Belgium and Luxembourg] in her fixed resolve to break through the northern defenses of France, and thus to turn the formidable fortifications of the Vosges. She has prepared for the day by bringing fully-equipped and admirably constructed railways up to her neighbors' frontiers, and in some places across them. . . . An immense sum of money has been sunk in these railways, . . . and there is not the least prospect of an adequate return on them as commercial ventures. They are purely military and strategical preparations for war with France." (See *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1910, and February, 1914, and *New York Times Current History*, I, 1000-1004.)

4. Exportation of chemicals used in making explosives greatly reduced in 1913-14, and importation of horses, foodstuffs, and fats (used in nitroglycerin) greatly in-

creased to provide war stocks. Great purchases of beds and hospital supplies in May, 1914; embargo on stocks of foreign pneumatic tires in Germany; hasty collection of accounts by German merchants; transfer of bank balances, etc., from beginning of July, etc. (See *Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 9-10.)

5. Recall of reservists from South America, etc., in May and June, 1914.
6. Exceptional grand manoeuvres of 1914. Ordered in May, these massed "500,000 men in Cologne, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine for the month of August." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 9.)

7. Preparations for stirring up revolt in the British Empire.

(a) In South Africa. Reply of the Kaiser (in 1913) to a communication from the future rebel leader, Colonel Maritz: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately." (Speech of General Botha at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. See Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, 5th ed., II, p. 379.)

(b) In British India. On July 8, 1915, indictments were brought in the Federal Court at San Francisco against 98 persons, including German consuls, at which time the Federal District Attorney said: "For more than a year prior to the outbreak of the European war certain Hindus in San Francisco and certain Germans were preparing openly for war with England. At the outbreak of the war Hindu leaders, members of the German consulate here, and attachés of the German Government, began to form plans to foment revolution in India for the purpose of freeing India and aiding Germans in their military operations." The leaders of these defendants plead guilty to the charges against them in December, 1917. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Intrigue Against American Peace.")

"Consideration of all testimony leads to the conviction that the India plot now before the Federal Court here [in Chicago] is but a very small part of the whole conspiracy. . . . The defendants appear to have traveled far and wide in promotion of their alleged work. And always, testimony indicates, German consuls were aware of what was going on and ready to give things a push. Pro-Germanism all over the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hawaii, Manila, China, Indo-China, Siam, Java, and various parts of Africa has been brought into the case. No part, according to the testimony, seems to have been detached. All blended into the whole scheme, which is alleged to have had its inspiration and propulsion in Berlin." (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 19, 1917.)

8. Coaling arrangements made for German naval vessels (June 14, 1914).

"A German cruiser, the *Eber*, was in dock at Cape Town a few days before the outbreak of war, and got away just in time. An intercepted letter addressed to the commander contained certain instructions from Berlin, which were dated June 14, 1914. These instructions revealed a complete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak of war through secret service agents in Cape Town, New York and Chicago.

"The commander of the *Eber* was given the names of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal confidentially, the essence of the plan being that a collier would leave Table Bay [Cape Colony] ostensibly bound for England, but really to meet a German warship at an agreed rendezvous. Naturally, so far as Cape Town is concerned, the arrangements have been upset owing to the discovery, and this, perhaps, explains why German cruisers have been more in evidence in North Atlantic waters than in the southern ocean." (Cape Town correspondent of *London Times*, issue of October 6, 1914.)

VI. CONCLUSION. Before June 28, 1914, Germany willed, if not war, at least another trial of diplomatic strength in which the threat of war should enter as a decisive factor.

"There is a whole category of facts to which we do not, temporarily, attach a decisive importance, for the spirit of mathematics can invoke in its favor the benefit of coincidence. . . . It is a question of various measures taken by Germany (the state or individuals) long before the menace of war was appreciable. . . . Certain persons would see in those measures, of which the war has demonstrated the utility, the proof that Germany had, months before, taken the resolve to launch the European war in 1914. When one has seen the German Government at work, this hypothesis is not extravagant." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 9-10.)

"Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view, and with the conviction, that Germany, as a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power." (Maximilian Harden, editor of *Die Zukunft*; see *New York Times Current History*, III, p. 130.)

"It now appears beyond the possibility of doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been preparing to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastness of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, because she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation." (Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, September 14, 1917.)

For reading references on Chapter III, see page 63.

IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY.

I. INTRODUCTION: PRIOR RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA.

1. Previous history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under Stephen Dushan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent years of "Greater Serbia" movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.")

2. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.

(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's high-handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Serbia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. Declaration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31):

"Serbia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (*British Blue Book*, No. 4; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 4.)

(b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was imposed in 1906.

(c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north," who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." (*Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 19; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 465.)

(d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway required that Serbia should be controlled by Austria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.)

3. Russia's interest in Serbia—founded upon kinship in blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might lead to war with Russia. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Pan-Slavism.")

"During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia." (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. *British Blue Book*, No. 139; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 101.)

"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies." (*German White Book*; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 406.)

II. THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914).

1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife, while on an official visit to Serajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Serajevo.")

2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 152.)

III. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914).

1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 490-4; *Austrian Red Book*, Appendix 8, and *German White Book*, Appendix; summary, pp. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measures against Serbia.

"A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided." (Austrian Minister at Belgrade to Austrian Government, July 21, 1914. In *Austrian Red Book*, No. 6; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 452.)

2. Conference at Potsdam (July 5, 1914), at which the terms of the Note were practically settled. The holding of such a conference has been denied by German newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Potsdam Conference;" *New York Times*, *Current History*, September, 1917, pp. 469-471.)

3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatum to which unconditional acceptance must be given within forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its demands. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")

"I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." (Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in *British Blue Book*, No. 5; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 13.)

"The demands of that [the Austrian] Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war." (German Socialist newspaper *Vorwärts*, July 25, 1914.)

4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those of the Note itself. (See *British Blue Book*, No. 4; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 3-12.)

"2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana [the chief society for Serbian propaganda], to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form."

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary."

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto."

5. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.

"We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations." (*German White Book*; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 406.)

This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (See Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Balkans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program? The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which certainly was not consulted.

6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult: Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate withdrawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a remote mountain resort, etc., etc.

7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and France make urgent endeavors:

(a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria.

(b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in order (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Serajevo; and (2) to permit them to exercise a moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp refusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)

IV. SERBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 25, 1914).

(See *British Blue Book*, No. 39; *Collected Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 31-37.)

1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia—

(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.

(b) Returned a qualified refusal to the other two.

As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that they "do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, . . . but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."

As to No. 6, they returned a temperate refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a deliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the demand): "It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or even-

tually may be, implicated in the plot, . . . and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [Austro-Hungarian] Government, the Royal [Serbian] Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents."

(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in case its reply was not considered satisfactory.

2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dishonest and evasive. (See *Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 34; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 506-514.)

In less than an hour after receiving it the Austrian Minister left Belgrade with all his staff. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.

The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could "no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." (*British Blue Book*, No. 93; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 70.)

V. AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914)

1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain, Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914.

2. Demand of Germany that the war be "localized"—i. e., that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastisement of Serbia.

3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the haste and secrecy which attended their measures.

"The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In *British Blue Book*, No. 41; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 38.)

"He [the German Secretary of State] admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the Note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." (British Chargé at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July

25, 1914. *British Blue Book*, No. 18; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 22.)

"In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. . . . Only a war, for which the best minds of the army were thirsting, . . . could cure the fundamental ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the acceptance of the claims put forward in the note could have profited Vienna.

"The question has been asked: Where was the plan of campaign elaborated—in Vienna or Berlin? And some hasten to reply: In Vienna. Why do people tolerate the propagation of such dangerous fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it must be), namely, that a complete understanding in all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna." (Maximilian Harden, in *Die Zukunft* for August 1, 1914; quoted in G. Alexinsky, *Russia and the Great War*, 129-130.)

§ Austria's object was to reduce Serbia to a state of vassalage, as a step to Austrian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. Her promises not to destroy Serbia's sovereignty, or to annex her territory, therefore, failed to satisfy Serbia's friends.

"Austria demanded conditions which would have placed Serbia under her permanent control." (Prof. Hans Delbrück, a noted professor and statesman of Germany, in *Atlantic Monthly*, for February, 1915, p. 234.)

§ Germany's objects were:

- To recover her prestige, lost in the Agadir affair (1911) and over the Balkan wars (1912-13).
- To strengthen her ally Austria, and so increase her own power.
- To humiliate Russia and the Triple Entente, and to disrupt or render harmless the latter.
- To promote the Central European—"Berlin to Bagdad"—project, and open a trade route to Saloniki, the most favorably situated seaport for the commerce of Central Europe with the East.

4. To advance these ends Germany and Austria deliberately incurred the grave risk of a general European war.

For reading references on Chapter IV, see page 63.

V. FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY TO AVERT WAR: GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AT WAR WITH RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

I. OUTLINE OF EVENTS, JULY 21 TO AUGUST 6, 1914.

July 21. Secret orders preliminary to mobilization issued in Germany. These measures, including the movement of troops towards the French frontier, continued up to final mobilization. (See *Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 14-25; *Nineteenth Century and After*, issue for June, 1917.)

July 23. Austrian Note sent to Serbia.

July 25. Reply of Serbia. Austrian Minister quits Belgrade, severing diplomatic relations.

July 27. Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference at London on the Serbian question. France, Russia, and Italy accepted; Germany refused.

July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.

July 29. Russian mobilization on the Austro-Hungarian frontier.

July 30. Bombardment of Belgrade. General mobilization in Russia begun.

July 31. "Threatening danger of war" proclaimed in Germany. German sent ultimatums to Russia and to France.

Aug. 1. Orders for general mobilization in France and in Germany. Declaration of war by Germany against Russia. Italy declared that she would remain neutral since "the war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German ambassador himself, an aggressive object." *British Blue Book*, No. 152; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 107.)

Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand that Belgium also permit German troops to violate its neutrality.

Aug. 3. Belgium refused the German demand. Germany declared war on France.

Aug. 4. Germany invaded Belgium. Great Britain declared war on Germany.

Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.

II. PROPOSALS FOR PRESEEVING PEACE.

1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Grey (July 27). To be composed of the German and Italian ambassadors to Great Britain, as friends of Austria, and the French ambassador and Grey himself, as friends of Russia. Its purpose, to discover "an issue which would prevent complications."

"If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the conference of ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference." (*I Accuse*, p. 155.)

The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and Italy. It was declined by Germany (without consulting Austria) on the ground that she "could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal." (*German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 409.) Grey explained that it "would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion;" nevertheless, Austria and Germany continued to decline.

2. Germany proposed (July 26) that France "exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg." The French Foreign Minister in reply "pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The [German] ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 28; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 276.)

3. Germany proposed direct negotiations between Russia and Austria over the Serbian question (July 27). Austria declined these direct negotiations, even though proposed by her ally. (Was this due to collusion between the two Governments?)

4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin on July 26 from a yachting cruise) attempted to act as "mediator" between Russia and Austria; but apparently he confined himself to the effort to persuade Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen." (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, in *German White Book*, exhibit 22; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 431-2.)

"Neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over

that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace." (J. M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case*, p. 112.)

- The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser (July 29), "to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from the *German White Book!* "The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for this reason it was declined." (*I Accuse*, p. 187, note.)
- Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.

King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: "I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 539.)

Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) was that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace." (*British Blue Book*, No. 84; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 64.)

- Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 60; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 288.)

Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 63; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 289.)

- Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31): "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 67; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 291.)

This proposal remained unanswered.

- Austria declared (August 1) that she was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 73; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 293.)

Sir Edward Grey comments: "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (*British Blue Book*, No. 131; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards "the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight." (British Ambassador at Vienna, in

British Blue Book, No. 161; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 117.)

But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums which precipitated the conflict.

III. GERMAN ULTIMATUMS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

- A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, apparently decided definitely to make war on France and Russia.

"Our innermost conviction is that it was on this evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consent to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 38.)

"People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation *en bloc* if war were not resolved on." (*I Accuse*, p. 189.)

- General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31). This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on "the measures for mobilization [against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days." (*French Yellow Book*, No. 118; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 223.)

The Tsar assured the Kaiser: "It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." (*German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 411.)

For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, see *Nineteenth Century and After*, issue for June, 1917. Consult also *I Accuse*, pp. 194-201; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Mobilization Controversy."

- German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) demanding that the Government "suspend their military measures by midday on August 1" (twelve hours).

Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) as to "What the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia?" (*French Yellow Book*, No. 117; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that "France would do that which her interests dictated." (*German White Book*, exhibit 27; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 434.)

- Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m. on August 1, following Russia's failure to demobilize. (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 76; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 294.)

Orders for a general mobilization of the French army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day.

- Declaration of war against France on August 3 (*French Yellow Book*, No. 147; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 240.)

This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremberg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 130-230; pamphlet entitled, *German Truth and a Matter of Fact*, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashes

through hot-headedness of her troops and under-officers, France withdrew her troops 10 kilometers (about six miles) within her own frontiers. On the other hand, German bands repeatedly crossed the French frontier, and even killed a French soldier on French soil before the declaration of war. (*French Yellow Book*, No. 106.)

Similar falsehoods were inserted in the Austrian declaration of war on *Serbia*, and in the German declaration of war on *Russia*. Falsehood and forgery were used with Machiavellian unscrupulousness by Germany in the conduct of her foreign affairs. (Compare Bismarck's changes in the "Ems despatch" at beginning of Franco-German war and his diabolical pleasure that war with France thus became certain. Bismarck, *Autobiography*, II, p. 101. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy," etc.)

IV. GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.

The testimony is overwhelming not only that Germany planned with Austria an aggressive stroke in 1914, but that in the end it was she who willed the war. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "War, Responsibility for.")

"The constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula [of July 29-31], declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had ever been consulted; in conclusion, all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war." (Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 31, in *French Yellow Book*, No. 114; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 221.)

"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy." (*I Accuse*, pp. 208-9.)

"The German Government contrived the war jointly in concert with the Austrian Government, and so burdened itself with the greatest responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. The German Government brought on the war under cover of deception practised upon the common people and even upon the Reichstag (note the suppression of the ultimatum to Belgium, the promulgation of the German White Book, the elimination of the Tsar's despatch of July 29, 1914, etc.)." (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, *German Socialist*, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

"The object of this war [on the part of the opponents of Germany] is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices

and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." (President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace proposals, August 27, 1917.)

For reading references on Chapter V, see page 63.

VI. VIOLATION OF BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY BRINGS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

I. WHY GREAT BRITAIN WAS EXPECTED TO STAY OUT.

1. Embittered state of party relations growing out of the Budget struggle of 1909-11, the limitation of the veto of the House of Lords in 1911, violence of the suffragettes ("the wild women"), and the passage by the House of Commons of the Irish Home Rule bill (May 25, 1914).
2. Serious threat of rebellion in northern Ireland (Ulster) against putting in force Irish Home Rule act. Organization of armed forces under Sir Edward Carson; "gun-running" from Germany.
3. Widespread labor troubles, especially among the railway workers.
4. Unrest in India, following administrative division of the province of Bengal; boycott movement; revolutionary violence attending Nationalist (Hindu) agitations.
5. Unwarlike character of the British people; a "nation of shopkeepers" supposedly unready for the sacrifices of war. Progress of pacifist opinions ("Norman-Angellism").
6. Lack of an army adequate for use abroad. Composed of volunteers ("mercenaries") instead of being based on compulsory service, it was regarded (in the Kaiser's phrase) as "contemptible."

II. BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR.

1. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, labored unremittingly for peace. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Grey and British Policy, 1914.")

"Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the name of the 'peacemaker of Europe.' . . . His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and energy will remain inextinguishable in history." (*I Accuse*, pp. 247-8.)

"No man in the history of the world has ever labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend, Sir Edward Grey, for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world—a general and abiding peace. . . . We preserved by every expedient that diplomacy can suggest, straining to almost the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making effort upon effort and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and dis-

honor, between treachery and good faith, and that we had at last reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and only then, that we declared for war." (Prime Minister Asquith, at the Guildhall, London, September 4, 1914.)

"Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal," etc. (*German White Book*; in *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 410.) Similar admissions that Great Britain strove sincerely and energetically for peace are found in other passages in the *German White Book*. Later the German Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, declared: "The inner responsibility [for the war] lies on the Government of Great Britain. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel." (Speech in Reichstag, December 2, 1914.) This statement, however, is palpably false.

2. British fleet kept together after the summer manoeuvres (July 27). Importance of this step.

"I pointed out [to the Austrian ambassador] that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt [over the Serbian question]." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 48; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 43.)

3. Her liberty of action reserved; Great Britain was free from engagements (July 29).

"In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. . . . We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because . . . we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn [the German ambassador] not to count on our standing aside, but that it would not be fair that I should let [the French ambassador] be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in *British Blue Book*, No. 87; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 65-66.)

4. Germany's "Infamous Proposal" of July 29 (following the Potsdam council of that date, at which war apparently was resolved upon). In return for *British neutrality in case of war between Germany and France*, the German Chancellor promised: (a) Not to aim at "territorial acquisitions at the expense of France" in Europe; (b) a similar undertaking with respect to the French colonies was refused; (c) the neutrality of Holland would be observed as long as it was respected by Germany's adversaries; (d) in case Germany was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality, "when the war

was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

"He [the German Chancellor] said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." (British Ambassador at Berlin, in *British Blue Book*, No. 85; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 64.)

5. This proposal was emphatically rejected by Great Britain. "What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 101; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 77. Compare Germany's attitude over Great Britain's proposal for a compact in 1912—see ch. i, IV 6 c.)

The proposals of July 29 may be regarded as "the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved, while Holland would be left alone." (J. H. Ross, *Development of the European Nations*, 5th ed., II, p. 387.)

6. Grey holds out the prospect of a League of Peace (July 30). In his reply to the foregoing proposals, the British Foreign Secretary adds:

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between

the Powers than has been possible hitherto." (*British Blue Book*, No. 101; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 78.)

Germany made no reply to the above suggestion.

7. Would Great Britain keep out if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality? (August 1.)

"He [the German Ambassador] asked me [Sir Edward Grey] whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." (*British Blue Book*, No. 123; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 93.)

8. Great Britain not to come in if Russia and France rejected reasonable peace proposals; otherwise she would aid France (July 31).

"I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 111; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 86.)

9. Great Britain gives Naval assurance to France (August 2), following the German declaration of war on Russia (August 1) and the invasion of Luxemburg.

"I am authorized [by the British Cabinet] to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in *British Blue Book*, No. 148; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 105.)

This assurance was given as the result of an arrangement of several years' standing whereby the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean and the British in the North Sea. "It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated." (Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at Paris, in *British Blue Book*, No. 148; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 105.)

III. NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG AND OF BELGIUM VIOLATED.

1. Luxemburg invaded by German troops (August 2). This was in violation of the Treaty of London (1867),

as well as of her rights as a neutral state in general. (See Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 2-5; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Luxemburg," "Neutral Duties," "Neutrality," "Neutralized State.")

2. Special status of Belgium as a Neutralized State. Based upon the Treaty of London (1839), by which Belgium became "an independent and perpetually neutral state, . . . bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states," and Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia became the "guarantors" of her neutrality. The German Empire was the successor to Prussia in this guarantee. Confirmation of Belgium's neutrality in 1870, by treaties between Great Britain and Prussia and Great Britain and France. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Neutralization.")

"Had Belgium been merely a small neutral nation, the crime [of her violation] would still have been one of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that Belgium was an internationalized State has made the invasion the master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what progress the world had made towards co-operation. If it could not survive, then no internationalism was possible. That is why, through these years of horror upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the basis of faith on which the world must build or perish." (Walter Lippman, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1917.)

3. German reassurances to Belgium in 1911 and 1914.

"Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty." (German Minister of War, in the Reichstag, April 29, 1911. See *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 12; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 306.)

"The troops will not cross Belgian territory" (German Minister to Belgium, early on August 2, 1914, to Brussels journalists. In H. Davignon, *Belgium and Germany*, p. 7.)

"Up to the present he [the German Minister to Belgium, on August 2] had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbors." (Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 19; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 309.)

4. France officially assured Great Britain and Belgium of her resolve to respect Belgium's neutrality (July 31 and August 1), in response to an inquiry addressed by Great Britain to both France and Germany. (*British Blue Book*, No. 115 and 125; *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 15; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 87, 94, 307.)

5. Germany declined to give such an official assurance (July 31)—apparently on the ground that "any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." (*British Blue Book*, No. 122; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 92.)

6. Germany demanded (August 2 at 7.00 p. m.) permission to pass through Belgium on the way to France, alleging (falsely) that France intended to march into Belgium, and offering to restore Belgium and to pay an indemnity at the end of the war. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, she would be considered "as an enemy,"

and Germany would "undertake no obligations" towards her. (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 20; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 309-311.)

7. Belgium refused such permission (August 3). "The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe." (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 22; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 312.)

8. German armed forces entered Belgium on the morning of August 4. Belgium thereupon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia, as guaranteeing Powers, to come to her assistance in repelling the invasion.

9. Germany's justification of her action.

(a) Plea of necessity. "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. . . . We know . . . that France stood ready for an invasion [this statement was false]. France could wait, we could not. . . . The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through" (Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bethmann Hollweg," "Kriegs-Raison," "Notwendigkeit.")

(b) Charge that Belgium had violated her own neutrality by concluding military conventions with England in 1905 and 1912 directed against Germany. This claim is based on a willful misinterpretation of documents discovered by Germany in Brussels after the taking of that city. (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 350-367.)

"That a wrong was done to Belgium was originally openly confessed by the perpetrator. As an afterthought, in order to appear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my opinion it was a spiritual blunder to rummage for documents in the pockets of the quivering victim. . . . To calumniate her in addition is really too much." (Karl Spitteler, a Swiss, quoted in *I Accuse*, p. 234.)

(c) Military expediency was the real reason. This is shown, among other indications, by an interview (August 3, 1914) between the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Belgian Minister to Germany.

German Minister: "It is a question of life or death for the Empire. If the German armies do not want to be caught between the hammer and the anvil they must strike a decisive blow at France, in order then to turn back against Russia."

Belgian Minister: "But the frontiers of France are sufficiently extended to make it possible to avoid passing through Belgium."

Foreign Minister: "They are too strongly fortified." (H. Davignon, *Belgium and Germany*, p. 14.)

IV. GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR.

1. Appeal of King Albert of Belgium to King George (August 3). "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention

of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 25; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 313.)

2. Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany (August 4) asking assurance by midnight that "the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany." (*British Blue Book*, No. 153, 159; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 107-109.)

3. War declared by Great Britain (about midnight, August 4). The "scrap of paper" utterance.

The account of the last interview (about 7.00 p. m., August 4) of the British Ambassador with the German Chancellor is instructive: "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'Neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow [German Foreign Minister] wished me to understand that for strategic reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, 'But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument (*British Blue Book*, No. 160; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 111. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Scrap of Paper.")

4. Great Britain's reasons for entering the war.

(a) Her obligations to Belgium under the treaty of 1839.

(b) Her relations to France growing out of the Entente Cordiale (1904). These ties were strengthened in subsequent years by consultations of British and French naval experts, but no promise of anything more than diplomatic support was given until August 2, 1914.

"We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in any contingency that has not yet arisen and may

never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, November 22, 1912; see *New York Times Current History*, I, p. 283.)

"There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France [of August 2, 1914] that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that." (Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; *New York Times Current History*, I, p. 289.)

(c) Self-interest—the realization that Germany's hostility to her was implacable, and that if Great Britain was not to surrender her position as a Great Power in the world, and possibly a goodly portion of her colonial possessions, she must ultimately fight Germany; if so, better in alliance with France and Russia than alone at a later time.

5. Great Britain's declared war aims.

"We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." (Prime Minister Asquith, November 9, 1914.)

"I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained. . . is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the continent into war." (Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, January 26, 1916.)

"What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free, not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war, free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords. In fact, we feel we are fighting for equal rights; for law, justice, peace; for civilization throughout the world as against brute force, which knows no restraint and no mercy.

"What Prussia proposes, as we understand her, is Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe mod-

elled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all. We say that life on these terms is intolerable. And this also is what France and Italy and Russia say. We are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost the desirability, of ever recurrent war. Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells degeneracy. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity. . . .

"The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and the wrongs of this war are ineffective if not irrelevant.

" . . . The Prussian authorities have apparently but one idea of peace, an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to war till it is defeated and renounced." (Sir Edward Grey to correspondent of *Chicago Daily News*, in June, 1916.)

For reading references on Chapter VI, see page 64.

VII. THE WAR SPREADS — CHARACTER OF THE WAR

1. OTHER STATES ENTER THE WAR.

1. Montenegro declares war (Aug. 7, 1914), as an ally of Serbia.
2. Japan declares war (Aug. 23), because of—
 - (a) Alliance with Great Britain (concluded in 1902; renewed in 1905 and 1911).
 - (b) Resentment at German ousting of Japan from Port Arthur in 1895, and German seizure of Kiao-Chau Bay (China) in 1897. Japanese ultimatum to Germany in 1914 modeled on that of Germany to Japan in 1895.
 - (c) Japan captures Tsingtau, on Kiao-Chau Bay (Nov. 17, 1914). Thenceforth her part in the military operations of the war was slight.
3. Unneutral acts of Turkey (sheltering of German warships, bombardment of Russian Black Sea ports, Oct. 29, etc.) lead to Allied declarations of war against her (Nov. 3-5, 1914). It is now proved that Turkey was in alliance with Germany from August 4, 1914. (See *N. Y. Times Current History*, Nov., 1917, p. 334-335.)
4. Italy declares war on Austria, (May 23, 1915; on Germany August 27, 1916.) Due in part to—
 - (a) Italy's desire to complete her unification by acquiring from Austria the Italian-speaking Trentino and Trieste (*Italia Irredenta*).
 - (b) Conflicts of interests with Austria on the Eastern shore of the Adriatic.
 - (c) Austria-Hungary's violation of the Triple Alliance agreement by her aggressive policy in the Balkans.
5. Bulgaria, encouraged by Russian and British reverses, and assured by Germany of the much coveted shore on the Aegean, makes an alliance with Austria and Germany and attacks Serbia (Oct. 13, 1915). Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon declared war on Bulgaria (Oct. 16-19.) Refusal of King Constantine of Greece to fulfill his treaty with Serbia.

6. Portugal drawn into the war (March 9, 1916) through her long-standing alliance with Great Britain.
7. Roumania, encouraged by Allied successes early in 1916, and treacherously pressed thereto by Russia, attacks Austria-Hungary in order to gain Transylvania (Aug. 28, 1916.)
8. Further spread of the war: United States declares war on Germany, April 6, 1917 (see chapter ix).—Greece deposes King Constantine and joins the Entente Allies (June 12, 1917).—Siam, China and Brazil enter the war against the Teutonic Allies; Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, etc., sever diplomatic relations with Germany. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "War, Declarations of.")

II. WORLD-WIDE CHARACTER AND IMPORTANCE OF THE CONFLICT.

1. The most widespread and terrible war in history. A score of countries involved; compare the size of the belligerent areas and populations with those remaining neutral, of the States arrayed against Germany with those on her side.

"At least 38,000,000 men are bearing arms in the war—27,500,000 on the side of the world Allies and 10,600,000 on the side of the Central Powers—according to latest War Department compilations from published reports in various countries. These figures do not include naval personnel strength, which would raise the total several millions. Against Germany's 7,000,000, Austria's 3,000,000, Turkey's 300,000 and Bulgaria's 300,000, are arrayed the following armed forces: Russia, 9,000,000; France, 6,000,000; Great Britain, 5,000,000; Italy, 3,000,000; Japan, 1,400,000; United States, more than 1,000,000; China, 541,000; Roumania, 320,000; Serbia, 300,000; Belgium, 300,000; Greece, 300,000; Portugal, 200,000; Montenegro, 40,000; Siam, 36,000; Cuba, 11,000, and Liberia, 400."—(Associated Press dispatch, Oct. 22, 1917.)
 2. Universal disorganization of commerce and industry. Widespread suffering even in neutral countries. Problems of food-supply, coal, and other necessities of life.
 3. Importance of the issues involved: Government of the world by negotiation, arbitration, and international law, *vs.* reliance upon military force, and the principle that "might makes right."—Humanity *vs.* "frightfulness."—Democracy and freedom *vs.* autocracy and slavery.
- ### III. INNOVATIONS IN WARFARE DUE TO THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND INVENTION.
1. New developments in trenches and trench fighting. Vast and complicated systems of deep and narrow trenches, inter-communicating; underground refuge chambers of timber and concrete; elaborate barbed wire entanglements; shell craters fortified with "pill boxes" of steel and concrete as gun emplacements. Defended by men with magazine rifles and machine guns; use of hand grenades, trench mortars, sapping and mining; steel helmets and gas masks. "Camouflage," the art of concealment. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Barbed-wire Entanglements," "Camouflage," "Trench Warfare," etc.)
 2. Great guns (German 42-centimeter mortars, etc.) used

to smash old fashioned steel and concrete fortifications and bombard towns twenty-two miles distant. Enormous quantities of high explosive shell, fired by thousands of guns, for days at a time, used to destroy wire entanglements and trenches. "Barrage" (barrier) shell-fire used to cover attack; definition and use of "creeping barrage"; excellence of French "75's" (quick-fire cannon with calibre of 75 millimeters—about three inches; British "tanks" (huge caterpillar motors, armored and armed with machine guns and rapid-fire cannon); poison gas and liquid fire; etc., etc. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Barrage," "Forbidden Methods of Warfare," "Gas Warfare," "Shells," "Tanks," etc.)

3. Great development of aeroplanes for scouting, directing artillery fire, etc. Use of captive balloons. Zeppelins used mainly for dropping bombs on undefended British and French towns; their failure to fulfill German expectations. Devices for combating aerial attacks. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Aviation," etc.)
4. Great development of the submarine and submarine warfare. Use of submarines against warships perfectly legitimate; employment against merchant shipping also entirely proper under certain limitations. Devices for combating submarines. (See *War Cyclopedia* under "Submarine," etc.)
5. New problems of transport and communication. Great use of motor trucks and automobiles for moving troops and supplies; increased difficulties of supply owing to great numbers of soldiers engaged, and enormous quantities of shells fired. Use of wireless telegraph and telephone. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Motor Transport.")
6. Mobilization of civilian population in all countries and national control of industry, food production and consumption. Increased participation of women in war work. In this conflict not merely armies but nations are engaged against one another; and the side with the greatest man-power, the best organized production and consumption, the largest financial resources, the staunchest courage and the closest co-operation between its allies will win. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Civilian Tasks," "Food Control," "Fuel Control," etc.)

IV. EXAMPLES OF GERMAN RUTHLESSNESS AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

1. War from the standpoint of International Law.

"From the standpoint of the international jurist, war is not merely a national struggle between public enemies, but a condition of juridical status under which such a conflict is carried on. It consists of certain legal rules and generally recognized customs, most of which have been codified and embodied in international treaties—the so-called Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907—which nearly all the members of the international community, including Germany, have signed and ratified. Now, if we were to take up the Hague Regulations in detail, we should find that Germany has violated again and again practically all of them. A bare list or enumeration of the proved and well authenticated instances of violation of international law by Germany in this war would, in fact, fill many volumes. If these were accompanied by some description or commentary, I

verily believe that the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* would not contain all of them."—(Prof. A. S. Hershey, in *Indiana University Alumni Quarterly*, October, 1917)

"Germany does not really wage war. She assassinates, massacres, poisons, tortures, intrigues; she commits every crime in the calendar, such as arson, pillage, murder, and rape; she is guilty of almost every possible violation of international law and of humanity—and calls it war."—(*Ibid.*)

2. The German war philosophy. Conception of "absolute war"; ruthlessness and "frightfulness" advocated as means of shortening war, and hence justified as really humane; doctrine that "military necessity" is paramount over every other consideration. International law regarded as a selfish invention of weak states seeking to hamper the strong. Principle of "Deutschland über Alles."

"Whoever uses force, without any consideration and without sparing blood, has sooner or later the advantage if the enemy does not proceed in the same way. One cannot introduce a principle of moderation into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity. It is a vain and erroneous tendency to neglect the element of brutality in war merely because we dislike it."—(Karl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, I, page 4.)

"War in the present day will have to be conducted more recklessly, less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than ever in the past . . . Every restriction on acts of war, once military operations have begun, tends to weaken the co-ordinated action of the belligerent . . . The law of nations must beware of paralyzing military action by placing fetters upon it . . . Distress and damage to the enemy are the conditions necessary to bend and break his will . . . The combatant has need of passion . . . it requires that the combatant . . . shall be entirely freed from the shackles of a restraining legality which is in all respects oppressive."—(General von Hartmann, "Militärische Notwendigkeit und Humanität," in *Deutsche Rundschau*, XIV, pp. 76, 119-122.)

"Since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations, which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences . . . The danger that in this way he [the officer] will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of . . . By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them . . .

"Every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained is permissible . . . It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary

judgment of the commanding officer."—(Official publication edited by the General Staff, *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*; in translation by J. H. Morgan entitled *The German War Book*, pp. 54-55, 64.)

All the foregoing extracts are quoted in E. Lavisse and C. Andler, *German Theory and Practice of War*, pp. 25-29. See also, D. C. Munro, *German War Practices*, Introduction; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Frightfulness," "Kriegs-Raison," "Notwendigkeit," "War, German Ruthlessness," "War, German View," etc.; Garner and Scott, *German War Code*.

3. German treatment of Belgium and other occupied territories (Northern France, Russian Poland, Serbia, etc). Evidence found in captured letters and diaries of German soldiers and in proclamations of German commanders, as well as in testimony of victims and witnesses. The violations of international law and the laws of humanity include:—

- (a) Deliberate and systematic massacre of portions of the civil population, as a means of preventing or punishing resistance. Individual citizens murdered (some while hostages); women abused, and children brutally slain. Several thousand persons were so killed, often with mutilation and torture. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hostages," "Non-combatants," etc.)

"Outrages of this kind [against the lives and property of the civil population] were committed during the whole advance and retreat of the Germans through Belgium and France, and only abated when open manoeuvring gave place to trench warfare along all the line from Switzerland to the sea. Similar outrages accompanied the simultaneous advance into the western salient of Russian Poland, and the autumn incursion of the Austro-Hungarians into Serbia, which was turned back at Valievo. There was a remarkable uniformity in the crimes committed in these widely separated theaters of war, and an equally remarkable limit to the dates within which they fell. They all occurred during the first three months of the war, while, since that period, though outrages have continued, they have not been of the same character or on the same scale. This has not been due to the immobility of the fronts, for although it is certainly true that the Germans have been unable to overrun fresh territories on the west, they have carried out greater invasions than ever in Russia and the Balkans, which have not been marked by outrages of the same specific kind. This seems to show that the systematic warfare against the civil population in the campaigns of 1914 was the result of policy, deliberately tried and afterwards deliberately given up." (J. Arnold Toynbee, *The German Terror in Belgium*, pp. 15-16.)

- (b) Looting, burning of houses and whole villages, and wanton destruction of property ordered and countenanced by German officers. Provision for systematic incendiarism a part of German military preparations. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Estates Destroyed," "Belgium's Woe," "Family Honor and Rights of Property," "Pillage," etc.)

"It is forbidden to pillage a town or locality even when taken by assault . . . [In occupied territory] pillage is forbidden."—(Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 28 and 47.)

- (c) Excessive taxes (\$12,000,000) a month, and heavy fines on cities and provinces, laid upon Belgium. Belgium robbed of its industrial and agricultural machinery, together with its stocks of food stuffs and raw materials, which were sent into Germany or converted to the use of the German army. This was according to a "plan elaborated by Dr. W. Rathenau in 1914 at Berlin, for the systematic exploitation of all the economic resources of occupied countries in favor of the military organization of the Empire." (See Munro, *German War Practices, Part II; War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Economic Destruction," "Contributions," "Requisitions.")

"[1] Coal, minerals, metals, chemical products; wood and various building materials; wool, flax, cotton and other materials for weaving; leathers, hides and rubber, all in every possible state of industrial transformation, from the raw material to the commercial product and the waste; [2] further, all machines, fixed and movable, and machine-tools (in particular, the American lathes which it is impossible to replace at present); transmission belts; wires for electric lighting and motor power; oils and grease products; [3] transport material, whether by road, railway or water, and an important part of the rolling-stock of local railway lines; all traction power, whether animal or mechanical; thoroughbreds and stud animals, and the products of breeding; [4] agricultural products, seed and harvests, etc.—were successively immobilized, and then seized and removed from the country, as a result of legislative acts on the part of the civil authorities, following upon innumerable requisitions by the military authorities. The value of these seizures and requisitions amounts to billions of francs . . . Moreover, many of the measures taken were inspired not only by the motives of military interest denounced above, but by the underlying thought of crushing the commercial rivalry of Belgium. This was explicitly admitted in Germany itself by several authorities."—(*Memorandum of the Belgian Government on the Deportations*, etc., February 1, 1917, pp. 7-8.)

The total exactions from Belgium, in money and materials, are computed to be "in excess of one billion dollars, or nearly five times as much as all the world has contributed to keep the Belgian people from starving to death."—(S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, page 116.)

- (d) Forcible deportation of tens of thousands of Belgian and other civilians to Germany, the men to serve practically as slaves in Germany's industries, and the women reduced frequently to worse than slavery. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Deportations.")

"They [the Germans] have dealt a mortal blow to any prospect they may ever have had of being tolerated by the population of Flanders [which they were seeking to alienate from French-speaking Belgium]; in tearing away from nearly every humble home in the land a husband and a father or a son and brother, they have lighted a fire of hatred that will never go out; they have brought home to every heart in the land, in a way that will impress its horror indelibly on the memory

of three generations, a realization of what German methods mean—not, as with the early atrocities, in the heat of passion and the first lust of war, but by one of those deeds that make one despair of the future of the human race, a deed coldly planned, studiously matured, and deliberately and systematically executed, a deed so cruel that German soldiers are said to have wept in its execution, and so monstrous that even German soliders are now said to be ashamed."—(U. S. Minister Brand Whitlock, in January, 1917.)

- (e) Fearful devastation of part of Northern France during Hindenburg's "strategic retreat" (March, 1917), including complete destruction of villages and homesteads, systematic destruction of vineyards and fruit trees, etc. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopaedia*, under "Destruction," "Frightfulness," "Hindenburg Line.")

"In the course of these last months, great stretches of French territory have been turned by us into a dead country. It varies in width from 10 to 12 or 15 kilometers [$6\frac{1}{4}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 miles], and extends along the whole of our new position, presenting a terrible barrier of desolation to any enemy hardy enough to advance against our new lines. No village or farm was left standing on this glacis, no road was left passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once were woods there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown up; wires, cables, and pipelines destroyed. In front of our new positions runs, like a gigantic ribbon, an empire of death."—(*Berlin Lokal-anzeiger*, March 18, 1917; quoted in *Frightfulness in Retreat*, page 5.)

"Whole towns and villages have been pillaged, burnt and destroyed; private houses have been stripped of all their furniture, which the enemy has carried off; fruit trees have been torn up or rendered useless for all future production; springs and wells have been poisoned. The comparatively few inhabitants who were not deported to the rear were left with the smallest possible ration of food, while the enemy took possession of the stocks provided by the Neutral Relief Committee and intended for the civil population . . . It is a question not of acts aimed at hampering the operations of the Allied armies, but of acts of devastation which have no connection with that object, and the aim of which is to ruin for many years to come one of the most fertile regions of France.—(Protest of the French Government to Neutral Powers, in *Frightfulness in Retreat*, pp. 6-7.)

- (f) Wanton destruction of historic works of art—library of Louvain; cathedrals of Rheims, Soissons, Ypres, Arras, St. Quentin; castle of Coucy; town halls, etc. of Ypres and other Belgian cities. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Louvain," "Rheims," "Works of Art," etc.)

4. Other violations of the laws of warfare on land.

- (a) Use of poison gas and liquid fire (both first used by the Germans); poisoning of wells; intentional dissemination of disease germs (anthrax and glanders, at Bucharest, etc.); bombardment of undefended towns by Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and cruisers; bombardment of hospitals, etc. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bombardment," "Explosives from Aircraft," "Forbidden Weapons," "Gas Warfare.")

"Poisons," "Roumania, German Treachery in," "Zeppelins," etc.)

(b) Civilians, including women and children, used as a screen by German forces; frequent abuse of Red Cross and white flag. (See Munro, *German War Practices*, under "Hostages and Screens.")

"We waited for the advance of the Germans," states a British officer; 'some civilians reported to us that they were coming down a road in front of us. On looking in that direction we saw, instead of German troops, a crowd of civilians—men, women, and children—waving white handkerchiefs and being pushed down the road in front of a large number of German troops.'—"They came on as it were in a mass," states a British soldier, 'with the women and children massed in front of them. They seemed to be pushing them on, and I saw them shoot down women and children who refused to march. Up to this my orders had been not to fire, but when we saw women and children shot my sergeant said: "It is too heartrending," and gave orders to fire, which we did.'—"I saw the Germans advancing on hands and knees towards our positions," states another; 'they were in close formation, and had a line of women and children in front of their front rank. Our orders at that time were not to fire on civilians in front of the enemy.'—(J. Arnold Toynbee, *The German Terror in France*, pp. 6-7.)

(c) Wounded and prisoners killed in many instances. (See Munro, *German War Practices*, *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hun," "Prisoners of War," "Quarter," etc.)

"28th August.—They [the French] lay in heaps of eight or ten wounded or dead on the top of one another. Those who could still walk we made prisoners and brought with us. Those who were seriously wounded, in the head or lungs, etc., and who could not stand upright, were given one more bullet, which put an end to their life. Indeed, that was the order which we had received."—(Diary of a German soldier, in Joseph Bédier, *How Germany seeks to Justify her Atrocities*, p. 45.)

"By leaps and bounds we got across the clearing. They were here, there, and everywhere hidden in the thicket. Now it is down with the enemy! And we will give them no quarter . . . We knock down or bayonet the wounded, for we know that those scoundrels fire at our backs when we have gone by. There was a Frenchman there stretched out, full length, face down, pretending to be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught him that we were there. Turning round he asked for quarter, but we answered: 'Is that the way your tools work, you—,' and he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd cracking sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald head of a Frenchman which a private of the 154th was dealing out vigorously; he was wisely using a French gun so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted souls are so kind to the French wounded that they finish them with a bullet, but others give them as many thrusts and blows as they can."—(Article entitled "A Day of Honor for our Regiment—24th September, 1914," in the *Jauresches Tageblatt*, 18th October, 1914; facsimile in Joseph Bédier, *German Atrocities from German Evidence*, pp. 32-33.)

"After today no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a single living enemy remain behind us."—(Order given 26th August, 1914, by General Stenger, of the 58th German Brigade; testified to by numerous German prisoners. See Bédier, *German Atrocities*, pp. 28-29, 39-40.)

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel [Attila], gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German."—(Speech of the Kaiser to German troops embarking for the Boxer War in 1900; reported in *Bremen Weser Zeitung* and in other German newspapers; quoted in *London Times*, July 30, 1900.)

"It is forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms and having no means of self-defense, gives himself up as a prisoner; to declare that no quarter will be given."—(Hague Convention of 1907, Article 23.)

(d) Inhuman treatment of British captives in German prison camps, at Wittenberg and elsewhere. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Prisoners of War," etc.) The British treatment of German prisoners, on the other hand, was humane and correct.

5. Submarine warfare waged in disregard of international law. Sinking without warning of the *Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, *Lusitania*, *Arabic*, *Sussex*, etc.; ruthless destruction of lives of innocent men, women, and children. Great extension of submarine warfare after February 1, 1917. Policy of "sinking without leaving a trace" (*spurlos versenkt*). Instructions to sink even hospital ships. Utter disregard of the rights of neutrals. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Lusitania Notes," "Submarine Warfare," "Spurlos Versenkt," "Visit and Search," etc., and under names of vessels.)

"The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)

6. Practical extermination of the Armenian nation by the Turks, evidently with German sanction (1915-16). (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Armenian Massacres.")

"In order, I was told, to cover the extermination of the Armenian nation with a political cloak, military reasons were being put forward, which were said to make it necessary to drive the Armenians out of their native seats, which had been theirs for 2,500 years, and to deport them to the Arabian deserts. I was also told that individual Armenians had lent themselves to acts of espionage.

"After I had informed myself about the facts and had made inquiries on all sides, I came to the conclu-

sion that all these accusations against the Armenians were, in fact, based on trifling provocations, which were taken as an excuse for slaughtering 10,000 innocents for one guilty person, for the most savage outrages against women and children, and for a campaign of starvation against the exiles which was intended to exterminate the whole nation . . .

"Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, women, and children, only two or three hundred survivors arrive here in the south. The men are slaughtered on the way; the women and girls, with the exception of the old, the ugly, and those who are still children, have been abused by Turkish soldiers and officers and then carried away to Turkish and Kurdish villages, where they have to accept Islam. They try to destroy the remnant of the convoys by hunger and thirst. Even when they are fording rivers, they do not allow those dying of thirst to drink. All the nourishment they receive is a daily ration of a little meal sprinkled over their hands, which they lick off greedily, and its only effect is to protract their starvation."—(Dr. Martin Niepage, *The Horrors of Aleppo*, Seen by a German Eyewitness, pp. 3-6.)

V. SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION OF GERMAN POLICY. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Der Tag," "German Military Autocracy," "Hegemony, German Ambition," "War, Responsibility for.")

"The German Government wages the war by methods which, judged even by standards till now conventional, are monstrous. Note, for example, the sudden attack upon Belgium and Luxemburg; poison gas, since adopted by all the belligerents; but most outrageous of all, the Zeppelin bombings, inspired with the purpose of annihilating every living person, combatant or non-combatant, over large areas; the submarine war on commerce; the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*, etc.; the system of taking hostages and levying contributions, especially at the outset in Belgium; the systematic exactions from Ukrainian, Georgian, Courland, Polish, Irish, Mohammedan, and other prisoners of war in the German prison camps, of treasonable war-service, and of treasonable espionage of the Central Powers; in the contract between Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann and Sir Roger Casement in December, 1914, for the organization, equipment, and training of the 'Irish brigade' made up of imprisoned British soldiers in the German prison camps; the attempts under threats by forced internment to compel enemy alien civilians found in Germany to perform treasonable war service against their own country, etc. 'Necessity knows no law.'" (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, the German Socialist leader, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

"This war was begun and these crimes against humanity were done because Germany was pursuing the hereditary policy of the Hohenzollerns and following the instincts of the arrogant military caste which rules Prussia, to grasp the overlordship of the civilized world and establish an empire in which she should play the role of ancient Rome. They were done because the Prussian militarist still pursues the policy of power through conquest, of aggrandizement through force and

fear, which in little more than two centuries has brought the puny Mark of Brandenburg with its million and a half of people to the control of a vast empire—the greatest armed force of the modern world."—(Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917.)

For reading references on Chapter VII, see page 64.

VIII. THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR.

I. STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN OUR NEUTRALITY (1914-16)

1. American opinion at the outbreak of the war confused as to merits and issues in the controversy; conflicting sympathies of hyphenated groups. (See *War Cyclopaedia* under "Hyphenated Americans," "United States, Isolation," "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17.")

2. Declaration of Neutrality of the United States, issued August 4, 1914. President Wilson's appeal for neutrality of sentiment. (August 18, 1914.) "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. . . . It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it." He expressed the fear that our Nation might become divided into camps of hostile opinion. "Such divisions among us . . . might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17.")

3. Alienation of American sentiment from Germany and Austria. Invasion of Belgium generally condemned; admiration for her plucky resistance and horror at German atrocities; Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter of Christmas, 1914; Commission for Belgian Relief under American direction (Mr. Herbert C. Hoover); Germany's monstrous crime in sinking the *Lusitania*; execution of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Atrocities," "Belgium's Woe," "Cavell, Edith," "Fryatt, Captain," "Lusitania," "Mercier, Cardinal," etc.)

4. Was the neutrality of our Government a real neutrality? Lack of interest in the contest or of desire on the part of the people for the triumph of one or the other of the participants not necessary to neutrality of the Government. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Neutrality," "Neutral Rights," etc.)

5. Controversies with Great Britain over questions of blockade, contraband, and interference with our mails. Question of the applicability to the present emergency of the Declaration of London (drawn up in 1909 on the initiation of Great Britain, but not ratified before the war by any government.) Property rights alone involved in these controversies, which could be settled after the war by our existing arbitration treaty with Great Britain. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Blacklist," "Blockade," "Declaration of London," "Embargo, British," "Mails, British Interference with," "War Zone, British," etc.)

6. Controversies with Germany. Over our supplying munitions to the Allies, and her submarine sinkings (*Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, *Lusitania*, *Arabic*, etc.). Intrigues and conspiracies in the United States; the

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the German attachés Boy-Rd and von Papen, dismissed by our Government (November 4, 1915) on clear proof of guilt, but no apologies to us or reprimand to them issued by their Governments. German intrigues against us in Cuba, Haiti, San Domingo, Mexico, etc.—For a defense of our policy in permitting sale of munitions, etc., see letter of Secretary of State W. J. Bryan to Senator Stone, January 20, 1915 (in *International Conciliation*, No. 96). (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Der Tag—When?," "Dumba," "German Intrigue," "Igel, von, Papers of," "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy of," "Manila Bay, Dewey and Diedrichs at," "Monroe Doctrine, German Attitude," "Intrigue," "Munitions," "Papen," "Sabotage," "Spies," "Strict Accountability," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," "Parole," "War Zone, German," and under names of vessels, etc.)

7. Apparent settlement of the submarine controversy in May, 1916.—Sinking of the channel passenger ship *Sussex* without warning on March 24, 1916, after months of expostulation, precipitates a crisis. Our demand that thenceforth Germany conduct her submarine warfare in accordance with international law, by (a) warning vessels before sinking them, and (b) placing passengers and crew in safety. Germany's conditional agreement to comply with this demand ends the crisis. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Submarine Warfare, American Lives Lost," "Submarine Warfare, German Defense," "Submarine Warfare, Illegalities," "Submarine Warfare, Stages of," "Sussex," "Sussex Ultimatum," "Sussex Ultimatum, German Pledge," etc.)

8. Unceasing German intrigues against the United States. A semi-official list of intrigue charges against the German Government, based on one set only of German documents seized by our Government (the von Igel papers), includes the following: "Violation of the laws of the United States; destruction of lives and property in merchant vessels on the high seas; Irish revolutionary plots against Great Britain; fomenting ill feeling against the United States in Mexico; subornation of American writers and lecturers; financing of propaganda; maintenance of a spy system under the guise of a commercial investigation bureau; subsidizing of a bureau for the purpose of stirring up labor troubles in munition plants; the bomb industry and other related activities." Since our entrance into the war a vast amount of evidence as to Germany's treacherous and hostile intrigues on our soil has come into the possession of our Government. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "German Intrigue," "Igel, von, Papers of," "Parole," "Passports, German Frauds," etc.)

"From the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under

the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial German Government accredited to the Government of the United States."—(President Wilson, Speech of April 2, 1917).

9. Reasons for our long enduring patience in dealing with Germany: (a) Hope that saner counsels might prevail in that country. (b) Our traditional sense of responsibility toward all the republics of the New World. (c) The desire, by keeping free from the conflict, more effectively to aid in restoring peace at its close. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Pan-Americanism," "Permanent Peace," "Watchful Waiting," etc.)

II. FROM NEUTRALITY TO WAR (1916-17).

1. Unsuccessful Peace overtures (Dec. 1916-Jan. 1917). Independent overtures by Germany (Dec. 12, 1916), and by President Wilson (Dec. 18). Answer of the Allies based on the reasonable idea of "Reparation, Restoration and Security." Refusal of Germany to disclose her terms. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Peace Overtures, German, 1916," "Peace Terms, German Industrialists on," "Peace Terms, German Professors on," etc.)

"Boasting of German conquests, 'the glorious deeds of our armies,' the [German] note implanted in neutral minds the belief that it was the purpose of the Imperial German Government to insist upon such conditions as would leave all Central Europe under German dominance and so build up an empire which would menace the whole liberal world. Moreover, the German proposal was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat to all neutral nations; and from a thousand sources, official and unofficial, the word came to Washington that unless the neutrals used their influence to bring the war to an end on terms dictated from Berlin, Germany and her allies would consider themselves henceforth free from any obligations to respect the rights of neutrals. The Kaiser ordered the neutrals to exert pressure on the Entente to bring the war to an abrupt end, or to beware of the consequences. Clear warnings were brought to our Government that if the German peace move should not be successful the submarines would be unleashed for a more intense and ruthless war upon all commerce." (*How the War Came to America*, pp. 10-11. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "German Military Dominance," "Mittel Europa," etc.)

2. President Wilson outlined such a peace as the United States could join in guaranteeing (Jan. 22, 1917). Favorable reception of these proposals in the Entente countries; lack of response in Germany. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Aim of the United States," "America, Creed," "Balance of Power," "League to Enforce Peace," "Permanent Peace, American Plan.")

"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not [1] recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people

but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing [2] that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"I am proposing . . . [3] that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and [4] that moderation of armaments which make of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence."

[5] "Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind." (President Wilson, Speech to U. S. Senate, Jan. 22, 1917.)

3. The "Zimmermann note" falls into the hands of the United States Government (dated Jan. 19, 1917; published through the Associated Press, February 28). In this the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs secretly informs the German minister to Mexico of the German intention to repudiate the *Sussex* pledge, and instructs him to offer the Mexican Government New Mexico and Arizona if Mexico will join with Japan in attacking the United States. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Zimmermann Note.")

4. The German Government officially notifies the United States (Jan. 31, 1917) that "from February 1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice." This meant the renewal of ruthless submarine operations, in violation of the pledge given after the sinking of the *Sussex*. (See *War Cyclopedia*, as above under I-7, also under "Submarine Warfare, Unrestricted.")

"The German Chancellor . . . stated before the Imperial Diet that the reason this ruthless policy had not been earlier employed was simply because the Imperial Government had not then been ready to act. In brief, under the guise of friendship and the cloak of false promises, it had been preparing this attack."—(*How the War Came to America*, p. 13.)

5. German Ambassador to the United States dismissed and diplomatic relations severed (Feb. 3, 1917). This act was not equivalent to a declaration of war. President Wilson in his speech to the Senate announcing it distinguished sharply between the German Government and the German people.—Failure of the German Government to recall its submarine order led the President to

recommend to Congress (Feb. 26) a policy of "armed neutrality." More than 500 out of 531 members of the two houses of Congress were ready and anxious to act; but a "filibuster" of a handful of "willful men" defeated the measure, by prolonging the debate until the expiration of the congressional session, on March 4.—March 12, orders were finally issued to arm American merchant ships against submarines. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Armed Neutrality Adopted," "Diplomatic Immunity," "Prussian Treaties, Attempted Modification of," "United States, Break with Germany," "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17," etc.)

6. President Wilson urges the recognition of a state of war with Germany (April 2). (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "United States, Break with Germany," etc.)

"The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a warfare against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it . . . There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

"With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war It will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany.

"We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feelings towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor States with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may

be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or to observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own . . .

"The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them . . .

"We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship [for the German people] in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few."—(Speech to the Senate, April 2, 1917)

7. Declaration of a state of war with Germany. Passed in the Senate (April 4) by a vote of 32 to 6; in the House (April 6), 373 to 50. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "War, Declaration Against Germany.")

"Whereas, The Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United

States."—(Joint Resolution of Congress, approved by the President, April 6, 1917)

8. Declaration of War against Austria-Hungary (Dec 7, 1917). Passed unanimously in the Senate, and with one opposing vote (Meyer London, Socialist, from New York City, voting "present") in the House. (See *War Cyclopedia*, "Austria-Hungary, Break with," "Dumba, Recall of," "War, Declaration against Austria-Hungary.")

III. SUMMARY OF OUR REASONS FOR ENTERING THE WAR.

1. Because of the renewal by Germany of her submarine warfare in a more violent form than ever before, contrary to the assurance given to our Government in the spring of 1916. This resulted in the loss of additional American lives and property on the high seas and produced in the minds of the President and Congress the conviction that national interest and national honor required us to take up the gauntlet which Germany had thrown down. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Submarine Warfare, American Lives Lost," etc.)
2. Because of the conviction, unwillingly reached, that the Imperial German Government had repudiated wholesale the commonly accepted principles of law and humanity, and was "running amuck" as an international desperado, who could be made to respect law and right only by forcible and violent means. The cumulative effect of Germany's outrages should be noted in this connection. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "German Diplomacy," "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy of.")
3. Because of the conviction that Prussian militarism and autocracy, let loose in the world, disturbed the balance of power and threatened to destroy the international equilibrium. They were a menace to all nations save those allied with Germany; and the menace must be overthrown, as Napoleonism had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by a coalition of the states whose honor, rights, and national existence were endangered. The Middle Europe project should receive attention in this connection. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Autocracy," "Hegemony," "Kaiserism," "Mittel-Europa," "Prussianism," etc.)
4. Because of the gradual shaping of the conflict into a war between democratic nations on the one hand and autocratic nations on the other, and because of the conviction that, as our nation in Lincoln's day could not hope to long endure "half slave and half free," so the world community of today could not continue to exist part autocratic and part democratic. Note the effect of the Russian Revolution on the issues of the war. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Russian Revolution of 1917.")
5. Because of the conviction that our traditional policy of isolation and aloofness was outgrown and outworn, and could no longer be maintained in the face of the growing interdependence which is one of the leading characteristics of this modern age. (See *War Cyclopedia*, "United States, Isolation.")
6. Because of the menace to the Monroe Doctrine and to our own independence. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "America Threatened," "Monroe Doctrine, German Attitude.")

"The history, the character, the avowed principles of action, the manifest and undisguised purpose of the German autocracy made it clear and certain that if America stayed out of the Great War, and Germany won, America would forthwith be required to defend herself, and would be unable to defend herself, against the same lust for conquest, the same will to dominate the world which has made Europe a bloody shambles. . .

"If we had stayed out of the war and Germany had won, we should have had to defend the Monroe Doctrine by force or abandon it; and if we had abandoned it, there would have been a German naval base in the Caribbean commanding the Panama Canal, depriving us of that strategic line which unites the eastern and western coasts, and depriving us of the protection the expanse of ocean once gave.

"And an America unable or unwilling to protect herself against the establishment of a German naval base in the Caribbean would lie at the mercy of Germany and subject to Germany's orders.

"America's independence would be gone unless she was ready to fight for it, and her security would thenceforth be not a security of freedom but only a security purchased by submission."—(Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

IV. DUTY OF ALL CITIZENS TO SUPPORT THE WAR WHOLE-HEARTEDLY.

"A nation which declares war and goes on discussing whether it ought to have declared war or not is impotent, paralyzed, imbecile, and earns the contempt of mankind and the certainty of humiliating defeat and subjection to foreign control.

"A democracy which cannot accept its own decisions made in accordance with its own laws, but must keep on endlessly discussing the questions already decided, has failed in the fundamental requirements of self-government; and, if the decision is to make war, the failure to exhibit capacity for self-government by action will inevitably result in the loss of the right of self-government.

"Before the decision of a proposal to make war, men may range themselves upon one side or the other of the question; but after the decision in favor of war the country has ranged itself, and the only issue left for the individual citizen is whether he is for or against his country.

"From that time on arguments against the war in which the country is engaged are enemy arguments.

"Their spirit is the spirit of rebellion against the Government and laws of the United States.

"Their effect is to hinder and lessen that popular support of the Government in carrying on the war which is necessary to success.

"Their manifest purpose is to prevent action by continuing discussion.

"They encourage the enemy. They tend to introduce delay and irresolution into our own councils.

"The men who are speaking and writing and printing arguments against the war now, and against everything which is being done to carry on the war, are rendering more effective service to Germany than they ever could render in the field with arms in their hands. The purpose and effect of what they are doing is so plain that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the greater part

of them are at heart traitors to the United States and willfully seeking to bring about the triumph of Germany and the humiliation and defeat of their own country.

"The same principles apply to the decision of numerous questions which arise in carrying on the war [such as conscription, sending troops to France, etc.] . . .

"It is beyond doubt that many of the professed pacifists, the opponents of the war after the war has been entered upon, the men who are trying to stir up resistance to the draft, the men who are inciting strikes in the particular branches of production which are necessary for the supply of arms and munitions of war, are intentionally seeking to aid Germany and defeat the United States. As time goes on and the character of these acts becomes more and more clearly manifest, all who continue to associate with them must come under the same condemnation as traitors to their country."—(Elihu Root, speech at Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

For reading references on Chapter VIII, see page 64

IX. COURSE OF THE WAR, 1914-17

I. CAMPAIGN OF 1914.

1. Germany's general plan of action: First crush France, then Russia, then Great Britain. The German plan in its earlier stages was like a timetable, with each step scheduled by day and hour.

2. On the Western Front:

- (a) Belgium overrun (August 4-20). Resistance of Liège, Namur, etc., overcome by giant artillery (42-centimeter mortars); but the delay (of ten days) gave the French time to mobilize and threw the German plans out of gear. Liège occupied, August 7; Brussels, August 20; Namur, August 22; Louvain burned, August 26.

"Every minute in it [the German plan] was determined. From the German frontier, opposite Ais-la-Chapelle, to the gap of the Oise, on the French frontier . . . there are six days' march. But the passage of the Germans across Belgium in arms halted before Liège and before Namur, halted on the edge of the Gette, beaten on August 12 on the edge of the forest of Haelen, victorious on August 18 and 19 at Aerschoot—had lasted sixteen days (August 4-20). The splendid effort of the Belgians had therefore made ten full days late the arrival of the German armies on the French frontier, from which only eight marches separated them from the advanced forts of Paris."—(Joseph Reinach, in *N. Y. Times Current History*, Sept., 1917, p. 495)

- (b) Invasion of France. Advance of Germans in five armies through Belgium and Luxemburg: General von Moltke, chief of staff; Generals von Kluck, von Buelow, etc. Wary tactics of the French under General Joffre; arrival of the British expeditionary force (100,000 men) under General French (August 8-21); Battle of Mons-Charleroi (August 21-23); dogged withdrawal of the French and British from Belgium to the line of the River Marne, while a new French army (the Sixth) was being formed.—Advance of the Germans to within twenty miles of Paris; then sudden swerve to the east away from Paris.

(c) Battle of the Marne (September 6-10). The opposing forces in contact from Paris to Verdun, a front of one hundred and eighty miles. French attempt to turn the German west flank. German armies forced to retreat from the Marne to the River Aisne, where they entrenched.

The battle of the Marne was "one more decisive battle of the world, . . . for Europe conceivably the greatest in permanent meaning since Waterloo. In that battle it has been decided that Europe should still be European and not Prussian. At the Marne, France had saved herself and Europe."—(F. H. Simons, in *American Review of Reviews*, for February, 1915, page 179.)

(d) Failure of the Allies (Sept. 12-17) to break through the German line in the Battle of the Aisne. Extension of the trench system from Switzerland to the North Sea (fall of Antwerp, Oct. 8). Importance of German conquest of Belgian coast as supplying bases for her later submarine warfare.

The battle line established after the Battle of the Aisne remained practically stationary, with some slight swaying backward and forward, for the next three years. The parts of France held by the Germans included ninety per cent of her iron ore, eighty per cent of her iron and steel manufactures, and fifty per cent of her coal resources.

(e) Battle of the River Yser (Oct. 16-28); Belgians cut dykes. First battle of Ypres (Oct. 22-Nov. 15); Prussian Guards defeated by the "contemptible little army" of Great Britain. German losses on Yser and at Ypres, 150,000.

2. On the Eastern Front:

(a) First Russian invasion of East Prussia (Aug. 18) following their unexpectedly rapid mobilization. The resulting necessity of withdrawing German troops from the West front helped to produce the German check on the Marne. Russians disastrously defeated among the Mazurian lakes in the Battle of Tannenberg (Aug. 26-Sept. 1). General Hindenburg thenceforth the idol of Germany.

(b) Russian invasion of Galicia. Breakdown of the Austrian resistance. Capture of Tarnopol, Halicz and Lemberg (Aug. 27-Sept. 3); Jaroslav (Nov. 5); siege of Przemysl (surrendered March 22, 1915); invasion of Hungary threatened.

(c) German invasion of Russian Poland fails. Three offensives of German armies against Warsaw beaten off (Nov.—Dec.). Narrow escape of a German army from disaster in the Battle of Lodz (Nov. 19- Dec. 3).

(d) Thanks to the relaxation of Austrian pressure, due to the foregoing events, Serbia expelled the Austrian invaders from her territory (Dec. 14).

3. Loss of Germany's colonies. New Guinea, Bismarck archipelago, etc., taken by the Australians (Sept.). Tsungtau (Nov. 7) and various Pacific islands captured by the Japanese. British conquest of Togoland (August 26); German Southwest Africa (July 15, 1915); Kamerun (Feb. 16, 1916); British invasion of German East Africa begun (conquest completed in December, 1917).—Failure of De Wet's German-aided rebellion in

South Africa owing to loyalty of the Boers (Oct.—Dec., 1914).—Pro-Turkish Khedive of Egypt deposed, British protectorate proclaimed, and a new ruler set up with title of Sultan (Dec. 17, 1914).

4. Turkey openly joins the Teutonic Allies (Oct. 29). Defeat of Turks by Russians in the Caucasian region (Jan. 1915). Failure of Turkish attempts to invade Egypt (Feb. 3, 1915). Revolt of the "holy places" in Arabia against Turkish rule and establishment of a petty kingdom there (June 27, 1916).

5. Naval War. Great importance in the war of British naval preponderance, aided by early concentration in the North Sea. British naval victory in Helgoland Bight (Aug. 28). German naval victory in the Pacific off coast of Chili (Nov. 1). Three British cruisers torpedoed by submarines in the North Sea (Sept. 21). German cruiser *Emden* caught and destroyed at Cocos Island after sensational career (Nov. 10). British naval victory off Falkland Islands (Dec. 8) avenges defeat of Nov. 1. German fleets driven from the seas. Disappearance of German shipping. Freedom of action for British transport of East Indian, New Zealand, Australian, and Canadian troops, etc., to Europe, and of Allied commerce, except for the (as yet slight) submarine danger. Error of Great Britain in failing to declare at once a rigid blockade of Germany.

6. Situation at close of 1914: On western front, defeat of the plan of the German General Staff; on eastern front, Teutonic forces held in check; Germany and Austria as yet cut off from their new ally, Turkey. On the whole the advantage was on the side of the Entente Allies. But the Allied commanders (General Joffre, Lord Kitchener, and Grand Duke Nicholas) failed fully to grasp the needs of the situation. "Each of these leaders believed that the height of military efficiency had been reached in the past campaigns"; in the great development of barrier fire and the excellence of the French "75's." The Teutonic allies, on the other hand, "were making the colossal preparations of artillery and munitions which were destined to change the year 1915 into a tragedy for the Entente Allies."—(T. C. Frothingham, in *N. Y. Times Current History*, Sept., 1917, page 422.)

II. CAMPAIGN OF 1915.

1. On the West Front. Failure of the Allied offensive in Champagne (March—April); Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Second Battle of Ypres (April 22-26); Germans first use poison gas; heroism of the Canadians. Inadequacy of Allies' preparations for carrying the formidable German entrenchments. Desultory fighting through the summer. Failure of the second offensive in Champagne and Flanders (Sept.). General French superseded by General Haig as British commander in chief. Death of Lord Kitchener through the sinking of the warship *Hampshire* (June 7, 1916).

2. The Gallipoli Expedition. Failure of Allies to force the Dardanelles with their fleets alone (Feb.—March). Troops landed after long delay, in April and August. Abandonment of expedition in Dec.—Jan., after enormous losses. Disastrous effects on the hesitating na-

tions, Bulgaria and Greece. Bitter controversy in Great Britain over the question of responsibility for this fiasco.

3. Second Russian invasion of East Prussia crushed by Hindenburg in Battle of Mazurian Lakes (Feb. 12). Russians lost 150,000 killed and wounded and 100,000 prisoners.

4. Terrific drive of combined Germans and Austrians under Hindenburg and Mackensen in Poland and Galicia (April—Aug.). Fall of Przemysl (June 2); Lemberg (June 22); Warsaw (Aug. 5). All Poland conquered; Courland overrun. Russian losses, 1,200,000 killed and wounded; 900,000 captured; 65,000 square miles of territory. Russian line established from Riga to Eastern Galicia. Grand Duke Nicholas removed from chief command and sent to command in the Caucasus (Sept. 8).

5. Bulgaria joins the Teutonic Allies (Oct. 13). Serbia crushed by simultaneous invasions of Austro-Germans and Bulgarians (completed Dec. 2). Montenegro conquered (Jan. 1916)—Landing of an Anglo-French army at Saloniki prevents King Constantine of Greece from openly joining the Teutonic alliance.

6. Italy declares war on Austria (May 23) to recover the regions about Trent (the "Trentino") and Trieste. Lack of military results on Italian front in 1915 (failure to capture Gorizia). War on Germany not declared until Aug. 27, 1916.

7. Naval War. In a battle in the North Sea (Jan. 24) a British patrolling squadron defeated a German raiding squadron. Increasing use of submarines by Germany. German proclamation of "a war zone" about the British Isles (in force Feb. 18) establishes a so-called "blockade" of Great Britain.—Sinking of the passenger steamship *Lusitania* (May 7) with loss of 1198 lives (124 Americans).

8. Increase in Allies' munitions supply arranged for; appointment (May, 1915) of Lloyd George to be British Minister of Munitions. Failure of Zeppelin raids over England to produce expected results. (Between Jan. 19, 1915, and Oct. 1, 1917, German aircraft, including Zeppelins, raided England thirty four times, killing outright 865 men, women, and children, and wounding over 2,500.)

9. Summary: The situation at the end of 1915 was much less favorable for the Entente than at the beginning of the year. Little change on Western front. Great changes on Eastern front—Russians driven from Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia; Hungary saved from invasion; Central Powers linked to Turkey by the adhesion of Bulgaria and the conquest of Serbia. "The Teutons were no longer hemmed in; they had raised the siege."

III. CAMPAIGN OF 1916.

1. Battle of Verdun ("no longer a fortress but a series of trenches"). Great German attack under the Crown Prince (Feb.—July); defeated by the heroic resistance of the French under General Pétain ("They shall not pass.") Enormous German losses (about 500,000 men) through attacks in close formation against French for-

tifications defended by "barrage" fire and machine guns. Practically all ground lost was slowly regained by the French in the autumn. "Verdun was the grave of Germany's claim to military invincibility."—(Col. A. M. Murray, "*Fortnightly*" *History of the War*, I. 368).—Hindenburg made commander-in-chief of the German forces, August 29.

2. Battle of the Somme (July 1—Nov.). The strengthened artillery of the Allies enabled them to drive back the German front on a breadth of twenty miles, and nine miles deep. Estimated loss of Germans 700,000 men; German estimate of French and British loss, 800,000. The Allies failed to break through the German lines.

3. Galician and Armenian Fronts. Great Russian offensive (June—Sept.) under General Brusilov, on front from Pripet marshes to Bukovinian border. Capture of Czernovitz (June 18). Hundreds of thousands of Austrians taken prisoners.—Successful offensive of Grand Duke Nicholas in Armenia against the Turks; capture of Erzerum (Feb. 16) and Trebizond (April 18).

4. Roumania enters the war and is crushed. Encouraged by Allied successes and coerced by the disloyal Russian Court, Roumania declared war (Aug. 27) with a view to rescuing her kindred populations from Austrian rule. Unsupported invasion of Transylvania; terrific counter attacks by German-Austrian-Bulgarian armies under Generals Mackensen and Falkenhayn; Roumanians driven from Transylvania. Greater part of Roumania conquered (fall of Bucharest, Dec. 6). Rich wheat-fields and oil lands gained by Teutons, and the "corridor" to Constantinople widened. The "Mittel-Europa" project approaches realization.

5. British failure in Mesopotamia. Basra, on Persian Gulf, taken by British Nov. 31, 1914; advance of General Townshend's inadequate expedition from India up the Tigris River toward Bagdad; expedition besieged by Turks at Kut-el-Amara (Jan.—April, 1916); relieving expedition forced to turn back. Surrender of General Townshend (April 29) with 13,000 men. Serious blow to British prestige in the East. (The report of an investigating commission, June 26, 1917, divides the responsibility for failure between the Home Government and the Government in India.)

6. Italian Front. Successful Austrian offensive from the Trentino (May 16—June 3). Brusilov's drive in Galicia, however, relieved the pressure upon the Italians, who then (Aug. 6th to Sept.) freed Italian soil of the Austrians, and began an offensive which brought them Gorizia on the River Isonzo (Aug. 9) and carried them to within thirteen miles of Trieste.

7. Naval War. Battle of Jutland (May 31); the German high seas fleet engaged the British battle-cruiser fleet until darkness enabled the German ships to escape the on-coming British dreadnaughts.—Increased use of submarines by Germans. Channel packet *Sussex* sunk (March 25) without warning, in violation of German pledge.

