DIPLOMACY
OLD AND NEW

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DIPLOMACY OLD AND NEW

By

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
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FOREWORD BY THE EDITOR

THE object of this series is twofold; to disseminate knowledge of the facts of international relations, and to inculcate the international rather than the nationalistic way of regarding them. This latter purpose implies no distortion of facts. It is hoped that the books will be found to maintain a high standard of accuracy and fairness.

But their avowed object is not merely to record facts, but to present them in a certain light, and with a certain object. That light is Internationalism and that object the peace of the world. If the series is successful in its purpose it will contribute to what Wells has called the "international mind."

The object has been to produce the books at a price that shall not be prohibitive to people of small incomes. For the world cannot be saved by governments and governing classes. It can be saved only by the creation, among the peoples of the world, of such a public opinion as cannot be duped by misrepresentation nor misled by passion. The difficulties of that achievement can hardly be exaggerated, but ought not to daunt. And the editor ventures to hope for support from men of good will in this one attempt, among the many others, to enlighten the intelligence and direct the will.

PREFACE

"DIPLOMACY OLD AND NEW" has been written for two very different sorts of readers. In the first place for my comrades in the Labour Party, and in the second place for my former colleagues in the foreign services. And the whole range of public opinion on diplomacy lies somewhere between these two points of view.

Before the war I had prepared for students a text-book on the principles and procedures of diplomacy, embodying the experiences of twenty years' diplomatic work—and later, exasperated by the failures of our diplomacy in peace and war owing to the repeated breach of first principles of foreign policy and diplomatic procedure, I have been on the point of publishing an exposure of the evils of the present system that would have given useful munitions of war to its revolutionary opponents. But I have had to recognise that the conditions created in England and in Europe by the war are not such as would make the publication of either of these serve any useful purpose at present. In the first case, all text-books on diplomacy written before the war are out of date because the war, and still more the "peace," have not only altered the matter of diplomacy by substituting equations in Balkanism and Bolshevism for problems in the Balance of Power, but they have altered the manner of diplomacy by substituting a lot of new short cuts for the old "diplomatic channels." The precepts and precedents of pre-war diplomacy are now only of practical value in so far as they are likely to be permanently adopted by and adapted

to the new conditions. It is still too early to estimate how far this will go. On the other hand it is, I think, already evident that neither the political nor the economic consequences of the catastrophe we have come through will at any early date make us scrap our general system of controlling and conducting foreign relations. There is no movement in England likely to revolutionise our machinery as in Russia. There is not even a movement likely to make us revise our methods, as in Germany. The most we can expect is such reform as a moderate Labour Government is likely to be able to impose on the existing system, subject to more urgent claims on its energies. A reform of this sort must take account of the vieux régime and of vested interests. It must build on what is sound in the old structure, and get its plans passed by those hostile to any change. Its success must depend as much on the *finesse* of the diplomacy at the head of it—as on the force of the democracy behind it. And consequently indictments of the whole existing system, that to be effective must be driven home by sensational disclosures and documents, would at present do harm. They would only rally to the support of the reactionaries those reformers inside the services whose co-operation is essential to reform on the lines of a compromise.

I have, therefore, gladly taken advantage of the invitation to contribute to this series with a short statement of what I believe to be the essential evils of the system, and the remedies that are at present realisable. It will be found that each of the following chapters begins with a broad and brief examination of what is wrong, and ends with a few practical and rather

professional suggestions as to how we might begin—or rather go on—setting it right. It is hoped that these suggestions may be of use to Labour and Liberal reformers, by directing their present discontents into definite and detailed demands. While it may be of help to official reformers to have the reforms already realised and the extension of them hereafter recommended brought into relation with what the public wants. Liberal minded officials are apt to pooh-pooh as absurd the demands of outside reformers in Parliament and the Press, without recognising that these demands are really directed at the evils from which they most suffer and can readily be adapted to reforms from which they would greatly benefit. While on their side outside reformers are too inclined to think that nothing more is necessary than to return to power a party pledged to some catchword like "democratic control" or "open diplomacy." Whereas it is only when they have come to power that their difficulties will begin. Indeed the more complete the victory the more difficult will be the subsequent settlement. And if reformers come to power without having prepared a programme in which official reformers can co-operate—the confusion in the foreign affairs of England will be of the same sort as that we now suffer in Europe from having failed to co-operate at Versailles with our real allies the German revolutionaries.

For reasons of space the reforms hereafter recommended have often been advanced as the conclusions of an official reformer instead if being argued back to first principles. And in judging of the value of such expert evidence the reader must be able to discount the personal

equations of the writer. This in the case of a diplomatist deprived of further opportunities of public service in mid-career and in the middle of a crisis would ordinarily be considerable. But the conditions under which I left diplomacy in 1915 were not ordinary, except in so far as they were those under which thousands of my countrymen left their professions. Many of them have never recovered their positions, but none I have met in the ranks or elsewhere have ever regretted the step or been soured by a sense of grievance. And the despatch that follows should relieve the reader from making any allowance for friction in the writer's estimates.

No. 45. Lisbon, 23 *April*, 1915.

SIR,

At the request of Mr. Young, First Secretary at this Legation, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two communications renewing the application which I understand he recently made to you in person, either to be transferred from Lisbon to another post where there would be more scope for his energy and capacity for work, or to be seconded for military service, or to be placed *en disponibilité* in order to enable him to take up other work connected with the war. Mr. Young adds that should you find it impossible to reconsider your decision that he should remain at Lisbon, he requests leave of absence from the 18th of May, at the expiration of which he proposes to resign his Commission.

I have pointed out to Mr. Young that there are a number of ways in which he has been and can be most useful to me, at the same time admitting his contention that owing to war conditions they are perhaps not of a nature to occupy his time in as complete a manner as he would wish, and as would be the case in normal times. He is, however, for motives which I appreciate, disposed to seek a post either in the diplomatic service, or if necessary elsewhere, in which he will have more opportunities than here of devoting his whole time and energies to the service of the country. It is unnecessary for me to testify to Mr. Young's ability and capacity for work, which are well-known to you. I regret the decision which he has taken, not only on account of the loss of his services, but also on personal grounds. L. CARNEGIE.

Finally, should any reformers, political or official, who may happen to read these chapters, desire further discussion of any points in them, I hope they will not hesitate to write to me direct.

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CHAPTER I

DIPLOMACY AND PERSONNEL

"My profession has taught me how extremely improper it would be by any allusion, however slight, to give any uneasiness, however trivial, to any individual, however foolish or wicked."—(Rejected Addresses.)

THE public is revolting against orthodox diplomacy, much as it is against orthodox divinity, and for the same reason—its failure to secure peace on earth to men of good will. But if Foreign Office clerks, like Anglican clergymen, have done little or less than nothing to avert war or restore peace, both the original responsibility and the ultimate remedy for this lie with the lay public. The average citizen has, indeed, got into the way of treating his relations with the Powers abroad much as he does those with the Powers above—either as a mystery beyond him, or a mummery beneath him. He is prepared to poojah to ambassadors, and pay tithe to armament firms as an insurance against war; but without ever thinking whether the "policies" he is getting are really an insurance against war, or not rather an investment in it. It is fundamentally the fault of the public if the democratic principle has been so slow in permeating our diplomatic procedure. I shall show that diplomatists at least have already done as much as could be expected to reform themselves. But so long as the public refuse them their confidence and co-operation little can be done.

One of the worst results of regarding diplomacy as a "mystery" has been the loss of confidence on both sides. The public have no confidence in the expert's efficiency, the expert has no confidence in the public's power to support him. Diplomats are treated either as hierophants or humbugs, instead of as advocates or agents; and they in turn come to believe that they can do better as dictators by divine right than as delegates of a democracy. So our house is divided against itself on the old lines of authority against autonomy, in that very region where unity is most essential.

The swiftest and simplest way of restoring confidence is of course to get the right men to represent us in foreign relations both at home and abroad. To do this as a special measure would only require a temporary re-assertion of public interest in foreign affairs in Parliament and the Press, but to do it systematically will require the reform of a system that does not give us the right representatives.

Public confidence is largely a matter of personality, and especially so in foreign relations where institutions are either too empiric or too effete to replace individuals. Our present system has failed because it does not produce personalities in foreign affairs that can restore public confidence either by personal or by professional eminence, and because it does put persons in responsible positions whose conspicuous inadequacy destroys such confidence as might otherwise have been retained by commonplace mediocrity.

One reason why we fail to get officials for our foreign affairs that will inspire confidence in the public is because

as a rule, there is no connection between public opinion and public policy in foreign affairs. Public opinion as a whole and as distinct from London clubs and côteries can only take cognisance of foreign affairs when broad issues are put before it in the light of moral principles, as was achieved by Gladstone in our last great European crisis and as was attempted by Wilson in this crisis of to-day. Our fathers can still remember the popular forces for truth and right that were aroused by the Midlothian Campaign. We ourselves have not quite forgotten the Wilsonian Messages, and how they restored faith and hope in a world of despair and of desolation. But apart from these major differences between such democratic diplomacy and our present bureaucratic diplomacy, there is this minor difference, that democratic diplomacy produces a type of official much more sympathetic to the man in the street. Those of us, for example, who were travelling on the continent in August, 1914, and were caught in the cataclysm, were in a position to compare the way in which British and American missions or consulates dealt with the emergency. And I think they will agree that so far as private individuals went the Americans were much more helpful and human. Again, those who compare the tone of our diplomatic despatches and reports in the 'eighties with those of recent years will find in the former a concern for the humanities and a conviction as to the moralities of a question that is absent from the latter. The difference is of course partly a matter of form, but it is more than that. The difference between the foreign policy of Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Balfour is that between the diplomacy of Cromwell and of Charles II, and is having the same effect

on the personnel of our foreign services and our position abroad. And by this I do not mean that the humanity of Mr. Gladstone is like that of Cromwell, who was indeed inhumane, or that the immorality of Mr. Balfour is the same as that of Charles II. Mr. Balfour is in some respects quite moral. But I mean that when, for example, Mr. Gladstone was making up to the Irish and Cromwell was mowing them down, they were both applying democratic diplomacy. They recognised that a subject race must ultimately either be enfranchised or enslaved, and they faced the facts accordingly; whereas the immorality of the diplomatic mind lies in its making concessions not on principle but under pressure, and in inflicting cruelties for convenience, not from conviction. The trouble is that to avoid failure in the constructive work of a democratic diplomatist you must have a touch of genius, whereas to succeed as a diplomatic diplomatist you need only have the gentlemanly touch.

Another difficulty is that the English would always sooner be governed by a gentleman than by a genius, and that as there is no demand for geniuses there is no supply. In all matters in which we do not feel competent ourselves, we English prefer being led by a gentleman, even though we know him to be incompetent, because we know pretty well what he will and won't do. Whereas in matters we understand we are democratic and have no use for aristocratic leadership. This is shown by our troops preferring to be led by gentlemanly boys rather than by experienced fighters of their own social class, and that, too, where rashness or stupidity meant death; while these same men would not accept the leadership of an "intellectual" in their trades union organisation

on a question of wages. Applying this to the nation as a whole, we realise how it has happened that we are still governed on the aristocratic principle in foreign affairs, and how it comes that, though we have been forced by now to open most careers to the talents, we have left foreign affairs a preserve—not of the gentry for they no longer exist as a political power—but of gentility. The result of this is that whereas in other regions of political activity democratic ideals and institutions have steadily developed, in foreign affairs they have decreased. Power that was formerly under the indirect control of the Commonwealth, either through Parliament or the King, has now been centred in the Foreign Office, an institution far remote from public influence. This is the main cause of our weak and wayward foreign policy.

The result, crudely and concisely put, is that, whereas theoretically the Foreign Office is merely a connecting link between the people's representatives in Parliament and the Empire's representatives abroad, practically it has made itself the sole organ, not only for the conduct of foreign affairs, but for the control of foreign policy. If this only meant that in foreign affairs our government was a good deal more bureaucratic and a good deal less democratic than in home affairs, the consequences, though they would probably have been distressing in some respects, would not have been generally so disastrous as they have been. But it is a fact that you cannot have a sound and efficient bureaucracy except in conjunction with democracy. Left to itself and freed from the restraint and stimulus of the democratic partnership, bureaucracy runs to seed and suckers.

Moreover, the authority in foreign affairs assumed

by the Foreign Secretary is such as no one man could possibly adequately discharge. As a result, he has been becoming, more and more, only the president of a sort of private cabinet. Thus, while Parliament has delegated foreign affairs to the Cabinet, and the Cabinet to the Foreign Secretary, the Foreign Secretary is dependent on his permanent secretaries for guidance in policy, and on his private secretaries for supervising the personnel of the service.

The system is unsound. And it has been officially recognised as unsound for a quarter of a century, and by three Royal Commissions. But the inside influence of the system is such, and the outside interests it represents are so strong that it is still untouched. Its outside influence is based on its combination with privilege, its inside power on patronage. For its centre, the Private Secretary controls all access to the Foreign Secretary, whether from outside or inside, all appointments to a service that still carries with it a social status, and all promotions in that service to posts of social eminence and solid emoluments.

Suppose you think of putting your son into diplomacy! First you want a nomination from the "Foreign Secretary," that is the private secretary; then the approval of a "Board of Selection"—again the private secretary; then you must see that he associates with the sort of people at home and abroad that are approved by the authorities—once more the private secretary; thereafter, in some twenty to thirty years, he may get a well-paid post—from the private secretary; and, finally, you must be prepared to see him drift through life from the demi-monde and diplomatic circles of one foreign

capital to those of another, a discontented dilettante; until at last life acquires for him a purpose and a pursuit in collecting M.V.O.'s and K.C.M.G.'s from the private secretary, until he retires on a pension—unless he is deprived of it by the private secretary. For if he does not suit the system, owing to independence or even individuality of character, it will almost automatically and quite arbitrarily make it impossible for him to remain in the service.

Small wonder if diplomatists sometimes put the preferences or prejudices of the private secretary before their own principles. We once had a private secretary whose criterion was neat boots—and for a time how beautiful upon the mountains were the feet even of the messengers. There has been of late a succession of Roman Catholic private secretaries. An increasing proportion of officials of senior rank are now of that Church, and I have yet not heard of any diplomatist becoming a Dissenter. Of appointments to diplomacy since 1907, over ninety per cent. went to expensive public schools, and sixty-seven per cent. to Eton. While from fear of being misunderstood I refrain from reproducing my estimate of the percentage with foreign connections, and who are, or have since become, Roman Catholics; which percentage has certainly not been reduced by the appointments made since the war without examination.

I should be very sorry if I were supposed to suggest that a man is a less proficient and less patriotic diplomatist for having foreign connections, and being a Roman Catholic. On the contrary. As diplomacy is still understood in the Foreign Offices of unrevolutionised

Powers, a Roman Catholic of foreign parentage will find the relationships he owes to his family and faith both instructive and useful. His proficiency as an "ancien-régime," or even "real-politik" diplomatist would be greater than that of a colleague without these personal advantages. On the other hand, the predominance of Roman Catholics in diplomatic posts of great responsibility does sometimes cause suspicion as to the sources of information on which our foreign policy is based.

