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
MAIN CURRENTS IN WORLD HISTORY

BY

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THE OVERSEAS DOMINIONS'



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
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1922

I had

TO MY SON
JOHN CECIL
BORN 14TH DEC. 1919
I DEDICATE THIS BOOK



INTRODUCTION

THE author who ventures to write a World History, even within strictly defined limits, owes an explanation to his readers ; the main point of my effort is to give a general introductory outline in one volume of moderate size. So far from wishing to confine my readers to one volume, I make it abundantly clear that my hope is to inspire wider reading ; and at the end of each chapter I append a bibliography. The ideal historian should be conversant with every written language. Since my own knowledge is restricted to English, French, Latin, and Greek, I refer my readers to works in those tongues or to works of which translations are easily obtainable ; I mention no book which I have not either read throughout myself or at least used either for reference or with my pupils.

I have taken as my connecting link the development and expansion of modern Western civilisation, which I trace from four sources : (1) Oriental religions, culminating in Christianity ; (2) Classical politics, law, and art ; (3) Anglo-Saxon Representative Institutions ; (4) modern inventions. Accordingly I do not profess to write a detailed history of the Ancient or Mediaeval world. My interest, in this book, in prehistoric man is limited to considerations concerning the antiquity of Man and the emergence of Man from Beast and of Barbarism (used in the sense defined in my first chapter) from Savagery ; it is wholesome to realise that the whole ' historical ' period is but a fragment of Man's story, although even the most obscure historian may be excused for hoping that, however

many chapters still remain, the records of our 'historical' period will not be lost. Again, I content myself with a summary of 'Ancient' and 'Mediaeval' History, attempting to emphasise just those elements which are still affecting our lives and human society to-day. In the more modern chapters I have allowed myself more scope. In fact, this is an outline of Modern History with summaries of those past ages to which it owes its origins.

The great output of historical works since the war is partly due to the recognition of the probability that we have now entered upon an age of Experiment, of the results of which it will be impossible to dogmatise for several generations. We are therefore tempted to explain to each other and to succeeding generations what manner of men we are and why we have become so.

I have kept in mind two main classes of possible readers. On the one hand, I hope that this book may be of some academic value to students, both at School and the Universities, who are beginning to specialise in History. With my own pupils I always insist upon a general outline knowledge as preliminary to the choice of special periods and subjects. The limitations of the time-table—often ignored by lay critics of our Schools—make it difficult to teach World History to ordinary forms, but many masters have suggested that a book of this description would enable them to widen their lectures and notes on the regular history lessons, and that many pupils might be expected to read it 'out of school.'

In the second place, I have met very many members of the general public who have told me that their interest in travelling, reading, etc., would be enormously increased if they had some general outline of history in their heads and possessed, in one volume, information which would enable them to see, let us say, what was happening in

Rome when the Greeks fought the Persians or in Europe at the time of the birth of Mohammed.

History may include all human interests. Possibly a history of Scientific inventions should have equal prominence with that of modern Democracy or the expansion of the White Race, particularly since all three are closely connected. But space—and the author's limitations—must be considered, and I have tried to deal with every aspect, economics, literature, thought, inventions, etc., simply as each one influenced my main theme: the development of modern states, their relations with each other, and their internal organisation.

I feel very strongly that a professional teacher of History is bound, in his books as in his lectures, to curb the propagandist zeal which may be excused, or even welcomed, in the works of politicians or novelists. Because I make the history of the White Race the central point of my book, it must not be taken for granted that I assume, as so many do, that the expansion and prosperity of the White Race are synonymous with Progress and Good. Indeed I make it fairly clear, in my accounts of China and Peru, that in those two cases I am inclined to think that the coming of the White Man was on the whole a misfortune. Nevertheless I must confess to holding what opponents call 'Imperialist' views, and I offer no apology for the space I allot to 'Overseas' History. I believe that the union of free states under the British Crown is the most original contribution of the modern world to Political Science; and that, at any rate in the case of backward peoples, British rule over alien races, whether appreciated or not, is at least more beneficent than any alternative that offers.