8. Political events in Great Britain affecting the war. Adoption of compulsory military service (May 25) lays the basis for a British army of 5,000,000 men.—Sinn Féin rebellion in Ireland crushed (April 25-28); Sir

Roger Casement executed (Aug. 2).—Lloyd George displaces Asquith as head of British cabinet, to infuse new energy into the war (Dec. 5-7).

9. Summary: The balance in 1916 inclined on the whole in favor of the Allies—at Verdun, on the Somme, in Galicia, in Italy, and on the sea. Against these victories must be set the disasters of Roumania and Mesopotamia. The Central Powers continued to possess the advantage of operating on interior lines, enabling them while adopting a defensive attitude on certain fronts to concentrate for a drive elsewhere; also of their superiority (though diminished) in strategy, tactics, and material equipment.

IV. CAMPAIGN OF 1917.

1. Unrestricted submarine warfare begun by Germany (Feb. 1). Hundreds of thousands of tons of belligerent and neutral shipping sunk each month; (merchant shipping destroyed by mines and submarines to Jan. 1, 1917, was 5,034,000 tons; from January to June, 1917 the total was 3,856,000 tons). Reliance upon this weapon by Germany to starve Great Britain out; failure of the policy to achieve the ends planned. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Shipping, Losses," "Spurlos Versenkt Applied," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," etc.)
2. Entrance of the United States into the War War declared on Germany, April 6; on Austria-Hungary, December 7. (See chapter viii.) Energetic measures to raise and train army of one and a half million men, and to provide food, munitions, and shipping for ourselves and our associates. Magnitude of this task prevented the full weight of the United States being felt in 1917. Nevertheless, about 250,000 American troops were in France under General Pershing by December. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Austria-Hungary, Break With," "United States, Break with Germany," "War, Declaration Against Austria-Hungary," "War, Declaration Against Germany"; also under "Acts of Congress," "Alien Enemies," "Army," "Bonds Act," "Cantonments," "Espionage Act," "Food and Fuel Control Act," "Profiteering," "Red Cross," "Selective Service," "Shipping Board," "War Industries Board," "Y. M. C. A.," etc.)
3. Further Spread of the War. Cuba and Panama follow the United States in declaring war on Germany (April 7). King Constantine of Greece deposed (June 12, 1917) and Greece joined the Allies (June 30). Siam declared war on Germany July 22; Liberia, August 4; China, Aug. 14. Brazil repealed its declaration of neutrality and severed diplomatic relations; war declared Oct. 26. The following broke diplomatic relations with Germany: Bolivia (April 14), Guatemala (April 27), Honduras (May 17), Nicaragua (May 18) Haiti (June 17), Costa Rica (Sept. 21), Peru (Oct. 6), Uruguay (Oct. 7), Ecuador (Dec. 8). German destruction of South American vessels and revelations of the abuse by her diplomats of Argentine neutrality under cover of Swedish diplomatic immunity (the Luxburg dispatches; *spurlos versenkt*), led to widespread agitations for war with Germany and united action of all the South American countries.

4. Western Front. Withdrawal of German forces on a front of fifty miles to new and more defensible positions (the "Hindenburg line") extending from Arras to Soissons (March); wanton wasting of the country evacuated. *Battle of Arras* (April 9—May) brought slight gains to the Allies; a mine of 1,000,000 lbs. of high explosives was fired at Messines (July 7).—Terrific British offensives in *Battle of Flanders* (July—Dec.) won Passchendaele ridge and other gains. *Battle of Cambrai* (Nov. 20—Dec.) begun by "tanks" without artillery preparation, penetrated Hindenburg line and forced German retirement on front of twenty miles, to depth of several miles. Terrific German counter attacks forced partial retirement of British (from Bournon wood, etc.)
5. Italian Front. Great Italian offensive begun in the Isonzo area (Carso Plateau) in May. When the Russian Revolution permitted the withdrawal of Austrian troops to the Italian front, a new Austro-German counter-drive was begun (Oct.—Dec.) which undid the work of two years. Northeastern Italy invaded; Italian stand on the Piave and Brenta Rivers (Asiago Plateau). French and British aid checked further enemy advance in 1917. Interallied War Council formed (Nov.)
6. Bagdad captured by a new British expedition (March 11). Restoration of British prestige in the East. Cooperation of Russian and British forces in Asia Minor and Persia. British advance from Egypt into Palestine in March; Ascalon and Jaffa taken (Nov.); Jerusalem surrendered to British, Dec. 9, 1917.
7. Revolution in Russia. Due to pro-German policy of certain members of the Russian court and the well founded suspicion that a separate peace with Germany was planned. Abdication of the Tsar, March 19. Power seized from Constitutional Democrats by moderate socialists and radicals (Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates); formation of a government under Alexander Kerensky (July 22). Military power of Russia paralyzed by abolition of discipline; frequent refusals of soldiers to obey orders; "fraternizing" of the armies encouraged by German agents. Germans seized Riga (Sept. 3), and the islands at entrance to Gulf of Riga (Oct. 13-15), thus threatening Petrograd. General Kornilov failed in an attempt to seize power with a view to restoring order and prosecuting the war (Sept.).—Overthrow of Kerensky (Nov.) by extreme socialists (Bolsheviks), who repudiated Russia's obligations to the Allies, and negotiated a separate armistice with Germany with a view to an immediate peace, Dec. 15). Practical withdrawal of Russia from the war, permitting transfer of German troops to the French and Italian fronts. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Kerensky," "Lenine," "Russian Revolution," etc.)
8. Summary: Ruthless submarining imparts a more desperate character to the conflict, but brings Germany and her allies no nearer ultimate victory. Against her submarine successes, the Austro-German gains in Italy, and the Russian defection, must be set the British victories in Mesopotamia and Palestine, the Allied gains on the Western Front, and the entrance of the United States with its vast potential resources into the war.

For reading references on Chapter IX, see page 64.

X. PROPOSALS FOR PEACE: WILL THIS BE THE LAST WAR?

I. SUMMARY OF STATES AT WAR IN 1917.

1. The Teutonic Allies: Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey (1914); Bulgaria (1915).
2. The Entente Allies: Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Japan (1914); Italy, San Marino (1915); Portugal, Roumania (1916); United States, Cuba, Panama, Liberia, Siam, China, Brazil (1917). Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador severed diplomatic relations with Germany (1917) without declaring war.

II. AMERICAN AIMS IN THE WAR. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Aims of the United States," "Permanent Peace, American Plans," "United States, Isolation of," "War Aims of the United States.")

1. Vindication of our national rights. "We enter the war only where we are clearly forced into it, because there is no other means of defending our rights." Hence war not declared at first against Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.
2. Vindication of the rights of humanity. "Our motive will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right . . . Our object . . . is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power."
3. Making the world safe for Liberty and Democracy. "We are glad . . . to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." (The above quotations are from President Wilson's speech to Congress on April 2, 1917.)
4. Creation of an improved international system including a permanent League or Concert of Powers to preserve international peace. (See President Wilson's speeches of January 22, and April 2, 1917, and January 8, 1918)
5. Absence of selfish designs. "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when these rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)

III. VARIOUS PEACE PROPOSALS. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Lansdowne Note," "Peace Overtures, German, 1916," "Peace Overtures, Papal," "Peace Terms, American," "No Annexations, no Indemnities," etc.)

1. Offer of Germany and her allies (December 12, 1916) to meet their enemies in a peace conference (see "Official Documents Looking toward Peace" in *International Conciliation* for January, 1917). An empty and insincere proposal. They "propose to enter forthwith into

peace negotiations," but refuse to state any terms; on the other hand much is made of the "glorious deeds of our armies" and their "incomparable strength." The proposal evidently looked to a "German peace," with Germany and her allies triumphant.

Reply of the Entente Allies (December 30, 1916). The German proposal was styled "less an offer of peace than a war manoeuvre. It is founded on calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle in the past, the present and the future. . . . Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationality and the free existence of small states, so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world."—(*International Conciliation* for January, 1917, pp. 27-29.)

2. President Wilson's effort (Dec. 20, 1916) to elicit peace terms from the belligerents. (See his note in *International Conciliation*, for February, 1917.)
 - (a) Germany merely repeats its proposal of December 12, still refusing to go into details in advance of a formal conference.—(*Ibid.*, p. 7.)
 - (b) The Allies' reply (Jan. 10, 1917). Their statement of terms included adequate compensation for Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro; evacuation of invaded territories of France, Russia, and Roumania; reorganization of Europe on the basis of nationality; the ending of Turkish rule in Europe, etc.

"It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples, and their political disappearance."—(*Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.)
3. Widespread and intense desire for peace among the German people. Evidenced, among other things, by the fall of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg (July 14, 1917) following this declaration of the Reichstag (July 13):

"As on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of the war the German people stand upon the assurance of the speech from the throne—'We are driven by no lust of conquest.'

"Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and independence and for the integrity of its territories. The Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic and financial violations are incompatible with such a peace.

"The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples.

"The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international juridical organizations. So long, however, as the enemy Governments do not

accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, the German people will stand together as one man, hold out unshaken and fight until the rights of itself and its allies to life and development are secured. The German nation united is unconquerable.

"The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at one with the men who are defending the Fatherland. In their heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the whole people." (*N. Y. Times Current History*, VI, p. 195.)

It should be noted that the Reichstag has no power to conclude peace, or to initiate peace negotiations, or even to force the German Government to do so.

4. Pope Benedict XV attempts to promote Peace.

(a) His first appeal (Aug. 1915) lacked definite proposals and was without effect.

(b) His second appeal (Aug. 1, 1917) recommended: (1) "That the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right"; simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments; the establishing of compulsory arbitration "under sanctions to be determined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." (2) True freedom and community of the seas. (3) Entire and reciprocal giving up of indemnities to cover the damages and cost of the war. (4) Occupied territory to be reciprocally given up; guarantees of Belgium's political, military, and economic independence; similar restitutions of the German colonies. (5) Territorial questions between Italy and Austria, and France and Germany, to be taken up after the war "in a conciliatory spirit, taking into account, as far as it is just and possible . . . the aspirations of the population." Questions of Armenia, the Balkan States, and the old Kingdom of Poland to be dealt with in the same way.—In the main this was a proposal for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* [the conditions existing before the war]—a drawn battle.—(*N. Y. Times Current History*, September, 1917, pp. 392-293).

5. Reply of the United States to the Pope's appeal (Aug. 27, 1917). The Entente Allies practically accepted this reply as their own.

"To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy, would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain counter-revolution, which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?"

" . . . We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired,

but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on."

6. Reply of Germany (September 22, 1917). This was filled with the vaguest generalities. In part it consisted of hypocritical and lying protestations that ever since the Kaiser ascended the throne he had "regarded it as his principal and most sacred task to preserve the blessings of peace for the German people and the world"; and that "in the crisis which led up to the present world conflagration his Majesty's efforts were up to the last moment directed towards settling the conflict by peaceful means." With reference to the substituting of "the moral power of right" for "the material power of arms", and for the reduction of armaments and the establishing of arbitration, indorsement was given the Pope's proposals in such vague and general terms as to bind the German Government to nothing.

"The Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the conviction that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right. . . . From this would follow, according to his Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all states and the institution of obligatory arbitrations for international disputes.

"We share his Holiness' view that definite rules and a certain safeguard for a simultaneous and reciprocal limitation of armaments on land, on sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom of the community and high seas, are the things in treating which the new spirit that in the future should prevail in international relations should first find hopeful expression .

"The task would then of itself arise to decide international differences of opinion not by the use of armed forces but by peaceful methods, especially by arbitration, whose high peace-producing effect we together with his Holiness fully recognize.

"The Imperial Government will in this respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people."

No notice whatever was taken of the Pope's plea for the giving up of occupied territory and the restoration of Belgium's independence. When reports were published in the German press that nevertheless the Government

was prepared to give up Belgium, the Chancellor denied this, saying (September 28):

"I declare that the Imperial Government's hands are free for eventual peace negotiations. This also refers to Belgium."

7. Failure of the attempt to promote an international conference of Socialists at Stockholm (Sweden) for peace on the basis of the Russian revolutionary formula, "No annexations and no indemnities," September, 1917. This failure was due to (a) suspicion that pro-German influence was back of the proposal; and (b) publication of proofs of pro-German and unneutral conduct on the part of Swedish diplomatic officials. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Spurlos Versenkt," "Stockholm Conference," "Sweden, Neutral Problems.")

January 28 to February 3, 1918, occurred a widespread strike in Germany (500,000 said to have struck in Berlin alone) to secure (a) a general peace "without indemnities or annexations," (b) betterment of food and living conditions, and (c) more democratic political institutions. The arrest of the leaders and the firm attitude of the military authorities speedily sent the strikers back to work.

8. President Wilson's proposals of January 8, 1918:

"What we demand in this war . . . is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are, in effect, partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:

"I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

"II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

"III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

"VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an

unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

"VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

"VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored; and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

"IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

"XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guaranties of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

"XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guaranties.

"XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

"XIV. A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." (*War, Labor, and Peace*, pp. 28-31.)

On February 11 the President made this further statement:

"After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government [Austria or United States] to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

"First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

"Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

"Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States; and

"Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world." (*War, Labor, and Peace*, p. 38.)

9. The proposals of Great Britain (speech of Lloyd George, January 5, 1918, and of revolutionary Russia (Bolshevik proposals at Brest-Litovsk, December 2, 1917) were in substantial agreement with those of President Wilson. (See comparative synopsis in *New York Times Current History* for February, 1918, pp. 257-9.)

An Inter-Allied Labor Conference, held in London, February 20-23, speaking in the name of practically all the organized working class of Great Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy, specifically indorsed President Wilson's proposals, and declared that "a victory for German imperialism would be the defeat of democracy and liberty in Europe," and that the Socialists whom they represented "were inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved." (Full text of declaration in *The New Republic* for March 23, 1918.)

10. Replies of Germany and Austria (January 24):

Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, replied to President Wilson's address of January 8, in a speech of conciliatory tone, but said that Austria would "defend the pre-war possessions of her allies as she would her own." This attitude ignored the Alsace-Lorraine question, but by implication conceded the giving up of Belgium. (In the first telegraphic despatches, this passage was falsified in the German interest by the Wolff Press Bureau.)

Chancellor von Hertling's speech in reply was "very vague and confusing":

"His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities; and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by

the twenty-three States now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood.

"He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic Provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

"It must be evident to everyone who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches." (President Wilson, address of February 11, 1918, in *War, Labor, and Peace*, pp. 34-5.)

11. Attitude of the Kaiser.

"The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely rely. . . . If the enemy does not want peace, then we must bring peace to the world by battering in with the iron fist and shining sword the doors of those who will not have peace." (*Address to German Second Army on the French front, December 22, 1917.*)

"We desire to live in friendship with neighboring peoples, but the victory of German arms must first be recognized. Our troops under the great Hindenburg will continue to win it. Then peace will come." (On conclusion of peace with Ukraine, February 11, 1918.)

"The prize of victory must not and will not fail us. No soft peace, but one corresponding with Germany's interests." (To Schleswig-Holstein Provincial Council, March 20, 1918.)

IV. DEALINGS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS WITH RUSSIA AND ROUMANIA.

1. Armistice with Russia for one month agreed to December 15, 1917 (subsequently extended to February 18, 1918).
2. Brest-Litovsk negotiations (December 22 to February 10).
 - (a) Count Czernin presented (December 25) what purported to be the terms of the Central Powers for a general peace, "without forcible annexation of territory" or indemnities. "Almost any scheme of conquest could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a pledge." (Lloyd George, January 5, 1918.)
 - (b) Failure of Russia's allies to appear at Brest-Litovsk within ten days led the German representatives to declare Czernin's terms withdrawn. Negotiations with Russia for a separate peace followed.
 - (c) Quarrels between the Russian and German negotiators over (1) the German refusal to guaranty an immediate removal, after the peace, of German troops from occupied Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia; and (2) over Bolshevik propaganda for revolution in Germany. (3) Reported conflicts between the German Foreign Minister von Kuehlmann and the German military party; victory of the militarists and determination to annex extensive portions of Russian territory.
3. Peace concluded (February 9) between the Central Powers and the anti-Bolshevik party in Ukraine, which had set up a weak "People's republic." Its purpose to secure grain for the Teutonic allies from the rich "black lands" of Ukraine, to control its extensive coal and iron deposits, and to rule the Black Sea. Refusal of the Bolsheviks to recognize the new State; civil war in Ukraine, resulting in conquest by German troops and the occupation of Odessa (March 13). Similar civil war and German occupation in Finland; Aaland Islands seized by Germany.
4. Abrupt withdrawal of the Bolshevik negotiators from Brest-Litovsk and announcement that the war was at an end, without signing a treaty of peace (February 10):

"We could not sign a peace which would bring with it sadness, oppression and suffering to millions of workmen and peasants. But we also cannot, will not, and must not continue a war begun by czars and capitalists in alliance with czars and capitalists. We will not and we must not continue to be at war with the Germans and Austrians—workmen and peasants like ourselves. . . . Russia, for its part, declares the present war with Germany and Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at an end. Simultaneously, the Russian troops receive an order for complete demobilization on all fronts." (Declaration signed by Lenine and Trotzky, heads of the Bolshevik Government of Russia.)
5. Renewal of German military operations against Russia (February 18) with the object of adding Esthonia and Livonia, the remaining Baltic Provinces, to other lands wrested from Russia.
6. Announcement by Lenine and Trotzky (February 19) that "in the present circumstances" their Government

was forced "formally to declare its willingness to sign a peace upon the conditions which had been dictated" by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk. The Germans nevertheless advanced, with practically no resistance, on a front of 500 miles and to within seventy miles of Petrograd. Great quantities of military supplies captured (over 1,300 cannon, 4,000 to 5,000 motor cars, etc.)

7. Peace between Russia and the Central Powers signed at Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918; ratified by the "All-Russian Congress of Soviets," at Moscow, March 14). Its principal terms were: (a) the surrender by Russia of Courland, Poland, Lithuania, Livonia, and Esthonia. (b) Peace to be made with Ukraine and Finland by which Russia recognizes their independence. (c) Batoum and other districts in Transcaucasia to be surrendered to Turkey. (d) An indemnity which is variously estimated at from \$1,500,000,000 to \$4,000,000,000.

Maxim Gorky calculated that this treaty robbed Russia of 4 per cent. of her total area, 26 per cent. of her population, 27 per cent. of her agricultural land normally cultivated, 37 per cent. of her food-stuffs production, 26 per cent. of her railways, 33 per cent. of her manufacturing industries, 75 per cent. of her coal, and 73 per cent. of her iron. It has also been pointed out that the treaty strengthened Germany's hold on the Mohammedan peoples, and gave her an alternative route to India and the East via Odessa, Batoum, Transcaucasia, and northern Persia.

8. Roumania was forced to sign a preliminary treaty with the Central Powers (March 6), ceding the whole of the Dobrudja and granting extensive trading and other rights. Subsequently (March 9) Roumania broke off negotiations owing to excessive demands. Austria then (March 21) added to her claims the surrender of about 3,000 square miles of territory on Roumania's western frontier.

Control of vast petroleum fields in Roumania and Transcaucasia as well as extensive and rich wheat lands, was obtained by the Central Powers through these treaties.

- V. WILL THIS BE THE LAST GREAT WAR? (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration," "Hague Tribunal," "International Law, Sanction of," "League to Enforce Peace," "Peace Treaties," "Permanent Peace," etc.)

1. Conflict vs. mutual aid as factors in evolution. Are States of necessity rival and conflicting organizations?
2. William James' answer to the militarists' plea for war as a school to develop character and heroism; the existence of a "moral equivalent for war." (See *International Conciliation* for February, 1910.)
3. Amicable means of settling international differences. These include negotiation, good offices, mediation, international commissions of inquiry, and international arbitration. (See A. S. Hershey, *Essentials of International Law*, ch. xxi.). About 600 cases of international arbitration have been listed since 1800. Importance of developing the habit of relying on these amicable means of settling differences.
4. Proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. These include the following articles, to be signed by the nations joining the League:

"(1) All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a Judicial Tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

"(2) All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

"(3) The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

"The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized by the Executive Committee: 'The signatory Powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international Judicial Tribunal or Council of Conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory without first submitting, or offering to submit, its grievance to the court or Council aforesaid and awaiting its conclusion.'

"(4) Conferences between the signatory Powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article I."—(World Peace Foundation, *Pamphlet Series*, August, 1916.)

5. Possibility of World Federation.

(a) Some historical antecedents—the Holy Alliance (1815); the Quadruple, later the Quintuple, Alliance (1815); the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907); the Conference at Algiers (1906).

(b) Success of partial federations—the United States of America; Dominion of Canada, Commonwealth of Canada, and Union of South Africa; the British Empire; the German Empire; etc.

(c) Lack of explicitness in current proposals. "Internationalists hold that nationalism is no longer expressive of the age, but that federation is not as yet feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly. Hence, they propose internationalism, that is, a sort of confederation, a co-operative union of sovereign states, a true Concert of Powers. The individual schemes vary greatly and are usually not very explicit, chief emphasis being placed on faults of the present system."—(Edward Kriebiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society*, page 210.)

6. Indispensable elements in an effective World Federation.

(a) The triumph of democratic government. "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with it or observe its covenants. . . . Only

free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)

(b) An international legislature. We have already the beginnings of a world legislature in the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

(c) An international executive authority and an international army and navy.

(d) An international court of justice. The so-called permanent court of arbitration at the Hague (Hague Tribunal) not a real court.

7. The triumph of the United States and the Entente Allies over militarist and despotic Germany, gives the best assurance of the establishment of a League of Peace and the practical ending of war.

For reading references for Chapter X, see page 64.

Reading References to accompany a Topical Outline of the War

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER I.

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PART III.

Preliminaries of the World Conflict
Syllabus of a Course of Study

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PREFACE.

This study outline is the result of an attempt to supply the need for an especially practical course in European history. It is not intended to constitute a history of the World War, nor a plan which stresses all the phases of life in modern Europe. It is, however, designed to secure for the student a broad, comprehensive view of European history, particularly during modern times, noting tendencies and motives, and attempting to interpret the significant facts and to give their explanation in terms of every-day life. It is primarily a history course rather than merely a war course, but it is intended to be the means of conveying a sane and intelligent understanding of the circumstances in which we live.

Prepared for a one semester's course, the plan as given is necessarily not exhaustive; it does provide a sufficiently complete course of study for the average high school student. The teacher must determine, of course, to what extent the outline is to be developed. Our views of the comparative importance of the many phases of the present situation are so varied and so changing that the relative amount of time which should be devoted to the different features of the course is difficult to determine. Moreover, there are no established precedents for such a course, and, in a sense, it is a pioneer. It is evident that in one semester the ground covered cannot be very extensive if a thorough understanding of historical development is to be secured. For this reason, high school courses in European history, covering the field of history from its beginning to about 1700, are made a prerequisite. This furnishes a working basis for the development of the specialized topics of the course. The outline provides for sixty lessons, thus giving sufficient latitude for supplementary work, reviews, tests, or more thorough consideration of some of the topics in the outline.

The topic for each day's work has been outlined somewhat in detail, chiefly for the purpose of serving as a guide to reading. This outline is not intended to summarize the chief points of the lesson, but rather to direct the investigation and to stimulate interest and curiosity on the part of the student. Recitations in such a course are not supposed to be devoted to the mere recitation of facts, except where necessary to insure a proper understanding of important points, but are intended to give opportunity for the discussion of the more significant facts in human development.

Neither are the problems included in each lesson in any sense exhaustive. They are inserted chiefly for the purpose of stimulating thought and inquiry, as well as for serving as an indication of the more important phases of the lesson. However, a student who has a good comprehension of all the problems listed must needs have a rather thorough knowledge of the whole field.

Since there is as yet no textbook available for such a

course, it is taken for granted that a reasonably good working reference library is at hand. Also, since much of the material needed for reference in the latter part of the course is not yet in permanent form, the student must necessarily have access to the recent volumes of dependable current literature. The references cited in connection with the study outline are those which are to be found in most history reference libraries, and while the list is not in any sense complete, it still provides a sufficient working basis for the preparation of the lesson and the discussion of the main facts involved in it. Special reports and notebook exercises may be given by the teacher. It may be said, however, that too much stress cannot be laid upon the study of maps showing the development of modern Europe.

An additional list of references is given in the bibliography appended to this syllabus. Only those books have been listed which offer material from an historical point of view. The object in preparing this bibliography has been not so much the presentation of a complete list of authoritative works as the listing of a comparatively few dependable volumes on the main phases of the war and its foundation.

In the references given in the outline proper the titles of reference books are given but once, and thereafter are not included. The most important references for the preparations of lessons are starred. There seems to be no necessity here for a grouping of references under the heads of sources and secondary works. Both outlines and references are presented more in detail as the course progresses, for reasons which are obvious.

The success of the course depends largely on the willingness of the student to do extensive reading and investigating, while constantly striving to understand the forces which have directed the actions of men. If a sufficiently critical, questioning spirit is consistently applied, the course will have well served its purpose.

BRIEF OUTLINE OF PRELIMINARIES OF THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

I. Origin of the European States.

1. Heritage of the Dark Ages.
2. Outcome of the Feudal Period.
3. Development of Nationalities to the Reformation.
4. Situation at the End of the Religious Wars.

II. National Consolidation and Expansion.

1. The Constitutional Development of England.
2. Founding of the British Empire.
3. Louis XIV in European Affairs.
4. Rise of Russia: Sweden.
5. Rise of Prussia: Poland Partitioned.

III. Revolutionary Period in Europe.

1. The French Revolution and Napoleon.
 - a. The Course of the French Revolution.
 - b. Napoleon: His Campaigns.

- c. Napoleon's Reconstruction of Europe.
d. The Congress of Vienna.
2. Later Revolutionary Activity.
a. Europe Under Metternich.
b. The French Revolution of 1848.
c. 1848 in Austria and Germany.
- IV. Constitutional Development of the Western Powers.
1. The Unification of Italy.
 - a. Italy from 1815 to 1849.
 - b. Subsequent Steps in Unification.
 2. The Unification of Germany.
 - a. Bismarck and the Austro-Prussian War.
 - b. The Franco-Prussian War.
 - c. The New German Empire.
 3. France and Britain.
 - a. The Third French Republic.
 - b. The Present British Constitution.
 - c. The Irish Problem.
- B. DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD PROBLEMS.
- I. Phases of Territorial Expansion.
1. The Partition of Africa.
 - a. Problems of European Expansion.
 - b. The Resulting African Situation.
 2. The Far East.
 - a. The Russo-Japanese War.
 - b. Relations of Japan and China.
 3. The Balkan Situation.
 - a. Liberation of the Balkan States.
 - b. Recent Conflicting Balkan Interests.
 4. The Near East.
 - a. Turkey and the Eastern Question.
 - b. The Problems of Constantinople.
- II. Events Leading to the War.
1. Review of Conflicting Interests.
 - a. Aims of Austria.
 - b. Situation of Russia.
 - c. The Case of Germany.
 - d. The Case of Britain.
 - e. The Case of France.
 - f. The Circumstances of Italy.
 - g. Situation of the Minor Powers.
 2. Late Diplomatic History.
 - a. Triple Alliance and Triple Entente.
 - b. The Hague Peace Conferences.
 - c. Recent Diplomatic Crises.
 3. Preparation for War.
 - a. Objects of War.
 - b. Militarism and Armaments.
 - c. Austro-German War Preparations.
 - d. The German Idea of War.
- C. THE WAR.
- I. Opening Events.
1. The Austro-Serbian Controversy.
 2. Failure of Diplomacy.
 3. Violation of Belgian Neutrality.
 4. Spread of the War.
- II. The Course of the War.
1. Conduct of the War.
 - a. Events of 1914-15.
 - b. The War During 1916.
 - c. Developments in 1917-18.
 2. The Russian Situation.
 3. Entrance of the United States.
 - a. Struggle to Maintain Neutrality.
 - b. Reasons for the Declaration of War.
 - c. America's Place in the Struggle.
- III. Prospectus.
1. Proposals for Peace.
 2. Proposed Remedies for War.
 3. The Future of War.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.

I. ORIGIN OF THE EUROPEAN STATES.

1. Heritage from the Dark Ages.

- a. Break-up of the Roman Empire.
- b. Barbarian migrations and settlements.
 - (1) Disappearance of civilization.
- c. New physical or racial basis.
 - (1) Variety of racial proportions.
 - (2) Foundation for modern European peoples.
 - (3) Formation of new languages and institutions (a), e. g., the Romance nations.

References:

- Harding, *New Medieval and Modern History*, pp. 13-25.
Myers, *Medieval and Modern History*, chaps. 1, 2, 4.
West, *Modern World*, chaps. 3, 4.
Robinson and Breasted, *Outlines of European History*, chap. 12.

Problems:

- What are the three prime elements of modern civilization?
Show that the barbarian invasions of Europe were the greatest blessings in disguise.
Where, in these dark times, were any elements of the problems of the present?
Explain the similarities and differences of the Spanish, French, Italian, English and German languages.

2. Outcome of the Feudal Period.

- a. The Feudal System in theory and practice.
 - (1) Its causes and nature.
 - (2) Growth of common language and sentiment.
- b. Gradual rise of nations.
 - (1) Formation of the nuclei of nations.
 - (2) Absence of natural or racial boundaries.
 - (3) First attempts at centralized government.
- c. Complete disintegration of the Carolingian Empire.

References:

- Harding, chaps. 1-4.
Myers, chaps. 7, 8, 9.
West, chaps. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9; all brief.
Robinson and Breasted, chap. 16.

Problems:

- On what basis did the present nations of western Europe form? Does this in any way account for their later conflicts?
Point out instances where some of the gravest problems now found in Europe must be traced to the Feudal Period for their origin.
What is a buffer state? Its purpose?

3. Development of Nationalities to the Reformation.

- a. The Holy Roman Empire.
 - (1) Origin of the idea.
 - (2) Attempts to use it as a working basis.
 - (3) Subsequent condition of Germany and Italy.
- b. England.
 - (1) Anglo-Saxon England.
 - (2) Danes and Normans.
 - (3) Rise of free institutions.
- c. Growth of France.
 - (1) Formation of the French Kingdom.
 - (2) Outcome of the Hundred Years' War.
- d. Rise of Spain.
 - (1) Spanish Marches.
 - (2) Consolidation of the Christian states.
- e. The Crusades.
 - (1) Important effects on Europe.

References:

- Harding, sketch chaps. 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14.
Myers, chaps. 11, 12, 13, 17.
West, chaps. 10, 11, 12, 16, 17.
Robinson and Breasted, chaps. 18, 19.

Problems:

- Account for the lack of any kind of national government in Germany and Italy until recent times.
Explain the development of free institutions in England, and their absence everywhere else.
Note the long hostility of France and England, and its causes.
Also note the uncertainty of territories and boundaries when France was in process of formation. Use maps liberally.

4. Situation at the End of the Religious Wars.

- a. Revolt of the Netherlands.
 - (1) The religious situation.
 - (2) The foundation for modern states.
- b. The Thirty Years' War.
 - (1) Its scope.
 - (2) Peace of Westphalia: territorial changes.
 - (a) Acquisitions of Sweden.
 - (b) Gains of France: Alsace.
 - (c) Rearrangements in Germany, Holland, Switzerland.

References:

- Harding, chap. 19.
Myers, chaps. 23, 24, 25.
West, chap. 22.
Robinson and Breasted, chap. 26.

Problems:

- Was the chief motive of these long wars religion? If not, what?
What effect did the Thirty Years' War have on the later development of Germany? Read descriptions of these wars in *Gardiner, "Thirty Years' War." Here Germany was the helpless battleground of nations; might this have left some elements of hate in the German mind?

II. NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION.

1. Constitutional Development of England.

- a. Struggles of Parliament for ascendancy.
 - (1) Effect of the Wars of the Roses.
 - (2) Recuperation of Parliament under the Tudors.
- b. Conflicts between King and Parliament.
 - (1) Divine Right idea of the Stuarts.
 - (2) Opposition of Parliament.
 - (3) Civil War and the Commonwealth.
 - (4) The Restoration and the Revolution of 1688.
- c. Later growth of constitutional government.
 - (1) Parliamentary growth under the Hanovers.
 - (2) Influence on the English people.
 - (3) Results on the world's progress.

References:

- Harding, pp. 221-225, chap. 21.
Myers, chap. 28.
West, chaps. 23-26.
Robinson and Breasted, chap. 27.
Cheyney, *Short History of England*, summaries of chaps. 9-17.

Problems:

- What has been the importance to modern history of British constitutional development? Cite concrete illustrations.
In what sense has England been the laboratory of the world?
Why should it matter particularly to other powers whether England or Germany controls Gibraltar and Suez in times of peace?

Note the places where, up to the present, the highest type of citizenship has been developed.

2. Founding of the British Empire.

- a. Motives.
 - (1) Increase of the population in England.
 - (2) Religion.
 - (3) Commerce.
- b. Means.
 - (1) Peaceful explorations and settlement.
 - (2) Military force in cases of dispute.
- c. Reasons for success.
 - (1) Character of the colonists.
 - (2) The policy of colonial support.
 - (3) Nature of colonial government.
- d. Extent.
 - (1) Extent of power in North America.
 - (2) Control of India.

References:

- Harding, pp. 453-462.
Myers, chap. 31.
West, chap. 27, pp. 418-422.
Robinson and Beard, *Outlines of European History* II, pp. 72-79.
*Cheyney, chap. 17.

Problems:

- Has British expansion always been conscious?
How can England's monopoly of so many large colonial fields be accounted for?
Where do you find possible "bones of contention" in this territorial growth?
Which state should be considered England's most logical rival in the colonial field up to the nineteenth century? Why?

3. Louis XIV in European Affairs.

- a. Louis' chief ambitions.
 - (1) To be supreme in France.
 - (2) To make France supreme in Europe.
- b. Louis' foreign designs.
 - (1) Attempts to conquer the Dutch.
 - (a) Lack of success; small gains.
 - (2) War of the Palatinate (King William's War).
 - (a) Seizure of German territory.
 - (b) Gains at the end of the war.
 - (3) War of the Spanish Succession (Queen Anne's War).
 - (a) New coalitions and interests involved.
 - (b) Peace of Utrecht.
- c. Summary of his influence.
 - (1) On the political map.
 - (2) On social and religious conditions.

References:

- Harding, chap. 20.
Myers, chap. 27.
West, chap. 28.
Robinson and Breasted, chap. 28.

Problems:

- Were Louis' ambitions pardonable?
Summarize the territories by which France was gainer at the end of his wars and note the nations which were losers.
What did the people in the territories concerned have to say about it? Would such wars and transfers tend to develop national feeling, or not?
Note that Europe is in a constant state of unstable equilibrium, of which now one, now another, ambitious man tries to take advantage.

4. Rise of Russia: Sweden.

- a. Origin of Russia.
 - (1) Races, peoples and geography of Russia.
 - (2) The coming of the Northmen: Rurik.
 - (3) The founding of the Romanoff dynasty.

- b. Wars with Sweden.
 (1) Territorial ambitions of Peter I.
 (2) Defeat of Charles XII of Sweden.
 (3) Loss of territory to Russia and Prussia.
- c. Internal reforms of Peter I.
 (1) Opening the door westward; Petrograd.
 (2) Attempts toward modernization of Russia.

References:

- Harding, pp. 431-437.
 Myers, chap. 19.
 West, chap. 29.
 Robinson and Beard, pp. 53-58.
 Hazen, *Modern European History*, pp. 17-27.

Problems:

- Compare the rise of Russia and France. Account for the difference.
 Was Russia "entitled" to a western seaport, as Peter claimed?
 Ought Russia's late entrance into European affairs be an argument for or against rapid development? Why?
 Note that Russia came into existence as a civilized state at the expense of other powers. How might that affect her future?

5. Rise of Prussia: Poland Partitioned.

- a. Origin of Prussia.
 (1) Growth of Brandenburg.
 (2) Addition of Prussia.
 (3) Further gains of the early Hohenzollerns.
- b. Acquisitions of Frederick II.
 (1) Seizure of Silesia.
 (2) War on the Austrian Succession (King George's War).
 (a) Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.
 (3) The Seven Years' War (French and Indian War).
 (a) Treaties of Hubertsburg and Paris.
 (b) Importance of the territorial changes.
 (4) Constructive work of Frederick.
- c. Fate of Poland.
 (1) Review of independent Poland.
 (2) Three partitions to Prussia, Russia and Austria.

References:

- Harding, pp. 437-453, 462-465.
 Myers, chap. 30.
 West, pp. 415-420.
 Robinson and Beard, pp. 58-72.
 Hazen, pp. 10-17, 29.

Problems:

- What have ever been some of the most striking traits of the Hohenzollern family? In what rulers of the line have these been most pronounced?
 When and why was a policy of Prussian military supremacy undertaken? Why is Frederick's statue to be removed from Washington?
 What were the objects in the partitions of Poland?
 Why is Germany proposing to re-establish Poland as an independent state? Would Poland be independent?
 Note the far-reaching results of the Seven Years' War.

III. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD IN EUROPE.

1. The French Revolution and Napoleon.

- a. Course of the French Revolution.
 (1) Causes of the Revolution.
 (a) Causes inherent in France and Europe.
 (b) Increasing enlightenment.
 (2) Attempts at popular government.
 (a) Failure of the monarchy.
 (b) Successive national bodies.
 (c) Reasons for the failure of popular government.
 (3) Foreign complications.
 (a) French revolutionary propaganda abroad.

- (b) The interference of Austria and Prussia.
 (c) Effect on the course of the Revolution.

References:

- Harding, chaps. 24, 25.
 Myers, chap. 33.
 West, chaps. 31, 32, 33, 34.
 Robinson and Beard, chaps. 5, 6, 7.
 Hazen, chaps. 1-8.

Problems:

- What old principles led the Austrians and Prussians to invade France without provocation in 1792?
 What is the great significance of the French Revolution?
 Why were the French unable to find a working form of popular government? Cf. present Russia.
 Note the feeling of the reactionary governments toward anything like liberalism.

b. Napoleon: His campaigns.

- (1) Napoleon's early career.
 (a) Napoleon's characteristics and ambitions.
 (b) Qualities of leadership.
 (c) Early services to France.
 (2) The Empire.
 (a) Successive steps in the rise to power.
 (b) The creation of the Empire.
 (c) Napoleon's war policy.
 (3) The military campaigns.
 (a) Campaigns during the Directory and Consulate.
 i. Italian campaign.
 ii. Expedition to Egypt.
 (b) Campaigns as Emperor.
 i. The struggle against coalitions.
 ii. Wars resulting from the Continental System.
 iii. The Hundred Days.
 (c) Napoleon's rank as a military genius.

References:

- Harding, chap. 26, pp. 527-530, 534-541.
 Myers, pp. 543-555, 557-568, 573-579.
 West, chaps. 35, 36, pp. 489-493, 497-500.
 Robinson and Beard, chap. 8, pp. 207-217.
 *Hazen, pp. 179-186, 191-205, 208-212, 213-248.

Problems:

- Was the French Revolution a failure?
 How do you account for Napoleon? Would the same kind of situation produce such another?
 Did Napoleon discredit or create friends for the Revolution?
 What feeling have his crushing victories and harsh terms caused toward France on the part of her neighbors?
 Study Napoleon's military principles. How do those of the present German Empire compare with them?

c. Napoleon's reconstruction of Europe.

- (1) Napoleon's work in France.
 (a) Reform of the administration.
 (b) The Code Napoleon.
 (2) Changes elsewhere in Europe.
 (a) Creation of new governments and states.
 (b) The reorganization of Germany.
 (c) Dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire.
 (3) Summary of achievements.
 (a) Napoleon's permanent works.
 (b) Their effect on recent Europe.

References:

- Harding, pp. 530-534.
 Myers, pp. 555-557, 568-573.
 West, pp. 493-497.
 Robinson and Beard, pp. 193-197.
 Hazen, pp. 186-191, 205-208, 212-213.

Problems:

- In what respects does Napoleon deserve to rank among the few great men of history?

- Where did Napoleon's wisdom fail him?
 Are great men chiefly the product of circumstances?
 On the whole, has Napoleon had a balance of fortunate or unfortunate influence on France? On Europe?

d. The Congress of Vienna.

- (1) Composition of the Congress.
 (a) Leadership: Metternich and Talleyrand.
 (b) Countries and purposes represented.
 (2) Its tasks.
 (a) The undoing of the work of Napoleon.
 (b) Reconstruction of the map of Europe.
 (c) Reinstating of the principle of legitimacy.
 (d) Prevention of revolutionary recurrences.
 (3) Its work.
 (a) As to rulers.
 (b) As to territories and boundaries.

References:

- Harding, pp. 542-548.
 Myers, pp. 580-585.
 Hazen, pp. 249-254.
 West, pp. 504-506.
 Robinson and Beard, pp. 227-236.

Problems:

- Did the Congress of Vienna succeed in its work? In what respects did it fail?
 Account for the liberal terms given France.
 Had the work of the French Revolution been undone? Consider the Congress of Vienna as an example of the settlement of European troubles by arbitration.
 Why was it impossible for this arbitration to be permanent?

2. Later Revolutionary Activity.

a. Europe under Metternich.

- (1) Metternich and his policy.
 (a) Series of congresses.
 (b) Armed intervention.
 (2) The "Holy" Alliance.
 (a) Its nature and purpose.
 (b) Its methods.
 (3) Revolutionary activity in 1820-30.
 (a) Rise of secret societies.
 (b) Loss of Spain's colonies.
 (c) French Revolution of 1830.
 (d) Revolutionary movements elsewhere.
 (4) Partial failure of reaction.
 (a) Attitude of England.
 (b) The Monroe Doctrine.

References:

- Harding, chap. 29.
 Hazen, pp. 254-288.
 Myers, pp. 585-591, 614-617.
 West, chaps. 39, 40, 41.
 Robinson and Beard, pp. 236-260.

Problems:

- Was Metternich's attitude toward revolution to be wondered at?
 Did the Holy Alliance and similar organizations postpone the liberation of Europe seriously?
 Where seemed to be the hotbed of revolutionary activity? Why?
 What stand did England take on interference to maintain absolutism? Of what importance was her attitude?

b. The French Revolution of 1848.

- (1) Downfall of Louis Philippe.
 (a) Unpopular ministers.
 (b) Rise of socialism.
 i. National workshops.
 (2) Second French Republic.
 (a) Election of Louis Napoleon.
 (3) Second French Empire.
 (a) Napoleon's coup d'état.

- (b) Aggressive foreign policy.
 (c) Disastrous results.

References:

- Harding, pp. 578-587.
 *Hazen, chaps. 15, 17.
 Myers, pp. 591-594.
 West, chaps. 45, 46.
 Robinson and Beard, chap. 13.

Problems:

- Note the causes of the rapid growth of the socialistic party in France. What part did this party take in the Revolution of 1848?
 Must we account for the rapid transition from republic to empire in French psychology or in circumstances likely to occur anywhere?
 Why, in a time of peace and prosperity, did Napoleon III deliberately choose a policy of war? Did he attain his object at any time?
 Sum up the evils now being faced by the French people for which they, as a people, are not to blame.

c. 1848 in Austria and Germany.

- (1) Condition of the Austrian Empire.
 (a) Agitation of Liberals.
 (b) Movements of various races for autonomy.
 (2) Progress of the Revolution.
 (a) Revolution in Hungary: Kossuth.
 (b) Agitation in Bohemia.
 i. Flight of Metternich.
 ii. Lack of unity among the revolutionists.
 iii. Failure of the Revolution.
 (3) Risings in Germany.
 (a) Constitution granted in Prussia.
 (b) Proposals of the Frankfort Parliament.
 (c) Hostile attitude taken by Austria.
 (d) Virtual failure of the Revolution.

References:

- Harding, pp. 601-607.
 *Hazen, chap. 16.
 West, pp. 566-571.
 *Robinson and Beard, chap. 14.

Problems:

- Compare the struggles of the Hungarian states for liberty with those of the English colonies in America.
 In general, what caused the failure of the liberal movements in Austria and Germany, just as success seemed to be at hand?
 What is the essential difference between German despotism as now practiced and the system used and advocated by Metternich?

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WESTERN POWERS.

1. The Unification of Italy.

a. Italy from 1815 to 1849.

- (1) Italy after the Congress of Vienna.
 (a) A "geographical expression."
 (b) Italy's tasks.
 i. Elimination of foreign control.
 ii. Establishment of constitutional government.
 (2) The Revolution of 1830.
 (a) Liberal agitation everywhere.
 (b) Leadership of Sardinia-Piedmont.
 i. Constitution granted.
 ii. War with Austria.
 (c) Failure of the Revolution.
 i. Disaffection among the allies.
 ii. Defeat of the Sardinian armies.
 iii. Humiliating peace with Austria.

References:

- Harding, pp. 607, 610-611.
 *Hazen, pp. 305-306, 325-329, chap. 23.
 Myers, pp. 619-624.

West, pp. 571-574.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 305-307.

Problems:

What circumstances favored Italian unification in 1848 more than at any previous time?

In what respects was the Revolution of 1848 in Italy a success?

The completion of this task was necessarily carried out at whose expense?

b. Subsequent steps in unification.

(1) Policy of Cavour.

- (a) Consolidation of Piedmont.
- (b) Foreign aid against Austria.
- (c) Participation in the Crimean War.

(2) Unity accomplished.

- (a) Important patriotic services.
 - i. Mazzini.
 - ii. Patriotic and secret organizations.
- (b) The war of 1859.
 - i. Faithlessness of Napoleon III.
 - ii. Exchange of territories.
- (c) The Kingdom of Italy.
 - i. Winning of Naples: Garibaldi.
 - ii. Gaining of Venetia.
 - iii. Seizure of Rome.

(d) The Constitution of Italy.

References:

Harding, pp. 611-618.

Myers, pp. 624-633.

West, pp. 574-581.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 311-322.

*Hazen, pp. 329-340, 349, 360, 409-415.

Robinson and Beard, Readings in European History II, Nos. 237-245.

Problems:

Why is the Pope called the "Prisoner of the Vatican"? What is his attitude toward the present Italian government, and why?

Explain Italia Irredenta.

What relations should be expected between Italy and Austria since the unification of the former?

2. The Unification of Germany.

a. Bismarck and the Austro-Prussian War.

(1) Character of the German Confederation.

(2) The Zollverein.

- (a) Its membership.
- (b) Creation of sentiment for unity.

(3) Bismarck's character and policies.

- (a) Reorganization of Prussian military system.
- (b) The policy of "Blood and Iron."
- (c) Victory over the Prussian Parliament.

(4) The war with Denmark.

- (a) Recovery of Schleswig-Holstein.
- (b) Provocation for the Austro-Prussian War.

(5) Seven Weeks' War with Austria.

- (a) Excellent preparation of Prussia.
- (b) Prompt defeat of Austria.

(c) Formation of the North German Confederation.

References:

Harding, pp. 623-626.

*Hazen, chap. 19.

Myers, pp. 634-643.

West, pp. 582-588.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 323-330.

Readings, II, Nos. 250-257.

Problems:

What has always seemed to justify war with Prussia? What influence has military rule had on aspirations toward liberal government? Why?

Why does Denmark undertake to remain neutral instead of trying to recover her lost provinces?

Why was Austria not included in the new plans for German unity?

b. The Franco-Prussian War.

(1) Napoleon's demands for "compensation."

- (a) Rebuffs of Prussia.

(2) Fear of Prussia's growing strength.

- (a) Dangers of German unification to France.
- (b) Relative increase of populations.

(3) Diplomacy of Bismarck.

- (a) Plans for the humiliation of France.
- (b) Designs for further German unification.

(4) Course of the war.

- (a) Question of Spanish succession.
- (b) French declaration of war.
- (c) Immediate Prussian victory.

(5) Terms of peace.

- (a) Humiliation of France.
- (b) Creation of the German Empire.

References:

Davis, chaps. I and II. Harding, pp. 626-630.

Hazen, chap. 20.

Myers, pp. 594-596, 643-649.

West, pp. 583-591.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 330-334.

Readings, II, Nos. 258-261.

Problems:

Why should Bismarck have desired the war with France? How did it bring about German unification? Why was all France so anxious to undertake it?

How do you account for the severe terms of peace imposed upon France? Were they profitable in the long run?

What part of the causes of the present war lie in this struggle of 1870-71?

c. The new German Empire.

(1) Composition of the new Empire.

(2) The Constitution.

- (a) Its origin.
- (b) Nature of the Federation.

(3) The Imperial government.

- (a) Provisions for Emperor.
 - i. Powers of the Emperor.
- (b) The Federal Council (Bundesrat).
- (c) Diet of the Empire (Reichstag).
- (d) The Imperial Ministry.

(4) Suffrage.

- (a) Restriction of popular will.
- (b) Circle voting.
- (c) The resulting autocracy.

References (brief accounts):

Harding, pp. 630-632.

Hazen, pp. 363-366.

West, pp. 654-660.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 340-348.

(Longer accounts):

Hazen, The German Government, War Information Series.

President's Flag Day Address, Note No. 7, War Information Series.

Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, chap. VII.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 267-273.

Problems:

What makes it possible for the Kaiser to control all German affairs?

Compare the structure of the German government with that of the United States; with England.

What are the conditions which make revolution in Germany difficult? Under what conditions is revolution deemed possible?

3. France and Britain.

a. The Third French Republic.

(1) Provisional government after the Franco-Prussian War

(a) Trouble with the Paris Commune

- (b) Variety of political parties.

(2) The Republican Constitution.

- (a) Organic laws of 1875.
 - i. Method of presidential election.
 - ii. Composition of two legislative bodies.
- (b) Recent changes and amendments.

(3) Trials of the Third Republic.

- (a) The Dreyfus affair.
- (b) Relations of church and state.
- (c) Extreme political parties.

References:

Davis, chap. VII. Harding, pp. 592-598.

Hazen, chap. 22.

Myers, pp. 596-598.

West, chap. 57.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 356-376.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 281-288.

Problems:

Compare the French and British constitutions. Is either one strictly an artificial form? Which is more efficient, and why? Suppose they were exchanged?

What has been the importance of the Dreyfus case in the political development of France?

Why do the Germans consider the war won if they reach Paris?

b. The present British Constitution.

(1) Unique nature of the British constitution.

- (a) Its origin.
- (b) Evolution to its present form.
- (c) Unusual features.

(2) Present democratic character.

- (a) The cabinet system.
- (b) The principle of representation.
- (c) Mobility of the constitution.

- i. Ease of amendment.
- ii. Relation to the kingship.

(3) Its success.

- (a) Advantages of the British form of government.
- (b) Its widespread influence.

References:

Harding, pp. 655-661.

*Hazen, chaps. 25, 26.

Myers, pp. 599-609.

West, chaps. 50-55.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 381-405.

Cheyney, review of chaps. 19, 20.

*Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 290-307, especially Nos. 295, 296.

Problems:

Note the advantages and disadvantages of the British type of constitution. When does it work more efficiently, in times of peace or war? How about the German type?

Why do the English maintain an expensive royal household, yet take pride in their democracy?

Consider the British type of constitution as the best evidence of the steady progressiveness of the Anglo-Saxon peoples.

c. The Irish problem.

(1) Origin of the Irish question.

- (a) Race differences.
- (b) Religious development.
- (c) Early English abuses in administration.

(2) The modern situation.

- (a) Agitation for Home Rule.
 - i. The Ulster problem.
 - ii. Patriotic societies.
 - iii. Efforts of Gladstone.
- (b) Ireland in the war.
 - i. Sinn Fein uprisings.
 - ii. The present situation.

References:

*Harding, pp. 351-352, 411-415, 424, 647, 648-655.

*Hazen, pp. 454-459, 466-471, 472, 483-485.

Myers, pp. 609-613.

West, chap. 55.

Robinson and Beard, pp. 405-410.

Cheyney, pp. 167, 304, 427, 439, 455, 517, 537, 593, 606-608, 637-639, 660-664.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 307-311.

Problems:

To what extent should England blame herself for the present uncertainty in Ireland? Has she done all possible to make amends for past mistakes and abuses?

Account for the Ulster phenomenon.

What is the nature of the most recent proposal made by England in the interests of Home Rule in Ireland?

How is the disaffection in Ireland a constant thorn in the side of England?

B. DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD PROBLEMS.

I. SPECIAL PHASES OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION.

1. Partition of Africa.

a. Problems of European expansion.

- (1) Desire for colonial empires.
 - (a) Overpopulation in Europe.
 - (b) Problems of food supply.
 - (c) Outlets for manufactures.
 - (d) Ambition for cultural expansion.
- (2) The exploration of Africa.
 - (a) The slave traffic.
 - (b) Livingstone and Stanley.
 - (c) The services of Belgium.
- (3) The scramble for territory.
 - (a) Means used to obtain territories.
 - (b) The Congress of Berlin.
 - (c) Final partition of the continent.

References:

Harding, pp. 685-689.

Hazen, pp. 507-514.

West, pp. 720-722.

Rose, Development of the European Nations, 1870-1914, chaps. 4, 5, 6, 8, in Part II.

National Geographic Magazine, Vol. 26, pp. 272-274, "Growth of Europe During Forty Years of Peace."

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 375-379.

Problems:

Why was the partition of Africa so long delayed?

What part does Africa promise to play in future world events?

Why are African colonies such expensive luxuries? Why are they retained when they involve enormous expense yearly?

b. The resulting African situation.

- (1) Rivalry over African possessions.
 - (a) Lack of natural boundaries.
 - (b) Necessity of extensive development.
 - (c) Extent of African colonial empires.
- (2) Recent incidents.
 - (a) The Fashoda incident and its outcome.
 - (b) Disputes over Morocco.
 - (c) Demands of Italy for African holdings.
 - (d) Influence on the war situation.
- (3) Present status of Africa.
 - (a) War operations in Africa.
 - (b) Capture of German holdings.
 - (c) Consolidation of previous interests.

References:

Harding, pp. 689-690.

*Hazen, pp. 404-408, 414, 373-374, 519, 521.

Cheyney, pp. 672-676.

Powers, Things Men Fight For, chap. 3.
Rose, pt. II, chap. 7.

Problems:

How does it happen that such extensive seizures and annexations in Africa failed to produce a war before 1914?

What would be the advantage of a Cape-to-Cairo railway? What have been the chief difficulties to be overcome? Do they still exist?

What is the present status of Morocco? Of Egypt? Of the German colonies?

2. The Far East.

a. The Russo-Japanese War.

- (1) Russian designs in Korea.
 - (a) The trans-Siberian railway.
 - (b) Move to consolidate Russian interests.
 - (c) Protests of Japan.
- (2) The resulting war.
 - (a) Japanese control of the sea.
 - (b) Siege of Port Arthur.
 - (c) The Mukden campaign.
 - (d) Battle in the Sea of Japan.
 - (e) Treaty of Portsmouth.
- (3) The results.
 - (a) Japan's unrestricted success.
 - (b) Japanese interest in China.
 - (c) Beginning of a Jap "Monroe Doctrine."
 - (d) Reconstruction of Russian policies.

References:

Harding, pp. 702-704 (very brief).
Hazen, pp. 580-583.
*West, pp. 709-713, 724-727.
Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 372-374.

Problems:

What was the importance to Russia of an outlet to the far east? What changes have been made in her policies since her defeat?

On what ground did Japan interfere? Account for her speedy success.

Estimate the results of this war on the development of both Russia and Japan. What did it mean to Korea? To China?

b. The relations of Japan and China.

- (1) The Chino-Japanese War of 1894.
 - (a) Causes.
 - i. Japanese interests in Korea.
 - ii. Japan's policy of continental expansion.
 - (b) Japanese success.
 - i. Treaty of Shimonoseki.
 - ii. Interference of Russia and the western powers.
- (2) Recent Japanese activity.
 - (a) "Spheres of influence" of the western nations.
 - i. The hostility of Japan.
 - (b) Japanese part in the present war.
 - i. Capture of Kiauchau.
 - ii. Demands on helpless China.
 - iii. Plans for Chinese development.
 - iv. Intervention in Russia.

References:

Hazen, pp. 574-584.
West, pp. 723-724.
Harding, pp. 694-699.
*Powers, chap. 17.
Rose, pt. II, chap. 2.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 36-38, "Young Japan."
Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 364-368.

Problems:

Account for Japanese interest in China.

On what basis did Japan make her recent demands on China? Why does China submit?

Why did Japan enter this war? Did she have sufficient cause?

What appears to be the future of Japan? What of the "Yellow Peril"?

3. The Balkan Situation.

a. Liberation of the Balkan States.

- (1) Turkish control of the Balkans.
 - (a) Centuries of misrule.
 - (b) The nature of Turkish government.
- (2) Early wars for liberation.
 - (a) The Greek war for independence.
 - i. The aid of Russia.
 - ii. Treaty of Adrianople.
 - (b) Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.
 - i. Interests of Russia.
 - ii. Treaty of San Stefano.
 - iii. Subsequent Treaty of Berlin.
- (3) The Balkan Wars of 1912-13.
 - (a) The object.
 - (b) Success of the Balkan allies.
 - (c) Attitude of the Great Powers.
 - (d) The Treaty of London.

References:

Davis, chaps. XII, XIII, XX. *Hazen, chap. 33.
West, chap. 53.
Powers, chap. 9.
Harding, pp. 677-680, 682-684.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, map of Balkan Europe; explanation, pp. 191-192.
Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, xxxi-xxxvi.
Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 342-350.

Problems:

Why were the Balkans so long in gaining their freedom?

Account for Russia's interest in the freedom of the Balkan states.

Why have the Great Powers undone so much costly work as regards the ending of the Turkish Empire in Europe?

Should not Europe have received the treaty of San Stefano with great satisfaction?

b. Conflicting Balkan interests.

- (1) Wars among the Balkan states.
 - (a) Rival claims of Serbia and Bulgaria.
 - (b) Hostility of Greece and Rumania.
 - (c) General conflict.
 - (d) The Treaty of Bucharest.
- (2) Results of the conflicts.
 - (a) New alliances among the Great Powers.
 - (b) The changed Balkan map.
 - (c) Unsatisfactory racial conditions.
 - i. The crushing of "national" hopes.
 - ii. The ignoring of economic needs.
 - iii. Creation of Albania.
 - iv. Disposition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- (3) Relation of the Balkans to the war.

References:

Davis, chap. XX. *Hazen, chap. 37 and map.
*Powers, p. 366, chap. 9.
West, pp. 717-719.
Harding, pp. 684-685.
Rose, pt. I, chap. 9.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 27, articles on Serbia and Bulgaria; vol. 28, 185-249, Rumania and Greece, pp. 295-329, "Greece of To-day;" vol. 30, pp. 360-391, "Rumania, the Pivotal State."
War Cyclopedia, "Balkan Wars," "Drang nach Osten," etc.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 351-363.

Problems:

Why is the Balkan situation so complex and persistently unsatisfactory?

II. CONDITIONS RESULTING IN THE WAR.

1. Review of Conflicting Interests.

a. Aims of Austria.

- (1) Nature of the Dual Monarchy.
 - (a) Historical sketch.
 - (b) The present constitution.
- (2) The question of races.
 - (a) The racial kaleidoscope in Hungary.
 - (b) National aspirations.
 - (c) Connection with the Balkan problems.
- (3) Question of the state's continued existence.
 - (a) Austrian vs. Balkan government.
 - (b) Plans for a Balkan federation.
 - i. Austria's desire for a "free hand" in the Balkans.
 - ii. The idea of "Pan-Slavism."
 - (c) Need for larger integration in Europe.

References:

Davis, chap. XIV.
*Powers, chaps. 4, 9; maps, pp. 61, 177.
Hazen, chap. 24.
West, chap. 60.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 311-393, "Hungary."
War Cyclopedia, "Austria and Serbia," etc.
Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 262-266.

Problems:

Is a union of distinct races or peoples under one artificial government justifiable?

Which are the only permanent boundaries? To what extent should racial boundaries be considered in map changes?

What appears to be the best solution of the problem of races and nationalities in Austria-Hungary and the Balkan states?

Note the instances where national aspirations have been modified or extinguished by continued enforced union with foreign governments.

b. The situation of Russia.

- (1) Geographical conditions of Russia.
 - (a) Relative size.
 - (b) The question of outlets.
 - i. Problem of the Pacific.
 - ii. Problem of the Baltic.
 - iii. Problem of the Mediterranean.
- (2) Conflicting foreign interests.
 - (a) Territorial interests.
 - (b) Problem of races and population.
- (3) Inevitable future of Russia.
 - (a) Necessity for expansion.
 - (b) Pressure on the Central Powers.
 - (c) Russia's relation to the War.

References:

Davis, chap. XXI.
*Powers, chap. 11; sketch, chaps. 5, 7; map, p. 191.
West, pp. 699-709.
Harding, pp. 707-711.
Rose, pt. I, chap. 11; pt. II, chap. 9.
Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 327-341.

Problems:

Why did the Germans say, as war was declared, that it was against Russia? Was it true?

Did the Russo-Japanese War settle the conflict between Russia and Japan?

What are some of the gravest problems future Russia has to solve? Do they involve wars, or rumors of wars?

What Russian problems depend on the war's outcome?

c. The Case of Germany.

- (1) German national policies after 1871.
 - (a) The policy of Bismarck.
 - (b) Policy of peaceful commercial expansion.
 - (c) Pan-German expansionist policy.
- (2) Obstacle to these policies.
 - (a) Russian growth and expansion.

What about the benefits of modern Christian government?

Account for the mutual jealousies among the Balkan states.

Explain the phenomenon of Albania.

4. The Near East.

a. Turkey and the Eastern Question.

- (1) The position of Turkey in Europe.
 - (a) Record of Turkey as an European power.
 - (b) Present status of Turkey.
 - (c) Relations of Turkey and the Great Powers.
- (2) The Eastern Question.
 - (a) Its definition.
 - (b) Reasons for ending Turkish rule.
 - i. The Armenian situation.
 - ii. Failure of Turkish administration.
 - iii. No justification for existence.
 - (c) Importance of the war's outcome.
- (3) Turkish claims to consideration.
 - (a) Record for fairness and dependability.
 - (b) Frequent impositions of Christian peoples.
 - (c) Recent tendencies toward progress.

References:

Davis, chaps. IV, V, XIII. *Powers, chap. 8.
*Hazen, pp. 540, 546-548, 555-557, 594-595, 613.
West, pp. 715, 736-737.
Rose, pt. I, chap. 7.
War Cyclopedia, "Young Turks," etc.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, map of Balkan Europe.

Problems:

Explain Turkey's entrance into the war on the side of the Central Powers.

Has Turkey any claim for existence as an European power? What has preserved her existence thus far?

Have we misjudged the Turk? In what light do we judge the American Indian?

Does the Turk give sufficient promise of eventually becoming a useful citizen of the world?

b. The problem of Constantinople.

- (1) The strategic position of Constantinople.
 - (a) Dominance of all the Near East.
 - (b) Its historic significance.
 - (c) The strategic center of the world.
 - (d) Natural military strength.
- (2) Commercial significance of the location.
 - (a) The gateway to the Black Sea region.
 - i. Size and nature of the territory dominated.
 - ii. Potential rival of the world's greatest cities.
- (3) Its importance in the war.
 - (a) The Gallipoli campaign.
 - (b) Its relation to the final terms of peace.
 - (c) Importance of its future control.

References:

*Powers, chap. 5, p. 349, map p. 119.
*National Geographic Magazine, vol. 27, "Gates to the Black Sea."
Hazen, pp. 172, 603.
War Cyclopedia, "Gallipoli," etc.

Problems:

What importance did Napoleon attach to Constantinople, and why?

Note the territory controlled by Constantinople in agricultural and commercial respects. What further strategic value has the city?

What appears to be the inevitable future of the location?

- (b) Rapid recovery of France.
- (c) Foreign monopoly of colonial and commercial interests.
- (3) Failures of German plans for expansion.
 - (a) Checkmate in South America.
 - (b) Forestalling in South Africa.
 - (c) Morocco incidents.
- (4) Changes in German policy.
 - (a) Preparation for the use of force.
 - (b) Mitteleuropa project.
 - (c) Certain trend toward war.

References:

- Davis, chaps. IX, X, XVII, XIX. *Powers, chap. 12.
 Hazen, chap. 21.
 West, chap. 58.
 Harding, pp. 630-636.
 War Cyclopedia, "Autocracy," "Kaiserism," "William II," "Place in the Sun," "Pan-Germanism," etc.
 National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 275-311, "The German Nation."
 President's Flag Day Address, Red, White and Blue Series.
 Conquest and Kultur, sections 6, 13, 16, Red, White and Blue Series.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 274-280.

d. The Case of Britain.

- (1) Nature of the British Empire.
 - (a) Unconscious growth of the Empire.
 - (b) Indispensability to British life.
 - (c) Outstanding benefits of British rule.
- (2) British dependence on sea power.
 - (a) Necessity for constant food supply.
 - (b) Sole means of protection for the Empire.
 - (c) Natural danger of foreign expansionist policies.
- (3) Conflict of British and German interests.
 - (a) The question of national existence.
 - (b) Danger of Germany's foreign policy.
 - (c) The natural question of naval supremacy.
 - i. Competition in naval construction.
 - ii. The coming of the submarine.

References:

- Davis, chap. XVIII. *Powers, chap. 13.
 Hazen, review of chap. 27, noting maps.
 West, chaps. 55, 56.
 Harding, chap. 33.
 National Geographic Magazine, vol. 29, pp. 217-273, "Great Britain's Bread Upon the Waters," W. H. Taft.
 Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 312-326.

Problems:

- Explain Britain's interest in Bagdad, Morocco and Belgium.
 Does every nation have a right to adopt a policy of expansion of national interests? Is this always expedient?
 In any event, how will the war affect the British Empire?

e. The Case of France.

- (1) Influence of geography on French history.
 - (a) Unique and enviable position.
 - (b) Sketch of French territorial history.
- (2) Forces making for permanent peace.
 - (a) Decline in the population.
 - (b) Peculiar commercial and financial relations.
 - (c) Growing reconciliation over Alsace-Lorraine.
- (3) Causes leading to conflict of interests.
 - (a) Desire for national expansion.
 - (b) Growing hostility of Germany.
 - (c) Nature of colonial holdings.
 - i. Forces producing the entente cordiale.
- (4) Future position of France.

References:

- *Powers, chap. 14.
 Hazen, review of chap. 22.

West, chap. 57.

Harding, pp. 592-598.

National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 193-223, "The France of To-day."

War Cyclopedia, "Alsace-Lorraine," "Franco-German Rivalry," etc.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 288, 289.

Problems:

- Has France made the most of her fortunate position in the past?
 Compare the German victories in 1870-71 with the French in the Moroccan case.
 Note the advantages of an entente cordiale over an alliance by treaty.

f. The circumstances of Italy.

- (1) Review of Italian history.
 - (a) Geographical position.
 - (b) Effect of environment on Italy's career.
- (2) Reasons for joining the Entente.
 - (a) Lack of sympathy with Central Powers.
 - (b) Fear of French and British sea power.
 - (c) Opportunity to pursue national interests.
- (3) Italian prospects of gain.
 - (a) Italia Irredenta.
 - (b) Territory on Albanian coast.
 - (c) Portions of Turkish territory.
- (4) Prospect of the future.
 - (a) Present colonial possessions.
 - (b) Further imperial ambitions.
 - (c) Bad financial condition.
 - (d) Probable foreign conflicts.

References:

- Davis, chap. VIII. *Powers, chap. 15 and map.
 Hazen, review of chap. 23.
 West, chap. 59.
 Harding, pp. 617-618.
 War Cyclopedia, "Italia Irredenta," etc.
 National Geographic Magazine, vol. 27, "The Austro-Italian Frontier," vol. 30, "Italy."
 Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 247-249.

Problems:

- Explain the phenomenal success of the new Italian kingdom.
 What will the war mean to Italy?
 Are Italy's aspirations based on a sound knowledge?
- g. Situation of the Minor Powers.
- (1) Position of the Minor Powers.
 - (a) Four distinct groups.
 - (b) Varying racial, geographical and political conditions.
 - (2) The Balkan States.
 - (a) Review of their relation to the war.
 - (3) Spain and Portugal.
 - (a) Forces for consolidation and separation.
 - (b) Relation to the present struggle.
 - (4) The Scandinavian countries.
 - (a) Precarious geographical positions.
 - (b) Reasons for their present independence.
 - (c) Vital importance of the war's outcome.
 - (5) The Low Countries.
 - (a) Strategic positions.
 - (b) Basis of their guaranteed neutrality.
 - (c) Fate determined by the war.

References:

- *Powers, chap. 16.
 *Hazen, sketch of chaps. 29, 30, 31, 32.
 West, chap. 61.
 Seignobos, Europe Since 1814, pp. 238-244, 257-284, 559-577.

Problems:

- What has long been the relation between the great and the minor powers of Europe?
 Where in Europe is the war not a vital matter, and why?

Have these Minor Powers followed the wisest courses under the circumstances? Note each case separately. Also note that the state of political equilibrium in Europe is largely determined by the status of these groups of minor powers.

2. Late Diplomatic History.

a. The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance.

- (1) The Triple Alliance.
 - (a) Purpose of the Alliance.
 - (b) Reasons for the attachment of Italy.
 - (c) Breaches of earlier alliances.
 - (d) History of the Alliance.
 - i. Internal discords.
 - ii. Its dominance in European affairs.
- (2) Formation of the Triple Entente.
 - (a) The Dual Alliance.
 - i. Reasons for its formation.
 - (b) Creation of the Triple Entente.
 - i. Removal of previous causes of discord.
 - ii. Establishment of the "entente cordiale."
- (3) The alignment of the Minor Powers.

References:

- Davis, chap. XV. Hazen, pp. 374-376.
 West, pp. 741-743.
 Harding, pp. 676-677.
 Powers, preface, sketch of chap. 18.
 Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, xxvii-xxx.
 Rose, pt. II, chap. 1.
 War Cyclopedia, "Triple Alliance," "Triple Entente," "Willy and Nicky Correspondence," "Encirclement," etc.

Problems:

- Note where the proposal for the Triple Alliance originated. It was founded in the interests of what policy? What were the definite objects of this alliance?
 In what respects was Italy inconsistent in joining Austria and Germany?
 What is the nature of the Triple Entente? Was this alliance the result of choice or necessity?

b. The Hague Peace Conferences.

- (1) History of the Hague Conferences.
 - (a) Agency of the United States and Russia for arbitration.
 - (b) Positive services rendered at the Hague.
- (2) Plans for arbitration and disarmament.
 - (a) Hostile attitude of Austria and Germany alone.
- (3) Policy of Germany concerning arbitration.
 - (a) Negative attitude toward permanent peace.
 - (b) Refusal to enter into arbitration treaties.
- (4) Conflicting views on the freedom of the seas.
 - (a) British view.
 - (b) Unusual German view.
- (5) Failure of conciliatory movements.
 - (a) Final attempts to adjust international differences.
 - (b) Refusal of Germany to make negotiations.

References:

- Davis, chap. XVI. *Hazen, pp. 591-594.
 West, pp. 743-747.
 *Powers, pp. 340-347.
 Harding, pp. 732-734.
 War Cyclopedia, "Hague Conferences," "Hague Conventions," "Hague Regulations," "Hague Tribunal," "Arbitration," etc.
 Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 383, 384.

Problems:

- What did the Hague Conferences accomplish of lasting value? Why did they fail in their main objects?
 Why did not the world become more suspicious of Austro-German policies long ago?
 Has German practice during this war been inconsistent with previously admitted policies?

c. Recent diplomatic crises.

- (1) Recent tense international feeling.
 - (a) Suspicion caused by conflicting interests.
- (2) First Moroccan crisis, 1905-6.
 - (a) French vs. German interests in Morocco.
 - (b) The Tangier incident.
 - (c) Dismissal of French ambassador on German demand.
 - (d) Conference of Powers at Algeceiras.
 - (e) Testing of the Triple Entente.
- (3) Crisis over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 - (a) Status as left by the Congress of Berlin.
 - (b) Annexation by Austria without cause.
 - (c) Attitude of Russia.
- (4) Second Moroccan crisis.
 - (a) Agadir affair.
 - (b) Attitude of Britain.
 - (c) Adjustment of the question by conference.
 - (d) Bitter resentment of German militarists.
- (5) Outcome of diplomatic clashes.
 - (a) Definite diplomatic defeat of Germany.
 - (b) German resolve to adopt new tactics.

References:

- Davis, chap. XIX. *Powers, p. 229, chap. 3.
 Rose, pt. II, chaps. 10, 11.
 War Cyclopedia, "Morocco Question," "Bosnia," "Congress of Berlin," "Pan-Slavism," "Slavs," etc., etc.
 *Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 136-142.

Problems:

- Note the Powers, which, by aggressive action, produced these crises.
 On what ground did Germany interfere in Moroccan affairs? Why were the diplomatic settlements considered unsatisfactory?
 What reasons were given by Austria for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? Why should Russia be concerned?

3. Preparation for War.

a. Objects of War.