And when we come to the question of foreign blood we find that a cross with foreign strains does evidently produce a more docile and diligent draft-horse than an English thoroughbred. Consequently the professional successes of all the men with these advantages is no doubt a survival of the fittest.

But even if these are the best suited to the system, they are only one sort of representative, and we want others brought in. And above all men with other points of view and principles should not on that account be frozen out. Of the men who have dropped or been driven out of the service prematurely in recent years, those I have known personally have been highly promising. The leading Oxford scholar of his year, a linguist of note and a brilliant writer was one. Another is now a prominent political reformer; a third has become powerful in the city; while all three were personalities of striking magnetism. These three men were all dismissed for differences on public issues; and if one of them has lately been taken back after the country has been deprived of his services during the last fifteen years, I think the others will prefer to wait

until a change in conditions makes their return more useful than it would be at present.

It will be observed that I am not making the usual indictment against the Foreign Office for conservative adherence to the aristocratic principle in the selection of suitable representatives. As things are, a really aristocratic character and intellect are probably the best chance we have of getting the touch of genius and the independence of mind essential to a democratic diplomacy. We have seen lately how the House of Lords alone of our governmental institutions made a stand for liberty and for law, when public opinion was raving in war delirium. And in diplomacy my experience is that the man with a really aristocratic training, tradition and temperament sees more readily what is right, and makes a better fight for it than the man who is less sure of himself. My complaint against the Foreign Office is that for this reason the true aristocrat has almost as poor a chance of success or even survival as the democrat. Of my immediate colleagues who have resigned, two were typical aristocrats that fifty years ago would have remained in the service and risen rapidly to high rank. Neither was a diplomatic phenomenon like Urquhart or Oliphant. It will be some time before we can get a diplomatic service that can use a Scottish chief with a Bardic second-sight and a bee in his bonnet; or even a political and literary genius. But our present system cannot even use men of ordinary individuality, intelligence and independence.

It seems safe to assert that the present system does not, and never will, sustain any diplomatist that does not suit it, however suitable otherwise he may be; it will

sustain one that suits it, however otherwise unsuitable; and it is, on the whole, those that are unsuitable that suit it best. By unsuitable I mean those whose capacities are esoteric, and whose characteristics are exotic, and who tend to be both unrepresentative and unreliable.

It would be easy to explain historically how dependance on the Foreign Office private secretaries has demoralised diplomacy. The original position of the young diplomatist as a member of the Envoy's household was, as late as my own recollection, a feudal and often a family relationship. But of late the young diplomatist has lived a life of the servants' hall, with all its servility and snobbery—and let it be said also—with all its solidarity and sociability.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that the notable diplomatic successes of our day have been outsiders such as Lord Bryce, Lord Cromer, or Lord Dufferin, all men who came in at the top. For professional pre-eminence we must go as far back as Sir W. White, or Sir R. Morier; and even then we find that the former was a consular clerk forced on the system, and that the latter forced himself to the front in opposition to it, thanks to powerful private connections.

In short the present diplomatic service, owing to the way it is recruited and regulated, is quite incapable of fulfilling its most important functions—that of representing the average attitude of mind of the peoples of the British Empire to foreign governments, and that of representing to our government the average attitude of mind of foreign peoples.

Reforms in the recruiting of the Foreign Service have followed so far at a very respectful and even remoter

distance the course by which the Civil Service has been converted from servants of the Crown to servants of the Ruling Class, and so eventually to servants of the Commonwealth. It was not so very long ago that an Ambassador appointed his staff very much as a Colonial Governor still does. It was only when the inadequacies of services so recruited imperilled the monopoly of the ruling class, that first a qualifying and then a competitive examination was super-imposed. But so long as the recruiting of the foreign service was left under the sole control of the Foreign Office means were found of restricting admission to it, appointments were by various devices accessible only to the "upper class," even to such members of it only as the private secretaries might prefer.

It might be supposed that this system would have produced a personnel that was at least representative of the English upper class. But it did not do so, because the special examination was not brought into any relation with the education of that class, as required by the "Macaulay principle," which is the basis of the general Civil Service examination. Consequently candidates with foreign connections and cramming had a great advantage over those who went through public school and university. The results were so exotic that the special examination was given up about 1904, and a system substituted by which appointments to the Foreign Service were selected from the results of the Civil Service examination.* This has brought about a considerable

* "The examination for entry into the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service has for many years been competitive and with certain exceptions due to the necessity of a special knowledge of foreign languages, similar to that for the rest of the Civil Service."—*Mr. Balfour, House of Commons, 23rd January, 1918.*

improvement in the character and capacity of candidates, and, be it observed, the reforms hereafter recommended merely carry a stage further this linking up of the educational curriculum with the professional career. But I have described the system as it was when I first knew it.

Mr. Balfour said in reply to a question (23rd January, 1918): "I know no method of securing the services of young men inclined to sympathy with the forward movement of civilisation by the machinery of competitive examination." Well, if he had wanted forward young men rather than backward young men, his private secretaries would have got them all right even through the machinery of competitive examination. But in another sense he is right and a mere Chinese examination must be supplemented by other machinery.

The abolition of the special examination was a step in the right direction, and I shall suggest how it should be developed by further breaking down of artificial divisions within the service and by building up a "Macaulay" bridge between education and employment. That the reforms already effected in the conditions of recruiting are on the right lines is shown by the improvement they have made in the class of candidate—but what has been done, if left at that, would be almost valueless. The fundamental defects of the old system are still untouched, and it is due to these defects that our diplomacy to-day is without driving power and our foreign policy without direction—that we have lost our ancient prestige and our traditional principles.

But diplomacy has not let itself be demoralised without some effort in its own interest, and in that of the

public. Dissatisfaction has even reached such a point that, impatient of the impotence of its critics to realise and remove the evil, the Service has tried to do so itself. I remember especially two such movements in the last twenty years and will report them for the first time, as they show the progress already made from inside towards finding a cure and the vantage points already gained. For it is on these lines and starting from these points that future reforms must be pursued.

The first of these movements, early in the century, concerned the Foreign Office, which, in those days was still, as to its administration and methods, much as it had been half a century earlier. The results of the workings of its mediæval machinery from the point of view of the public interest would have been ludicrous if they had not been lamentable. The waste of time and trouble in its rococo routine was the least of the evils, though one recalled with regret the comparatively simple "zweckmassigkeit" of the Sublime Porte where you scribbled on a scrap of paper in the palm of your hand and then stuffed it into a sack in the corner. It was a minor evil that a highly educated and not underpaid young graduate spent his whole time in such occupations as copying despatches in long hand and drying them before the fire because typewriters and blotting paper were not "received at court" by Queen Victoria, or that the evenings he might have spent at least less stupidly were often occupied with waiting about until he had tied up with red tape, labelled and sealed some messenger bag to a foreign mission by a method which would allow of its being opened and reclosed by an "unauthorised person" *en route*, in just

seven and a half minutes! The main evil lay in the general "esoteric" effluvium still to-day permeating diplomacy. The atmosphere of the Foreign Office at this time was that of the Court of Pumpernickel, and if by the outbreak of war it has advanced to that of the Court of Potsdam it achieved this improvement through its own initiative and ideals.

Dissatisfaction with the Pumpernickel chinoiseries came to a head about 1904, when Arthur Ponsonby, then a diplomatist employed in the Foreign Office, headed a movement for a reform of office procedure. Nothing, of course, came of it at the time, other than the elimination of the rebel; but later when another diplomatist became permanent Secretary, a complete reorganisation was effected—and so far as mechanism and method goes the Foreign Office now compares well with any other department.

This, however, was only a reform of administrative machinery. Diplomacy and the diplomatic service remained in bondage and an Egyptian darkness. Energetic diplomats succeeded in bringing some missions up to date for a time, but were not encouraged. But gradually it came to be realised that the root of the evil lay in the separation into two services; and the demand for amalgamation of the Diplomatic Service with the Foreign Office that had been growing for a quarter of a century became so strong that some concession had to be made. The individual and temporary exchanges that had been recommended in the 'sixties were consequently introduced about 1907. But the only result of this was that diplomats abroad often found themselves working under officials whose knowledge of diplomacy

was a minus quantity, while in the office they were on principle excluded from all real work, especially that for which they had qualified themselves abroad. A diplomat who, as the trusted delegate of his chief, had been carrying on first-class negotiations abroad, would find in the office that he had to draft letters for clerks many years his junior, and that any such letters that concerned matters he had dealt with abroad were carefully given to someone else. Foreign Office clerks, on the other hand, found their very limited prospects of promotion still further restricted. This superficial remedy, therefore, if anything, only accentuated the evil.

At last, having secured the support of the Ambassador, Lord Bryce, an ex-Cabinet Minister, the Washington Embassy plucked up courage to present privately a round robin with a "petition of rights" on behalf of the service. The immediate results were, of course, nil, or rather annihilation. The mission was dispersed, as soon as might be, and the moving spirit, after various vicissitudes, successfully eliminated. But though the frontal demonstration failed, the flank attack that followed had better success. Influential personages in London were convinced of the necessity of reform and converted to the proposals of the petition. The final result was the report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service dealing with the Foreign Office Diplomatic and Consular Services, published shortly after the outbreak of war.* The recommendations of this report constitute a definite public record of the reforms required in the opinion of competent public men, after careful public enquiry. The whole is very well worth reading, and I will only

* Fifth Report of the Commissioners. [C.D. 7748.] Price 5½d.

reproduce here the leading recommendations. The Commission recommended :

(*a*) The reconstruction of the Board of Selection for candidates in such a way as would prevent the control of entry hitherto exercised by the private secretaries ; as well as the complete assimilation of the examination to that for the rest of the Civil Service, and the abolition of the income qualification.

(*b*) The amalgamation of the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. This indispensible condition for a " united *esprit de corps* " (I quote the report) had already been urged by the Ridley Commission in 1890. The natural reluctance of the office to give effect to this reasoned recommendation is mainly responsible for the subsequent deficiencies in our diplomacy.

(*c*) The payment of a living wage and the assignment of promotions and transfers to a properly constituted departmental body ; as also the lengthening of the periods of employment at any post. This would improve the capacity of diplomatists and the conditions under which they work.

(*d*) The relegation of routine work to the second division, and a reduction in the numbers. This would increase efficiency and reduce expenditure.

" If our proposals are adopted," says the report, " the diplomatic service will be made more attractive to men of ability and high academic training, while its members will have greater opportunity of studying subjects of value to them in their profession. Charges have been made before us of defects of knowledge and narrowness of outlook in members of the diplomatic service, and, without admitting the justice of such general criticisms, we consider that in many cases there is room for improvement."

These proposals are in fact the same as those arrived at by members of the Service as the result of long and

often bitter inside experience. If we allow them to be pigeon-holed, as were the proposals of the Ridley Commission of 1890, we have no one but ourselves to blame for the inevitable consequences. It will be our democracy that is at fault, not our diplomacy.

If, then, the report of the Royal Commission contains the reforms required to give us reasonably efficient officials for the conduct of foreign affairs, what prospect is there of realising these recommendations. At present the only way of getting the reforms enforced is through securing their acceptance by the official authorities themselves. Various promises to this effect have been given in Parliament, departmental committees have been appointed, and pronouncements have been made in the press that the recommendations are being or are going to be adopted.

But the Foreign Office has been for a quarter of a century the last stronghold of privilege and prerogative, and has again and again beaten off or baffled the assaults of democracy. It has often pretended to capitulate. As late as July 31st, 1918, a time when prospects were dark and pressure heavy, a white flag was hung out. In a debate on that date, Lord Robert Cecil recognised that diplomacy had of late years changed its character, and that the war had made reforms imperative. He added that reforms in certain regions were about to be adopted. He indicated further the reforms in question which are those advocated for many years by official reformers. This would mean that the Foreign Office had decided to adopt the principal proposals of the report of the Royal Commission.

One such reform that has been realised and that has

importance, though less than has generally been attributed to it, is the abolition of the income qualification hitherto required from candidates. The stipulation that all candidates should have £400 per annum private income was, of course, a challenge to democratic principles, and as such became a centre of attack. But it was really only a necessary consequence of the system by which men served the State for twenty years or so at a salary that rarely covered their out-of-pocket expenses, with the prospect thereafter of securing posts of social eminence and large emoluments. It was a bad system, because not only did it restrict the field to men with a private income more like £1,000 than £400 per annum, but by involving them in debt at the most useful period of their career, it made them absolutely dependent on the private secretaries. A transfer might mean ruin or relief according to circumstances. I know of no other profession in which officials after twenty years' service have been dismissed or driven out by private secretaries without appeal, with the State several thousand pounds in their debt for official expenses.

If, then, there is now to be a living wage and an adequate allowance for expenses, the effect on our foreign relations will be important.* It will raise the intellectual standard of officials and will increase their mental independence. It will abolish the Government lottery by which a man invested twenty years' work and the

* The new salaries are as follows: *Counsellors*: Salaries, from £1,200 to £1,500, ten rent allowances at £300, one rent allowance at £600, and foreign allowances at £300. *First Secretaries*: viz., At salaries from £800 to £1,000, twenty-seven rent allowances at £250, one at £500, and foreign allowances, £250. *Second and Third Secretaries*: At £300—£25—£600, rent allowances at £250 for married and £150 for unmarried secretaries; foreign allowances at £150.

equivalent of some ten thousand pounds, not to mention moral assets, on the one in fifteen chance of ten thousand a year, and the one in five chance of three thousand.

From the public's point of view, however, the considerable increases in pay of diplomatic officials are not so satisfactory. It has still the same men it had before but it has to pay them twice as much. The pay increases do not only concern junior ranks. For example, the total pay of our ambassador to Washington is now £20,000, double what it used to be. Of this all but £2,500 is called "entertainment allowance." Unless this allowance is to be expended and accounted for officially it is only a device for avoiding income tax. In any case it seems a lot to spend on the insignificant little society of Washington. Your diplomacy will cost you more—twice as much in fact, and it is up to you to see that you get the sort that will be worth the money.

A third indispensable condition for getting good work out of our representatives abroad towards which something has been done, is the setting them free from purely clerical work, such as copying and cyphering. As to the realisation of this reform, Lord Eustace Percy says:

> "The Foreign Office Clerk has been relieved in this way by a clerical staff, and it is even more important that the diplomatist should have time to move about the country and to report on matters of interest, much as does a foreign correspondent. It will, of course, be some years before the junior diplomatist learns how to employ usefully his new liberty, and some will never do so; but at least mere mechanical routine will no longer, as hitherto, impede or even prevent intelligent enterprise."—*New Europe*, No. 134, p. 80.