Again I cannot avoid expressing the honest opinion that Cosmopolitanism, as opposed to Internationalism,

is a delusion. The truth of the lesson implied in the Biblical legend of Babel has been confirmed by the failures of Roman Empire, Holy Roman Empire, Roman Catholic Church, Bonapartism, Kaiserdom, and 'Internationale.' The alternative to nationality seems to be anarchic selfishness and chronic class-warfare. On the other hand, I agree with Dean Inge that Patriotism may go mad and thus good become bad. If we praise the volunteers who came forward in 1914 to preserve not Democracy but England, we must recognise that the same spirit, beclouded with madness, drove the German people into their aggression. If nationality is a fact, and therefore cannot be calmly ignored, its effects must be modified by international reasoning. I have endeavoured at times, in order to stimulate thought, to be provocative without being partisan: as, for example, when I suggest that the five great figures of the latter half of the nineteenth century were the nation-makers, Bismarck, Cavour, Lincoln, the Mikado Mutsuhito, and Cecil Rhodes.

I have suggested the problem, rather than attempted a direct answer, of the influence of Personality in History: does the Great Man influence events or is he mere flotsam on the tide of Evolution? or again does he bring to a head the evolutionary tendencies of one age and thus pave the way to another? Nor have I definitely attached myself, on the question of the reality of progress, to either of the protagonists of the opposed schools of thought of to-day—Mr. Marvin and Dean Inge—although I cordially recommend the books of both.

Finally I should like to make acknowledgment of the sources whence I received encouragement or help. The books which I have mainly used will be found in the lists at the end of each chapter.

At a meeting convened by Mr. Marten at Eton in Sep-

tember 1917 History masters and College tutors discussed the often-debated problem of widening the teaching of History; of showing pupils that nations and periods cannot be separated in water-tight compartments, and that foreign nations do not exist merely to exemplify England's wickedness or England's valour, according to the bias of the writer.

This idea was pursued at a meeting of Educational Associations, where we were told not to be afraid of using the phrase 'World History.'

Mr. Wells, who provokes thought even if one denies his facts and recognises his original ideas as the discarded heresies of long ago, emphasised the same point in that anachronistic caricature of Schools, *Joan and Peter* and in certain articles in *John o' London's Weekly*. I probably started this book before he set to work to solve the problem, but the circumstances in which it has been written have made it a matter of years.

The Rev. A. E. Hillard, D.D., High Master of St. Paul's School, has both encouraged me, as so many others of his staff, to write, and has helped me with suggestions and corrections. Mr. S. Rivington was largely responsible for my starting upon this task.

My history pupils of the last three years have given me valuable help both as raw material on which I have tried the 'teaching' qualities of the book, and by research work, mostly done by boys who have gained their University awards. I must single out the following as having been particularly helpful:—

- B. BLECK, Exhibitioner of King's College, Cambridge, who is mainly responsible for the Date Chart;
- D. K. H. ROBERTS, Scholar of Magdalene College, Cambridge, who has prepared the Date Chart of Literature;
- H. H. WHITE, Scholar of C.C.C., Cambridge;

- E. H. HANSON, Exhibitioner of New College, Oxford ;
 E. E. ABRAHAM, Duke of Devonshire Prizeman and History
 Scholar, St. John's College, Oxford ;
 J. C. GELARDI, Exhibitioner of Sidney Sussex College, Cam-
 bridge ;
 A. D. GAYER, Scholar of Lincoln College, Oxford ;
 C. M. WEEKLEY, Scholar of St. John's College, Oxford ;
 J. A. GIUSEPPI, Scholar of Lincoln College, Oxford ;
 J. BUSSE, Exhibitioner of C.C.C., Cambridge ;
 J. M. COHEN, Exhibitioner of Queen's College, Cambridge ;
 R. F. CHAMPNESS, Exhibitioner of St. Catherine's College,
 Cambridge ;
 R. H. BROWN and B. G. ATKINSON, Exhibitors of Downing
 College, Cambridge ;—all of them pupils at some period
 during the years 1919-1922.