- (1) The tangible objects of war.
 - (a) Defense of soil.
 - i. Different phases of this question.
 - (b) Protection of independence.
 - (c) Commerce.
 - i. Freedom of the seas.
 - ii. Colonies.
 - (d) Comparison with the objects of the past.
- (2) Intangible objects.
 - (a) Race unity.
 - i. Blood relationship.
 - ii. Unity of language.
 - (b) Religion.
 - (c) Nationality.
 - i. Complex elements of nationality.
 - ii. Cf. German "Kultur."
 - (d) Struggles for national existence.
 - i. Dangers of peaceful growth of peoples.
 - ii. Possibilities of biological defeat.
- (3) Objects of the present struggle.
 - (a) Many forms of each problem.
 - (b) Review of chief objects of each Power.

References:

- Davis, chap. XXII. *Powers, chaps. 1, 2, p. 358.
 *Conquest and Kultur, sections I, VI, X, XI, XVII.
 A War of Self-Defense, War Information Series.
 National Geographic Magazine, vol. 31, pp. 287-382, articles by President Wilson, Asquith, Viviani, Balfour.

Problems:

- Which causes of war are the more potent; the tangible or the intangible?

How many of these objects are considered justifiable causes of war by nations?
Note the different proportions in which the various tangible and intangible objects concern the powers now at war.

Note especially the German idea of the perils of peace.

- b. Militarism and armaments.
- (1) Definition of militarism.
 - (2) Military dominance in Germany.
 - (a) History of German militarism.
 - (b) Practical examples.
 - (3) International competition in armaments; armies.
 - (a) Europe as an "armed camp."
 - i. Comparative statistics.
 - ii. History of universal service.
 - (4) Naval rivalries.
 - (a) Britain's policy.
 - i. Motives; national necessity.
 - ii. Shipbuilding program.
 - (b) German competition.
 - i. Reasons.
 - ii. Degree of success.
 - (5) Extraordinary military measures in Germany.
 - (a) Army and navy increases.
 - (b) Construction of strategic railways.
 - (c) Recall of reservists abroad.
 - (d) Spread of German propaganda.

References:

- Gerard, chap. 4.
Hazen, pp. 590-592.
West, pp. 661-662.
Harding, pp. 675-677.
Powers, Things Men Fight For.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 191-193, "Statistics of Populations, Armies and Navies of Europe;" vol. 28, pp. 503-511, "Citizen Army of Switzerland;" vol. 29, pp. 609-623, "Citizen Army of Holland."
War Cyclopedica, "Militarism," "Prussianism," "Zabern," "Conquest," "Luxemburg, Rosa," "Propaganda for War," etc.

Problems:

- How do you account for the growth of militarism in Europe in a time when peace was thought to be assured?
Explain the necessity of England's naval policy. When and why did Germany change her naval policy and give up the attempt to overtake England?
Note that England had no army when the war began.

- c. Austro-German war preparations.
- (1) Change in German plans for expansion.
 - (a) Announcement after the Morocco incidents.
 - (b) Change in the nature of German diplomacy.
 - (2) Indications of plans for aggression.
 - (a) Crises in 1912.
 - (b) Other incidents prior to June, 1914.
 - i. Austrian proposals to Italy, 1913.
 - ii. Strengthening of German army, 1913.
 - iii. German propaganda at home and abroad.
 - iv. Variety of other military plans.
 - (3) Changed attitude of the Kaiser.
 - (4) Change in German public opinion.
 - (a) German philosophy.
 - (b) Parties in Germany.
 - (c) Forces for peace and for war.
 - (5) Extraordinary German military measures.
 - (a) New inclusive military laws.
 - (b) Canals and railways.
 - (c) Increase in munitions.
 - (d) Recall of reservists.
 - (e) Intensive preparations of all kinds.
 - (6) Conclusions.

References:

- Hazen, pp. 608-609.
Powers, chaps. 10, 12.

Kahn, Otto H., The Poison Growth of Prussianism. Conquest and Kultur, sections II, III, XVI.
*Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 131, 132, 133, 32, 142-143.

*War Cyclopedica, "Kultur," "Pan-Germanism," "Neutralized State," "Netherlands, German View," "Kiel Canal," "Sinn Fein," "Egypt," "South Africa," "German Intrigue," "Mobilization Controversy," etc.

Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 381, 382, 405.

Problems:

Are there definite proofs that this war was intended before July, 1914? Why did it not come sooner? Explain the changed attitude of the Kaiser after 1912. What has been the nature of German propaganda? Why has the war been well supported by the German people?

What is the only possible interpretation of Germany's unusual military measures prior to 1914?

- d. The German idea of war.
- (1) Summary of German reasons for entering the war.
 - (a) Profit derived from war.
 - i. Increase of rich territory.
 - ii. Indemnities.
 - iii. Increased prestige and influence.
 - (b) Need of a "place in the sun."
 - i. Right of national expansion.
 - ii. Necessity of creating room by force.
 - (c) Biological argument for war.
 - i. Darwinian theory.
 - ii. War as a requirement for national health.
 - iii. Nature of German philosophy.
 - (d) Estimation of German "Kultur."
 - i. Belief in the superiority of the German race.
 - ii. Idea of German destiny in the world.
 - (2) German conduct of the war.
 - (a) Influence of war philosophy.
 - i. Justification of any means in war.
 - ii. "Necessity knows no law."
 - (b) Examples of German ruthlessness.
 - i. Violations of international law.
 - ii. Treatment of civilian populations.
 - iii. Unheard-of methods in actual warfare.
 - (3) Summary of German policy: conclusions.

References:

- *Conquest and Kultur, Red, White and Blue Series.
*German War Practices, Red, White and Blue Series.
The Great War, from Spectator to Participant, War Information Series.
A War of Self-Defense, War Information Series.
*War Cyclopedica, "War, German View," "Bernhardt," "Treitschke," "Notwendigkeit," "Kriegs-Raison," "War—Ruthlessness," "Frightfulness," "Pillages," "Family Rights and Honor," "Hostages," "Non-combatants," "Deportations," "Destruction," "Louvain," "Rheims," "Forbidden Weapons," "Gas Warfare," "Prisoners of War," "Spurlos versenkt," "Armenian Massacres," "Der Tag," "Kultur," etc., etc.

Problems:

What part does morality play in German plans? What is the German standard of morals? Have the German leaders any religious convictions? What is the nature of the Prussian "Gott"? How do the Germans explain their war atrocities? What is the attitude of the German people on these matters? Why?

C. THE WAR.

I. OPENING EVENTS.

1. The Austro-Serbian Controversy.

- a. Review of Austro-Serbian relations.
 - (1) Previous history of Serbia.
 - (2) Russian interest in Serbia.

- b. The assassination at Serajevo.
 - (1) Murder of the Austrian Crown Prince.
 - (2) Convenience of the crime for Austrian purposes.
- c. Austrian note to Serbia.
 - (1) Secret investigation of the crime by Austria.
 - (2) Conference at Potsdam.
 - (3) Character of the note to Serbia.
 - (4) Continued hostile attitude of Austria.
 - (5) Anxiety of the other Powers.
- d. Serbian reply to the Austrian note.
 - (1) Unselfish concessions by Serbia.
 - (2) Rejection of the reply by Austria.
 - (3) Attitude of the Prussian War Party.
- e. Austrian declaration of war on Serbia.
 - (1) Efforts by the Powers for mediation.
 - (2) German refusal to negotiate.
 - (3) Conclusions.

References:

- Davis, chap. XXIII. *Powers, pp. 152-163.
Hazen, pp. 609-612.
Rose, pt. II, chap. 12.
Atlantic Monthly, February, 1915, p. 234.
*Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 4, 5-12, 31-37, 70, 406, 452, 469-471, 506-514.
Gerard, chaps. VI, VIII, XI.
War Cyclopedica, "Kingdom of the Serbs," "Serajevo," "Potsdam Conference," "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum," etc.

Problems:

What are the conclusions as to the guilt of Serbia for the assassination?
Explain the nature and object of Austria's ultimatum? Why was it delayed so long after the assassination? Where does Serbia's reply place the burden of guilt? Why?

2. Failure of Diplomacy.

- a. Attempts to adjust the Austro-Serbian situation.
 - (1) Diplomatic attitude of Serbia.
 - (2) Attempts by the Powers to adjust differences.
 - (a) Serbia's concessions.
 - (b) Austria's hesitation.
 - (c) German ultimatum to Russia.
- b. Efforts to avoid a general conflict.
 - (1) Proposals by the English ministry.
 - (a) Suggestions for a London Conference.
 - (b) Second proposal for mediation.
 - (2) German demands.
 - (a) For localization of the conflict.
 - (b) For direct Austro-Russian negotiations.
 - (c) Results and logical inferences.
 - (3) Russian proposals.
 - (a) For Hague Conferences.
 - (b) For mutual cessation of war preparations.
 - (c) For a conference of the Powers.
 - (4) German ultimata.
 - (a) Mobilization of armies.
 - (b) Declarations of war.
 - (5) Responsibility for the war.

References:

- *Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 107, 117, 223, 276, 288-291, 409, 431-434, 539, etc.
Davis, chap. XXIII. Hazen, pp. 612-613.
*Gerard, chap. VIII.
Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, xxxvi-xl.
War Cyclopedica, "War, Responsibility for," "German Diplomacy," "Mobilization Controversy," "Junkers," "German Government," "Moral Bankruptcy," "Liebknecht," "Grey, Viscount," etc.

Problems:

On what grounds did Austria take action against Serbia?
Explain Germany's attempts at pacification.

How must we explain the failure of Austria and Germany to agree to mediation at the same time? Why did Russia mobilize? Was this directed against Germany?
After Austria's declaration of war on Serbia, why was it impossible to avoid a general conflict?

3. Violation of Belgian Neutrality.

- a. Circumstances favoring British neutrality.
 - (1) Party differences in England.
 - (2) Threatened rebellion in Ireland.
 - (3) Labor troubles.
 - (4) Unrest in India.
 - (5) Lack of military preparedness.
 - (6) Peaceful character of the British people.
- b. British war diplomacy.
 - (1) Conferences between English and German statesmen.
 - (a) German bids for British neutrality.
 - (b) Clear statement of the British position.
 - (c) Entente cordiale with France.
- c. Invasion of Belgium and Luxemburg.
 - (1) Belgian appeals for support.
 - (2) English ultimatum to Germany.
 - (3) German attempts at justification of action.
 - (a) Plea of necessity.
 - (b) Military expediency.
 - (c) Charge of Belgian treachery.
- d. Entry of Great Britain.
 - (1) German wrath at England's declaration.
 - (2) Britain's announced war policies.
 - (3) Review of the basis of British entrance.

References:

- Davis, chap. XXIV. Hazen, pp. 616-617.
*Collected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 43, 77, 86, 92-93, 105, 111, 309-311, 313, 350-367, 410, etc.
Gibbons, H. A., The New Map of Europe, chap. 20.
Beck, J. M., The Evidence in the Case.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 223-265, "Belgium, the Innocent Bystander."

Problems:

Compare the strength of "good understandings" with "scraps of paper."
Was Britain's attitude honorable and upright? On what grounds did the Germans denounce it?
Tabulate and compare the declared objects of Germany and England in entering the war.
Why was the violation of Belgium's neutrality the worst international crime in the history of modern times, if not in the world?

4. Spread of the War.

- a. Entrance of other states into the war.
 - (1) Entrance of Montenegro.
 - (2) Reasons for the participation of Japan.
 - (a) Alliance with Great Britain.
 - (b) Resentment of German holding in the Far East.
 - (c) Further reasons (?).
 - (3) The war operations of Turkey.
 - (a) Actions producing allied declarations of war.
 - (4) Italy's action against Austria.
 - (a) Italia Irredenta.
 - (b) The problem of the Adriatic.
 - (c) Austrian violation of the Triple Alliance.
 - (5) Entrance of Bulgaria.
 - (a) Alliance with Germany and Austria.
 - (b) Hostility to aims of Serbia and Romania.
 - (6) Portugal's declaration of war.
 - (7) The war interests of Romania.
 - (8) Declarations of war by other minor states.
 - (9) Entrance of the United States.
- b. Universal character of the war.
 - (1) Great amount of life and wealth involved.
 - (2) Disorganization of industry.
 - (3) Importance of the issues involved.

References:

- *Powers, review of chaps. 3, 4, 15.
The War Message and Facts Behind It, War Information Series.
How the War Came to America, Red, White and Blue Series.
War Cyclopedia, "Scraps of Paper," "Germany, Moral Bankruptcy," "War, Declaration of," "Mittel-Europa," "Kaiserism," "Italia Irredenta," "Sabotage," etc.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 28, pp. 491-503, "The World's Debt to France."
Current Literature (especially Literary Digest, Independent, New Republic, etc.), volumes covering the period of the war.

Problems:

- In what respects is this war different from any preceding one?
How many of these differences may serve as an index to the future of war?
Which states are not in the war because of dire necessity? Note those which are fighting merely in the hope of gain.
Note the great variety of motives which drew the different states into the war.

II. COURSE OF THE WAR.

1. Conduct of the War.

a. Events of 1914-15.

- (1) The war in 1914.
 - (a) German military plans.
 - (b) The western front.
 - i. Belgium overrun.
 - ii. Invasion of France.
 - (c) The eastern front.
 - i. Russian offensives.
 - ii. Austro-German movements.
 - (d) Loss of the German colonies.
 - (e) Naval warfare.
 - (f) Situation at the close of 1914.
- (2) Campaign of 1915.
 - (a) The west front.
 - i. Allied failures in offensive warfare.
 - (b) The east front.
 - i. The Gallipoli expedition.
 - ii. Russian reverses.
 - (c) Naval warfare.
 - (d) Summary of the situation.

References:

- The Great War from Spectator to Participant, War Information Series.
Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, xli-li.
*War Cyclopedia, "Ordnance," "Emden," "Gallipoli," "Przemysl," "Trentino," "Lusitania," "Boers," "Zeppelin," etc. etc.
*American Review of Reviews, February, 1915, "Battle of the Marne."
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 31, pp. 194-210, "What Great Britain is Doing."
Recent Current Literature.

Problems:

- What does the character of the German military plans show about German preparedness?
Note the new developments in naval warfare and their significance.
With which group of Powers did the advantage lie in 1914? In 1915?
Account for the disastrous failure of the Gallipoli campaign.
How does the treatment of Belgium by Germany contribute to the understanding of German motives?

b. The war during 1916.

- (1) Operations in the west.
 - (a) Verdun.

- (b) The Somme.
- (c) Italian operations.
- (2) The eastern theatre.
 - (a) Romania crushed.
 - (b) Successful Russian offensives.
 - (c) British failures in Mesopotamia.
- (3) Developments in naval warfare.
- (4) New political problems.
 - (a) Strikes in England.
 - (b) Agitation and revolt in Ireland.
- (5) Summary of the year's course.

References:

- War Cyclopedia, "Verdun," "Mesopotamia," "Sinn Fein," "Barrage," "Dreadnought," etc.
New York Times History of the War.
Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, li-liiii.
Wells, H. G., Italy, France and Britain at War.
Simonds, Frank, History of the Great War.
Current Literature for 1916.

Problems:

- What is the proper place of the battle of Verdun in history?
Explain the weaknesses and many failures of the Entente Powers.
Note the special handicaps of Great Britain during 1916.
To whose advantage did the year end? What were the new or significant developments?
It was supposed by many in authority that the war must end in 1916. Why? Why did it not?

c. Developments in 1917-18.

- (1) Naval warfare.
 - (a) Unrestricted submarine warfare.
 - (b) Establishment of blockade "zones."
- (2) Further spread of the war.
 - (a) Entrance of the United States.
 - (b) Declarations of war by Minor Powers.
- (3) War on the western front.
 - (a) The "retreat to victory."
 - (b) Invasion of Italy begun.
- (4) Developments in the east.
 - (a) New British operations in Mesopotamia.
 - (b) Revolution in Russia.
- (5) Great German offensive in the west.
 - (a) Release of troops and supplies by Russia.
 - (b) Concentration of German troops in the west.
 - (c) Allied efforts in preparation.
- (6) The war up to date.

References:

- Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, lii-lx.
War Cyclopedia, "Shipping Losses," "Spurlos versenkt," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," "Tanks," etc.
Current Literature for 1917-18.
How the War Came to America, Red, White and Blue Series.
Dependable Newspapers.

Problems:

- Explain the idea of "spurlos versenkt."
In what important respects did the course of the war change during this period?
What part has Russia played in the war thus far? What will likely be the effect of her revolution on the war?
What developments may be anticipated in the coming year?
The war has developed in whose favor up to the present?
How can the war continue when the wealth of the several countries involved is so largely used up?

2. The Russian Situation.

a. The Russian Revolution.

- (1) Causes.
- (2) Course of the Revolution.

b. Its relation to the Great War.

- (1) Rise of new parties.
 - (a) Their attitude toward the war.
- (2) Universal demands for peace.
 - (a) German propaganda and propagandists.
 - (b) Attempts to secure a separate peace.
 - (c) Anarchy and German intervention.
- c. Dismemberment of the Russian Empire.
 - (1) National movements.
 - (a) Declared independence of Finland.
 - (b) Estrangement of Siberia.
 - (c) Establishment of the Ukraine.
 - (2) German occupation of Russian territory.
 - (a) Question of the disposition of Poland.
 - (b) Occupation of Russian provinces.
 - (c) Counter intervention of Japan in the East.
 - (3) Future development of Russia.
 - (a) Dependence on the war's outcome.
 - (b) Loss of seaports and territories.
 - (c) The question of government.

References:

- War Cyclopedia, "Russian Revolution," "Kerensky," "Lenine," "Trotzky," "Battalion of Death," etc.
Current Literature; Newspapers.
*National Geographic Magazine, vol. 31, pp. 210-240, "Russia's Democrats," pp. 371-382, "The Russian Situation and Its Significance to America," vol. 32, pp. 24-45, "Russia's Man of the Hour," pp. 91-120, "Russia from Within," pp. 238-253, "A Few Glimpses Into Russia."

Problems:

- Explain the causes of the Revolution. Why did it come at such a time?
What effect will the withdrawal of Russia have on the course of the war? Was this to have been anticipated?
What are the greatest problems New Russia has to face? What are perhaps her greatest dangers?
Why do the Allies offer to carry on relations with Russia after her attempts to form a separate peace? Consider the effects on Russia's future of the loss of territory.
On what basis have parts of the Russian Empire declared their independence? Are they good reasons?

3. Entrance of the United States.

a. The struggle to maintain neutrality.

- (1) America's early attitude toward European troubles.
 - (a) Influence of the Monroe Doctrine.
 - (b) Natural feeling of isolation.
 - (c) Attitude toward war, generally.
- (2) Pleas for neutrality.
 - (a) Proclamations of the President.
 - (b) European bids for neutrality.
 - (c) Influence of peace organizations.
- (3) Change of sentiment toward Central Powers.
 - (a) Feeling aroused over the invasion of Belgium.
 - (b) Disgust at the German conduct of war.
- (4) Inevitable controversies.
 - (a) Differences with England.
 - (b) Controversies with Germany.
 - (c) Austro-German intrigues.
 - (d) The submarine question.
- (5) Reasons for keeping the peace.
 - (a) Hope of a basis for international agreement.
 - (b) Desire to lead in restoring peace.
 - (c) Wish to continue charity and relief work.
 - (d) Conception of duty in Pan-America.

References:

- The President's Flag Day Address, Red, White and Blue Series.
The Great War, from Spectator to Participant, War Information Series.

- War Cyclopedia, "United States, Isolation," "Neutrality," "Hyphenated Americans," "Atrocities," "Belgium's Woe," "Cavell, Edith," "Fryatt, Capt.," "Lusitania," "Embargo," "Mails," "War Zone, British," "Der Tag," "Dumba," "Igel, von, Papers of," "Papan," "Manila Bay," "Monroe Doctrine," "Submarine Warfare," "Parole," "Sussex," "Pan-Americanism," "Watchful Waiting," etc., etc.
National Geographic Magazine, vol. 26, pp. 265-272, "The Foreign Born of the United States," vol. 31, pp. 240-254, "Republics, the Ladder to Liberty."

Problems:

- Why were Americans so long in comprehending the war?
What was the basis of our declaration of neutrality? When and how was this basis destroyed?
Explain the gradual change in American sentiment after the war began in Europe.
What circumstances drew us into war? Could these have been foreseen and avoided?

b. Reasons for America's declaration of war.

- (1) Unrestricted submarine warfare.
 - (a) Violation of agreements with the United States.
 - (b) German violation of all international law.
- (2) Evidence of Germany's faithlessness.
 - (a) German policy in Belgium.
 - (b) Treaties considered "scraps of paper."
- (3) Germany considered a world menace.
 - (a) Her admitted foreign policy.
 - (b) Plots involving the United States.
- (4) Principle of democracy threatened.
 - (a) Proposed spread of Prussian autocracy.
 - (b) Principles of the Entente vs. Central Powers.
- (5) Threat to American independence.
 - (a) Idea of American isolation abandoned.
 - (b) Spread of German propaganda in the New World.
 - (c) Reluctant declaration of a state of war.

References:

- How the War Came to America, Red, White and Blue Series.
A War of Self-Defense, War Information Series.
The War Message and Facts Behind It, War Information Series.
War Cyclopedia, "Zimmerman Note," "Submarine Warfare," "United States, Break with Germany," "War, Declaration Against Germany," "War, Declaration Against Austria-Hungary," "American Lives Lost," "America Threatened," "German Attitude," "United States, Isolation," "Monroe Doctrine," etc.

Problems:

- In what ways has the entrance of the United States defined the issues of the whole war?
To what extent may we "make the world safe for democracy"?
Are the standards held by all members of the Entente alike?
What are the evidences that America did not desire the war and did not enter rashly?

c. America's place in the struggle.

- (1) Importance of America's entrance.
 - (a) Moral influence on the world.
 - (b) The military importance.
- (2) Objects of the American offensive.
 - (a) To "make the world safe for democracy."
 - (b) To secure a just settlement of European problems.
 - (c) To abolish Prussianism from the earth.
 - (d) To provide a permanent peace basis.
- (3) The American program of war.
 - (a) Co-operation with the Entente Powers.
 - (b) Furnishing supplies of food and munitions.
 - (c) Removal of the submarine peril.
 - (d) Placing of a large draft army in Europe.

- (4) Our war accomplishments.
 (a) Raising, equipping and training of a large army.
 (b) Successful transfer of troops to France.
 (c) Shipbuilding and airplane programs.
 (d) Successful financial measures.
- (5) Probable war developments.
 (a) The problem of the Atlantic.
 (b) Great need of supplies abroad.
 (c) Increasing need of troops.

References:

First Session of the War Congress, War Information Series.
 American Loyalty, War Information Series.
 American Interest in Popular Government Abroad, War Information Series.
 The Great War from Spectator to Participant, War Information Series.
 The Nation in Arms, War Information Series.
 War Cyclopedia, "Selective Service," "Acts of Congress," "Alien Enemies," "Army," "Cantonments," "Bonds Act," "Profiteering," "Red Cross," "Y. M. C. A.," "Food and Fuel Control Act," "Shipping Board," "War Industries Board," etc.
 Current Literature: Newspapers.

Problems:

What has been the effect of the United States aims, as stated by the President?
 What have been the noteworthy accomplishments of the nation since the declaration of war?
 What appear to be the greatest tasks immediately ahead?
 What will undoubtedly be some of the most important effects of the war on America?
 Note that the entrance of the United States went far toward defining the war issues. Show how the war appears to be not merely a national but a moral necessity.

III. PROSPECTUS.

1. Proposals for Peace.

- a. German offer for peace conferences.
 (1) Evidence of insincerity.
 (2) Reasons for the refusal of the Entente.
- b. Efforts of the United States towards peace.
 (1) The proposals of President Wilson.
 (2) Unsatisfactory replies of the Powers.
- c. Desire of the Austro-Germans for peace.
 (1) Unexpected developments of the war.
 (2) Desire for peace at their height of power.
 (3) Unrest of civilian populations.
- d. Peace proposals of Pope Benedict XV.
 (1) First and second appeals.
 (2) Replies of the United States and Entente.
 (3) Reply of Germany.
- e. Peace platform of the Bolsheviks.
 (1) No annexations—no indemnities.
 (2) Attempts at separate peace.
 (a) Failure to meet German demands fully.
 (b) German occupation of Russian territory.
 (c) Probable developments of the situation.
- f. Review of present peace prospects.

References:

Hirst, F. W., The Logic of International Co-operation, American Association for International Conciliation Series.
 Eckhardt, Prof. C. C., The Bases of Permanent Peace, HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, March, 1918.
 Robinson, The Last Decade and the Great War, ix-xxxiv.
 Wilson, President, A League for Peace; also, The Basis for Enduring Peace, in the Forum of Democracy.
 Benedict, Pope, A Plea for Peace, Forum of Democracy.
 War Cyclopedia, "Peace Overtures," "Aim of the United States," "America, Creed," "Peace Terms," "Lansdowne Note," "No Annexations, No Indemnities," "Zimmerman Note," etc.

Current Literature: Newspapers.

Problems:

Note the sources of all the peace proposals since the United States entered the war. Do you find anything significant in this?
 What is the American view of the German peace suggestions? What is their evident purpose?
 What is England's basis for peace? Does the American plan differ essentially?
 Is there any likelihood of a compromise of demands accepted as the basis for peace?
 What stand have the Russians taken in regard to peace? What is the objection to it?
 What new governmental principle is on trial in Russia?

2. Proposed Remedies for War.

- a. Past efforts to avoid war.
 (1) Peace alliances and conferences.
 (2) Partial success of federations.
- b. The naturalness of war.
 (1) The character of human nature.
 (2) The real services performed by war.
- c. Suggested methods of war prevention.
 (1) Arbitration.
 (2) Diplomacy.
 (3) International police system.
 (4) Plebiscites.
 (5) Settlements on the basis of ethnology.
 (6) Federations.
- d. Relative merits and demerits of these proposals.
 (1) Their relation to the fundamental causes of war.
 (2) Their chances for success.

References:

*Powers, chap. 19.
 Carnegie, Andrew, A League of Peace, American Association for International Conciliation Series.
 Wilson, President, The Basis for Enduring Peace, Forum of Democracy.
 Eckhardt, Prof. C. C., The Bases of Permanent Peace, HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, March, 1918.
 War Cyclopedia, "Arbitration," "Hague Tribunal," "International Law," "League to Enforce Peace," "Peace Treaties," "Permanent Peace," etc.
 Robinson and Beard, Readings, II, Nos. 380, 401.

Problems:

Consider the arguments for and against each of the proposed remedies for war. Which seems to be most generally accepted?
 Are any of these plans based on a clear, fundamental understanding of the real causes of war? What is the chief defect in them all?
 What shall we offer, then, as the best remedy suited to bring about permanent peace at the earliest possible moment?
 Which of the proposed plans are theoretical; that is, which have never been given an actual trial?

3. The Future of War.

- a. Review of the fundamental causes of war.
 (1) Expansion; commercial and cultural.
 (2) Defense.
 (3) Race unity.
- b. The past history of war.
 (1) Its antiquity.
 (2) The functional nature of war.
- c. Usual failure of the proposed remedies.
 (1) The conformation of the planet.
 (2) The causes of war misunderstood.
- d. Requirements for a lasting peace.
 (1) Integration or consolidation of nations.
 (a) Forces tending in this direction.
 (b) Probable situation after the war.

- (2) The need of coercion or substitutes.
 (a) The evident services of war.
 (b) Future substitutes.
 i. Peaceful competition.
 ii. Community of interest.
- (3) Necessity for further evolution.
 (a) Unstable nature of man's wisdom.
 (b) Transformation of "human nature."
- e. The outlook for the future.
 (1) The probability of future wars.
 (2) The necessity of consistent education.
 (3) Conditions eventually supplanting war.

References:

*Powers, chaps. 1, 20, 21, epilogue.
 James, William, The Moral Equivalent of War, American Association for International Conciliation Series.
 Angell, Norman, The Great Illusion.
 "Cosmos," The Basis of a Durable Peace.

Problems:

Will the outcome of the present war in any case settle the issues at stake? Is war a necessary evil? Are the "perils of peace" greater than those of war?
 Sum up your conclusions as to the future of war.
 When it does end, what will take its place?

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 Thorndike, L., A History of Medieval Europe.
 West, W. M., The Modern World.

Source Material.

Robinson, J. H., and Beard, C. A., Readings in European History, Vol. II.

PART B. DEVELOPMENT OF WORLD PROBLEMS.

Secondary Works.

Ackerman, C., Germany, the Next Democracy.
 Angell, N., The Great Illusion.
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 Bülow, Prince von, Imperial Germany.
 Cheyney, E. P., A Short History of England.
 Chitwood, O. P., The Fundamental Causes of the War. Forum of Democracy, articles by many authorities on phases of the conflict.
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Periodical Articles.

Archer, W., Fighting a Philosophy; North American Review, 201, pp. 30-44.
 Jordan, D. S., Alsace-Lorraine; Atlantic Monthly, 113, pp. 688-702.
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 National Geographic Magazine, volumes 26, 28, 30, 31.
 O'Connor, The Bagdad Railway; Fortnightly Review, 95, pp. 201-216.
 Toujoroff, The Balkan War; North American Review, 196, pp. 721-730.

PART C. THE WAR.

Secondary Works.

Beck, J. M., The Evidence in the Case.
 Belloc, H., The Great War, First Phase.
 Bland, J. O. P., Germany's Violation of the Laws of War.
 Bullard, A., Diplomacy of the Great War.
 Burgess, J. H., The European War of 1914.
 Chesterton, G. K., The Barbarism of Berlin.
 Cobb, I. S., The Paths of Glory.
 "Cosmos," The Basis of a Durable Peace.
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 Volumes of Current Literature for the period of the war.

PART IV.

Some Geographical Aspects of the War

BY SAMUEL B. HARDING, PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY IN INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE

Despite the changed character of modern warfare, geographical factors play a part in military operations as important now as in the past. The initial determination of the Germans to invade France by way of Belgium, the Battle of the Marne, the operations about Verdun, the Russian invasions of East Prussia and Galicia, the successive German incursions into Russian Poland, the operations on the Balkan, Italian, and Mesopotamian fronts, in all these the influence of terrain upon military operations is easily discernible. How this is so may be seen by referring to Professor D. W. Johnson's highly suggestive book entitled "Topography and Strategy in the War," reviewed elsewhere in this issue.

If we take a wider view, it is evident also that at bottom it is geography which has enabled Great Britain to maintain her supremacy over the surface of the seas; it is geography that has forced Germany to attempt her challenge of that control by means of submarines and air-craft; and it is geography, in the main, which is so seriously hampering the efforts of the United States to bring to bear in the war its great potential resources. Indeed, we may consider that it is geography—in the form of colonies, spheres of trade and influence, control of lines of transportation, and considerations affecting the present and future sufficiency of the sources of food-supply, together with those of iron and coal so vitally important to an industrial nation—that makes up the essence of the German demand for a larger "place in the sun" which caused the present war. And we may be perfectly sure that in the successive "peace drives" of the German Government, it is the extending and securing of German "loot" in the form of agricultural and mineral lands, of harbors and shipping facilities, of industrial establishments and subject labor populations—all matters of economic geography—which occupy the official German mind far more than defense against other peoples' aggressions, or even the triumph of the abstract "German idea in the world."

In this supplement nothing further is attempted than to present maps and charts showing (1) the respective resources of the two warring groups, (2) the development of Prussia, (3) the subject nationalities of Middle-Europe, and the Berlin-Bagdad railway project as realized in January, 1918, (4) the countries at war, (5) the various battle-fronts of the war as they stood in the spring of 1918, and (6) the territories lost by Russia in the peace settlement of March, 1918.

The maps and atlases listed below are of varying value, but all will be found useful. In *The Geographical Review* (New York) for July, 1917, will be found a fuller list; also in a pamphlet published by Edward Stanford entitled "A Selection of the Best War Maps" (London, 1917). The Division of Maps of the Library of Congress has prepared a typewritten catalogue of several hundred pages entitled "A List of Atlases and Maps Applicable to the Present War," but at present is without funds for its publication.

CRAM, G. F., & Co. United States at War. American War Atlas. Eight colored maps. New York, 1917.

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MAWSON, C. O. S. Doubleday, Page & Co.'s Geographical Manual and War Atlas. New York, 1917.

POATES. War Atlas of Europe. 32 pages of colored maps of the warring countries of Europe. McKinley Publishing Co., Philadelphia.

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ROBERTSON, C. G., AND BARTHOLOMEW, J. G. An Historical Atlas of Modern Europe, from 1789 to 1914. Oxford, 1915.

SHEPHERD, W. R. Historical Atlas. New York, 1911.

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European Geography and the War

BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM E. LINGELBACH, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

It has been said that the present generation has learned more geography in the last three years and a half than in all the decades before. In connection with the war, the world has been studying not only political and historical geography, but economic and physical geography as never before. The location of the world's coal and iron supply, its oil and wheat fields, its trade routes, its racial units, as well as political and military boundaries have become objects of serious consideration and study by persons who had never given any thought to these questions.

During the last six months, the newspapers have been eagerly studying and mapping the resources of Russia, in the desperate effort to forecast, if possible, the effect upon the great economic issues of the war of the temporary disintegration of the once formidable empire of the Tsars. A year ago Rumania was the subject of particular interest, while the topography of northeastern France, and the rôle of the coal and iron deposits in Western Europe have been of paramount importance from the beginning of the war. Even the layman has become familiar with the expression "an ironless France" and with the half-truths, that the sanguinary campaigns about Verdun were a fight for iron, as that of Lens is a struggle for coal. (Cp. map p. 90.)¹ In the early days of the war, when the freedom of the seas was still a subject of discussion, men were examining the maps to determine the remarkable geographical basis of England's unique commercial empire. Germany's claim to direct access to the trade of the world by the shortest routes raised innumerable questions as to the geography and history of Antwerp, Trieste, Salonica and Constantinople. With each larger change in the military situation, the topography of that section of Europe directly involved has attracted particular attention.

To the majority of readers, the facts concerning the surface conditions of the European continent have not been readily accessible and it is therefore a matter of especial satisfaction that we now have a book on this subject, which is not only thoroughly scientific, but also popular in style and presentation, in Professor Johnson's "Topography and Strategy in the War."² The title sounds a little technical, but the author interprets strategy in a broad sense. It includes not merely the strategy of the military campaigns, but to some extent also the larger problems of this world conflict.

The western theatre of the war is introduced by

¹ Map references are made to the maps in this volume.

² Douglas W. Johnson, "Topography and Strategy in the War;" New York, 1917; Henry Holt and Co.

a remarkably lucid description of "The Paris Basin," with its geological strata uniformly and gradually rising toward the east, each ending in a more or less steep escarpment, thus forming a succession of impregnable barriers against invasion from the Rhine. (Cp. map p. 86.) To this is due the fact that the Germans unhesitatingly invaded France along the coastal plain, even though it was the longer route by eighty miles; though it necessitated the violation of treaty pledges, and the rape of Belgium; forced England into the war, and invited the moral condemnation of the neutral world. Following the chapter on the terrain are three chapters on the campaigns of the western area bringing out in detail the relation of land formation to military operations.

On the east front, the topographical factor is less dominant, though to most readers the description of the altogether exceptional topography of the moraine area in East Prussia, and the account of the skillful use made of the Mazurian Lakes by Von Hindenburg in his attack on the invading Russians in 1914 will help to explain the terrible punishment of the Russian forces in this region. (Cp. map p. 87.) Equally new to many will be the author's explanation of the strong natural defenses of the Polish salient, against which the German frontal attacks were again and again broken. In the meantime, the exposed area of Galicia was overrun by the Russians. They seized the Carpathians and straightened out their line in that section.

Then the unexpected happened. In the early summer of 1915, Von Mackensen drove a wedge right through the Russian line eastward from Cracow to Lemberg. Then swinging northward, he threatened the Warsaw railways from Odessa and Kiev, while Von Hindenburg attacked in the direction of the Petrograd-Warsaw line. This did what all the frontal attacks had failed to accomplish. It forced the Grand Duke to give up his battle-line, the longest in history, and retreat. In the retreat admirable use was made of the defensive possibilities of the rivers and marshes, a strategy to which the ultimate escape of the Grand Duke's colossal army into the interior of Russia is in a last analysis to be attributed.

But even though the Russian army extricated itself, the retreat and the surrender of a territory larger than Germany itself to the invader was a stupendous defeat. Its effect soon appeared not only in Russia, but in the Balkans. "For back of the Russian lines lay the Balkan States, politically, if not geographically." The reaction upon Bulgaria of the colossal victory was clearly foreseen by the German strategists. The Russian retreat ended in August, 1915. Early in October Bulgar armies were combining in

an overwhelming attack with German-Austrian forces upon Serbia.

This at once called into play, as Professor Johnson points out, a very powerful topographical factor in the Balkans. Up to the entrance of Bulgaria into the war, Serbia had held an impregnable position in her guardianship of the great Morava-Vardar trench with its secondary trench from Nish eastward into the Bulgarian plateau. (Cp. map p. 88.) Austria's frontal attacks on the north end of the trench had all been hurled back. Now the entire main valley was at one blow, open to a flank attack by the Bulgarian army. This, together with the powerful Austrian-German forces attacking at the northern entrance to the trench, crushed Serbian resistance. The extreme importance of the results of this successful articulation of strategy and topography appears in several ways.

The Central Powers gained complete control, not only of the Morava-Vardar trench to Salonica, but also of the "Morava-Maritza trench carrying the Orient railway, that vital artery which alone assured continued life to the Turkish Empire." The water route by the Danube was also opened to the enemy by the expulsion of Serbia from the Iron Gates.

The tremendous import of this can only be appreciated when considered in its relation to the situation at Constantinople. The memorable attack of the Allied fleet on the Dardanelles was undertaken, it will be recalled, before the opening of communication through Serbia from the Central Powers to Turkey. The Turks were desperately short in ammunition for their coast defense guns, and it was the knowledge of this condition that led to the attempt to force the Strait, and the loss of the Buvette and Queen Elizabeth.

The abandonment of further efforts at that time was dictated by the deadly work of the Turkish batteries and by the rumors that supplies had reached Constantinople through Romania. These rumors were groundless, and another day's fighting we now know would have exhausted the Turkish ammunition. With the defeat of Serbia, however, and the opening of the "vital artery" between the Central Powers and Turkey, the opportunity to take Constantinople by assault was lost. Nor was this the only result. The extension of the battle line of the Central Powers tended naturally to endanger the position of Romania long since restive and impatient to seize the opportunity of the war to free the Romanians of Transylvania from Magyar domination.

Romania's position was formidable both for defensive and offensive operations. As Professor Johnson points out the Transylvanian Alps on the north and west, and the broad Danube on the south, formed a strong frontier. The only undefended section was the southern boundary of the Dobrudja, a stretch of 100 miles. Here lay the vulnerable spot to be guarded against all attack, or better still to be utilized as a gateway for offensive operations. Co-operating with the allied force at Salonica and the Russian from the Black Sea, the objective of such an offensive would have been the Orient railway, the possible elimination

of Turkey from the war, and the capture of Varna and of Constantinople. Some of the highest stakes of the war lay within reach. If ever there was an invitation to enlighten allied strategy, it was here. But it was not accepted. Local and political ambitions determined Romania's action rather than topography, or a military policy developed on the basis of topography and allied strategy in general.

Romania decided to invade Transylvania. This gave the Central Powers their opportunity. Transylvania could be left to the Romanians till Von Mackensen gathered his forces in Bulgaria opposite the defenseless Dobrudja line for a series of crushing blows, while Von Falkenhayn waited the opportune moment to crush the heads of the Romanian invading columns or cut their line of communication. "For her part," says Professor Johnson, "Germany, the controlling genius of the Central Powers, permitted no political considerations to warp the plans for dealing with the Romanian menace. She prescribed a plan of campaign which involved deliberate sacrifice of large areas in Transylvania to the impatient grasp of Romania, and gathered strength for an assault on the Dobrudja gateway which should effectually close the way to any future menace to Bulgaria from that quarter." Romania was herself invaded and occupied, and her armies pushed north and east to the line of the Sereth near the Russian border.

Thus by a misdirected and purely local strategy Romania and the allies invited a defeat which, like the Serbian disaster, brought enormous advantages to the enemy. His battle line was shortened by 500 miles, the oil and wheat fields fell into his hands, while the Orient railway freed from all danger on the north "continued to carry munitions to the Turk."

In the Italian theatre of the war the problems of strategy arising from topographical conditions, while much more localized, are nevertheless equally significant. (Cp. map p. 89.) When Italy entered the war in May, 1915, there were many persons who expected that she would quickly occupy the Trentino, and that her armies would sweep around the head of the Adriatic and occupy Trieste. Months passed and only a small portion of *Italia Irredenta* was redeemed. In the meantime the rapid advance of Cadorna's troops across the boundary and parts of the Isonzo to the edge of the Carso plain also came to a halt. For more than a year little or no apparent progress was made. Criticism and malicious rumors of Italian policy and Italian good faith were frequently heard. But to anyone familiar with the terrain it was clear that the almost impregnable positions in the mountains about Gorizia and along the edge of the Carso must be at least partially reduced before either of the rocky gateways to the city of Trieste could be attempted. Nor is it only the mountain wall that checked the Italians; the Isonzo itself presented formidable obstacles. The work of Cadorna seemed impossible of achievement.

Nevertheless by tunneling and driving trenches to-

ward the Austrian positions on the heights, tactics resembling those of the Japanese at Port Arthur, the objectives were gradually approached. Finally in August of 1916, more than a year after crossing the Isonzo, the Italians were ready for the second offensive against the Austrian positions. Success crowned their efforts, and at the time of Professor Johnson's writing they had by "more than two years of almost superhuman efforts" succeeded in forcing the approaches to Trieste. Then came the counter blow that had all along threatened the eastward advance of the Italian armies. A powerful flank attack launched from the highlands of the Alps along the north, forced a general retreat. A glance at the map on page 89 will make plain the topographical elements in the success of the enemy's counter offensive in the late fall of 1917.

The text is illustrated by numerous photographs and a series of excellent topographical plans and maps. The work is done so thoroughly and the relationship of inanimate nature to the military development of the war presented in so appreciative and interesting a manner, that it is safe to predict a lasting and permanent place for the little volume in the vast bulk of the literature of this great war. In view of this, it is unfortunate that the author did not add several chapters on the geography of the influence of sea power. Since the sea power promises to become the determining factor in this war, as in the Napoleonic wars, there are more than the usual reasons for a study of the geographical factors underlying England's control of ocean commerce. We need a semi-popular study of the geography of the long distance blockade; of the peculiar geography of the coast of Germany with its "Watten" or shallows, making it well-nigh impregnable against attack by sea; of the great strategic importance of Heligoland and the Kiel Canal, and of the land-locked Baltic. For the same reasons we hope the author will some time give us a study of the topography of the Black Sea and the Straits, and of the Asia Minor and Mesopotamian theatres of the war.

To some this close articulation of geography and history will appear as an overemphasis of the geographic factor in human affairs. For there are still those who, like Langlois and Seignobos, think it difficult to find that a professor of history or an historian is much the better for a knowledge of geology, oceanography and climatology and the whole group of geographical sciences. The unfairness as well as the unscientific nature of this attitude must appear patent to every one who reads Professor Johnson's book. Military history cannot be treated without constant reference to topography; nor can political and international relations in these days without an understanding of the raw materials and resources of the earth.

On the other hand there is an equal danger in going too far in the other direction. Specialists are apt to overemphasize their own particular subject, and so there are men who pompously explain the whole

course of human history by general references to geographical conditions. Human progress is too complex to be explained by any single set of factors. Buckle's brilliant effort to account for the civilization of England on purely economic grounds is familiar to all students of history. To apply it in the present world crisis would be to omit, for example, from among the causes of the war the very pernicious educational propaganda toward the creation of a war psychology among the German people.

"An equal mind" is a first essential of the historian; he must take his facts in whatever domain of the activities of man or of nature he finds them. Among these facts the geographical will always continue of great importance. Not that they are immutable, for in their relation to history they are constantly changing. A topographical or climatic fact remains the same, but its influence in this war may be very different from its influence in the Civil War. Man in his conquest of nature is constantly forcing changes in the operation of geographic conditions, causing the appearance of new factors or the operation of the old in a new and different manner. In its outward appearance the stage of the great human drama remains the same but in reality it differs radically with each new advance in the application of science to man's natural needs.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF THE MAPS.

The following problems are given only as suggestions of the manner in which the maps may be used in class-work:

On map on page 86, indicate by figures what are called the eight natural defenses of Paris. Compare the distance from the German border to Paris via Metz and Verdun with that via Belgium. Show how the German campaign in France has avoided the natural defenses of Paris.

On map on page 87, point out the political boundaries in 1914 and their relation to physical features.

On map on page 88, show territory lost by Romania in 1918. Point out three geographical features important in the war. Compare the distance from Leipzig to Suez by way of Saloniki with that by way of Hamburg and Gibraltar.

On map on page 89, point out Italia Irredenta. Show farthest advance of Italy; of Austria.

On map on page 90, transfer coal and iron areas to map on page 86. Note the coal and iron regions held by Germany. Show the position of the American army with reference to these regions.

On map opposite page 93, give the main points in the history of the Bagdad Railway project.

On map on page 95, indicate coal and iron deposits. What proportion of French industrial territory and production is under control of Germans?

On map on page 97, give dates of the losses of German colonies, and the countries to whom lost.

On map on page 98, point out the significance of the Russian peace settlements.


On map on page 99, locate principal towns and sea-ports. What is the distance from Antwerp to London?

On map on page 100, trace the new routes to Constantinople, Mesopotamia, and Central Asia. Contrast with the route of the Bagdad Railway and the "Balkan Bridge."

On map on page 103, show the successive Allied advances. Show areas regained by Central Powers.


On map on page 104, show English and German mine areas. Show how neutral trade is controlled in this region.

FROM JOHNSON'S TOPOGRAPHY AND STRATEGY IN THE WAR, p. 4.




Diagrammatic view of the western theater of war, showing the principal plateaus and plains, mountains and lowlands, cliff scarps and river trenches which have influenced military operations. The underground rock structure is shown in the front edge of the block.

FROM JOHNSON'S TOPOGRAPHY AND STRATEGY IN THE WAR, p. 50.




- Key to place names:
- A, Allenstein;
- B, Biala;
- Br, Bromberg;
- D, Debica;
- Dr, Drohobycz;
- Du, Dunajec;
- G, Grodek; J, Józefów;
- Le, Leczyca;
- Lo, Lowicz;
- P, Piontek; R, Raba;
- Rz, Rzeszow; S, Sejny;
- Tn, Tannenberg;
- Tw, Tarnow; W, Wislok;
- Wa, Wisłoka.

Diagrammatic view of the eastern theater of war, showing the Carpathian Mountains and their chief passes, the plain of Poland, the hill and lake country of East Prussia, the river trenches and marshes, and other features of the terrain which have influenced military operations in the east.



Map showing barriers and trenches of the Balkan Peninsula.

Abbreviations. (1) In northern Serbia, etc.: Lo, for Losnitza; Ma, for Maljen Ridge; Mi, for Mitrovitza (on the Save); O, for Orsova; Ob, for Obrenovatz; S, for Shabat; Se, for Semendria; U, for Uzhitze; Va, for Valjevo; Vi, for Vishegrad; Z, for Zaietchar. (2) Along the Morava-Vardar trench; D, for Demir Kapu gorge; Ku, for Kumanovo; L, for Leskovatz; Ve, for Veles; Vr, for Vranje. (3) Elsewhere: Du, for Durazzo (on the Adriatic); I, for Ipek ($42\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ N. and 20° E.); K, for Katchanik ($42\frac{1}{4}^{\circ}$ N. and 21° E.).
 From Johnson's Topography and Strategy in the War, p. 144.






The Italian theater of war, showing the principal mountain and plateau barriers, river trenches and marshes, affecting the Italian campaigns.

From Johnson's Topography and Strategy in the War, p. 121.

The solid black on each map generally shows the total area at the date of the preceding map, the shaded area the territory since added. On the first map the solid black is the area in 1450. On the map for 1806 the dotted line separates the Polish territories lost in 1815 from those retained. The limits of the present German Empire are shown on each map.

GROWTH OF PRUSSIA.






PANGERMANIST PLAN OF 1895.

Map printed in Berlin in 1895, and distributed by the Pangermanist League, showing the frontiers of Central Pan-Germany "as they should be in 1950." It will be observed that the line of the projected frontier includes Italian (or Venetian) Friuli, which the Austro-Germans have recently taken, but stops a little short of their present front, as shown by the line added to the map by M. Chéradame.


This map is reprinted from Chéradame's "Pan-Germany: The Disease and the Cure: And a Plan for the Allies," published by the Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston.








DATES OF DECLARATIONS OF WAR OR OF SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (the latter indicated by dates in *italics*).


Germany	Austria-Hungary	Turkey	Bulgaria	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Turkey	Bulgaria	Germany	Austria-Hungary	Turkey	Bulgaria
Belgium.....	*Aug. 4, 1914	*Aug. 28, 1914		Guatemala....	<i>Apr. 28, 1917</i>			Portugal.....	<i>†Mar. 8, 1916</i>	Mar. 15, 1916	
Bolivia.....	<i>Apr. 15, 1917</i>			Haiti.....	<i>June 17, 1917</i>			Roumania.....	Aug. 28, 1916	Aug. 27, 1916	*Aug. 31, 1916
Brazil.....	Oct. 26, 1917			Honduras....	<i>May 17, 1917</i>			Russia.....	*Aug. 1, 1914	*Aug. 6, 1914	Nov. 3, 1914
China.....	Aug. 14, 1917	Aug. 14, 1917		Italy.....	Aug. 27, 1916	May 23, 1915	Aug. 20, 1915	Oct. 19, 1915			Oct. 13, 1915
Costa Rica...	<i>Sept. 21, 1917</i>			Japan.....	Aug. 23, 1914	*Aug. 27, 1914					
Cuba.....	Apr. 7, 1917			Liberia.....	Aug. 4, 1914						
Ecuador.....	Dec. 8, 1917			Montenegro...	Aug. 9, 1914	Aug. 7, 1914					
France.....	*Aug. 3, 1914	Aug. 12, 1914	Nov. 5, 1914	Nicaragua....	<i>May 18, 1917</i>						
Great Britain	Aug. 4, 1914	Aug. 12, 1914	Nov. 5, 1914	Panama.....	Apr. 7, 1917	Dec. 10, 1917					
Greece.....	July 2, 1917		July 2, 1917	Peru.....	<i>Oct. 6, 1917</i>						
								Uruguay.....	<i>Oct. 7, 1917</i>		

* War declared by a Central Power (named at top of column). In all other cases declaration of war was first made by an Entente Power.
 † In the case of Portugal a resolution was passed on November 23, 1914, authorizing military intervention as an ally of Great Britain; on May 19, 1915, military aid was granted; on March 8, 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal.



WESTERN AND EASTERN BATTLE FRONTS.






Lost by Roumania
 Lost by Russia


RUSSIAN PEACE SETTLEMENTS.

This map represents the peace settlements as nearly as they could be learned March 16, 1918. Necessarily the representation is somewhat uncertain and the lines are only approximate.


McKINLEY'S OUTLINE MAPS OF THE GREAT WAR, LARGE SIZE No. 91'b. THE WESTERN FRONT




MCKINLEY'S OUTLINE MAPS. NO. 127 b. RUSSIA.




MCKINLEY'S OUTLINE MAPS OF THE GREAT WAR, LARGE SIZE No. 93 b, THE BALKAN STATES






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McKINLEY'S OUTLINE MAPS OF THE GREAT WAR. LARGE SIZE. No. 94b.
THE NORTH SEA, BRITISH ISLES AND ENGLISH CHANNEL.



PART V.
A Selected Critical Bibliography of Publications in
English Relating to the World War

BY GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.
PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE

In July, 1917, the National Board for Historical Service projected a bibliography similar to this, but on a somewhat more inclusive plan and with more extended comment. On behalf of the Board, Professor Charles H. Hull, of Cornell University, assumed oversight of the project in Washington, and he and the present compiler, with some assistance from Professor Edward R. Turner, of the University of Michigan, and Professor Albert H. Lybyer, of the University of Illinois, had practically completed the work for the press by August, when the expected channel for publication proved unavailable.

The postponed date and the changed method of publication have made necessary an entire change in the organization of the work, in the extent of critical comment, and in the content of the list which had to be modified to permit the inclusion of later publications. Some titles have been omitted from the earlier list, and many new ones added. The critical notes on the older titles retained have in nearly every case been rewritten in much briefer form, so that judgments are more summary and less qualified and critical. So little has been left of the work in its earlier form that it is not just to place any responsibility upon any one except the present compiler, though he most heartily expresses his gratitude to the three persons mentioned, especially to Professor Hull, for the helpfulness of the work they did in making possible this publication, and for their fuller notes on some books which he has not himself had in hand.

As far as possible the compiler has made his notes directly from the books concerned, but it has not always been possible, especially for the more recent publications to inspect the book at first-hand. In such cases he has had to rely upon the consensus of available book reviews. In nearly all cases where the critical comment has been prepared with the book in hand, it has been checked with several published reviews to verify the general fairness and correctness of the estimate.

The purpose of the list is to include books on the causes, problems, and issues of the war, on the question of war and peace; and on the several countries, their conditions, problems, and relations.

The list omits, with only a few outstanding exceptions, periodicals and periodical articles; pamphlets, that is, volumes of less than one hundred pages; collections of illustrations and cartoons; official publications; technical or specialized works; memoirs,

diaries, and accounts of campaigns; histories of the war, unless valuable for inclusion of other than military material; poetry, literary appreciations, and philosophical speculations. No work is listed under more than one classification heading, though many relate to several topics. Usually such a book is listed under the heading to which its content or character mainly relates. No attempt has been made to include histories of the period before 1914, but a few of the most convenient ones have been mentioned because they furnish good brief accounts and adequate bibliographical guidance to their respective fields. Only books of unusual interest or value published earlier than 1914 are included, and no attempt has been made to include volumes issued since November, 1917, of which supplementary lists may, perhaps, be published from time to time.

The compiler will welcome, for use in a supplementary list, suggestion of any volume of such character and importance as should have entitled it to place in this list; and also corrections of any errors of material importance. Errors of oversight or of judgment are only too easy in such a compilation. Some titles are retained, though better works have appeared, because of the influence the books exercised in moulding public opinion.

The place of publication, unless otherwise indicated, is New York. Many of the publications are English, but in such cases the American importer and the American price are given, wherever known, instead of the English publisher and price. The prices quoted were the prices at publication. For many books published before 1917, the price has been increased from ten to twenty-five per cent. The prices are for the cheapest bound edition, except in case of a few pamphlets, and are in almost all cases net prices. All critical comments are conditioned by date of publication, the heading under which the title appears, and by the title itself.

Space forbids an alphabetical index, but under the several topics, the entries are alphabetically arranged, so that the presence of a particular title should be readily determined. An asterisk indicates a book of more than average value, or one of the better works available on the subject; a double asterisk indicates one of the most useful books, usually a book to be heartily commended. The bibliography contains about 700 titles, of which 144 are marked with a single asterisk and 25 with double asterisk. The latter group is listed at \$35.80, and the two selected groups together at \$346.75. Small libraries should possess the double asterisked books; good, larger libraries should contain at least the asterisked books as well.

EDITOR'S NOTE.—Supplementary bibliographies to the present one will be published from time to time in the "The History Teacher's Magazine."

1. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

*Lange, Frederick William Theodore, and Berry, W. T. *Books on the Great War, an Annotated Bibliography of Literature Issued During the European Conflict*. White Plains, N. Y., Wilson, 1915-16, vols. 1-4. \$4.50. First three volumes bound in one cover to July, 1915, the fourth to April, 1916. Arranged topically; thorough for books and pamphlets issued in England, with increasing attention in later parts to American and foreign publications. Good indexes, some annotations.

2. HANDBOOKS.

Davis, Muriel O. *The Great War and What It Means for Europe*. Oxford Press, 1915, p. vii, 110. \$40. Designed for English elementary schools.

Gibson, Charles R. *War Inventions and How They Were Invented*. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1917, p. 255. \$1. Clear information and explanation for general reader.

Magnus, Leonard A. *Pros and Cons in the Great War, a Record of Foreign Opinion, with a Register of Fact*. Dutton, 1917, p. viii, 396. \$2. A cyclopedic arrangement of quoted opinions on causes and phases of the war; convenient as handbook.

Scheip, Stanley S., and Bingham, Alfred, editors. *Handbook of the European War*. White Plains, N. Y., Wilson, vols. 1 and 2, 1914-16, p. x, 334; xi, 304. Each \$1. Conveniently arranged compilations, largely documentary. Second volume covers November, 1914, to November, 1915, and gives special attention to relations of United States to the war.

White, James William. *A Textbook of the War for Americans, Written and Compiled by an American, being the Fourth Edition of a Primer of the War for Americans, Revised and Enlarged*. Philadelphia, Winston, 1915, p. xiii, 551. \$1. Much documentary material compiled and abstracted in answer to twenty questions. Well indexed; useful compendium for speakers.

3. HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Allen, George Henry; Whitehead, Henry C., and Chadwick, French Ensor. *The Great War*. Philadelphia, Barrie, 1915-16, vols. 1-3, p. xxx, 377; xxii, 494; xx, 500. Each \$5. First volume deals with causes; second with outbreak of war, organization and strength of the military and naval forces, and financial resources of the contending powers; third with earlier campaigns. Full, clear account for general reader.

Arnoux, Anthony. *The European War*. Steiger, 1915 ff., each \$1.50. Third volume carries account to March, 1916; professedly neutral narrative.

Belloc, Hilaire. *Elements of the Great War; The First Phase (1915, p. 374); The Second Phase (1916, p. 382)*. Nelson. Each \$1.50. First volume sketches causes and outbreak of war, forces opposed, and invasion of Belgium and France; second is devoted to battle of the Marne. Sets forth clearly, often vividly, the movement of events; descriptions of strategic movements seem convincing to all except military experts.

Battine, Captain Cecil. *A Military History of the War from the Declaration of War to the Close of the Campaign of August, 1914*. London, Hodder, 1916, p. 307. 5s. Personal observations of Daily Telegraph correspondent supplemented by careful study. Account prefaced by study of strength and equipment of contending armies.

Buchan, John. *Nelson's History of the War*. Nelson, 1914 ff., volumes each \$60. Annalistic method; compiled largely from newspapers; documentary appendix in each

volume; many simple maps, chiefly of battles. Tends to become military history, but is consequently hampered by censorship. Volume 16 appeared in July, 1917.

Current History, *A Monthly Magazine of the New York Times*. 1914 ff. \$6 a year. Documents, special articles, illustrations and other material compiled in useful form, not a narrative history in proper sense. Seventh volume current at beginning of 1918.

Dillon, Emile Joseph. *England and Germany; with an Introduction by the Hon. W. M. Hughes, M.P., Prime Minister of Australia*. Brentano, 1915, p. xii, 312. \$3. Survey of European situation made at end of first year of war comprising international politics of the year and of preceding years as a whole under numerous topics. Indicts Germany; indicates lessons for England.

Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan. *History of the Great War*. Doran, 1916-17; vols. 1-2, p. xiii, 349; ix, 257. Each \$2. Careful, accurate, detailed record devoted chiefly to British participation and operations.

Gardiner, Alfred G. *The War Lords*. Dutton, 1915, p. viii, 319. \$2.50 (reprint, \$40). Editor of *London Daily News* writes pleasing sketches of prominent men and their relation to events of the war; in style of his earlier work, *Prophets, Priests, and Kings*.

Illustrated War News. London, 1914 ff. Pictures reprinted from *Illustrated London News* with explanatory text. Successive volumes cover four to six months.

Mumby, Frank A., editor. *The Great War*. London, Gresham, 1915 ff. Rather casual, illustrated account for British consumption. Volumes cover about two months each; fifteenth part issued in March, 1917.

Murray, Arthur Mordaunt. *The Fortnightly History of the War*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. 403. \$3. Collection of Colonel Murray's series of monthly contributions to *Fortnightly Review* from beginning of the war to July, 1916. Good survey of military events.

Simonds, Frank Herbert. *The Great War, the First Phase; the Second Phase*. Kennerley, 1914-15, 2 vols. p. 256; xi, 284. Each \$1.25. *They Shall Not Pass*. Garden City, Doubleday, 1916, p. viii, 142. \$1. First volume covered from assassination of archduke to fall of Antwerp; second concludes with second battle of Ypres; third describes French resistance at Verdun in 1916. First is little more than reprint of editorials in *New York Sun*; second is revised from articles in *Review of Reviews*, *New Republic*, etc.; third is reprint of five articles from *New York Tribune*. Based partly on personal observations. Author is recognized as probably foremost American critical writer on the war.

The Times Documentary History of the War. London, The Times, 1917 ff. Two volumes (p. 549, 583) of diplomatic and one (p. 534) of naval documents have been issued with brief explanatory, not argumentative notes.

The Times History of the War. London, The Times, 1914 ff. Weekly parts issued since September, 1914; fourteen volumes have appeared; a compilation of information and pictures rather than a history.

4. FORECASTS OF THE WAR.

Chesney, Sir George Tomkyns. *The Battle of Dorking, being an Account of the German Invasion of England, with the Occupation of London and the Fall of the British Empire*. London, Richards, 1914. 6d. First published, 1871.

Delaisi, Francis. *The Inevitable War*. Boston, Small, 1915, p. 120. \$1. Translation of *La Guerre Qui Vient* (Paris, 1911); interesting on social and economic matters.

Ford, Edward, and Home, Gordon Cochrane. *England Invaded*. Macmillan, 1913, p. xii, 371. \$2. Forecasts German invasion. Compare contemporary English play, *An Englishman's Home*.

The Great War of 189—, a Forecast. London, Heinemann, 1893; 2d ed., 1895. 6s. Co-operative work by leading English military writers.

*Sarolea, Charles. *The Anglo-German Problem*. American edition with new introduction. Putnam, 1915, p. xx, 288. \$1. First printed in England, December, 1912. Remarkable discussion of Anglo-German relations and forecast of the war and its issues. Author, a Belgian professor at Edinburgh.

A Second Franco-German War and Its Consequences for England. London, Simpkin, 1907, p. 154. 1s. Includes German invasion of Belgium.

5. THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR.

Adkins, Frank James. *Historical Backgrounds of the Great War, the War, its Origins and Warnings*. McBride, 1915, p. 227. \$1. Informative lectures delivered in England shortly after outbreak of war, on Germany, France, the Slavs, and England and Sea Power. Clear outline of situation which produced the war. Within the comprehension of young readers.

Barclay, Sir Thomas. *Thirty Years, Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906*. Boston, Houghton, 1914, p. viii, 389. \$3.50. Detached jottings of an Englishman long resident in Paris, which throw some light on Fashoda affair and formation of Anglo-French entente in 1904.

Barry, William. *The World's Debate, an Historical Defence of the Allies*. Doran, 1917. \$1.25. Hodge-podge of facts from modern history against absolutism and favoring democracy; hence favoring France and England against Germany.

Bevan, Edwyn Robert. *Method in the Madness, a Fresh Consideration of the Case between Germany and Ourselves*. Longmans, 1917, p. vii, 309. \$1.50. An Englishman's attempt at a judicial statement of case between England and Germany, rather England's case against Germany.

Beveridge, Albert Jeremiah. *What is Back of the War*. Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1915, p. 430. \$2. Journalistic observations in Germany, France, and England, chiefly important for reports of conversations with leaders of public opinion. Misuse of this quoted material by pro-Germans discredited the book, which is really blissfully impartial.

**Bullard, Arthur. *The Diplomacy of the Great War*. Macmillan, 1916, p. xii, 344. \$1.50. American journalist surveys events since 1878, discusses new elements in diplomacy, problems of the war, and relations of United States and Europe. Style sprightly; views advanced, but not out of touch with realities. One of best all-around books.

The Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 12, The Latest Age. Macmillan, 1910, p. xxxiv, 1033. \$4. Helpful surveys of developments in several nations, but fails to treat adequately international affairs. Chapters on extra-European matters are particularly useful. To be consulted for information, rather than read for enlightenment.

Cook, Sir Edward Tyas. *Britain and Turkey, the Causes of the Rupture Set Out in Brief Form from the Diplomatic Correspondence (p. 31, \$10). How Britain Strove for Peace, a Record of Anglo-German Negotiations, 1898-1914 (p. 40, \$20). Why Britain is at War, the Causes and the Issues Set out in Brief Form from the Diplomatic Correspondence and Speeches of Ministers (p. 24, \$10)*. Macmillan, 1914. Three pamphlets widely circulated in early days of the war.

*Coolidge, Archibald Cary. *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*. Scribner, 1917, p. vi, 236. \$1.25. These three lectures by Professor Coolidge of Harvard are the best account of the subject; clear, scholarly, and impartial.

**Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. *The European Anarchy*. Macmillan, 1916, p. 144. \$1. Not a narrative but an essay of only 30,000 words on forces which produced the war. Blame rests not upon one nation alone, but upon the anarchy in which European nations struggled without common law. Notable book, and by far best brief discussion of underlying causes of the war.

Fullerton, William Morton. *Problems of Power*. Scribner, 1913, second, revised edition, 1915, p. xxiv, 390. \$2.25. Former newspaper correspondent discusses international problems from Sedan to Agadir with great cleverness, but assumes such familiarity with the facts, that few readers will find themselves sufficiently equipped to peruse it intelligently.

**Gibbons, Herbert Adams. *The New Map of Europe, 1911-1914, the Story of the Recent European Diplomatic Crises and Wars and of Europe's Present Catastrophe*. Century, 1914, p. xi, 412. \$2. Well written account of events of four years preceding the war, by American especially familiar with Balkan affairs. Clear, informing, generally reliable and fair, though inclinations are anti-German. Minor changes in later editions.

**Guyot, Yves. *The Causes and Consequences of the War*; translated by F. A. Holt. Brentano, 1916, p. xxxvi, 359. \$3. One of ablest French authorities discusses political, economic, and historical causes of the war, and its probable consequences. Original is probably best all-around book in French.

Hart, Albert Bushnell. *The War in Europe, its Causes and Results*. Appleton, 1914, p. ix, 254. \$1. Hurried compilation published in October, 1914, for American general reader; superseded by later works.

Hayes, Carlton Joseph Huntley. *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*. Macmillan, 1916, vol. 1, p. xvi, 582, \$2; vol. 2, p. xii, 726, \$2.25. First volume summarizes three centuries ending 1815; second volume treats more fully the century since with special attention to economic and social factors and the antecedents of the war. Readable and generally reliable.

Hazen, Charles Downer. *Modern European History*. Holt, 1917, p. xiv, 650. \$1.75. Condensed from his *French Revolution and Napoleon and his Europe since 1815*. Admirable brief survey since 1789.

*Holt, Lucius Hudson, and Chilton, Alexander Wheeler. *The History of Europe from 1862 to 1914, from the Accession of Bismark to the Outbreak of the Great War*. Macmillan, 1917, p. xv, 611. \$2.60. By professors of history at West Point; deals mainly with diplomatic and military events; with considerable quotations from primary sources; clear, vigorous style; excellent maps.

Hovelaque, Emile. *The Deeper Causes of the War, with an Introduction by Sir Walter Raleigh*. Dutton, 1916, p. 158. \$1.25. Vehement and able indictment of Germany's theories of race, the state, and war, and of her application of them in her policy toward England.

Lipson, Ephraim. *Europe in the Nineteenth Century, an Outline History*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 298. \$2. Neglects international affairs except as leading to the war. Best chapters on internal affairs of leading countries, especially prior to 1870. Treatment unusual and uneven.

Morel, Edmund Deville. *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, an Unheeded Warning, Being a Reprint of Morocco in Diplomacy*. London, National Labour Press, 1915, p. xxix

198. 2s. Reprint of 1912 original with slight changes and omission of appendix of documents. New prefaces added, especially to third edition of reprint. Bitter indictment of whole Morocco affair and of Sir Edward Grey.

Morris, Charles, and Dawson, Lawrence H. *Why the Nations Are at War, the Causes and Issues of the Great Conflict.* London, Harrap, 1915, p. 414. 5s. A British survey of 19th century history as antecedent to the war.

Muir, Ramsay. *Britain's Case against Germany, an Examination of the Historical Background of the German Action in 1914.* Longmans, 1914, p. ix, 196. \$1. Study of German political theories in action in last generation; argues that Germany had long intended and prepared for the war.

*Muir, Ramsay. *The Expansion of Europe, the Culmination of Modern History.* Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. xii, 243. \$2. An historical survey of modern imperialism, with an attempt to appraise the achievements of the several colonizing powers. Glorifies England. Part on last forty years inferior.

Why We Are at War, Great Britain's Case, by Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History. Oxford Press, 1914, third edition, p. 264. \$85. First effort of English historians to explain situation; widely circulated; rather well done, in circumstances; but now valuable as evidence of state of mind following outbreak of war. Appendixes contain documents.

Rose, John Holland. *The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900.* Putnam, 1905, 2 vols., p. xi, 376; v, 363; fifth edition, 1914, p. xvii, 376, 410. \$2.75. Devoted mainly to international relations of the period; with additional chapters in later editions. Gives little attention to some forces that would now command attention in a history of the period.

Rose, John Holland. *The Origins of the War, 1871-1914.* Putnam, 1915, p. 201. \$1. Hastily prepared by competent English scholar; was one of best books available in first year of the war. Written with emphasis on Germany and with strong convictions against Germany, but with tone of fairness.

*Schmitt, Bernadotte Everly. *England and Germany, 1740-1914.* Princeton University Press, 1916, p. ix, 524. \$2. Period prior to 1904 treated in series of topical chapters; decade, 1904-1914, is given thorough chronological treatment; outbreak of war is covered by use of colored books. Written before the war, rewritten and enlarged after war started. Places responsibility clearly on Germany. Well written, one of most useful books.

**Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War.* New Haven, Yale Press, 1916, p. xv, 311. \$2. Admirable, concise, scholarly survey of events since 1871, furnishing adequate background for understanding the war and its issues. Written clearly, without passion, but gives verdict explicitly against Germany. Best book available for background of the war.

*Tardieu, André. *France and the Alliances, the Struggle for the Balance of Power.* Macmillan, 1908, p. x, 314. \$1.50. Most useful account of international situation in 1904-7, covering Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian agreements and first Moroccan crisis. Author is recognized authority on international questions and is at present French High Commissioner in United States.

Whitman, Sidney. *Things I Remember, Recollections of a Political Writer in the Capitals of Europe.* New York, Stokes, 1917, p. viii, 268. \$2.50. Reminiscences of a European correspondent of New York Herald covering events of last quarter-century, especially Balkan and German affairs and problems. Good.

6. THE DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE.

Andriulli, Giuseppe A., editor. *Documents relating to the Great War; with an Introduction by Guglielmo Ferrero,* translated by Thomas Okey. London, Unwin, 1915, p. 128. 1s. Brief selection supporting Ferrero's conclusion that Germany decided for war, July 29, 1914.

Baldwin, Elbert Francis. *The World War, How It Looks to the Nations Involved.* Macmillan, 1914, p. vii, 267. \$1.25. Judicial, impartial effort soon after opening of hostilities to summarize immediate causes and portray conditions and states of mind in several European countries.

Beck, James Montgomery. *The Evidence in the Case, in the Supreme Court of Civilization, as to the Moral Responsibility for the War.* Putnam, 1914, p. 200. \$1. Revised edition, 1915. *The War and Humanity, a Further Discussion of the Ethics of the World War and the Attitude and Duty of the United States.* Putnam, 1916, p. xi, 322. \$1.50. The first is not so much a judicial statement as a prosecutor's plea for conviction of Germany. Widely distributed but to be used only when more thorough and dispassionate works are not available. The second deals in same manner with episodes such as submarine controversy, case of Miss Cavell, and relations of America with Allies.

**Chitwood, Oliver Perry. *The Immediate Causes of the Great War.* Crowell, 1917, p. xii, 196. \$1.35. By professor in University of West Virginia. Impartial narrative of events from the assassination of the Archduke to Italy's declaration of war, based on the published official documents.

Davenport, Briggs. *A History of the Great War, 1914—, Vol. I. The Genesis of the War, June, 1914, to August, 1915.* Putnam, 1916, p. viii, 545. \$2. Clear, simple, but uncritical; commends itself to those for whom better books are too complex and heavy. Also useful for account of entrance of Italy and Bulgaria into the war.

Dillon, Emile Joseph. *A Scrap of Paper, the Inner History of German Diplomacy and her Scheme of Worldwide Conquest.* Doran, 1914, third edition, p. xxvii, 220. \$50. Summary account of the events which precipitated war, by well-known English authority on international affairs. Widely circulated in early months of war but now replaced by later works.

Ferrero, Guglielmo. *Who Wanted the European War?* Translated by P. E. Matheson. Oxford Press, 1915, p. 39. \$25. Interpretation of events of diplomatic rupture based on the colored books by leading Italian historian.