I remember Baron Rosen, one of the most able of Germany's ambassadors, telling me, when at Lisbon, that he never allowed his young men to pass more than

half their time in the Chancery, the remaining half being spent in getting into touch with some social centre or getting a grasp of some social object. One certainly felt at a serious disadvantage in competing, as we then were, with this particular Mission.

But on the whole it looks as though one of the lesser losses due to our success in the war has been that of Foreign Office reform. That somewhat decrepit, but still debonair devil, Old Diplomacy, was very sick after the diplomatic disasters of the first years of war, and seriously thought of seeing about sainthood. He got out of their dusty pigeonholes all the prescriptions of Royal Commisssions for converting his soul by curing his system, and all the preachments of the radical prophets that said he could only be saved if he were born again. He even took a good dose of one of the nicest of the prescriptions, that told him to raise his salary; and he told everyone that he was quite sure he could find his soul if they would only let him look round for a bit. But then came the victory, and off he went to celebrate it in a regular razzle at Paris. There he found a nice new mansion of a war profiteering angel who had somewhat overbuilt, and set up the League of Nations in it as a second establishment in addition to his legitimate *ménage* in the Foreign Office. And now, though he has gained the whole world, he has lost that soul again.

The "Soul's Awakening" of the Foreign Office, as featured by Lord Robert Cecil, made a considerable sensation in the little world of foreign affairs; but personally, I do not think anything serious will be done until a fresh impetus is given by a change both of the political atmosphere at Westminster, and of the permanent

authorities in Whitehall.* And when this change does come it will allow of these reforms being made part of a general reorganisation of the Foreign Services; a reorganisation which should not be revolutionary, but should build on whatever is sound in the present system and bring its various still vital organs into relations with its ever-increasing functions.

The defect in principle that has stunted the growth of our Foreign Services and strangled their energies, has been that of departmental sub-division and self-assertion. This division has, moreover, been based on an unsound classification of function and a survival of class favour. The general result has been a breaking up of the Foreign Service with its uniform function of representing us abroad, into a "crack corps" with the "cavalry spirit" in the embassies and legations, a Foreign Office of "sappers" and "brass hats," and a "labour corps" of second division. Again its political and commercial functions have been respectively labelled first and second class, and divided between diplomats and consuls. Where this separation has been clearly impossible, as in the Far East and in the Levant, the consuls have been given political functions, but refused the best posts, which have been reserved for diplomats. When, as of late, some commercial work, such as concession hunting and commercial negotiation, has been required from diplomats, it has generally had to be entrusted to experts from Big Business, or the Board of Trade, with much prejudice to our interests. For such alliances with Big Business have their drawbacks, and officials trained in

* The latter condition has possibly been met by the promotion of Sir E. Crowe to be permanent Secretary.

inter-departmental controversies and the Home Civil Service do not make good negotiators. On the whole, the division of authority over the foreign commercial work between the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, in consequence of the former's early neglect of this branch has been most detrimental to the public interest.

You cannot run your Foreign Service as a train with first, second and third class coaches without communicating corridors or third class admission to the dining car. Such an arrangement of classes has worked in the Whitehall Civil Service, where it corresponds to what is still the structure of West End Society, and it may continue to work there for such time as the middle class continues to enjoy this rather artificial and archaic atmosphere. But it has not worked well in the open air of life abroad, even within the cloisters of the *Corps diplomatique*, where caste conventions are still religiously respected. It will not work at all in the new Europe emerging from the revelations and revolutions of the war. If we try and maintain these obsolete classifications, we shall never get proper representation abroad of our political and commercial interests, or enter into real touch with foreign ethnic and economic movements.

An amalgamation between Office and Missions has been accepted in principle, but there is no possible principle precluding the extension of such amalgamation to the Consular Service; nor is there any real practical reason against it. If consuls have not shown in the past as much intelligence and initiative as diplomats (and personally I think they have), it is the fault of their careers and official status, not of their characters and social standing. If commercial work has not been given the

same opportunities for distinction, it is the fault of an administrative authority that did not recognise to what extent the principles of economics were the basis of present-day politics, and that segregated and subordinated "commercial" work as second-class, or looked on it as a competition in concession hunting. And if the clerical Second Division does not seem likely to produce at present men worth promoting to executive rank, it is because present conditions are not even as favourable to their doing so as they were. For in the old days when there was more personal contact between the authorities and juniors, such men have risen from the ranks. The case of Sir William White, the best ambassador we ever had at Constantinople, is one example of several.

What we have at present is a Foreign Office with junior appointments offering very great opportunities, and with senior posts of inferior importance—a Diplomatic Service with junior appointments offering only an occasional opportunity of acquiring either general or special experience, but with a very large proportion of senior posts requiring both general and special excellences—a Consular Service with only second-class opportunities and positions for either juniors or seniors—and a Clerical Branch that has neither opportunities nor positions. Illustrating this individually, we find that an intelligent young Foreign Office Clerk can, as Private Secretary, get a position in the conduct and even in the control of Foreign Affairs of more value possibly to himself than to the State; but that he must later retire either into a foreign post for which he has little taste and no training, or into an office department where he

will conduct controversies with other departments or criticise the minutes of his juniors. An intelligent young diplomat, on the other hand, will, after twenty years of typewriting and tea parties, find himself responsible for advising on issues of peace and war, for reporting on matters and movements in which he has had no education or experience, and for representing individuals and institutions with which he has never been in touch.* The intelligent young consul, after mastering the mechanism and methods of a great commercial centre

* Extract from a diplomatist's diary, published in *New Europe*, 13th June, 1918: "I find—as many a good man has found before me—that the practice of copying reports on stupid commercial subjects tends to atrophy my native wit; and my resolutions for the Secretary of State do not quite live up to my hopes. A square talk with him—which I may hope to have when I am on the doddering side of sixty, but not before—would give him some of those home truths which are the common coin when diplomatists talk shop; though most of the crowd I'm with here have long ago given up the airing of grievances and simply have a good time when they can get it. I shall reach that point soon; but I haven't reached it yet, else I shouldn't bother to keep this diary. God preserve our sense of humour, *à tout prix*, must be the prayer of all like me who are caught in the wheels of this system and can't get out. Let me see; I spent goodness knows how long in learning one of the most difficult languages in Europe, with the result that I was sent to the opposite end of the continent, where I only use the knowledge in capping stories with the naval attaché at the club. That is the excellent operation of the square peg principle. And that reminds me. Jack and I agreed over a bottle of P.J. at the Carlton last year that we'd swop diaries at the end of a given time. When I wrote reminding him of it, the beggar sent me the following on a half-sheet of paper:

Any old hour:	Get up.
Three more hours:	Pretend to be a typist.
One or more hours:	Lunch.
Three more hours:	Type again and pretend to be an expert paper file.
One more hour:	Seal one bag.
One more hour:	Unseal and disembowel one bag.
One minute:	Realise that I'm engaged in the practice of diplomacy.
Next minute:	Forget it and go out to dine.
Last hour:	Go to bed.

like New York, will very likely find himself whisked off by the Genii to some petty semi-political post. And, after spending his middle life in becoming a power, say, in Polish politics, he will be rewarded by the Consulate-General in Rio; while the intelligent young shorthand typewriter at a Foreign Mission will soon realise that he has no prospects, and he will use his post only as a mounting block to business. I have myself got a first-class young man out from England for clerical work, only to see him go off in a year or two to get a better salary than I was getting myself. For that is the result in all the above cases; the enterprising and intelligent young man goes—either to better himself or to the bad—but he goes. And while this picture of our present Foreign Service is drawn with a broad brush, I do not think it is over-coloured or out of perspective.

The old classification, never satisfactory, has been reduced to absurdity by the war. The pre-war politico-economic empires—Russian, Austrian, and Ottoman—into which Central and Eastern Europe were divided, provided an artificial administration of Europe that was not so very much out of relation with the artificial organisation of our Foreign Services. The centralised Empire, with its cosmopolitan capital, its commercial provincial centres, and its aristocratic, bureaucratic and plutocratic ruling class, could be covered fairly well by our Embassy with its subordinate Consulates run by public school men with little or no local knowledge. But the war and the peace have "Balkanised" Europe by dissolving these cosmopolitan Empires into a number of national communities in which such matters as language and local knowledge have become indispensable. They

have "Bolshevised" Europe by bringing to power members of the professorate or proletariat, who both speak in languages and think on lines beyond the range of Eton and Winchester. It was the coming into diplomatic prominence of a world east of Vienna, outside the ken of the cosmopolitan ruling class, that caused the creation many years ago of the Levant and China Consular Services. Now, though the Foreign Office cannot always be depended on to adapt its arrangements at once to a change of foreign conditions, yet I think it must see that the old system cannot be made to work; and that it only does not yet see how to work it over to suit the new conditions. It must see that at present our Minister to Riga, say, after a term of boredom there, would be fairly entitled to a turn of the cosmopolitan delights of Brussels; while the Minister there would have, in fairness to his colleagues, to do time at Bogota. The public interest would suffer by both changes; but no one would be to blame. Too much of Riga or Columbia would demoralise a man without the educational equipment enabling him to enjoy and exploit the intense but rather exotic interest of these posts. But if these men had been educated for, and had become experienced in, dealing with the regional resources and relationships of these countries, there would be no question of banishment or boredom. Moreover, the problems of promotion, now so difficult of satisfactory solution, and so easy of solutions that are as unsatisfactory to the profession as to the public, would be greatly facilitated.

If this principle is recognised, progress by stages becomes easy. The first thing to do would be to complete the existing regional system in the Levant and

Far East, by entitling their officials in principle to the embassies and legations in these regions. Such promotions would in practice be nothing new. The promotion of Sir John Jordan and Sir E. Satow, of the Chinese Consular Service, gave us the best Ministers we have had lately at Peking. On the other hand, the passing over of Sir A. Block and Consul-General Graves, of the Levant Service, let us in for some of the worst we have had at Constantinople. The next thing will be to create other regional divisions; and this raises the question of the remaining reform—that of post-graduate training and professional education. The regional system has, as shown above, provided in principle for the necessary amalgamation of the Services, together with that of political with commercial work and amelioration of the conditions of service. It will also provide properly trained officials by linking up official careers with educational curriculum.

The old departmental stratification into political, commercial and clerical functions, and into diplomatic consular and clerical branches, with its first, second, and third-class standings, should be replaced by vertical division into regional sections, with as clear a ladder as possible, not only from the lowest post to the highest, but also from a previous general and special education. These regional divisions, which would correspond to those already existing, both in the Service and in the Universities, would enable an official to prepare for his future regional responsibilities in post-graduate and even in undergraduate studies; while men who could not afford a University would enter the Foreign Services four or five years earlier for clerical routine work, and,

if they were of outstanding ability, might win promotion to executive posts by using the opportunities afforded them for prosecuting regional studies.

It is essential that officials, if they are to be so equipped as to make the best of and get the best out of work abroad, should have a general grounding in subjects that form the basis of their profession, such as political science, economics, history, philology, and sociology, and that they should also have special training in the languages and local knowledge of their region. The schools of regional studies, now being started in the University of London, will enable such extra training to be combined with a sound general education. Consequently, in reorganising the service on a regional basis, it will be convenient to co-ordinate the official regions with those that exist in the University of London, or that might exist there or elsewhere.

These requirements would result in regional services and schools somewhat on the following lines:

(1) A Far Eastern (Oriental) service as already existing, and a school of Oriental languages, also existing, in which languages—Chinese, Japanese, Siamese and Malay—would be prominent, history highly specialised, and political science, economics, sociology, etc., subordinate.

(2) A Middle Eastern (Levant) service, also existing, and a school in which languages, including Modern Greek, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Amharic, Armenian and Georgian, would be of equal importance with history, with the general subjects again secondary.

(3) An East European (mainly Slavonic) service, with a school, just coming into existence, in which the Slavonic

languages (with the addition of German), history, political science, and economics and sociology, would be all of equal importance.

(4) A West European (Teuto-Scandinavian) service, where the languages, including French, would take up less time than the other subjects. And this applies also to:

(5) A South European (Romance) service, including France, Italy, the Peninsula, and South and Central America. The formation of a regional course of studies for these last two would merely be a matter of co-ordination of existing courses.

Each regional service would have its corresponding department in the Foreign Office served by its own men.

There would remain the non-regional service (in which only French and German would be required) that would concern itself with internal and international administration, and that would provide a suitable career for those who had too much general ability or too little special aptitude for the regional services. This "League of Nations" section would provide for North America.

The political education required for these reformed Foreign Services could be provided almost entirely by organisation out of existing institutions, such as the London School of Economics, the Centre for Historical Research, and the International Law Lecturers. Young Consuls are already attending classes at the School of Economics, and professional classes should be arranged there or in some College of the University for the young official of the first division. For the control and co-ordination of this instruction, for the giving of professional courses, and for the development of the

relationship between employment in the Foreign Service and education in the Home Universities, a Chair and Seminar of Foreign Affairs is required, preferably in the University of London. But this development will be dealt with in a later chapter.

Apart from the advantage to diplomacy to be expected from an amalgamation of the foreign services, the breaking down of departmental and social distinctions would get rid of the sense of official subjection and of social inferiority that accounts for much of the staleness and sterility of the Consular Services and Second Division.*

* I annex an extract from a report written early in the century :

"Our Consular service is fairly efficient, thanks to the recent abolition of patronage, and its recognition as a profession, but it is not enthusiastic. The disadvantages of dependence on another department that falsify the relations between the Diplomatic Service and the Foreign Office are aggravated in the case of the Consular Services by their double dependence on the central authority of the Foreign Office, and the local authority of the Mission. This disadvantage is most obvious in respect of promotions. Indeed, with every effort to be equitable, promotion could not be properly apportioned at present because there is no means of obtaining the information on which it should be based. The only record of a consul's work is to be found in his own reports, in the occasional formal inspection of his office by a diplomatic secretary or Foreign Office clerk ignorant of consular work, and in the gossip of travellers. The consul or vice-consul has no chief to take care of him, and his best work is for the most part unrecorded, unrecognised and unrewarded. The prizes in the service are not very considerable, come as a rule too late, and too often are used as shelves for failure from the two other services. The sovereign remedy for the first of these evils is greater autonomy. The Consular Service should have a say in its own promotions on the lines already adopted by foreign powers—notably the United States. This can best be done by the establishment of a system of regional consular inspections ; the inspectors being consuls appointed for five years, and responsible for large areas. All promotions and administrative alterations in the service to be considered on the basis of the inspector's reports."

This recommendation, which contained the germ of the regional system, was eventually adopted, and a number of consular inspectors were appointed. But as the appointments were not given to prominent consuls, but to protégés favoured by or forced on the private secretaries, the only result has been that the Consular Service, that Cinderella of the Civil Service, has three elder sisters instead of two.