Also

A. H. CROXTON, who gave me his wartime diary ; and
 MY WIFE, who, as in all my books, has helped with proofs
 and index.

To these and all other helpers I offer my hearty thanks.

L. C. S.

I have not included maps in this book because a general
 History would require a map on almost every page ; further-
 more, it is easier to read with an atlas open before one than to
 look forwards and backwards in one's text-book.

Among the many good atlases available for English readers
 are : 'The Atlas of Ancient and Classical Geography' (Every-
 man's Library) ; 'Historical Maps of Europe and her Colonies,'
 by R. L. Poole (Oxford University Press) ; 'New Historical
 Atlas for Students,' and 'New School Atlas for Students of
 Modern History,' by Professor Ramsay Muir (Philips) ; J. G.
 Bartholomew's 'Physical and Political Atlas' (Oxford University
 Press) ; and 'Comparative Atlas' (Meiklejohn and Son).

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CHAPTER I

PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE ANCIENT WORLD

Definition of Civilisation : The State of Savagery : Barbarism and Civilisation : Relative Antiquity of Early Civilisations : Our Debt to the Ancients : Main Divisions of Mankind : The Aryans : Our Debt to the Greeks, the Jews, the Romans.

APPENDICES—The Athenian Constitution : Chief Figures and Movements in Greek History : Rome, City-State, Country-State, Empire : The Constitution of the Augustan Empire : Bibliography.

WHAT is Civilisation and where and when did it originate? These are the questions which we propose to discuss in this introductory chapter, but at the outset we must confess that, in spite of the existence of a veritable library of works on these most fascinating of questions, it is not and never will be possible to give to any of them a categorical answer such as could be given to a problem of arithmetic or to such questions of fact as what, when, and where was the battle of Trafalgar? Civilisation after all is not an artificial product but a stage in the development of Man. It is convenient to recognise three main stages—Savagery, Barbarism, Civilisation—but it is difficult to fix the dividing line. Moreover, each stage lends itself naturally to subdivision; for instance there are many types and degrees of civilisation which may be classified according to their respective advancement—moral, religious, aesthetic, political, intellectual, and material—while, to complicate matters further, we find that progress is not necessarily congruous; an advance in mechanical efficiency does not necessarily imply an improvement in morality or aesthetic taste, although there is no necessary antagonism, and similarly a high standard in the arts may be reached by a people backward in religious and political conceptions, or intellectual advancement may coexist with des-

potism and slavery. It is, therefore, often difficult, if not impossible, even to classify communities according to their relative progress in civilisation, and we may meet with cases in which it is hard to decide whether Progress, Retrogression, or Stagnation is the prevailing influence. Civilisation means, in the first place, the development of conditions in which men can live together as citizens—'cives'; secondly, the development of those qualities which make this social life worth living. Over two thousand years ago Aristotle enunciated this truth; the State, he said, came into being to make Life possible—*τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκα*—it continues to make the Good Life a practical ideal—*τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἕνεκα*. He also realised that civilisation is a natural growth, since Man is a social animal—*πολιτικὸν ζῶον*—and that apart from some form of social organisation Man would not be Man at all.