Great Britain, Foreign Office. *Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War.* Doran, 1915, p. xix, 561. \$1. Contains British Diplomatic Correspondence, French Yellow Book, Russian Orange Book, Belgian Gray Book, Serbian Blue Book, German White Book, Austro-Hungarian Red Book, and some supplementary documents, with explanatory introduction and index, but no comparative chronological table. Confined mainly to last days of July and early days of August, 1914.

*Headlam, James Wycliffe. *The History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 4th, 1914, being an Account of the Negotiations Preceding the Outbreak of War, Based on the Official Publications.* Scribner, 1915, p. xxiv, 412. \$3. The English historical writer has based his account with assiduous care upon official documents and utterances. Tone restrained, dispassionate, and fair, but obviously not absolutely impartial. Style not popular, but clear, direct, and closely reasoned. Best account of diplomatic rupture in English.

Headlam, James Wycliffe. *The German Chancellor and the Outbreak of War.* London, Unwin, 1917, p. 127. 3s. 6d.

Supplements his *History of Twelve Days* by more detailed study of events of July 29-30, 1914, based on further information, to refute the Chancellor's charges placing responsibility on Russia and England for German mobilization and hence for the war.

Kennedy, John McFarland. *How the War Began, with an Introduction by W. L. Courtney.* Doran, 1914, p. xxvii, 187. \$50. *How the Nations Waged War.* Doran, 1915, p. 190. \$50. First is hasty compilation by English publicist on period from June 28 to August 4, 1914. Further official documents published a few days after its appearance made it out of date. The second volume deals with first weeks of war.

Mach, Edmund Robert Otto von, editor. *Official Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War, with Photographic Reproductions of Official Editions of the Documents Published by the Governments of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Serbia.* Introduction, Daily Summaries, Cross-References, and Footnotes. Macmillan, 1916, p. xxii, 608. \$6. Criticism of the inaccuracies and misleading nature of editorial portion of volume led publishers to withdraw it. It is, however, a convenient compilation, and the chronological arrangement is particularly handy.

Parker, Sir Gilbert. *The World in the Crucible, an Account of the Origins and Conduct of the Great War.* Dodd, 1915, p. viii, 422. \$1.50. Space divided about equally between antecedents of the war, rupture of relations, and early weeks of war. Well-written, compendious and fairly reliable account.

*Scott, James Brown, editor. *Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War.* Oxford Press, 1916, 2 vols., p. lxxxii, xcii, 1516. \$5. Careful reprints of official English translations of Austro-Hungarian, Belgian, French, German, Russian, Serbian, British, and Italian "colored" books of documents relating to outbreak of war, with tables of contents and introduction. Most complete collection now available.

*Stowell, Ellery Cory. *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, Vol. I. The Beginnings of the War.* Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xvii, 728. \$5. Opens with forty page sketch of history of thirty years prior to the war and closes with appendix of 130 pages of documents. Rest of book is analytical study of documents and exposition of acts, events, rights, and motives. Chapters are topical in character and arranged in order of events. Author, who is assistant professor of international law in Columbia University, concludes "Germany has clearly violated international law." Most exhaustive American account of the *Twelve Days* and ranks with Headlam.

7. POLEMICS: ENGLAND VS. GERMANY.

Angell, Norman (pseud. of Ralph Norman Angell Lane). *Prussianism and its Destruction.* London, Heinemann, 1914, p. xiv, 248. \$1.25. Denounces militarism in his former style, but identifies it with Prussianism which must be fought and destroyed.

Chesterton, Gilbert Keith. *The Crimes of England.* Lane, 1916, p. 173. \$1. The crimes are the failures to arrest growth of Prussian militarism and spread of German ideas, each of which is discussed in author's usual manner.

Harris, Frank. *England or Germany?* Wilmarth, 1915, third edition, p. 187. \$1. American resident in England avows Celtic and revolutionary sympathies and indulges in fantastic diatribe against England.

Harrison, Frederic. *The German Peril: Forecasts, 1864-1914; Realities, 1915; Hopes, 191—.* London, Unwin, 1915,

p. 300. 5s. Collection of author's pronouncements against Germany. Claims to be "the oldest and most persistent" anti-German prophet.

Powys, John Cowper. *The War and Culture, a Reply to Professor Münsterberg.* Shaw, 1914, p. 103. \$60. English edition: *The Menace of German Culture.* Author was formerly in Education Department of city of Hamburg. Pointed, detailed, destructive criticism; constructive criticism also appears.

Sladen, Douglas Brooke Wheaton. *The Real Truth about Germany, Facts about the War, an Analysis and a Refutation from the English Point of View of the Pamphlet, The Truth about Germany, issued under the Authority of Representative German Citizens, with an Appendix on Great Britain and the War, by A. Maurice Low.* Putnam, 1914 p. xiii, 272. \$1. English edition entitled *Germany's Great Lie.* Answers arranged point by point are, like the original, assertions rather than proofs.

Stilwell, Arthur Edward. *To All the World (except Germany).* London, Allen & Unwin, 1915, p. 251. 3s. 6d. An incongruity of belligerent pacifism and anti-Germanism dedicated to King Albert and Henry Ford.

8. THE WARRING NATIONS.

Herrick, Robert. *The World Decision.* Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. 253. \$1.25. Six chapters on observations in Italy in spring of 1915, six more chapters on observations in France in ensuing summer, and three chapters on relations of United States to the war. Importance of volume lies in its revelation of the morale of the several contending nations and its reflections on moral issues at stake.

Jones, Jenkin Lloyd. *Love for the Battle-torn Peoples.* Chicago, Unity Pub. Co., 1917, p. 166. \$75. Series of popular sermons on the admirable traits of the conflicting peoples and a plea for human brotherhood.

Low, Sidney James Mark, editor. *The Spirit of the Allied Nations.* Macmillan, 1915, p. 214. \$1. Series of lectures by competent authorities on the several Allied nations, arranged by Imperial Studies Committee of University of London.

McCabe, Joseph. *The Soul of Europe, a Character Study of the Militant Nations.* Dodd, 1915, p. vi, 407. \$3. Informative book to explain their Allies to English readers.

Nyrop, Christopher. *Is War Civilization?* translated by H. G. Wright. Dodd, 1917, p. 256. \$1.25. Not abstract discussion but collection of articles by Copenhagen professor on the war, especially on Belgium, Italy, languages and war, and religion and war.

Orth, Samuel Peter. *The Imperial Impulse, Background Studies of Belgium, England, France, Germany, Russia.* Century, 1916, p. 234. \$1.20. Collection of interesting and informing magazine articles. An additional essay on *Our First Duty* urges United States to uphold principle that "every people with national instincts" be allowed to determine its own government.

*Powers, Harry Huntington. *The Things Men Fight For, with Some Application to Present Conditions in Europe.* Macmillan, 1916, p. vii, 382. \$1.50. Thoughtful candid book based on wide travel, broad knowledge, and generous sympathies. Seeks to present case of each contending nation as manifesting the highest instincts of that nation. Concluding chapter gives carefully weighed decision in favor of Britain rather than Germany.

Stoddard, Theodore Lothrop. *Present Day Europe, its National States of Mind.* Century, 1917, p. 322. \$2. A study

of the war psychology of the various European nations, based as far as possible upon the utterances of representatives of the respective nations. Quite neutral, and uses material down to opening of 1917.

Wells, Herbert George. Italy, France, and Britain at War. Macmillan, 1917, p. 285. \$1.50. Accounts of his visit to Italian and western fronts in 1916, with added section on "How People Think About the War." Chiefly interesting for those who care to know what Mr. Wells thinks.

9. VIEWS OF THE WAR BY EUROPEAN NEUTRALS.

*Brandes, Georg Morris Cohen. The World at War; translated by Catherine D. Groth. Macmillan, 1917, p. 272. \$1.50. The famous Danish-Jewish writer, without sympathy for Germany, deals rigorously with Allied aims and acts, and urges rights of small, oppressed, and neutral nations. Collection of articles including some of special interest written before the war.

Jørgensen, Johannes. False Witness. Doran, 1917, p. vii, 227. \$1. Translation of the Danish author's *Klokke Roland*, which is an examination of the German professors' "Appeal to the Civilized World." Evidence of the falsity of their statements is adduced and other material on the German character and kultur is included.

Maccas, Leon. German Barbarism, a Neutral's Indictment, with preface by Paul Girard. Doran, 1916, p. xii, 228. \$1. By a Venizelist Greek.

Prüm, Emile. Pan-Germanism versus Christendom; the Conversion of a Neutral; edited with comments by René Johannet. Doran, 1917, p. xii, 184. \$1. Letter of Prüm, Catholic leader in Luxemburg to Erzberger, Catholic leader in Germany; record of proceedings against Prüm, and an article on the Catholic Center in Germany. Convincingly anti-German.

10. GREAT BRITAIN: DESCRIPTION, HISTORY, POLICY.

*Barker, J. Ellis. Great and Greater Britain, the Problems of Motherland and Empire, Political, Naval, Military, Industrial, Financial, Social. London, Smith, Elder, 1909, 2d edition, 1910, p. 604. \$3. Counterpart of his *Modern Germany*, and supplemented by his *British Socialism*. An avowed disciple of Joseph Chamberlain describes essential matters of domestic and imperial concern in decade preceding the war.

Begbie, Harold. The Vindication of Great Britain, a Study in Diplomacy and Strategy with Reference to the Illusions of her Critics and the Problems of the Future. London, Methuen, 1916, 3d edition, p. xv, 302. 6s. Particularly valuable for work and influence of Edward VII and Lord Haldane. Lauds English achievement in arming against Germany during first two years of the war. Peace problems discussed.

*Boutmy, Emile. The English People, a Study of their Political Psychology, with an Introduction by J. E. C. Bodley. Putnam, 1904, p. xxxvi, 332. \$2.50. Author was leading French authority in political science in last generation, and one of most eminent foreign students of English constitution and people. French original published in 1901. Accurate in fact, sane in judgment, keen in analysis, bristling with illuminating ideas.

Cheyney, Edward Potts. A Short History of England. Boston, Ginn, 1904, p. xvi, 695. \$1.40. Excellent textbook, briefer and more readable than Cross.

*Cramb, John Adam. Germany and England, with an Introduction by the Hon. Joseph H. Choate. Dutton, 1914,

p. xiv, 152. \$1. Professor Cramb's lectures were delivered at Queen's College, London, February-March, 1913, and after his death written up from notes and published, June, 1914. Author's study in Germany had convinced him of German bitterness against England and inevitableness of conflict. Book holds historic place because most widely read book in English during first months of war. Note also author's *Origin and Destiny of Imperial Britain and Nineteenth Century Europe* (Dutton, 1915), first published during Boer war, for fuller statement of chauvinistic English imperialism.

Cross, Arthur Lyon. A History of England and Greater Britain. Macmillan, 1914, p. xiii, 1165. \$2.50. Excellent comprehensive account to spring of 1914, written as college text.

Dunning, William Archibald. The British Empire and the United States, a Review of their Relations during the Century of Peace following the Treaty of Ghent. Scribner, 1914, p. xl, 381. \$2. Well written narrative by able American historical scholar.

*Egerton, Hugh Edward. British Foreign Policy in Europe to the End of the Nineteenth Century, a Rough Outline. Macmillan, 1917, p. x, 440. \$2. Not a narrative but an effort to show the motives and purposes which have directed British foreign policy, largely in the words of the responsible individuals in promoting or defending their plans and acts. Holds that "policy of the country on the whole has been singularly honest and straightforward;" and such is tone of the book. By professor of colonial history, Oxford.

Gooch, George Peabody and Masterman, John Howard Bertram. A Century of British Foreign Policy. London, Allen & Unwin, 1917, p. 110. Written for the Council for the Study of International Relations; Masterman deals with 19th century; Gooch, with 20th century. Two clear, concise, excellent essays.

*Low, Sidney James Mark, and Sanders, Lloyd Charles. The History of England during the Reign of Victoria, 1837-1901. Longmans, 1907, p. xviii, 532. \$2.60. Best account of period, though little more than narrative of political facts.

*Lowell, Abbott Lawrence. The Government of England. Macmillan, 1908, 2 vols., p. xv, 570; viii, 563. \$4. Admirable description of the organization and working of English government, local, national, and imperial.

Marriott, John Arthur Ransome. England since Waterloo. Putnam, 1913, p. xxi, 558. \$3. Careful accurate account to 1885, with sketchy chapter to 1901.

Meyer, Eduard. England, its Political Organization and Development and the War Against Germany. Translated by Helene S. White. Boston, Ritter, 1916, p. xix, 328. \$1.50. Arraignment of England and English policy by eminent Berlin professor of history, so vehement as to be condemned by German critics. Valuable, however, as presenting essentially the German view of England.

Murray, Gilbert. The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1915. Oxford Press, 1915, p. 128. 50 cents. Good survey and thorough-going defence by eminent Oxford professor whose views were less favorable before the war.

Reventlow, Ernest, Graf zu. The Vampire of the Continent; translated with a Preface by G. Chatterton Hill. Jackson, 1916, p. xiii, 225. \$1.25. Original published in 1915. Author is spokesman of extreme Junker group. Denounces England's desire to maintain balance of power and destroy economic rivals as cause of present and earlier great wars which have sucked the blood of Continental Europe.

Author's more substantial work, *Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888-1913* (1914), is not available in translation.

*Seeley, Sir John Robert. The Expansion of England, Two Courses of Lectures. Boston, Little, p. viii, 359. \$1.75. Originally published, 1883. First course, English expansion in 17th and 18th centuries; second, England's acquisition and control of India. Brilliant and convincing presentation of achievements and high aims of British imperial policy. Seeley's position in history of English imperialism has been compared to Treitschke's in Pan-Germanism.

Tönnies, Ferdinand. Warlike England as Seen by Herself. Dillingham, 1915, p. 202. \$1. Account of English foreign and colonial policy since Elizabeth, especially in nineteenth century, by Professor in University of Kiel, composed largely of quotations from English writers. Shows existence of English imperialism, but does not prove causal relation with the war.

11. GREAT BRITAIN: ARMY AND NAVY, PREPAREDNESS.

Lea, General Homer. The Day of the Saxon. Harper, 1912, p. 249. \$1.80. This and his earlier *Valour of Ignorance* (1909) attracted wide attention by their extreme advocacy of Lord Roberts' efforts to impress the English people with the importance of England's empire and sea power and of their defence. Faulty in fact and logic, though events have justified the main thesis.

MacDonald, J. Ramsay. National Defense. London, Allen & Unwin, 1917. 2s. 6d. Denounces militarism as a false method of national defense; foresees that defeat of Germany will not be likely to create a pacific German democracy.

*Oliver, Frederick Scott. Ordeal by Battle. Macmillan, 1915, p. li, 437. \$1.50. One of most notable English war books, important for insight into English state of mind on foreign and military questions in decade before the war. The author belonged to the Lord Roberts school, and wrote much of book before the war, publishing it to promote conscription. After good analysis of causes of the war and spirit of German policy, the real contribution of the book appears in parts on spirit of British policy and democracy and national service.

Protheroe, Ernest. The British Navy, its Making and its Meaning. Dutton, 1915, p. xx, 694. \$2.50. Comprehensive historical and technical account addressed to British youth. Includes chapter on early naval events of the war.

Roland, pseud. The Future of Militarism. London, Unwin, 1916. 2s. 6d. Not an independent discussion but a denunciation of Oliver's *Ordeal by Battle*.

12. GREAT BRITAIN'S PART IN THE WAR.

**Chevillon, André. England and the War, 1914-1915; with a Preface by Rudyard Kipling. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1917, p. xxi, 250. \$1.60. Translation of articles contributed to *Revue de Paris* from Nov., 1915, to Jan., 1916, by nephew of Taine, who was keen observer in England of awakening and reconstruction during the first year and a half of the war. Traces conception and development of England's will to war in way to enlighten Americans when their nation is undergoing somewhat similar transition.

Cravath, Paul Drennan. Great Britain's Part, Observations of an American Visitor to the British Army in France at the Beginning of the Third Year of the War. Appleton, 1917, p. vi, 127. \$1. Convinced of greatness of England's achievement and that it will win.

Destrée, Jules. Britain in Arms. Lane, 1917, p. xv, 292. \$1.50. Translation by J. Lewis May of *L'Effort Britannique*, with preface by M. Georges Clemenceau. Originally written in Italian to dispel the Italian suspicion that England was not doing its share. Explains military, naval, industrial and financial activities. By a Belgian.

George, David Lloyd. Through Terror to Triumph, Speeches and Pronouncements since the Beginning of the War, arranged by F. L. Stevenson. Doran, 1915, p. xii, 187. \$1. Important for speeches intended to sway public opinion, especially in case of munition workers.

Gleason, Arthur Huntington. Inside the British Isles. Century, 1917, p. 434. \$2. Main topics treated are labor, Ireland, women, and social studies. Attaches great importance to changes wrought during the war. Somewhat superficial observations and hasty generalizations of clever American journalist.

Grew, Edwin Sharpe, and others. Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, his Life and Work for the Empire. London, Gresham Publishing Co., 1916, 3 vols. 25s. 6d. Careful co-operative biography but not a definitive study. Third volume relates to present war. Fashoda incident opens second volume.

*Murray, Gilbert. Faith, War and Policy. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. xiv, 255. \$1.25. Collection of articles and addresses during the war, in exposition and defence of England's part and policies. Able but open to criticism.

Pollard, Albert Frederick. The Commonwealth at War. Longmans, 1917, p. vii, 256. \$2.25. Collection of nineteen occasional articles during the war by professor of history, University College, London.

Ward, Mary Augusta (Arnold) (Mrs. Humphrey Ward). England's Effort, Letters to an American Friend, with Preface by Joseph H. Choate; 3d edition with epilogue to August, 1916. Scribner, 1916, p. xv, 228. \$1. The author was given special privileges to inspect British military forces, munition works, etc., with purpose of answering criticism that Great Britain was not doing its share.

Ward, Mary Augusta (Arnold) (Mrs. Humphrey Ward). Towards the Goal. Scribner, 1917, p. xvii, 231. \$1.25. Series of letters addressed to Mr. Roosevelt in March to June, 1917, describing England's war aims and activities. Practically a sequel to England's Effort.

13. IRELAND.

Barker, Ernest. Ireland in the Last Fifty Years, 1866-1916. Oxford Press, 1917. 1s. 6d. Good account of political, religious, educational, and agrarian problems, especially useful for condition of peasant class.

Hamilton, Lord Ernest William. The Soul of Ulster. Dutton, 1917, p. 188. \$1.25. Able statement of the Ulster side of the Irish question.

Harrison, Marie. Dawn in Ireland. London, Melrose, 1917, p. 222. Chapters on present conditions, the spirit that moves in Ireland, enemies of Ireland, and the future. Insists on English goodwill toward Ireland.

The Irish Home-Rule Convention. Macmillan, 1917, p. 183. 50 cents. Timely papers by John Quinn, G. W. Russell, Sir Horace Plunkett and others.

Kettle, Thomas Michael. The Ways of War, with a Memoir by his Wife, Mary S. Kettle. Scribner, 1918, p. ix, 246. \$1.50. Papers by Irish professor and member of parliament who has perished in the war, to show why an Irishman went into the fight. Strong indictment of Germany.

Leslie, Shane. *The Celt and the World, a Study of the Relation of Celt and Teuton in History*. Scribner, 1917, p. 224. \$1.25. Interesting volume which slights the main theme of relation of Celt and Teuton to discuss Anglo-Irish relations and the war.

Morris, Lloyd R. *The Celtic Dawn, a Survey of the Renaissance in Ireland, 1889-1916*. Macmillan, 1917, p. xviii, 251. \$1.50. Review of political, social, economic, and cultural developments in Ireland in last generation to the Sinn Fein rebellion in 1916.

Russell, George William (pseud. A. E.). *National Being, Some Thoughts on an Irish Polity*. Macmillan, 1916, p. 176. \$1.35. Ireland must seek political independence through economic independence, which is to be attained by co-operative rather than competitive methods. Admirable in style and tone, even if not entirely convincing.

Wells, Warre B., and Marlow, N. *The History of the Irish Rebellion of 1916*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. 271. \$2.50. Comprehensive, though not friendly account, with documents.

14. BRITISH EMPIRE: FUTURE PROBLEMS AND POLICIES.

**Beer, George Louis. *The English-speaking Peoples, their Future Relations and Joint International Obligations*. Macmillan, 1917, p. xi, 322. \$1.50. By an able historian of the British colonies in America. Excellent discussion of the international problems which America faces; favors co-operative arrangements between United States and Great Britain. Very important and valuable. Abundant references to authorities.

Dawson, William Harbutt, editor. *After-war Problems*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 366. \$2.50. Includes papers on the topics Empire and Citizenship, National Efficiency, Social Reform, and National Finance and Taxation by Lord Cromer, Lord Haldane and several other leading English thinkers, which command attention.

Duchesne, A. E. *Democracy and Empire, the Applicability of the Dictum that "a democracy cannot manage an empire," to the Present Condition and Future Problems of the British Empire, especially the Question of the Future of India*. Oxford Press, 1916, p. vii, 120. 2s. 6d.

*The Empire and the Future, a Series of Imperial Studies. Macmillan, 1917, p. xvi, 110. 75 cents. Collection of lectures, including Sir Charles Lucas on Empire and Democracy, H. A. L. Fisher on Imperial Administration, and Philip Kerr on Commonwealth and Empire. Able discussions of problems underlying British imperial organization; not a solution. Introduction by A. D. Steel-Maitland, Under Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Fletcher, Charles Brunson. *The New Pacific: British Policy and German Aims; with a preface by Viscount Bryce, and a foreword by the Right Hon. W. M. Hughes*. Macmillan, 1917, p. xxxiii, 325. \$3. One of editors of Sydney Morning Herald arraigns German policies and methods in the Pacific, and sets forth Australian ideas for future of the Pacific.

Hodge, Harold. *In the Wake of the War; Parliament or Imperial Government?* Lane, 1917, p. viii, 226. \$1.50. Propounds a plan for the future administration of the British Empire. Disapproves of parliament.

Levi, N. *Jan Smuts, being a Character Sketch of Gen. the Hon. J. C. Smuts, K.C., M.L.A., Minister of Defence, Union of South Africa*. Longmans, 1917, p. vi, 310. \$2.50. Poorly written account of important personage in British Empire, with much interesting information on South African affairs.

McLaren, A. D. *Peaceful Penetration*. Dutton, 1917, p. 224. \$1.50. Australian journalist, familiar with Germany, writes on German colonizing methods and policies, and on Australia's place in world politics.

Smuts, Jan Christiaan. *War-time Speeches, a Compilation of Public Utterances in Great Britain*. Doran, 1917, p. viii, 116. 75 cents. Chiefly important for discussion of future of what he has named the British Commonwealth.

Worsfold, W. Basil. *The Empire on the Anvil, being Suggestions and Data for the Future Government of the British Empire*. London, Smith, Elder, 1916, p. xv, 242.

Wise, Bernhard Ringrose. *The Making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1889-1900, a Stage in the Growth of Empire*. Longmans, 1913, p. xiii, 365. \$2.50. With special reference to New South Wales, by a participant in the movement. A study of growth of federation in British Empire.

15. BELGIUM: HISTORY, DESCRIPTION.

Ensor, Robert Charles Kirkwood. *Belgium (Home University Library)*. Holt, 1915, p. v, 256. \$.50. Concise survey of recent history and conditions before the war. Generally accurate and fair, except, perhaps, to Catholic church.

*MacDonnell, John de Courcy. *Belgium, her Kings, Kingdom, and People*. Boston, Little, 1914, p. xii, 354. \$3.60. Good historical survey since establishment of independence in 1830, with account of conditions under King Albert. Published on eve of the war. Written with fairness and moderation; apparently Catholic in sympathies.

Pirenne, Henri. *Belgian Democracy, its Early History*; translated by J. V. Saunders. Longmans, 1915, p. xi, 250. \$1.50. Original published in 1910. Mainly account of medieval city republics of the Low Countries, by leading Belgian historian.

Van der Essen, Léon. *Short History of Belgium*. Chicago, University Press, 1916, p. 168. \$1. Good outline account by professor of history at Louvain.

16. BELGIUM: GERMAN INVASION AND RULE.

Belgium and Germany, Texts and Documents, preceded by a Foreword by Henri Davignon. Nelson, 1915, p. iv, 132. \$2.5. Documents and illustrations, with annotations. Preface by Belgian foreign minister.

Bryce, James Bryce, Viscount, and others. *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages (p. 61. \$10). Evidence and Documents Laid before the Committee on Alleged German Outrages (p. 296. \$50)*. Macmillan, 1915. Report is an attempt at a systematic summary of evidence. Membership of committee also gives its conclusions the highest standing.

Cammaerts, Emile. *Through the Iron Bars (Two Years of German Occupation in Belgium)*. Lane, 1917, p. 72. \$.75. Patriotic presentation of Belgium's plight.

The Case of Belgium in the Present War, an Account of the Violation of the Neutrality of Belgium and of the Laws of War on Belgian Territory. Macmillan, 1914, p. xvii, 120. \$2.5. Officially prepared by the Belgian delegates in the United States, with official documents and affidavits.

Chambry, René. *The Truth about Louvain*. Doran, 1915, p. 95. \$.25. By resident of Louvain.

*Erichsen, Erich. *Forced to Fight, the Tale of a Schleswig Dane, translated from the Danish*. McBride, 1917, p. 184. \$1.25. A narrative of war service which has attracted wide attention because of nationality of its author, who has been invalided from wounds. Main importance is for account of campaign in Belgium.

Gerlache de Gomery, Commandant de. *Belgium in War Time, Translated from the French by Bernard Miall*. Doran, 1917, p. xii, 243. \$.50. Comprehensive accounts of events and conditions, amply illustrated.

*Gibson, Hugh S. *A Journal from our Legation in Belgium*. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1917, p. xii, 360. \$2.50. Interesting selection from daily notes of first secretary of American legation from July 4 to December 31, 1914.

Grondys, L. H. *The Germans in Belgium, Experiences of a Neutral*. Appleton, 1916, p. ix, 95. \$.50. Journal account of Dutch professor who was in Louvain during the destruction and witnessed other German atrocities during the invasion.

Halasi, Odon. *Belgium under the German Heel*. Cassell, 1917, p. x, 257. 6s. Description of conditions observed by an Hungarian author during a visit in 1916. The anonymous translator adds information derived from another Magyar who had spent eighteen months in Belgium during the war. Sympathetic, not sensational.

Huberich, C. H., and Nicol-Speyer, A., editors. *German Legislation for the Occupied Territories of Belgium; Official Texts*. The Hague, Nijhoff. Editions in German, Flemish, French, and English have appeared in successive volumes for the legislation of successive periods; fifth volume, with index to first five, covers to Dec. 31, 1915.

Kellogg, Mrs. Charlotte. *The Women of Belgium; Turning Tragedy to Triumph*. Funk, 1917, p. xviii, 210. \$1. By only woman member of Hoover commission. Describes relief work and what Belgian women have done for themselves. Written with simplicity and restraint.

Libert de Flemalle, Gabriel de. *Fighting with King Albert*. Doran, 1915, p. xi, 327. 6s. By Captain in Belgian army; important for Belgian army before the war and question of its preparedness, with narrative on resistance to invasion.

*Massart, Jean. *The Belgians under the German Eagle, translated by Bernard Miall*. Dutton, 1916, p. 368. \$3.50. Written from observations during first year of the war, with full documentation from German sources. Vigorous indictment of German rule.

Mercier, Desiré Felician Francois Joseph, Cardinal. *Pastorals, Letters, Allocutions, 1914-1917, with a biographical Sketch by Rev. Joseph F. Stillemans*. Kenedy, 1917. \$1.25. The Voice of Belgium, being the War Utterances of Cardinal Mercier, with a Preface by Cardinal Bourne. London, Burns & Oates, 1917, p. ix, 330. 2s. 6d. Similar collections, including some items which have been published separately.

Mokveld, L. *The German Fury in Belgium; translated by C. Thieme*. Doran, 1917, p. 247. \$1. By Dutch correspondent with German army from Liège to the Yser, whose careful, candid, neutral observations constitute a formidable indictment of German acts.

Morgan, John Hartman. *German Atrocities, an Official Investigation*. Dutton, 1916, p. 192, \$1. Professor Morgan was member of Bryce commission, and this volume supplements the Report with additional materials and comments.

Nothomb, Pierre. *The Barbarians in Belgium; translated by Jean E. H. Findlay*. London, Jarrold, 1915, p. 294. 2s. 6d. Account by Belgian, endorsed by preface by Belgian Minister of Justice.

Nyrop, Kristopher. *The Imprisonment of the Ghent Professors, a Question of Might and Right, My Reply to the German Legation in Stockholm*. London, Hodder, 1917, p. 91. Includes discussion of Flemish, question, case of University of Ghent as well as arrests of professors Fred-eriq and Pirenne.

Official Commission of the Belgian Government. *Reports on the Violations of the Rights of Nations and of the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium, with Extracts from the Pastoral Letter of Cardinal Mercier, and Preface by J. Van den Heuvel, Minister of State*. London, Unwin, 1915, p. xxxv, 113, 6d. Systematic presentation of carefully collected evidence. Strong indictment of German war methods and deeds.

Sarolea, Charles. *How Belgium Saved Europe, with a Preface by Count Goblet d'Alviella*. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1915, p. ix, 227. \$1. Patriotic appreciation of Belgium's part in first weeks of the war. Author was in Belgium during period.

Somville, Gustave. *The Road to Liège, the Path of Crime, August 1914; translated by Bernard Miall*. Doran, 1916, p. xxii, 296. \$1. French writer; divides material into narrative and critical sections. Challenges Germans to disprove his statements.

**Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. *The German Terror in Belgium, an Historical Record*. Doran, 1917, p. xiii, 160. \$1. Systematic account of German behavior in Belgium and treatment of Belgian people, based on testimony gathered and published by officials and commissions of various governments.

*Van der Essen, Léon. *The invasion and the War in Belgium, with a Sketch of the Diplomatic Negotiations preceding the Conflict*. London, Unwin, 1917, p. 356. 15s. By a professor of history at Louvain. Best and fullest account yet available, but military side is rather weak and the critical method is not all that could be desired of a professor of history. Discusses neutrality issue.

Verdavaine, Georges. *Pictures of Ruined Belgium, with 72 Pen and Ink Sketches Drawn on the Spot by L. Berden Lane*, 1917. \$3. Chief value in pictures. Text by art critic of Independence Belge, translated by J. Lewis May, based on official reports.

Verhaeren, Emile. *Belgium's Agony, translated and introduced by M. T. H. Sadler*. Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xxii, 131. \$1.25. Splendid literary exposition of Belgium's sufferings and pride in bearing the suffering; biting criticisms of Germany.

Williams, Albert Rhys. *In the Claws of the German Eagle*. Dutton, 1917, p. ix, 273. \$1.50. Good account of observations, especially in Belgium, during early weeks of the war, by a Boston pastor of socialist proclivities.

17. BELGIUM: NEUTRALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISCUSSIONS.

**DeVisscher, Charles. *Belgium's Case, a Juridical Enquiry; translated from the French by E. F. Jourdain, with a Preface by J. van den Heuvel*. Doran, 1916, p. xxiv, 164. \$1. Excellent, comprehensive, concise study by professor of law in University of Ghent; written with fairness and moderation.

Fuehr, Karl Alexander. *The Neutrality of Belgium, a Study of the Belgian Case under its Aspects in Political History and International Law*. Funk, 1915, p. xiii, 248. \$1.50. Historical and legal study to support German side. Contains various documents, including facsimiles of famous Brussels documents.

Grasshoff, Richard. *The Tragedy of Belgium, an Answer to Professor Waxweiler*. Dillingham, 1915, p. 244. \$1. Claims to use official material of German government to refute charges of German atrocities in Belgium, but generally mistakes vehemence for argument, and assertion for proof. Emphasizes franco-tireur acts of Belgians.

Labberton, J. H. Belgium and Germany, a Dutch View, translated by William Ellery Leonard. Chicago, Open Court Pub. Co., 1916, p. ix, 153. \$1. Somewhat philosophical attempt to justify German invasion of Belgium. Avows neutrality but accepts German unsupported statements with little question, exonerates Germany and blames England.

Langenhove, Fernand van. The Growth of a Legend, a Study Based upon the German Accounts of Francs-Tireurs and "Atrocities" in Belgium, with a preface by J. Mark Baldwin. Putnam, 1916, p. xv, 321. \$1.25. The author is scientific secretary of the Solvay Institute of Brussels. Translation by E. B. Sherlock. Moderate, restrained investigation of evidence, but occasional over-refinement of argument.

*Sanger, Charles Percy, and Norton, Henry Tertius James. England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg, with the Full Text of the Treaties. Scribner, 1915, p. viii, 155. \$1.50. Historical section by Norton, international law discussion by Sanger. Treatment, careful, technical, legalistic, not popular. "The obligations of Great Britain under the treaties of 1839 and 1867 are extremely doubtful . . . but in the circumstances of the case, Sir Edward Grey adhered to the traditional view of English statesmen."

*Waxweiler, Emile. Belgium, Neutral and Loyal, the War of 1914. Putnam, 1915, p. xi, 324. \$1.25. Author is Director of Solvay Institute of Sociology of Brussels. Original appeared in Switzerland in December, 1914. Earnest, dignified plea for exoneration by an advocate; sober and moderate in tone, but vigorously insistent on facts and views.

*Waxweiler, Emile. Belgium and the Great Powers, her Neutrality Explained and Vindicated. Putnam, 1916, p. xi, 186. \$1. Published fifteen months after former, "it neither corrects nor modifies it in any respect." Answers various German charges against Belgium. Like predecessor will remain one of most important volumes on Belgian question.

18. FRANCE.

Bracq, Jean Charlemagne. France under the Third Republic. Scribner, 1910, p. x, 376. \$1.50. Account of cultural development, including church and education questions. Clear, accurate, fair, sympathetic to the Republic.

*Bracq, Jean Charlemagne. The Provocation of France, Fifty Years of German Aggression. Oxford Press, 1916, p. vii, 202. \$1.25. Discriminating survey of Franco-German relations in last half-century with careful references to authorities, by professor in Vassar College.

Dimnet, Ernest. France Herself Again. Putnam, 1914, p. xii, 399. \$2.50. Written in English by patriotic Frenchman; nearly completed before outbreak of war. Though France had been decadent under Second Empire and Third Republic, its health and vigor has revived since 1905.

*Guérard, Albert Léon. French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century, a Historical Introduction. Century, 1914, p. 312. \$3. Good historical and descriptive account, published before the war.

Kipling, Rudyard. France at War, On the Frontier of Civilization. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1915, p. 130. 50 cents. Interpretation of spirit of France in author's best style.

*Poincaré, Raymond. How France is Governed. Translated by Bernard Miall. McBride, 1914, p. 376. \$2.25. Written before author became president of France, for French school use. Adult readers will find this an excellent introduction to theory, form, and working of French government.

**Sabatier, Paul. A Frenchman's Thoughts on the War. Translated by Bernard Miall. Scribner, 1916, p. 164. \$1.25. Perhaps best effort to reveal development of French character during the war. Somewhat historical and descriptive, but the human interest is the keynote. Compare Kipling's France at War and Chevrillon's England.

*Wright, Charles Henry Conrad. A History of the Third French Republic. Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. 206. \$1.50. Excellent, concise, impartial narrative. Should be supplemented for descriptive matter by Braçq's Third Republic

19. ITALY.

*Bainville, Jacques. Italy and the War. Translated by Bernard Miall. Doran, 1916, p. 267. \$1. The author, a French correspondent with long service in Italy, reviews growth of Italian national unity, describes movement of Italy from Triple Alliance to Quadruple Entente, and concludes with chapter on effect of the war on Italy's future. Believes Italy's entrance into war was act of public will.

*Dillon, Emile John. From the Triple to the Quadruple Alliance: Why Italy Went Into the War. Doran, 1915, p. xii, 242. \$1.50. Good account of traditions and events which influenced Italy's entrance into the war by able English student of foreign affairs, who visited Italy in critical period.

*Jamison, E. M., and others. Italy, Medieval and Modern, a History. Oxford Press, 1917, p. viii, 564. \$2.90. Four English historical scholars have furnished a convenient sketch of Italian history from the close of the Roman Empire to 1915. The section on the nineteenth century and the antecedents of the war is noteworthy.

Low, Sidney James Mark. Italy in the War. Longmans, 1916, p. xii, 316. \$1.75. Good account of movement of events since August, 1914, in Italy; of how Italy and Austria went to war; and of the conditions under which they contend.

McClure, W. K. Italy in North Africa, an Account of the Tripoli Enterprise. Philadelphia, Winston, 1914, p. xi, 328. \$2.50. Good account of Italo-Turkish war by an observer and Italian sympathizer.

Vivian, Herbert. Italy at War. Dutton, 1917, p. ix, 370. \$2.50. Character sketches of Italian leaders and of the Italian people rather than discussion of issues. Useful for sympathetic understanding of Italian attitude and activity.

Wallace, William Kay. Greater Italy, 1858-1916. Scribner, 1917, p. x, 312. \$2. Account of unification of Italy and of the Triple Alliance, and good, informing discussion of Italy's problems in connection with the war.

20. PORTUGAL.

Young, George. Portugal, Old and Young. Oxford Press, 1917. 5s. Though published in Histories of Belligerents Series, not so much history as a collection of essays on modern Portugal; best on cultural side. Author belonged to British legation at Lisbon.

21. ALSACE-LORRAINE.

*Hazen, Charles Downer. Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule. Holt, 1917, p. 246. \$1.25. Clear, convincing indictment of German control of Alsace-Lorraine, by competent American historical scholar.

Jordan, David Starr. Alsace-Lorraine, a Study in Conquest. Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1917. \$1. Written in 1913, after special study in the provinces, and partly published in Atlantic Monthly, May, 1914. Alsace is the storm-center, but war is no remedy for its problem. Quotes liberally both French and German views.

Putnam, Ruth. Alsace and Lorraine from Cæsar to Kaiser, 58 B. C.—1871 A. D. Putnam, 1915, p. viii, 208. \$1.25. Scholarly historical outline, with supplementary chapter on German rule; non-committal.

22. GERMANY: HISTORY.

Germany in the Nineteenth Century. Longmans, 1915, p. xvi, 254. \$2. Two series of lectures delivered at Manchester University in 1911 and early in 1914 by J. H. Rose and other English scholars, descriptive of German history and culture. Authors' views have been somewhat modified by the war, as shown by their later writings.

Henderson, Ernest Flagg. A Short History of Germany. Macmillan, 1916, 2 vols. \$3.50. Second edition of work published in 1902, with three chapters added for period 1871-1914. By American scholar of German sympathies; accurate, fair, well written.

*Marriott, John Arthur Ransome, and Robertson, Charles Grant. The Evolution of Prussia, the Making of an Empire. Oxford Press, 1915, p. 459. \$1.75. From Great Elector to Bismarck, with bibliography and sketch maps. Of avowed tendency and lively but not unfair criticism. More detailed and readable than Priest.

*Priest, George Madison. Germany since 1740. Boston, Ginn, 1915, p. xvi, 199. \$1.25. Good sketch with emphasis on Prussia; tends to neglect internal affairs. Summarizes the views of German history prevalent in generation preceding the war.

*Schevill, Ferdinand. The Making of Modern Germany, Six Public Lectures Delivered in Chicago in 1915. Chicago, McClurg, 1916, p. xi, 259. \$1.25. A professor of modern European history in University of Chicago surveys events from Great Elector to the war with studied moderation of tone and reserve of statement. Clear, pleasing style, sometimes ingratiating as in its minimizing militarism.

Smith, Munroe. Bismarck and German Unity. Columbia University Press, 1910, p. x, 132. \$1. Second edition of sketch published on occasion of Bismarck's death in 1898. Excellent brief survey of the man and his policies.

Treitschke, Heinrich Gotthard von. History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century; translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. McBride, 1915-16, vols. 1 and 2, xix, 708; xiv, 724. Each \$3.25. Less permeated with his notorious views than his "Politics," the "History" has been more widely popular and influential in Germany. In general, good history; important for understanding German history of past century and present German character. Second volume covers to 1820.

Ward, Sir Adolphus William. Germany, 1815-1890. Cambridge Historical Series. Putnam, 1916, vol. 1, p. xiv, 592. \$3. A learned accumulation of facts narrated in dry, impartial manner. Most thorough English account. First volume covers to 1852.

23. GERMANY: KAISER AND COURT.

Fox, Edward Lyell. Wilhelm Hohenzollern & Co. McBride, 1917, p. xii, 237. \$1.50. Sensational account of the Kaiser and men around him by American journalist who was three times in Germany during the war.

Graves, Armgaard Karl, pseud. The Secrets of the Hohenzollerns. McBride, 1915, p. 251. \$1.50. English title: The Red Secrets of the Hohenzollerns. Highly sensational; would be interesting if true.

Hammer, Simon Christian. William the Second. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. 272. \$1.50. Attempt at psychological analysis of the Kaiser based on his speeches and on contemporary German writings.

Keen, Edith. Seven Years at the Prussian Court. Lane, 1917, p. 315. \$3. Author was in household of sister of Empress. Reminiscences and court gossip; trivial.

Radziwill, Catherine (Rzewuska) Princess. Germany Under Three Emperors. Funk, 1917. \$4. Account of German politics and diplomacy centered around Bismarck and William II; by a close observer.

Topham, Anne. Memories of the Kaiser's Court. Dodd, 1914, p. vii, 308. \$3. English teacher of Princess Victoria gives intimate view of Kaiser's family and court since 1902.

24. GERMANY: GOVERNMENT AND CONDITIONS.

Barker, J. Ellis. The Foundations of Germany, a Documentary Account Revealing the Causes of her Strength, Wealth, and Efficiency. Dutton, 1916, p. ix, 280. \$2.50. Topical account of German conditions and policies told largely by quotations from Frederick the Great and other German rulers and statesmen since Great Elector.

*Barker, J. Ellis. Modern Germany, her Political and Economic Problems, her Foreign and Domestic Policy, her Ambitions and the Causes of her Success; fifth revised and enlarged edition brought to Jan. 1915. Dutton, 1915, p. xi, 852. \$3. Author, native of Cologne, name changed from Eltzbacher by act of parliament, more moderate and reasonable English counterpart of H. S. Chamberlain. Originally written in connection with famous colonial election of Reichstag in 1907, and brought to date in successive editions, has been most notable English work on Germany through the decade. Deals with economic, colonial, and naval bases of German imperialism which he regards as directed against Great Britain, United States, or both.

*Beyens, Eugene, Baron. Germany before the War; translated by Paul V. Cohn. Nelson, 1916, p. 366. \$1.50. Former Belgian minister at Berlin describes country and government and events preceding war in which he participated. Severe especially towards the Emperor.

Bourdon, Georges. The German Enigma, being an Inquiry among the Germans as to What They Think, What They Want, What They Can Do, translated by Beatrice Marshall, with Introduction by Charles Sarolea. Dutton, 1914, p. xiii, 357. \$1.25. Editor of Paris Figaro toured Germany in 1913 to learn attitude toward France. Found militarism inbred but everyone disclaiming desire for war, notably as against France.

Collier, Price. Germany and the Germans from an American Point of View. Scribner, 1913, p. xii, 498. \$1.50. Popular account by shrewd observer, not unfriendly in tone. Author published volume with similar title and character on England in 1911.

Dawson, William Harbutt. The Evolution of Modern Germany. Scribner, 1908, p. xvi, 503. \$4. Excellent description of character and conditions, with mass of information, but statistics are all of 1906 or earlier. Author has written various other works on Germany, including Municipal Life and Government in Germany (Longmans, 1914, \$3.75).

*Dawson, William Harbutt. What Is Wrong with Germany. Longmans, 1915, p. xii, 227. \$1. Confessedly out of tune with his other works which he had hoped would promote better feeling between England and Germany. Based on far more thorough knowledge of growth of ideas and opinion in Germany than shown in most war books. Deals with theory of the state, militarism, imperialism, Weltpolitik, relations of north and south Germany, questions of reform, etc.

**Fife, Robert Herndon, Jr. The German Empire between Two Wars, a Study of the Political and Social Development of the Nation between 1871 and 1914. Macmillan, 1916, p.

xiv, 400. \$1.50. Absolutely impartial, sympathetic account and criticism of foreign and domestic affairs, notably good on Alsace-Lorraine, Polish question, education, the press, municipal affairs, and parties. Based on personal observation and wide study; written, in large part, before the war.

Holmes, Edmond Gore Alexander. *The Nemesis of Docility, a Study of German Character*. Dutton, 1916, p. vii, 264. \$1.75. Style superior to facts and logic.

Howard, Burt Estes. *The German Empire*. Macmillan, 1906, p. viii, 449. \$2. A careful, somewhat legalistic, study of the imperial constitution.

Krüger, Fritz-Konrad. *Government and Politics of the German Empire*. Yonkers, N. Y., World Book Co., 1915, p. xi, 340. \$1.20. Good survey, sympathetic to Germany, written as textbook.

Lichtenberger, Henri. *Germany and its Evolution in Modern Times*, translated from the French by A. M. Ludovic. Holt, 1913, p. 440. \$2.50. By an Alsatian professor at the Sorbonne, published originally in 1907, lacks translator's notes to bring it to date. Emphasizes economic progress and expansion, not militarism as the basic Hohenzollern policy.

McLaren, A. D. *Germanism from Within*. Dutton, 1916, p. x, 363. \$3. Lived in Germany seven years preceding the war as correspondent of an Australian paper, and eight months in a concentration camp. Some of these attempts to analyze German character were written before the war, and all have unusual tone of fairness.

Perris, George Herbert. *Germany and the German Emperor*. Holt, 1913, 4th edition, 1914, p. xii, 520. \$3. Account of modern Germany written to promote better understanding between England and Germany. Chapters on Weltpolitik and other topics are valuable for presenting English views of 1912. Later editions show no change except in preface.

Reich, Emil. *Germany's Madness*. Dodd, 1914, p. x, 224. \$1. Author Hungarian resident in England. First published 1907, also issued with title: *Germany's Swelled Head*. New edition somewhat condensed and brought to date.

Schierbrand, Wolf von. *Germany, the Welding of a World Power*. Garden City, Doubleday, 1902, p. vii, 307. \$2.40. Cheap reprint at later date. Superficial account by American journalist for American readers. Largely out of date, but of some interest for views of the time.

Smith, Thomas F. A. *The Soul of Germany, a Twelve Years' Study of the People from Within, 1902-1914*. Doran, 1915, p. xv, 354. \$1.25. Author was Englishman on Erlangen faculty. Facts usually accurate, interpretation made in war time, under personal pique at circumstances of his hasty exit from Germany. Unfortunate tendency to emphasize seamy side. Chapters on Treitschke and Nietzsche.

*Veblen, Thorstein. *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*. Macmillan, 1915, p. viii, 324. \$1.50. Sociological-historical essay, projected before the war, to study divergent lines of German and English cultural development in modern times, considered due to economic circumstances rather than to national genius or manifest destiny. Thoughtful work in difficult, often ironical, style, by American professor.

Villard, Oswald Garrison. *Germany Embattled, an American Interpretation*. Scribner, 1915, p. 181. \$1. Mainly reprint of articles by American editor familiar with Germany, to explain Germany's case, but shows why American opinion has developed adversely to Germany. Careful, intelligent study.

25. GERMANY: POLITICAL THOUGHT.

Bernhardi, Friedrich Adam Julius von. *Britain as Germany's Vassal*, translated by J. Ellis Barker. Doran, 1914, p. 255. \$1. Written year after Germany and the Next War to show that Germany's next step toward world domination should be subjugation of England. Appendix contains selections from *Kriegsbrauch*, the German handbook of law and custom of war.

Bernhardi, Friedrich Adam Julius von. *Germany and England*. Dillingham, 1915, p. 93. \$50. Partly reply to Cramb's book, partly apologia addressed to American readers. Blames England for the war and naively declares notion of German invasion of America "belongs only to sphere of bar-room discussion."

*Bernhardi, Friedrich Adam Julius von. *Germany and the Next War*, translated by Allen H. Powles. Longmans, 1913, p. 288. \$3. First published in Germany in 1911 as author's reaction from Moroccan crisis of that year. Not the technical, but the political and ethical chapters gave this book its fame as the typical expression of German militarism.

Bernhardi, Friedrich Adam Julius von. *How Germany Makes War*. Doran, 1914, p. xv, 263. \$1.25. Abridgment of *On War Today* (Dodd, 1914, 2 vols., \$5) translated and edited by Hugh Rees. Largely technical, but reveals author's belief in Germany as world power with cultural mission.

*Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von. *Bismarck the Man and the Statesman, being the Reflections and Reminiscences Written and Dictated by Himself after his Retirement from Office*, translated from the German under the Supervision of A. J. Butler. Harper, 1899, 2 vols., p. xx, 415; xix, 362. \$7.50. Valuable not as record of events, but as exposition of his policies and acts. Second volume on events, 1862-1890, is of great importance on both domestic and foreign affairs.

*Bülow, Bernhard Heinrich Martin Karl, Fürst von. *Imperial Germany*; with a Foreword by J. W. Headlam; translated by Marie A. Lewenz; new and revised edition. Dodd, 1917, p. xlv, 335. \$2. By former German chancellor. Original German edition published in 1913 in volume to commemorate twenty-fifth anniversary of Kaiser's accession. New German edition published separately in 1916. English edition of original appeared in 1914. Largely rewritten with new parts in brackets, also new chapters on militarism and the Social Democrats, and a new introduction. Early chapters devoted to foreign relations, with some comment on almost every event since 1888. Observations on individual topics are keen; didactic tone, strong nationalist and imperialist patriotism pervade the book. Correlation of ideas and consistency of statement are neglected virtues.

Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, with an Introduction by Lord Redesdale. Lane, 1910, 2 vols., p. cii, 578; vii, 580. \$10. Author born of distinguished English family, married daughter of Richard Wagner, and has long lived in Germany as naturalized citizen. Not history, but a copious conglomerate of facts, an induction into the sacred mystery of Teutonism. Facts not always supported by authorities and logic untrammelled by customary rules. Regards Teutons as great creators and custodians of culture.

Frobenius, Herman Theodor Wilhelm. *The German Empire's Hour of Destiny*, with preface by Sir Valentine Chirol. McBride, 1914, p. 139. \$1. Published early in 1914, predicting the war, based partly on *Lea's Day of the Saxon*. Made prominent by commendation from the Crown Prince.

*Gauss, Christian. *The German Emperor as Shown in his Public Utterances*. Scribner, 1915, p. xvi, 329. \$1.25.

Schierbrand, Wolf von. *The Kaiser's Speeches, forming a Character Portrait of Emperor William II; Translated and Edited with Annotations; based upon a compilation made by A. Oscar Klausmann*. Harper, 1903, p. xxxi, 333. \$2.50. Omits part of Klausmann collection, but adds some other. Speeches are not printed in whole, but under topical arrangement, material from various speeches is brought together. Covers only first fifteen years of reign.

Treitschke, Heinrich Gotthard von. *Germany, France, Russia, and Islam*, translated into English, with a Foreword by George Haven Putnam. Putnam, 1915, p. xiv, 336. \$1.50. Eight essays written between 1871 and 1895; of no great interest.

*Treitschke, Heinrich Gotthard von. *Politics*, translated from the German by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille, with an Introduction by Arthur James Balfour, and a Foreword by A. Lawrence Lowell. Macmillan, 1916, 2 vols., p. xlv, 406; vi, 643. \$7. Lectures, published posthumously in German in 1897-8, grouped under five headings: the nature of the state, the social foundations of the state, varieties of political constitution, the state considered in regard to its influence upon rulers and ruled, and the state considered in relation to international intercourse. The first and last sections contain the more notable pronouncements. He failed to verify his facts, to weigh evidence correctly, and to avoid contradiction, but his brilliance and earnestness carried conviction. There is a convenient volume of Selections, translated by Adam L. Gowans (Philadelphia, Stokes, 1915, \$75).

26. GERMANY: POLITICAL THOUGHT: CRITICISMS.

Davis, Henry William Charles. *The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke*. Scribner, 1915, p. viii, 295. \$2. Attempt, by English historical scholar, to trace development of Treitschke's ideas and to analyze them with special reference to his Politics. Rigorous, but not harsh or unfair, criticism.

*Dewey, John. *German Philosophy and Politics*. Holt, 1915, p. 134. \$1.25. Able, readable survey, by American philosopher, of philosophical origins and background, from Kant, Fichte, and Hegel to the war, of current German political ideas.

Figgis, John Neville. *The Will to Freedom, or the Gospel of Nietzsche and the Gospel of Christ*. Scribner, 1917, p. xviii, 320. \$1.25. Excellent analysis and criticism of the philosophy of Nietzsche and estimate of its influence on German thought.

*Guilland, Antoine. *Modern Germany and her Historians*. McBride, 1915, p. 360. \$2.25. Author is professor in Swiss Polytechnic School, Zürich. Critical study of political school of historians in Germany in nineteenth century. Written before the war, with excellent style and wide knowledge.

Salter, William Mackintire. *Nietzsche the Thinker, a Study*. Holt, 1917, p. x, 539. \$3.50. Thorough philosophical study nearly completed before the war, with which he does not find Nietzsche specially connected.

Santayana, George. *Egotism in German Philosophy*. Scribner, 1916. \$1.50. Abstract, brilliant, bitter.

Treitschke, his *Doctrine of German Destiny and of International Relations*. Putnam, 1914, p. xi, 332. \$1.50. Contains study of Treitschke and his works by Adolf Hausrath and selections from his writings. Handy introduction to Treitschke and his ideas.

27. GERMANY: ANTHOLOGIES OF OPINION.

Archer, William. *Gems (?) of German Thought*. Garden City, Doubleday, 1917, p. ix, 264. \$1.25. Extracts from over eighty sources arranged topically, to show "the dominant characteristics of German mentality."

*Bang, Jacob Peter. *Hurrah and Hallelujah, the Teaching of Germany's Poets, Prophets, Professors and Preachers, a Documentation translated from the Danish by Jessie Bröchner, with an introduction by Ralph Connor*. Doran, 1917, p. xi, 234. \$1. Author is professor in University of Copenhagen. After introductory survey of growth of the "new-German spirit" before the war, reviews, with abundant quotations, utterances and publications during the war both by chauvinists and moderates. Effective revelation of obsessions of German thought.

Chapman, John Jay. *Deutschland über Alles, or Germany Speaks, a Collection of Utterances of Representative Germans: Statesmen, Military Leaders, Scholars and Poets, in Defence of the War Policies of the Fatherland*. Putnam, 1914, p. 102. \$75.

Gowans, Adam L. *A Month's German Newspapers, being Representative Extracts from those of the Memorable Month of December, 1914*. New York, Stokes, 1915, p. vii, 275. \$1. Extracts from eight leading papers, whose character is described, dealing especially with events on the west front and relations with England.

Smith, Thomas F. A. *What Germany Thinks; the War as Germans See It*. Doran, 1915, p. 336. \$1.25. German utterances during first year of war, topically arranged. Seems to reveal solidarity of German opinion, though other currents of thought may be overlooked.

28. GERMANY: WELTPOLITIK.

*Hurd, Archibald S., and Castle, Henry. *German Sea Power, its Rise, Progress, and Economic Basis*. Scribner, 1913, p. xv, 388. \$3.25. Intelligent, though not friendly, English account of German naval policy. Hurd has written much else on naval and diplomatic questions of the war and the years immediately preceding.

Lewin, Percy Evans. *The German Road to the East, an Account of the Drang nach Osten and of Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East*. Doran, 1917, p. 340. \$2.50. Based not on personal observation but on thorough study of the literature of the subject.

Mach, Edmund Robert Otto von. *Germany's Point of View*. Chicago, McClurg, 1915. \$1.50. Well written attempt to state Germany's case, especially against England, and to give German side of Belgian and other matters. Belongs to Münsterberg school of German propaganda in America.

Mach, Edmund Robert Otto von. *What Germany Wants*. Boston, Little, 1914. \$1. Clear, moderate explanation of German ideals, problems, and policies to persuade Americans that Germany should not be judged by Bernhardi.

*Prothero, George Walter. *German Policy Before the War*. Dutton, 1916, p. viii, 111. \$1. Outlines with clearness and vigor but not entirely dispassionately, development of German thought and policy leading to the war. By well known English historian.

*Rohrbach, Paul. *Germany's Isolation, an Exposition of the Economic Causes of the War*; translated by Paul H. Phillipson. Chicago, McClurg, 1915, p. xvii, 186. \$1. Translation of *Der Krieg und die Deutsche Politik* (1914). Six chapters written before the war deal with Anglo-German rivalry. Final chapter on outbreak of war exonerates Germany. Chapter on Salient Ideas of German Foreign Policy is remarkable, if printed as written before the war.

*Rohrbach, Paul. *German World Policies*, translated by E. von Mach. Macmillan, 1915, p. xi, 243. \$1.25. Translation of *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), which translator says has "inspired more Germans than any other book published since 1871, for everybody felt that it presented a generally true picture of the Fatherland and indicated the paths which the Germans had resolved to follow." Typical of German idealism and much more moderate than Bernhardt.

Usher, Roland Greene. *Pan-Germanism from its Inception to the Outbreak of the War, a Critical Study*. Boston, Houghton, 1914, p. vii, 422. \$1.75. Widely read during first year of the war as clear, breezy presentation of Pan-German movement, its ideas and their application to events of two decades preceding the war. Though not to be relied on for accuracy, events have given warrant to many of his conclusions.

29. GERMANY: WAR-TIME DISCUSSIONS OF POLICY.

Fernau, Hermann. *Coming Democracy*. Dutton, 1917, p. viii, 321. \$2. Translation of "Durch! Zur Demokratie," published before Russian revolution. By a German democrat and pacifist who vigorously denounces the German government and proclaims necessity of military defeat of Germany for its own sake, as only means of replacing monarchy by democracy.

*I Accuse! (J'Accuse) by a German; with Preface by Dr. Anton Suter, translated by Alexander Gray. Doran, 1915, p. viii, 445. \$1.50. German refugee, pacifist, perhaps Social Democrat, asserts his German loyalty but with intelligence and courage denounces Prussian militarists as responsible for the war. To be read to offset accepted German views of Bülow, Bernhardt, and Rohrbach. Has since published first of three volumes entitled *The Crime* (1917) to complete his proofs of Prussian militarist responsibility.

*Naumann, Friedrich. *Central Europe; a translation by Christabel M. Meredith from the Original German*. Knopf, 1917, p. vii, 351. \$3. Painstaking argument for closer union of Germany and Austria and ultimately for a still greater central European combination. Economic considerations are given full weight. Perhaps the most notable German book on national and international policy produced during the war. The author is a member of the Reichstag, of socialist antecedents.

**Modern Germany in Relation to the Great War*, by Various German Writers; translated by W. W. Whitelock. Kennerley, 1916, p. 628. \$2. Translation of *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, edited by Professors Heintze, Meinecke, Oncken, and Schuhmacher, in which twenty German scholars co-operate to state Germany's case. Note especially Erich Marck's essay on historic relations between Germany and England.

30. GERMANY: ARMY, NAVY, SECRET SERVICE.

Edelsheim, Franz, Freiherr von. *Operations upon the Sea, a Study translated from the German*. Outdoor Press, 1914. \$75. Technical study, interesting for illustrative studies of German invasions of England and United States.

The German Spy-System from within, by an Ex-Intelligence Officer. Doran, 1915, second edition, p. viii, 195. \$1. Shallow performance, possibly by British secret service man to explain the menace to English readers.

Goltz, Colmar, Freiherr von der. *A Nation in Arms*, translated by Philip A. Ashworth, edited by A. Hilliard Atteridge. Doran, 1915, p. viii, 288. \$1. Exposition of

German military system by veteran German officer, formerly military governor of Belgium. Condensed from first English translation of 1906.

Goltz, Horst von der. *My Adventures as a German Secret Agent*. McBride, 1917, p. xii, 287. \$1.50. Purports to be account of German secret service and of personal experiences by one whose activities in United States and Mexico attracted attention prior to his arrest by English. Asserts wide ramification of German system in United States.

Graves, Armgaard Karl, pseud., and Fox, Edward Lyell. *The Secrets of the German War Office*. McBride, 1914, p. 240. \$1.50. Sensational narrative of doubtful authenticity by purported German secret agent.

Henderson, Ernest Flagg. *Germany's Fighting Machine, her Army, her Navy, her Air-ships, and Why She Arrayed Them Against the Allied Powers of Europe*. Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1914, p. 97. \$1.25. Brief popular account by German sympathizer, with wealth of excellent illustrations.

**The War Book of the German General Staff*, being "The Usages of War on Land." Issued by the Great General Staff of the German Army; translated by J. H. Morgan. McBride, 1915, p. xv, 199. \$1. Professor Morgan has made careful literal translation and added a full critical introduction to the *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*.

31. GERMANY: DESCRIPTIONS IN WAR-TIME.

Ackerman, Carl William. *Germany, the Next Republic?* Doran, 1917, p. xiv, 292. \$1.50. Author was American correspondent in Germany from March, 1915, to the rupture of relations. Describes rivalry of Bethmann-Hollweg and Tirpitz factions and movement of public opinion in Germany. Approves American delay in entering the war.

Beaufort, J. M. de. *Behind the German Veil; a Record of a Journalistic War Pilgrimage*. Dodd, 1917, p. xix, 403. \$2. Author a native of Holland, trained as correspondent in America, went to Germany in 1914. Wide observations, including eastern front and the fleet. Sympathies pro-All.

Bullitt, Mrs. Ernesta Drinker. *An Uncensored Diary; from the Central Empires*. Garden City, Doubleday, 1917, p. v, 205. \$1.25. Diary of wife of correspondent in Germany in summer of 1916. Includes visits to Belgium and Austria-Hungary. Many interesting observations, especially concerning women and children.

Curtin, D. Thomas. *The Land of Deepening Shadow, Germany-at-War*. Doran, 1917, p. 337. \$1.50. Description of German methods and of conditions in Germany late in 1915 by American correspondent.

*Gerard, James Watson. *My Four Years in Germany*. Doran, 1917, p. xvi, 448. \$2. The former American ambassador to Germany gives some important information, and records many interesting and enlightening observations. Honest, straightforward account, intended to arouse popular interest and give general public convincing proofs of American case against Germany.

McClellan, George Brinton. *The Heel of War*. Dillingham, 1916, p. xi, 177. \$1. Record of visits to Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy during the war, by former mayor of New York, now professor at Princeton. Professedly unbiassed, actually transparently German.

Swope, Herbert Bayard. *Inside the German Empire in the Third Year of the War*. Century, 1917, p. xxi, 366. \$2. By American correspondent of *New York World*. Tone, impartial; observations, hasty and inadequate; judgments, hasty and now somewhat superannuated; style, readable.

32. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

*Andrassy, Graf Julius. *Whose Sin Is the World War?* Translated by E. J. Euphrat. New Era Publishing House, 1915, p. 154. 50 cents. Author is son of famous state chancellor, and has himself been an Hungarian minister. Able, tactful presentation of Austria's case against Serbia and Russia; places blame squarely on Russia.

Austria-Hungary and the War. Fatherland Corporation, 1915, p. 64. Nine articles by prominent Austrians on causes of the war and Austrian interests. Official Austrian propaganda.

Capek, Thomas, editor. *Bohemia under Hapsburg Misrule, a Study of the Ideals and Aspirations of the Bohemian and Slovak Peoples as they Relate to and are Affected by the Great European War*. Revell, 1915, p. 187. \$1. Articles by leading authorities on Bohemian affairs setting forth anti-Hapsburg feeling and opposition to Germanization. Not to be relied on as accurate or authoritative.

Knatchbull-Hugesson, Cecil Marcus. *The Political Evolution of the Hungarian Nation*. London, National Review, 1908, 2 vols. Deals primarily with the Magyar element and presents its views.

Ludwig, Ernest. *Austria-Hungary and the War*, with a preface by Dr. K. T. Dumba. Ogilvie, 1915, p. 200. \$1. The Austrian case told by the former consul at Cleveland. Attention centered on the Serbian question, with best account of Sarajevo trial. Chapter on Ruthenian problem, also one on relations with United States.

*Pollak, Gustav. *The House of Hohenzollern and the Hapsburg Monarchy*. Evening Post Co., 1917, p. 107. 50 cents. Reprint of seven timely articles on German and Austrian questions from *New York Evening Post* by a native of Vienna.

Schierbrand, Wolf von. *Austria-Hungary, the Polyglot Empire*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. vii, 372. \$3. Journalist who had spent years in Germany and Austria describes conditions, problems, and war-time situation.

*Steed, Henry Wickham. *The Hapsburg Monarchy*. Scribner, 1913, p. xxxii, 304. \$2.50. Author writes with knowledge and insight due to a decade's residence in the Dual Monarchy as *London Times* correspondent. Pleasing style, but too much knowledge is presumed for easy reading. Describes organization and administration of the monarchy and such conditions and problems as foreign policy, Bosnia, Yugoslavs, and Jews.

Whitman, Sidney. *Austria (Story of the Nations Series)*. Putnam, 1898. \$1.50. Brief outline account to 1898. The same series contains a volume on Hungary by Vámbéry (1886).

33. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: SLAVIC PEOPLES.

Bailey, William Frederick. *The Slavs of the War Zone*. Dutton, 1916, p. xii, 266. \$3.50. Descriptions of Austrian Slavs, both northern and southern, impassioned but informing.

Seton-Watson, Robert William. *Racial Problems in Hungary*, by Scotus Viator (pseud). London, Constable, 1908, p. xxvii, 540. *The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy*. London, Constable, 1911, p. xii, 463. 12s. 6d. *Corruption and Reform in Hungary, a Study of Electoral Practice*. London, Constable, 1911, p. xvi, 197. 4s. 6d. *German, Slav, and Magyar, a Study in the Origins of the Great War*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1916, p. 198. 2s. 6d. Four works on various phases of the Southern Slav question in Hungary, by a specialist on the subject, an advocate of Jugoslavie nationality.

34. BALKAN PENINSULA: HISTORY, CONDITIONS, PROBLEMS.

Abbott, George Frederick. *Turkey, Greece, and the Great Powers; a Study in Friendship and Hate*. McBride, 1917, p. vii, 384. \$3. Part I deals with Turkey and the Great Powers; Part II treats Greece similarly. Both historical antecedents and relations during the war are discussed. Author was formerly a war correspondent. Historical sections are inadequate; judgments of contemporary events to be taken with caution. Criticises treatment of Greece by the Allies.

Brown, Demetra (Vaka) (Mrs. Kenneth Brown). *The Heart of the Balkans*. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. 248. \$1.50. A series of sketches of travel through the Balkans in 1913 or thereabouts.

*Buxton, Noel Edward, and Buxton, Charles Roden. *The War and the Balkans*. London, Allen & Unwin, 1915, p. 112. 2s. 6d. Unusually successful effort to set forth concisely and impartially the views and feelings of the several Balkan peoples.

*Courtney, Leonard Henry Courtney, 1st Baron, editor. *Nationalism and War in the Near-East, by a Diplomatist*. Oxford Press, 1916, p. xxvi, 428. \$4.15. Marked by democratic and pacifist bias, but, perhaps, ablest discussion of Balkan problems, especially of years immediately preceding the war. Not so much narrative or descriptive as analytical and philosophical.

*Forbes, Nevill; Toynbee, Arnold Joseph; Mitrany, D.; and Hogarth, David George. *The Balkans, a History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Turkey*. Oxford Press, p. 407. \$1.75. Bulgaria and Serbia by Forbes, Greece by Toynbee, Romania by Mitrany, Turkey by Hogarth; the last being especially good. Diverse in method and value, and with no unity except the binding; general treatment of Balkan problem is unfortunately lacking. Better for general reader than Miller for accounts of separate states; Miller's account more unified and general.

Holland, Thomas Erskine. *The European Concert in the Eastern Question, a Collection of Treaties and other Public Acts, with introductions and Notes*. Oxford Press, 1885, p. xii, 366. \$3.25. Contains principal documents from 1830 to 1883.

*Marriott, John Arthur Ransome. *The Eastern question, an Historical Study in European Diplomacy*. Oxford Press, 1917, p. viii, 456. \$5.50. An historical account of the Ottoman empire is the central topic for a treatment of the Balkan problems and the international interests involved. The present war and its immediate antecedents receive ample attention. There is a chapter on the geography of the Balkans. The only good systematic work in English by well-known English historical scholar.

*Miller, William. *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913*. Putnam, 1913, p. xvi, 547. \$2.50. History since 1801 of all lands then part of Ottoman Empire, hence really an account of the rise of the Balkan nationalities, and of the international relations involved. Mass of facts, which covers to close of first Balkan war, makes the book informing but the style and method are scarcely enlightening.

The Near East from Within. Funk, 1915, p. viii, 256. \$3. Author claims to have been highly placed diplomat in the confidence of the Kaiser. Purports to unburden his mind of intrigues of secret diplomacy in the Balkans; interesting, but authenticity needs to be vouched.

*Newbigin, Marion Isabel. *Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems in their Relation to the Great European War*. Putnam, 1915, p. ix, 243. \$1.75. Covers whole peninsula

and Danube valley; important on trade routes, river systems, agricultural conditions and other features connected with racial questions and political ambitions. Written with full recognition of the two Balkan wars and of importance of Balkan problems in present war.

*Phillipson, Coleman, and Buxton, Noel. *The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles*. London, Stevens & Haynes, 1917, p. xvi, 264. Discusses general problems of international law involved; surveys history of question from 1774 to 1878 with reference to successive treaties and their application; considers future readjustment, with special reference to Russia and to internationalization similar to Danube Commission.

Savic, Vladislav R. *South-Eastern Europe, the Main Problem of the Present World Struggle, with Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler*. Revell, 1918, p. 276. \$1.50. Surveys history of Southern Slavs and of their relations with Austria-Hungary and with Bulgaria; chapters on America and the South Slav State, Pan-Slavism, and the Adriatic Question. By Serb correspondent of English papers.

Seton-Watson, Robert William. *The Balkans, Italy, and the Adriatic*. London, Nisbet, 1915, p. 79. 1s. Brief study of Adriatic question and of Italy's interests in the Balkans.

*Seton-Watson, Robert William. *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*. London, Constable, 1917. 10s. 6d. Thorough account by a leading authority.

Singleton, Esther. *Turkey and the Balkan States as Described by Great Writers*. Dodd, 1908, p. xii, 336. \$1.60. Well selected compilation illustrating manners, customs, and conditions.

Villari, Luigi, editor. *The Balkan Question, the Present Condition of the Balkans and of European Responsibilities, by Various Writers, with Introduction by James Bryce*. Dutton, 1905, p. 362. \$3. Distinguished writers of various nationalities discuss various aspects of problems and argue for extension of international European control for immediate relief of conditions.

Woods, Henry Charles. *The Danger Zone of Europe, Changes and Problems in the Near East*. Boston, Little, 1911, p. 328. \$3.50. Based on travel and research; discusses several phases of Balkan affairs.

Woolf, Leonard Sidney. *The Future of Constantinople*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 169. \$1. Suggests control by international commission similar to Danube Commission of which some account is given.

35. BALKAN WARS, 1912-13.

International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Report. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, p. 413. Report of an attempt to make thorough impartial study of Balkan situation. Places blame on all Balkan peoples, but finds Greeks rather more guilty of atrocities than Bulgarians.

Rankin, Reginald. *The Inner History of the Balkan War*. Dutton, 1914, p. x, 569. \$5. After historical surveys of the several countries of the Balkans, recounts causes and progress of the war with personal journalistic experiences. Lengthy and pretentious.

*Schurman, Jacob Gould. *The Balkan Wars, 1912-13*. Princeton, University Press, 1914, p. xv, 140. \$1. Author was American minister to Greece at the time. Clear concise review of causes, events and results.

Sloane, William Milligan. *The Balkans, a Laboratory of History*. Methodist Book Concern, 1914, p. viii, 322. \$1.50.

Comprehensive but not always accurate account of the Balkan wars and their antecedents.

Trapmann, A. H. *The Greeks Triumphant*. London, Forster, Groom & Co., 1915, p. xi, 294. 7s. 6d. Accounts of the two Balkan wars by correspondent of London Daily Telegraph.

36. SERBIA, MONTENEGRO, SOUTHERN SLAVS.

*Jones, Fortier. *With Serbia into Exile, an American's Adventures with the Army that Can Not Die*. Century, 1916, p. 447. \$1.60. London Times calls it best personal narrative of Serbian retreat. Author was student in Columbia School of Journalism who engaged in Serbian relief work.

Petrovic, Vojislav M. *Serbia, her People, History, and Aspirations*. New York, Stokes, 1915, p. 280. \$1.50. Convenient, though not scrupulously accurate, outline of Serbian history to 1914, with clear statement of national aims; by Serbian diplomatist.