This suggests another consideration that connects this first part of the subject—the more efficient control of foreign affairs—with the second—the more effective control of foreign policy. It is that if you "democratise diplomacy" in the sense of drawing in more active and able men from the "masses," you will make it less, not more, democratic in its point of view and policies. Such ambitious young arrivistes will adapt themselves to their atmosphere, and become devoted acolytes of the sacred mysteries. Even to-day the Foreign Office, where there has been no income qualification and a somewhat higher mental and lower social average than diplomacy, has the more snobbish tone. In diplomacy the proportion of men with independent minds and means is larger, and that of men merely "on the make" is smaller. Clever young men from the lower middle classes will be less capable of resisting the demoralising effects of the diplomatic atmosphere, and of bureaucratic authority than those inured to such influences by birth and breeding. The recent loss of independence and initiative in our diplomatic officers is due, already, more to the recruiting of the service from middle-class families with social ambitions, than to any restriction of it to the upper classes. A snob makes a worse diplomatist than a smarty.

The way to "democratise" diplomacy is not to throw open an autocratically administered service with an aristocratic tradition to the general public. That will only vulgarise it. Diplomacy must itself be given a democratic development. The Foreign Service must in the first place be made self-coherent and self-conscious by amalgamation, and then it must be made

self-governing by a measure of autonomy. The administrative authority of the Secretary of State, which is merely the control of his private secretaries, must be given a broader and a better basis. If the Whitley Council system can safely be introduced into the Navy and into other branches of the Civil Service, something of the sort, with at least advisory functions, may safely be attempted in a service where there is less discipline and much more discontent. That such an innovation would not be welcome to the First Division itself is no reason for rejecting it ; rather the contrary. I myself would be glad to see regional Councils of the Foreign Service consulted even on matters like promotion, or superannuation. The general opinion of the Service itself will seldom be at fault as to personal qualifications ; and appointments of so much importance to the public can no longer be left to the private secretaries. And without some firm foundation in the rank and file of the Service, Boards of Selection and Promotion will always tend to become mere camouflaged private secretaries. You will only get good work from men who have a say in respect of all the conditions under which they work. This is as true of a Foreign Office as of a factory, and by the present system you risk not only public disaster but private tragedies. I shall never forget an experience of my first visit to the Foreign Office when applying for a nomination a quarter century ago. I found the then private secretary, a most kindly and courteous character, in great distress. A Consular officer, after an interview with the private secretary, had shot himself in the adjoining room. No one was to blame but the man himself, and the system which had refused him the hearing that

would have enabled him to keep his balance. If you have a Chinese system you must expect its subjects to behave like Chinese and occasionally cut their own throats to spite you—unless they survive to become mandarins and learn to love its chinoiseries. But even China has brought itself up to date to some extent.

I don't mean that regional reconstruction of the Foreign Service and a radical internal reorganisation would be a wholly adequate response to the imperative demand for reform in our foreign relationships. Such reforms may revivify diplomacy—that is, the conduct of foreign affairs : but what we need is a revitalising of foreign policy, that is, the control of foreign relations. With this larger task these reforms have little to do. They were not inspired, nor have they been enforced by, the popular demand. They were conceived by official reformers and in part incorporated in the report of the Royal Commission, before the war forced the negligences and ignorances of our diplomacy on the public mind. This particular fight was, in fact, fought by the "old contemptibles" of the service, who stood up against and were struck down by the phalanx of privilege and Prussianism before the new citizen armies had taken the field for a larger and a longer warfare.

Chapter II

DIPLOMACY AND PARLIAMENT

"Come weal, come woe, come calm, come storm,
I'll see you all blessed ere I give you reform."
"Bravo!" says Chittabob—"that's your sort
Come along, you devils, here's more sport."
—*Ingoldsby Legends*.

In the previous chapter reasons were given for believing that recent failures of our diplomacy may be explained: firstly, by the Foreign Office having deprived the diplomatic service of many of its functions, and most of its vitality, which has caused a loss of contact with facts and forces abroad; and secondly, by the Foreign Office having so defended its authority over foreign affairs against democracy that contact has been lost with facts and forces at home. Finally, that this arbitrary authority has been too much exercised by subordinate officials who have neither the political qualifications nor the personal qualities for so tremendous a responsibility.

The reform movements already dealt with had to do with improving the conduct of foreign affairs. An even more essential matter is an improvement in the control of foreign policy.

The essential elements in foreign affairs—in the relationship of one people to another—are to be found, firstly, in the point of contact with the foreign authority abroad, *i.e.*, the foreign mission; and, secondly, in the centre of control at home, *i.e.*, the Foreign minister, or, as we call him, Foreign Secretary.

The whole official relationship, say, from the British to the French people, might be stated thus: British people through press, Parliament, or the polls to the Cabinet, and so to the Foreign Secretary, thence through the Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Paris, or the French Ambassador in London, thus to the French Foreign Minister, and so as before to the French people. Properly, Parliament or the press should criticise, the Cabinet should control, the Foreign Secretary conduct, and the Ambassador counsel. But the way our system really works now is that a Foreign Office clerk counsels, controls and conducts, the Foreign Secretary criticises, and nothing else counts at all.

This appropriation by the Foreign Office of the functions both of the democratic representatives of the people at home and of the diplomatic representatives of the Empire abroad has come about as the result of two distinct political processes.

One such process is the general acquisition of authority of late years by the bureaucracy at the expense of the democracy—augmented in the case of foreign affairs by the pontifical powers claimed by diplomacy, and to some extent conceded by the public. For the attitude of Parliament towards an announcement on foreign policy is much what that of the Roman Senate was towards an augur who argued peace or war from the colour of a chicken's liver. The other process is the recovery by the so-called ruling-class of a monopoly of foreign affairs, a monopoly menaced at one time by the extension over foreign affairs of the democratic ideas and institutions already established in home affairs.

Thus it would not even strike a bank clerk as curious

that though he may become Foreign Secretary, he is not good enough to be a First Secretary; nor a solicitor's clerk that, though he may become Lord Chancellor, he is not qualified to be Head of a Chancery. If he were a sensible man he would not mind much—unless and until he saw how much he and everyone else suffered by his exclusion.

For it is these processes, reproduced in foreign peoples, that have so weakened diplomacy as to bring down the whole structure of European civilisation into an abyss of war. The whole weight of the international relationships has been thrown on the newest and weakest link in the chain—the Foreign Office—a link that properly should not appear in the chain at all.

As it is, however, the Government—that is the Cabinet—that is the Foreign Secretary—that is the Senior Clerk—can decide for the whole Empire issues involving the prosperity or poverty, the life or death of each of us, and the honour or disgrace, the unity or discord of the Empire. And that, moreover, without any power of revision by, even without reference to, the public opinion of England, still less that of the Empire. The Cabinet is supposed to be informed, but frequently is not, and rarely is called on for a decision. The House of Commons is not supposed to be informed, and rarely gets even an opportunity for discussion. Foreign Secretaries mostly sit in the House of Lords, and, especially of late, have frankly and forcibly contended that foreign affairs are matters of exclusively executive concern. Theoretically, the consent of Parliament is not necessary to peace or war, or to the cession of territory, or to any treaty unless it involves a change in

the law of the country. The most momentous changes in the recent history of our foreign policy—the Japanese alliance, the *entente* with France, the convention with Russia, the secret treaty with Italy, and the peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Turkey—were all accomplished facts before Parliament knew anything about them. Not only so, but Parliament was the last to hear about them. It is, indeed, one of the paradoxes of modern politics that Parliament, so jealous of some of its prerogatives, should contentedly allow control of foreign affairs, and therefore of financial and ultimately of ordinary legislation, to slip out of its grasp.

Parliament is still, of course, nominally in control of Foreign Affairs, but really it reigns and does not govern. Of late years Parliamentary control of foreign policy has simply not existed, and Parliamentary criticism of it has been nothing more than an attempt of a small and mostly unpopular group of members to make some use of the few opportunities given by Parliamentary procedure for the discussion of Foreign Affairs.

The only procedures by which a foreign question can be brought before the House are by raising it on the Consolidated Fund Bill, on a Motion for Adjournment, on the Foreign Office vote, or in a Question. The first two are practically useless. The Foreign Office Vote is not discussed unless the Opposition leaders demand it. If it is put down for discussion, there ensues a full-dress debate in which the leaders of the two parties make debating speeches and other members occupy any time left over with disquisitions on any matter, however discursive, that may interest themselves. Anyone taking the trouble to read the official report of

the very few debates on Foreign Affairs (they are not reported in the press nowadays), must conclude that they are of very little public utility. It is melancholy to compare them with the frequent and intelligent discussions about foreign affairs of a generation ago. Consequently there remains only " Questions " as a means of criticising the conduct of Foreign Affairs.

The first objection to the procedure of Parliamentary control by questioning the Foreign Secretary, or rather the Under Secretary—for the Secretary is generally out of his place, or " in another place "—is that it is merely critical, unless it is collusive. The question is either intended to force the Foreign Office to make an admission as to what it has been trying to conceal, or its object is to give the Office an opportunity of making a communiqué. In the case of questioning by an opponent the result is a sort of game in which the questioner tries by a carefully drafted question and especially by " supplementaries " to extract information; while the answerer evades him by procrastination or by prevarication. Indeed the art of misleading without literally lying has been developed to a degree that has seriously impaired the relations that should exist between the Imperial Legislature and Executive and the reputations of our statesmen abroad.

This process, by which all control of Foreign Affairs has been withdrawn from the representatives of the people, and reserved to the representatives of a class, has been at work in foreign countries as well as in our own. But of late reform and revolution have restored a measure of democratic control in many of the more important foreign states, and there is now none, without exception,

so un-parliamentary in its foreign relations as ourselves. The Mother of Free Parliaments is not mistress in her own house as are her daughters.

The necessity of a return to a sounder relationship between Legislature and Executive has long been recognised in competent quarters.

Viscount Bryce, a constitutional lawyer and Ambassador, says in his book, *The American Commonwealth*:

> The day may come when in England the question of limiting the at present all but unlimited discretion of the executive in foreign affairs, will have to be dealt with, and the example of the American Senate will then deserve and receive careful study.

Lord Rosebery, Foreign Secretary and historian, speaking at Glasgow just before the war, said:

> . . . I do not know if any Glasgow merchant here would care particularly to do what we do in foreign affairs—that is, to engage in vast and unknown liabilities, and affix his signature to them without knowing their nature and extent.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain, a Conservative and a man of common-sense, has said:

> I sometimes ask myself whether in the future it will not be necessary and, indeed, if it will not be a good thing that the Foreign Secretary should take the House of Commons, in the first instance, and his countrymen at large in the second, much more into his confidence, than he has done in the past. We have passed in recent years through European crises, the full gravity of which was not realised by our people, if realised at all, until after they had passed into history. I ask myself can you conduct democratic governments on these principles.

But we have no need of such admissions and anticipations from Elder Statesmen. The failure of the present system has been very bitterly brought home to us private citizens, and this failure is due directly to the want of democratic control over our foreign policy. What concerns us now is to consider a remedy.

There has been for many years a movement in the House of Commons itself for correcting this evil by two measures. One is the reservation to Parliament of a right of revision of all old treaties and of ratification of all new ones.

By revision, I do not mean, of course, that a Labour Government, for example, should, on coming into office, revise the treaties of its Conservative predecessors. But that periodically all international engagements of an indefinite validity should be brought up for re-sanction or for re-negotiation. It does not strengthen the sanctity of treaties that there should be a tangle of out-of-date and discordant obligations by which any policy, however unpopular or impolitic, can be justified as a sacred duty and any proposal, however prudent, condemned as a breach of contract. Our responsible representatives must have means of knowing without the aid of expert opinion what the national engagements are by which the Government must regulate its foreign policy. They must also be able to secure the repeal, by the appropriate procedure, of any such engagements as no longer in the opinion of a majority of the House express the interests of the country. Also they must be able to do this without raising the question of confidence in the Government of the day. And the same applies all the more to new contracts. Parliament can exercise no effective control over Foreign Affairs until it can refuse to ratify a treaty of which it disapproves.

If this is conceded, as it must be sooner or later, then the second measure called for by the reform movement will follow of itself. A permanent Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs will be found

then to have become indispensable in order to ensure the eventual assent of the House to the proceedings of the Foreign Office.

Treaty revisions and ratifications by Parliament, and control of foreign affairs by a permanant Committee are no very daring innovation. Indeed, it looks as though we would shortly be the only Great Power whose diplomacy had not been provided with some such safeguard—we who still pride ourselves on the ease with which our unwritten constitution adapts itself to changing conditions. Thus Art. 45, Par. 1, of the new German constitution provides: "Alliances and treaties with foreign States concerning subjects of national legislation require the consent of the Reichstag." This represents one of the concessions to democracy that we have wrung from Germany by the bloodiest of wars. But the proposal is still stoutly opposed by our own Government.

Considering this proposal first in the Constitutional aspect we come up against the claim that foreign affairs are matters of purely executive concern. This claim cuts so deeply at the root of all reform, and has been countenanced by authorities of so great a weight in constitutional law, that it cannot be merely ruled out as reactionary. It has found some support from Liberals, such as Mr. Gladstone and Viscount Grey. Viscount Grey, in August, 1913, refused to give Mr. Dillon assurances that a certain contentious foreign question would not be executively settled during recess: "I cannot give assurances," he said, "to suspend during the recess decisions on points that do not constitutionally require the consent of Parliament." Mr. Gladstone,

in replying to the annual motion of Mr. Richards on the subject, admitted that in former times, and down to a late period, Parliament had much more to say in matters of peace and war, and particularly of treaty engagements, than it has now. The reasons, he thought, were that Parliament in those early days was a more exclusive body, and that its proceedings were not so fully reported.

The same principle has been asserted of late by Mr. Balfour, and argued by Sir Frederick Pollock (*New Europe*, No. 83, May 16th, 1918). Sir Frederick claims that control over foreign affairs is a "residual executive power of the Crown." But, in the first place, if this claim is made as a constitutional precept, it seems to be worth little; for the British Constitution is not a law regulating governmental functions, but a continuous development of them in conformity with certain principles. In the second place, so far as such principles are concerned, the tendency of this development has been to contract the authority of the Executive over questions of general policy, while extending it in administrative affairs. The attempts, such as that of Stockmar early last century, to preach the "Prussian" principle of a royal prerogative over foreign policy have failed. Whenever our princes have taken direct part in foreign affairs it has been on the responsibility of their ministers and acting, so to say, as their own ambassador or assistant secretary; for a fundamental principle of our constitution is the paramount authority of Parliament in all matters executive and legislative. Nor can this residual executive power be claimed for the Cabinet as distinct from Parliament, for a corollary of this principle is that Ministers are responsible to Parliament for all executive

action, whether under the authority of the King, or of an act of Parliament. The Cabinet has no existence in constitutional law. It is, constitutionally, no more than a permanent committee of such members of Parliament as are Ministers. The recent Constitutional Status given to the Cabinet by special Act of Parliament is outside our purpose here except that it makes it all the more necessary to put the "residual executive" power on a proper basis now, before the executive power claimed by the Foreign Office is reinforced by a similar claim on the part of the new Cabinet Office. The real question is—supposing that the next Parliament, as it well may, passes an edict to the effect that no treaty shall have the force of law that has not been ratified by the existing Parliament, and that no new treaty shall be ratified by Parliament that has not been approved, before signature, by a Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs—would this be a development of, or a derogation from, the principles of the British Constitution?