Even Savagery is not completely unsocial. Man cannot exist in the state of complete isolation which Hobbes pictured in his imaginary state of Nature wherein men lived a 'short, brutish, and nasty' life of universal antipathy—'Homo homini lupus.' Human nature presupposes social ties. These may be ties of kinship—the logical development of the dependence of children on their Mother, resulting in matriarchal societies such as existed among some of the less-known tribes of Central America,¹ or the evolution of the Father's authority into the patriarchal government which seems to mark at any rate one stage, if not the first stage, in the development of progressive peoples and of which we have invaluable, though unconscious, first-hand evidence in the traditional records and folklore of the Old Testament and Homer, while Sir Henry Maine directed the thoughts of modern historians to this material; physical force may well have been another tie, and among other bonds of union would be interdependence for purposes of defence and hunting;

¹ There is also evidence of widespread matriarchal institutions in Asia Minor, and Mr. Elton records, in his *Origins of English History*, the survival of apparently matriarchal customs amongst the ancient 'Picts.'

presently common superstitions and a common sense of local rights of hunting and inhabitation would tend more and more to unite the tribal unit.

Such in brief is the condition of Savagery. The first step forward from this condition is probably due to a growth of population which necessitates the artificial production of food; that is to say, agriculture and the domestication of animals for the sake of meat and milk, and, at a later stage, wool and transport, are added to hunting and fighting as the means of supporting life. To this stage we apply the description 'Barbarism,' adopting Mr. Payne's convenient, though arbitrary, use of the word in his *History of America*. Progress is likely to be most rapid in districts of average productivity of fauna and flora. A land lacking natural resources of game and fruit will probably not encourage such a growth of population as to make progress necessary or possible: as examples of this Australia and the Arctic regions may be cited; on the other hand, some tropical districts are so rich in game and natural fruits that Man can live and multiply without toil. Among some races, Arabs for instance, the Pastoral stage seems to have preceded the Agricultural; on the other hand, the lack of game in Mexico led to the development of a purely agricultural¹ community. The Mexican tribes, lacking even the llamas which, to some extent, compensated the Peruvians for the absence of sheep, cattle, camels, or horses, trusted to Agriculture for their food supplies and added to them by developing cannibalism to a political principle. Their Religious, Political, and Military organisations were based upon the necessity of procuring a regular supply of human flesh, and it is for this reason mainly that Mr. Payne, to whose work the author acknowledges his debt, refuses to include the Aztec State among civilised communities, but prefers to classify it as an advanced Barbarism. The distinction is, of course, difficult to define.

¹ Turkey-farms were the only artificial method of creating supplies of animal food noted by the Conquerors. See Prescott.

Barbarism
and
Civilisation.

Civilisation found its cradle, or more accurately speaking its cradles, in certain great river valleys and among the sheltered coasts and islands of the Eastern Mediterranean. It would be rash to attempt to classify these early societies according to their respective antiquity, but we may say that the balance of existing evidence favours the view that the Nile valley, a long strip of country fertilised by annual floods, was the earliest of the group which includes the civilisations of the Nile, the Tigris and Euphrates, and the Syrian Coast, and the pre-Hellenic societies of the islands and coasts of Asia Minor and Greece. Although this group is of the greatest interest to us because of its connection with the birth of the religions and existing civilisations of the Western and Near Eastern World, yet we must also include in our survey the ancient civilisations of China and India. The theory has been put forward that in the central districts of the American continent there are signs of a prehistoric civilisation and that the ruins distinctly resemble the pyramids of Egypt. Arguing from these data and from the existence of mysterious images and relics on certain Pacific islands, and from the physical configuration of the Pacific Ocean and from the universality of the legend of the Flood, some writers have even suggested a lost continent of the Pacific as the original home from which civilisation spread East and West. On the whole, however, it is safer to steer clear of such conjectures. It is more probable that the American ruins are not of very much greater antiquity than the comparatively modern relics of Aztecs and Incas. Climatic conditions and rank vegetation would give the appearance of prehistoric antiquity to ruins of the 14th or 15th century A.D. Moreover, it seems to be almost certain that the native inhabitants of America migrated from the north-east coasts of Asia. The greater part of the migrations probably preceded the Glacial period and took place when the two continents were joined together by a broad peninsula in the north. The floods which followed the Glacial period inundated this peninsula and made migration more difficult,

Relative
Antiquity
of Early
Civilisations.

although it did not altogether cease. Thus can we account for the universal traditions among American peoples of a Flood, and of prehistoric wanderings Southwards, and this view is also borne out by evidence of language and of physical features. In fact, we are probably safe in asserting that the native civilisations of America, although they developed untouched by any outside influence,¹ were merely later and less advanced forms of that Mongolian civilisation which reached its highest development in China and Japan.