Reiss, Rodolphe Archibald. *Report upon the Atrocities Committed by the Austro-Hungarian Army during the First Invasion of Serbia*; English translation by F. S. Copeland. London, Simpkin, 1916, p. 192. 5s. Report to Serbian government by Dr. Reiss of University of Lausanne on materials gathered in autumn of 1914.

Stead, Alfred, editor. *Servia and the Servians*. London, Heinemann, 1909, p. 390. 12s. 6d. Useful compilation, including economic data.

Taylor, A. H. E. *The Future of the Southern Slavs*. Dodd, 1917. \$3. Deals with Serbia and the Yugoslav question; chapter on the Adriatic question takes sides with Slavs against Italy.

*Temperley, Harold William Vazielle. *History of Serbia*. Macmillan, 1917, p. x, 354. \$4. Good account by competent English historian. Unfortunately closes with 1910.

Trevor, Roy. *Montenegro, a Land of Warriors*. Macmillan, 1914, p. vii, 87. \$55. Avoids politics; describes people and conditions.

Tucic, Srgjan Pl. *The Slav Nations*; translated by Fanny S. Copeland. Doran, 1915, p. viii, 192. \$50. Serbian writes chapter on each Slav nation, descriptive of peoples. Hasty, enthusiastic sketches.

Velimirovic, Nicolai. *Serbia in Light and Darkness, with a Preface by the Archbishop of Canterbury*. Longmans, 1916, p. xii, 147. \$1.20. Based on addresses of a Serbian priest to English audiences, voicing national spirit and portraying national life; not a book of facts.

37. ALBANIA.

Durham, Mary Edith. *The Struggle for Scutari, Turk, Slav, and Albanian*. Longmans, 1914, p. 332. \$4. Also includes discussion of international affairs in Balkans and gives special attention to Albanians.

Peacock, Wadham. *Albania, the Foundling State of Europe*. Appleton, 1914, p. 256. \$2.50. Author spent some time at Scutari in English consular service and admires Albanians. Historical and descriptive account with some discussion of problems.

38. GREECE.

Cassavetti, Demetrius John. *Hellas and the Balkan Wars*; with an Introduction by W. Pember Reeves. Dodd, 1914, p. xv, 368. \$3. Record of Greek history and aims for last half century with special reference to causes and Greek participation in Balkan wars of 1912-13. Carefully

done with citation of authorities. Patriotic and anti-Bulgarian.

Garnett, Lucy Mary Jane. *Greece of the Hellenes*. Scribner, 1914, p. vii, 246. \$1.50. Good descriptive work on contemporary life and conditions.

Kerofilas, Dr. C. Eleftherios Venizelos, his Life and Work, with an Introduction by M. Take Jonesco; translated by Beatrice Barstow. Dutton, 1915, p. xvii, 198. \$1.25. Laudatory, popular account of career to early months of the war. Introduction by former Romanian premier is best part of book.

Price, W. H. Crawford. *Venizelos and the War*. London, Simpkin, 1917. 2s. Athens correspondent of London Daily Mail describes recent relations of Greece with the Allies and with other Balkan states.

Venizelos, Eleutherios. *Greece in her True Light, her Position in the World-wide War as Expounded by El. K. Venizelos, her Greatest Statesman, in a Series of Official Documents, translated by S. A. Xanthaky, and N. G. Sakellarios. Sakellarios and Xanthaky, 1916, p. 288. \$2. Supplemented with an account of career of Venizelos.*

39. OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE TURKS.

Baker, B. Granville. *The Passing of the Turkish Empire in Europe*. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1913, p. 335. \$3.50. Author was in Constantinople during the first Balkan war, but says little of it; mainly descriptive material which throws some incidental light on political problems.

Cobb, Stanwood. *The Real Turk*. Boston, Pilgrim Press, 1914, p. xv, 301. \$1.50. Author lived three years in Turkey under Young Turk rule and frankly endeavors to present the good side of Turkish people.

Eliot, Sir Charles Norton Edgcombe (Odysseus, pseud). *Turkey in Europe*. Longmans, second edition, 1908, p. vii, 459. \$2.50. Based on residence and travel especially from 1893 to 1898, with additional chapters to 1907. Deals with Balkan peoples in general, but with special reference to Turks. Good historical and descriptive account. Furnishes background for understanding events of last decade. First edition, pseudonymous, 1900.

Emin, Ahmed. *The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press*. Longmans, 1914, p. 142. \$1.50. A Columbia University doctoral thesis on influence of the press on reform movements in Turkey.

Eversley, George John Shaw-Lefevre, 1st Baron. *The Turkish Empire, its Growth and Decay*. Dodd, 1917, p. 392. \$3. Earlier parts derived from familiar authorities, but later sections record personal observations and use other first-hand material. Good, popular account.

Jabotinsky, Vladimir. *Turkey and the War*. London, Unwin, 1917. 6s. Discussion of the partition of Turkey, by a Russian journalist.

Pears, Sir Edwin. *Forty Years in Constantinople*. Appleton, 1915, p. xiii, 390. \$5. Reminiscences of Englishman long resident at Constantinople with special reference to English diplomats; chapter on American Ambassador Morgenthau and his services after outbreak of war.

*Pears, Sir Edwin. *Turkey and its People*. London, Methuen, 1911; second edition, 1912, p. vi, 409. 12s. 6d. Excellent historical and descriptive volume based on long residence and extensive travel in Turkey.

Pears, Sir Edwin. *Life of Abdul Hamid*. Holt, 1917, p. x, 365. \$2. Account of villainous acts and influences of the former Sultan, by an authority of special competence on Ottoman affairs.

Sykes, Sir Mark, Bart. *The Caliph's Last Heritage, a Short History of the Turkish Empire*. Macmillan, 1916, p. ix, 638. \$6.25. Half of volume is a not very critical or thorough historical account, but remainder of volume records author's travels in Asiatic Turkey.

Whitman, Sidney. *Turkish Memories*. Scribner, 1914, p. xi, 305. \$2.25. Based on visits to European and Asiatic Turkey between 1896 and 1908. Favorable portrayal of the Turk.

40. BULGARIA.

Fox, Frank. *Bulgaria*. London, Black, 1915, p. 216. 10s. Historical and descriptive account by war correspondent.

Historicus, pseud. *Bulgaria and her Neighbors*. 1917. By Bulgarian diplomat, presenting Bulgarian side of case; moderate and candid.

Monroe, Will Seymour. *Bulgaria and her People, with an account of the Balkan wars, Macedonia, and the Macedonian Bulgars*. Boston, Page, 1914, p. xxi, 410. \$3. Author was in Bulgaria during second Balkan war, but draws largely from official reports and reference books. Considerable account of the two Balkan wars from Bulgarian point of view.

41. ROMANIA.

Seton-Watson, Robert William. *Roumania and the Great War*. London, Constable, 1915, p. 102. 2s. Sketch of people, history, and policy, with special reference to Romanian element in Transylvania and to reasons why Romania had not entered the war.

42. POLAND.

Gibbons, Herbert Adams. *The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East, Problems of Peace*. Century, 1917. \$1. Written before Russian revolution. Reprinted from Century Magazine. His formula of settlement is government by consent of the governed. The local will and not the imperial interest of the great powers must be assured to safeguard small nations and prevent future war. Clear statement of various problems with sufficient historical background.

Lewinski-Corwin, Edward Henry. *Political History of Poland*. Polish Book Importing Co., 1917, p. xv, 628. \$3. Good survey of Polish history, well illustrated; most useful for period since partition, including chapter on present war. Some discussion of Poland's future.

*Orvis, Julia Swift. *Brief History of Poland*. Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. xix, 359. \$1.50. Good, readable account of Polish history down to the present time; useful for the historical background of the existing Polish problem.

Phillips, Walter Alison. *Poland*. Holt, 1916, p. vi, 258. 50 cents. Good brief sketch of Polish history and problem by English believer in integrally restored Poland.

Poland's Case for Independence, being a Series of Essays Illustrating the Continuance of Her National Life. Dodd, 1916, p. 352. \$3. Six papers collected by Polish Information Committee on Polish history, culture, and problems in strong nationalist strain.

43. RUSSIA: HISTORY.

Kornilov, Alexander. *Modern Russian History, being an Authoritative and Detailed History of Russia from the Age of Catherine the Great to the Present*; translated by A. S. Kaun. Knopf, 1917, 2 vols., p. 310, 370. \$5. Concerned primarily with internal affairs, social and cultural development prior to 1890. The translator adds supplementary chapters to cover from that date to the third year of the

war. Only available account in English carrying Russian history from the beginning of the nineteenth century into the present war, which may be regarded as acceptable. By Petrograd professor. Poor translation.

McCabe, Joseph. *The Romance of the Romanoffs*. Dodd, 1917, p. xiv, 390. \$2. The seamy side of Russian autocracy to the fall of Nicholas II, written in lively style.

*Mavor, James. *An Economic History of Russia*. Dutton, 1914, 2 vols., p. xxxii, 614; xxii, 630. \$10. Professor in University of Toronto has written fullest and best account in English. Second volume deals with revolutionary movements and forces contributing thereto during nineteenth century and down to 1907.

Novikova, Olga Aleksieevna. *Russian Memories*, with an Introduction by Stephen Graham. Dutton, 1916, p. 310. \$3.50. Covers period from 1876 to 1916. The author played a prominent international part in 1876-8, and was a supporter of the old regime in Russia. Though including materials on recent years, the main interest attaches to the earlier time.

Reeves, Francis Brewster. *Russia Then and Now, 1892-1917*. Putnam, 1917, p. xiii, 186. \$1.50. Author's personal contribution is confined to service in 1892 on committee for relief of famine sufferers. Material on Russia during the war is mostly in appendix.

*Skrine, Francis Henry. *The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900*. Putnam, 1903, p. vii, 386. \$1.50. Clear, well-balanced narrative by retired Anglo-Indian civil servant; peculiarly sympathetic for date of its writing.

Vassili, Count Paul, pseud. *Behind the Veil at the Russian Court*. Lane, 1914, p. 408. \$4.50. Covers events from Crimean war into reign of Nicholas II, by a member of Russian diplomatic service. Much gossip, but rather more historical value than usual in such books.

Wesselitsky, Gabriel de. *Russia and Democracy, the German Canker in Russia*, with a Preface by Henry Cust. Duffield, 1916, p. viii, 96. \$75. By London correspondent of *Novoe Vremya*. Survey of Russian history, but with purpose of proving Russians essentially democratic and that autocracy is due to Germans who have controlled the government.

44. RUSSIA: ANTE-BELLUM DESCRIPTIONS.

*Alexinsky, Gregor. *Modern Russia*; translated by Bernard Miall. Scribner, 1914, p. 361. \$3.75. Not a revelation of spirit and soul of Russia but mass of information on economic and social conditions and problems since emancipation of serfs, the organization of government, revolution of 1905-6, questions of nationality, religion, and literature. Lacks accurate historical scholarship and readable style. Author former member of Duma, with liberal, perhaps socialistic, tendencies.

Alexinsky, Gregor. *Russia and Europe*; translated from the manuscript by Bernard Miall. Scribner, 1917, p. 352. \$3. Complementary to his *Modern Russia*. Deals with material bonds between Russia and Europe, Russia's part in European wars before 1914, Europeanization of the state and other topics. Written on eve of March Revolution which it forecasts. Wealth of facts; poor style.

*Alexinsky, Gregor. *Russia and the Great War*. Scribner, 1915, p. 357. \$3. Survey of domestic and foreign affairs from war with Japan to early months of present war. Important for conditions at opening of war and attitude toward the war. Still useful if read with caution.

*Baring, Maurice. *The Russian People*. Doran, 1911, p. 358, \$3.50. One of the best accounts for insight into con-

ditions and thoughts of the people shortly before the war. A portion condensed and rewritten as *The Mainsprings of Russia* (Nelson, 1915. \$1).

Bechhofer, C. E. *Russia at the Cross-roads*, with an Introduction by A. H. Murray. Dutton, 1916, p. viii, 201. \$2. By Anglicized Russian, with no thoroughness of knowledge or depth of insight.

Bubnoff, J. V. *The Co-operative Movement in Russia, its History, Significance and Character*. Fainberg, 1917, p. 162. \$1.25. Good account of movement which has developed rapidly during past dozen years.

*Duff, James Duff, editor. *Russian Realities and Problems*. Putnam, 1917, p. vi, 229. \$2. Collection of six lectures by Milyukov, Struve, Dmowski, Lappo-Danilevsky, and Harold Williams. Informing and enlightening, though written before overthrow of the Tsar.

Gorky, Maxim, pseud. (Alexei Maximovitch Pyeshkoff); Andreieff, Leonid Nikolaevich; and Sologub, Feodor, pseud. (Feodor Kuzmich Teternikov), editors. *The Shield*, with a foreword by William English Walling; translated from the Russian by A. Yarmolinsky. Knopf, 1917, p. xviii, 209. \$1.25. Collection of articles from various authors on Jewish problems in Russia. Original published by a non-Jewish Russian society for the study of Jewish life.

Graham, Stephen. *A Vagabond in the Caucasus*, with Some Notes of his Experiences among the Russians. Lane, 1911, p. vii, 311. \$1.50. Undiscovered Russia. Lane 1911, p. xvi, 337. \$4. *Changing Russia*. Lane, 1913, p. ix, 309. \$2.50. *A Tramp's Sketches*. Macmillan, 1912, p. xiii, 339. \$1.60. Four volumes of which second and third are the most important, based on walking tours in Russia, written with insight, charm, and force. Much valuable description of conditions and ideas, but not well arranged for the student.

Jarintzoff, N. *Russia, the Country of Extremes*. Holt, 1914, p. 372. \$4. Published on eve of the war by Russian woman resident in England. Interestingly written jumble of facts, many of them not usually found in books on Russia.

Raisin, Jacob Salmon. *The Haskalah Movement in Russia*. Jewish Pub. Co., 1914, p. 355. \$1.50. Excellent account of intellectual awakening of Jews in Russia in last half-century.

Sarolea, Charles. *Great Russia, her Achievement and Promise*. Knopf, 1916, p. ix, 252. \$1.25. English title: *Europe's Debt to Russia*. Author's chief competence for the work is literary. First section, on geographical foundations of Russian politics is distinctly useful; second part devoted to main theme reveals Russia as liberator of oppressed nationalities; third part, to literature; fourth part, to typical Russian problems such as, Poland, Jews, and revolutionary movements.

Vinogradoff, Sir Paul Gavrilovich. *The Russian Problem*. Knopf, 1915, p. viii, 44. \$75. Two articles, *Russia after the War*, and *Russia, the Psychology of a Nation*. Sanguine views by eminent Russian historian and jurist, now professor at Oxford. *Self-Government in Russia*. Dutton, 1916, p. 118. \$1.25. Series of lectures giving optimistic view of development of self-governing institutions and capacity prior to 1916.

Walling, William English. *Russia's Message; the People against the Czar*. Knopf, 1917, p. 245. \$1.50. First edition, 1908. This reprint omits some material and has an introduction which partly brings it up to date. By an American socialist who spent two years in Russia before writing the original text. Particularly interesting on economic matters.

*Wiener, Leo. *An Interpretation of the Russian People*. McBride, 1915, p. 248. \$1.25. Author is native Russian, now professor of Slavic at Harvard. Utilizes his scholarly knowledge of Russia's past to judge Russia of the present. One of most illuminating books on Russia.

*Williams, Harold Whitmore. *Russia of the Russians*. Scribner, 1914, p. ix, 430. \$1.50. Not historical, but descriptive on wide range of topics, best on culture, social conditions, and political thought. By able correspondent long resident in Russia. Best introductory account available.

Winter, Nevin Otto. *The Russian Empire of Today and Yesterday, the Country and its Peoples, together with a Brief Review of its History, Past and Present, and a Survey of its Social, Political and Economic Conditions*. Boston, Page, 1913, p. xvi, 487. \$3. Lacks insight of Baring or Williams, though giving wider range of facts.

45. RUSSIA: CONDITIONS IN WAR-TIME.

*Child, Richard Washburn. *Potential Russia*. Dutton, 1916, p. 221. \$1.50. American writer visited Russia during the war, describes conditions observed and discusses questions of Russia's part in the war. Partly reprinted magazine articles. Dispassionate and illuminating.

Fraser, John Foster. *Russia of Today*. Funk, 1916, p. viii, 296. \$1.50. By English journalist, on conditions in war time. Ephemeral.

Graham, Stephen. *Russia and the World, a Study of the War, and a Statement of the World-Problem that Now Confronts Russia and Great Britain*. Macmillan, 1915, p. xi, 305. \$2. Attempt to interpret Russia and its conditions immediately following outbreak of war, to English people, as favorably as possible. Antiquated. *Russia in 1916*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 191. \$1.25. Similar record of Russian tour made after two years of war.

Ruhl, Arthur Brown. *White Nights and Other Russian Impressions*. Scribner, 1917, p. viii, 248. A correspondent's sketches of scenes and conditions in war-time Russia. Also description of Swedish and Norwegian attitudes toward the war.

Russian Court Memoirs, 1914-1916, with Some Account of Court, Social, and Political Life in Petrograd before and since the War, by a Russian. Dutton, 1917, p. 315. \$5. Anonymous; aristocratic in sympathies; archaic since the Revolution; light weight.

Simpson, James Young. *The Self-discovery of Russia*. Doran, 1916, p. 227. \$2. Seven articles by Edinburgh professor on conditions and problems of Russia in war time. Sympathetic; point of view, summer of 1915.

Wright, Richardson Little. *The Russians, an Interpretation*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. xii, 288. \$1.50. Written before the March revolution by a correspondent of the *New York World* to interpret the Russians, their tendencies and ideals to Americans. The Revolution makes much of it a misinterpretation.

46. RUSSIA: REVOLUTION OF 1917.

Levine, Isaac Don. *The Russian Revolution*. Harper, 1917, p. 279. \$1. By foreign news editor of *New York Tribune*. Describes forces and conditions underlying the revolutionary movement, the internal history of Russia during the war, and the events of March, 1917.

Marcosson, Isaac Frederick. *The Rebirth of Russia*. Lane, 1917, p. xvi, 208. \$1.25. By American journalist who visited Russia immediately after the March Revolution, of which the larger part of the book is an account. Some account of leading personages.

Souiny-Seydlitz, Leonie Ida Philipovna, Baroness. *Russia of Yesterday and Tomorrow*. Century, 1917, p. 382. \$2. By wife of Russian baron. Two chapters refer to the Revolution of March, 1917. Readable, trivial, lacks discriminating judgment.

47. AFRICA.

*Gibbons, Herbert Adams. *The New Map of Africa, 1900-1916, a History of European Colonial Expansion and Colonial Diplomacy*. Century, 1916, p. xiv, 503. \$2. Contains sufficient preliminary matter to make clear events since the Boer war; includes first two years of Great War. Careful and impartial. For earlier history best brief account is Sir H. H. Johnston's *Colonization of Africa* (Putnam).

Lewin, Percy Evans. *The Germans and Africa*, with an Introduction by the Right Hon. Earl Grey. New York, Stokes, 1915, p. 317. \$3.60. Excellent account, by Librarian of the Royal (English) Colonial Institute, of German colonization, with special reference to each of their four African colonies.

48. JEWS, ZIONISM, PALESTINE.

Goodman, Paul, and Lewis, Arthur D., editors. *Zionism, Problems and Views*. Bloch, 1917, p. 286. \$1.50. Twenty-three papers by Anglo-Jewish writers. Some discussion of capability of Jews for national life, and account of what they have done in Palestine.

Hyamson, Albert Montefiore. *Palestine, the Rebirth of an Ancient People*. Knopf, 1917, p. xiv, 299. \$1.50. After brief historical survey, describes present-day conditions, with some notice of war-time conditions and of Zionist movement.

Kohler, Max James, and Wolf, Simon. *Jewish Disabilities in the Balkan States*. American Jewish Historical Society, 1917, p. 169. \$1.50. Relates largely to Romania. Careful collection of facts. Deals with American action in diplomatic ways in behalf of Jewish rights and indicates application and effect of the policy in settling future peace.

Sacher, Harry, editor. *Zionism and the Jewish Future*. Macmillan, 1917, p. viii, 252. \$1. Chapters contributed by Zionists from many countries and arranged by an English journalist. Good account of present status of Zionist movement for propaganda purposes.

49. THE ARMENIANS.

Bryce, James Bryce, Viscount. *Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916; Documents presented to Viscount Grey*. Putnam, 1917, p. 726. \$1. Sources cited include American consuls and missionaries, German travelers and missionaries, Danish Red Cross Workers, Swiss visitors, native teachers, pastors and other religious leaders. British Blue-book mainly compiled by A. J. Toynbee.

Buxton, Noel, and Buxton, Harold. *Travel and Politics in Armenia*, with an Introduction by Viscount Bryce, and a *Contribution to Armenian History and Culture* by Aram Raffi. Macmillan, 1914, p. xx, 274. \$1.50. Because of massacres by Turks, Russia should be permitted to occupy Armenian vilayets of Asiatic Turkey.

Gibbons, Helen Davenport (Brown) (Mrs. Herbert Adams Gibbons). *Red Rugs of Tarsus, A Woman's Record of the Armenian Massacre of 1909*. Century, 1917, p. xiv, 194. \$1.25. Personal experiences and observations.

*Gibbons, Herbert Adams. *The Blackest Page of Modern History*. Putnam, 1916, p. 71. \$75. Vigorous indictment of Turks for Armenian massacres of 1915, for which carefully sifted testimony is adduced. Ultimate blame attributed to Germany.

Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. *The Armenian Atrocities, the Murder of a Nation, with a Speech Delivered by Lord*

Bryce in the House of Lords. Doran, 1916, p. 119. \$.25. Concise but conclusive presentation of evidence for general reader based on the Blue-book cited above under Bryce.

50. PERSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

Chirol, Sir Valentine. *The Middle Eastern Question, or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence.* Dutton, 1903, p. xiv, 512. By London Times correspondent who traveled through Persia in 1902-3. Able discussion of political problems of Persia, Afghanistan, Bagdad Railway, etc., written before Anglo-Russian agreement concerning Persia. Though out of date, still useful in lack of later works.

Shuster, William Morgan. *The Strangling of Persia, Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue that Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans, a Personal Narrative.* Century, 1912, p. lxiii, 423. \$.250. American who was temporarily treasurer-general of Persia records effects of Anglo-Russian agreement on Persia.

Sykes, Percy Molesworth. *A History of Persia.* Macmillan, 1915, 2 vols., p. xxvi, 544; xxii, 565. \$.15. Second volume covers from 641 to 1906. Excellent, scholarly, impartial.

Yohannan, Abraham. *The Death of a Nation, or the Ever Persecuted Nestorians or Assyrian Christians.* Putnam, 1916, p. xx, 170. \$.2. First part gives history of Nestorian church; second part describes the tragic fate of the Nestorians in the war.

51. FAR EAST, CHINA, JAPAN.

*Bashford, James Whitford. *China, an Interpretation.* Abingdon Press, 1916, 2d ed., 1916, p. 620. \$.250. Methodist Episcopal bishop stationed in China gives excellent account of events of last ten years to death of Yuan Shi Kai, and describes with accuracy and insight conditions and problems. Valuable appendixes.

*Douglas, Sir Robert Kennaway. *Europe and the Far East, 1506-1912,* second edition with chapter continuing from 1904 to 1912 by J. H. Longford. Putnam, 1913, p. vii, 487. \$.2. Best account of Far Eastern history in a single volume, with special reference to nineteenth century. Emphasizes China rather than Japan; gives some space to Indo-China. Belittles Americans and every other nationality except English.

*Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl. *Contemporary Politics in the Far East.* Appleton, 1916, p. xii, 466. \$.3. Only comprehensive volume on foreign and domestic politics of Japan and China since 1894. Sympathy with China rather than Japan. Special attention to American interests in Far East, and some account of events during first two years of the war.

Jones, Jefferson. *The Fall of Tsingtau, a Study of Japan's Ambitions in China.* Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xvii, 215. \$.175. Account of Japan's capture of Kiao Chao from Germans, and of Japan's consequent relations with China, by American journalist who witnessed the siege. Disapproves Japan's designs on China, which he regards as unfriendly to United States.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *The Development of China.* Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. xi, 274. \$.175. Excellent sketch, by a young American scholar who has lived for a time in China, of Chinese history, with special reference to recent events and contemporary problems.

*Millard, Thomas Franklin Fairfax. *Our Eastern Question, America's Contact with the Orient and the Trend of*

Relations with China and Japan. Century, 1916. \$.3. Formerly editor of China Press, now of Millard's Review (Shanghai); author speaks with full knowledge on events since 1910. Appendixes contain all important documents. Author seems strongly prejudiced against Japan.

*Okuma, Count Shigenobu, editor. *Fifty Years of New Japan, English Version Edited by Marcus B. Huish.* Dutton, second edition, 1910, 2 vols. \$.750. Originally written to cover 1854 to 1904, there was little revision to bring matter up to date. Fifty-six chapters on wide range of topics by many authors, translated in Japan by many hands. Uneven in character and style, with some omissions, but generally comprehensive, and quite accurate and authoritative.

Parker, Edward Harper. *China, Her History, Diplomacy, and Commerce from the Earliest Times to the Present Day.* Dutton, 1917. \$.250. Revised and enlarged edition of work published in 1901 by professor in University of Manchester, who had been in consular service in China. Added chapters on recent events. Good.

Perry-Ayescough, Henry George Charles, and Otter-Barry, Robert Bruère. *With the Russians in Mongolia, with a Preface by Sir Claude Macdonald.* Lane, 1914, p. xxii, 344. \$.450. Captain Otter-Barry visited Mongolia shortly before the Chinese Revolution ended Chinese rule, and Mr. Perry-Ayescough spent time there after Russians had taken control. Wealth of facts, many documents; complete into 1914.

Porter, Robert Percival. *Japan the New World Power, being a Detailed Account of the Progress and Rise of the Japanese Empire.* Oxford Press, 1915, p. xxiv, 789. \$.250. First edition, *The Full Recognition of Japan, 1911.* Only twelve-page introduction as evidence of revision in second edition. Written to justify the Anglo-Japanese alliance and to show Japan's fitness to rank as a world power. Descriptive parts good, historical sections scant.

*Weale, Bertram Lenox Putnam (pseud. Bertram Lenox Simpson). *The Fight for the Republic in China.* Dodd, 1917, p. xiii, 490. \$.350. Excellent account of events from 1911 to 1917 by an observer long familiar with the Far East. Appendixes contain the important documents.

52. JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

Abbott, James Francis. *Japanese Expansion and American Policies.* Macmillan, 1916, p. viii, 267. \$.150. The author, for some time teacher in Japan, believes war with America would be national suicide for Japan, but that United States should recognize Japan's aspirations in the Orient.

*Blakeslee, George Hubbard, editor. *Japan and Japanese-American Relations, Clark University Addresses.* Stechert, 1912, p. xi, 348. \$.250. Contains addresses by twenty-one Americans and seven Japanese in 1911. Competent authorities treat every important topic.

Flowers, Montaville. *The Japanese Conquest of American Opinion.* Doran, 1917, p. xvi, 272. \$.150. Suspects and denounces Japanese peaceful penetration of the United States. Intended as antidote for writings of Gulick and others. Neither competent in content nor commendable in tone. "Rich in fallacies."

Gulick, Sidney Lewis. *The American Japanese Problem, a Study of the Racial Relations of the East and the West.* Scribner, 1914, p. x, 349. \$.175. American long resident in Japan discusses problems and suggests new American Oriental policy to avoid discrimination against China and Japan. Appendixes crammed with information. Good bibliography.

Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl. *Japan in World Politics.* Macmillan, 1917, p. xxvii, 230. \$.150. Mainly reprint of magazine articles discussing Japanese-American relations with purpose of promoting more friendly relations.

McCormick, Frederick. *The Menace of Japan.* Boston, Little, 1917, p. vi, 372. \$.2. Discussion of United States and Far Eastern relations during past dozen years by a correspondent with long service in the Far East. Intensely anti-Japanese. "A book which no thoughtful reader could for a moment take seriously."

Masaoka, Naoichi, editor. *Japan to America, a Symposium of Papers by Political Leaders and Representative Citizens of Japan on Conditions in Japan and on the Relations between Japan and the United States.* Putnam, 1915, p. xii, 235. \$.125. With companion volume of much less value. *America to Japan,* issued by Japanese Society of America to promote better understanding between the two countries. Thirty Japanese authorities treat as many topics setting forth Japan's development and aims.

*Millis, Harry Alvin. *The Japanese Problem in the United States, an Investigation for the Commission on Relations with Japan Appointed by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.* Macmillan, 1915, p. xxi, 334. \$.150. Based on report of commission, with other materials and personal views. Deals with Japanese immigration to United States and treatment and status of Japanese in United States. Friendly to Japan; by writer with long experience with problem in Immigration Bureau. Authoritative and commendable.

*Scherer, James Augustin Brown. *The Japanese Crisis.* New York, Stokes, 1916, p. 148. 75 cents. President of Throop Institute, California, formerly resident in Japan, discusses race issue, hoping to promote "a just balance of view." Footnotes with references to authorities.

Steiner, Jesse Frederick. *The Japanese Invasion, a Study in the Psychology of Inter-racial Contacts.* Chicago, McClurg, 1917, p. xvii, 231. \$.125. A study of Japanese-American relations as psychological problems of race-prejudice and of national egotism. Covers most of questions at issue. Author taught in Japan for seven years.

53. UNITED STATES: HISTORY, IDEALS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

Bassett, John Spencer. *A Short History of the United States.* Macmillan, 1913, p. xv, 885. \$.250. Best single volume American history which covers from the discovery nearly up to date.

*Coolidge, Archibald Cary. *The United States as a World Power.* Macmillan, 1908, p. vii, 385. \$.2. Prepared as course of exchange lectures at the Sorbonne, by Harvard professor of history. Explains problems and international relations of United States as developed in decade following Spanish war. Time has added new facts, but has required surprisingly little alteration in general view, so general reader will still find it best presentation of American international problems in single volume.

**Fish, Carl Russell. *American Diplomacy.* Holt, 1917, p. 541. \$.275. Clear, comprehensive narrative complete to beginning of 1915. Excellent maps. Scholarly; better for average reader than fuller work by Johnson.

Fish, Carl Russell. *The Development of American Nationality.* American Book Co., 1913, p. xxxix, 535. \$.25. Scholarly, readable survey of American history, 1783-1912.

Foerster, Norman, and Pierson, William Whatley, editors. *American Ideals.* Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. vi, 326. \$.125. Collection mainly from writings and speeches of American

statesmen, supplemented with some other items. Arranged by topics.

Hart, Albert Bushnell. *The Monroe Doctrine, an Interpretation.* Boston, Little, 1916, p. xiv, 445. \$.175. Good comprehensive, up to date account, though his interpretation will not command universal acceptance.

Johnson, Willis Fletcher. *America's Foreign Relations.* Century, 1916, 2 vols., p. xii, 551; vii, 485. \$.6. Thorough, readable, generally accurate account for general reader, but lacking in scholarly method and discriminating judgment.

*Jones, Chester Lloyd. *The Caribbean Interests of the United States.* Appleton, 1916, p. viii, 379. \$.250. Does not reveal intimate acquaintance with the region or thorough research into problems concerning it; but generally trustworthy, and commendable for directing attention to problems of vital significance to United States.

*Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Interest of America in International Conditions.* Boston, Little, 1910, p. 212. \$.150. Almost everything Admiral Mahan wrote has its lessons for America in the present war, but this volume dealt with the immediate problems and anticipated to remarkable degree actual developments of the war. Discusses international situation with reference to naval preparedness.

Moore, John Bassett. *The Principles of American Diplomacy.* Harper, 1918, p. 476. \$.2. Revision of his *American Diplomacy.* Best book on subject by ablest American authority; for student rather than general reader.

Ogg, Frederic Austin. *National Progress, 1907-1917, (American Nation series, vol. 27).* Harper, 1918, p. 430. \$.2. Convenient narrative of domestic and foreign affairs, mainly internal politics and relation to the war.

*Paxson, Frederic Logan. *The New Nation.* Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. 342. \$.125. Fourth volume of *The Riverside History of the United States,* covering 1865-1914. Best survey of period.

Roosevelt, Theodore. *The New Nationalism, with an Introduction by Ernest Hamlin Abbott.* Outlook Co., 1910, p. xxi, 268. \$.150. Collection of addresses and articles which contain much of his political philosophy and ideals. Should be read with President Wilson's *The New Freedom* for some comprehension of American political ideals on eve of the war.

Weyl, Walter Edward. *American World Policies.* Macmillan, 1917, p. 307. \$.225. Discussion of whether American isolation shall give place to nationalistic imperialism or to internationalism. Economic interests are given full—perhaps too full—consideration. Marred by publication on eve of American declaration of war; somewhat remedied in second printing.

Wilson, Woodrow. *Division and Reunion, 1829-1909.* Longmans, 1909, p. xx, 389. \$.125. Third volume of *Epochs of American History* series. First published in 1893, has passed through many editions. Professor Edward S. Corwin has furnished the portion for the period since 1889 at which date work originally closed.

Wilson, Woodrow. *The New Freedom, a Call for the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People.* Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1913, p. viii, 294. \$.1. Compiled by W. B. Hale from stenographic reports of campaign speeches. Sets forth his interpretation of American political life and ideals.

54. UNITED STATES: PREPAREDNESS.

Chittenden, Hiram Martin. *War or Peace, a Present Duty and a Future Hope.* Chicago, McClurg, 1911, p. 273,

\$1. After some discussion of evil of war and desirability of peace, this retired brigadier general argues for larger navy, larger standing army, and fortification of Panama Canal as necessary policies for United States.

Dickson, Harris. Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself, as Recorded in Uncle Sam's own Words. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. xiv, 162. \$.75. A preparedness argument, largely abstracted from Upton's "Military Policy of the United States."

*Greene, Francis Vinton. Present Military Situation of the United States. Scribner, 1915, p. 102. \$.75. Able brief argument "to persuade the citizens, the voters, . . . to give calm but thoughtful consideration to this question of adequate national defense," by an American general.

Howe, Lucien. Universal Military Education and Service; the Swiss System for the United States. Putnam, first edition, 1916; second edition with appendix, 1917, p. xv, 147. \$1.25. Description of Swiss and Australian systems with arguments in favor of similar system for United States.

*Huidekoper, Frederic Louis. The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, a History of the American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1, 1915. Macmillan, 1915, p. xvi, 735. \$4. To close of 1862, an avowed abridgment of Upton, after that based on original researches; carefully done with full references to authorities. Strong argument from past experience for different procedure in future. Many of his suggestions have been followed by present administration, notably conscription.

Johnston, Robert Matteson. Arms and the Race, the Foundations of Army Reform. Century, 1915, p. 219. \$1. Able military historian presents arguments for reform and enlargement of American army.

Kuenzli, Frederick Arnold. Right and Duty, or Citizen and Soldier; Switzerland Prepared and at Peace, a Model for the United States. Stechert, 1916, p. 225. \$1. Excellent account of Swiss military system, which is advocated for American adoption, by a Swiss-American.

Marcosson, Isaac Frederick. Leonard Wood, Prophet of Preparedness. Lane, 1917, p. 92. \$.75. Laudatory sketch of General Wood's career, reprinted from Everybody's Magazine, March, 1917.

Maxim, Hudson. Defenceless America. Hearst, 1915, p. xxiii, 318. \$2. The inventor-author has compiled a miscellaneous mass of facts which he wields vigorously as arguments for preparedness; best on technical matters.

Roosevelt, Theodore. America and the World War. Scribner, 1915, p. xv, 277. \$.75. Fear God and take Your Own Part. Doran, 1916, p. 414. \$1.50. The Foes of Our Own Household. Doran, 1917, p. xii, 347. \$1.50. Three volumes of collected addresses and articles of occasional character, presenting robust, often aggressive views, of duties of American citizenship and of United States in relation to the war. Wholesome arguments for preparedness are marred by statements of militaristic or chauvinistic sort and by criticisms of President Wilson and his policies which are not always just.

Upton, Emory. The Military Policy of the United States. Washington, Supt. of Docs., 1904; fourth impression, 1912, p. xxiii, 495. \$.65. Thorough study of national military policy to close of 1862, which reveals weaknesses of policy in past. Incomplete work published after author's death, edited by J. P. Sanger. Basis on which practically all preparedness books are constructed.

Van Zile, Edward Sims. The Game of Empires, a

Warning to America; with Prefatory Note by Theodore Roosevelt. Moffat, 1915, p. 302. \$1.25. After three hundred pages of flippant or cynical comment on war in general and this war in particular, writer turns suddenly to advocate preparedness. The one Rooseveltian page states real point of book with pith.

Wheeler, Howard Duryée. Are We Ready? With a Letter by Major General Leonard Wood. Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xvii, 227. \$1.50. Fictitious account of attack on New York rendered vivid actual unpreparedness of United States. Compare the "movie" play, "The Battle Cry of Peace."

Wise, Jennings Cropper. Empire and Armament, the Evolution of American Imperialism and the Problem of National Defense. Putnam, 1915, p. xii, 353. \$1.50. Former professor of political science and international law at Virginia Military Institute discusses American imperialism prior to Civil War, condemns more recent imperialism, and considers defense problems.

Wise, Jennings Cropper. The Call of the Republic. Dutton, 1917, p. x, 141. \$1. A plea for universal military service, with some historical considerations.

Wood, Eric Fisher. The Writing on the Wall, the Nation on Trial. Century, 1916, p. ix, 208. \$1. By author of Note-book of an Attaché, who was in Europe at outbreak of war; clear, intelligent, vigorous argument for preparedness.

**Wood, Leonard. The Military Obligation of Citizenship. Princeton, University Press, 1915, p. vii, 76. \$.75. Our Military History, its Facts and Fallacies. Chicago, Reilly, 1916, p. 240. \$1. Historical portions drawn from Upton and Huidekoper. General Wood has given best brief presentation of historical argument for preparedness in the second, and admirable appeal on duties of citizenship in national defense in the first.

55. UNITED STATES: GERMAN INTRIGUE.

Alphaud, Gabriel. L'Action Allemande aux états-Unis, de la Mission Dernburg aux Incidents Dumba, 2 Août, 1914,—25 Septembre, 1915; Préface de M. Ernest Lavisse. Paris, Payot, 1915, p. xvi, 498. 5 francs. Les Etats-Unis contre l'Allemagne, du Rappel de Dumba à la Déclaration de Guerre, 25 Septembre, 1915—4 Avril, 1917. Paris, Payot, 1917, p. 343. 5 francs. These works have unfortunately not been translated. They cover whole field of German intrigue in America and relations between United States and Germany, with abundant documents, and form best account yet available. By correspondent of the *Matin*.

Jones, John Price. America Entangled (Title, English edition: The German Spy in America). Laut, 1917, p. xii, 224. \$.50. Account of German spy system in America by member of staff of New York Sun. Careful array of evidence, generally dispassionate style.

Skaggs, William Henry. The German Conspiracies in America, from an American Point of View, by an American, with an Introduction by Theodore Andrea Cook. London, Unwin, 1915, p. xxviii, 332. 5s. Deals with first year of war, discussing immigration, propaganda, espionage, malicious interference in commercial and industrial affairs, diplomatic activity, etc. Strongly anti-German compilation.

Wile, Frederic William. The German-American Plot, the Record of a Great Failure, the Campaign to Capture the Sympathy and Support of the United States. London, Pearson, 1915, p. 123. 1s. Strongly anti-German English pamphlet.

56. GERMAN-AMERICANS: PRO-GERMAN VIEWS AND PROPAGANDA.

Burgess, John William. The European War of 1914, its Causes, Purposes, and Probable Results. Chicago, McClurg, 1915, p. 209. \$1. America's Relations to the Great War. Chicago, McClurg, 1916, p. 209. \$1. Author, who is emeritus professor at Columbia University, is eminent authority on political science and foremost American to espouse actively German cause during first two years of war. Assumes German attitude of mind, blames Allies, especially England, and emphasizes American grievances against England.

Cronau, Rudolf. German Achievements in America. New York, 340 E. 198th St., 1916, p. 233. \$1. Brief survey of history of German element in America to refute "unwarranted insinuations questioning the loyalty of the German-Americans toward the land of their adoption."

Dernburg, Bernhard. Germany and the War, Not a Defense but an Explanation (p. 24). The Case of Belgium in the Light of Official Reports Found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government after the Occupation of Brussels, with Facsimiles of the Documents (p. 16). Search-lights on the War, Germany and England—the Real Issue, England's Share of Guilt—a Critical Analysis of the English White Book, Germany and the Powers, the Ties that Bind America and Germany, Germany's Food Supply, When Germany Wins (p. 62). Fatherland Corporation, 1915, each \$1.00. Three pamphlets by former head of German propaganda in United States to influence American opinion.

Faust, Albert Bernhardt. The German Element in the United States, with Special Reference to its Political, Moral, Social, and Educational Influence. Boston, Houghton, 1909, 2 vols., p. xxvi, 591; xvi, 605. \$7.50. Most thorough and careful study of German element in United States, showing fully its numbers, activities, and influence in American history. A scholarly work by native American; reference to chapter on political influence shows freedom from sinister bias.

Francke, Kuno. The German Spirit. Holt, 1916, p. vi, 132. \$1. In three papers of occasional origin, professor of German at Harvard, with keen insight, discriminating judgment, and genial temper, seeks to interpret German character and ideals favorably to Americans.

Hale, William Bayard. American Rights and British Pretensions on the Seas; the Facts and the Documents, Official and Other, Bearing upon the Present Attitude of Great Britain toward the Commerce of the United States. McBride, 1915, p. 172. \$1.50. Compilation to turn American opinion against England and divert it from hostility to Germany. Relates to detentions, seizures, interference with mails, etc.

Münsterberg, Hugo. The War and America (1914, p. 210). The Peace and America (1915, p. 276). Tomorrow, Letters to a Friend in Germany (1916, p. 275). Appleton, each \$1. Three books made up, in part at least, of occasional papers, but possessing a distinct unity in method and purpose. The late Professor at Harvard appealed cleverly and ingratiatingly to American opinion to win it to more favorable attitude to Germany. Avoids inconvenient topics and glosses over difficulties in subtle manner. First two are largely out of date, but third remains an able presentation of German views on fundamental questions of principle and policy.

The Truth about Germany, Facts about the War. Baker, 1914, p. 86. \$.25. Controversial pamphlet issued soon after outbreak of war by influential German committee, and widely distributed in United States and other countries. See refutation by Sladen.

57. UNITED STATES: RELATIONS AND ATTITUDE TO THE WAR, 1914-17.

Angell, Norman (pseud. of Ralph Norman Angell Lane). The World's Highway, Some Notes on America's Relation to Sea Power and Non-Military Sanctions for the Law of Nations. Doran, 1915, p. xvi, 361. \$1.50. America and the New World-State, a Plea for American Leadership in International Organization. Putnam, 1915, p. x, 305. \$1.25. The Danger of Half-Preparedness, a Plea for a Declaration of American Policy. Putnam, 1916, p. 129. \$.50. Native of England, but naturalized American, author defends England's sea power as against German militarism; urges necessity of crushing militarism, need of modification of international law, and that United States should lead in forming international union. Author formerly prominent pacifist.

Baldwin, James Mark. American Neutrality, its Cause and Cure. Putnam, 1916, p. 138. \$.75. The Super-State and the Eternal Values. Oxford Press, 1913, p. 38. \$.50. Two pamphlets by former American professor, "a loyal American citizen" who lectured in Paris in 1915 condemning American neutrality.

*Blakeslee, George Hubbard, editor. The Problems and Lessons of the War; Clark University Addresses, December 16, 17, and 18, 1915. Putnam, 1916, p. xlvi, 381. \$2. Lectures by competent exponents of various views on the war and its problems, which form a useful record of divergencies of American opinion at that time.

Gleason, Arthur Huntington. Our Part in the Great War. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. 338. \$1.35. Written before United States entered war Deals with American relief work in France, with American neutrality, observations in Belgium and France, and gives extracts from German war diaries. Says commercialism and immigration held the United States back from entering the war.

Gould, Benjamin Apthorp. War Thoughts of an Optimist, a Collection of Timely Articles by an American Citizen Residing in Canada. Dutton, 1915, p. vii, 200. \$1. The Greater Tragedy and Other Things. Putnam, 1916, p. viii, 189. \$1. Two volumes of occasional articles reflecting pro-Ally and anti-Wilson attitude.

Johnson, Douglas Wilson. My German Correspondence, concerning Germany's Responsibility for the War and for the Method of its Conduct, being a Letter from a German Professor together with a Reply and a Foreword. Doran, 1917, p. 97. \$.50. The Peril of Prussianism. Putnam, 1917, p. vii, 53. \$.75. The latter is the substance of an address on mutual antagonism of American and Prussian political ideals, by a Columbia professor.

*Johnson, Willis Fletcher. America and the Great War for Humanity and Freedom. Philadelphia, Winston, 1917, p. 352. \$1.50. Collection of good newspaper articles summarizing causes and progress of the war and relation to it of United States. Useful summary volume for American general reader.

Lodge, Henry Cabot. War Addresses, 1915-1917. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. viii, 303. \$2.50. Miscellaneous senatorial and public addresses from January, 1915, to April, 1917. Earlier addresses include questions of neutral rights and national defence; later addresses are related to events in four months preceding American declaration of war. Senator Lodge is spokesman of Republican views in Senate regarding President Wilson's policies.

Martin, Edward Sanford. The Diary of a Nation, the War and How We Got Into It. Garden City, Doubleday, 1917, p. xii, 407. \$1.50. Reprint of editorials from *Life* from the outbreak of the war to the entrance of the United

States into it, forming a record, by current comment, of a reaction to the war which was common to a considerable section of the American people.

Okie, Howard Pitcher. *America and the German Peril*. London, Heinemann, 1915, p. 198. 2s. 6d. Collection of articles of which only last relates directly to United States.

**Rogers, Lindsay. *America's Case Against Germany*. Dutton, 1917, p. xiv, 264. \$1.50. Good, narrative account of the submarine controversy in clear popular form to assure the general public that the case of the United States in international law, as well as in ethics, is sound.

**Scott, James Brown. *A Survey of International Relations between the United States and Germany, August 1, 1914-April 6, 1917*. Based on Official Documents. Oxford Press, 1917, p. cxiv, 390. Introduction includes quotations showing German theories of the state, of international policy, and of international law, and other material. Comprehensive and thorough account by eminent American authority on international law. Supplementary volumes are announced to contain the diplomatic correspondence between United States and Germany for the period, and the Messages, Addresses and Papers of President Wilson on Foreign Policy.

Sixty American Opinions on the War. London, Unwin, 1915, p. 165. 1s. Collection of expressions of war views by sixty leading Americans.

Thayer, William Roscoe. *Germany vs. Civilization, Notes on the Atrocious War*. Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. vi, 238. \$1. Condemnation of German ideals and policies, based on wide knowledge of German history and thought; written with crusading zeal against Germany, with climax in chapter on the Plot to Germanize America.

Van Dyke, Henry. *Fighting for Peace*. Scribner, 1917, p. 247. \$1.25. Personal observations and views on the war based on service as minister at The Hague.

Whitridge, Frederick Wallingford. *One American's Opinion of the European War, an Answer to Germany's Appeals*. Dutton, 1914, p. xi, 79. \$50. Vigorous statement of attitude against Germany by leading New York business man.

58. UNITED STATES: PARTICIPANT IN THE WAR.

Beith, John Hay (pseud. Ian Hay). *Getting Together* (p. 91). *The Oppressed English*. Garden City, Doubleday, 1917, each \$50. Two pamphlets to explain England and its problems to Americans and to promote sympathy between the two nations.

*Bullard, Arthur. *Mobilizing America*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 129. \$50. Published at the moment of the entry of the United States into the war "to show how the experience of other democracies can teach us the way to do it (fight) efficiently." Based on observations in England and France during the war, and endorsed by other competent observers. Has chapters on mobilizing public opinion, men, and industry, and sets forth a program.

Halsey, Francis Whiting, editor. Balfour, Viviani, and Joffre, their Speeches and other Public Utterances in America. Funk, 1917, p. v, 369. \$1.50. Also contains some narrative material.

*Harris H. Wilson. *President Wilson, his Problems and his Policy from an English Point of View*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. 278. \$1.75. Good, dispassionate account of the President's earlier life and of his first administration, written with unusual understanding of American affairs.

Herron, George Davis. *Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace*. Kennerley, 1917, p. viii, 173. \$1.25. Six articles

addressed to European readers in support of President Wilson's policy and against a premature peace, during early months of 1917.

Marcosson, Isaac Frederick. *The War after the War*. Lane, 1917, p. 272. \$1.25. Exposes American unpreparedness for the trade rivalry that will follow the war and urges financial and commercial reorganization to meet the test. Includes character sketches of Lloyd George and W. M. Hughes, premier of Australia.

O'Brien, Charles. *Food Preparedness for the United States*. Boston, Little, 1917, p. xi, 118. \$60. Based on first-hand study of German methods in autumn of 1916, but with some account of the procedure of other countries.

Powell, E. Alexander. *Brothers in Arms*. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. 62. \$50. Published by an American correspondent, at time of visit of Joffre-Viviani mission, to impart to Americans his admiration for the French soldier.

Robinson, Edgar E., and West, Victor J. *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson, 1913-1917*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 428. \$1.75. An introductory essay of 150 pages on the development of policy to entrance into the war, with chronological table and 230 pages of extracts from addresses and state papers.

Wilson, Woodrow. *Why We Are at War*. Harper, 1917. \$50. Collection of addresses connected with declaration of war by United States.

Wilson, Woodrow. *President Wilson's Great Speeches and Other History Making Documents*. Chicago, Stanton, 1917. \$1. Collection similar to preceding.

59. LATIN AMERICA: PAN-AMERICANISM.

Macdonald, James Alexander. *The North American Idea*. Revell, 1917, p. 240. \$1.25. Author is editor of *Toronto Globe*. Historical considerations and political analysis outweighed by idealistic views.

Pérez Triana, S. *Some Aspects of the War*. London, Unwin, 1915, p. 225. 3s. 6d. By Colombian jurist, formerly member of Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague; discusses war issues and some points in which Pan-American interests were involved.

Root, Elihu. *Latin America and the United States*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1917, p. xvi, 302. \$2.50. A volume of his collected speeches edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. Contains speeches during his South American tour in 1906 and, of more importance, his addresses delivered in the United States on Latin-American questions.

Usher, Roland Greene. *Pan-Americanism, a Forecast of the Inevitable Clash between the United States and Europe's Victor*. Century, 1915, p. xix, 466. \$2. *The Challenge of the Future, a Study in American Foreign Policy*. Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. xxi, 350. \$1.75. Discussions of American problems in light of the war by brilliant American historical scholar, who deserts field of history and method of scholarship for field and method of prophecy. Reveal assurance and conviction rather than soundness of judgment.

60. THE WAR ON THE SEA.

Dixon, William MacNeile. *The British Navy at War*. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. 93. \$75. Brief account by a Glasgow professor for propaganda use.

Kipling, Rudyard. *Sea Warfare*. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1917, p. 222. \$1.25. Reprints *The Fringes of the Fleet*, *Tales of the Trade*, and *Destroyers at Jutland*,

and other matter. Sympathetic, vivid portrayals of part of English sailors in the war.

Lauriat, Charles Emelius, Jr. *The Lusitania's Last Voyage, being a Narrative of the Torpedoing and Sinking of the R. M. S. Lusitania by a German Submarine off the Irish Coast, May 7, 1915*. Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. vii, 159. \$1. Includes personal narrative of survivor, supplementary explanatory details, reprint and translation of account in *Frankfurter Zeitung* of May 9th, and text of report of Lord Mersey's inquiry, with comments.

Mücke, Kapitänleutnant Hellmuth von. *The Emden*; translated by Helene S. White. Boston, Ritter, 1917, p. viii, 219. \$1.25. The *Ayesha*, being the Adventure of the Landing Squad of the Emden, translated by Helene S. White. Boston, Ritter, 1917, p. vi, 225. \$1.25. Account of last voyage and fight of German naval vessel in Indian Ocean, and of remarkable exploit of part of crew under Mücke's command.

Noyes, Alfred. *Open Boats*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. 91. \$50. Based on narratives of those compelled to take refuge in open boats after their vessel has been sunk by submarine.

61. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEUTRAL RIGHTS.

Barclay, Sir Thomas. *The Law and Usage of War, a Practical Handbook of the Law and Usage of Land and Naval Warfare and Prize*. Boston, Houghton, 1914, p. xv, 245. \$1.50. Material arranged alphabetically, forming a small cyclopedia of law of war.

Brewer, Daniel Chauncey. *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals, a Discussion of Principles and Practices*. Putnam, 1916, p. ix, 260. \$1.25. Discusses questions of neutral rights which arose in first two years of war and argues that America must be prepared to safeguard its neutral rights.

*Brown, Philip Marshall. *International Realities*. Scribner, 1917, p. xvi, 233. \$1.40. Professor of International Law at Princeton discusses apparent breakdown of international law under strain of the war and seeks to determine what are realities in international intercourse. Technical problems are discussed in clear, readable style.

*Dampierre, Léon Michel Marie Jacques de, Marquis. *German Imperialism and International Law, based upon German Authorities and the Archives of the French Government*. Scribner, 1917, p. viii, 277. \$3.50. Shows principles and teachings underlying German imperialism are directly opposed to those at basis of international law, and that Germany's acts in the war were inevitable outcome of German teachings. Carefully documented, especially from German sources.

Deportation of Women and Girls from Lille. Doran, 1917, p. 81. \$50. Translation of French note on subject, with abundant confirmatory evidence from both French and German sources.

Germany's Violation of the Laws of War, 1914-15; compiled under the Auspices of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; translated by J. O. P. Bland. Putnam, 1915. \$2. Carefully compiled evidence, much from German sources; well translated.

**Grant, Arthur James, and others. *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Macmillan, 1916, p. viii, 207. \$75. Co-operative work by British writers; furnishes outlines for study of more obvious problems of international relations; may be used in study classes with Krehbiel's *Nationalism* and Seton-Watson's *War and Democracy*. Apparently hastily prepared, but richly suggestive.

Hazeltine, Harold Dexter. *The Law of the Air*, Three

Lectures Delivered in the University of London at the Request of its Faculty. London, Hodder, 1911, p. 160. 5s.

*Hershey, Amos Shurtle. *The Essentials of International Public Law*. Macmillan, 1912, p. xlvi, 558. \$3. Good, single volume manual, published shortly before the war. Will serve need of average reader who wishes to look up a topic. Has full bibliographies.

Higgins, Alexander Pearce. *War and the Private Citizen, Studies in International Law*. London, King, 1912, p. 216. 5s. *Defensively Armed Merchant Ships and Submarine Warfare*. London, Stevens, 1917, p. 56. Two treatises on special topics of international law brought into prominence by the war.

How Diplomats Make War, by a British Statesman; with Introduction by Albert Jay Nock. Huebsch, 1915, p. xviii, 376. \$1.50. Significant contribution to discussion of democratization of diplomacy.

*Phillipson, Coleman. *International Law and the Great War, with an Introduction by Sir John MacDonell*. Dutton, 1916, p. xxiv, 407. \$6. *Termination of War and Treaties of Peace*. Dutton, 1916, p. xix, 486. \$7. First is systematic effort to study causes and events of the war in light of the law of peace, law of war, and rights of neutrals. Written shortly after sinking of *Lusitania*. Will remain as collection of cases, rather than as authoritative text. Second is only scholarly monograph text in its field; thorough masterly study in anticipation of close of the war. Has as appendix twenty-six treaties, 1815-1913, concluding hostilities. Both works ignore German treatises on international law.

Piggott, Sir Francis Taylor. *The Neutral Merchant in Relation to the Law of War and Blockade under the Order in Council of 11th March, 1915*. London, University Press, 1915, p. 128. 2s. 6d. Perhaps best defense of British restrictions on neutral trade.

Pyke, Harold Reason. *The Law of Contraband of War*. Oxford Press, 1915, p. xl, 314. \$4.15. Historical treatment; includes cases in present war up to time of going to press; important documents in appendix; bibliography.

Roxburgh, Ronald Francis. *International Conventions and Third States*. Longmans, 1917, p. xvi, 119. \$2.50. Monograph on phase of international law never before specially investigated. Deals with construing international law with reference to municipal law.

*Satow, Sir Ernest Mason. *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. Longmans, 1917, 2 vols., p. xxi, 407; xii, 405. \$9. By experienced English diplomat. Wealth of information on diplomatic questions and procedure, particularly present day practice. Should be considered in discussing proposal to abolish secret diplomacy.

Smith, Sir Frederick Edwin. *The Destruction of Merchant Ships under International Law*. Dutton, 1917, p. 109. \$1.75. British Attorney General gives brief readable discussion of practically whole question of status of both enemy and neutral shipping in war time. Based on Phillipson.

Treherne, E. C. M. *British and Colonial Prize Cases; Reports of Prize Cases Decided during the Present War in the Courts of Great Britain and Overseas Dominions*. London, Stevens, Part I, 1915, p. 135. 7s. 6d.

62. NATIONALITY AND ITS PROBLEMS.

**Dominian, Leon. *The frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*. Holt, 1917, p. xviii, 375. \$3. Discusses relations of language and geographical features to nationality and political frontiers, with application to the various

concrete problems, especially in the Balkans. Illuminating maps. Best work of sort in English.

Grant, Madison. *The Passing of the Great Race, or the Racial Basis of European History*. Scribner, 1916, p. xxi, 245. \$2. Much scientific and historical data marred by dogmatic insistence on views for which proofs cannot be adduced, concerning the Nordic peoples and their destiny. Recalls Houston S. Chamberlain's work.

Hannah, Ian Campbell. *Arms and the Map, a Study of Nationalities and Frontiers*. Shaw, 1915, p. viii, 261. \$1.25. Attempts to give simple, clear, non-partisan view of the problems of nationality in Europe, due to difference between national areas and state boundaries.

Holdich, Sir Thomas Hungerford. *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making*. Macmillan, 1916, p. xii, 307. \$3.25. The author is an eminent English geographer with wide experience on boundary commissions. Excellent on historical and geographical facts and interesting for personal experience, but questionable on political considerations, for he strongly favors strategical frontiers. Unfortunately without maps.

*Krehbiel, Edward Benjamin. *Nationalism, War, and Society, a Study of Nationalism and its Concomitant, War, in their Relations to Civilization, and of the Fundamentals and the Progress of the Opposition to War; with an Introduction by Norman Angell*. Macmillan, 1916, p. xxxv, 276. \$1.50. Carefully prepared syllabus of topical studies, with good selections of references for reading.

**Muir, Ramsay. *Nationalism and Internationalism, the Culmination of Modern History*. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. 229. \$1.25. Despite its faults the general reader will find this an illuminating survey of the development of nationalism and of internationalism as forces in European history, especially since 1815. Denounces the Central Powers as the last menace to national freedom and hostile to the international idea.

*Rose, John Holland. *Nationality in Modern History*. Macmillan, 1916, p. xi, 202. \$1.25. Ten lectures by English historian on rise of present national states in Europe, especially in nineteenth century.

Tagore, Sir Rabindranath (Revindranatha Thakura). *Nationalism*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 159. \$1.25. Essays on nationalism in the West, in Japan, and in India; disapproves nationalism. Chief interest for personal or Hindu point of view.

**Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. *Nationality and the War*. Dutton, 1915, p. x, 522. \$2.50. *The New Europe, Some Essays in Reconstruction*, with an Introduction by the Earl of Cromer. Dutton, 1916, p. 85. \$1. By competent English historian, surveying, with some detail, the several problems of nationality in Europe, the rise of nationality and its effects, and some suggestions of solutions for the problems. The second volume supplements the first, and its introduction by Lord Cromer is noteworthy.

*Zangwill, Israel. *The Principle of Nationalities*. Macmillan, 1917, p. 116. \$1.50. A lecture, scathingly criticizing the work of Rose, Muir, and Toynbee. Perhaps the ablest analysis of nationality.

63. THE WAR AND DEMOCRACY.

Bryce, James Bryce, Viscount, and others. *The War of Democracy, the Allies' Statement, Chapters on the Fundamental Significance of the Struggle for a New Europe*. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1917, p. xxiv, 441. \$2. Two chapters by Belgian, three by French, and sixteen by English writers, mainly related to England's interest and activity in the war. Contains some of best utterances of

Bryce, Grey, Lloyd George, Balfour, Haldane, Murray and others.

Fisher, Herbert Albert Laurens. *The Republican Tradition in Europe*. Putnam, 1911, p. xii, 363. \$2.50. Chiefly concerned with development of republicanism in France since 1789, by English historical scholar, now President of Board of Education of Great Britain.

**Lippmann, Walter. *The Stakes of Diplomacy*. Holt, 1915, p. vii, 235. \$1.25. Strong argument for democratization of diplomacy; one of ablest discussions produced by the war; addressed to earnest, thoughtful reader. So closely argued that conclusions seem irresistible, but rests on too implicit acceptance of an economic interpretation of history.

Sellers, Roy Wood. *The Next Step in Democracy*. Macmillan, 1916, p. v, 275. \$1.50. Discussion of socialism and labor by assistant professor of philosophy, University of Michigan; marked by spirit of practicality. Written before United States entered the war, but has chapters on Reflections on the War, and Can We Universalize Democracy?

**Seton-Watson, Robert William; Wilson, John Dover; Zimmern, Alfred Eckhard; and Greenwood, Arthur. *The War and Democracy*. Macmillan, 1915, p. xiv, 390. \$3.80. Gives historical background, ultimate causes of the war, issues involved, probable solutions, and ideals and principles at stake. Allowing for individual views, perhaps, the best single book on fundamental causes and issues of the war.

Sims, Newell Leroy. *Ultimate Democracy and its Making*. Chicago, McClurg, 1917, p. 347. \$1.50. An interpretation of democracy from the sociological not the political point of view. Gives readable digest of much recent sociological discussion.

64. RESULTS OF THE WAR: PROBLEMS OF PEACE.

Bourne, Randolph Stillman, editor. *Towards an Enduring Peace, a Symposium of Peace Proposals and Programs, 1914-1916*, with an Introduction by Franklin H. Giddings. Association for International Conciliation, 1916, p. xv, 336. Compilation from writings of pacifists and other publicists, not official pronouncements.

*Buxton, Charles Roden, editor. *Towards a Lasting Settlement*. Dodd, 1917, revised edition, p. 216. \$2. Collection of essays by leading English pacifists on problems of nationality, territorial settlement, revision of maritime law, colonial affairs, and international co-operation to reduce war.

**Chéradame, André. *The Pangerman Plot Unmasked, Berlin's Formidable Peace-trap of The Drawn War*; with an Introduction by the Earl of Cromer. Scribner, 1917, p. xxxi, 235. \$1.25. Translation of a French work published early in 1916, but without corrections or additions to bring it up to date. Written without knowledge of Naumann's Central Europe, but with full knowledge of earlier literature of the sort, and with extensive study and observation in the countries concerned. Valuable for information on geographical problems, and one of the ablest analyses of the Pan-German and Central Europe schemes and their dangers.

Chéradame, André. *The United States and Pangermania*. Scribner, 1918, p. xii, 170. \$1. Germany is replaced by Pangermania whose existence menaces United States and freedom of the world; must be blocked by liquidation of Austria-Hungary and Polish independence. Author has spent twenty-two years studying and writing against pan-Germanism.

Chesterton, Cecil Edward. *The Perils of Peace; with Introduction by Hilaire Belloc*. London, Laurie, 1916, p. 239. 2s. A warning against a hasty or compromise peace. Does

not spare criticism of the ministry any more than of pacifist group in England.

Cook, Sir Theodore Andrea. *The Mark of the Beast*. London, Murray, 1917. 5s. An array of facts on German history, kultur, and atrocities as argument against inconclusive peace. Largely reprint of his *Kaiser, Krupp, and Kultur*.

**Cosmos, pseud. *The Basis of a Durable Peace*. Scribner, 1917, p. ix, 144. \$30. Reprint of articles contributed to the *New York Times* in November and December, 1916, by an eminent authority. After able analysis of the several problems solutions are suggested which accord with democratic conceptions of international law and of individual and national rights.

*Fayle, Charles Ernest. *The Great Settlement*. Duffield, 1915, p. xix, 309. \$1.75. Careful exposition of interests concerned in the war and in prospective peace, as territorial, colonial, and economic questions, and of principles involved. Author belongs to English pacifist school, but is not blind to facts.

*Hart, Albert Bushnell, editor. *Problems of Readjustment after the War*. Appleton, 1915, p. 186. \$1. Seven essays by as many competent American writers, dealing rather with probable effects of war upon fundamental conditions of life than with technical issues of future peace. Significance undiminished by American entrance into the war.

Hazen, Charles Downer, and others. *Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1917, p. 93. \$75. Professor Hazen writes on the Congress of Vienna; Dr. W. R. Thayer on the Congress of Paris, and Professor R. H. Lord on the Congress of Berlin. Professor A. C. Coolidge adds most illuminating article on Claimants to Constantinople. These scholarly essays deal particularly with organization and procedure of the three congresses.

*Headlam, James Wycliffe. *The Issue*. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. vii, 159. \$1. Reprint, with long introduction, of four articles from *Nineteenth Century and After*, analyzing and answering earlier German peace pronouncements. A review of Naumann's Central Europe is reprinted from *Westminster Gazette*. Broader issues are avoided, but German aims are rigorously exposed as impossible. Author is English, but adds to thorough information, sanity of view which makes this one of best books on issues of the war.

Herron, George Davis. *The Menace of Peace*. Kennerley, 1917, p. 110. \$1. Condemns an indecisive peace as a victory for German militarism which is eloquently denounced. Anti-Catholic.

*Hill, David Jayne. *The Rebuilding of Europe, a Survey of Forces and Conditions*. Century, 1917, p. x, 289. \$1.50. Fitted by wide research in diplomatic history and by long experience in American diplomatic service, author discusses abstractly causes and issues of the war; discusses but does not accept various schemes for internationalism. Chapter on America's interest in the new Europe; otherwise, concrete problems avoided.

*McClure, Samuel Sidney. *Obstacles to Peace*. Boston, Houghton, 1917, p. xxiii, 487. \$2. Contains important documents and much valuable information, marred by personal trivialities. Based on visits to warring countries. Emphasizes that war is a state of mind, and sets forth facts affecting development of that state of mind.

Schoonmaker, Edwin Davies. *The World Storm and Beyond*. Century, 1915, p. 294. \$2. Emphasizes importance of reforms and social changes in progress in Europe in war-

time and that United States should heed them in order to maintain its own progress. Stimulates thought even if it fails to persuade.

*Veblen, Thorstein B. *An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of its Perpetuation*. Macmillan, 1917, p. xiii, 367. \$2. One of the most thorough and philosophical discussions of war and peace with special reference to the present struggle. Style incisive but not easy. Views, socialistic or at least anti-capitalistic. Completed in February, 1917. Presented definite set of peace terms.

65. THE WAR AGAINST WAR.

*Angell, Norman (pseud. of Ralph Norman Angell Lane). *The Great Illusion, a Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*. Putnam, 1910, fourth revised and enlarged edition, 1913, p. xxii, 416. \$1. *Arms and Industry* (English edition, *Foundations of International Polity*). Putnam, 1914, p. xlv, 248. \$1.25. The first had wide currency before the war and won author his fame as exponent of pacifism; the second is companion volume issued on eve of the war, arguing against militarism and nationality and for an international polity.

*Bloch, Ivan Stanislavovich. *The Future of War in its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations: Is War Now Impossible? With a Prefatory Conversation with the Author by W. T. Stead*; translated by R. C. Long. Doubleday, 1899, p. lxxix, 380. \$2. (Ginn, 1902, \$65.) Somewhat technical array of facts and arguments based on nineteenth century developments, with special reference to Great Britain, Germany, France, and Russia. Said to have influenced Nicholas II to call First Hague Conference.

*Brailsford, Henry Noel. *The War of Steel and Gold, a Study of the Armed Peace*. Macmillan, 1916, sixth edition, p. 340. \$3.80. First published in May, 1914. Postscript chapter and some notes appear in third and later editions. Describes balance of power between rival alliances and economic interests involved; proceeds to constructive criticism, suggesting a new concert of Europe. English author professes intellectual passion for peace, but his keen sense of facts saves him from pitfalls of sentimental pacifists.

**Eliot, Charles William. *The Road toward Peace, a Contribution to the Study of the Causes of the European War and of the Means of Preventing War in the Future*. Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xv, 228. \$1. Ex-President Eliot of Harvard has approached the problems with his accustomed gravity and acumen. One of best American discussions of the war as a war of ideas, but treatment is unfortunately not systematic, for volume is only a collection of occasional papers and addresses, of which several additional ones are included in second edition, September, 1915.

Howe, Frederic Clemson. *Why War?* Scribner, 1916, p. 366. \$1.50. Attributes wars to munition makers, high finance, and secret diplomacy; declares, "Peace is the problem of democracy."

Hugins, Roland. *Germany Misjudged, an Appeal to International Good Will in the Interest of a Lasting Peace*. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1916, p. 111. \$1. *The Possible Peace, a Forecast of World Politics after the War*. Century, 1916, p. xiv, 198. \$1.25. First, published before sinking of Lusitania, is habitually neutral, but in case of doubt inclines to German view. Second, published after sinking of Lusitania, condemns militarism and war, criticizes various nations, including United States, sharply; fears that after the war "the general problem of international peace will not be much nearer solution;" consequently advocates American preparedness.

Jordan, David Starr. *War and the Breed, the Relation of War to the Downfall of Nations.* Boston, American Unitarian Assn., 1915, p. 265. \$1.35. Argument that war, by extinguishing the strongest, weakens the race.

*Key, Ellen Karolina Sofia. *War, Peace, and the Future, a Consideration of Nationalism and Internationalism and of the Relation of Women to War;* translated by Hildegard Norberg. Putnam, 1916, p. x, 271. \$1.50. Calm, cool, comprehensive presentation of facts and deduction of conclusions. By Swedish author and leader in woman and peace movements.

Liebknecht, Karl Paul August Friedrich. *Militarism.* Huebsch, 1917. \$1. Thorough-going indictment by famous German socialist; suppressed in Germany. Original published in Leipzig, 1907; third German edition in Zürich, 1911.

McCormick, Howard Fowler. *Via Pacis, How Terms of Peace Can Be Automatically Prepared while the War is Still Going On.* Chicago, McClurg, 1917, p. 45. \$60. Proposes novel scheme for constant interchange of desired or acceptable terms.

Macdonald, John Archibald Murray. *European International Relations.* London, Unwin, 1916, p. 144. 2s. 6d. Argues that sovereign nations need a tribunal over them as much as do free men; appeared in part in *Contemporary Review*, April, 1915.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *Armaments and Arbitration, or the Place of Force in the International Relations of States.* Harper, 1912, p. 259. Argument that armament and even war are necessary in international relations. Replies to Angell's Great Illusion.

Quin, Malcolm. *The Problem of Human Peace Studied from the Standpoint of a Scientific Catholicism.* Dutton, 1917, p. 275. \$1. Catholicism, somewhat modernized, is the cure for war and guarantee of peace.

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William. *Justice in War-time.* Chicago, Open Court Publishing Co., 1916, p. ix, 243. \$1. Non-resistance argument by able English pacifist. Review of Entente policy in reply to Professor Gilbert Murray, and chapter "On What Our Policy Ought to Have Been" are noteworthy.

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William. *Why Men Fight, a Method of Abolishing the International Duel.* (Title, English edition: *Principles of Social Reconstruction.*) Century, 1917, p. 272. \$1.50. Places responsibility for war not so much upon matters of national or international concern as upon human instincts, which must be schooled against war. The book has glaring faults along with much that is excellent.

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William. *Political Ideals.* Century, 1917, p. 172. \$1. Reiterates his ideas on nationalism and internationalism, but also deals with individual liberty and public control, capitalism and socialism. Excellent style but inadequate analysis of problems.

Taylor, Charles Fremont. *A Conclusive Peace, presenting the Historically Logical, and a Feasible Plan of Action for the Coming Peace Conference, Which Will Co-ordinate and Harmonize Europe, and the World.* Philadelphia, Winston, 1916, p. 173. \$50. By editor of *Equity*. Utilizes pacifist stock in trade; suggestive but not critical. Proposes world congress similar to Congress of United States, and other devices for international government.

Warden, Archibald A. *Common Sense Patriotism;* Preface by Norman Angell. Dillingham, 1916, p. lxx, 129. \$1. Believes right is not all on one side, that discussion would secure peace; relates his efforts to secure conference at Berne.

Wells, Herbert George. *War That Will End War.* Duffield, 1914, p. 106. \$75. *What Is Coming? A European Forecast.* Macmillan, 1916, p. 294. \$1.50. First is collection of occasional papers produced in first weeks of the war. Both reveal the prophetic desire to play with facts that characterizes Mr. Britling Sees It Through (1916) and much of the author's other writing.