The claim that the Foreign Office holds from the Crown a constitutional authority over foreign affairs seems to be an attempt to camouflage a recent bureaucratic reaction with the relics of divine right. But, of course, in the authority of the Crown there was originally no distinction between legislative and executive. And because so much of that authority as has definitely been developed by Parliament on constitutional lines has properly been divided into legislative and executive (the latter being the administrative part of that authority which Parliament considers that it cannot well exercise itself) it does not follow that all the "residual" authority not yet assumed by Parliament is also executive

in the sense that it must be unassailable by Parliament. There is nothing constitutionally to prevent Parliament regulating Foreign Affairs by a general statute, as it has the constitution of a Dominion, or by special statutes, as it does the functions of other departments. It is a clause in the written constitution of most countries that cessions of territory, such as that of Heligoland, be approved by Parliament. Even the diplomatic deals with Germany concerning reversions in the Portuguese colonies and the renunciation of the Bagdad-Basrah railway concession could be conveyed in a schedule such as is usual with other business bargains requiring confirmation by Parliament. In this latter case the Foreign Secretary derogated from his principle that all Foreign Affairs are of exclusively executive concern by insisting on publication of the treaty, so that Parliament might exercise its right of rejection ; and, to quote Sir Frederick Pollock, " no prudent Minister would venture on any new departure in foreign policy without being in one way or another assured of his ground." The only question, indeed, is whether the one way or another is the best : the way that restricts Parliament to rejection of a *fait accompli*, and to asserting its authority in the form of a vote of censure ; or the way that carries Parliament and public opinion with it, and strengthens its own policy and position by consultation and co-operation. One is no more constitutional than the other, but the former leads to fiascoes like the Prize Court Convention, and to follies like the " Secret Treaties." And when we come to the fundamental issues of peace and war the danger of concealing the principles of the national policy from Parliament is far greater than any danger

that could be created by a sensational Press and an emotional public out of a measure of publicity. Secret diplomacy not only increases the danger of war, but it increases the dangers of it.*

Until the present division and distrust between Parliament and the Foreign Office can be replaced by co-operation we cannot have either a bureaucracy or a sound foreign policy. Dicta that might encourage a bureaucracy to think that it was defending a constitutional prerogative of the Crown when it is really defending a customary privilege of the ruling class are dangerous, as aggravating that division and distrust. Democracy as we in Britain understand it is not a duel between Demos and Despotes, between the Lion and the Unicorn fighting for the Crown, but a co-ordination of national forces and governmental functions.

Another objection in principle often made by the same defenders of the Executive prerogative is that a Foreign Affairs Committee is undemocratic. It is

* I think Mr. Bernard Shaw goes nearer to the root of the matter than Sir Frederick Pollock : " Our autocratic foreign policy, in which the Secretary for Foreign Affairs is always a Junker, and makes war and concludes war without consulting the nation, or confiding in it, or even refraining from deceiving it as to his intentions, leads inevitably to a disastrous combination of war and unpreparedness for war. Wars are planned which require huge expeditionary armies trained and equipped for war. But as such preparation could not be concealed from the public, it is simply deferred until the war is actually declared and begun, at the most frightful risk of such an annihilation of our little peace army as we escaped by the skin of our teeth at Mons and Cambrai. The military experts tell us that it takes four months to make an infantry, and six to make a cavalry soldier. And our way of getting an army able to fight the German army is to declare war on Germany just as if we had such an army, and then trust to the appalling resultant peril and disaster to drive us into wholesale enlistment, voluntary or (better still from the Junker point of view) compulsory. It seems to me that a nation which tolerates such insensate methods and outrageous risks must shortly perish from sheer lunacy. And it is all pure superstition : the retaining of the methods of Edward the First in the reign of George the Fifth."

argued that it would usurp the responsibilities of the House as a whole. This is not much more than a debating point. It would be more justifiable to object to the institution of a Parliamentary Under-Secretary for fear lest he supplant the Secretary of State. For the Committee would enable the House, as a whole, to discharge constitutional functions which it cannot but neglect at present, while it would fill a subordinate but useful, "liaison" function. As French and Russian revolutionary precedents show, so far from Parliamentary committees being undemocratic, there can in certain circumstances be no effective parliamentary democracy without them.

There is, of course, the danger that the bureaucracy would be strong enough to use the Committee and its influence with the House of Commons merely as a defence against democratic pressure from other members, much as it uses the Parliamentary Secretary and his answer to questions. This would probably be the case were the House of Commons to remain what it was during the war. But in this case we shall be on the road to a revolution that will leave no room for mere reforms such as are here suggested. If, on the other hand, there is even a minority representation in Parliament of democratic points of view at home and of democratic policy abroad, that minority will find a place in the Committee. Every single independent and enlightened individuality in such an inside position would exercise an influence that might be of great public service. One such member could probably ensure that the principal purpose of the Committee was properly carried out, and that any important departure from traditional

principles of foreign policy should be brought before the House in secret session, if necessary, before signature of any confidential contract.

The actual constitution of the Committee must depend on the constitution of the House of Commons that sets it up, and will be decided in detail by House of Commons procedure. The one essential is that it should, like the French and American and other similar committees, roughly represent the parties in the House, and that it should not be nominated only by the Government Whips. It should have the power to call for documents and to examine officials, and would be kept informed as to Foreign Affairs as members of the pre-war Cabinet used to be. It would have a permanent secretariat, would record its discussions and decisions, and would maintain relations with the Committees of other Parliaments, both foreign and Colonial.

Of course, no one is proposing anything so absurd as that the actual negotiations between two Foreign Offices should be published as they proceeded. But in so far as they concern principles of policy, and few if any, will not do so, such principles should have been decided on in debate between representatives of the different parties and points of view in Parliament, and their decision should have been submitted to the country in the press. Such a procedure is indeed already followed in most modern democracies to a far larger extent than in our own.

Although this proposal for a Committee still meets with strong opposition from the older officials, yet if it were once adopted they would soon recognise the

advantage of being in touch with public opinion. The two organs for the expression of public opinion are Parliament and the Press, and it is not long since both were kept at arms' length by diplomacy. But during the war audiences were given to a sort of Committee of Correspondents, who were given confidential information for guidance and not for publication. Some explanation seems to be required why the Foreign Office considers it can safely, during a war, take into its confidence a posse of correspondents, but that it could not in peace keep informed a permanent Committee of Members of Parliament.

Another series of objections argues that the association of Parliament in foreign affairs in this, or indeed any other, form will weaken the authority of the Foreign Secretary. It is assumed that the process by which the authority of the Foreign Secretary has been made more and more autocratic of late years and less and less amenable to control by Parliament, has improved our authority among the nations. There is at present no position of greater personal responsibility in the world than that of a British Foreign Secretary. But so all-powerful is this position that it is exposed, though in less degree, to the same dangers that brought to ruin Tsarism and Kaiserdom. It may sound absurd to compare the position of a Grey or a Curzon with that of a Romanoff or a Hapsburg, but in the main essentials they are the same. Both have been born and bred up in a regal remoteness. Both work within an inner ring of junkers and tchinovniks and an outer ring of "interests." And both, owing to the control of all the international relationships of the world being centralised in the

Foreign Offices of the Great Powers, can with the best of wills bring the worst of wars on mankind.

President Wilson demanded as a condition of peace "the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its own choice, disturb the peace of the world; or at least its reduction to virtual impotence."* We all felt then that until Germany complied with this condition there could be no real peace. Germany complied by overthrowing its autocracy, by reducing the predominance of Prussia in the German polity, and by establishing the most democratic constitution in the world. In this Constitution were inserted, moreover, special precautions as to the conduct and control of Foreign Affairs. Art. 45 of the Constitution providing for the Ratification of treaties by Parliament has already been referred to. Art. 25, par. 1, is as follows:

> The Reichstag shall appoint a Permanent Committee for Foreign Affairs; such committee may also sit during the recess or after the election has come to an end, or after the dissolution, until the meeting of the new Reichstag. The sittings of such committee are not public unless the committee itself decides on publicity by a two-thirds majority.

And the democratic purpose of this committee is made even clearer by the ensuing paragraph, which provides a permanent committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Peoples' Representatives against the Government during recess. So much for Germany. But has "every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice, disturb the peace of the world been reduced to virtual impotence"? Certainly not, while the vast resources of the British Monarchy, now the only surviving military Empire,

* Speech at Mount Vernon, 4th July, 1918.

can be carried into war as we were in 1914, and into peace as we have been in 1919. Germany, disarmed and democratised, is far better qualified for membership of a League of Peace than we who refuse Germany admission to it.

A somewhat similar objection urged against Parliamentary control is that it will hamper the Foreign Secretary in doing business with foreign governments. On the strength of twenty years' experience in negotiation, I venture to assert confidently that such a "Mr. Jorkins" greatly strengthens the hands of a negotiator; and that its intervention benefits its own side and is on the whole to the general advantage. In negotiating the long series of treaties and conventions by which Lord Bryce "cleaned the slate" of controversies, some of them a century old, his professional advisers were at a great disadvantage in driving bargains owing to having no leverage like that which the Americans got from their Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. There was no great harm done in this case, for the Americans did not press their advantage over us unfairly, and we had others over them. But a previous attempt by Lord Herschel to settle these questions resulted in a diplomatic defeat over the Alaska boundary that severely strained our relations with Canada. And this defeat was primarily owing to tactical advantages given to the American negotiators by their Constitution.

Even as I wrote these lines an interesting example was being given of the assistance such a Parliamentary Committee gives to the Government. The fate of Armenia and the future of Constantinople was at that time under settlement in London by the processes of

"secret diplomacy." That is to say, general principles of foreign policy involving the fate of whole peoples and our own future peace or war were presumably being discussed, and were certainly being determined, in secret, by two or three persons representing the Governments in Paris and London. The decision having been come to, to re-establish the Turk at Constantinople, the French plenipotentiary, M. Millerand, went straight off to Paris and submitted the whole diplomatic "deal" to his Foreign Affairs Committee. The English plenipotentiaries, having no Committee, were forced to take the far more risky course of trying to conceal the decision from a dissentient public opinion until it could be faced with a *fait accompli*. The result in England was a violent agitation; in France a silent acceptance.

In spite of these experiences we are assured by official opinion that a permanent Parliamentary Committee of Foreign Affairs is a foreign device which has not worked especially well, either in Washington or Paris, the two examples most generally known. I cannot speak from personal experience as to the working of the institution in France; and certainly French diplomacy is no more "open" than ours. On the other hand there is reason for thinking that it might be even worse than it is, and that the occasional friction reported as existing between the Committee and the Quay d'Orsay has a useful function as a brake. An example of this that can safely be quoted is the check imposed before the war on some of the more questionable developments of French Government policy in the Near East.*

* The French Committee system seems to have made one convert in our own Premier, who, in a speech on the 19th December, 1916, said: "I have always thought that the methods of Parliamentary control,

As to the effect of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and of the Senate veto in international acts, I can speak with first-hand experience. It gives American foreign policy the "continuity" we hold so indispensable and at the same time keeps it in contact with public opinion. The fact that the American Foreign Secretary (Secretary of State) is not a member of the House does not affect the lesson drawn from the working of this institution in America. If the Secretary were in the House it would work more smoothly. No doubt it was annoying to the Roosevelt administration, when they considered they had made a profitable imperial deal in the treaty with Columbia, to have ratification refused on grounds of traditional principle; and no less annoying to the Taft administration, when the pacifist new departure in the arbitration treaty with us, was rejected on the same grounds. But the most ardent pacifists will to-day admit that in the decade before the war too great expectations were held as to the effectiveness of compulsory arbitration for preserving peace. Again, many of us have been greatly disappointed at the results of the opposition of the Senate to the ratification of the Peace Treaty. But, after all, in discussions of such immense importance,

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and I speak here as a fairly old Parliamentarian, rather tended to give undue prominence to trivialities—and, on the other hand, that it rather tended to minimise and ignore realities. Whether you can improve upon that I personally have never had any doubt, but I have always thought that the French system was the more effective one, the system whereby Ministers have to appear before Parliamentary Committees, where questions can be asked them, and where they can give an answer which they would not care to give in public. I think that in many respects that system has helped to save France from one or two very serious blunders."—Official Report, col. 1344, Vol. 88.

arrived at by dickering and diplomacy without previous sanction from general discussion or juridic principle, opportunity for reconsideration and revision is well worth occasional disappointment and delay. And in all cases when the American Legislature, in consequence of a change of party predominance in the Houses, or of public opinion outside them, has differed, the Legislature has in the long run been proved to have been right.

Moreover, if the Constitution of the United States had made parliamentary control more thorough these upsets at the last moment would have very rarely occurred. As it is, a prudent American Administration is careful to carry the Senate Committee with it in every stage of the negotiation. President Wilson's difficulties with his Senate are to be explained partly by his prolonged absence in Paris, and partly by the wide divergence between the policy of the treaty as concluded and that which he had proclaimed in his "Fourteen Points." Had he remained in Washington he would have carried his Committee with him step by step, and they on their side would have pulled him up when he was inclined to overstep, for diplomatic reasons, the real applications of his own policy. If the treaty for which he made himself responsible was accepted by our Parliament, but could not secure the support of the more democratic constitutional authority of the U.S., that need not necessarily imply that the American machinery for the control of foreign policy is less efficient. The explanation may be that a Treaty which was a repudiation of solemn obligations, a rupture with traditional foreign policy and a reversal of the accepted principles of foreign relations could be imposed on Parliament and

could not be imposed on Congress. The partisan opposition to the treaty in Congress was, as is usual in popular assemblies, the means by which general popular disapproval expressed itself. The same popular disapproval existed with us, but we had no means of expression owing to the absence of any effective party opposition.

It is very difficult to predict the exact effect here of the establishment of a Committee on Foreign Affairs, judging merely from foreign precedents. The relations between the Foreign Secretary and his Committee would depend very much on the personality of the former and the party in power. A strong Foreign Secretary would dominate his Committee, a weak one would tend to be dependent on it. If a Liberal or Labour Government were in power the Committee would tend to strengthen the Foreign Secretary in his democratic diplomacy, while in a period of reaction it would stabilise policy and put a stop to secret commitments of a serious character.