Woods, Frederick Adams, and Baltzly, Alexander. *Is War Diminishing? A Study of the Prevalence of War in Europe from 1450 to the Present Day.* Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xi, 105. \$1. Whatever may be said of their scientific method, the selection of their historical premises can scarcely meet approval.

66. LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE: LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

Ashbee, Charles R. *The American League to Enforce Peace. An English Interpretation;* with Introduction by G. L. Dickinson. London, Allen & Unwin, 1917, p. 92. 2s. 6d. Author was an Englishman present at inauguration of the League, of which he approves. Discusses international significance of United States.

*Brailsford, Henry Noel. *The League of Nations.* Macmillan, 1917, p. vii, 332. \$1.75. Calm, dispassionate discussion of many of problems of the war and of suggestions for their solution, especially of the League to Enforce Peace, by an Englishman.

Bryce, James Bryce, Viscount, and others. *Proposals for the Prevention of Future Wars.* London, Allen & Unwin, 1917. 1s. Scheme similar to League to Enforce Peace.

Bryce, James Bryce, Viscount. *Some Historical Reflections on War, Past and Present.* Oxford Press, 1917, p. 28. 1s. Two addresses as president of the British Academy in June, 1915 and June, 1916. Includes some discussion of international law in war time, of international public opinion, and of a league of nations.

*Butler, Nicholas Murray. *A World in Ferment, Interpretations of the War for a New World.* Scribner, 1917, p. viii, 254. \$1.25. Collection of addresses delivered from September, 1914, to June, 1917, on war questions. Thoughtful, practical, and inspired with constructive ideals.

Collin, Christen Christian Dreyer. *The War against War, and the Enforcement of Peace;* with Introduction by William Archer. Macmillan, 1917, p. xii, 163. \$80. Collection of essays by an eminent professor in the University of Christiania, with special reference to the league of nations idea.

Coulton, George Gordon. *The Main Illusions of Pacifism, a Criticism of Mr. Norman Angell and the Union of Democratic Control.* Macmillan, 1916, p. xv, 295, lxii. \$2. Collection of anti-pacifist articles intended to promote a British policy of national defence.

*Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes. *The Choice Before Us.* Dodd, 1917, p. xiii, 268. \$2. Denounces militarism and economic war; sees hope only in international organization which must include all great powers, even Germany. Powerful arguments by an earnest, able advocate of world peace.

*Fried, Alfred Hermann. *The Restoration of Europe;* translated by Lewis Stiles Garnett. Macmillan, 1916, p. xiv, 157. \$1. Original published in April, 1915, by native of Vienna, for fifteen years editor of the *Friedens-Warte* in Berlin, since the war in Zürich. Author, who received Nobel prize in 1911, suggests co-operative union of Europe, starting like Pan-American Union, which might lead ulti-

mately to political co-operation. "A European union is at present more desirable than a world-wide one."

*Goldsmith, Robert. *A League to Enforce Peace;* with a special introduction by A. Lawrence Lowell. Macmillan, 1917, p. xxvi, 331. \$1.50. Volume for study classes on inadequacy or failure of other means of securing peace and on the plan of the League to Enforce Peace and reasons in favor of it. Several chapters against militarism. Contains bibliography.

League to Enforce Peace. *Enforced Peace, Proceedings of the First Annual National Assemblage.* League to Enforce Peace, 1917, p. vi, 204. \$50. Collection of papers on various phases of subject, especially from side of United States.

Marburg, Theodore. *The League of Nations, a Chapter in the History of the Movement.* Macmillan, 1917, p. 139. \$50. History of League to Enforce Peace movement by one of its originators.

67. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE WAR.

Babson, Roger Ward. *The Future of Nations; Prosperity, How It Must Come; Economic Facts for Business Men* (1914, p. 123. \$1). *The Future of World Peace, a Book of Charts showing Facts Which Must Be Recognized in Future Plans for Peace; the Prospects for Peace* (1915, second edition, p. 142. \$1). Wellesley Hills, Mass., Babson's Statistical Organization. Contain much statistical matter on economic and financial affairs, but are arguments for an international government.

Barron, Clarence Walker. *The Audacious War.* Boston, Houghton, 1915, p. xiv, 192. \$1. Collected papers on business problems underlying the war by editor of Boston News Bureau who visited Europe in early months of war to observe financial affairs at first hand. Clear, concise, vigorous style; keen insight.

Bowley, Arthur Lyon. *The Effect of the War on the External Trade of the United Kingdom, an Analysis of the Monthly Statistics, 1906-1914.* Putnam, 1915, p. viii, 56. \$60. Professor of statistics in University of London makes comparative study with reference to last five months of 1914. Excellent; relevant only to exact period considered.

Byers, Norman R. *World Commerce in its Relation to the British Empire.* London, King, 1916, p. 104. 1s.

Claes, Jules. *The German Mole, a Study in the Art of Peaceful Penetration.* Macmillan, 1915, p. xiv, 143. \$1. Articles on methods of German peaceful penetration in Belgium, especially Antwerp, published by editor of *La Métropole* in his Antwerp journal in August and September, 1914. English edition has introduction by J. Holland Rose.

Clapp, Edwin James. *The Economic Aspects of the War, Neutral Rights, Belligerent Claims, and American Commerce in the Years 1914-1915.* New Haven, Yale Press, 1915, p. xiv, 340. \$1.50. Apparently written before sinking of Lusitania. Mainly criticism of British policy of trade restriction. Deals with import and export situation with special reference to cotton and copper.

Colvin, Ian D. *The Unseen Hand in English History.* London, National Review Office, 1917. 7s. 6d. Continues his Germans in England, reviewing events since Tudor times. A tract of protectionist argument, spiced with anti-Germanism.

Dibblee, George Binney. *Germany's Economic Position and England's Commercial and Industrial Policy after the War.* London, Heinemann, 1917, p. 108. 1s. Published by English Central Committee for National Patriotic Organizations. Describes German industrial and commercial methods and outlines a revised policy for England. Moderate in tone.

Eltzbacher, Paul. *Germany's Food, Can It Last? Germany's Food and England's Plan to Starve Her Out, a Study by German Experts;* English Version edited by S. R. Wells. London, Hodder, 1915, p. 264. 2s.

England's Financial Supremacy, a Translation of *Die Englische Finanzmacht; England's Falsche Rechnung; Deutschland und die Erbschaft der City* from the *Frankfurter Zeitung;* with Introduction and Notes by the Translators. Macmillan, 1917, p. xv, 106. \$1.25. Original articles by financial authority appeared in November, 1915; argue that Germany's (forced) reliance on home resources is more advantageous than England's dependence on outside financial aid. Some forecasts have already failed of fulfillment.

Gill, Conrad. *National Power and Prosperity, a Study of the Economic Causes of Modern Warfare.* London, Unwin, 1916, p. 208. 4s. 6d. Based on lectures to workingmen by English college teacher. Principally concerned with past wars but with present one in mind.

Girault, Arthur. *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France;* edited by C. Gide. Oxford Press, 1916, p. viii, 305. \$2.50. A general historical and critical account, with specific accounts of each colony.

Gourvitch, Paul Pensac. *How Germany Does Business, Chapters on Export and Finance Methods, with a Preface by Dr. B. E. Shatsky.* Huebsch, 1917, p. 142. \$1. Shatsky's preface written from Russian point of view after Revolution of March, 1917. Twenty-three short chapters, mainly on various phases of credits and export trade. Has special reference to Russia.

Grunzel, Josef. *Economic Protectionism;* edited by Eugen von Philippovich. Oxford Press, 1916, p. xiv, 357. \$2.90. Sympathetic, comprehensive study of both import duties and other protective measures, by an Austrian.

Harris, Winthrop & Company. *American Business as Affected by Peace and Preparedness, the Composite Opinion of Seventeen Hundred American Business Men.* Chicago, Harris, Winthrop & Company, 1916, p. 80.

*Hauser, Henri. *Germany's Commercial Grip on the World, her Business Methods Explained;* translated by Manfred Emanuel. Scribner, 1917, p. xv, 259. \$1.65. Translation of *Les Méthodes Allemandes d'Expansion Economique,* which has passed through several editions. Thorough, moderate, discriminating study. Urges keeping out of Germany's economic grip in future and emulating her systematic, hard work.

Hirst, Francis Wrigley. *Political Economy of War.* Dutton, 1915, p. xii, 327. \$2. Former editor of *The Economist* (London) writes with special reference to England, dealing with policy and economics of war, and war debts; treatment is largely historical. About forty pages refer to present war. Author's preconceptions were pacifist. Close study of facts with wealth of detail, though not too technical for layman.

Jones, J. H. *The Economics of War and Conquest, an Examination of Mr. Norman Angell's Economic Doctrines.* London, King, 1915, p. 178. 2s. 6d. Relates specifically to *The Great Illusion*, but is really a critical analysis of economic contentions of pacifists against militarism to sift out the false and to place the argument on sound foundations.

Lawson, W. R. *British War Finance, 1914-15.* Van Nostrand, 1915, p. vi, 367. \$2. Full, rather technical study.

MacDonald, Allan John MacDonald. *Trade, Politics, and Christianity in Africa and the East;* with an Introduction by Sir Harry Johnston. Longmans, 1916, p. xxi, 295. \$2. Discussion of the problem of contact with and control of backward peoples.

Millioud, Maurice. *The Ruling Caste and Frenzied Trade in Germany*; translated with an Introduction by Sir Frederick Pollock. Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. 159. \$1. Caste section of volume is slashing attack on H. S. Chamberlain and German chauvinists; trade part is clear, concise, vigorous arraignment of German economic activities, financial situation, and imperialistic policy. Conclusions will command less confidence than when written.

*Noyes, Alexander Dana. *Financial Chapters of the War*. Scribner, 1916, p. xi, 255. \$1.25. Financial editor of *New York Evening Post* and *The Nation* studies effect of the war on American financial conditions during first two years of war, and American financing of Europe in same period. Also three chapters on probable economic and financial results.

O'Farrell, Horace Handley. *The Franco-German War Indemnity and its Economic Results*. London, Harrison, 1913, p. 90. 1s. Author seeks to prove that Germany's exaction of war indemnity was unfortunate for itself. Bibliography of dozen pages.

Schuster, Ernest Joseph. *The Effect of War and Moratorium on Commercial Transactions*. Bender, 1914, second edition revised and enlarged, p. viii, 166. \$1.25.

Withers, Hartley. *The War and Lombard Street*. Dutton, 1915, p. viii, 171. \$1.25. Clear account from London banking point of view of extraordinary financial situation precipitated by the war. Covers to December, 1914. Appendix of special statutes and other documents.

68. WOMEN AND THE WAR.

Addams, Jane; Balch, Emily Greene; and Hamilton, Alice. *Women at the Hague, the International Congress of Women and its Results*. Macmillan, 1915, p. vii, 171. 75 cents. Account of notable unofficial movement for peace.

Atherton, Mrs. Gertrude Franklin (Horn). *The Living Present*. New York, Stokes, 1917, p. xvi, 303. \$1.50. Observations made in 1916 of activities of French women in war work. Discusses fully relations of the war and feminism.

Gribble, Francis Henry. *Women in War*. Dutton, 1916. \$2.75. Series of biographical and historical sketches written before the war, with an epilogue dealing with women in the earlier part of the present war.

Hewes, Amy, and Walter, Henriette R. *Women as Munition Makers; and Munition Workers in England and France*. Russell Sage Foundation, 1917. 75 cents. First article by Miss Hewes reports investigations for the Foundation made in Bridgeport, Conn., in 1916; the second, by Miss Walter summarizes British official reports.

Replier, Agnes. *Countercurrents*. Boston, Houghton, 1916, p. iii, 291. \$1.25. Collection of essays includes one on Women and War.

Stone, Gilbert, editor. *Women War Workers*. Crowell, 1917, p. 320. \$1.65. Composed largely of accounts written by women engaged in the several forms of war work. Almost entirely English.

69. SOCIALISM AND THE WAR.

*Walling, William English, editor. *The Socialists and the War, a Documentary Statement of the Position of the Socialists of all Countries, with Special Reference to their Peace Policy, including a Summary of the Revolutionary State Socialist Measures Adopted by the Governments at War*. Holt, 1915, p. xii, 512. \$1.50. Well edited mass of information.

70. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAR: PHILOSOPHICAL.

Bergson, Henri Louis. *The Meaning of the War*. Macmillan, 1915, p. 47. \$40. Early pronouncement by famous French philosopher; indicts Prussian unification of Germany.

Boutroux, Emile. *Philosophy and War*, translated by Fred Rothwell. Dutton, 1917, p. xii, 212. \$1.75. An analysis of German and of French philosophical ideas in their relation to the war, by eminent French philosopher. Style clear and simple.

Richard, Paul. *To the Nations*. Pond, 1917, p. xv, 79. \$1. Translated from the French with introduction by Sir Rabindranath Tagore. Declares purpose of the war is destruction of old evil, root and branch, to make way for better and truer civilization whose ideals are discussed.

71. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAR: SOCIOLOGICAL.

Bosanquet, Bernard. *Social and International Ideals*. Macmillan, 1917, p. ix, 325. \$2.25. Collection of essays, reviews, and lectures, all but one of which were published before the war. Interesting for ideas on pacifism, patriotism, and political elements in the social structure.

Burnet, John. *Higher Education and the war*. Macmillan, 1917, p. x, 238. \$1.50. Most of material was already published in 1913 by this professor in University at St. Andrew's. Discusses systems of higher education in several countries, especially interesting on Germany, in whose system much is commended.

Ellis, Henry Havelock. *Essays in War-time*. Houghton, 1916, p. 247. \$1.50. Author is voluminous English writer on sociological, psychological and sexual questions. Of these eighteen essays only first six deal directly with war questions, such as evolution and war, war and eugenics, war and the birth-rate, and war and democracy.

*Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawney. *The World in Conflict*. London, Unwin, 1915, second edition, 1916, p. 104. 1s. Questions of War and Peace. London, Unwin, 1916, 3s. 6d. Two collections of articles by eminent professor of sociology in University of London. Simplicity of style and sanity of thought mark his efforts to discover basal significance of war and nationality and their interrelation in the first, and his Platonic dialogues on the soul of civilization and the hope of the world in the second.

Lodge, Sir Oliver. *The War and After, Short Chapters on Subjects of Serious Practical Import for the Average Citizen in A. D., 1915, Onwards*. London, Methuen, 1915, sixth edition, p. xiii, 240. 1s. Three groups of essays dealing with past, present and future of the war. Quotes others freely. Gives special attention to ideals and social conditions. Records Sir Oliver's mental states rather than contributes to elucidation of problems.

Marvin, Francis Sydney, editor. *Progress and History*. Oxford Press, 1917, p. 314. \$3.75. A series of essays by distinguished English thinkers in continuation of "The Unity of Western Civilization" (1916). The basic problem is general, but the specific problem of the war is pervasive in these able discussions.

Mitchell, Peter Chalmers. *Evolution and the War*. Dutton, 1915, p. 114. \$1. Secretary of Zoological Society of London presents scientific facts to prove that German notion that war is essential element in process of natural selection is not in accord with Darwinian theory.

72. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAR: POLITICAL.

Baty, Thomas, and Morgan, John Hartman. *War, its Conduct and its Legal Results*. Dutton, 1915, p. 578. \$3.50. Scholarly treatise of effects of the war upon English administration and legislation, but not too technical for popular reader and not without value for Americans. Chapter on Laws of War on Land is significant for light thrown on German theory and method of warfare.

Hobson, John Atkinson. *Imperialism, a Study*. Pott, 1902, second edition, 1915, p. viii, 331. \$2.75. Towards International Government. Macmillan, 1916. \$1. First is diagnosis of economic and cultural aspects of imperialism, a product of liberal revolt against Boer war. Second voices liberal revolt against high finance and secret diplomacy as causes of present war. Suggests international council. Clear, well reasoned, thoughtful, optimistic.

The International Crisis, the Theory of the State. Oxford Press, 1916, p. viii, 164. \$1.80. Bedford College lectures for 1916, by six different speakers, dealing with church and state, state and morality, might and right, state and society, egoism, personal and national, and idea of general will.

Phillips, Lisle March. *Europe Unbound*. Scribner, 1917. \$1.75. The author, an Englishman, shows deep insight and clear appreciation in discussing the fundamental differences in national ideals. The analysis of English political thought is remarkable, and the essay on liberty is notable.

73. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Conway, Sir Martin. *The Crowd in Peace and War*. Longman's, 1915, p. 332. \$1.75. Careful general study of crowd psychology written in clear interesting style, but some premises and more conclusions are debatable.

Crile, George Washington. *A Mechanistic View of War and Peace*, edited by Amy F. Rowland. Macmillan, 1915, p. 104. \$1.25. Interesting record of observations of campaign in Belgium and France to battle of the Marne and of "the behavior of man when under the influence of the strongest emotional and physical stress—man at war," by professor of surgery in Western Reserve University. Marred by reiteration of his familiar notions which have not received approval of philosophic thinkers.

Eastman, Max. *Understanding Germany; the Only Way to End the War, and Other Essays*. Kennerley, 1916, p. 169. \$1.25. Editor of *The Masses* reprints articles from that and other journals; gives psychological analysis of anti-German hate and of patriotism. Contains much that is thoughtful and stimulating on psychology of the war and other war topics, but author disclaims national loyalty and fails to see wherein the Allies are better than the Germans.

Le Bon, Gustave. *The Psychology of the Great War*; translated by E. Andrews. Macmillan, 1916, p. 479. \$3. The author is well-known French authority on social psychology, but his carelessness in ascertaining facts and his lack of impartial attitude impair seriously the value of the volume.

Machen, Author. *The Bowman and Other Legends of the War*. Putnam, 1915, p. 77. \$75. Author, a devout Catholic, wrote story of St. George and the bowmen of England saving an English army. This story and other legends are published with introduction showing how a piece of fiction grew to a myth of the present war.

Trotter, W. *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. Macmillan, 1916, p. 213. \$1.25. Basis of book are two articles published in 1908-9 by English author in *Sociological Review*. These studies in social psychology have been somewhat enriched by materials relating to the war and comparisons of English and German character.

74. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAR: ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS.

Adler, Felix. *The World Crisis and its Meaning*. Appleton, 1915, p. 232. \$1.50. Collection of addresses, including the world crisis and its meaning, militarism and its eulogists, American ideals contrasted with German and English, the illusion and ideal of international peace, civilization and progress in light of present war. Popular presentation of ethical considerations; inclined to neglect the practical.

Burroughs, Edward Arthur. *The Fight for the Future, with a Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury*. London, Nisbet, 1917. 1s. *The Valley of Decision, a Plea for Wholeness in Thought and Life*. Longmans, 1916, p. xix, 391. \$1.60. Two books containing discussions of the religious significance of the war.

Campbell, Reginald John. *The War and the Soul*. Dodd, 1916, p. ix, 300. \$1.25. Popular newspaper articles by Church of England clergymen to help those whose faith is shaken by the evils of the war. Discussions cover various timely topics and questions.

*For the Right, *Essays and Addresses by Members of the "Fight for Right Movement"*. Putnam, 1917. \$1.50. Addresses by Lord Bryce, Dr. L. P. Jacks, Sir Frederick Pollock, Professor Gilbert Murray and many other able English thinkers to explain the principles and to uphold the ideals for which the Allies are fighting and to prevent diversion by mercenary or retaliatory motives.

*Hankey, Donald William Alers. *A Student in Arms, with an Introduction by J. St. Loe Strachey* (p. 290. \$1.50). Second Series (p. iv, 246. \$1.50). Dutton, 1917. Record of intellectual and spiritual experiences and speculations written on firing line by Oxford man who was killed in action in October, 1916. Second series contains a biographical article by his sister. First volume has been one of most widely read war books.

*The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects, *Six Lectures Delivered in February and March, 1915, at Bedford College for Women by Eleanor M. Sedgwick, Gilbert Murray, A. C. Bradley, L. P. Jacks, G. F. Stout, and Bernard Bosanquet*. Oxford Press, 1915, p. 155. \$1.15. Discussions of ethics of war and patriotism by leaders of English thought.

Loisy, Alfred Firmin. *The War and Religion*, translated by Arthur Galton. Longmans, 1915, p. \$50. Keen discussion of origins of the war; criticizes Christianity and the papal neutrality; considers patriotism the religious power of the future. American readers unfamiliar with French conditions and thought will find book somewhat puzzling.

Palmer, Frederick. *With our Faces in the Light*. Dodd, 1917, p. 123. \$50. Charming effort to impress the finer meaning of the war for America; by well known war correspondent.

War and the Spirit of Youth. Boston, Atlantic Monthly, 1917, p. 110. \$1. Reprint of three spiritual interpretations of the war by Maurice Barrès of French Academy, Sir Francis Younghusband, English soldier, and Anne C. E. Allinson, American authoress.

75. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE WAR: BY MEN OF LETTERS.

Loti, Pieree, pseud. (Louis Marie Julien Viaud). War translated from the French by Marjorie Laurie. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1917, p. 320. \$1.25. Collection of war sketches, written between August, 1914, and April, 1916, by members of French Academy.

*Maeterlinck, Maurice. The Wrack of the Storm, translated by A. Teixeira de Mattos. Dodd, 1916, p. 330. \$1.50. Public utterances of author in first two years of war chronologically arranged. Chief value as record of author's reactions to the war; much of it below his normal level of style. Recognizes and emphasizes moral issues.

*Rolland, Romain. Above the Battle, translated by C. K. Ogden. Chicago, Open Court Publishing Company, 1916, p. 194. \$1. Collection of essays by French musical critic and pacifist who received Nobel prize for literature in 1915, and who has been engaged in work of International Agency for Prisoners of War in Switzerland since outbreak of war, and has become unpopular in France. Despite attitude of detachment indicated by title, and lack of unity, book is marked by deep moral earnestness and eloquent style. "No saner counsel has yet been heard above the turmoil of the conflict."

*Wister, Owen. The Pentecost of Calamity. Macmillan, 1915, p. 148. \$50. Fifteen admirable vignettes, by American author, showing with fine insight the issues of the war and the human element in it. Emphasizes American interest in moral issues of the war.

Zangwill, Israel. The War for the World. Macmillan, 1916, p. 455. \$1.75. Collection of brilliant essays discussing various questions of the war with special introductory chapter. Shows more sympathy with his race than with his country. Denounces fighting Germans with German methods.

76. ATLASES.

[For brief bibliography of War Maps and Atlases, see page 82 of this collection, and THE HISTORY TEACHER'S MAGAZINE, April, 1918.]

77. PAMPHLET SERIES.

Columbia War Papers. Columbia University, 1917. Eleven numbers have been issued and more are announced; sold at nominal figures. Deal mainly with economic problems of the war. Note especially Seligman and Haig's How to Finance the War.

The History Teacher's Magazine War Reprints. Philadelphia, McKinley Publishing Co., 1918. Each 10 to 25 cents, according to size. No. 1, The Study of the Great War, by S. B. Harding; No. 2, Belgian War Curiosities, by C. Gauss; No. 3, Selected Critical Bibliography of the War, by G. M. Dutcher; No. 4, Geography of the War, with many maps. Others in active preparation.

*Oxford Pamphlets, 1914-1915. Oxford Press, 1914-15, 19 vols. Each \$40. Completed series of 19 volumes contains 86 pamphlets, written by leading English authorities on problems and events of the war. Historical numbers are often illustrated with clear sketch maps. Many of these pamphlets offer best brief accounts or discussions of subjects easily accessible in English.

Papers for War Time, Published under the Auspices of a Committee Drawn from Various Christian Bodies and Political Parties, and edited by Rev. W. Temple. Oxford Press, 1914-15, 36 numbers, each \$.08. Series is completed;

devoted chiefly to moral and religious aspects of the war; by English writers.

The University of Chicago War Papers. Chicago, University Press, 1917-18. Each \$.05. Four issues have appeared, including The Threat of German World-Politics, by President Judson; Americans and the World-Crisis, by Professor Small; and Sixteen Causes of the War, by Professor McLaughlin.

University of North Carolina Extension Leaflets: War Information Series. Chapel Hill, N. C., 1917-18. Eleven issues have appeared.

78. COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION: PUBLICATIONS.

*Red, White, and Blue Series: 1. How the War Came to America (p. 32); 2. National Service Handbook (p. 246); 3. The Battle Line of Democracy (a collection of patriotic prose and poetry, p. 134. \$1.5); 4. The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans (p. 32); 5. Conquest and Kultur (quotations from German writers revealing the plans and purposes of pan-Germany, p. 160); 6. German War Practices, Part I. Treatment of Civilians, p. 91); 7. War Cyclopedic, a Handbook for Ready Reference on the Great War (p. 321, \$.25); 8. German Treatment of Conquered Territory; Part II. of German War Practices (p. 61); 9. War, Labor, and Peace, Some Recent Addresses and Writings of the President (American Reply to the Pope, address to the American Federation of Labor, message to Congress, Dec. 4, 1917, addresses to Congress, Jan. 8, and Feb. 11, 1918, p. 40).

*War Information Series: 101. The War Message and the Facts behind It (p. 32); 102. The Nation in Arms (two addresses by Secretaries Lane and Baker, p. 16); 103. The Government of Germany, by Charles D. Hazen (p. 16); 104. The Great War, From Spectator to Participant, by A. C. McLaughlin (p. 16); 105. A War of Self-Defense (addresses by Secretary of State Lansing and Assistant Secretary of Labor Post, p. 22); 106. American Loyalty (by American citizens of German descent, p. 24); 107. Amerikanische Bürgertreue (German translation of 106); 108. American Interest in Popular Government Abroad, by E. B. Greene, p. 16); 109. Home Reading Course for Citizen Soldiers, Prepared by the War Department (p. 62); 110. First Session of the War Congress (complete summary of all legislation, p. 48); 111. The German War Code, by G. W. Scott and J. W. Garner (p. 16); 112. American and Allied Ideals, by Stuart P. Sherman (p. 24); 113. German Militarism and its German Critics, by Charles Altschul (p. 40); 114. The War for Peace, by Arthur D. Call (Views of American peace organizations and leaders in the present war); 115. Why America Fights Germany, by John S. P. Tatlock (p. 13); 116. The Activities of the Committee on Public Information (p. 20); 117. The Study of the Great War, by Samuel B. Harding.

Loyalty Leaflets: 201. Friendly Words to the Foreign Born, by Judge Joseph Buffington; 202. The Prussian System, by Frederic C. Walcott; 203. Labor and the War, President Wilson's Address to the American Federation of Labor, Nov. 12, 1917; 204. A War Message to the Farmer, by the President; 205. Plain Issues of the War, by Elihu Root; 206. Ways to Serve the Nation, a Proclamation by the President, April 16, 1917; 207. What Really Matters, by a Well Known Newspaper Writer.

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PART VI.

Statutes of the United States Relating to the State of War

April 6, 1917, to May 20, 1918

DECLARATION OF WAR WITH GERMANY, APRIL 6, 1917.¹

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Approved, April 6, 1917.

JOINT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE TAKING OVER OF ENEMY VESSELS, MAY 12, 1917.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President be, and he is hereby, authorized to take over to the United States the immediate possession and title of any vessel within the jurisdiction thereof, including the Canal Zone and all territories and insular possessions of the United States except the American Virgin Islands, which at the time of coming into such jurisdiction was owned in whole or in part by any corporation, citizen, or subject of any nation with which the United States may be at war when such vessel shall be taken, or was flying the flag of or was under register of any such nation or any political subdivision or municipality thereof; and, through the United States Shipping Board, or any department or agency of the Government, to operate, lease, charter, and equip such vessel in any service of the United States, or in any commerce, foreign or coastwise.

SEC. 2. That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to appoint, subject to the approval of the President, a board of survey, whose duty it shall be to ascertain the actual value of the vessel, its equipment, appurtenances, and all property contained therein, at the time of its taking, and to make a written report of their findings to the Secretary of the Navy, who shall preserve such report with the records of his department. These findings shall be considered as competent evidence in all proceedings on any claim for compensation.

Approved, May 12, 1917.

SELECTIVE DRAFT ACT, MAY 18, 1917.²

An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives

¹ For the President's proclamations concerning the state of war, responsibilities of aliens, and treasonable acts, see pages 169-171.

² For the President's proclamation setting June 5, 1917, as registration day, see p. 171.

of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in view of the existing emergency, which demands the raising of troops in addition to those now available, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized—

First. Immediately to raise, organize, officer, and equip all or such number of increments of the Regular Army provided by the national defense Act approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, or such parts thereof as he may deem necessary; to raise all organizations of the Regular Army, including those added by such increments, to the maximum enlisted strength authorized by law. . . .

Second. To draft into the military service of the United States, organize, and officer, in accordance with the provisions of section one hundred and eleven of said national defense Act, so far as the provisions of said section may be applicable and not inconsistent with the terms of this Act, any or all members of the National Guard and of the National Guard Reserves, and said members so drafted into the military service of the United States shall serve therein for the period of the existing emergency unless sooner discharged: *Provided*, That when so drafted the organizations or units of the National Guard shall, so far as practicable, retain the State designations of their respective organizations.

Third. To raise by draft as herein provided, organize and equip an additional force of five hundred thousand enlisted men, or such part or parts thereof as he may at any time deem necessary, and to provide the necessary officers, line and staff, for said force and for organizations of the other forces hereby authorized, or by combining organizations of said other forces, by ordering members of the Officers' Reserve Corps to temporary duty in accordance with the provisions of section thirty-eight of the national defense Act approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen; by appointment from the Regular Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, from those duly qualified and registered pursuant to section twenty-three of the Act of Congress approved January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and three (Thirty-second Statutes at Large, page seven hundred and seventy-five), from the members of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, from those who have been graduated from educational institutions at which military instruction is compulsory, or from those who have had honorable service in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or in the volunteer forces, or from the country at large; by assigning retired officers of the Regular Army to active duty with such force with their rank on the retired list and the full pay and allowances of their grade; or by the appointment of retired officers and enlisted men, active or retired, of the Regular Army as commissioned officers in such forces: *Provided*, That the organization of said force shall be the same as that of the corresponding organizations of the Regular Army: *Provided further*, That the President is authorized to increase or decrease the number of organizations prescribed for the typical brigades, divisions, or army corps of the Regular Army, and to prescribe such new and different organizations and personnel for army corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, squadrons, companies, troops, and batteries as the efficiency of the service may require: *Provided further*, That the number of organi-

zations in a regiment shall not be increased nor shall the number of regiments be decreased: *Provided further*, That the President in his discretion may organize, officer, and equip for each Infantry and Cavalry brigade three machine-gun companies, and for each Infantry and Cavalry division four machine-gun companies, all in addition to the machine-gun companies comprised in organizations included in such brigades and divisions: *Provided further*, That the President in his discretion may organize for each division one armored motor-car machine-gun company. The machine-gun companies organized under this section shall consist of such commissioned and enlisted personnel and be equipped in such manner as the President may prescribe: *And provided further*, That officers with rank not above that of colonel shall be appointed by the President alone, and officers above that grade by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate: *Provided further*, That the President may in his discretion recommission in the Coast Guard persons who have heretofore held commissions in the Revenue-Cutter Service or the Coast Guard and have left the service honorably, after ascertaining that they are qualified for service physically, morally, and as to age and military fitness.

Fourth. The President is further authorized, in his discretion and at such time as he may determine, to raise and begin the training of an additional force of five hundred thousand men organized, officered, and equipped, as provided for the force first mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this section.

Fifth. To raise by draft, organize, equip, and officer, as provided in the third paragraph of this section, in addition to and for each of the above forces, such recruit training units as he may deem necessary for the maintenance of such forces at the maximum strength.

Sixth. To raise, organize, officer, and maintain during the emergency such number of ammunition batteries and battalions, depot batteries and battalions, and such artillery parks, with such numbers and grades of personnel as he may deem necessary. Such organizations shall be officered in the manner provided in the third paragraph of this section, and enlisted men may be assigned to said organizations from any of the forces herein provided for or raised by selective draft as by this Act provided.

Seventh. The President is further authorized to raise and maintain by voluntary enlistment, to organize, and equip, not to exceed four infantry divisions, the officers of which shall be selected in the manner provided by paragraph three of section one of this Act: *Provided*, That the organization of said force shall be the same as that of the corresponding organization of the Regular Army: *And provided further*, That there shall be no enlistments in said force of men under twenty-five years of age at time of enlisting: *And provided further*, That no such volunteer force shall be accepted in any unit smaller than a division.

SEC. 2. That the enlisted men required to raise and maintain the organizations of the Regular Army and to complete and maintain the organizations embodying the members of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, at the maximum legal strength as by this Act provided, shall be raised by voluntary enlistment, or if and whenever the President decides that they can not effectually be so raised or maintained, then by selective draft; and all other forces hereby authorized, except as provided in the seventh paragraph of section one, shall be raised and maintained by selective draft exclusively; but this provision shall not prevent the transfer to any force of training cadres from other forces. Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of

all male citizens, or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, and shall take place and be maintained under such regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the terms of this Act. Quotas for the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, or subdivisions thereof, shall be determined in proportion to the population thereof, and credit shall be given to any State, Territory, District, or subdivision thereof, for the number of men who were in the military service of the United States as members of the National Guard on April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, or who have since said date entered the military service of the United States from any such State, Territory, District, or subdivision, either as members of the Regular Army or the National Guard. All persons drafted into the service of the United States and all officers accepting commissions in the forces herein provided for shall, from the date of said draft or acceptance, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, except as to promotions, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to persons whose permanent retention in the military service on the active or retired list is not contemplated by existing law, and those drafted shall be required to serve for the period of the existing emergency unless sooner discharged: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to raise and maintain by voluntary enlistment or draft, as herein provided, special and technical troops as he may deem necessary, and to embody them into organizations and to officer them as provided in the third paragraph of section one and section nine of this Act. Organizations of the forces herein provided for, except the Regular Army and the divisions authorized in the seventh paragraph of section one, shall, as far as the interests of the service permit, be composed of men who come, and of officers who are appointed from, the same State or locality.³

SEC. 3. No bounty shall be paid to induce any person to enlist in the military service of the United States; and no person liable to military service shall hereafter be permitted or allowed to furnish a substitute for such service; nor shall any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in the military service of the United States; and no such person shall be permitted to escape such service or to be discharged therefrom prior to the expiration of his term of service by the payment of money or any other valuable thing whatsoever as consideration for his release from military service or liability thereto.

SEC. 4. That the Vice President of the United States, the officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, students who at the time of the approval of this Act are preparing for the ministry in recognized theological or divinity schools,⁴ and all persons in the military and naval service of the United States shall be exempt from the selective draft herein prescribed; and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance

³ Note the changes made by the joint resolutions of May 16 and May 20, 1918, pp. 167-168.

⁴ Joint resolution of May 20, 1918, extended exemption to medical students, see p. 168.

with the creed or principles of said religious organizations, but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be non-combatant; and the President is hereby authorized to exclude or discharge from said selective draft and from the draft under the second paragraph of section one hereof, or to draft for partial military service only from those liable to draft as in this Act provided, persons of the following classes: County and municipal officials; customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mails; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards of the United States, and such other persons employed in the service of the United States as the President may designate; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States; persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary to the maintenance of the Military Establishment or the effective operation of the military forces or the maintenance of national interest during the emergency; those in a status with respect to persons dependent upon them for support which renders their exclusion or discharge advisable; and those found to be physically or morally deficient. No exemption or exclusion shall continue when a cause therefor no longer exists: *Provided*, That notwithstanding the exemptions enumerated herein, each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall be required to supply its quota in the proportion that its population bears to the total population of the United States.

The President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to create and establish throughout the several States and subdivisions thereof and in the Territories and the District of Columbia local boards, and where, in his discretion, practicable and desirable, there shall be created and established one such local board in each county or similar subdivision in each State, and one for approximately each thirty thousand of population in each city of thirty thousand population or over, according to the last census taken or estimates furnished by the Bureau of Census of the Department of Commerce. Such boards shall be appointed by the President, and shall consist of three or more members, none of whom shall be connected with the Military Establishment, to be chosen from among the local authorities of such subdivisions or from other citizens residing in the subdivision or area in which the respective boards will have jurisdiction under the rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such boards shall have power within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine, subject to review as hereinafter provided, all questions of exemption under this Act, and all questions of or claims for including or discharging individuals or classes of individuals from the selective draft, which shall be made under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, except any and every question or claim for including or excluding or discharging persons or classes of persons from the selective draft under the provisions of this Act authorizing the President to exclude or discharge from the selective draft "Persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary to the maintenance of the Military Establishment, or the effective operation of the military forces, or the maintenance of national interest during the emergency."

The President is hereby authorized to establish additional boards, one in each Federal judicial district of the United States, consisting of such number of citizens, not connected with the Military Establishment, as the President may determine, who shall be appointed by the President. The President is hereby authorized, in his discre-

tion, to establish more than one such board in any Federal judicial district of the United States, or to establish one such board having jurisdiction of an area extending into more than one Federal judicial district.

Such district boards shall review on appeal and affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of any local board having jurisdiction in the area in which any such district board has jurisdiction under the rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such district boards shall have exclusive original jurisdiction within their respective areas to hear and determine all questions or claims for including or excluding or discharging persons or classes of persons from the selective draft, under the provisions of this Act, not included within the original jurisdiction of such local boards.

The decisions of such district boards shall be final except that, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, he may affirm, modify or reverse any such decision.

Any vacancy in any such local board or district board shall be filled by the President, and any member of any such local board or district board may be removed and another appointed in his place by the President, whenever he considers that the interest of the nation demands it.

The President shall make rules and regulations governing the organization and procedure of such local boards and district boards, and providing for and governing appeals from such local boards to such district boards, and reviews of the decisions of any local board by the district board having jurisdiction, and determining and prescribing the several areas in which the respective local boards and district boards shall have jurisdiction, and all other rules and regulations necessary to carry out the terms and provisions of this section, and shall provide for the issuance of certificates of exemption, or partial or limited exemptions, and for a system to exclude and discharge individuals from selective draft.

SEC. 5. That all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, shall be subject to registration in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President; and upon proclamation by the President or other public notice given by him or by his direction stating the time and place of such registration it shall be the duty of all persons of the designated ages, except officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Navy, and the National Guard and Naval Militia while in the service of the United States, to present themselves for and submit to registration under the provisions of this Act; and every such person shall be deemed to have notice of the requirements of this Act upon the publication of said proclamation or other notice as aforesaid given by the President or by his direction; and any person who shall willfully fail or refuse to present himself for registration or to submit thereto as herein provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, and shall thereupon be duly registered: *Provided*, That in the call of the docket precedence shall be given, in courts trying the same, to the trial of criminal proceedings under this Act: *Provided further*, That persons shall be subject to registration as herein provided who shall have attained their twenty-first birthday and who shall not have attained their thirty-first birthday on or before the day set for the registration, and all persons so registered shall be and remain subject to draft into the forces hereby authorized, unless exempted or excused therefrom as in this Act provided: *Provided further*, That in the case of temporary absence from actual place of legal residence of any person liable to registration as pro-

vided herein such registration may be made by mail under regulations to be prescribed by the President.

SEC. 6. That the President is hereby authorized to utilize the service of any or all departments and any or all officers or agents of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and subdivisions thereof, in the execution of this Act, and all officers and agents of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and subdivisions thereof, and of the District of Columbia, and all persons designated or appointed under regulations prescribed by the President whether such appointments are made by the President himself or by the governor or other officer of any State or Territory to perform any duty in the execution of this Act, are hereby required to perform such duty as the President shall order or direct, and all such officers and agents and persons so designated or appointed shall hereby have full authority for all acts done by them in the execution of this Act by the direction of the President. Correspondence in the execution of this Act may be carried in penalty envelopes bearing the frank of the War Department. Any person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying into effect any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations made or directions given thereunder who shall fail or neglect to perform such duty; and any person charged with such duty or having and exercising any authority under said Act, regulations, or directions, who shall knowingly make or be a party to the making of any false or incorrect registration, physical examination, exemption, enlistment, enrollment, or muster; and any person who shall make or be a party to the making of any false statement or certificate as to the fitness or liability of himself or any other person for service under the provisions of this Act, or regulations made by the President thereunder, or otherwise evades or aids another to evade the requirements of this Act or of said regulations, or who, in any manner, shall fail or neglect fully to perform any duty required of him in the execution of this Act, shall, if not subject to military law, be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or, if subject to military law, shall be tried by court-martial and suffer such punishment as a court-martial may direct.

SEC. 7. That the qualifications and conditions for voluntary enlistment as herein provided shall be the same as those prescribed by existing law for enlistments in the Regular Army, except that recruits must be between the ages of eighteen and forty years, both inclusive, at the time of their enlistment; and such enlistments shall be for the period of the emergency unless sooner discharged. All enlistments, including those in the Regular Army Reserve, which are in force on the date of the approval of this Act and which would terminate during the emergency shall continue in force during the emergency unless sooner discharged; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to shorten the period of any existing enlistment: *Provided*, That all persons enlisted or drafted under any of the provisions of this Act shall as far as practicable be grouped into units by States and the political subdivisions of the same: *Provided further*, That all persons who have enlisted since April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, either in the Regular Army or in the National Guard, and all persons who have enlisted in the National Guard since June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, upon their application, shall be discharged upon the termination of the existing emergency.

The President may provide for the discharge of any or

all enlisted men whose status with respect to dependents renders such discharge advisable; and he may also authorize the employment on any active duty of retired enlisted men of the Regular Army, either with their rank on the retired list or in higher enlisted grades, and such retired enlisted men shall receive the full pay and allowances of the grades in which they are actively employed.

SEC. 8. That the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is authorized to appoint for the period of the existing emergency such general officers of appropriate grades as may be necessary for duty with brigades, divisions, and higher units in which the forces provided for herein may be organized by the President, and general officers of appropriate grade for the several Coast Artillery districts. . . .

SEC. 9. That the appointments authorized and made as provided by the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh paragraphs of section one and by section eight of this Act, and the temporary appointments in the Regular Army authorized by the first paragraph of section one of this Act, shall be for the period of the emergency, unless sooner terminated by discharge or otherwise. The President is hereby authorized to discharge any officer from the office held by him under such appointment for any cause which, in the judgment of the President, would promote the public service; and the general commanding any division and higher tactical organization or territorial department is authorized to appoint from time to time military boards of not less than three nor more than five officers of the forces herein provided for to examine into and report upon the capacity, qualification, conduct, and efficiency of any commissioned officer within his command other than officers of the Regular Army holding permanent or provisional commissions therein. . . .

SEC. 10. That all officers and enlisted men of the forces herein provided for other than in the Regular Army shall be in all respects on the same footing as to pay, allowances, and pensions as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades and length of service in the Regular Army; and commencing June one, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and continuing until the termination of the emergency, all enlisted men of the Army of the United States in active service whose base pay does not exceed \$21 per month shall receive an increase of \$15 per month; those whose base pay is \$24, an increase of \$12 per month; those whose base pay is \$30, \$36, or \$40, an increase of \$8 per month; and those whose base pay is \$45 or more, an increase of \$6 per month: *Provided*, That the increases of pay herein authorized shall not enter into the computation of continuous-service pay.

SEC. 11. That all existing restrictions upon the detail, detachment, and employment of officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army are hereby suspended for the period of the present emergency.

SEC. 12. That the President of the United States, as Commander in Chief of the Army, is authorized to make such regulations governing the prohibition of alcoholic liquors in or near military camps and to the officers and enlisted men of the Army as he may from time to time deem necessary or advisable: *Provided*, That no person, corporation, partnership, or association shall sell, supply, or have in his or its possession any intoxicating or spirituous liquors at any military station, cantonment, camp, fort, post, officers' or enlisted men's club, which is being used at the time for military purposes under this Act, but the Secretary of War may make regulations permitting the sale and use of intoxicating liquors for medicinal purposes. It

shall be unlawful to sell any intoxicating liquor, including beer, ale, or wine, to any officer or member of the military forces while in uniform, except as herein provided. Any person, corporation, partnership, or association violating the provisions of this section of the regulations made thereunder shall, unless otherwise punishable under the Articles of War, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be punished by a fine of not more than \$1,000 or imprisonment for not more than twelve months, or both.

SEC. 13. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed during the present war to do everything by him deemed necessary to suppress and prevent the keeping or setting up of houses of ill fame, brothels, or bawdy houses within such distance as he may deem needful of any military camp, station, fort, post, cantonment, training, or mobilization place. . . .

SEC. 14. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby suspended during the period of this emergency.

Approved, May 18, 1917.

ACT RELATING TO ESPIONAGE, ETC., JUNE 15, 1917.

An Act To punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and better to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:

TITLE I. ESPIONAGE.

SECTION 1. That (a) whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with the national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section six of this title; or (b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or (c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or

obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or (d) whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, note, or information, relating to the national defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 2. (a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to, communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years: *Provided*, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years; and (b) whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than thirty years.

SEC. 3. Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.

SEC. 4. If two or more persons conspire to violate the

provisions of sections two or three of this title, and one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in said sections provided in the case of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of such conspiracy. Except as above provided conspiracies to commit offenses under this title shall be punished as provided by section thirty-seven of the Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States approved March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine.

SEC. 5. Whoever harbors or conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe or suspect, has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under this title shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 6. The President in time of war or in case of national emergency may by proclamation designate any place other than those set forth in subsection (a) of section one hereof in which anything for the use of the Army or Navy is being prepared or constructed or stored as a prohibited place for the purposes of this title: *Provided*, That he shall determine that information with respect thereto would be prejudicial to the national defense.

SEC. 7. Nothing contained in this title shall be deemed to limit the jurisdiction of the general courts-martial, military commissions, or naval courts-martial under sections thirteen hundred and forty-two, thirteen hundred and forty-three, and sixteen hundred and twenty-four of the Revised Statutes as amended.

SEC. 8. The provisions of this title shall extend to all Territories, possessions, and places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, whether or not contiguous thereto, and offenses under this title when committed upon the high seas or elsewhere within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and outside the territorial limits thereof shall be punishable hereunder.

SEC. 9. The Act entitled "An Act to prevent the disclosure of national defense secrets," approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, is hereby repealed.

TITLE II.

VESSELS IN PORTS OF THE UNITED STATES.

SECTION 1. Whenever the President by proclamation or Executive order declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened war, insurrection, or invasion, or disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, may inspect such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if necessary in his opinion in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or injury to any harbor or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance of the rights and obligations of the United States, may take, by and with the consent of the President, for such purposes, full possession and control of such vessel and remove therefrom the officers and crew thereof and all other persons not specially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof.

Within the territory and waters of the Canal Zone the Governor of the Panama Canal, with the approval of the President, shall exercise all the powers conferred by this section on the Secretary of the Treasury.⁵

⁵ See the President's proclamation of May 23, 1917, for action taken concerning the canal, p. 172.

SEC. 2. If any owner, agent, master, officer, or person in charge, or any member of the crew of any such vessel fails to comply with any regulation or rule issued or order given by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Governor of the Panama Canal under the provisions of this title, or obstructs or interferes with the exercise of any power conferred by this title, the vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States in the same manner as merchandise is forfeited for violation of the customs revenue laws; and the person guilty of such failure, obstruction, or interference shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 3. It shall be unlawful for the owner or master or any other person in charge or command of any private vessel, foreign or domestic, or for any member of the crew or other person, within the territorial waters of the United States, willfully to cause or permit the destruction or injury of such vessel or knowingly to permit said vessel to be used as a place of resort for any person conspiring with another or preparing to commit any offense against the United States, or in violation of the treaties of the United States or of the obligations of the United States under the law of nations, or to defraud the United States, or knowingly to permit such vessels to be used in violation of the rights and obligations of the United States under the law of nations; and in case such vessel shall be so used, with the knowledge of the owner or master or other person in charge or command thereof, the vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United States in the same manner as merchandise is forfeited for violation of the customs revenue laws; and whoever violates this section shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 4. The President may employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this title.

TITLE III.

INJURING VESSELS ENGAGED IN FOREIGN COMMERCE.

SECTION 1. Whoever shall set fire to any vessel of foreign registry, or any vessel of American registry entitled to engage in commerce with foreign nations, or to any vessel of the United States as defined in section three hundred and ten of the Act of March fourth, nineteen hundred and nine, entitled "An Act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States," or to the cargo of the same, or shall tamper with the motive power or instrumentalities of navigation of such vessel, or shall place bombs or explosives in or upon such vessel, or shall do any other act to or upon such vessel while within the jurisdiction of the United States, or, if such vessel is of American registry, while she is on the high sea, with intent to injure or endanger the safety of the vessel or of her cargo, or of persons on board, whether the injury or danger is so intended to take place within the jurisdiction of the United States, or after the vessel shall have departed therefrom; or whoever shall attempt or conspire to do any such acts with such intent, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

TITLE IV.

INTERFERENCE WITH FOREIGN COMMERCE BY VIOLENT MEANS.

SECTION 1. Whoever, with intent to prevent, interfere with, or obstruct or attempt to prevent, interfere with, or obstruct the exportation to foreign countries of articles

from the United States, shall injure or destroy, by fire or explosives, such articles or the places where they may be while in such foreign commerce, shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

TITLE V.

ENFORCEMENT OF NEUTRALITY.

[This title deals with acts performed in a war in which the United States is neutral.]

TITLE VI.

SEIZURE OF ARMS AND OTHER ARTICLES INTENDED FOR EXPORT.

SECTION 1. Whenever an attempt is made to export or ship from or take out of the United States, any arms or munitions of war, or other articles, in violation of law, or whenever there shall be known or probable cause to believe that any such arms or munitions of war, or other articles, are being or are intended to be exported, or shipped from, or taken out of the United States, in violation of law, the several collectors, naval officers, surveyors, inspectors of customs, and marshals, and deputy marshals of the United States, and every other person duly authorized for the purpose by the President, may seize and detain any articles or munitions of war about to be exported or shipped from, or taken out of the United States, in violation of law, and the vessels or vehicles containing the same, and retain possession thereof until released or disposed of as hereinafter directed. If upon due inquiry as hereinafter provided, the property seized shall appear to have been about to be so unlawfully exported, shipped from, or taken out of the United States, the same shall be forfeited to the United States.

SEC. 2. It shall be the duty of the persons making any seizure under this title to apply, with due diligence, to the judge of the district court of the United States, or to the judge of the United States district court of the Canal Zone, or to the judge of a court of first instance in the Philippine Islands, having jurisdiction over the place within which the seizure is made, for a warrant to justify the further detention of the property so seized, which warrant shall be granted only on oath or affirmation showing that there is known or probable cause to believe that the property seized is being or is intended to be exported or shipped from or taken out of the United States in violation of law; and if the judge refuses to issue the warrant, or application therefor is not made by the person making the seizure within a reasonable time, not exceeding ten days after the seizure, the property shall forthwith be restored to the owner or person from whom seized. . . .

SEC. 8. The President may employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this title.

TITLE VII.

CERTAIN EXPORTS IN TIME OF WAR UNLAWFUL.

SECTION 1. Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the public safety shall so require, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export from or ship from or take out of the United States to any country named in such proclamation any article or articles mentioned in such proclamation, except at such time or times, and under such regulations and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by the President or

by Congress: *Provided, however*, That no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another.⁶

SEC. 2. Any person who shall export, ship, or take out, or deliver or attempt to deliver for export, shipment, or taking out, any article in violation of this title, or of any regulation, or order made hereunder, shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or, if a natural person, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both; and any article so delivered or exported, shipped, or taken out, or so attempted to be delivered or exported, shipped, or taken out, shall be seized and forfeited to the United States; and any officer, director, or agent of a corporation who participates in any such violation shall be liable to like fine or imprisonment, or both.

SEC. 3. Whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that any vessel, domestic or foreign, is about to carry out of the United States any article or articles in violation of the provisions of this title, the collector of customs for the district in which such vessel is located is hereby authorized and empowered, subject to review by the Secretary of Commerce, to refuse clearance to any such vessel, domestic or foreign, for which clearance is required by law, and by formal notice served upon the owners, master, or person or persons in command or charge of any domestic vessel for which clearance is not required by law, to forbid the departure of such vessel from the port, and it shall thereupon be unlawful for such vessel to depart. Whoever, in violation of any of the provisions of this section shall take, or attempt to take, or authorize the taking of any such vessel, out of port or from the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both; and, in addition, such vessel, her tackle, apparel, furniture, equipment, and her forbidden cargo shall be forfeited to the United States.

TITLE VIII.

DISTURBANCE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

SECTION 1. Whoever, in relation to any dispute or controversy between a foreign government and the United States, shall willfully and knowingly make any untrue statement, either orally or in writing, under oath before any person authorized and empowered to administer oaths, which the affiant has knowledge or reason to believe will, or may be used to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government, or of any officer or agent of any foreign government, to the injury of the United States, or with a view or intent to influence any measure of or action by the Government of the United States, or any branch thereof, to the injury of the United States, shall be fined not more than \$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

SEC. 2. Whoever within the jurisdiction of the United States shall falsely assume or pretend to be a diplomatic or consular, or other official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the Government of the United States with intent to defraud such foreign government or any person, and shall take upon himself to act as such, or in such pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from any person or from said foreign government, or from any officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing of value, shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

SEC. 3. Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attache, shall act in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. . . .

⁶ A number of executive proclamations have been issued relating to foreign trade. See pp. 172, 176-177.

SEC. 5. If two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United States conspire to injure or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging to a foreign Government or to any political subdivision thereof with which the United States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, or other public utility so situated, and if one or more of such persons commits an act within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to the conspiracy shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. Any indictment or information under this section shall describe the specific property which it was the object of the conspiracy to injure or destroy.

TITLE IX.

PASSPORTS.

SECTION 1. Before a passport is issued to any person by or under authority of the United States such person shall subscribe to and submit a written application duly verified by his oath before a person authorized and empowered to administer oaths, which said application shall contain a true recital of each and every matter of fact which may be required by law or by any rules authorized by law to be stated as a prerequisite to the issuance of any such passport. Clerks of United States courts, agents of the Department of State, or other Federal officials authorized, or who may be authorized, to take passport applications and administer oaths thereon, shall collect, for all services in connection therewith, a fee of \$1, and no more, in lieu of all fees prescribed by any statute of the United States, whether the application is executed singly, in duplicate, or in triplicate.

SEC. 2. Whoever shall willfully and knowingly make any false statement in an application for passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States, either for his own use or the use of another. . . .

SEC. 3. Whoever shall willfully and knowingly use, or attempt to use, any passport issued or designed for the use of another than himself. . . .

SEC. 4. Whoever shall falsely make, forge, counterfeit, mutilate, or alter, or cause or procure to be falsely made, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent to use the same, or with intent that the same may be used by another . . . [shall in each case be fined not more than \$2,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both].

TITLE X.

COUNTERFEITING GOVERNMENT SEAL.

SECTION 1. Whoever shall fraudulently or wrongfully affix or impress the seal of any executive department, or of any bureau, commission, or office of the United States, to or upon any certificate, instrument, commission, document, or paper of any description; or whoever, with knowledge of its fraudulent character, shall with wrongful or fraudulent intent use, buy, procure, sell, or transfer to another any such certificate, instrument, commission, document, or paper, to which or upon which said seal has been so fraudulently affixed or impressed, shall be fined not more than \$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. . . .

TITLE XI.

SEARCH WARRANTS.

SECTION 1. A search warrant authorized by this title may be issued by a judge of a United States district court, or by a judge of a State or Territorial court of record, or

by a United States commissioner for the district wherein the property sought is located.

SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued under this title upon either of the following grounds:

1. When the property was stolen or embezzled in violation of a law of the United States; in which case it may be taken on the warrant from any house or other place in which it is concealed, or from the possession of the person by whom it was stolen or embezzled, or from any person in whose possession it may be.

2. When the property was used as the means of committing a felony; in which case it may be taken on the warrant from any house or other place in which it is concealed, or from the possession of the person by whom it was used in the commission of the offense, or from any person in whose possession it may be.

3. When the property, or any paper, is possessed, controlled, or used in violation of section twenty-two of this title; in which case it may be taken on the warrant from the person violating said section, or from any person in whose possession it may be, or from any house or other place in which it is concealed.

SEC. 3. A search warrant can not be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person and particularly describing the property and the place to be searched.

SEC. 4. The judge or commissioner must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant and any witness he may produce, and require their affidavits or take their depositions in writing and cause them to be subscribed by the parties making them.

SEC. 5. The affidavits or depositions must set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application or probable cause for believing that they exist.

SEC. 6. If the judge or commissioner is thereupon satisfied of the existence of the grounds of the application or that there is probable cause to believe their existence, he must issue a search warrant, signed by him with his name of office, to a civil officer of the United States duly authorized to enforce or assist in enforcing any law thereof, or to a person so duly authorized by the President of the United States, stating the particular grounds or probable cause for its issue and the names of the persons whose affidavits have been taken in support thereof, and commanding him forthwith to search the person or place named, for the property specified, and to bring it before the judge or commissioner.

SEC. 7. A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its direction, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its execution.

SEC. 8. The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.

SEC. 9. He may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house for the purpose of liberating a person who, having entered to aid him in the execution of the warrant, is detained therein, or when necessary for his own liberation. . . .

SEC. 20. A person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search warrant to be issued and executed shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year.

SEC. 21. An officer who in executing a search warrant willfully exceeds his authority, or exercises it with unnece-

sary severity, shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year.

SEC. 22. Whoever, in aid of any foreign Government, shall knowingly and willfully have possession of or control over any property or papers designed or intended for use or which is used as the means of violating any penal statute, or any of the rights or obligations of the United States under any treaty or the law of nations, shall be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 23. Nothing contained in this title shall be held to repeal or impair any existing provisions of law regulating search and the issue of search warrants.

TITLE XII.

USE OF MAILS.

SECTION 1. Every letter, writing, circular, postal card, picture, print, engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, book, or other publication, matter, or thing, of any kind, in violation of any of the provisions of this Act is hereby declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to authorize any person other than an employee of the Dead Letter Office, duly authorized thereto, or other person upon a search warrant authorized by law, to open any letter not addressed to himself.

SEC. 2. Every letter, writing, circular, postal card, picture, print, engraving, photograph, newspaper, pamphlet, book, or other publication, matter or thing, of any kind, containing any matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the United States, is hereby declared to be nonmailable.

SEC. 3. Whoever shall use or attempt to use the mails or Postal Service of the United States for the transmission of any matter declared by this title to be nonmailable, shall be fined not more than \$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Any person violating any provision of this title may be tried and punished either in the district in which the unlawful matter or publication was mailed, or to which it was carried by mail for delivery according to the direction thereon, or in which it was caused to be delivered by mail to the person to whom it was addressed. . . .

Approved, June 15, 1917.

ACT PUNISHING THE OBSTRUCTING OF TRANSPORTATION,
AND EMPOWERING THE PRESIDENT TO ESTABLISH
PRIORITIES IN TRANSPORTATION, AUGUST 10, 1917.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section one of the act entitled "An Act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, as heretofore amended, be further amended by adding thereto the following:

"That on and after the approval of this Act any person or persons who shall, during the war in which the United States is now engaged, knowingly and willfully, by physical force or intimidation by threats of physical force obstruct or retard, or aid in obstructing or retarding, the orderly conduct or movement in the United States of interstate or foreign commerce, or the orderly make-up or movement or disposition of any train, or the movement or disposition of any locomotive, car, or other vehicle on any railroad or elsewhere in the United States engaged in interstate or foreign commerce shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and for every such offense shall be punishable by a fine of not exceeding \$100 or by imprisonment for not exceeding six

months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and the President of the United States is hereby authorized, whenever in his judgment the public interest requires, to employ the armed forces of the United States to prevent any such obstruction or retardation of the passage of the mail, or of the orderly conduct or movement of interstate or foreign commerce in any part of the United States, or of any train, locomotive, car, or other vehicle upon any railroad or elsewhere in the United States engaged in interstate or foreign commerce: *Provided*, That nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal, modify, or affect either section six or section twenty of an Act entitled 'An Act to supplement existing laws against unlawful restraints and monopolies, and for other purposes,' approved October fifteenth, nineteen hundred and fourteen.

"That during the continuance of the war in which the United States is now engaged the President is authorized, if he finds it necessary for the national defense and security, to direct that such traffic or such shipments of commodities as, in his judgment, may be essential to the national defense and security shall have preference or priority in transportation by any common carrier by railroad, water, or otherwise. He may give these directions at and for such times as he may determine, and may modify, change, suspend, or annul them, and for any such purpose he is hereby authorized to issue orders direct, or through such person or persons as he may designate for the purpose or through the Interstate Commerce Commission. Officials of the United States, when so designated, shall receive no compensation for their services rendered hereunder. Persons not in the employ of the United States so designated shall receive such compensation as the President may fix. Suitable offices may be rented and all necessary expenses, including compensation of persons so designated, shall be paid as directed by the President out of funds which may have been or may be provided to meet expenditures for the national security and defense. The common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce or as many of them as desire so to do are hereby authorized without responsibility or liability on the part of the United States, financial or otherwise, to establish and maintain in the city of Washington during the period of the war an agency empowered by such carriers as join in the arrangement to receive on behalf of them all notice and service of such orders and directions as may be issued in accordance with this Act, and service upon such agency shall be good service as to all the carriers joining in the establishment thereof. . . ."

Approved, August 10, 1917.

ACT AUTHORIZING THE CONTROL OF FOOD PRODUCTS AND
FUEL, AUGUST 10, 1917.

An Act To provide further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That by reason of the existence of a state of war, it is essential to the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, and for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution, and to facilitate the movement, of foods, feeds, fuel including fuel oil and natural gas, and fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients, tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and equipment required for the actual production of foods, feeds, and fuel, hereafter in this Act called necessities; to prevent, locally or

generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulations, and private controls, affecting such supply, distribution, and movement; and to establish and maintain governmental control of such necessities during the war. For such purposes the instrumentalities, means, methods, powers, authorities, duties, obligations, and prohibitions hereinafter set forth are created, established, conferred, and prescribed. The President is authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 2. That in carrying out the purposes of this Act the President is authorized to enter into any voluntary arrangements or agreements, to create and use any agency or agencies, to accept the services of any person without compensation, to cooperate with any agency or person, to utilize any department or agency of the Government, and to coordinate their activities so as to avoid any preventable loss or duplication of effort or funds.

SEC. 3. That no person acting either as a voluntary or paid agent or employee of the United States in any capacity, including an advisory capacity, shall solicit, induce, or attempt to induce any person or officer authorized to execute or to direct the execution of contracts on behalf of the United States to make any contract or give any order for the furnishing to the United States of work, labor, or services, or of materials, supplies, or other property of any kind or character, if such agent or employee has any pecuniary interest in such contract or order, or if he or any firm of which he is a member, or corporation, joint-stock company, or association of which he is an officer or stockholder, or in the pecuniary profits of which he is directly or indirectly interested, shall be a party thereto. Nor shall any agent or employee make, or permit any committee or other body of which he is a member to make, or participate in making, any recommendation concerning such contract or order to any council, board, or commission of the United States, or any member or subordinate thereof, without making to the best of his knowledge and belief a full and complete disclosure in writing to such council, board, commission, or subordinate of any and every pecuniary interest which he may have in such contract or order and of his interest in any firm, corporation, company, or association being a party thereto. Nor shall he participate in the awarding of such contract or giving such order. Any willful violation of any of the provisions of this section shall be punishable by a fine of not more than \$10,000, or by imprisonment of not more than five years, or both: *Provided*, That the provisions of this section shall not change, alter or repeal section forty-one of chapter three hundred and twenty-one, Thirty-fifth Statutes at Large.

SEC. 4. That it is hereby made unlawful for any person willfully to destroy any necessities for the purpose of enhancing the price or restricting the supply thereof; knowingly to commit waste or willfully to permit preventable deterioration of any necessities in or in connection with their production, manufacture, or distribution; to hoard, as defined in section six of this Act, any necessities; to monopolize or attempt to monopolize, either locally or generally, any necessities; to engage in any discriminatory and unfair, or any deceptive or wasteful practice or device, or to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge, in handling or dealing in or with any necessities; to conspire, combine, agree, or arrange with any other person, (a) to limit the facilities for transporting, producing, harvesting, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or dealing in any necessities; (b) to restrict the supply of any necessities; (c) to restrict distribution of any necessities; (d) to pre-

vent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any necessities in order to enhance the price thereof, or (e) to exact excessive prices for any necessities; or to aid or abet the doing of any act made unlawful by this section.

SEC. 5. That, from time to time, whenever the President shall find it essential to license the importation, manufacture, storage, mining, or distribution of any necessities, in order to carry into effect any of the purposes of this Act, and shall publicly so announce, no person shall, after a date fixed in the announcement, engage in or carry on any such business specified in the announcement of importation, manufacture, storage, mining, or distribution of any necessities as set forth in such announcement, unless he shall secure and hold a license issued pursuant to this section. The President is authorized to issue such licenses and to prescribe regulations for the issuance of licenses and requirements for systems of accounts and auditing of accounts to be kept by licensees, submission of reports by them, with or without oath or affirmation, and the entry and inspection by the President's duly authorized agents of the places of business of licensees. Whenever the President shall find that any storage charge, commission, profit, or practice of any licensee is unjust, or unreasonable, or discriminatory and unfair, or wasteful, and shall order such licensee, within a reasonable time fixed in the order, to discontinue the same, unless such order, which shall recite the facts found, is revoked or suspended, such licensee shall, within the time prescribed in the order, discontinue such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice. The President may, in lieu of any such unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory, and unfair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice, find what is a just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory and fair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice, and in any proceeding brought in any court such order of the President shall be prima facie evidence. Any person who, without a license issued pursuant to this section, or whose license shall have been revoked, knowingly engages in or carries on any business for which a license is required under this section, or willfully fails or refuses to discontinue any unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory and unfair storage charge, commission, profit, or practice, in accordance with the requirement of an order issued under this section, or any regulation prescribed under this section, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding \$5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both: *Provided*, That this section shall not apply to any farmer, gardener, cooperative association of farmers or gardeners, including live-stock farmers, or other persons with respect to the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased, or cultivated by him, nor to any retailer with respect to the retail business actually conducted by him, nor to any common carrier, nor shall anything in this section be construed to authorize the fixing or imposition of a duty or tax upon any article imported into or exported from the United States or any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia: *Provided further*, That for the purposes of this Act a retailer shall be deemed to be a person, copartnership, firm, corporation, or association not engaging in the wholesale business whose gross sales do not exceed \$100,000 per annum.⁷

SEC. 6. That any person who willfully hoards any necessities shall upon conviction thereof be fined not exceeding \$5,000 or be imprisoned for not more than two years, or both. Necessaries shall be deemed to be hoarded within the meaning of this Act when either (a) held, contracted for,

⁷ For proclamation concerning food licenses, see p. 173.

or arranged for by any person in a quantity in excess of his reasonable requirements for use or consumption by himself and dependents for a reasonable time; (b) held, contracted for, or arranged for by any manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, or other dealer in a quantity in excess of the reasonable requirements of his business for use or sale by him for a reasonable time, or reasonably required to furnish necessities produced in surplus quantities seasonally throughout the period of scant or no production; or (c) withheld, whether by possession or under any contract or arrangement, from the market by any person for the purpose of unreasonably increasing or diminishing the price: *Provided*, That this section shall not include or relate to transactions on any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business as described in section thirteen of this Act that may be permitted by the President under the authority conferred upon him by said section thirteen: *Provided, however*, That any accumulating or withholding by any farmer or gardener, cooperative association of farmers or gardeners, including live-stock farmers, or any other person, of the products of any farm, garden, or other land owned, leased, or cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be hoarding within the meaning of this Act.

SEC. 7. That whenever any necessities shall be hoarded as defined in section six they shall be liable to be proceeded against in any district court of the United States within the district where the same are found and seized by a process of libel for condemnation, and if such necessities shall be adjudged to be hoarded they shall be disposed of by sale in such manner as to provide the most equitable distribution thereof as the court may direct, and the proceeds thereof, less the legal costs and charges, shall be paid to the party entitled thereto. The proceedings of such libel cases shall conform as near as may be to the proceedings in admiralty, except that either party may demand trial by jury of any issue of fact joined in any such case, and all such proceedings shall be at the suit of and in the name of the United States. It shall be the duty of the United States attorney for the proper district to institute and prosecute any such action upon presentation to him of satisfactory evidence to sustain the same.

SEC. 8. That any person who willfully destroys any necessities for the purpose of enhancing the price or restricting the supply thereof shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding \$5,000 or imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 9. That any person who conspires, combines, agrees, or arranges with any other person (a) to limit the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing, or dealing in any necessities; (b) to restrict the supply of any necessities; (c) to restrict the distribution of any necessities; (d) to prevent, limit, or lessen the manufacture or production of any necessities in order to enhance the price thereof shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not exceeding \$10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

SEC. 10. That the President is authorized, from time to time, to requisition foods, feeds, fuels, and other supplies necessary to the support of the Army or the maintenance of the Navy, or any other public use connected with the common defense, and to requisition, or otherwise provide, storage facilities for such supplies; and he shall ascertain and pay a just compensation therefor. If the compensation so determined be not satisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such

further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum will make up such amount as will be just compensation for such necessities or storage space, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred on the United States District Courts to hear and determine all such controversies: *Provided*, That nothing in this section, or in the section that follows, shall be construed to require any natural person to furnish to the Government any necessities held by him and reasonably required for consumption or use by himself and dependents, nor shall any person, firm, corporation, or association be required to furnish to the Government any seed necessary for the seeding of land owned, leased, or cultivated by them.

SEC. 11. That the President is authorized from time to time to purchase, to store, to provide storage facilities for, and to sell for cash at reasonable prices, wheat, flour, meal, beans, and potatoes: *Provided*, That if any minimum price shall have been theretofore fixed, pursuant to the provisions of section fourteen of this Act, then the price paid for any such articles so purchased shall not be less than such minimum price. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the disposal by the United States of necessities under this section may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

SEC. 12. That whenever the President shall find it necessary to secure an adequate supply of necessities for the support of the Army or the maintenance of the Navy, or for any other public use connected with the common defense, he is authorized to requisition and take over, for use or operation by the Government, any factory, packing house, oil pipe line, mine, or other plant, or any part thereof, in or through which any necessities are or may be manufactured, produced, prepared, or mined, and to operate the same. Whenever the President shall determine that the further use or operation by the Government of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, is not essential for the national security or defense, the same shall be restored to the person entitled to the possession thereof. The United States shall make just compensation, to be determined by the President, for the taking over, use, occupation, and operation by the Government of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof. If the compensation so determined be unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amounts as will be just compensation, in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code. The President is authorized to prescribe such regulations as he may deem essential for carrying out the purposes of this section, including the operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, the purchase, sale, or other disposition of articles used, manufactured, produced, prepared, or mined therein, and the employment, control, and compensation of employees. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the use or operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for the purpose of the continued use or operation of any such factory, mine, or plant, or part thereof, and the accounts of each such factory, mine, plant, or part thereof, shall be kept separate and distinct. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be paid into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

SEC. 13. That whenever the President finds it essential in order to prevent undue enhancement, depression, or fluctuation of prices of, or in order to prevent injurious speculation in, or in order to prevent unjust market manipulation or unfair and misleading market quotations of the prices of necessaries, hereafter in this section called evil practices, he is authorized to prescribe such regulations governing, or may either wholly or partly prohibit, operations, practices, and transactions at, on, in, or under the rules of any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or place of business as he may find essential in order to prevent, correct, or remove such evil practices. . . .

SEC. 14. That whenever the President shall find that an emergency exists requiring stimulation of the production of wheat and that it is essential that the producers of wheat, produced within the United States, shall have the benefits of the guaranty provided for in this section, he is authorized, from time to time, seasonably and as far in advance of seeding time as practicable, to determine and fix and to give public notice of what, under specified conditions, is a reasonable guaranteed price for wheat, in order to assure such producers a reasonable profit. The President shall thereupon fix such guaranteed price for each of the official grain standards for wheat as established under the United States grain standards Act, approved August eleventh, nineteen hundred and sixteen. The President shall from time to time establish and promulgate such regulations as he shall deem wise in connection with such guaranteed prices, and in particular governing conditions of delivery and payment, and differences in price for the several standard grades in the principal primary markets of the United States, adopting number one northern spring or its equivalent at the principal interior primary markets as the basis. Thereupon, the Government of the United States hereby guarantees every producer of wheat produced within the United States, that, upon compliance by him with the regulations prescribed, he shall receive for any wheat produced in reliance upon this guarantee within the period, not exceeding eighteen months, prescribed in the notice, a price not less than the guaranteed price therefor as fixed pursuant to this section. In such regulations the President shall prescribe the terms and conditions upon which any such producer shall be entitled to the benefits of such guaranty. The guaranteed prices for the several standard grades of wheat for the crop of nineteen hundred and eighteen, shall be based upon number one northern spring or its equivalent at not less than \$2 per bushel at the principal interior primary markets. This guaranty shall not be dependent upon the action of the President under the first part of this section, but is hereby made absolute and shall be binding until May first, nineteen hundred and nineteen. When the President finds that the importation into the United States of any wheat produced outside of the United States materially enhances or is likely materially to enhance the liabilities of the United States under guaranties of prices therefor made pursuant to this section, and ascertains what rate of duty, added to the then existing rate of duty on wheat and to the value of wheat at the time of importation, would be sufficient to bring the price thereof at which imported up to the price fixed therefor pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section, he shall proclaim such facts, and thereafter there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon wheat when imported, in addition to the then existing rate of duty, the rate of duty so ascertained; but in no case shall any such rate of duty be fixed at an amount which will effect a reduction of the rate of duty upon wheat under any then existing tariff law of the United States. For the purpose of making any

guaranteed price effective under this section, or whenever he deems it essential in order to protect the Government of the United States against material enhancement of its liabilities arising out of any guaranty under this section, the President is authorized also, in his discretion, to purchase any wheat for which a guaranteed price shall be fixed under this section, and to hold, transport, or store it, or to sell, dispose of, and deliver the same to any citizen of the United States or to any Government engaged in war with any country with which the Government of the United States is or may be at war or to use the same as supplies for any department or agency of the Government of the United States. Any moneys received by the United States from or in connection with the sale or disposal of wheat under this section may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any balance of such moneys not used as part of such revolving fund shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

SEC. 15. That from and after thirty days from the date of the approval of this Act no foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds shall be used in the production of distilled spirits for beverage purposes: *Provided*, That under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the President may prescribe, such materials may be used in the production of distilled spirits exclusively for other than beverage purposes, or for the fortification of pure sweet wines as defined by the Act entitled "An Act to increase the revenue, and for other purposes," approved September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen. Nor shall there be imported into the United States any distilled spirits. Whenever the President shall find that limitation, regulation, or prohibition of the use of foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in the production of malt or vinous liquors for beverage purposes, or that reduction of the alcoholic content of any such malt or vinous liquor, is essential, in order to assure an adequate and continuous supply of food, or that the national security and defense will be subserved thereby, he is authorized, from time to time, to prescribe and give public notice of the extent of the limitation, regulation, prohibition, or reduction so necessitated. Whenever such notice shall have been given and shall remain unrevoked no person shall, after a reasonable time prescribed in such notice, use any foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in the production of malt or vinous liquors, or import any such liquors except under license issued by the President and in compliance with rules and regulations determined by him governing the production and importation of such liquors and the alcoholic content thereof. Any person who willfully violates the provisions of this section, or who shall use any foods, fruits, food materials, or feeds in the production of malt or vinous liquors, or who shall import any such liquors, without first obtaining a license so to do when a license is required under this section, or who shall violate any rule or regulation made under this section, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding \$5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both: *Provided further*, That nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the licensing of the manufacture of vinous or malt liquors in any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or any civil subdivision thereof, where the manufacture of such vinous or malt liquor is prohibited.

SEC. 16. That the President is authorized and directed to commandeer any or all distilled spirits in bond or in stock at the date of the approval of this Act for redistillation, in so far as such redistillation may be necessary to meet the requirements of the Government in the manufacture of munitions and other military and hospital supplies, or in so

far as such redistillation would dispense with the necessity of utilizing products and materials suitable for foods and feeds in the future manufacture of distilled spirits for the purposes herein enumerated. The President shall determine and pay a just compensation for the distilled spirits so commandeered; and if the compensation so determined be not satisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined by the President and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation for such spirits, in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

SEC. 17. That every person who willfully assaults, resists, impedes, or interferes with any officer, employee, or agent of the United States in the execution of any duty authorized to be performed by or pursuant to this Act shall upon conviction thereof be fined not exceeding \$1,000 or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. . . .

SEC. 24. That the provisions of this Act shall cease to be in effect when the existing state of war between the United States and Germany shall have terminated, and the fact and date of such termination shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President; but the termination of this Act shall not affect any act done, or any right or obligation accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil case before the said termination pursuant to this Act; but all rights and liabilities under this Act arising before its termination shall continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if the Act had not terminated. Any offense committed and all penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred prior to such termination may be prosecuted or punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if this Act had not been terminated.

SEC. 25. That the President of the United States shall be, and he is hereby, authorized and empowered, whenever and wherever in his judgment necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war, to fix the price of coal and coke, wherever and whenever sold, either by producer or dealer, to establish rules for the regulation of and to regulate the method of production, sale, shipment, distribution, apportionment, or storage thereof among dealers and consumers,⁸ domestic or foreign: said authority and power may be exercised by him in each case through the agency of the Federal Trade Commission during the war or for such part of said time as in his judgment may be necessary.

That if, in the opinion of the President, any such producer or dealer fails or neglects to conform to such prices or regulations, or to conduct his business efficiently under the regulations and control of the President as aforesaid, or conducts it in a manner prejudicial to the public interest, then the President is hereby authorized and empowered in every such case to requisition and take over the plant, business, and all appurtenances thereof belonging to such producer or dealer as a going concern, and to operate or cause the same to be operated in such manner and through such agency as he may direct during the period of the war or for such part of said time as in his judgment may be necessary.

That any producer or dealer whose plant, business, and appurtenances shall have been requisitioned or taken over by the President shall be paid a just compensation for the use thereof during the period that the same may be requisitioned or taken over as aforesaid, which compensation the

⁸ For priorities list issued in April, 1918, see p. 178.

President shall fix or cause to be fixed by the Federal Trade Commission.

That if the prices so fixed, or if, in the case of the taking over or requisitioning of the mines or business of any such producer or dealer the compensation therefor as determined by the provisions of this Act be not satisfactory to the person or persons entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as, added to said seventy-five per centum, will make up such amount as will be just compensation in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

While operating or causing to be operated any such plants or business, the President is authorized to prescribe such regulations as he may deem essential for the employment, control, and compensation of the employees necessary to conduct the same.

Or if the President of the United States shall be of the opinion that he can thereby better provide for the common defense, and whenever, in his judgment, it shall be necessary for the efficient prosecution of the war, then he is hereby authorized and empowered to require any or all producers of coal and coke, either in any special area or in any special coal fields, or in the entire United States, to sell their products only to the United States through an agency to be designated by the President, such agency to regulate the resale of such coal and coke, and the prices thereof, and to establish rules for the regulation of and to regulate the methods of production, shipment, distribution, apportionment, or storage thereof among dealers and consumers, domestic or foreign, and to make payment of the purchase price thereof to the producers thereof, or to the person or persons legally entitled to said payment. . . .

All such products so sold to the United States shall be sold by the United States at such uniform prices, quality considered, as may be practicable and as may be determined by said agency to be just and fair.

Any moneys received by the United States for the sale of any such coal and coke may, in the discretion of the President, be used as a revolving fund for further carrying out the purposes of this section. Any moneys not so used shall be covered into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

That when directed by the President, the Federal Trade Commission is hereby required to proceed to make full inquiry, giving such notice as it may deem practicable, into the cost of producing under reasonably efficient management at the various places of production the following commodities, to wit, coal and coke. . . .

Whoever shall, with knowledge that the prices of any such commodity have been fixed as herein provided, ask, demand, or receive a higher price, or whoever shall, with knowledge that the regulations have been prescribed as herein provided, violate or refuse to conform to any of the same, shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine of not more than \$5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. Each independent transaction shall constitute a separate offense.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as restricting or modifying in any manner the right the Government of the United States may have in its own behalf or in behalf of any other Government at war with Germany to purchase, requisition, or take over any such commodities for the equipment, maintenance, or support of armed forces at any price or upon any terms that may be agreed upon or otherwise lawfully determined.

SEC. 26. That any person carrying on or employed in

commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, or with or in the Territories or other possessions of the United States in any article suitable for human food, fuel, or other necessities of life, who, either in his individual capacity or as an officer, agent, or employee of a corporation or member of a partnership carrying on or employed in such trade, shall store, acquire, or hold, or who shall destroy or make away with any such article for the purpose of limiting the supply thereof to the public or affecting the market price thereof in such commerce, whether temporarily or otherwise, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both: *Provided*, That any storing or holding by any farmer, gardener, or other person of the products of any farm, garden, or other land cultivated by him shall not be deemed to be a storing or holding within the meaning of this Act: *Provided further*, That farmers and fruit growers, cooperative and other exchanges, or societies of a similar character shall not be included within the provisions of this section: *Provided further*, That this section shall not be construed to prohibit the holding or accumulating of any such article by any such person in a quantity not in excess of the reasonable requirements of his business for a reasonable time or in a quantity reasonably required to furnish said articles produced in surplus quantities seasonably throughout the period of scant or no production. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to repeal the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, commonly known as the Sherman Antitrust Act.

SEC. 27. That the President is authorized to procure, or aid in procuring, such stocks of nitrate of soda as he may determine to be necessary, and find available, for increasing agricultural production during the calendar years nineteen hundred and seventeen and eighteen, and to dispose of the same for cash at cost, including all expenses connected therewith. For carrying out the purposes of this section, there is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, available immediately and until expended, the sum of \$10,000,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, and the President is authorized to make such regulations, and to use such means and agencies of the Government, as, in his discretion, he may deem best. The proceeds arising from the disposition of the nitrate of soda shall go into the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.

Approved, August 10, 1917.

ACT PROVIDING FOR SECOND LIBERTY LOAN, SEPTEMBER 24, 1917.

An Act To authorize an additional issue of bonds to meet expenditures for the national security and defense, and, for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of the war, to extend additional credit to foreign Governments, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, is hereby authorized to borrow, from time to time, on the credit of the United States for the purposes of this Act, and to meet expenditures authorized for the national security and defense and other public purposes authorized by law, not exceeding in the aggregate \$7,538,945,460, and to issue therefor bonds of the United States, in addition to the \$2,000,000,000 bonds already issued or offered for subscription under authority of the Act

approved April twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and seventeen. . . .

The bonds herein authorized shall be in such form or forms and denomination or denominations and subject to such terms and conditions of issue, conversion, redemption, maturities, payment, and rate or rates of interest, not exceeding four per centum per annum, and time or times of payment of interest, as the Secretary of the Treasury from time to time at or before the issue thereof may prescribe. The principal and interest thereof shall be payable in United States gold coin of the present standard of value.

The bonds herein authorized shall from time to time first be offered at not less than par as a popular loan, under such regulations, prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury from time to time, as will in his opinion give the people of the United States as nearly as may be an equal opportunity to participate therein, but he may make allotment in full upon applications for smaller amounts of bonds in advance of any date which he may set for the closing of subscriptions and may reject or reduce allotments upon later applications and applications for larger amounts, and may reject or reduce allotments upon applications from incorporated banks and trust companies for their own account and make allotment in full or larger allotments to others, and may establish a graduated scale of allotments, and may from time to time adopt any or all of said methods, should any such action be deemed by him to be in the public interest: *Provided*, That such reduction or increase of allotments of such bonds shall be made under general rules to be prescribed by said Secretary and shall apply to all subscribers similarly situated. And any portion of the bonds so offered and not taken may be otherwise disposed of by the Secretary of the Treasury in such manner and at such price or prices, not less than par, as he may determine. . . .

SEC. 4. That in connection with the issue of any series of bonds under the authority of section one of this Act the Secretary of the Treasury may determine that the bonds of such series shall be convertible as provided in or pursuant to this section, and, in any such case, he may make appropriate provision to that end in offering for subscription the bonds of such series (hereinafter called convertible bonds). In any case of the issue of a series of convertible bonds, if a subsequent series of bonds (not including United States certificates of indebtedness, war savings certificates, and other obligations maturing not more than five years from the issue of such obligations, respectively) bearing interest at a higher rate shall, under the authority of this or any other Act, be issued by the United States before the termination of the war between the United States and the Imperial German Government, then the holders of such convertible bonds shall have the privilege, at the option of the several holders, at any time within such period, after the public offering of bonds of such subsequent series, and under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury shall have prescribed, of converting their bonds, at par, into bonds bearing such higher rate of interest at such price not less than par as the Secretary of the Treasury shall have prescribed. . . .

SECTION 5. That in addition to the bonds authorized by section one of this Act the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to borrow from time to time, on the credit of the United States, for the purposes of this Act and to meet public expenditures authorized by law, such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefor certificates of indebtedness of the United States at not less than par in such form or forms and subject to such terms and conditions and at such rate or rates of interest as he may

prescribe; and each certificate so issued shall be payable at such time not exceeding one year from the date of its issue, and may be redeemable before maturity upon such terms and conditions, and the interest accruing thereon shall be payable at such time or times as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. The sum of such certificates outstanding hereunder and under section six of said Act approved April twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, shall not at any one time exceed in the aggregate \$4,000,000,000.

SEC. 6. That in addition to the bonds authorized by section one of this Act and the certificates of indebtedness authorized by section five of this Act, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to borrow from time to time, on the credit of the United States, for the purposes of this Act and to meet public expenditures authorized by law, such sum or sums as in his judgment may be necessary, and to issue therefor, at such price or prices and upon such terms and conditions as he may determine, war-savings certificates of the United States on which interest to maturity may be discounted in advance at such rate or rates and computed in such manner as he may prescribe. Such war-savings certificates shall be in such form or forms and subject to such terms and conditions, and may have such provisions for payment thereof before maturity, as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. Each war-saving certificate so issued shall be payable at such time, not exceeding five years from the date of its issue, and may be redeemable before maturity, upon such terms and conditions as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. The sum of such war-savings certificates outstanding shall not at any one time exceed in the aggregate \$2,000,000,000. The amount of war-savings certificates sold to any one person at any one time shall not exceed \$100, and it shall not be lawful for any one person at any one time to hold war-savings certificates to an aggregate amount exceeding \$1,000. The Secretary of the Treasury may, under such regulations and upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe, issue, or cause to be issued, stamps to evidence payments for or on account of such certificates.

SEC. 7. That none of the bonds authorized by section one, nor of the certificates authorized by section five, or by section six, of this Act, shall bear the circulation privilege. All such bonds and certificates shall be exempt, both as to principal and interest from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States, any State, or any of the possessions of the United States, or by any local taxing authority, except (a) estate or inheritance taxes, and (b) graduated additional income taxes, commonly known as surtaxes, and excess profits and war-profits taxes, now or hereafter imposed by the United States, upon the income or profits of individuals, partnerships, associations, or corporations. The interest on an amount of such bonds and certificates the principal of which does not exceed in the aggregate \$5,000, owned by any individual, partnership, association, or corporation, shall be exempt from the taxes provided for in subdivision (b) of this section. . . .

SEC. 9. That in connection with the operations of advertising, selling, and delivering any bonds, certificates of indebtedness, or war-savings certificates of the United States provided for in this Act, the Postmaster General, under such regulations as he may prescribe, shall require, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, the employees of the Post Office Department and of the Postal Service to perform such services as may be necessary, desirable, or practicable, without extra compensation.

SEC. 13. That for the purposes of this Act the date of the termination of the war between the United States and the

Imperial German Government shall be fixed by proclamation of the President of the United States.⁹

Approved, September 24, 1917.

ACT CREATING AN AIRCRAFT BOARD, OCTOBER 1, 1917.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of expanding and coordinating the industrial activities relating to aircraft, or parts of aircraft, produced for any purpose in the United States, and to facilitate generally the development of air service, a board is hereby created, to be known as the Aircraft Board, hereinafter referred to as the board.

SEC. 2. That the board shall number not more than nine in all, and shall include a civilian chairman, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, and two other officers of the Army, to be appointed by the Secretary of War; the Chief Constructor of the Navy and two other officers of the Navy, to be appointed by the Secretary of the Navy; and two additional civilian members. The chairman and civilian members shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

SEC. 3. That said board and tenure of office of the members thereof shall continue during the pleasure of the President, but not longer than six months after the present war. The civilian members of the board shall serve without compensation.

SEC. 4. That the board is hereby empowered, under the direction and control of and as authorized by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively, on behalf of the Departments of War and Navy, to supervise and direct, in accordance with the requirements prescribed or approved by the respective departments, the purchase, production, and manufacture of aircraft, engines, and all ordnance and instruments used in connection therewith, and accessories and materials therefor, including the purchase, lease, acquisition, or construction of plants for the manufacture of aircraft, engines, and accessories: *Provided*, That the board may make recommendations as to contracts and their distribution in connection with the foregoing, but every contract shall be made by the already constituted authorities of the respective departments.

SEC. 5. That the board is also empowered to employ, either in the District of Columbia or elsewhere, such clerks and other employees as may be necessary to the conduct of its business, including such technical experts and advisers as may be found necessary, and to fix their salaries. Such salaries shall conform to those usually paid by the Government for similar service: *Provided*, That by unanimous approval of the board higher compensation may be paid to technical experts and advisers. . . .

Approved, October 1, 1917.

WAR REVENUE ACT,¹⁰ OCTOBER 3, 1917.

An Act To provide revenue to defray war expenses, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE I.—WAR INCOME TAX.

SECTION 1. That in addition to the normal tax imposed by subdivision (a) of section one of the Act entitled "An Act to increase the revenue, and for other purposes," approved September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen,

⁹ For proclamation concerning the loan, see p. 174.

¹⁰ It has been found impracticable to print here the entire act. The full text would occupy over forty pages.

there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid a like normal tax of two per centum upon the income of every individual, a citizen or resident of the United States, received in the calendar year nineteen hundred and seventeen and every calendar year thereafter.

SEC. 2. That in addition to the additional tax imposed by subdivision (b) of section one of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid a like additional tax upon the income of every individual received in the calendar year nineteen hundred and seventeen and every calendar year thereafter, as follows:

One per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$5,000 and does not exceed \$7,500;

Two per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$7,500 and does not exceed \$10,000;

Three per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$10,000 and does not exceed \$12,500;

Four per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$12,500 and does not exceed \$15,000;

Five per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$15,000 and does not exceed \$20,000;

Seven per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$20,000 and does not exceed \$40,000;

Ten per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$40,000 and does not exceed \$60,000;

Fourteen per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$60,000 and does not exceed \$80,000;

Eighteen per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$80,000 and does not exceed \$100,000;

Twenty-two per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$100,000 and does not exceed \$150,000;

Twenty-five per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$150,000 and does not exceed \$200,000;

Thirty per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$200,000 and does not exceed \$250,000;

Thirty-four per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$250,000 and does not exceed \$300,000;

Thirty-seven per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$300,000 and does not exceed \$500,000;

Forty per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$500,000 and does not exceed \$750,000.

Forty-five per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$750,000 and does not exceed \$1,000,000;

Fifty per centum per annum upon the amount by which the total net income exceeds \$1,000,000.

SEC. 3. That the taxes imposed by sections one and two of this Act shall be computed, levied, assessed, collected, and paid upon the same basis and in the same manner as the similar taxes imposed by section one of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, except that

in the case of the tax imposed by section one of this Act (a) the exemptions of \$3,000 and \$4,000 provided in section seven of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, as amended by this Act, shall be, respectively, \$1,000 and \$2,000, and (b) the returns required under subdivisions (b) and (c) of section eight of such Act as amended by this Act shall be required in the case of net incomes of \$1,000 or over, in the case of unmarried persons, and \$2,000 or over in the case of married persons, instead of \$3,000 or over, as therein provided, and (c) the provisions of subdivision (c) of section nine of such Act, as amended by this Act, requiring the normal tax of individuals on income derived from interest to be deducted and withheld at the source of the income shall not apply to the new two per centum normal tax prescribed in section one of this Act until on and after January first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and thereafter only one two per centum normal tax shall be deducted and withheld at the source under the provisions of such subdivision (c), and any further normal tax for which the recipient of such income is liable under this Act or such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, as amended by this Act, shall be paid by such recipient.

SEC. 4. That in addition to the tax imposed by subdivision (a) of section ten of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, as amended by this Act, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid a like tax of four per centum upon the income received in the calendar year nineteen hundred and seventeen and every calendar year thereafter, by every corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insurance company, subject to the tax imposed by that subdivision of that section, except that if it has fixed its own fiscal year, the tax imposed by this section for the fiscal year ending during the calendar year nineteen hundred and seventeen shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid only on that proportion of its income for such fiscal year which the period between January first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and the end of such fiscal year bears to the whole of such fiscal year.

The tax imposed by this section shall be computed, levied, assessed, collected, and paid upon the same incomes and in the same manner as the tax imposed by subdivision (a) of section ten of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, as amended by this Act, except that for the purpose of the tax imposed by this section the income embraced in a return of a corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insurance company, shall be credited with the amount received as dividends upon the stock or from the net earnings of any other corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insurance company, which is taxable upon its net income as provided in this title.

SEC. 5. That the provisions of this title shall not extend to Porto Rico or the Philippine Islands, and the Porto Rican or Philippine Legislature, shall have power by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal the income tax laws in force in Porto Rico or the Philippine Islands, respectively.

TITLE II.—WAR EXCESS PROFITS TAX.

SEC. 200. That when used in this title—

The term "corporation" includes joint-stock companies or associations and insurance companies;

The term "domestic" means created under the law of the United States, or of any State, Territory, or District thereof, and the term "foreign" means created under the law of any other possession of the United States or of any foreign country or government;

The term "United States" means only the States, the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii, and the District of Columbia;

The term "taxable year" means the twelve months ending December thirty-first, excepting in the case of a corporation or partnership which has fixed its own fiscal year, in which case it means such fiscal year. The first taxable year shall be the year ending December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, except that in the case of a corporation or partnership which has fixed its own fiscal year, it shall be the fiscal year ending during the calendar year nineteen hundred and seventeen. If a corporation or partnership, prior to March first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, makes a return covering its own fiscal year, and includes therein the income received during that part of the fiscal year falling within the calendar year nineteen hundred and sixteen, the tax for such taxable year shall be that proportion of the tax computed upon the net income during such full fiscal year which the time from January first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, to the end of such fiscal year bears to the full fiscal year; and

The term "prewar period" means the calendar years nineteen hundred and eleven, nineteen hundred and twelve, and nineteen hundred and thirteen, or, if a corporation or partnership was not in existence or an individual was not engaged in a trade or business during the whole of such period, then as many of such years during the whole of which the corporation or partnership was in existence or the individual was engaged in the trade or business.

The terms "trade" and "business" include professions and occupations.

The term "net income" means in the case of a foreign corporation or partnership or a nonresident alien individual, the net income received from sources within the United States.

SEC. 201. That in addition to the taxes under existing law and under this act there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the income of every corporation, partnership, or individual, a tax (hereinafter in this title referred to as the tax) equal to the following percentages of the net income:

Twenty per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of the deduction (determined as hereinafter provided) and not in excess of fifteen per centum of the invested capital for the taxable year;

Twenty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of fifteen per centum and not in excess of twenty per centum of such capital;

Thirty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of twenty per centum and not in excess of twenty-five per centum of such capital;

Forty-five per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of twenty-five per centum and not in excess of thirty-three per centum of such capital; and

Sixty per centum of the amount of the net income in excess of thirty-three per centum of such capital.

For the purpose of this title every corporation or partnership not exempt under the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be engaged in business, and all the trades and businesses in which it is engaged shall be treated as a single trade or business, and all its income from whatever source derived shall be deemed to be received from such trade or business.

This title shall apply to all trades or businesses of whatever description, whether continuously carried on or not, except—

(a) In the case of officers and employees under the United States, or any State, Territory, or the District of

Columbia, or any local subdivision thereof, the compensation or fees received by them as such officers or employees;

(b) Corporations exempt from tax under the provisions of section eleven of Title I of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, as amended by this Act, and partnerships and individuals carrying on or doing the same business, or coming within the same description; and

(c) Incomes derived from the business of life, health, and accident insurance combined in one policy issued on the weekly premium payment plan.

SEC. 202. That the tax shall not be imposed in the case of the trade or business of a foreign corporation or partnership or a nonresident alien individual, the net income of which trade or business during the taxable year is less than \$3,000.

SEC. 203. That for the purposes of this title the deduction shall be as follows, except as otherwise in this title provided—

(a) In the case of a domestic corporation, the sum of (1) an amount equal to the same percentage of the invested capital for the taxable year which the average amount of the annual net income of the trade or business during the prewar period was of the invested capital for the prewar period (but not less than seven or more than nine per centum of the invested capital for the taxable year), and (2) \$3,000;

(b) In the case of a domestic partnership or of a citizen or resident of the United States, the sum of (1) an amount equal to the same percentage of the invested capital for the taxable year which the average amount of the annual net income of the trade or business during the prewar period was of the invested capital for the prewar period (but not less than seven or more than nine per centum of the invested capital for the taxable year), and (2) \$6,000;

(c) In the case of a foreign corporation or partnership or of a nonresident alien individual, an amount ascertained in the same manner as provided in subdivisions (a) and (b) without any exemption of \$3,000 or \$6,000;

(d) If the Secretary of the Treasury is unable satisfactorily to determine the average amount of the annual net income of the trade or business during the prewar period, the deduction shall be determined in the same manner as provided in section two hundred and five.

SEC. 204. That if a corporation or partnership was not in existence, or an individual was not engaged in the trade or business, during the whole of any one calendar year during the prewar period, the deduction shall be an amount equal to eight per centum of the invested capital for the taxable year, plus in the case of a domestic corporation \$3,000, and in the case of a domestic partnership or a citizen or resident of the United States \$6,000.

A trade or business carried on by a corporation, partnership, or individual, although formally organized or reorganized on or after January second, nineteen hundred and thirteen, which is substantially a continuation of a trade or business carried on prior to that date, shall, for the purposes of this title, be deemed to have been in existence prior to that date, and the net income and invested capital of its predecessor prior to that date shall be deemed to have been its net income and invested capital. . . .

SEC. 213. That the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall make all necessary regulations for carrying out the provisions of this title, and may require any corporation, partnership, or individual, subject to the provisions of this title, to furnish him with such facts, data, and information as in his judgment are necessary to collect the tax imposed by this title. . . .

TITLE III.—WAR TAX ON BEVERAGES.

SEC. 300. That on and after the passage of this Act there shall be levied and collected on all distilled spirits in bond at that time or that have been or that may be then or thereafter produced in or imported into the United States, except such distilled spirits as are subject to the tax provided in section three hundred and three, in addition to the tax now imposed by law, a tax of \$1.10 (or, if withdrawn for beverage purposes or for use in the manufacture or production of any article used or intended for use as a beverage, a tax of \$2.10) on each proof gallon, or wine gallon when below proof, and a proportionate tax at a like rate on all fractional parts of such proof or wine gallon, to be paid by the distiller or importer when withdrawn, and collected under the provisions of existing law.

That in addition to the tax under existing law there shall be levied and collected upon all perfumes hereafter imported into the United States containing distilled spirits, a tax of \$1.10 per wine gallon, and a proportionate tax at a like rate on all fractional parts of such wine gallon. Such a tax shall be collected by the collector of customs and deposited as internal-revenue collections, under such rules and regulations as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may prescribe.

SEC. 301. That no distilled spirits produced after the passage of this Act shall be imported into the United States from any foreign country, or from the West Indian Islands recently acquired from Denmark (unless produced from products the growth of such islands, and not then into any State or Territory or District of the United States in which the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor is prohibited), or from Porto Rico, or the Philippine Islands. Under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, the provisions of this section shall not apply to distilled spirits imported for other than (1) beverage purposes or (2) use in the manufacture or production of any article used or intended for use as a beverage. . . .

SEC. 313. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid—

(a) Upon all prepared sirups or extracts (intended for use in the manufacture or production of beverages, commonly known as soft drinks, by soda fountains, bottling establishments, and other similar places) sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer thereof, if so sold for not more than \$1.30 per gallon, a tax of 5 cents per gallon; if so sold for more than \$1.30 and not more than \$2 per gallon, a tax of 8 cents per gallon; if so sold for more than \$2 and not more than \$3 per gallon, a tax of 10 cents per gallon; if so sold for more than \$3 and not more than \$4 per gallon, a tax of 15 cents per gallon; and if so sold for more than \$4 per gallon, a tax of 20 cents per gallon; and

(b) Upon all unfermented grape juice, soft drinks or artificial mineral waters (not carbonated), and fermented liquors containing less than one-half per centum of alcohol, sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer thereof, in bottles or other closed containers, and upon all ginger ale, root beer, sarsaparilla, pop, and other carbonated waters or beverages, manufactured and sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer of the carbonic acid gas used in carbonating the same, a tax of 1 cent per gallon; and

(c) Upon all natural mineral waters or table waters, sold by the producer, bottler, or importer thereof, in bottles or other closed containers, at over 10 cents per gallon, a tax of 1 cent per gallon. . . .

SEC. 315. That upon all carbonic acid gas in drums or

other containers (intended for use in the manufacture or production of carbonated water or other drinks) sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer thereof, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid a tax of 5 cents per pound. Such tax shall be paid by the purchaser to the vendor thereof and shall be collected, returned, and paid to the United States by such vendor in the same manner as provided in section five hundred and three.

TITLE IV.—WAR TAX ON CIGARS, TOBACCO, AND MANUFACTURES THEREOF.

SEC. 400. That upon cigars and cigarettes, which shall be manufactured and sold, or removed for consumption or sale, there shall be levied and collected, in addition to the taxes now imposed by existing law, the following taxes, to be paid by the manufacturer or importer thereof: (a) on cigars of all descriptions made of tobacco, or any substitute therefor, and weighing not more than three pounds per thousand, 25 cents per thousand; (b) on cigars made of tobacco, or any substitute therefor, and weighing more than three pounds per thousand, if manufactured or imported to retail at 4 cents or more each, and not more than 7 cents each, \$1 per thousand; (c) if manufactured or imported to retail at more than 7 cents each and not more than 15 cents each, \$3 per thousand; (d) if manufactured or imported to retail at more than 15 cents each and not more than 20 cents each, \$5 per thousand; (e) if manufactured or imported to retail at more than 20 cents each, \$7 per thousand: *Provided*, That the word "retail" as used in this section shall mean the ordinary retail price of a single cigar, and that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, by regulation, require the manufacturer or importer to affix to each box or container a conspicuous label indicating by letter the clause of this section under which the cigars therein contained have been tax-paid, which must correspond with the tax-paid stamp on said box or container; (f) on cigarettes made of tobacco, or any substitute therefor, made in or imported into the United States, and weighing not more than three pounds per thousand, 80 cents per thousand; weighing more than three pounds per thousand, \$1.20 per thousand. . . .

SEC. 401. That upon all tobacco and snuff hereafter manufactured and sold, or removed for consumption or use, there shall be levied and collected, in addition to the tax now imposed by law upon such articles, a tax of 5 cents per pound, to be levied, collected, and paid under the provisions of existing law. . . .

TITLE V.—WAR TAX ON FACILITIES FURNISHED BY PUBLIC UTILITIES, AND INSURANCE.

SEC. 500. That from and after the first day of November, nineteen hundred and seventeen, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid (a) a tax equivalent to three per centum of the amount paid for the transportation by rail or water or by any form of mechanical motor power when in competition with carriers by rail or water of property by freight consigned from one point in the United States to another; (b) a tax of 1 cent for each 20 cents, or fraction thereof, paid to any person, corporation, partnership, or association, engaged in the business of transporting parcels or packages by express over regular routes between fixed terminals, for the transportation of any package, parcel, or shipment by express from one point in the United States to another: *Provided*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the carrier collecting such tax to list separately in any bill of lading, freight receipt, or other similar document, the amount of the tax herein levied, if the total amount of the freight and tax be therein stated; (c) a tax equivalent to eight per centum of

the amount paid for the transportation of persons by rail or water, or by any form of mechanical motor power on a regular established line when in competition with carriers by rail or water, from one point in the United States to another or to any point in Canada or Mexico, where the ticket therefor is sold or issued in the United States, not including the amount paid for commutation, or season tickets for trips less than thirty miles, or for transportation the fare for which does not exceed 35 cents, and a tax equivalent to ten per centum of the amount paid for seats, berths, and staterooms in parlor cars, sleeping cars, or on vessels. . . .

SEC. 502. That no tax shall be imposed under section five hundred upon any payment received for services rendered to the United States, or any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia. The right to exemption under this section shall be evidenced in such manner as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, may by regulation prescribe. . . .

SEC. 504. That from and after the first day of November, nineteen hundred and seventeen, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid the following taxes on the issuance of insurance policies:

(a) Life insurance: A tax equivalent to 8 cents on each \$100 or fractional part thereof of the amount for which any life is insured under any policy of insurance, or other instrument, by whatever name the same is called: *Provided*, That on all policies for life insurance only by which a life is insured not in excess of \$500, issued on the industrial or weekly-payment plan of insurance, the tax shall be forty per centum of the amount of the first weekly premium: *Provided further*, That policies of reinsurance shall be exempt from the tax imposed by this subdivision;

(b) Marine, inland, and fire insurance: A tax equivalent to 1 cent on each dollar or fractional part thereof of the premium charged under each policy of insurance or other instrument by whatever name the same is called whereby insurance is made or renewed upon property of any description (including rents or profits), whether against peril by sea or inland waters, or by fire or lightning, or other peril: *Provided*, That policies of reinsurance shall be exempt from the tax imposed by this subdivision;

(c) Casualty insurance: A tax equivalent to 1 cent on each dollar or fractional part thereof of the premium charged under each policy of insurance or obligation of the nature of indemnity for loss, damage, or liability (except bonds taxable under subdivision two of schedule A of Title VIII) issued or executed or renewed by any person, corporation, partnership, or association, transacting the business of employer's liability, workmen's compensation, accident, health, tornado, plate glass, steam boiler, elevator, burglary, automatic sprinkler, automobile, or other branch of insurance (except life insurance, and insurance described and taxed in the preceding subdivision): *Provided*, That policies of reinsurance shall be exempt from the tax imposed by this subdivision;

(d) Policies issued by any person, corporation, partnership, or association, whose income is exempt from taxation under Title I of the Act entitled "An Act to increase the revenue, and for other purposes," approved September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, shall be exempt from the taxes imposed by this section. . . .

TITLE VI.—WAR EXCISE TAXES.

SEC. 600. That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid—

(a) Upon all automobiles, automobile trucks, automobile wagons, and motorcycles, sold by the manufacturer, pro-

ducer, or importer, a tax equivalent to three per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(b) Upon all piano players, graphophones, phonographs, talking machines, and records used in connection with any musical instruments, piano player, graphophone, phonograph, or talking machine, sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to three per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(c) Upon all moving-picture films (which have not been exposed) sold by the manufacturer or importer a tax equivalent to one-fourth of 1 cent per linear foot; and

(d) Upon all positive moving-picture films (containing a picture ready for projection) sold or leased by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to one-half of 1 cent per linear foot; and

(e) Upon any article commonly or commercially known as jewelry, whether real or imitation, sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer thereof, a tax equivalent to three per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(f) Upon all tennis rackets, golf clubs, baseball bats, lacrosse sticks, balls of all kinds, including baseballs, foot balls, tennis, golf, lacrosse, billiard and pool balls, fishing rods and reels, billiard and pool tables, chess and checker boards and pieces, dice, games and parts of games, except playing cards and children's toys and games, sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to three per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(g) Upon all perfumes, essences, extracts, toilet waters, cosmetics, petroleum jellies, hair oils, pomades, hair dressings, hair restoratives, hair dyes, tooth and mouth washes, dentifrices, tooth pastes, aromatic cachous, toilet soaps and powders, or any similar substance, article, or preparation by whatsoever name known or distinguished, upon all of the above which are used or applied or intended to be used or applied for toilet purposes, and which are sold by the manufacturer, importer, or producer, a tax equivalent to two per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(h) Upon all pills, tablets, powders, tinctures, troches or lozenges, sirups, medicinal cordials or bitters, anodynes, tonics, plasters, liniments, salves, ointments, pastes, drops, waters (except those taxed under section three hundred and thirteen of this Act), essences, spirits, oils, and all medicinal preparations, compounds, or compositions whatsoever, the manufacturer or producer of which claims to have any private formula, secret, or occult art for making or preparing the same, or has or claims to have any exclusive right or title to the making or preparing the same, or which are prepared, uttered, vended, or exposed for sale under any letters patent, or trade-mark, or which, if prepared by any formula, published or unpublished, are held out or recommended to the public by the makers, venders, or proprietors thereof as proprietary medicines or medicinal proprietary articles or preparations, or as remedies or specifics for any disease, diseases, or affection whatever affecting the human or animal body, and which are sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to two per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(i) Upon all chewing gum or substitute therefor sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to two per centum of the price for which so sold; and

(j) Upon all cameras sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equivalent to three per centum of the price for which so sold. . . .

SEC. 603. That on the day this Act takes effect, and thereafter on July first in each year, and also at the time of the original purchase of a new boat by a user, if on any other date than July first, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid, upon the use of yachts, pleasure boats,

power boats, and sailing boats, of over five net tons, and motor boats with fixed engines, not used exclusively for trade or national defense, or not built according to plans and specifications approved by the Navy Department, an excise tax to be based on each yacht or boat, at rates as follows: Yachts, pleasure boats, power boats, motor boats with fixed engines, and sailing boats, of over five net tons, length not over fifty feet, 50 cents for each foot, length over fifty feet and not over one hundred feet, \$1 for each foot, length over one hundred feet, \$2 for each foot; motor boats of not over five net tons with fixed engines, \$5.

In determining the length of such yachts, pleasure boats, power boats, motor boats with fixed engines, and sailing boats, the measurement of over-all length shall govern.

In the case of a tax imposed at the time of the original purchase of a new boat on any other date than July first, the amount to be paid shall be the same number of twelfths of the amount of the tax as the number of calendar months, including the month of sale, remaining prior to the following July first.

TITLE VII.—WAR TAX ON ADMISSIONS AND DUES.

SEC. 700. That from and after the first day of November, nineteen hundred and seventeen, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid (a) a tax of 1 cent for each 10 cents or fraction thereof of the amount paid for admission to any place, including admission by season ticket or subscription, to be paid by the person paying for such admission: *Provided*, That the tax on admission of children under twelve years of age where an admission charge for such children is made shall in every case be 1 cent; and (b) in the case of persons (except bona fide employees, municipal officers on official business, and children under twelve years of age) admitted free to any place at a time when and under circumstances under which an admission charge is made to other persons of the same class, a tax of 1 cent for each 10 cents or fraction thereof of the price so charged to such other persons for the same or similar accommodations, to be paid by the person so admitted; and (c) a tax of 1 cent for each 10 cents or fraction thereof paid for admission to any public performance for profit at any cabaret or other similar entertainment to which the charge for admission is wholly or in part included in the price paid for refreshment, service, or merchandise; the amount paid for such admission to be computed under rules prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, such tax to be paid by the person paying for such refreshment, service, or merchandise. . . . These taxes shall not be imposed in the case of a place the maximum charge for admission to which is 5 cents, or in the case of shows, rides, and other amusements (the maximum charge for admission to which is 10 cents) within outdoor general amusement parks, or in the case of admissions to such parks.

No tax shall be levied under this title in respect to any admissions all the proceeds of which inure exclusively to the benefit of religious, educational, or charitable institutions, societies, or organizations, or admissions to agricultural fairs none of the profits of which are distributed to stockholders or members of the association conducting the same.

The term "admission" as used in this title includes seats and tables, reserved or otherwise, and other similar accommodations, and the charges made therefor.

SEC. 701. That from and after the first day of November, nineteen hundred and seventeen, there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid, a tax equivalent to ten per centum of any amount paid as dues or membership fees (in-

cluding initiation fees), to any social, athletic, or sporting club or organization, where such dues or fees are in excess of \$12 per year; such taxes to be paid by the person paying such dues or fees: *Provided*, That there shall be exempted from the provisions of this section all amounts paid as dues or fees to a fraternal beneficiary society, order, or association, operating under the lodge system or for the exclusive benefit of the members of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge system, and providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of such society, order, or association or their dependents.

TITLE VIII.—WAR STAMP TAXES.

SEC. 800. That on and after the first day of December, nineteen hundred and seventeen, there shall be levied, collected, and paid, for and in respect of the several bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock and of indebtedness, and other documents, instruments, matters, and things mentioned and described in Schedule A of this title, or for or in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments, matters, or things, or any of them, are written or printed, by any person, corporation, partnership, or association who makes, signs, issues, sells, removes, consigns, or ships the same, or for whose use or benefit the same are made, signed, issued, sold, removed, consigned, or shipped, the several taxes specified in such schedule. . . . [The stamp taxes imposed range from one cent up.]

TITLE IX.—WAR ESTATE TAX.

SEC. 900. That in addition to the tax imposed by section two hundred and one of the Act entitled "An Act to increase the revenue, and for other purposes," approved September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, as amended—

(a) A tax equal to the following percentages of its value is hereby imposed upon the transfer of each net estate of every decedent dying after the passage of this Act, the transfer of which is taxable under such section (the value of such net estate to be determined as provided in Title II of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen):

One-half of one per centum of the amount of such net estate not in excess of \$50,000;

One per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$50,000 and does not exceed \$150,000;

One and one-half per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$150,000 and does not exceed \$250,000;

Two per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$250,000 and does not exceed \$450,000.

Two and one-half per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$450,000 and does not exceed \$1,000,000;

Three per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$1,000,000 and does not exceed \$2,000,000;

Three and one-half per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$2,000,000 and does not exceed \$3,000,000;

Four per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$3,000,000 and does not exceed \$4,000,000;

Four and one-half per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$4,000,000 and does not exceed \$5,000,000;

Five per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$5,000,000 and does not exceed \$8,000,000;

Seven per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$8,000,000 and does not exceed \$10,000,000; and

Ten per centum of the amount by which such net estate exceeds \$10,000,000.

SEC. 901. That the tax imposed by this title shall not apply to the transfer of the net estate of any decedent dying while serving in the military or naval forces of the United States, during the continuance of the war in which the United States is now engaged, or if death results from injuries received or disease contracted in such service, within one year after the termination of such war. For the purposes of this section the termination of the war shall be evidenced by the proclamation of the President.

TITLE X.—ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS. [Omitted.]

TITLE XI.—POSTAL RATES.

SEC. 1100. That the rate of postage on all mail matter of the first class, except postal cards, shall thirty days after the passage of this Act be, in addition to the existing rate, 1 cent for each ounce or fraction thereof: *Provided*, That the rate of postage on drop letters of the first class shall be 2 cents an ounce or fraction thereof. Postal cards, and private mailing or post cards when complying with the requirements of existing law, shall be transmitted through the mails at 1 cent each in addition to the existing rate.

That letters written and mailed by soldiers, sailors, and marines assigned to duty in a foreign country engaged in the present war may be mailed free of postage, subject to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Postmaster General.

SEC. 1101. That on and after July first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, the rates of postage on publications entered as second-class matter (including sample copies to the extent of ten per centum of the weight of copies mailed to subscribers during the calendar year) when sent by the publisher thereof from the post office of publication or other post office, or when sent by a news agent to actual subscribers thereto, or to other news agents for the purpose of sale:

(a) In the case of the portion of such publication devoted to matter other than advertisements, shall be as follows: (1) On and after July first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and until July first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, 1½ cents per pound or fraction thereof; (2) on and after July first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, 1½ cents per pound or fraction thereof.

(b) In the case of the portion of such publication devoted to advertisements the rates per pound or fraction thereof for delivery within the several zones applicable to fourth-class matter shall be as follows (but where the space devoted to advertisements does not exceed five per centum of the total space, the rate of postage shall be the same as if the whole of such publication was devoted to matter other than advertisements): (1) On and after July first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and until July first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, for the first and second zones, 1½ cents; for the third zone, 1½ cents; for the fourth zone, 2 cents; for the fifth zone, 2½ cents; for the sixth zone, 2½ cents; for the seventh zone, 3 cents; for the eighth zone, 3½ cents; (2) on and after July first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, and until July first, nineteen hundred and twenty, for the first and second zones, 1½ cents; for the third zone, 2 cents; for the fourth zone, 3 cents; for the fifth zone, 3½ cents; for the sixth zone, 4 cents; for the seventh zone, 5 cents; for the eighth zone, 5½ cents; (3) on and after July first, nineteen hundred and twenty, and until July first, nineteen hundred and twenty-one, for the first and second zones, 1¾ cents; for the third zone, 2½ cents; for the fourth zone, 4 cents; for the fifth zone, 4¾ cents; for the sixth zone, 5½ cents; for the seventh zone, 7 cents; for the eighth zone, 7¾ cents; (4) on and after July first, nineteen hundred and twenty-one, for the first and

second zones, 2 cents; for the third zone, 3 cents; for the fourth zone, 5 cents; for the fifth zone, 6 cents; for the sixth zone, 7 cents; for the seventh zone, 9 cents; for the eighth zone, 10 cents;

(c) With the first mailing of each issue of each such publication, the publisher shall file with the postmaster a copy of such issue, together with a statement containing such information as the Postmaster General may prescribe for determining the postage chargeable thereon. . . .

TITLE XII.—INCOME TAX AMENDMENTS.

SEC. 1203. (1) That section seven of such Act of September eighth, nineteen hundred and sixteen, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 7. That for the purpose of the normal tax only, there shall be allowed as an exemption in the nature of a deduction from the amount of the net income of each citizen or resident of the United States, ascertained as provided herein, the sum of \$3,000, plus \$1,000 additional if the person making the return be a head of a family or a married man with a wife living with him, or plus the sum of \$1,000 additional if the person making the return be a married woman with a husband living with her; but in no event shall this additional exemption of \$1,000 be deducted by both a husband and a wife: *Provided*, That only one deduction of \$4,000 shall be made from the aggregate income of both husband and wife when living together: *Provided further*, That if the person making the return is the head of a family there shall be an additional exemption of \$200 for each child dependent upon such person, if under eighteen years of age, or if incapable of self-support because mentally or physically defective, but this provision shall operate only in the case of one parent in the same family: *Provided further*, That guardians or trustees shall be allowed to make this personal exemption as to income derived from the property of which such guardian or trustee has charge in favor of each ward or cestui que trust: *Provided further*, That in no event shall a ward or cestui que trust be allowed a greater personal exemption than as provided in this section, from the amount of net income received from all sources. There shall also be allowed an exemption from the amount of the net income of estates of deceased citizens or residents of the United States during the period of administration or settlement, and of trust or other estates of citizens or residents of the United States the income of which is not distributed annually or regularly under the provisions of subdivision (b) of section two, the sum of \$3,000, including such deductions as are allowed under section five." . . .

"SEC. 28. That all persons, corporations, partnerships, associations, and insurance companies, in whatever capacity acting, including lessees or mortgagors of real or personal property, trustees acting in any trust capacity, executors, administrators, receivers, conservators, and employers, making payment to another person, corporation, partnership, association, or insurance company, of interest, rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensation, remuneration, emoluments, or other fixed or determinable gains, profits, and income (other than payments described in sections twenty-six and twenty-seven), of \$800 or more in any taxable year, or, in the case of such payments made by the United States, the officers or employees of the United States having information as to such payments and required to make returns in regard thereto by the regulations hereinafter provided for, are hereby authorized and required to render a true and accurate return to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under such rules and regulations and in such form and manner as may be prescribed

by him, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, setting forth the amount of such gains, profits, and income, and the name and address of the recipient of such payment." . . .

Approved, October 3, 1917.

ACT PERMITTING FOREIGN VESSELS TO ENTER COASTWISE TRADE, OCTOBER 6, 1917.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That during the present war with Germany and for a period of one hundred and twenty days thereafter the interests of the United States require, suspend the present provisions of law and permit vessels of foreign registry, and foreign-built vessels admitted to American registry under the Act of August eighteenth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, to engage in the coastwise trade of the United States: *Provided*, That no such vessel shall engage in the coastwise trade except upon a permit issued by the United States Shipping Board, which permit shall limit or define the scope of the trade and the time of such employment: *Provided further*, That in issuing permits the board shall give preference to vessels of foreign registry owned, leased, or chartered by citizens of the United States or corporations thereof: *And provided further*, That the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the coastwise trade with Alaska or between Alaskan ports.

Approved, October 6, 1917.

ACT TO PREVENT THE PUBLICATION OF CERTAIN INVENTIONS, OCTOBER 6, 1917.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That whenever during a time when the United States is at war the publication of an invention by the granting of a patent might, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Patents, be detrimental to the public safety or defense or might assist the enemy or endanger the successful prosecution of the war he may order that the invention be kept secret and withhold the grant of a patent until the termination of the war: *Provided*, That the invention disclosed in the application for said patent may be held abandoned upon it being established before or by the commissioner that in violation of said order said invention has been published or that an application for a patent therefor has been filed in a foreign country by the inventor or his assigns or legal representatives, without the consent or approval of the Commissioner of Patents, or under a license of the Secretary of Commerce as provided by law.

When an applicant whose patent is withheld as herein provided and who faithfully obeys the order of the Commissioner of Patents above referred to shall tender his invention to the Government of the United States for its use, he shall, if and when he ultimately received a patent, have the right to sue for compensation in the Court of Claims, such right to compensation to begin from the date of the use of the invention by the Government.

Approved, October 6, 1917.

WAR RISK INSURANCE ACT, OCTOBER 6, 1917.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first section of the Act entitled "An Act to authorize the establishment of a Bureau of War Risk Insurance in the Treasury Department," approved September second, nineteen hundred and fourteen, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"ARTICLE I.

"SECTION 1. That there is established in the Treasury Department a Bureau to be known as the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the director of which shall receive a salary at the rate of \$5,000 per annum.

"That there be in such bureau a Division of Marine and Seamen's Insurance and a Division of Military and Naval Insurance in charge of a commissioner of Marine and Seamen's Insurance and a commissioner of Military and Naval Insurance, respectively, each of whom shall receive a salary of \$4,000 per annum." . . .

ARTICLE II.

ALLOTMENTS AND FAMILY ALLOWANCES.

SEC. 200. That the provisions of this article shall apply to all enlisted men in the military or naval forces of the United States.

SEC. 201. That allotment of pay shall, subject to the conditions, limitations, and exceptions hereinafter specified, be compulsory as to wife, a former wife divorced who has not remarried and to whom alimony has been decreed, and a child, and voluntary as to any other person; but on the written consent of the wife or former wife divorced, supported by evidence satisfactory to the bureau of her ability to support herself and the children in her custody, the allotment for her and for such children may be waived; and on the enlisted man's application or otherwise for good cause shown, exemption from the allotment may be granted upon such conditions as may be prescribed by regulations. . . .

SEC. 202. That the enlisted man may allot any proportion or proportions or any fixed amount or amounts of his monthly pay or of the proportion thereof remaining after the compulsory allotment, for such purposes and for the benefit of such person or persons as he may direct, subject, however, to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed under regulations to be made by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively.

SEC. 203. That in case one-half of an enlisted man's monthly pay is not allotted, regulations to be made by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, respectively, may require, under such circumstances and conditions as may be prescribed in such regulations, that any proportion of such one-half pay as is not allotted shall be deposited to his credit, to be held during such period of his service as may be prescribed. Such deposits shall bear interest at the rate of four per centum per annum, with semi-annual rests and, when payable, shall be paid principal and interest to the enlisted man, if living, otherwise to any beneficiary or beneficiaries he may have designated, or if there be no such beneficiary, then to the person or persons who would under the laws of the State of his residence be entitled to his personal property in case of intestacy.

SEC. 204. That a family allowance of not exceeding \$50 per month shall be granted and paid by the United States upon written application to the bureau by such enlisted man or by or on behalf of any prospective beneficiary, in accordance with and subject to the conditions, limitations, and exceptions hereinafter specified.

The family allowance shall be paid from the time of enlistment to death in or one month after discharge from the service, but not for more than one month after the termination of the present war emergency. No family allowance shall be made for any period preceding November first, nineteen hundred and seventeen. The payment shall be subject to such regulations as may be prescribed relative to cases of desertion and imprisonment and of missing men.

Subject to the conditions, limitations, and exceptions hereinafter specified, the family allowance payable per month shall be as follows:

Class A. In the case of a man, to his wife (including a former wife divorced) and to his child or children:

- (a) If there be a wife but no child, \$15.
- (b) If there be a wife and one child, \$25.
- (c) If there be a wife and two children, \$32.50, with \$5 per month additional for each additional child.
- (d) If there be no wife, but one child, \$5.
- (e) If there be no wife, but two children, \$12.50.
- (f) If there be no wife, but three children, \$20.
- (g) If there be no wife, but four children, \$30, with \$5 per month additional for each additional child.

Class B. In the case of a man or woman, to a grandchild, a parent, brother, or sister:

- (a) If there be one parent, \$10.
- (b) If there be two parents, \$20.
- (c) For each grandchild, brother, sister, and additional parent, \$5.

In the case of a woman, to a child or children:

- (d) If there be one child, \$5.
- (e) If there be two children, \$12.50.
- (f) If there be three children, \$20.
- (g) If there be four children, \$30, with \$5 per month additional for each additional child. . . .

ARTICLE III.

COMPENSATION FOR DEATH OR DISABILITY.

SEC. 300. That for death or disability resulting from personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line of duty, by any commissioned officer or enlisted man or by any member of the Army Nurse Corps (female) or of the Navy Nurse Corps (female) when employed in the active service under the War Department or Navy Department, the United States shall pay compensation as hereinafter provided; but no compensation shall be paid if the injury or disease has been caused by his own willful misconduct.

SEC. 301. That if death results from injury—

If the deceased leaves a widow or child, or if he leaves a widowed mother dependent upon him for support, the monthly compensation shall be the following amounts:

- (a) For a widow alone, \$25.
- (b) For a widow and one child, \$35.
- (c) For a widow and two children, \$47.50, with \$5 for each additional child up to two.
- (d) If there be no widow, then for one child, \$20.
- (e) For two children, \$30.
- (f) For three children, \$40, with \$5 for each additional child up to two.

(g) For a widowed mother, \$20. The amount payable under this subdivision shall not be greater than a sum which, when added to the total amount payable to the widow and children, does not exceed \$75. This compensation shall be payable for the death of but one child, and no compensation for the death of a child shall be payable if such widowed mother is in receipt of compensation under the provisions of this article for the death of her husband. Such compensation shall be payable whether her widowhood arises before or after the death of the person and whenever her condition is such that if the person were living the widowed mother would have been dependent upon him for support.

If the death occur before discharge or resignation from service, the United States shall pay for burial expenses and the return of body to his home a sum not to exceed \$100, as may be fixed by regulations.

The payment of compensation to a widow or widowed mother shall continue until her death or remarriage.

The payment of compensation to or for a child shall continue until such child reaches the age of eighteen years or marries, or if such child be incapable, because of insanity, idiocy, or being otherwise permanently helpless, then during such incapacity.

Whenever the compensation payable to or for the benefit of any person under the provisions of this section is terminated by the happening of the contingency upon which it is limited, the compensation thereafter for the remaining beneficiary or beneficiaries, if any, shall be the amount which would have been payable to them if they had been the sole original beneficiaries.

As between the widow and the children not in her custody, and as between children, the amount of the compensation shall be apportioned as may be prescribed by regulations. The word "widow" as used in this section shall not include one who shall have married the deceased later than ten years after the time of injury.

SEC. 302. That if disability results from the injury—

(1) If and while the disability is total, the monthly compensation shall be the following amounts:

- (a) If he has neither wife nor child living, \$30.
- (b) If he has a wife but no child living, \$45.
- (c) If he has a wife and one child living, \$55.
- (d) If he has a wife and two children living, \$65.
- (e) If he has a wife and three or more children living, \$75.

(f) If he has no wife but one child living, \$40, with \$10 for each additional child up to two.

(g) If he has a widowed mother dependent on him for support, then, in addition to the above amounts, \$10.

To an injured person who is totally disabled and in addition so helpless as to be in constant need of a nurse or attendant, such additional sum shall be paid, but not exceeding \$20 per month, as the director may deem reasonable: *Provided, however*, That for the loss of both feet or both hands or both eyes, or for becoming totally blind or helplessly and permanently bedridden from causes occurring in the line of duty in the service of the United States, the rate of compensation shall be \$100 per month: *Provided further*, That no allowance shall be made for nurse or attendant.

(2) If and while the disability is partial, the monthly compensation shall be a percentage of the compensation that would be payable for his total disability, equal to the degree of the reduction in earning capacity resulting from the disability, but no compensation shall be payable for a reduction in earning capacity rated at less than ten per centum. . . .

(3) In addition to the compensation above provided, the injured person shall be furnished by the United States such reasonable governmental medical, surgical, and hospital services and with such supplies, including artificial limbs, trusses, and similar appliances, as the director may determine to be useful and reasonably necessary: *Provided*, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the necessary military control over any member of the military or naval establishments before he shall have been discharged from the military or naval service.

(4) The amount of each monthly payment shall be determined according to the family conditions then existing.

SEC. 303. That every person applying for or in receipt of compensation for disability under the provisions of this article shall, as frequently and at such times and places as may be reasonably required, submit himself to examination

by a medical officer of the United States or by a duly qualified physician designated or approved by the director. He may have a duly qualified physician designated and paid by him present to participate in such examination. For all examinations he shall, in the discretion of the director, be paid his reasonable traveling and other expenses and also loss of wages incurred in order to submit to such examination. If he refuses to submit himself for, or in any way obstructs, any examination, his right to claim compensation under this article shall be suspended until such refusal or obstruction ceases. No compensation shall be payable while such refusal or obstruction continues, and no compensation shall be payable for the intervening period.

Every person in receipt of compensation for disability shall submit to any reasonable medical or surgical treatment furnished by the bureau whenever requested by the bureau; and the consequences of unreasonable refusal to submit to any such treatment shall not be deemed to result from the injury compensated for.

SEC. 304. That in cases of dismemberment, of injuries to sight or hearing, and of other injuries commonly causing permanent disability, the injured person shall follow such course or courses of rehabilitation, reeducation, and vocational training as the United States may provide or procure to be provided. Should such course prevent the injured person from following a substantially gainful occupation while taking same, a form of enlistment may be required which shall bring the injured person into the military or naval service. Such enlistment shall entitle the person to full pay as during the last month of his active service, and his family to family allowances and allotment as hereinbefore provided, in lieu of all other compensation for the time being.

In case of his willful failure properly to follow such course or so to enlist, payment of compensation shall be suspended until such willful failure ceases and no compensation shall be payable for the intervening period.

SEC. 305. That upon its own motion or upon application the bureau may at any time review an award, and, in accordance with the facts found upon such a review, may end, diminish, or increase the compensation previously awarded, or, if compensation has been refused or discontinued, may award compensation.

SEC. 306. That no compensation shall be payable for death or disability which does not occur prior to or within one year after discharge or resignation from the service, except that where, after a medical examination made pursuant to regulations, at the time of discharge or resignation from the service, or within such reasonable time thereafter, not exceeding one year, as may be allowed by regulations, a certificate has been obtained from the director to the effect that the injured person at the time of his discharge or resignation was suffering from injury likely to result in death or disability, compensation shall be payable for death or disability, whenever occurring, proximately resulting from such injury.

SEC. 307. That compensation shall not be payable for death in the course of the service until the death be officially recorded in the department under which he may be serving. No compensation shall be payable for a period during which the man has been reported "missing" and a family allowance has been paid for him under the provisions of Article II.

SEC. 308. That no compensation shall be payable for death inflicted as a lawful punishment for a crime or military offense except when inflicted by the enemy. A dismissal or dishonorable or bad conduct discharge from the

service shall bar and terminate all right to any compensation under the provisions of this article.

SEC. 309. That no compensation shall be payable unless a claim therefor be filed, in case of disability, within five years after discharge or resignation from the service, or, in case of death during the service, within five years after such death is officially recorded in the department under which he may be serving: *Provided, however,* That where compensation is payable for death or disability occurring after discharge or resignation from the service, claim must be made within five years after such death or the beginning of such disability. . . .

ARTICLE IV. INSURANCE.

SEC. 400. That in order to give to every commissioned officer and enlisted man and to every member of the Army Nurse Corps (female) and of the Navy Nurse Corps (female) when employed in active service under the War Department or Navy Department greater protection for themselves and their dependents than is provided in Article III, the United States, upon application to the bureau and without medical examination, shall grant insurance against the death or total permanent disability of any such person in any multiple of \$500, and not less than \$1,000 or more than \$10,000, upon the payment of the premiums as hereinafter provided. . . .

Approved, October 6, 1917.

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT, OCTOBER 6, 1917.

An Act To define, regulate, and punish trading with the enemy, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act shall be known as the "Trading with the enemy Act." . . .

SEC. 3. That it shall be unlawful—

(a) For any person in the United States, except with the license of the President, granted to such person, or to the enemy, or ally of enemy, as provided in this Act, to trade, or attempt to trade, either directly or indirectly, with, to, or from, or for, or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person, with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such other person is an enemy or ally of enemy, or is conducting or taking part in such trade, directly or indirectly, for, or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, an enemy or ally of enemy.

(b) For any person, except with the license of the President, to transport or attempt to transport into or from the United States, or for any owner, master, or other person in charge of a vessel of American registry to transport or attempt to transport from any place to any other place, any subject or citizen of an enemy or ally of enemy nation, with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that the person transported or attempted to be transported is such subject or citizen.

(c) For any person (other than a person in the service of the United States Government or of the Government of any nation, except that of an enemy or ally of enemy nation, and other than such persons or classes of persons as may be exempted hereunder by the President or by such person as he may direct), to send, or take out of, or bring into, or attempt to send, or take out of, or bring into the United States, any letter or other writing or tangible form of communication, except in the regular course of the mail; and it shall be unlawful for any person to send, take, or

transmit, or attempt to send, take, or transmit out of the United States, any letter or other writing, book, map, plan, or other paper, picture, or any telegram, cablegram, or wireless message, or other form of communication intended for or to be delivered, directly or indirectly, to an enemy or ally of enemy: *Provided, however,* That any person may send, take, or transmit out of the United States anything herein forbidden if he shall first submit the same to the President, or to such officer as the President may direct, and shall obtain the license or consent of the President, under such rules and regulations, and with such exemptions, as shall be prescribed by the President.

(d) Whenever, during the present war, the President shall deem that the public safety demands it, he may cause to be censored under such rules and regulations as he may from time to time establish, communications by mail, cable, radio, or other means of transmission passing between the United States and any foreign country he may from time to time specify, or which may be carried by any vessel or other means of transportation touching at any port, place, or territory of the United States and bound to or from any foreign country. Any person who willfully evades or attempts to evade the submission of any such communication to such censorship or willfully uses or attempts to use any code or other device for the purpose of concealing from such censorship the intended meaning of such communication shall be punished as provided in section sixteen of this Act.

SEC. 4. (a) Every enemy or ally of enemy insurance or reinsurance company, and every enemy or ally of enemy, doing business within the United States through an agency or branch office, or otherwise, may, within thirty days after the passage of this Act, apply to the President for a license to continue to do business; and, within thirty days after such application, the President may enter an order either granting or refusing to grant such license. . . .

(b) That, during the present war, no enemy, or ally of enemy, and no partnership of which he is a member or was a member at the beginning of the war, shall for any purpose assume or use any name other than that by which such enemy or partnership was ordinarily known at the beginning of the war, except under license from the President.

Whenever, during the present war, in the opinion of the President the public safety or public interest requires, the President may prohibit any or all foreign insurance companies from doing business in the United States, or the President may license such company or companies to do business upon such terms as he may deem proper.

SEC. 5. (a) That the President, if he shall find it compatible with the safety of the United States and with the successful prosecution of the war, may, by proclamation, suspend the provisions of this Act so far as they apply to an ally of enemy, and he may revoke or renew such suspension from time to time; and the President may grant licenses, special or general, temporary or otherwise, and for such period of time and containing such provisions and conditions as he shall prescribe, to any person or class of persons to do business as provided in subsection (a) of section four hereof. . . .

If the President shall have reasonable cause to believe that any act is about to be performed in violation of section three hereof he shall have authority to order the postponement of the performance of such act for a period not exceeding ninety days, pending investigation of the facts by him.

(b) That the President may investigate, regulate, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise, any transactions

in foreign exchange, export or ear-markings of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, transfers of credit in any form (other than credits relating solely to transactions to be executed wholly within the United States), and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign countries, by any person within the United States; and he may require any such person engaged in any such transaction to furnish, under oath, complete information relative thereto, including the production of any books of account, contracts, letters or other papers, in connection therewith in the custody or control of such person, either before or after such transaction is completed.

SEC. 6. That the President is authorized to appoint, prescribe the duties of, and fix the salary (not to exceed \$5,000 per annum) of an official to be known as the alien property custodian, who shall be empowered to receive all money and property in the United States due or belonging to an enemy, or ally of enemy, which may be paid, conveyed, transferred, assigned, or delivered to said custodian under the provisions of this Act; and to hold, administer, and account for the same under the general direction of the President and as provided in this Act. . . .

SEC. 7. . . . (e) No person shall be held liable in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in pursuance of any order, rule, or regulation made by the President under the authority of this Act.

SEC. 10. . . . (c) Any citizen of the United States or any corporation organized within the United States desiring to manufacture, or cause to be manufactured, a machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or design, or to carry on, or to use any trade-mark, print, label or cause to be carried on, a process under any patent or copyrighted matter owned or controlled by an enemy or ally of enemy at any time during the existence of a state of war may apply to the President for a license; and the President is hereby authorized to grant such a license, nonexclusive or exclusive as he shall deem best, provided he shall be of the opinion that such grant is for the public welfare, and that the applicant is able and intends in good faith to manufacture, or cause to be manufactured, the machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or design, or to carry on, or cause to be carried on, the process or to use the trade-mark, print, label or copyrighted matter. The President may prescribe the conditions of this license, including the fixing of prices of articles and products necessary to the health of the military and naval forces of the United States or the successful prosecution of the war, and the rules and regulations under which such license may be granted and the fee which shall be charged therefor. . . .

(f) The owner of any patent, trade-mark, print, label, or copyright under which a license is granted hereunder may, after the end of the war and until the expiration of one year thereafter, file a bill in equity against the licensee in the district court of the United States for the district in which the said licensee resides, or, if a corporation, in which it has its principal place of business (to which suit the Treasurer of the United States shall be made a party), for recovery from the said licensee for all use and enjoyment of the said patented invention, trade-mark, print, label, or copyrighted matter.

SEC. 11. Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the public safety so requires and shall make proclamation thereof it shall be unlawful to import into the United States from any country named in such procla-

mation any article or articles mentioned in such proclamation except at such time or times, and under such regulations or orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress: *Provided, however*, That no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another.

Sec. 16. That whoever shall willfully violate any of the provisions of this Act or of any license, rule, or regulation issued thereunder, and who shall willfully violate, neglect, or refuse to comply with any order of the President issued in compliance with the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than \$10,000, or, if a natural person, imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and the officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in such violation shall be punished by a like fine, imprisonment, or both, and any property, funds, securities, papers, or other articles or documents, or any vessel, together with her tackle, apparel, furniture, and equipment, concerned in such violation shall be forfeited to the United States.

Sec. 19. That ten days after the approval of this Act and until the end of the war, it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association, to print, publish, or circulate, or cause to be printed, published, or circulated in any foreign language, any news item, editorial or other printed matter, respecting the Government of the United States, or of any nation engaged in the present war, its policies, international relations, the state or conduct of the war, or any matter relating thereto: *Provided*, That this section shall not apply to any print, newspaper, or publication where the publisher or distributor thereof, on or before offering the same for mailing, or in any manner distributing it to the public, has filed with the postmaster at the place of publication, in the form of an affidavit, a true and complete translation of the entire article containing such matter proposed to be published in such print, newspaper, or publication, and has caused to be printed, in plain type in the English language, at the head of each such item, editorial, or other matter, on each copy of such print, newspaper, or publication, the words "True translation filed with the postmaster at _____ on _____ (naming the post office where the translation was filed, and the date of filing thereof) as required by the Act of _____ (here giving the date of this Act)."

Any print, newspaper, or publication in any foreign language which does not conform to the provisions of this section is hereby declared to be nonmailable, and it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or association, to transport, carry, or otherwise publish or distribute the same, or to transport, carry or otherwise publish or distribute any matter which as made nonmailable by the provisions of the Act relating to espionage, approved June fifteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen: *Provided further*, That upon evidence satisfactory to him that any print, newspaper, or publication, printed in a foreign language may be printed, published, and distributed free from the foregoing restrictions and conditions without detriment to the United States in the conduct of the present war, the President may cause to be issued to the printers or publishers of such print, newspaper, or publication, a permit to print, publish, and circulate the issue or issues of their print, newspaper, or publication, free from such restrictions and requirements, such permits to be subject to revocation at his discretion. And the Postmaster General shall cause copies of all such permits and revocations of permits to be furnished to the postmaster of the post office serving the place from which the print, newspaper, or publication,

granted the permit is to emanate. All matter printed, published and distributed under permits shall bear at the head thereof in plain type in the English language, the words, "Published and distributed under permit authorized by the Act of _____ (here giving date of this Act), on file at the post office of _____ (giving name of office)."

Approved, October 6, 1917.

JOINT RESOLUTION DECLARING A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE UNITED STATES, DECEMBER 7, 1917.

Whereas the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a state of war is hereby declared to exist between the United States of America and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Approved, December 7, 1917.

ACT TO PROVIDE HOUSING FOR FLEET WORKERS, MARCH 1, 1918.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation is hereby authorized and empowered within the limits of the amounts herein authorized—

(a) To purchase, lease, requisition, including the requisition of the temporary use of, or acquire by condemnation or otherwise any improved or unimproved land or any interest therein suitable for the construction thereon of houses for the use of employees and the families of employees of shipyards in which ships are being constructed for the United States.

(b) To construct on such land for the use of such employees and their families houses and all other necessary or convenient facilities, upon such conditions and at such price as may be determined by it, and to sell, lease, or exchange such houses, land, and facilities upon such terms and conditions as it may determine.

(c) To purchase, lease, requisition, including the requisition of the temporary use of, or acquire by condemnation or otherwise any houses or other buildings for the use of such employees and their families, together with the land on which the same are erected, or any interest therein, all necessary and proper fixtures and furnishings therefor, and all necessary and convenient facilities incidental thereto; to manage, repair, sell, lease, or exchange such lands, houses, buildings, fixtures, furnishings, and facilities upon such terms and conditions as it may determine to carry out the purposes of this act.

(d) To make loans to persons, firms, or corporations in such manner upon such terms and security, and for such time not exceeding ten years, as it may determine to provide houses and facilities for the employees and the families of employees of such shipyards.

Whenever said United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation shall acquire by requisition or condemnation such property or any interest therein, it shall deter-

mine and make just compensation therefor, and if the amount thereof so determined is unsatisfactory to the person entitled to receive the same, such person shall be paid seventy-five per centum of the amount so determined, and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as added to such seventy-five per centum will make such an amount as will be just compensation for the property or interest therein so taken, in the manner provided by section twenty-four, paragraph twenty, and section one hundred and forty-five of the Judicial Code.

That whenever the said United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation shall requisition any property or rights, or upon the filing of a petition for condemnation hereunder, immediate possession may be taken by it of such land, houses, or other property, rights, and facilities, to the extent of the interests to be acquired therein, and the same may be immediately occupied and used and the provisions of section three hundred and fifty-five of the Revised Statutes, providing that no public money shall be expended upon such land until the written opinion of the Attorney General shall be had in favor of the validity of the title nor until the consent of the legislature of the State in which the land is located has been given, shall be, and the same are hereby, suspended as to all land acquired hereunder.

The power to acquire property by purchase, lease, requisition or condemnation, or to construct houses, or other buildings, and to make loans, or otherwise extend aid as herein granted shall cease with the termination of the present war with Germany. The date of the conclusion of the war shall be declared by proclamation of the President. . . .

That for the purpose of carrying out the provision of this act the expenditure of \$50,000,000 is hereby authorized, and in executing the authority granted by this act, the said United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation shall not expend more than the said sum, nor shall any contract for construction be entered into which provides that the compensation of the contractor shall be the cost of construction plus a percentage thereof for profit, unless such contract shall also fix the reasonable cost of such construction as determined by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation and provide that upon any increase in cost above the reasonable cost so fixed by such board, the percentage of profit shall decrease as the cost increases in accordance with a rate to be fixed by said board and expressed in the contract.

No contract shall be let without the approval of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation: *Provided, however*, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent said board from contracting for the payment of premiums or bonuses for the speedy completion of the work contracted for: *Provided further*, That the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation shall report to Congress on the first Monday in December of each year the names of all persons or corporations with whom it has made contracts and of such subcontractors as may be employed in furtherance of this act, including a statement of the purposes and amounts thereof, together with a detailed statement of all expenditures by contract or otherwise for land, buildings, material, labor, salaries, commissions, demurrage, or other charges in excess of \$10,000. . . .

Approved, March 1, 1918.

PROTECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PERSONS IN THE MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISHMENTS, MARCH 8, 1918.

An Act to extend protection to the civil rights of mem-

bers of the Military and Naval Establishments of the United States engaged in the present war.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

ARTICLE I.

GENERAL PROVISIONS.