Then comes the technical objection that a Committee of the Parliament of Great Britain cannot adequately represent the democracies of the Dominions. Answering still more technically one might reply that the British Parliament is the Imperial Parliament. But it may be argued that the only existing imperial institution is the Crown, and that the authority of a Foreign Secretary as representing the Crown will find readier acceptance in the self-governing Dominions than the authority of a Parliament elected only by the United Kingdom. It has, moreover, been asserted that a Foreign Secretary from one of the great governing families of England—

the Cecils or the Greys—and almost all our recent Foreign Secretaries have been such, will more adequately represent the common racial and social tradition on which the Empire is based than any committee of representatives of the United Kingdom. Well—there is nothing prejudicial to the position of such a personality in the proposed Parliamentary control. Nor anything to prevent representatives of the self-governing Dominions from being either associated with the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, or from having similar committees of their own. But, on the other hand, supposing the peculiar imperial and non-partisan position acquired of late years by the Foreign Secretary comes to an end. We are apparently at the end of a political epoch. Up till now government by the party system has been a competition for power between two political parties representing the upper and middle classes respectively—a competition in which the original class conflict and economic rivalry have long become obsolete. The competition for power has consequently degenerated into "rotativism." But in the future we shall have a competition for power between these two classes combined on one side, and the lower class. In this struggle between the propertied class and the proletariat, the whole arena will be fought over; and it will no longer be possible to keep the department of Foreign Affairs as a reserved enclosure. Indeed, owing to the reactionary lines on to which our foreign policy has of late relapsed, foreign policy is likely to be the cause of bitter dissensions.* For if a ruling class sees its

* At the Trades Union Congress at Scarborough this summer, nearly all the debates and resolutions were occupied with Foreign Affairs.

political predominance threatened it will, as we have reason to know, go to the edge of rebellion and secession to protect its privileges. And if its property is threatened at the same time it will be prepared to go over that edge. We have seen the ruling class make a clever use of Ulster particularism and protestantism to defeat a party opponent that had broken the rules of the party game by altering the Constitution in its own favour. It has lately done its best to bring pressure from the Dominions for the forcing on Great Britain of a measure of Protection. If the "Interests," to use a convenient Americanism, have already been driven to exploiting openings in internal and imperial diplomacy, they will not fail to seize any opportunity that may offer in international diplomacy. They have in fact already done so in the political use they have made of the Russian revolution. Their propaganda against Bolshevism and their war against Russia are admittedly measures of precaution against any form of revolution at home. Moreover, as the class conflict develops in each particular country a community of interests will tend to draw classes together across the old national frontiers. This in itself will be wholesome enough provided it stops short of class war. But it will tend to break down the usual definition and delimitation of Foreign Affairs.

We shall find that while foreign affairs will be forcing themselves into the forefront of the political fight, matters which have hitherto been wholly and exclusively internal in character will be acquiring an important "foreign" connection. All social and much fiscal legislation will be subject to international regulation before many years. This will in itself involve

a close and constant co-operation between the Foreign Office and the Legislature. How is this co-operation to be assured and how are the conflicts above anticipated to be averted except by some intermediary such as a Permanent Committee?

It may seem absurd to claim that so domestic an institution as a Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs is required to carry our Empire over from its historical and present basis on the armed forces of the Crown, to its ethical and future basis as a Community of peaceful Commonwealths. The Crown as the symbol of the bonds of sympathy and sentiment that unite the Empire is an imperial institution of the first importance. But it should not be overloaded. As power passes to the lower classes, with their revolutionary and republican intelligenzia, the social influence of the monarchy will decline as its political power has declined. Unless an Imperial Parliament succeeds to the authority of the Imperial Prince, this authority, the present political basis of the Empire, will lapse. For the political successor of Parliament is the Council or Soviet, with an occupational franchise. But in the Council system imperial institutions can find no place. The Council system is inter-national and anti-imperial.

As a matter of fact the present basis of our Empire is not autocratic as we imply when we say it is united in the Crown. Nor is it democratic as we suggest when we talk of a Federation of Free Peoples, a Community of Commonwealths, and such phrases. Its basis is diplomatic. The Colonial Premiers come to a Colonial Conference as plenipotentiaries accredited by the Colonial Government to our Government. The

Dominions are Sovereign States. They have even been given representation on the League of Nations. Owing to our continued constitutional Conservatism they are actually less developed in their imperial relationship with us than they are in their international relationship with the rest of the world.

But the difficulty is that there is no popular demand for imperial federation as such. The Dominion democracies are indeed suspicious of any such suggestions for good historic reasons. Development can only proceed as hitherto through the adoption of new procedures, like the Colonial Conferences, in order to meet obvious practical requirements. Such a requirement is now obviously the providing a link between the Legislatures of the Empire and the League of Nations.

Let us see how this would develop out of a permanent Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs. A question would arise with a Foreign State in which the interests of a Dominion were involved. The Foreign Office, after consultation with the Dominion Government, would submit the outlines of a settlement to the Committee for confidential consideration. The Committee, considering that a principle was involved in the proposed settlement, that would eventually require ratification by the Dominion Legislature, would consult the Foreign Affairs Committee of that Legislature. For convenience of conference a deputation from the Dominion Committee would attend the sittings of the Imperial Committee, and this might in time develop into a permanent delegation to an imperial sub-committee charged with the concerns of that Dominion. An Imperial Legislature would thus develop very much

as an Imperial Executive is now developing out of our existing Imperial institutions. For the Imperial Conferences of Colonial Premiers are really Imperial Cabinet Councils. They are the first step towards developing a foreign relationship into a federal relationship.

The Committee would, moreover, have an international function no less important than its imperial function. The League of Nations is at present admittedly diplomatic in its basis and machinery. But if it is to do more good than harm, and if Geneva is to maintain its predominance over its rival, Moscow, it must, as most will admit, be put as quickly as possible on a democratic basis. This means that Parliaments must take the place now held by Foreign Offices as the national source and sanction of the League's international authority. The Assembly of the League must be made representative of the constituent Parliaments, and the Council must be eventually subordinated to it, much as a Cabinet is subordinated to a popular Chamber.

This will make requisite a means of intercommunication between the constituent Parliaments. The permanent Committees of these Parliaments would be the most suitable intermediaries for such intercommunication.*

This democratic inter-communication would be a very useful auxiliary to the formal diplomatic channel.

* I do not consider that the organisation known as the inter-Parliamentary Conference can so develop as to discharge this function. "Liaison" organisations have no strength as connecting links, and no power of development. This is because they have no real entity or separate existence. By uniting national delegations having vital functions, such as Parliamentary Committees on Foreign Affairs, you may produce as offspring an international institution. But meetings between deputations without real powers, however personally stimulating, are politically sterile.

Moreover if, as seems likely, Labour, or the "Left," in some form comes into power in the Parliaments of Europe, it will be desirable that it should have some international connection in its Parliamentary capacity, as well as in its proletarian capacity. We shall undoubtedly have before long a powerful international organisation of Workmen's Councils, elected on an occupational basis, and cutting across regional and racial frontiers. It may be that Parliamentary democracy has had its day, and that its failure of the last four years will force it to abdicate to Council democracy. But if, as more likely, the two political systems are destined to develop for some time side by side, it is for those who still believe in parliamentary democracy to equip it properly for its international functions. An organisation which should bring the parliaments of Europe into effective contact in the control of their foreign affairs would not only be a guarantee against the causes of war between countries, but some sort of safeguard against the causes of war between classes. Should the Bureaucrats and the Bolshevists of Europe conspire against each other the present League of Nations could not prevent a conflict. But a League of national delegations from constitutional Labour and Socialist Governments might do so.

Parliamentary government is just now going through a period of collapse abroad, and of coma at home, from which it may not recover. Its vitality had been greatly lowered even before the war throughout Europe in general, and in England in particular. Since the war progressives of the present day and their following, the proletariat, no longer look to Parliament for representation and reform of their grievances. They prefer to put forward their programmes through their own press and public meetings, and to enforce their demands by direct action such as strikes. Every strike is a vote of want of confidence in the House of Commons passed by the strikers. Unless the House of Commons can be revitalised it will follow the House of Lords and the Privy Council into the limbo of obscured ideals and the lumber-room of obsolete institutions. Then, after a struggle between revolutionary and reactionary extremists, its place will be taken by new democratic machinery —for example, provincial governments and industrial guilds, with new economic electorates. Yet, with such a revolution imminent, when those who believe in Parliamentary institutions propose such a mild reform as is here recommended in order to restore to some extent Parliamentary government in foreign affairs, they can get no response. When Mr. Lloyd George first came before the House as Premier, he promised to consider the proposal. But some weeks later Mr. Balfour announced that he would sooner resign office than work with such a Committee. For many years a group of members of all parties had been pressing for it—until this last election gave its present complection to the House of Commons. Now neither the ruling section nor the revolutionary opposition see any advantage in strengthening Parliament. But unless we can strengthen Parliament we shall get some other form of democratic representation, and unless we can restore Parliamentary Government, including parliamentary control of foreign affairs, we can make no useful contribution to the present League of Nations.

We British taught the world national self-government. Is the world to learn international self-government from the Bolshevists? For the alternative now lies between an international Constituent of parliamentary democracies in which we shall lead, and an international Council of proletarian democracies, from which we shall be left out.

Chapter III

DIPLOMACY AND PEACE

Je vis ensuite un grand nombre de ces officiers qui dans un long parterre mesuraient soigneusement les sauts de puces. Ils m'affirmaient que cet acte était plus que nécessaire au gouvernement des royaumes, à la conduite des guerres, à l'administration des républiques. D'autres tiraient de grandes choses du néant et les faisaient retourner de même au néant. D'autres coupaient le feu avec un couteau et puisaient de l'eau avec un filet. D'autres faisaient de nécessité vertu—l'ouvrage me semblait bien beau et bien à propos.—*Rabelais.*

It would take a Rabelais to write the story of the Paris Peace Conference—to express what we think of the diplomatists laboriously measuring the flea-like skippings of Mr. Lloyd George, of President Wilson making great things out of empty words, and making them back into empty words again; of M. Clemenceau cutting the flames of Russian and German revolutions with a knife, and M. Orlando trying to draw the Adriatic in a net. And though others made a virtue of necessity only Rabelaisian sarcasm could call the Treaties of Peace "bien beau et bien à propos."

These last years have indeed convinced many of us that the relationship between our diplomacy and our democracy is positively bad. Our diplomacy, when at its worst, as in the Secret Treaties, or in the Treaties of Peace, has indeed represented phases and factors of public opinion, but they have been the worst phases and the worst factors. It has not only represented, and reproduced in the peace settlement, the worst

phantasies of war-fever—of the hot head and cold feet of the man in the street—but it has perverted and prostituted the ideals and institutions born of the cool head and warm heart of the man in the trenches. The soldiers' and sailors' "War to end War," and "War against Prussianism," has become the diplomatists' and demagogues' "War to begin War"—a war against socialism. The Peace League has become an armed alliance, and the Parliament of Man a Diet of Diplomatists. Nor has our diplomacy benefited technically by its association with demagogy. In this sinister relationship between the worst features in diplomacy, and the worst features in democracy the one has debauched the other, and has been thereby demoralised itself. Our demagogic diplomacy of Paris would make a Machiavelli and a Mazzini groan—it would make a Metternich or a Lenin grin.

We have only to compare our recent diplomatic performance at Paris with the precepts of the earliest writers on diplomatic principles and procedure to see how bad our demagogic diplomacy has been from ignorance of both the theory and technique of its subject. Take such a treatise as that of M. de Callière, a French diplomatist and statesman, written for the enlightenment of the corrupt gang of courtiers and concessionaires round Louis XIV in the golden age of secret diplomacy, that culminated in the Treaty of Utrecht.

The maxims of this seventeenth century diplomatist, which breathe his own bitter experience in every line, might come from every democratic diplomatist of to-day. "To understand the permanent use of diplomacy

. . . we must think of the States of Europe . . . as members of one Republic." How far have we advanced towards such understanding? Our progress is recorded in the four hundred pages of the Treaty of Versailles. "A lawyer diplomat has sometimes made a great success of negotiation in countries where the final responsibility for public policy lay with public assemblies which could be moved by adroit speech; but in general the training of a lawyer breeds habits and dispositions of mind unfavourable to the practice of diplomacy." This is still true; and the proofs lie in a thousand pigeonholes in London and Washington. Why is this? Why are our international relationships still exposed to universal calamities on account of individual incapacities? Reasons and the remedies have already been suggested. But there is a more fundamental reason for our failure than can be remedied by any reform in the conduct of diplomacy or even in the control of foreign policy. We have not yet learnt the way to negotiate with the Sovereigns of to-day—the Peoples.

M. de Callière's advice as to negotiating with Sovereign Princes suggests the reason for our failure in negotiating with Sovereign Peoples. At the end of his most cynical chapter of advice as to approaching Sovereigns through their passions and pettinesses, he says that the negotiator, "unless he has before him an ideal as a guide, will find himself plunged in distracting affairs without any rule for his own conduct," and that "when events and men are unkind he must never despair of being able to change them."

Our rulers could not either in war-making or in peace-making guide themselves by ideals, because in so far as

they were conscious of them at all it was only the same instinctive and imaginative idea as that of any other private individual. They had not had the professional education and experience that would enable them to use the public forces at their disposal by expressing the ideal in political principle and by executing it in practical procedure. They did not make the mistake of Clemenceau, who forced everything into conformity with the narrowest nationalism, nor that of Wilson who could bring nothing into connection with his academic internationalism. But our diplomatists plunging into "distracting affairs" without any guiding principle or rule of conduct, with the best will in the world, have done us and the world as much harm in the war as in the peace, while our demagogues—for if we have no diplomatist *par excellence*, we have the greatest of modern demagogues—if *The Times* was unkind, or the Whips unfavourable, at once despaired.

We have only to read the treatises on diplomacy of the days when it was studied as a science or as an art, to see that the demagogic diplomacy of the twentieth century is nothing new. It is merely the diplomacy of the eighteenth century applied to a Sovereign People instead of to a Sovereign Prince. It has learnt to pander to passions infinitely more dangerous to the world and to civilisation than the vanity of a Louis XIV, or the vice of a Charles II. The Sovereign People of to-day is as easily seduced by a pretentious phrase-maker, or by a magnetic personality as ever any Sovereign Prince was by a Madame de Maintenon or by a Nell Gwynn. And otherwise respectable statesmen-diplomatists are as ready to-day as yesterday to exploit the weaknesses of

their Sovereign Rulers. A Foreign Secretary who entangles his Sovereign People in secret "ententes" with France, or who entices them into demoralising exploitations of Germany, is no more respectable than the Ministers who exploited the French mistresses of Charles II or the German mistresses of George II. The demagogic diplomacy of to-day, ringing the changes of secrecy and sensation, is only the development of the despotic diplomacy of yesterday ringing the changes on secrecy and sensuality. It has even borrowed its terms from the worst procedures of secret diplomacy. "Propaganda" it adopted from the Jesuits, and "Real-Politik" from the Junkers.