SEC. 100. That for the purpose of enabling the United States the more successfully to prosecute and carry on the war in which it is at present engaged, protection is hereby extended to persons in military service of the United States in order to prevent prejudice or injury to their civil rights during their term of service and to enable them to devote their entire energy to the military needs of the Nation, and to this end the following provisions are made for the temporary suspension of legal proceedings and transactions which may prejudice the civil rights of persons in such service during the continuance of the present war. . . .

ARTICLE II.

GENERAL RELIEF.

SEC. 200. That in any action or proceeding commenced in any court if there shall be a default of an appearance by the defendant the plaintiff before entering judgment shall file in the court an affidavit setting forth facts showing that the defendant is not in military service. If unable to file such affidavit plaintiff shall in lieu thereof file an affidavit setting forth either that the defendant is in the military service or that plaintiff is not able to determine whether or not defendant is in such service. If an affidavit is not filed showing that the defendant is not in the military service, no judgment shall be entered without first securing an order of court directing such entry, and no such order shall be made if the defendant is in such service until after the court shall have appointed an attorney to represent defendant and protect his interest and the court shall on application make such appointment. . . .

SEC. 201. That at any stage thereof any action or proceeding commenced in any court by or against a person in military service during the period of such service or within sixty days thereafter may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending, on its own motion, and shall, on application to it by such person or some person on his behalf, be stayed as provided in this act, unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service. . . .

ARTICLE III.

RENT, INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS, MORTGAGES.

SEC. 300. (1) That no eviction or distress shall be made during the period of military service in respect of any premises for which the agreed rent does not exceed \$50 per month, occupied chiefly for dwelling purposes by the wife, children or other dependents of a person in military service, except, upon leave of court granted upon application therefor, or granted in an action or proceeding affecting the right of possession. . . .

SEC. 301. (1) That no person who has received, or whose assignor has received, under a contract for the purchase of real or personal property, or of lease or bailment with a view to purchase of such property, a deposit or installment of the purchase price from a person or from the assignor of a person who, after the date of payment of such deposit or installment, has entered military service, shall exercise any right or option under such contract to rescind or terminate the contract or reserve possession of the property for non-payment of any installment falling

due during the period of such military service, except by action in a court of competent jurisdiction. . . .

ARTICLE IV.

INSURANCE.

SEC. 405. That no policy which has not lapsed for the non-payment of premium before the commencement of the period of military service of the insured, and which has been brought within the benefits of this Article, shall lapse or be forfeited for the non-payment of premium during the period of such service or during one year after the expiration of such period: *Provided*, That in no case shall this prohibition extend for more than one year after the termination of the war. . . .

ARTICLE V.

TAXES AND PUBLIC LANDS.

SEC. 500. (1) That the provisions of this section shall apply when any taxes or assessments, whether general or special, falling due during the period of military service in respect of real property owned and occupied for dwelling or business purposes by a person in military service or his dependents at the commencement of his period of military service and still so occupied by his dependents or employees are not paid.

(2) When any person in military service, or any person in his behalf, shall file with the collector of taxes, or other officer whose duty it is to enforce the collection of taxes or assessments, an affidavit showing (a) that a tax or assessment has been assessed upon property which is the subject of this section, (b) that such tax or assessment is unpaid, and (c) that by reason of such military service the ability of such person to pay such tax or assessment is materially lessened, no sale of such property shall be made to enforce the collection of such tax or assessment, or any proceeding or action for such purpose commenced, except upon leave of court granted upon an application made therefor by such collector or other officer. The court thereupon may stay such proceedings or such sale, as provided in this Act, for a period extending not more than six months after the termination of the war. . . .

SEC. 501. That no right to any public lands initiated or acquired prior to entering military service by any person under the homestead laws, the desert-land laws, the mining-land laws, or any other laws of the United States, shall be forfeited or prejudiced by reason of his absence from such land, or of his failure to perform any work or make any improvements thereon, or to do any other act required by any such law during the period of such service. . . .

ARTICLE VI.

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.

SEC. 600. That where in any proceeding to enforce a civil right in any court it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that any interest, property, or contract has since the date of the approval of this Act been transferred or acquired with intent to delay the just enforcement of such right by taking advantage of this Act, the court shall enter such judgment or make such order as might lawfully be entered or made the provisions of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding. . . .

Approved, March 8, 1918.

DAYLIGHT SAVING LAW, MARCH 19, 1918.

An act to save daylight and to provide standard time for the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That, for the purpose of establishing the standard time of the United States, the territory of continental United States, shall be divided into five zones in the manner hereinafter provided. The standard time of the first zone shall be based on the mean astronomical time of the seventy-fifth degree of longitude west from Greenwich; that of the second zone on the ninetieth degree; that of the third zone on the one hundred and fifth degree; that of the fourth zone on the one hundred and twentieth degree; and that of the fifth zone, which shall include only Alaska, on the one hundred and fiftieth degree. That the limits of each zone shall be defined by an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, having regard for the convenience of commerce and the existing junction points and division points of common carriers engaged in commerce between the several States and with foreign nations, and such order may be modified from time to time.

SEC. 2. That within the respective zones created under the authority hereof the standard time of the zone shall govern the movement of all common carriers engaged in commerce between the several States or between a State and any of the Territories of the United States, or between a State or the Territory of Alaska and any of the insular possessions of the United States or any foreign country. In all statutes, orders, rules, and regulations relating to the time of performance of any act by any officer or department of the United States, whether in the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government, or relating to the time within which any rights shall accrue or determine, or within which any act shall or shall not be performed by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, it shall be understood and intended that the time shall be the United States standard time of the zone within which the act is to be performed.

SEC. 3. That at 2 o'clock antemeridian of the last Sunday in March of each year the standard time of each zone shall be advanced one hour, and at 2 o'clock antemeridian of the last Sunday in October in each year the standard time of each zone shall, by the retarding of one hour, be returned to the mean astronomical time of the degree of longitude governing said zone, so that between the last Sunday in March at 2 o'clock antemeridian and the last Sunday in October at 2 o'clock antemeridian in each year the standard time in each zone shall be one hour in advance of the mean astronomical time of the degree of longitude governing each zone, respectively.

SEC. 4. That the standard time of the first zone shall be known and designated as United States standard eastern time; that of the second zone shall be known and designated as United States standard central time; that of the third zone shall be known and designated as United States standard mountain time; that of the fourth zone shall be known and designated as United States standard Pacific time; and that of the fifth zone shall be known and designated as United States standard Alaska time.

SEC. 6. That all acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed.

Approved, March 19, 1918.

ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, MARCH 21, 1918.

An Act to provide for the operation of transportation systems while under Federal control; for the just compensation of their owners, and for other purposes.¹¹

¹¹ For the previous action of the President in taking over railroad control, see proclamation of December 26, 1917, p. 174.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President, having in time of war taken over the possession, use, control, and operation (called herein carriers), is hereby authorized to agree with and to guarantee to any such carrier making operating returns to the Interstate Commerce Commission, that during the period of such Federal control it shall receive as just compensation an annual sum, payable from time to time in reasonable installments, for each year and pro rata for any fractional year of such Federal control, not exceeding a sum equivalent as nearly as may be to its average annual railway operating income for the three years ended June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen.

That any railway operating income accruing during the period of Federal control in excess of such just compensation shall remain the property of the United States. . . .

Every such agreement shall also contain adequate and appropriate provisions for the maintenance, repair, renewals, and depreciation of the property, for the creation of any reserves or reserve funds found necessary in connection therewith, and for such accounting and adjustments of charges and payments, both during and at the end of Federal control, as may be requisite in order that the property of each carrier may be returned to it in substantially as good repair and in substantially as complete equipment as it was in at the beginning of Federal control, and also that the United States may, by deductions from the just compensations or by other proper means and charges, be reimbursed for the cost of any additions, repairs, renewals, and betterments to such property not justly chargeable to the United States; in making such accounting and adjustments, due consideration shall be given to the amounts expended or reserved by each carrier for maintenance, repairs, renewals, and depreciation during the three years ended June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, to the condition of the property at the beginning and at the end of Federal control and to any other pertinent facts and circumstances. . . .

That every railroad not owned, controlled, or operated by another carrier company, and which has heretofore competed for traffic with a railroad or railroads of which the President has taken the possession, use and control, or which connects with such railroads and is engaged as a common carrier in general transportation, shall be held and considered as within "Federal control," as herein defined, and necessary for the prosecution of the war, and shall be entitled to the benefit of all the provisions of this act: *Provided, however*, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as including any street or interurban electric railway which has as its principal source of operating revenue urban, suburban, or interurban passenger traffic, or sale of power, heat and light or both. . . .

SEC. 2. That if no such agreement is made, or pending the execution of an agreement, the President may nevertheless pay to any carrier while under Federal control an annual amount, payable in reasonable installments, not exceeding ninety per centum of the estimated annual amount of just compensation, remitting such carrier, in case where no agreement is made, to its legal rights for any balance claimed to the remedies provided in section three hereof. Any amount thereafter found due such carrier above the amount paid shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum. The acceptance of any benefits under this section shall constitute an acceptance by the carrier of all the provisions of this act and shall obligate the carrier to pay to the United States, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from a date or dates fixed in pro-

ceedings under section three, the amount by which the sums received under this section exceed the sum found due in such proceedings.

SEC. 3. That all claims for just compensation not adjusted (as provided in section one) shall, on the application of the President or of any carrier, be submitted to boards, each consisting of three referees to be appointed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, members of which and the official force thereof being eligible for service on such boards without additional compensation. . . .

SEC. 4. That the just compensation that may be determined as hereinbefore provided by agreement or that may be adjudicated by the Court of Claims shall be increased by an amount reckoned at a reasonable rate per centum to be fixed by the President upon the cost of any additions and betterments, less retirements, and upon the cost of road extensions to the property of such carrier made by such carrier with the approval of or by order of the President while such property is under Federal control.

SEC. 5. That no carrier while under Federal control shall, without the prior approval of the President, declare or pay any dividend in excess of its regular rate of dividends during the three years ended June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen: *Provided, however*, That such carriers as have paid no regular dividends or no dividends during said period may, with the prior approval of the President, pay dividends at such rate as the President may determine.

SEC. 6. That the sum of \$500,000,000 is hereby appropriated, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, which, together with any funds available from any operating income of said carriers, may be used by the President as a revolving fund for the purpose of paying the expenses of the Federal control, and so far as necessary the amount of just compensation, and to provide terminals, motive power, cars, and other necessary equipment, such terminals, motive power, cars, and equipment to be used and accounted for as the President may direct and to be disposed of as Congress may hereafter by law provide.

The President may also make or order any carrier to make any additions, betterments, or road extension, and to provide terminals, motive power, cars and other equipment necessary or desirable for war purposes or in the public interest on or in connection with the property of any carrier. He may from said revolving fund advance to such carrier all or any part of the expense of such additions, betterments, or road extensions, and to provide terminals, motive power, cars, and other necessary equipment so ordered and constructed by such carrier or by the President, such advances to be charged against such carrier and to bear interest at such rate and be payable on such terms as may be determined by the President, to the end that the United States may be fully reimbursed for any sums so advanced.

Any loss claimed by any carrier by reason of any such additions, betterments, or road extensions, ordered and constructed may be determined by agreement between the President and such carrier; failing such agreement the amount of such loss shall be ascertained as provided in section three hereof.

From said revolving fund the President may expend such an amount as he may deem necessary or desirable for the utilization and operation of canals, or for the purchase, construction, or utilization and operation of boats, barges, tugs, and other transportation facilities on the inland, canal, and coastwise waterways, and may in the operation and use of such facilities create or employ such agencies

and enter into such contracts and agreements as he shall deem in the public interest.

SEC. 7. That for the purpose of providing funds requisite for maturing obligations or for other legal and proper expenditures, or for reorganizing railroads in receivership, carriers may, during the period of Federal control, issue such bonds, notes, equipment trust certificates, stock, and other forms of securities, secured or unsecured by mortgage, as the President may first approve as consistent with the public interest. The President may, out of the revolving fund created by this act, purchase for the United States all or any part of such securities at prices not exceeding par, and may sell such securities whenever in his judgment it is desirable at prices not less than the cost thereof. Any securities so purchased shall be held by the Secretary of the Treasury who shall, under the direction of the President, represent the United States in all matters in connection therewith in the same manner as a private holder thereof. The President shall each year as soon as practicable after January first cause a detailed report to be submitted to the Congress of all receipts and expenditures made under this section and section six during the preceding calendar year. . . .

SEC. 10. That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common law, except in so far as may be inconsistent with the provisions of this act or any act applicable to such Federal control or with any order of the President. . . .

That during the period of Federal control, whenever in his opinion the public interest requires, the President may initiate rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices by filing the same with the Interstate Commerce Commission, which said rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall not be suspended by the commission pending final determination.

Said rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, and practices shall be reasonable and just and shall take effect at such time and upon such notice as he may direct, but the Interstate Commerce Commission shall, upon complaint, enter upon a hearing concerning the justness and reasonableness of so much of any order of the President as establishes or changes any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice of any carrier under Federal control, and may consider all the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the making of the same. In determining any question concerning any such rates, fares, charges, classifications, regulations, or practices or changes therein, the Interstate Commerce Commission shall give due consideration to the fact that the transportation systems are being operated under a unified and co-ordinated national control and not in competition.

After full hearing the commission may make such findings and orders as are authorized by the act to regulate commerce as amended, and said findings and orders shall be enforced as provided in said act: *Provided, however*, That when the President shall find and certify to the Interstate Commerce Commission that in order to defray the expenses of Federal control and operation fairly chargeable to railway operating expenses and also to pay railway tax accruals other than war taxes, net rents for joint facilities and equipment, and compensation to the carriers, operating as a unit, it is necessary to increase the railway operating revenues, the Interstate Commerce Commission, in determining the justness and reasonableness of any rate, fare, charge, classification, regulation, or practice shall take into consideration said finding and certificate by the President, together with such recommendations as he may make. . . .

SEC. 14. That the Federal control of railroads and transportation systems herein and heretofore provided for shall continue for and during the period of the war and for a reasonable time thereafter, which shall not exceed one year and nine months next following the date of the proclamation by the President of the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace: *Provided, however*, That the President may, prior to July first, nineteen hundred and eighteen, relinquish control of all or any part of any railroad or system of transportation, further Federal control of which the President shall deem not needful or desirable; and the President may at any time during the period of Federal control agree with the owners thereof to relinquish all or any part of any railroad or system of transportation. The President may relinquish all railroads and systems of transportation under Federal control at any time he shall deem such action needful or desirable. No right to compensation shall accrue to such owners from and after the date of relinquishment for the property so relinquished.

SEC. 15. That nothing in this act shall be construed to amend, repeal, impair, or affect the existing laws or powers of the States in relation to taxation or the lawful police regulations of the several States, except wherein such laws, powers, or regulations may affect the transportation of troops, war materials, Government supplies, or the issue of stocks and bonds.

SEC. 16. That this act is expressly declared to be emergency legislation enacted to meet conditions growing out of war; and nothing herein is to be construed as expressing or prejudicing the future policy of the Federal Government concerning the ownership, control, or regulation of carriers or the method or basis of the capitalization thereof.

Approved, March 21, 1918.

WAR FINANCE CORPORATION ACT, APRIL 5, 1918.

An Act to provide further for the national security and defense, and, for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of the war, to provide credits for industries and enterprises in the United States necessary or contributory to the prosecution of the war, and to supervise the issuance of securities, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled.

TITLE I.—WAR FINANCE CORPORATION.

That the Secretary of the Treasury and four additional persons (who shall be the directors first appointed as hereinafter provided), are hereby created a body corporate and politic in deed and in law by the name, style, and title of the "War Finance Corporation" (herein called the corporation), and shall have succession for a period of ten years: *Provided*, That in no event shall the Corporation exercise any of the powers conferred by this Act, except such as are incidental to the liquidation of its assets and the winding up of its affairs, after six months after the termination of the war, the date of such termination to be fixed by the proclamation of the President of the United States.

SEC. 2. That the capital stock of the Corporation shall be \$500,000,000, all of which shall be subscribed by the United States of America, and such subscription shall be subject to call upon the vote of three-fifths of the board of directors of the Corporation, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, at such time or times as may be deemed advisable; and there is hereby appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of \$500,000,000 or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purpose of making payment upon such subscription when and as called. . . .

SEC. 3. That the management of the Corporation shall be vested in a board of directors, consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be chairman of the board, and four other persons, to be appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. No director, officer, attorney, agent, or employee of the Corporation shall in any manner, directly or indirectly, participate in the determination of any question affecting his personal interests, or the interests of any corporation, partnership, or association, in which he is directly or indirectly interested; and each director shall devote his time, not otherwise required by the business of the United States, principally to the business of the Corporation. . . .

Of the four directors so appointed, the President of the United States shall designate two to serve for two years, and two for four years; and thereafter each director so appointed shall serve for four years. . . . Any director shall be subject to removal by the President of the United States. . . .

SEC. 4. That the four directors of the Corporation appointed as hereinbefore provided shall receive annual salaries, payable monthly, of \$12,000. . . .

SEC. 7. That the Corporation shall be empowered and authorized to make advances, upon such terms, not inconsistent herewith, as it may prescribe, for periods not exceeding five years from the respective dates of such advances:

(1) To any bank, banker, or trust company in the United States, which shall have made after April sixth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and which shall have outstanding, any loan or loans to any person, firm, corporation, or association, conducting an established and going business in the United States, whose operations shall be necessary or contributory to the prosecution of the war, and evidenced by a note or notes, but no such advance shall exceed seventy-five per centum of the face value of such loan or loans; . . . [under certain conditions the advance may amount to one hundred per cent. of the loans].

SEC. 8. That the Corporation shall be empowered and authorized to make advances from time to time, upon such terms, not inconsistent herewith, as it may prescribe, for periods not exceeding one year, to any savings bank, banking institution or trust company, in the United States, which receives savings deposits, or to any building and loan association in the United States, on the promissory note or notes of the borrowing institution, whenever the Corporation shall deem such advances to be necessary or contributory to the prosecution of the war or important in the public interest. . . .

SEC. 9. That the Corporation shall be empowered and authorized in exceptional cases, to make advances directly to any person, firm, corporation, or association, conducting an established and going business in the United States, whose operations shall be necessary or contributory to the prosecution of the war. . . .

SEC. 10. That in no case shall the aggregate amount of the advances made under this title to any person, firm, corporation, or association exceed at any one time an amount equal to ten per centum of the authorized capital stock of the Corporation. . . .

SEC. 12. That the Corporation shall be empowered and authorized to issue and have outstanding at any one time its bonds in an amount aggregating not more than six times its paid-in capital, such bonds to mature not less than one year nor more than five years from the respective dates of issue, and to bear such rate or rates of interest, and may be redeemable before maturity at the option of the Corporation, as may be determined by the board of directors, but

rate or rates of interest shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. . . .

SEC. 15. That all net earnings not required for its operations shall be accumulated as a reserve fund until such time as the Corporation liquidates under the terms of this title. . . .

SEC. 17. That the United States shall not be liable for the payment of any bond or other obligation or the interest thereon issued or incurred by the Corporation, nor shall it incur any liability in respect of any act or omission of the Corporation. . . .

TITLE II.—CAPITAL ISSUES COMMITTEE.

SEC. 200. That there is hereby created a committee to be known as the "Capital Issues Committee," hereinafter called the Committee; and to be composed of seven members to be appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. At least three of the members shall be members of the Federal Reserve Board. . . .

SEC. 203. That the Committee may, under rules and regulations to be prescribed by it from time to time, investigate, pass upon, and determine whether it is compatible with the national interest that there should be sold or offered for sale or subscription any issue, or any part of any issue, of securities hereafter issued by any person, firm, corporation, or association, the total or aggregate par or face value of which issue and any other securities issued by the same person, firm, corporation, or association since the passage of this Act is in excess of \$100,000. . . .

Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize such Committee to pass upon (1) any borrowing by any person, firm, corporation, or association in the ordinary course of business as distinguished from borrowing for capital purposes, (2) the renewing or refunding of indebtedness existing at the time of the passage of this Act, (3) the resale of any securities the sale or offering of which the Committee has determined to be compatible with the national interest, (4) any securities issued by any railroad corporation the property of which may be in the possession and control of the President of the United States, or (5) any bonds issued by the War Finance Corporation. . . .

SEC. 206. That this title shall continue in effect until, but not after, the expiration of six months after the termination of the war. . . .

Approved, April 5, 1918.

JOINT RESOLUTION CHANGING BASIS OF APPOINTMENT OF THE DRAFT, MAY 16, 1918.

Joint Resolution Providing for the calling into military service of certain classes of persons registered and liable for military service under the terms of the Act of Congress approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, entitled "An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States."

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That if under any regulations heretofore or hereafter prescribed by the President persons registered and liable for military service under the terms of the Act of Congress approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, entitled "An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States," are placed in classes for the purpose of determining their relative liability for military service, no provision of said Act shall prevent the President from calling for immediate

military service under regulations heretofore or hereafter prescribed by the President all or part of the persons in any class or classes except those exempt from draft under the provisions of said Act, in proportion to the total number of persons placed in such class or classes in the various subdivisions of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia designated by the President under the terms of said Act; or from calling into immediate military service persons classed as skilled experts in industry or agriculture, however classified or wherever residing.

Approved, May 16, 1918.

JOINT RESOLUTION EXTENDING DRAFT PROVISIONS,
MAY 20, 1918.

Joint Resolution Providing for the registration for military service of all male persons citizens of the United States and all male persons residing in the United States who have since the fifth day of June, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and on or before the day set for the registration by proclamation by the President, attained the age of twenty-one years, in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe under the terms of the Act approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, entitled "An Act to authorize the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States."

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That during the present emergency all male persons, citizens of the United States and all male persons residing in the United States, who have, since the fifth day of June, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and on or before the day set for the registration by proclamation by the President, attained the age of twenty-one years, shall be subject to registration in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President, and that upon proclamation by the President, stating the time and place of such registration, it shall be the duty of all such persons, except such persons as are exempt from registration under the Act of May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and any Act or Acts amendatory thereof, to present themselves for and submit to registration under the provisions of said Act approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and they shall be registered in the same manner and subject to the same requirements and liabilities as those previously registered under the terms of said Act: *Provided,* That those persons registered under the provisions of this Act shall be placed at the bottom of the list of those liable for military service, in the several classes to which they are assigned, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe.

SEC. 2. That after the day set under section one hereof for the registration by proclamation by the President at such intervals as the President may from time to time prescribe, the President may require that all male persons, citizens of the United States and all male persons residing in the United States, who have attained the age of twenty-one years since the last preceding date of registration, and on or before the next day set for the registration by proclamation by the President, except such persons as are exempt from registration under the Act of May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and any Act or Acts amendatory thereof, shall be registered in the same manner and subject to the same requirements and liabilities as those previously registered under the terms of said Act: *Provided,* That students who are preparing for the ministry in recognized theological or divinity schools, and students

who are preparing for the practice of medicine and surgery in recognized medical schools, at the time of the approval of this Act shall be exempt from the selective draft prescribed in the Act of May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen.

SEC. 3. That all such persons when registered shall be liable to military service and to draft under the terms of said Act approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, under such regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the terms of said Act.

SEC. 4. That all such persons shall be subject to the terms and provisions and liabilities of said Act approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, in all respects as if they had been registered under the terms of said Act, and every such person shall be deemed to have notice of the requirements of said Act and of this joint resolution upon the publication of any such proclamation by the President.

Approved, May 20, 1918.

OVERMAN BILL, MAY 20, 1918.

An Act Authorizing the President to coordinate or consolidate executive bureaus, agencies, and offices, and for other purposes, in the interest of economy and the more efficient concentration of the Government.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war, for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, for the better utilization of resources and industries, and for the more effective exercise and more efficient administration by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of the land and naval forces the President is hereby authorized to make such redistribution of functions among executive agencies as he may deem necessary, including any functions, duties, and powers hitherto by law conferred upon any executive department, commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer, in such manner as in his judgment shall seem best fitted to carry out the purposes of this Act, and to this end is authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as he may deem necessary, which regulations and orders shall be in writing and shall be filed with the head of the department affected and constitute a public record: *Provided,* That this Act shall remain in force during the continuance of the present war and for six months after the termination of the war by the proclamation of the treaty of peace, or at such earlier time as the President may designate: *Provided further,* That the termination of this Act shall not affect any act done or any right or obligation accruing or accrued pursuant to this Act and during the time that this Act is in force: *Provided further,* That the authority by this Act granted shall be exercised only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war.

SEC. 2. That in carrying out the purposes of this Act the President is authorized to utilize, coordinate, or consolidate any executive or administrative commissions, bureaus, agencies, offices, or officers now existing by law, to transfer any duties or powers from one existing department, commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer to another, to transfer the personnel thereof or any part of it either by detail or assignment, together with the whole or any part of the records and public property belonging thereto.

SEC. 3. That the President is further authorized to establish an executive agency which may exercise such jurisdiction and control over the production of aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment as in his judgment

may be advantageous; and, further, to transfer to such agency, for its use, all or any moneys heretofore appropriated for the production of aeroplanes, aeroplane engines, and aircraft equipment.

SEC. 4. That for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, any moneys heretofore and hereafter appropriated for the use of any executive department, commission, bureau, agency, office, or officer shall be expended only for the purposes for which it was appropriated under the direction of such other agency as may be directed by the President hereunder to perform and execute said function.

SEC. 5. That should the President, in redistributing the functions among the executive agencies as provided in this Act, conclude that any bureau should be abolished and it

or their duties and functions conferred upon some other department or bureau or eliminated entirely, he shall report his conclusions to Congress with such recommendations as he may deem proper.

SEC. 6. That all laws or parts of laws conflicting with the provisions of this Act are to the extent of such conflict suspended while this Act is in force.

Upon the termination of this Act all executive or administrative agencies, departments, commissions, bureaus, offices, or officers shall exercise the same functions, duties, and powers as heretofore or as hereafter by law may be provided, any authorization of the President under this Act to the contrary notwithstanding.

Approved, May 20, 1918.

PART VII

Executive Proclamations and Orders

April 6, 1917, to April 10, 1918

PROCLAMATION OF STATE OF WAR AND OF ALIEN ENEMY
REGULATIONS, APRIL 6, 1917.

Whereas the Congress of the United States in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them have resolved, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives bearing date this day "That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared":

Whereas it is provided by Section four thousand and sixty-seven of the Revised Statutes, as follows:

Whenever there is declared a war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized, in any such event, by his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject, and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety;

Whereas, by Sections four thousand and sixty-eight, four thousand and sixty-nine, and four thousand and seventy, of the Revised Statutes, further provision is made relative to alien enemies;

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that a state of war exists between the United States and the Imperial German Government; and I do specially direct all officers, civil or military, of the United States that they exercise vigilance and zeal in the discharge of the duties incident to such a state of war; and

I do, moreover, earnestly appeal to all American citizens that they, in loyal devotion to their country, dedicated from its foundation to the principles of liberty and justice, uphold the laws of the land, and give undivided and willing support to those measures which may be adopted by the constitutional authorities in prosecuting the war to a successful issue and in obtaining a secure and just peace;

And, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution of the United States and the said sections of the Revised Statutes, I do hereby further proclaim and direct that the conduct to be observed on the part of the United States towards all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of Germany, being males of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United States and not actually naturalized, who for the purpose of this proclamation and under such sections of the Revised Statutes are termed alien enemies, shall be as follows:

All alien enemies are enjoined to preserve the peace towards the United States and to refrain from crime against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and of the States and Territories thereof, and to refrain from actual hostility or giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, and to comply strictly with the regulations which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the President; and so long as they shall conduct themselves in accordance with law, they shall be undisturbed in the peaceful pursuit of their lives and occupations and be accorded the consideration due to all peaceful and law-abiding persons, except so far as restrictions may be necessary for their own protection and for the safety of the United States; and towards such alien enemies as conduct themselves in accordance with law, all citizens of the United States are enjoined to preserve the peace and to treat them with all such friendliness as may be compatible with loyalty and allegiance to the United States;

And all alien enemies who fail to conduct themselves as so enjoined, in addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, shall be liable to restraint, or to give security, or to remove and depart from the United States in the manner prescribed by Sections four thousand and sixty-nine and four thousand and seventy of the Revised Statutes, and as prescribed in the regulations duly promulgated by the President;

And pursuant to the authority vested in me, I hereby declare and establish the following regulations, which I find necessary in the premises and for the public safety;

(1) An alien enemy shall not have in his possession, at any time or place, any firearm, weapon, or implement of war, or component part thereof, ammunition, maxim or other silencer, bomb or explosive or material used in the manufacture of explosives;

(2) An alien enemy shall not have in his possession at any time or place or use or operate any aircraft or wireless apparatus, or any form of signalling device, or any form of cipher code, or any paper, document or book written or printed in cipher or in which there may be invisible writing;

(3) All property found in the possession of an alien enemy in violation of the foregoing regulations, shall be subject to seizure by the United States;

(4) An alien enemy shall not approach or be found within one-half of a mile of any Federal or State fort, camp, arsenal, aircraft station, Government or naval vessel, navy yard, factory, or workshop for the manufacture of munitions of war or of any products for the use of the army or navy;

(5) An alien enemy shall not write, print, or publish any attack or threats against the Government or Congress of the United States, or either branch thereof, or against the measures or policy of the United States, or against the person or property of any person in the military, naval, or civil service of the United States, or of the States or Territories, or of the District of Columbia, or of the municipal governments therein;

(6) An alien enemy shall not commit or abet any hostile act against the United States, or give information, aid, or comfort to its enemies;

(7) An alien enemy shall not reside in or continue to reside in, to remain in, or enter any locality which the President may from time to time designate by Executive Order as a prohibited area in which residence by an alien enemy shall be found by him to constitute a danger to the public peace and safety of the United States, except by permit from the President and except under such limitations or restrictions as the President may prescribe;

(8) An alien enemy whom the President shall have reasonable cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or to be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety of the United States, or to have violated or to be about to violate any of these regulations shall remove to any location designated by the President by Executive Order, and shall not remove therefrom without a permit, or shall depart from the United States if so required by the President;

(9) No alien enemy shall depart from the United States until he shall have received such permit as the President shall prescribe, or except under order of a court, judge, or justice, under Sections 4069 and 4070 of the Revised Statutes;

(10) No alien enemy shall land in or enter the United States, except under such restrictions and at such places as the President may prescribe;

(11) If necessary to prevent violations of these regulations, all alien enemies will be obliged to register;

(12) An alien enemy whom there may be reasonable cause to believe to be aiding or about to aid the enemy, or who may be at large to the danger of the public peace or safety, or who violates or attempts to violate, or of whom there is reasonable ground to believe that he is about to violate, any regulation duly promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States

or Territories thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or his deputy, or such other officer as the President shall designate, and to confinement in such penitentiary, prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President.

This proclamation and the regulations herein contained shall extend and apply to all land and water, continental or insular, in any way within the jurisdiction of the United States.¹

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this sixth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and seventeen, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and forty-first.

WOODROW WILSON.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING TREASON, APRIL 16, 1917.

WHEREAS, all persons in the United States, citizens as well as aliens, should be informed of the penalties which they will incur for any failure to bear true allegiance to the United States;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, hereby issue this proclamation to call especial attention to the following provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the United States:

Section 3 of Article III of the Constitution provides, in part:

Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.

The Criminal Code of the United States provides:

Section 1.

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.

Section 2.

Whoever is convicted of treason shall suffer death; or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of his property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing such treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every person so convicted of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under the United States.

Section 3.

Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty of misprision of treason and shall be imprisoned not more than seven years, and fined not more than one thousand dollars.

Section 6.

If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,

¹ Congress by Act of April 16, 1918, extended to women the provisions of law respecting alien enemies; accordingly the President by proclamation of April 19, 1918, declared females over 14 years of age amenable to certain of the terms of this and later proclamations concerning aliens.

conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.

The courts of the United States have stated the following acts to be treasonable:

The use or attempted use of any force or violence against the Government of the United States, or its military or naval forces;

The acquisition, use, or disposal of any property with knowledge that it is to be, or with intent that it shall be, of assistance to the enemy in their hostility against the United States;

The performance of any act or the publication of statements or information which will give or supply, in any way, aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States;

The direction, aiding, counseling, or countenancing of any of the foregoing acts.

Such acts are held to be treasonable whether committed within the United States or elsewhere; whether committed by a citizen of the United States or by an alien domiciled, or residing, in the United States, inasmuch as resident aliens, as well as citizens, owe allegiance to the United States and its laws.

Any such citizen or alien who has knowledge of the commission of such acts and conceals and does not make known the facts to the officials named in Section 3 of the Penal Code is guilty of misprision of treason.

And I hereby proclaim and warn all citizens of the United States, and all aliens, owing allegiance to the Government of the United States, to abstain from committing any and all acts which would constitute a violation of any of the laws herein set forth; and I further proclaim and warn all persons who may commit such acts that they will be vigorously prosecuted therefor. . . .

PROCLAMATION CALLING FOR REGISTRATION UNDER THE DRAFT ACT, MAY 18, 1917.

WHEREAS, Congress has enacted and the President has on the 18th day of May one thousand nine hundred and seventeen approved a law which contains the following provisions: [The President here recites the provisions of the draft act; see p. 138.]

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, do call upon the Governor of each of the several States and Territories, the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia and all officers and agents of the several States and territories, of the District of Columbia, and of the counties and municipalities therein to perform certain duties in the execution of the foregoing law, which duties will be communicated to them directly in regulations of even date herewith.

And I do further proclaim and give notice to all persons subject to registration in the several States and in the District of Columbia in accordance with the above law that the time and place of such registration shall be between 7 a. m. and 9 p. m. on the 5th day of June, 1917, at the registration place in the precinct wherein they have their permanent homes. Those who shall have attained their twenty-first birthday and who shall not have attained their thirty-first birthday on or before the day here named are required to register, excepting only officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the

National Guard and Naval Militia while in the service of the United States, and officers of the Officers Reserve Corps and enlisted men in the Enlisted Reserve Corps while in active service. In the territories of Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico a day for registration will be named in a later proclamation.

And I do charge those who through sickness shall be unable to present themselves for registration that they apply on or before the day of registration to the county clerk of the county where they may be for instructions as to how they may be registered by agent. Those who expect to be absent on the day named from the counties in which they have their permanent homes may register by mail, but their mailed registration cards must reach the places in which they have their permanent homes by the day named herein. They should apply as soon as practicable to the county clerk of the county wherein they may be for instructions as to how they may accomplish their registration by mail. In case such persons as, through sickness or absence, may be unable to present themselves personally for registration shall be sojourning in cities of over thirty thousand population; they shall apply to the city clerk of the city wherein they may be sojourning rather than to the clerk of the county. The clerks of counties and of cities of over thirty thousand population in which numerous applications from the sick and from non-residents are expected are authorized to establish such sub-agencies and to employ and deputize such clerical force as may be necessary to accommodate these applications.

The power against which we are arrayed has sought to impose its will upon the world by force. To this end it has increased armament until it has changed the face of war. In the sense in which we have been wont to think of armies there are no armies in this struggle. There are entire nations armed. Thus, the men who remain to till the soil and man the factories are no less a part of the army that is [in] France than the men beneath the battle flags. It must be so with us. It is not an army that we must shape and train for war; it is a nation. To this end our people must draw close in one compact front against a common foe. But this can not be if each man pursues a private purpose. All must pursue one purpose. The nation needs all men; but it needs each man, not in the field that will most pleasure him, but in the endeavor that will best serve the common good. Thus, though a sharpshooter pleases to operate a trip-hammer for the forging of great guns, and an expert machinist desires to march with the flag, the nation is being served only when the sharpshooter marches and the machinist remains at his levers. The whole nation must be a team in which each man shall play the part for which he is best fitted. To this end, Congress has provided that the nation shall be organized for war by selection and that each man shall be classified for service in the place to which it shall best serve the general good to call him.

The significance of this can not be overstated. It is a new thing in our history and a landmark in our progress. It is a new manner of accepting and vitalizing our duty to give ourselves with thoughtful devotion to the common purpose of us all. It is in no sense a conscription of the unwilling; it is rather, selection from a nation which has volunteered in mass. It is no more a choosing of those who shall march with the colors than it is a selection of those who shall serve an equally necessary and devoted purpose in the industries that lie behind the battle line.

The day here named is the time upon which all shall present themselves for assignment to their tasks. It is for that reason destined to be remembered as one of the most conspicuous moments in our history. It is nothing less

than the day upon which the manhood of the country shall step forward in one solid rank in defense of the ideals to which this nation is consecrated. It is important to those ideals no less than to the pride of this generation in manifesting its devotion to them, that there be no gaps in the ranks.

It is essential that the day be approached in thoughtful apprehension of its significance and that we accord to it the honor and the meaning that it deserves. Our industrial need prescribes that it be not made a technical holiday, but the stern sacrifice that is before us, urges that it be carried in all our hearts as a great day of patriotic devotion and obligation when the duty shall lie upon every man, whether he is himself to be registered or not, to see to it that the name of every male person of the designated ages is written on these lists of honor. . . .

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING THE USE OF THE PANAMA CANAL IN WAR TIME, MAY 23, 1917.

WHEREAS the United States exercises sovereignty in the land and waters of the Canal Zone and is responsible for the construction, operation, maintenance, and protection of the Panama Canal:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim the following Rules and Regulations for the regulation, management and protection of the Panama Canal and the Maintenance of its Neutrality which are in addition to the general "Rules and Regulations for the Operation and Navigation of the Panama Canal and Approaches Thereto, including all Waters under its jurisdiction" put into force by Executive Order of July 9, 1914. . . .

Rule 3. A vessel of war or an auxiliary vessel of a belligerent, other than the United States, shall only be permitted to pass through the Canal after her commanding officer has given written assurance to the Authorities of the Panama Canal that the Rules and Regulations will be faithfully observed.

The authorities of the Panama Canal shall take such steps as may be requisite to insure the observance of the Rules and Regulations by auxiliary vessels which are not commanded by an officer of the military fleet.

Rule 4. Vessels of war or auxiliary vessels of a belligerent, other than the United States, shall not revictual nor take any stores in the Canal except so far as may be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through the Canal shall be effected with the least possible delay in accordance with the Canal Regulations in force, and with only such intermission as may result from the necessities of the service.

Prizes shall be in all respects subject to the same Rules as vessels of war of a belligerent.

Rule 5. No vessel of war or auxiliary vessel of a belligerent, other than the United States, shall receive fuel or lubricants while within the territorial waters of the Canal Zone, except on the written authorization of the Canal Authorities, specifying the amount of fuel and lubricants which may be received.

Rule 6. Before issuing any authorization for the receipt of fuel and lubricants by any vessel of war or auxiliary vessel of a belligerent, other than the United States, the Canal Authorities shall obtain a written declaration, duly signed by the officer commanding such vessel, stating the amount of fuel and lubricants already on board.

Rule 7. Fuel and lubricants may be taken on board vessels of war or auxiliary vessels of a belligerent, other than the United States, only upon permission of the Canal Authorities, and then only in such amounts as will enable them, with the fuel and lubricants already on board, to

reach the nearest accessible port, not an enemy port, at which they can obtain supplies necessary for the continuation of the voyage. Provisions furnished by contractors may be supplied only upon permission of the Canal Authorities, and then only in amount sufficient to bring up their supplies to the peace standard.

Rule 8. No belligerent, other than the United States, shall embark or disembark troops, munitions of war, or warlike materials in the Canal, except in case of necessity due to accidental hindrance of the transit. In such cases the Canal Authorities shall be the judge of the necessity, and the transit shall be resumed with all possible dispatch.

Rule 9. Vessels of war or auxiliary vessels of a belligerent, other than the United States, shall not remain in the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States longer than twenty-four hours at any one time, except in case of distress; and in such case, shall depart as soon as possible.

Rule 10. In the exercise of the exclusive right of the United States to provide for the regulation and management of the Canal, and in order to ensure that the Canal shall be kept free and open on terms of entire equality to vessels of commerce and of war, there shall not be, except by special arrangement, at any one time a greater number of vessels of war of any one nation, other than the United States, including those of the allies of such nation, than three in either terminal port and its adjacent terminal waters, or than three in transit through the Canal; nor shall the total number of such vessels, at any one time, exceed six in all the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States.

Rule 11. The repair facilities and docks belonging to the United States and administered by the Canal Authorities shall not be used by a vessel of war or an auxiliary vessel of a belligerent, other than the United States, except when necessary in case of actual distress, and then only upon the order of the Canal Authorities, and only to the degree necessary to render the vessel sea-worthy. Any work authorized shall be done with the least possible delay.

Rule 12. The radio installation of any public or private vessel or of any auxiliary vessel of a belligerent, other than the United States, shall be used only in connection with Canal business to the exclusion of all other business while within the waters of the Canal Zone, including the waters of Colon and Panama Harbors.

Rule 13. Air craft, public or private, of a belligerent, other than the United States, are forbidden to descend or arise within the jurisdiction of the United States at the Canal Zone, or to pass through the air spaces above the lands and waters within said jurisdiction.

Rule 14. For the purpose of these rules the Canal Zone includes the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to the said cities.

Rule 15. In the interest of the protection of the Canal while the United States is a belligerent no vessel of war, auxiliary vessel, or private vessel of an enemy of the United States or an ally of such enemy shall be allowed to use the Panama Canal nor the territorial waters of the Canal Zone for any purpose, save with the consent of the Canal Authorities and subject to such rules and regulations as they may prescribe. . . .

PROCLAMATION RESTRICTING EXPORTS OF COIN, SEPTEMBER 7, 1917.

WHEREAS Congress has enacted, and the President has on the fifteenth day of June, 1917, approved a law which contains the following provisions: [The President here recites parts of the Espionage Act; see p. 143.]

AND WHEREAS the President has heretofore by proclamation, under date of the twenty-seventh day of August in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventeen, declared certain exports in time of war unlawful, and the President finds that the public safety requires that such proclamation be amended and supplemented in respect to the articles hereinafter mentioned;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DO HEREBY PROCLAIM to all whom it may concern that the public safety requires that, except at such time or times, and under such regulations and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress, the following articles, namely: coin, bullion and currency: shall not, on and after the 10th day of September in the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventeen, be exported from or shipped from or taken out of the United States or its territorial possessions to Albania, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Germany, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Greece, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, The Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Sweden, Switzerland or Turkey, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Great Britain, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, the colonies, possessions or protectorates of The Netherlands, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Portugal, her colonies, possessions or protectorates, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, San Marino, Serbia, Siam, Uruguay, or Venezuela.

The regulations, orders, limitations and exceptions prescribed will be administered by and under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, from whom licenses in conformity with said regulations, orders, limitations and exceptions will issue.

Except as hereby amended and supplemented, the above mentioned proclamation under date of August 27, 1917, shall continue in full force and effect. . . .

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING FOOD LICENSES, OCTOBER 8, 1917.

WHEREAS, Under and by virtue of an Act of Congress entitled "An Act to provide further for the national security and defense by encouraging the production, conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel," approved by the President on the 10th day of August, 1917, it is provided among other things as follows: [The President here recites part of the Food and Fuel Control Act; see page 146.]

AND, WHEREAS, It is essential, in order to carry into effect the provisions of the said Act, that the powers conferred upon the President by said Act be at this time exercised, to the extent hereinafter set forth,

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the powers conferred upon me by said Act of Congress, hereby find and determine and by this proclamation do announce that it is essential, in order to carry into effect the purposes of said Act, to license the importation, manufacture, storage and distribution of necessities, TO THE EXTENT HEREINAFTER SPECIFIED.

All persons, firms, corporations and associations engaged in the business either of (1) operating cold storage warehouses (a cold storage warehouse, for the purposes of this

proclamation, being defined as any place artificially or mechanically cooled to or below a temperature of 45 degrees above zero Fahrenheit, in which food products are placed and held for thirty days or more), (2) operating elevators, warehouses or other places for the storage of corn, oats, barley, beans, rice, cotton seed, cottonseed cake, cottonseed meal or peanut meal, or (3) IMPORTING, MANUFACTURING (including milling, mixing or packing), or DISTRIBUTING (including buying and selling) any of the following commodities:

Wheat, wheat flour, rye or rye flour,
Barley or barley flour,
Oats, oatmeal or rolled oats,
Corn, corn grits, cornmeal, hominy, corn flour, starch
from corn, corn oil, corn syrup or glucose,
Rice, rice flour,
Dried beans,
Pea seed or dried peas,
Cotton seed, cottonseed oil, cottonseed cake or cottonseed meal,
Peanut oil or peanut meal,
Soya bean oil, soya bean meal, palm oil or copra oil,
Oleomargarine, lard, lard substitutes, oleo oil or cooking fats,
Milk, butter or cheese,
Condensed, evaporated or powdered milk,
Fresh, canned or cured beef, pork, or mutton,
Poultry or eggs,
Fresh or frozen fish,
Fresh fruits or vegetables,
Canned: Peas, dried beans, tomatoes, corn, salmon or sardines,
Dried: Prunes, apples, peaches or raisins,
Sugar, syrups or molasses,

EXCEPTING, however,

- (1) Operators of elevators or warehouses handling wheat or rye, and manufacturers of the derivative products of wheat or rye, who have already been licensed,
- (2) Importers, manufacturers and refiners of sugar, and manufacturers of sugar syrups and molasses, who have already been licensed,
- (3) Retailers whose gross sales of food commodities do not exceed \$100,000.00 per annum,
- (4) Common carriers,
- (5) Farmers, gardeners, co-operative associations of farmers or gardeners, including live stock farmers, and other persons with respect to the products of any farm, garden or other land owned, leased or cultivated by them,
- (6) Fishermen whose business does not extend beyond primary consignment,
- (7) Those dealing in any of the above commodities on any exchange, board of trade or similar institution as defined by Section 13 of the Act of August 10th, 1917, to the extent of their dealings on such exchange or board of trade,
- (8) Millers of corn, oats, barley, wheat, rye or rice operating only plants of a daily capacity of less than seventy-five barrels,
- (9) Cannerymen of peas, dried beans, corn, tomatoes, salmon or sardines whose gross production does not exceed 5,000 cases per annum,
- (10) Persons slaughtering, packing and distributing fresh, canned or cured beef, pork or mutton, whose gross sales of such commodities do not exceed \$100,000.00 per annum,
- (11) Operators of poultry or egg packing plants, whose gross sales do not exceed \$50,000.00 per annum.
- (12) Manufacturers of maple syrup, maple sugar and maple compounds,

(13) Ginners, buyers, agents, dealers or other handlers of cotton seed who handle yearly, between September 1st and August 31st, less than one hundred and fifty tons of cotton seed, are hereby required to secure on or before November 1, 1917, a license, which license will be issued under such rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business as may be prescribed.

Application for license must be made to the United States Food Administration, Washington, D. C., Law Department—License Division, on forms prepared by it for that purpose, which may be secured on request.

Any person, firm, corporation or association other than those hereinbefore excepted, who shall engage in or carry on any business hereinbefore specified after November 1, 1917, without first securing such license will be liable to the penalty prescribed by said Act of Congress. . . .

PROCLAMATION RELATING TO SECOND LIBERTY LOAN,
OCTOBER 12, 1917.

The Second Liberty Loan gives the people of the United States another opportunity to lend their funds to their Government to sustain their country at war. The might of the United States is being mobilized and organized to strike a mortal blow at autocracy in defense of outraged American rights and of the cause of Liberty. Billions of dollars are required to arm, feed and clothe the brave men who are going forth to fight our country's battles and to assist the nations with whom we are making common cause against a common foe. To subscribe to the Liberty Loan is to perform a service of patriotism.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, do appoint Wednesday, the twenty-fourth of October, as Liberty Day, and urge and advise the people to assemble in their respective communities and pledge to one another and to the Government that represents them the fullest measure of financial support. On the afternoon of that day I request that patriotic meetings be held in every city, town and hamlet throughout the land, under the general direction of the Secretary of the Treasury and the immediate direction of the Liberty Loan Committees which have been organized by the Federal Reserve Banks. The people responded nobly to the call of the First Liberty Loan with an oversubscription of more than fifty per cent. Let the response to the Second Loan be even greater and let the amount be so large that it will serve as an assurance of unequalled support to hearten the men who are to face the fire of battle for us. Let the result be so impressive and emphatic that it will echo throughout the Empire of our enemy as an index of what America intends to do to bring this war to a victorious conclusion.

For the purpose of participating in Liberty Day celebrations, all employees of the Federal Government throughout the country whose services can be spared, may be excused at twelve o'clock noon, Wednesday, the twenty-fourth of October. . . .

THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION TAKING OVER RAILROAD
LINES, DECEMBER 26, 1917.

Whereas the Congress of the United States, in the exercise of the constitutional authority vested in them, by joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, bearing date April 6, 1917, resolved:

That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and di-

rected to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States:

And by joint resolution bearing date of December 7, 1917, resolved:

That a state of war is hereby declared to exist between the United States of America and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

And whereas it is provided by section 1 of the act approved August 29, 1916, entitled "An Act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes," as follows:

The President, in time of war, is empowered, through the Secretary of War, to take possession and assume control of any system or systems of transportation, or any part thereof, and to utilize the same to the exclusion, as far as may be necessary, of all other traffic thereon for the transfer or transportation of troops, war material, and equipment, or for such other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful or desirable.

And whereas it has now become necessary in the national defense to take possession and assume control of certain systems of transportation and to utilize the same to the exclusion, as far as may be necessary, of other than war traffic thereon for the transportation of troops, war material, and equipment therefor, and for other needful and desirable purposes connected with the prosecution of the war;

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by the foregoing resolutions and statute, and by virtue of all other powers thereto me enabling, do hereby, through Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, take possession and assume control at 12 o'clock noon on the twenty-eighth day of December, 1917, of each and every system of transportation and the appurtenances thereof located wholly or in part within the boundaries of the continental United States and consisting of railroads, and owned or controlled systems of coastwise and inland transportation, engaged in general transportation, whether operated by steam or by electric power, including also terminals, terminal companies, and terminal associations, sleeping and parlor cars, private cars and private car lines, elevators, warehouses, telegraph and telephone lines, and all other equipment and appurtenances commonly used upon or operated as a part of such rail or combined rail and water systems of transportation to the end that such systems of transportation be utilized for the transfer and transportation of troops, war material and equipment, to the exclusion, so far as may be necessary, of all other traffic thereon, and that so far as such exclusive use be not necessary or desirable, such systems of transportation be operated and utilized in the performance of such other services as the national interest may require and of the usual and ordinary business and duties of common carriers.

It is hereby directed that the possession, control, operation and utilization of such transportation systems hereby by me undertaken shall be exercised by and through Wm. G. McAdoo, who is hereby appointed and designated

Director General of Railroads. Said Director may perform the duties imposed upon him, so long and to such extent as he shall determine, through the boards of directors, receivers, officers, and employees of said systems of transportation. Until and except as far as said Director shall from time to time by general or special orders otherwise provide, the boards of directors, receivers, officers, and employees of the various transportation systems shall continue the operation thereof in the usual and ordinary course of the business of common carriers, in the names of their respective companies.

Until and except so far as said Director shall from time to time otherwise by general or special orders determine, such systems of transportation shall remain subject to all existing statutes and orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to all statutes and orders of regulating commissions of the various States in which said systems or any part thereof may be situated. But any orders, general or special, hereafter made by said Director shall have paramount authority and be obeyed as such.

Nothing herein shall be construed as now affecting the possession, operation, and control of street electric passenger railways, including railways commonly called interurbans, whether such railways be or be not owned or controlled by such railroad companies or systems. By subsequent order and proclamation, if and when it shall be found necessary or desirable, possession, control, or operation may be taken of all or any part of such street railway systems, including subways and tunnels; and by subsequent order and proclamation possession, control, and operation in whole or in part may also be relinquished to the owners thereof of any part of the railroad systems or rail and water systems, possession and control of which are hereby assumed.

The director shall, as soon as may be after having assumed such possession and control, enter upon negotiations with the several companies looking to agreements for just and reasonable compensation for the possession, use, and control of their respective properties on the basis of an annual guaranteed compensation, above accruing depreciation and the maintenance of their properties, equivalent, as nearly as may be, to the average of the net operating income thereof for the three-year period ending June 30, 1917, the results of such negotiations to be reported to me for such action as may be appropriate and lawful.

But nothing herein contained, expressed, or implied, or hereafter done or suffered hereunder, shall be deemed in any way to impair the rights of the stockholders, bondholders, creditors, and other persons having interests in said systems of transportation or in the profits thereof to receive just and adequate compensation for the use and control and operation of their property hereby assumed.

Regular dividends hitherto declared, and maturing interest upon bonds, debentures, and other obligations, may be paid in due course; and such regular dividends and interest may continue to be paid until and unless the said director shall, from time to time, otherwise by general or special orders determine; and, subject to the approval of the director, the various carriers may agree upon and arrange for the renewal and extension of maturing obligations.

Except with the prior written assent of said Director, no attachment by mesne process or on execution shall be levied on or against any of the property used by any of said transportation systems in the conduct of their business as common carriers; but suits may be brought by and against said carriers and judgments rendered as hitherto until and except so far as said Director may, by general or special orders, otherwise determine.

From and after twelve o'clock on said twenty-eighth day of December, 1917, all transportation systems included in this order and proclamation shall conclusively be deemed within the possession and control of said Director without further act or notice. But for the purpose of accounting said possession and control shall date from twelve o'clock midnight on December 31, 1917. . . .

PROCLAMATION CALLING UPON THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION
TO REDUCE CONSUMPTION OF WHEAT AND MEAT
PRODUCTS IN ORDER TO FEED AMERICA'S ASSO-
CIATES IN THE WAR, JANUARY 18, 1918.

Many causes have contributed to create the necessity for a more intensive effort on the part of our people to save food in order that we may supply our associates in the war with the sustenance vitally necessary to them in these days of privation and stress. The reduced productivity of Europe because of the large diversion of manpower to the war, the partial failure of harvests, and the elimination of the more distant markets for foodstuffs through the destruction of shipping places the burden of their subsistence very largely on our shoulders.

The Food Administration has formulated suggestions which, if followed, will enable us to meet this great responsibility, without any real inconvenience on our part.

In order that we may reduce our consumption of wheat and wheat products by 30 per cent.—a reduction imperatively necessary to provide the supply for overseas—wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers should purchase and resell to their customers only 70 per cent. of the amounts used in 1917. All manufacturers of alimentary pastes, biscuits, crackers, pastry, and breakfast cereals should reduce their purchases and consumption of wheat and wheat flour to 70 per cent. of their 1917 requirements, and all bakers of bread and rolls to 80 per cent. of their current requirements. Consumers should reduce their purchases of wheat products for home preparation to at most 70 per cent. of those of last year, or, when buying bread, should purchase mixed cereal breads from the bakers.

To provide sufficient cereal food, homes, public eating places, dealers, and manufacturers should substitute potatoes, vegetables, corn, barley, oats, and rice products, and the mixed cereal bread and other products of the bakers which contain an admixture of other cereals.

In order that consumption may be restricted to this extent, Mondays and Wednesdays should be observed as wheatless days each week, and one meal each day should be observed as a wheatless meal.

In both homes and public eating places, in order to reduce the consumption of beef, pork, and sheep products, Tuesday should be observed as meatless day in each week, one meatless meal should be observed in each day; while, in addition, Saturday in each week should further be observed as a day upon which there should be no consumption of pork products.

A continued economy in the use of sugar will be necessary until later in the year.

It is imperative that all waste and unnecessary consumption of all sorts of foodstuffs should be rigidly eliminated.

The maintenance of the health and strength of our own people is vitally necessary at this time, and there should be no dangerous restriction of the food supply; but the elimination of every sort of waste and the substitution of other commodities of which we have more abundant supplies for those which we need to save, will in no way impair the strength of our people and will enable us to meet one of the most pressing obligations of the war.

I, therefore, in the national interest, take the liberty of

calling upon every loyal American to take fully to heart the suggestions which are being circulated by the Food Administration and of begging that they be followed. I am confident that the great body of our women who have labored so loyally in co-operation with the Food Administration for the success of food conservation will strengthen their efforts and will take it as a part of their burden in this period of national service to see that the above suggestions are observed throughout the land.

WOODROW WILSON.

The White House,
January 18, 1918.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING EXPORTS, FEBRUARY 14, 1918.

Whereas, Congress has enacted, and the President has on the 15th day of June, 1917, approved a law which contains the following provisions:

"Whenever during the present war the President shall find that the public safety shall so require, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export from or ship from or take out of the United States to any country named in such proclamation any article or articles mentioned in such proclamation, except at such time or times, and under such regulations and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress; provided, however, that no preference shall be given to the ports of one State over those of another."

And, whereas, the President has heretofore by proclamations dated July 9, 1917, August 27, 1917, September 7, 1917, and November 28, 1917, declared certain exports in time of war unlawful, and the President now finds that the public safety requires that such proclamations be amended and supplemented in respect to the articles and countries hereinafter mentioned;

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim to all whom it may concern that the public safety requires that the following articles, namely: All kinds of arms, guns, ammunition and explosives, machines for their manufacture or repair, component parts, thereof, materials or ingredients used in their manufacture, and all articles necessary or convenient for their use; all contrivances for or means of transportation on land or in the water or air, machines used in their manufacture or repair, component parts thereof, materials or ingredients used in their manufacture, and all instruments, articles, and animals necessary or convenient for their use; all means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers, and other articles, machines and documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile operations; all kinds of fuel, food, food-stuffs, feed, forage, and clothing, and all articles and materials used in their manufacture; all chemicals, drugs, dyestuffs, and tanning materials; cotton, wool, silk, flax, hemp, jute, sisal, and other fibers and manufactures thereof; all earths, clay, glass, sand, stone, and their products; animals of every kind, their products and derivatives; hides, skins, and manufactures thereof; all non-edible animal and vegetable products; all machinery, tools, dies, plates, and apparatus, and materials necessary or convenient for their manufacture; medical, surgical, laboratory, and sanitary supplies and equipment; all metals, minerals, mineral oils, ores, and all derivatives and manufactures thereof; paper pulp, books, and all printed matter and material necessary or convenient for their manufacture; rubber, gums, rosins, tars, and waxes, their products, derivatives, and substitutes, and all articles containing them; wood and wood manufactures, coffee, cocoa, tea,

and spices; wines, spirits, mineral waters, and beverages; and all other articles of any kind whatsoever shall not, on and after the 16th day of February, in the year 1918, be exported from, or shipped from, or taken out of the United States or its Territorial possessions to Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Germany, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Great Britain, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Japan, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Nepal, The Netherlands, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Portugal, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Roumania, Russia, Salvador, San Marino, Serbia, Siam, Spain, her colonies, possessions, and protectorates, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, or Venezuela, except under license granted in accordance with regulations or orders and subject to such limitations and exceptions as have heretofore been, or shall hereafter be prescribed in pursuance of the powers conferred by said act of June 15, 1917. The said proclamation of July 9, 1917, August 27, 1917, September 7, 1917, and November 28, 1917, and paragraph 11 of the Executive Order of October 12, 1917, are hereby confirmed and continued and all rules and regulations heretofore made in connection therewith or in pursuance thereof are likewise hereby confirmed and continued and made applicable to this proclamation. . . .¹

PROCLAMATION DIRECTING THE TAKING OVER OF DUTCH VESSELS, MARCH 20, 1918.

Whereas, the law and practice of nations accords to a belligerent power the right in times of military exigency and for purposes essential to the prosecution of war, to take over and utilize neutral vessels lying within its jurisdiction:

And whereas the act of Congress of June 15, 1917, entitled "An Act making appropriations to supply urgent deficiencies in appropriations for the Military and Naval Establishments on account of war expenses for the fiscal year ending June thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventeen, and for the other purposes," confers upon the President power to take over the possession of any vessel within the jurisdiction of the United States for use or operation by the United States:

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, in accordance with international law and practice and by virtue of the act of Congress aforesaid, and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do hereby find and proclaim that the imperative military needs of the United States require the immediate utilization of vessels of Netherlands registry, now lying within the territorial waters of the United States; and I do therefore authorize and empower the Secretary of the Navy to take over on behalf of the United States the possession of and to employ all such vessels of Netherlands registry as may be necessary for essential purposes connected with the prosecution of the war against the Imperial German Government. The vessels shall be manned, equipped, and operated by the Navy Department and the United States Shipping Board, as may be deemed expedient; and the United States Shipping Board

¹ An almost identical proclamation relating to imports was issued on the same day.

shall make to the owners thereof full compensation, in accordance with the principles of international law. . . .

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT CONCERNING THE TAKING OVER OF DUTCH VESSELS, MARCH 20, 1918.

For some months the United States and the entente allies have been conducting negotiations with the Dutch Government with the object of concluding a general commercial agreement.

A very clear statement of the character of these negotiations was made on March 12 to the Dutch Parliament by his excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Holland. As appears from the statement, the discussion proceeded upon the basis of two fundamental propositions, namely, that the United States and the allies should facilitate the importation into Holland of foodstuffs and other commodities required to maintain her economic life, and that Holland should restore her merchant marine to a normal condition of activity.

It was the task of the negotiators to develop a specific application of these propositions which would be acceptable to the Governments concerned.

Early in January, 1918, the negotiators came to an understanding which was embodied in a tentative agreement, which was submitted to the Governments concerned in order that if acceptable it might be ratified, or if unacceptable a counter proposal might be made.

The negotiations becoming prolonged, the Dutch delegates proposed, in order that their ships might sooner be put into remunerative service, that Dutch tonnage lying idle in American waters should, with certain exceptions, be immediately chartered to the United States for periods not exceeding 90 days.

This proposal was accepted by the United States Government, and on January 25, 1918, the Dutch Minister at Washington handed to the Secretary of State of the United States a note expressing the terms of the temporary chartering agreement and his Government's acceptance thereof. This agreement provided, among other things, that 150,000 tons of Dutch shipping should, at the discretion of the United States, be employed partly in the service of Belgian relief and partly for Switzerland on safe conduct to Cete, France, and that for each ship sent to Holland in the service of Belgian relief a corresponding vessel should leave Holland for the United States. Two Dutch ships in the United States ports with cargoes of foodstuffs were to proceed to Holland, similar tonnage being sent in exchange from Holland to the United States for charter as in the case of other Dutch ships lying in the United States ports.

The agreement was explicitly temporary in character, and, being designed to meet an immediate situation, prompt performance was of the essence. The Dutch Government at once disclosed, however, that it was unwilling or unable to carry out this chartering agreement which it had itself proposed. The first desire of the United States was to secure at once shipping, as contemplated by the agreement to transport to Switzerland foodstuffs much needed by the State. One difficulty after another was, however, raised to postpone the chartering of Dutch ships for Swiss relief, and, although the reason was never formally expressed, it was generally known that the Dutch shipowners feared lest their ships should be destroyed by German submarines, even though on an errand of mercy, and though not traversing any of the so-called "danger zones" proclaimed by the German Government. That this fear was not wholly unjustified has, unhappily, been shown by the recent act of the German Government in sinking the Spanish ship *Sardinero* outside the "danger zone" when carrying a cargo of grain for Switzerland, and after the submarine commander had ascertained this fact by an inspection of the ship's papers.

In respect of Belgian relief, the Dutch Government expressed its present inability to comply with the agreement on the ground that the German Government had given Holland to understand that it would forcibly prevent the departure from Holland of the corresponding ships, which under the agreement were to leave coincidentally for the

United States. The Dutch Government even felt itself unable to secure the two cargoes of foodstuffs, which under the agreement it was permitted to secure, since here again the German Government intervened and threatened to destroy the equivalent Dutch tonnage which under the agreement was to leave Holland for the United States.

Nearly two months have elapsed since the making of the temporary chartering agreement, and the proposed general agreement has lain even longer without reply on the part of Holland. Meanwhile, German threats have grown more violent, with a view to preventing any permanent agreement and of forcing Holland to violate any temporary agreement.

On March 7, through Great Britain, a final proposal, expiring on the 18th, was submitted to Holland. A reply has been received which, while in itself unacceptable, might under other conditions have served as a basis for further negotiations. But the events to which I have alluded had served to demonstrate conclusively that we have been attempting to negotiate where the essential basis for an agreement, namely, the meeting of free wills, is absent. Even were an agreement concluded, there is lacking that power of independent action which alone can assure performance. I say this not in criticism of the Dutch Government. I profoundly sympathize with the difficulty of her position under the menace of a military power which has in every way demonstrated its disdain of neutral rights. But, since coercion does in fact exist, no alternative is left to us but to accomplish, through the exercise of our indisputable rights as a sovereign, that which is so reasonable that in other circumstances we could be confident of accomplishing it by agreement.

Steps are accordingly being taken to put into our service Dutch shipping lying within our territorial jurisdiction. This action which is being taken by Governments associated with us leaves to Holland ample tonnage for her domestic and colonial needs. We have informed the Dutch Government that her colonial trade will be facilitated and that she may at once send ships from Holland to secure the bread cereals which her people require. These ships will be freely bunkered and will be immune from detention on our part. The liner *New Amsterdam*, which came within our jurisdiction under an agreement for her return, will, of course, be permitted at once to return to Holland. Not only so, but she will be authorized to carry back with her the two cargoes of foodstuffs which Holland would have secured under the temporary chartering agreement had not Germany prevented. Ample compensation will be paid to the Dutch owners of the ships which will be put into our service, and suitable provision will be made to meet the possibility of ships being lost through enemy action.

It is our earnest desire to safeguard to the fullest extent the interests of Holland and of her nationals. By exercising in this crisis our admitted right to control all property within our territory, we do no wrong to Holland. The manner in which we proposed to exercise this right and our proposals made to Holland concurrently therewith cannot, I believe, fail to evidence to Holland the sincerity of our friendship toward her.

WOODROW WILSON.

PROCLAMATION CONCERNING NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD, APRIL 8, 1918.

Whereas, in January, 1918, the Secretary of Labor, upon the nomination of the President of the American Federation of Labor and the President of the National Industrial Conference Board, appointed a War Labor Conference Board, for the purpose of devising for the period of the war a method of labor adjustment which would be acceptable to employers and employees; and

Whereas, said board has made a report recommending the creation for the period of the war of a national war labor board with the same number of members as, and to be selected by the same agencies, that created the War Labor

Conference Board whose duty it shall be to adjust labor disputes in the manner specified, and in accordance with certain conditions set forth in the said report; and

Whereas, the Secretary of Labor has, in accordance with the recommendation contained in the report of said War Labor Conference Board dated March 29, 1918, appointed as members of the National War Labor Board, Hon. William Howard Taft and Hon. Frank P. Walsh, representatives of the general public of the United States; Messrs. Loyall Z. Osborne, L. F. Loree, W. H. Van Dervoort, C. E. Michael, and B. L. Worden, representatives of the employers of the United States; and Messrs. Frank J. Hayes, William L. Hutcheson, William H. Johnston, Victor A. Olander, and T. A. Rickert, representatives of the employees of the United States:

Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby approve and affirm the said appointments and make due proclamation thereof and of the following for the information and guidance of all concerned:

The powers, functions, and duties of the National War Labor Board shall be: To settle by mediation and conciliation controversies arising between employers and workers in fields of production necessary for the effective conduct of the war, or in other fields of national activity, delays and obstructions which might, in the opinion of the National Board, affect detrimentally such production; to provide, by direct appointment or otherwise, for committees or boards to sit in various parts of the country where controversies arise and secure settlement by local mediation and conciliation; and to summon the parties to controversies for hearing and action by the National Board in event of failure to secure settlement by mediation and conciliation.

The principles to be observed and the methods to be followed by the National Board in exercising such powers and functions and performing such duties shall be those specified in the said report of the War Labor Conference Board dated March 29, 1918, a complete copy of which is hereunto appended.

The national board shall refuse to take cognizance of a controversy between employer and workers in any field of industrial or other activity where there is by agreement or Federal law a means of settlement which has not been invoked.

And I do hereby urge upon all employers and employees within the United States the necessity of utilizing the means and methods thus provided for the adjustment of all industrial disputes, and request that during the pendency of mediation or arbitration through the said means and methods there shall be no discontinuance of industrial operations which would result in curtailment of the production of war necessities. . . .

PRIORITIES LIST FOR SUPPLY OF FUEL, APRIL 10, 1918.

The War Industries Board of the Council of National Defense issued the following statement:

The Priorities Board has adopted Preference List No. 1 for the guidance of all governmental agencies in the supply and in the distribution by rail or water of coal and coke. While the list speaks for itself, it is proper to say that the board has not undertaken to classify any industry as non-essential or at this time to limit the quantity of fuel which any particular industry or plant shall receive. The board has, however, listed certain industries whose operation is of exceptional importance, measured by the extent of their direct or indirect contribution either toward winning the war or toward promoting the national welfare, and these industries will be accorded preferential treatment by the Fuel Administration in the distribution of coal and coke, and

also in the transportation of such coal and coke by the railroads.

This same plan will be followed in according preferential treatment to war industries and plants in the transportation of raw materials and supplies required by them in their manufacturing operations, so that they may not be delayed or hampered in complying with priority orders issued against them governing their products.

Preference List No. 1 is not complete in itself, but it will be noted that provision is made for certifying additional classes of industries, and also individual plants whose operations are necessary as a war measure.

In determining what industries or plants are entitled to be certified, two factors will control: (1) The relative urgency of the uses or purposes for which the product of the plant is utilized; and (2) the per cent. of the product of the plant utilized in war work, direct or indirect, or work of exceptional or national importance. No plant, a very substantial per cent. of whose product is not of exceptional importance, can be accorded preferential treatment.

PRIORITIES BOARD PREFERENCE LIST NO. 1.

In pursuance of a resolution unanimously adopted by the Priorities Board at a meeting held April 6, 1918, the following preference list of classes of industries, whose operation as a war measure is of exceptional importance, is promulgated and published for the guidance of all agencies of the United States Government in the supply and distribution of coal and coke, and in the supply of transportation by rail and water for the movement of coal and coke to said industries.

The priorities commissioner shall, under the direction of and with the approval of the Priorities Board, certify additional classes of industries, and also certify individual plants whose operation as a war measure is of exceptional importance, which industries and plants when so certified shall be automatically included in this Preference List, which shall be amended or revised from time to time by action of the Priorities Board to meet changing conditions.

No distinction is made between any of the industries or plants which are or may be included in this Preference List, and no significance should attach to the order in which the industries or plants appear in the list.

Aircraft.—Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing aircraft or supplies and equipment therefor.

Ammunition.—Plants engaged in the manufacture of ammunition for the United States Government and the allies.

Army and Navy cantonments and camps.
Arms (small).—Plants engaged in manufacturing small arms for United States Government and for the allies.

Chemicals.—Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing chemicals.

Coke plants.
Domestic consumers.
Electrical equipment.—Plants manufacturing same.
Electrodes.—Plants producing electrodes.

Explosives.—Plants manufacturing explosives.
Farm implements.—Manufacturers exclusively of agricultural implements and farm-operating equipment.

Feed.—Plants producing feed.
Ferroalloys.—Plants producing.
Fertilizers.—Manufacturers of fertilizers.
Fire brick.—Plants producing exclusively.

Food.—Plants manufacturing, milling, preparing, refining, preserving, and wholesaling food for human consumption.

Food containers.—Manufacturers of tin and glass con-

tainers and manufacturers exclusively of other food containers.

Gas.—Gas-producing plants.

Gas.—Plants manufacturing exclusively gas-producing machinery.

Guns (large).—Plants manufacturing same.

Hemp, jute, and cotton bags.—Plants manufacturing exclusively hemp, jute, and cotton bags.

Insecticides.—Manufacturers exclusively of insecticides and fungicides.

Iron and steel.—Blast furnaces and foundries.

Laundries.

Machine tools.—Plants manufacturing machine tools.

Mines.

Mines.—Plants engaged exclusively in manufacturing mining tools and equipment.

Newspapers and periodicals.—Plants printing and publishing exclusively newspapers and periodicals.

Oil.—Refineries of both mineral and vegetable oils.

Oil production.—Plants manufacturing exclusively oil-well equipment.

Public institutions and buildings.

Public utilities.

Railways.

Railways.—Plants manufacturing locomotives, freight cars, and rails, and other plants engaged exclusively in manufacture of railway supplies.

Refrigeration.—Refrigeration for food and exclusive ice-producing plants.

Seeds.—Producers or wholesalers of seeds (except flower seeds.)

Ships (bunker coal).—Not including pleasure craft.

Ships.—Plants engaged exclusively in building ships (not including pleasure craft) or in manufacturing exclusively supplies and equipment therefor.

Soap.—Manufacturers of soap.

Steel.—Steel plants and rolling mills.

Tanners.—Tanning plants, save for patent leather.

Tanning extracts.—Plants manufacturing tanning extracts.

Tin plate.—Manufacturers of tin plate.

Twine (binder) and rope.—Plants producing exclusively binder twine and rope.

Wire rope and rope wire.—Manufacturers of same.

EDWIN B. PARKER,
Chairman, Priorities Board.

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