The true antithesis to secret diplomacy is not this demagogic diplomacy, but the point of view and the principles of what is generally called democratic diplomacy. I have hitherto pointed out the defects of diplomacy by contrasting it with the demands of democracy. But there is, of course, no real antithesis between diplomacy and democracy. Diplomacy is the practice of conducting foreign affairs, democracy a principle for controlling the conduct of foreign and other public affairs. There can be and is a democratic diplomacy which is not, as generally supposed, only the diplomacy favoured by democrats; but a diplomacy that deals with public facts and forces and national or international points of view, as distinct from the diplomacy which deals only with official personalities and Government policies. Of the principles of this democratic diplomacy both Cromwell and Lenin have been exponents, and it is not necessarily either pacifist or progressive. It will not always be progressive, because

it will sometimes express purely nationalist or imperialist forces and because national parliamentary democracy, though perhaps still the best political system extant for securing both peace and progress, is not infallible. It will not always be pacific; because the national or international force to which democracy gives an organised expression will explode in internal war if it be too much corked down by conservative and class opposition, and similarly it will explode into international wars if it ferments into ill-feeling against other countries. Therefore, even if diplomacy becomes the expression of democracy, it will not work for peace and progress without having suitable institutions. That is the real reason in favour of democratically controlling our diplomacy by some such body as a permanent Parliamentary Committee and of diplomatically controlling our democracy by some such body as a permanent Council of Nations.

The term "democratic diplomacy" is not of my choosing. One has to work with the words available, and it is a serious disadvantage to have to present a subject from a new point of view through the medium of two such underestimated and overworked words as "democracy" and "diplomacy." The word diplomacy was first popularised by Chesterfield, the word democracy by Bentham. The union of these two elderly terms seems as unprolific as would be that of a Georgian Buck with a Regency Blue-stocking. Diplomacy has long outlived its autocratic heyday in the eighteenth century, and its aristocratic "high life" in the nineteenth. It only imposes on the hobbledehoy-hood of popular government in the twentieth century with its "ancien

régim" and "vieux roué" airs and its attitudes of elegant inefficiency. Democracy has, on the other hand, become dowdy in its middle-class middle age.

Democracy as a political ideal or an inspiration of policy, whether domestic or foreign, is, we are often told nowadays, out of date. Words do not change as the ideas they represent develop; otherwise we should now have one word to represent the early rôle of the democrat when he was as Peter the Hermit preaching and leading a crusade, and another to convey his modern practical service as the parish priest busied with good works. We should have one word for our diplomacy of the Vienna, the Berlin and the Paris Treaties, another for that of the Durham and Montague reports as to our relations with Canada and India, and the Campbell Bannerman and Bryce settlements as to South Africa and North America. We should have one word for the democracy of Parliamentary Government, long past middle age, and another for the democracy of Council Government, not yet come to maturity.

And for want of such new terms we are entering a new world under a great handicap in dealing with its new conditions. It is one of the advantages of revolution that it provides new terms for new things. Self-determination is not Home Rule, nor is socialisation the same as Socialism. We have not had, and shall not have, a revolution, and so we have to treat of and deal with a revolutionised world in words that do not mean to others what they do to us.

The new world of foreign affairs is one in which the "Right" thinks in terms of "Sovereignties," the "Left" believes in "Soviets"; in which the Right fears

inter-nationalisation, the Left nationalism. And in which diplomacy will have to preserve peace not only against wars between countries, but against wars between classes.

In this new world we cling to our old confused compromises of a League of Nations with a diplomatic foundation and a democratic façade; of an internationalism that is based on nationalism; and of a pacificism that guarantees itself against war between countries by exciting wars between classes, and that guards itself against war between classes by exciting war between countries. In this new world now emerging from the deluge with new countries and new conditions, new forces and new forms of life, British "diplomacy" and British "democracy" survive as the only relics of a previous epoch, as dignified as the dodo and as obscurantist as the ostrich. Our compromises may be, I am myself inclined to think they are, the right road by which to carry the world over from its old conditions to the new. But we cannot get these compromises carried out except by a democratic diplomacy that knows what it has to deal with and what it has to do.

In most other countries the strain of war and the storm of revolution have razed to the ground, or at least unroofed, what Bright used to call the "Egyptian Temples" of the diplomatic mysteries. The clumsy chicaneries of the diplomatic oracles of Petrograd and Berlin have been exposed. The attempts of Lenin to force the Governments of Europe into "open diplomacy," and the attempt of Wilson to force them into a diplomacy of principle, both failed. But something has been

achieved. Public opinion has demanded an enlarged and an enlightened treatment of international relationships.

The international relationship with which diplomacy deals, like every other human relationship, covers a wide range. Regarded from the moral standpoint its two opposite poles may be labelled by borrowing the terms "tender-minded" and "tough-minded" from Pragmatism. The "tender-minded" school of diplomacy is intellectual, optimistic, internationalist, and believes in moral force, the "tough-minded" is traditional, cynical and imperialist, and believes in material facts. The tough consider the tender-minded as socialists and soft-heads, the tender-minded call the tough jingoes and junkers. Diplomacy must represent a compromise between the two. Indeed the definition given by Professor James of the purpose of his presentment of "Pragmatism" describes well enough the practical object with which these ideas on foreign policy have been put forward. "We must find," he writes, "a theory that will *work*; and that means something extremely difficult; for our theory must mediate between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified exactly."

Regarded from the political standpoint the two poles of diplomacy are represented by the democratic and aristocratic ideals. And up to the Spring of 1917 the aristocratic ideal, that had succumbed to the democratic in all other political relationships, still held its own in this foreign relationship—the remotest region from the source of the democratic movement. In fact

"aristocratic" diplomacy is still for most of us in England the only diplomacy and "foreign affairs" as much a reservation for the ruling class as pheasant shooting.

Yet, in spite of the theories of international jurists and diplomatists, there is, as a matter of fact, no clear dead line between "foreign relations" and other relationships. Consequently the democratic principle working its way up from below, so to say, has at last reached these remote, reserved seats of the mighty. Moreover, the process by which it is penetrating "foreign affairs" and the region of international authority is very similar to that by which it prevailed in municipal affairs and the region of national authority.

If we divide the history of diplomacy into three periods we find that each period has a different character and centre. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries diplomacy had its culture centre in France and concerned itself chiefly with the relations between autocratic personalities, and its only sanction was that of armed force. This primitive conception, to which we have recently returned, may be called "ancien régime" diplomacy. During the later nineteenth century diplomacy concerned itself mainly with relations between more or less representative committees, such as national Cabinets or financial combines, and its sanction was primarily the power of money. This form of diplomacy was developed in its highest degree in Germany, and may be described as "real-politik" diplomacy. The third period on which we are now entering is that in which the relationship is between the peoples themselves and obtains its sanction from the force of their aims and

ambitions. This has been called democratic diplomacy and found its first exponents in England—the England of the Midlothian Campaign and the Manchester School. But since we relapsed into reaction we have resigned the lead in this, the true diplomacy of to-day, to America and Russia.

Democratic diplomacy is the only true diplomacy of to-day because it is the only diplomacy that can exploit the moral forces of to-day. Diplomacy is getting your will willingly accepted by other wills. It is not jousting but jiu-jitsu. If you over-throw or over-bear your opponent by sabre-rattlings and mailed-fist-raisings it is not diplomacy, or at best "ancien régime" diplomacy; because in getting from him what you willed you give him the will to get it back again. If, again, you get it by palm-oilings and profit-sharings, it is "real-politik" diplomacy and a poor investment, because you cannot perpetuate property rights in international relationships even by the most profitable partnerships between the few or the most prodigal propaganda among the many. You can best succeed nowadays as a democratic diplomatist; that is, by making most of the other side want what you want, and by making the best of what they want. And if this has a sermonising sound about it, let me add that there is nothing necessarily puritanical about this form of diplomacy, and that its honesty is of the "best policy" order. But, whereas the ancient régimist can only appeal to primitive instincts of self-preservation—so to say to the extreme "Right" of the human mind; and the *real-politiker* relies on the middle "Block" of the mind—the mass and materialism of the man in the street; the democratic diplomatist

looks rather to the "Left"—the driving power of ideals and the directing power of intellectuals. The last has therefore this great advantage, that, whereas the two former have to work with the qualities of mind that make for antagonism between communities, the democrat works with those that mostly make for association. Because obviously the man of privilege or of property wants to keep it to himself; equally obviously the man of principles wants most to give them to others. The democratic diplomatist, working through principles has consequently always a foot in the other camp, and a friend at court. He needs no coercive authority, not even credentials; his only requisite is that he be recognised by the mass-mind to which he is accredited as representative of the element most sympathetic to it in the mass-mind of which he is an ambassador.

Diplomacy is not bribery. Nor is it bullying. It is not even bamboozling. It is simply business, and democratic diplomacy is nothing more than up-to-date business methods applied to politics.

It is partly giving the public what they want, and partly making them want what you give them. And to do this successfully you must supply sound goods suitable to the public needs and make the public see they are both sound and suitable. The first is a matter of insight and honesty; the second of personality and publicity. A sound diplomacy can be got by honesty, a suitable diplomacy can be got by insight, while a diplomacy that is both sound and suitable can be given the full support of all national and international forces by a conscientious and courageous proclamation of its aims and advantages.

This advertising the aims and advantages of the diplomacy you are producing in order to create a demand for it does not entail propaganda. The openness of democratic diplomacy is its own advertisement. The Press will of its own initiative, and in its own interest, give all the publicity wanted for any diplomatic enterprise. It will be quite unnecessary to develop further, the sinister relations that secret diplomacy established or tried to establish with the London dailies during the war.

The immense power over the public exhibited by the great dailies during the war, which has more than once overthrown the Government's foreign policy, has not escaped the observation of the Foreign Office. Attempts have been made, and will be made again, to establish such direct relations between the Foreign Office and pressmen as have existed in other Capitals where the system of secret diplomacy was more highly developed than in pre-war London.

Personally, both as a diplomatist and as a journalist, I look on all these rapprochements with suspicion. Although it is useful both to the diplomatist and to the journalist to have such confidential relations as will enable the clerk to give the correspondent information for his guidance only, yet I know as a journalist that such relations are more often an embarrassment than an advantage. It is very rare that even a secret diplomatist knows more of such matters as are of general interest to the public than an energetic, experienced journalist; and I always, as a journalist, refused to be told details in confidence which might prevent my using later information of interest and importance from another

source. A journalist is far more useful as a rule to a diplomatist than *vice versa*. But the danger for the diplomatist in too much of such association lies in his taking all the data from which to form his views of popular movements, and even the views themselves, at second-hand in this convenient form. And a journalist is after all only a servant of the public—not a Public Servant. The danger for the public in a closer association between Whitehall and Fleet Street lies in its enabling that master of the public, Big Business, to make the whole nation speak with its master's voice, both in a leading article and in a *note verbale*.

Therefore, establishment and development of the sort of confidential Press Committee that attended the Foreign Office during the war—or even the weekly reception by a high official of press representatives much as foreign envoys are received, does not seem to me a matter for progressives to press for. All the more that in a time of great reaction into secret diplomacy this association with the Press was accepted by a bureaucracy that stoutly resisted any similar association with Parliament by a confidential Committee.

The Press is obviously the most direct connecting link between diplomacy and the public, just as Parliament is a less direct link, and the official personnel itself a still less direct connection. But the relationship between diplomacy and democracy cannot be developed through the Press in any direct way. There is, however, an indirect way.

The Press should not be influenced or inspired in its task of instructing the public in foreign affairs, but it can be educated. There is now a school of journalism

in the University of London. There should be, and no doubt soon will be, a school of diplomacy. An adequate study of political science in the school of diplomacy should be made a qualification for the certificate in journalism. Further, the utility to a diplomatic career of experience as a foreign correspondent should be recognised by arrangements permitting officials to be seconded for this purpose, and conversely admitting journalists to official appointments.*

A journalist, and I speak from experience of both professions, has opportunities that an official diplomatist has not, for work, not only in the formation of public opinion, but of a constitutionally constructive character abroad, and such work represents some of the most difficult and delicate forms of democratic diplomacy.

The failure of our diplomacy to direct or even to control public opinion both in war-making and peace-making is the best evidence that it was undemocratic, that is to say unrepresentative, that is to say un-English. The diplomacy of the secret ententes and secret treaties that conditioned our war-making was "ancien régime" diplomacy, French in origin and *vieux jeu*. The diplomacy of the Coalition, the diplomacy of cynical militarism and cynical nationalism that conditioned our peace-making was real-politik diplomacy—German in origin and junkerisch. The general result has been that

* In both these developments we should only be following precedents given by France which have worked well in practice. It is only necessary to mention the Ecole des Sciences Politiques, and the career of M. Tardieu, to show what can be done on these lines. Nor are examples wanting of successful diplomacy by British journalists, though such have never received, for obvious reasons, any adequate recognition. The work of Mr. Bourchier, *Times* Correspondent at Athens and Sofia, as intermediary in the negotiations of the Balkan Alliance against Turkey in 1912, is a historic example of democratic diplomacy.

we had to win the war in spite of our ancien régime diplomacy, that by 1916 had politically lost it for us; and that we shall have to make peace in spite of our real-politik diplomacy that by 1920 has made peace remoter than ever.

This failure of our diplomacy has been pretty fatal to the peace of the world. And it was caused by our diplomacy not realising that the first essential of an international settlement must be the establishment of an equipoise—a balance of power; for without that there can be no will to settle on both sides, and no working out of the line of least resistance. An official opposition is as necessary to good international legislation as it is to good internal legislation. Yet no effort was made by any British diplomatist to support the demands for representation of the Central Powers, or of British Liberalism and Labour. By representation I don't mean a subpoena to Herr Brockdorff-Rantzau to sign a prenegotiated treaty, or a seat at formal functions for Mr. Barnes. Our diplomatists of a century ago didn't fear to face Talleyrand; ours of to-day might have ventured to face Erzberger.

The idea that the essential principle of a League of Nations is opposed to that of a Balance of Power is incorrect. The policy of the members of a Peace League would be different in point of view from those of members of militarist alliances in equilibruim—but that is a different matter. Vattel and Mr. Balfour both agree with this.* But neither has explained to us that the

* "Europe constitutes a political system . . . a sort of Republic, of which the members, independent, yet bound together by ties of common interest, combine to preserve order and freedom. It is this that has given birth to that celebrated idea of political equilibrium or balance of power."—*Vattel*, Lib. I., Cap. 83.

"The peace we desire will be such a modification of political forces in Europe that there will not be a balance of power in precisely the old eighteenth century sense of the word." — Mr. Balfour, House of Commons, 30th July, 1917.

reason why the Peace League that we demanded as part of the peace is different from the Balance of Power that ended in war, is that a proper Peace League should enable the balance of power to express itself in terms other than dreadnoughts and divisions. A balance of power expressing itself in terms of the awards of arbitral courts or the resolutions of international committees is no doubt ultimately based on the right to resist by arms—so, in the latter end is the balance of power in a national constitution. But obviously the merit of a Peace League or of a League of Nations or of a Holy Alliance, or any other super-sovereign body is in the measure in which it can give pacific expression to the balance of power. A balance that can only be preserved by a State "throwing its sword into the lighter scale" as we did before the war is a provocation to, not a protection against war. The Paris Conference failed to make peace because it couldn't restore the old balance of power between armaments, and it couldn't replace it by a balance of power in any other terms.

Yet it would not have been difficult to arrange a working balance of power between delégations, really nationally representative, meeting in a neutral atmosphere. The first thing would have been to associate with the Diplomatic Conference representing national and imperial interests, a democratic convention of delegations representing parliamentary parties. The next would

have been to secure that the Committees through which the Convention would work with the Conference should be of such general complexion as to counteract the bias of the Conference. These two Bodies should then have made peace on broad lines, leaving all disputed details to be settled by a League of Nations established on a doubly representative basis. The liquidation of war liabilities and the laying down the lines of the international institutions of Europe could only be done by the League after war fever had been eliminated. The dilemma between a national sovereignty claiming equal representation for States however small, and international Sovereignty that can only work on a basis of proportional representation, could then have been solved as in other federations by a two-chamber system. The present Supreme Council would have been enlarged and elaborated into a sort of diplomatic diet of representatives of sovereign States, which like the German Bundesrat or American Senate would slowly surrender sovereignty to the more popular body representing the larger sovereignty. By these stages a statesmanlike diplomacy would have not only restored our mental and political balance overthrown by war, but would have started us well on the road to a stable Super-State. In other words, British diplomacy should have seen that its real contribution lay in working out and worrying through a constructive programme of peace procedure, and not in sitting down to play at jigsaw puzzles with the map of Europe or at cat's cradle with the League of Nations.

The failure of our diplomacy to give us real peace after two years of talking and fighting is due to elementary blunders in diplomatic strategy and tactics. The

battle between the forces of peace and of war was lost before it was gained, because our diplomacy failed to recruit properly its peace forces, failed to bring them into line, and failed to choose favourable ground for them to fight in. The first mistake was the war election, which by changing the composition of the House of Commons on a war appeal and in an apoplexy of war passion purged it of all representation of pacificism and reduced Liberalism and Labour to a mere rump. This diplomatic attempt to strengthen the Government at home weakened it seriously in its work abroad; for it was thenceforward at the mercy of imperialist profiteers and pressmen. The second mistake was the choice of Paris for the Conferences, which by accentuating the diplomatic atmosphere and our French Commitments minimised the influence of the Americans, that was our best instrument for peace; and which gave full force to the French war feelings that were our greatest difficulty. And the third was the exclusion from the Conference of all democratic procedures and publicity, which though possibly accepted by us with a view to excluding pressure from a Jingo and Junker press, nevertheless worked the other way.* For the "interests" and influences of the few can always bribe or bully their way up the back stairs, but the ideals and instincts of the many will only come in if the front door is set open and invitations sent out.

Our diplomacy therefore allowed itself to lose the three conditions precedent to negotiation of which no

* The venality of the French Press made Paris especially unsuitable as a milieu. The sums expended by various interests at different crises are known. I will mention £13,000 invested by the Greeks for the securing of Thrace.

diplomat can afford to lose more than one—namely mandate, milieu and method. It was in the position of a plenipotentiary applying the policy of a party out of power in unsympathetic surroundings by a procedure which gave his opponents every advantage.

Finally, there remains the question as to how we can take precautions against future generations again suffering as we suffered at Paris, from a diplomacy ignorant of the first principles of its professions.

Diplomacy in the largest sense of the word is the art of peace-making and the science of peaceful relations. We have military schools of every sort for the study of the art of war-making and of the science of war in foreign relations. We gladly pay large sums for such education of military experts, as an insurance against defeat in war and an investment in victory. Even our Universities have schools of military science and history. But we have made no educational provision whatever for the study of the art and science of peace. We have established no educational insurance against war itself.

Diplomacy, in so far as it is an art and not a science, can come by intuition or inspiration, and without special instruction. In so far as it is a science it can be acquired by practice and private study. But the temperament of an average Englishman of the upper class, and the training at a public school and a foreign pension that makes up the education of an average diplomatic candidate, are not such as to produce diplomatic talents. An English diplomatist of to-day will only think of foreign relations in terms of dreadnoughts and divisions, and an English Consul will only think of them in terms of tariffs and trade statistics, because thay have only been

taught to see such tangible and superficial facts as these. British prestige may decline with a foreign mass mind, because our Government is opposing some essential moral element of foreign public opinion. British products may dwindle in a foreign market because our merchants are offending against some essential mercantile element in the foreign popular demand, but our officials will be unable to recognise and report this. We require four years' study in a special school before we allow a doctor to diagnose a disease, for fear one man may decline or die unnecessarily. But apparently we consider anyone should be able to practise unprepared on the diseases and developments of peoples ; though failure may mean not the death of one man but of millions. No lawyer would be employed to draw a business contract between two shopkeepers unless he had had an adequate training. But we airily allow anyone to draft a Convention—a contract between Sovereign States that can never be put straight by any Court, however great may be the wrong in it, and that may have to be put in force by war, however little may be the right in it. We cannot properly provide for the control and conduct of our foreign relations until we recognise that they must be a subject of special study.

We are beginning to recognise that an empirical practice of diplomacy and a pursuit of solutions in foreign affairs by trial and error have not been altogether satisfactory. Experimenting with military Empires has come very expensive, and some errors of our dilettante diplomatists have been both illimitable and irremediable.

As a result of the diplomatic disaster of 1870, France founded a School of Diplomacy and of Foreign Affairs

(École Libre des Sciences Politiques). As a result of the diplomatic defeats of Germany in this war a scheme for an Auslands Hoch-Schule has been revived, and is being realised in Berlin. As a result of our diplomatic discomfitures in the early part of the war, a movement was started by Liberal Parliamentarians for a School of Foreign Affairs in London. The proposal may be considered as having already reached the stage of discussions as to what form the institution should take. The alternative lies between an independent institution like the French School, and the establishment of a School, or perhaps preferably a Chair, in the University of London.

Those in favour of an independent institution seem to be influenced by the fear that association with the University might hamper its activities. My short experience as a professor in the University does not lead me to share this apprehension. On the contrary, I am inclined to think that inclusion in the University would enable the institution to extend its energies by making easier its co-ordination and co-operation with schools of study on related subjects. The French School covers a larger field than could be assigned exclusively to any London School of Foreign Affairs, for the simple reason that two important regions included under the French School are already provided for in London by the London School of Economics and by the new School of Historical Research. This would mean that an independent School of Foreign Affairs would have to restrict itself to diplomacy proper and to a strictly technical section of its subject, and might have difficulty in developing what would otherwise be the more important and general

side of its work. The University of London is an organisation that allows its constituent colleges and schools a very sufficient autonomy while affording them the advantage of a close confederation with one another. On the other hand I do not think it would give the Chair sufficient status for the work it will have to do if it were merely made a department of one of the semi-independent schools, such as the London School of Economics or the School of Historical Research. Herewith is a sketch for a new Chair and Seminar, showing its relations with existing institutions, and a syllabus which will suggest with what an important and interesting region of research it has to deal.

CHAIR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Sections	Subjects
1. Professional Section	1. Drafting and Documents. 2. Protocol and Procedure. 3. Organisation of Foreign Services. 4. Office Regulation.
2. Political Section	1. Philosophy and Psychology of Foreign Relations. 2. Principles of Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. 3. Forces and Factors of Nationality. 4. International Institutions.
3. Historical Section .. .. (in association with the new School of Historical Research and the new Schools of Regional Studies).	1. History of Foreign Policy. History of Nationalism. History of Internationalism. History of Imperialism.
4. Legal Section .. .. (in association with the University Law Faculty and International Law Societies).	1. Public International Law. 2. Private International Law. 3. Maritime and Mercantile Law. 4. Foreign Constitutional Law.

SECTIONS	SUBJECTS
5. Commercial Section .. (in association with the London School of Economics and the Board of Trade).	1. Consular Duties. 2. Commercial Relations. 3. Customs Regulations and Company Law. 4. Principles of Economics in Foreign Relations.

The real public value of the Chair will lie, in my opinion, not so much in the extent to which it can deal with the technical diplomatic side, as in the extent to which it can develop the general side, what may be called the philosophy and psychology of diplomacy. While those who intend to occupy themselves professionally with Foreign Affairs would take a diploma in "diplomatics,"* a far larger number would, I should hope, interest themselves in the study of Foreign Affairs generally. A course of study on this general side would be such as might well qualify it to be made an alternative subject for University Pass and Honours degrees. While candidates for diplomatic appointments would, no doubt, be sent as soon as the School was started to be instructed in the technique of their profession, just as young consuls are already sent to attend lectures at the London School of Economics. It might be that before long Pass Degrees in Foreign Affairs would be required of all candidates for examination. And, if the Chair proved its value, we should no doubt in time solve the very difficult problem of finding suitable men for the Foreign Service by giving appointments to men who had graduated with honours in this and other subjects in

* The present study of "diplomatic" in the University has, of course, nothing to do with diplomacy.

the different Universities of the country.* This may seem a revolutionary suggestion, but it was already done before the war in more than one foreign country. And the principle of basing appointments on University attainments has been to some extent recognised already in this country. The University authorities are consulted concerning candidates for various departments of the Civil Service. In the case of some foreign services also, candidates are required to go through a special course at the University and to obtain satisfactory reports of general conduct, character, and capacity. This system has, I believe, worked well; and it might be a better method of selection for posts of such primary importance as those of diplomacy than an open, competitive examination. It would, at any rate, secure that the men sent to represent us abroad were so equipped that they could make use of the opportunities opened to them by their official position. We should no longer have intelligent, young men of education wasting their time and our money because they were intellectually incapable of occupying themselves more usefully in a foreign capital. Moreover, those students who had taken a course in Foreign Affairs and a degree in that

* This linking up of the Foreign Services with a special University training will, as already suggested, be aided greatly by the recent development in the University of London of Schools of Regional Studies, which propose, while giving a general education of a proper academic standard in association with the other Schools and Faculties of the University, to give a special education in the language, literature, history and economics of a particular region. By connecting up these regional schools with the regional sections into which a re-organised Foreign Service should be divided, a continuity between official careers and educational curriculum could be secured. These regional sections of the Foreign Service would only be an extension of the diplomatic area of the special Levant and China services that have worked well in the semi-political, semi-commercial region of foreign relations.

and in a School of Regional Studies as their University career, would, if they were undeserving or undesirous of an official appointment, be nevertheless in possession of a useful preparation for public life or for other professions. It is hoped that the great newspaper proprietors would encourage their foreign correspondents to take advantage of the training and instruction in foreign questions that would be offered by the School. There are already classes in journalism in the University of London, through which a diploma can be obtained. The establishment of our Universities generally, and especially in the University of London, of Chairs and Seminars for the systematic study of the principles of foreign policy and of the procedure of diplomacy for the special benefit of future diplomatists and journalists is, I believe, the best means for beginning that education of the general public in Foreign Affairs that all shades of opinion desire.

With a Chair of Foreign Affairs started in the University of London, other developments would follow and find their proper sphere in association with it. One such development which is already in progress is that of Chairs of what may be called "National Studies"—Chairs whose holders are concerned with study of the general national culture and character of any foreign country, rather than in the peculiar contributions of that country to any general academic subject. And such study has suddenly become of urgent national and international importance.

We have decided to establish our new international system on a national basis. It is to be a diplomatic "League of Nations," and to rely only very remotely

on the real non-national forces of internationalism. It is such a compromise as is dear to the English mind, but whether it works outside England will depend on the degree to which we study the character and culture of the constituent nations, especially of those new and crude nationalities that have now become factors in Foreign Affairs.

The war has given us an opportunity, such as few nations have enjoyed, of instructing and influencing the other countries constituting European civilisation. For it has not only given us almost undisputed political authority in Europe, thanks to military and economic predominance, but it has resolved the military and economic Empires, that previously would have resisted our hegemony, into adolescent nations who look to us for guidance. That guidance cannot be given in all respects through the official and governmental channels. We have been placed by the war almost in an Imperial relation to the nations arising from the dissolution of the German, Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman Empires. Unless in this new relation we can convince these young and sensitive nations that we have a real sympathy for, and are making a real study of, their national character and culture, our authorities will be handicapped in the very difficult diplomacy that lies before them.

The proper *milieu* for such study is the University of London. The Governments of some foreign nations have seen this, and their desire to have Chairs of national study founded in the University, though it encounters academic difficulties, is politically sound both in the national and in the international interest. The objection that this work belongs properly to a future development

of the diplomatic Missions, or of the League of Nations, is best answered by the fact that the University has already undertaken it in certain cases in practice though not as yet in principle. Indeed, precedents have been set from which it will now be more difficult for the University to recede on principle than to recognise the principle. No University would refuse to establish a Chair in Sociology, for which there was a real demand, for fear of being involved in controversies between Capital and Labour. Nor would it discourage study of Political Socialism for fear a professor might talk party politics. In the case of Chairs of National Studies there would be an automatic check upon propaganda likely to embarrass the University; for the interest of a foreign Government in a Chair would probably be sufficient to cause the resignation of any holder who had been rash enough to identify himself too conspicuously with a party that had lost power, or a faction fallen out of popular favour. It is probable that Chairs of National Studies will before many years be functioning in the University of London for most of the Lesser Nations of Europe and the foundation of a Chair of Foreign Affairs will give these Chairs a controlling centre. The University will then have no difficulty in co-ordinating the work of this new Faculty with the work of the Faculties of Arts and of Law, and with that of the existing semi-independent Schools.

The Chair of Foreign Affairs, in combination with the Schools of Regional Studies and the Chairs of National Studies, would create a new and complete international organism in the intellectual relationship. The " universality " of the Universities that made them

so valuable for maintaining the international solidarity of mediæval civilisation has been lost in modern times owing to the Universities becoming centres of national culture. A start can now be made towards restoring to the Universities some of their ancient international influence and importance by making them centres for the study of the national character and culture of other countries. The international function of this new Chair of Foreign Affairs and of the Chairs of Regional and of National Studies, can be popularly illustrated by comparing it with that of a Foreign Office (the Chair of Foreign Affairs), its diplomatic representatives (the Chairs of Regional Studies), and the foreign diplomatic representatives (the Chairs of National Studies). It would indeed be a more living link, a more " definite connection " between the sources of national feeling and the centres of national force than any official representation, however reformed, can ever become.

Thus an institution that we should have established for the more efficient expression of our national interests would end by becoming an institution also for the effective realisation of international ideals.

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