Existing evidence, then, points to Egypt as being the earliest cradle of civilisation. Earlier than 4000 years B.C. the inhabitants of the Nile valley already possessed such acquaintance with the arts of architecture and sculpture as to indicate a considerable degree of civilisation. Figures are dangerous, but arguing from such data as we have, we may venture on the statement that Man has certainly inhabited parts of this planet for 200,000² years—the Galley Hill skeleton is said to be over 170,000 years old—and that a stage of progress deserving to be called Early civilisation existed in Egypt nearly 8000 years ago.

The Euphrates valley challenges the Nile for claim to priority, but, although it is quite conceivable that Babylon may possess a lost history reaching back to even earlier ages, and even that the Egyptians were emigrants from Mesopotamia, yet this is only conjecture. Probably 4000 years B.C. would be near the mark as a suggested date for the beginning of recorded Babylonian history. A Semitic wave of warlike migrants overflowed the earlier inhabitants, and from the Semitic city, Ur of the Chaldees, Abraham set out in the 22nd century B.C. to found the Jewish race, from which

¹ The possibility of spasmodic migrations from Asia in Historic times and of the occasional arrival of castaways from the Chinese seas does not cause us to modify this judgment; neither did the Vikings, who undoubtedly reached North America, penetrate to the districts in question.

² For a summary of opinions as to prehistoric Man see H. G. Wells's *Outlines of History*.

modern Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans alike trace the origins of their religions. The Assyrians of Nineveh and Mesopotamia, the Babylonians in the country to the South, stretching from modern Baghdad to Basra, and the Egyptians of the Nile were the Great Powers in the days when the Jewish nation was climbing to a national importance which reached its zenith in the reign of Solomon (about 970 B.C.), whose glory is still preserved in place-names from the borders of India to Africa. The mysterious 'Hittites' seem only occasionally to have gained a place among the 'Powers.'

In 722 B.C. the Assyrians carried the Israelites to Nineveh, while in 588 the Babylonians, having destroyed Nineveh, carried off the Jews from Judah to Babylon. This brings Eastern and Biblical history into touch with Classical, for the Babylonians had recourse to alliance with the Medes, an Aryan tribe, in their attack on Nineveh; the Persian Highlanders of Cyrus turned the Medo-Persian tribes into a Persian Empire (559 B.C.); Cyrus restored the Jews (537); and Darius, who succeeded Cambyses, Cyrus's son, invaded Greece.

From this time on the history of Syria and Palestine becomes the history of provinces of the Persian, the Alexandrine, the Roman, the Arabian, and the Turkish Empires in turn—a gloomy history, relieved only by the transitory romance of the Maccabees' revolt (165 B.C.), 'Saladin's' rule, and the Crusaders' Christian 'Kingdom of Jerusalem.'

We must now turn back and refer to the Aryan civilisation of India and the Mongolian civilisation of China, the latter of which, although isolated from the general current of History, yet for antiquity challenges comparison with Egypt and Mesopotamia. Chinese 'History' begins somewhere between 2000 and 3000 years B.C., but legend and tradition carry it back long before that. Until the 19th century A.D. China will not occupy a prominent part in our story, because, in spite of a civilisation which was rich in art, handicraft, and, from the time of

Confucius (551-478 B.C.), in moral philosophy, yet the Chinese remained on the whole isolated, and exercised but little influence on the remainder of the world. Nevertheless we must not minimise the importance of a system which secured for so many ages—in spite of Mongol or Hun invasions, from which China, like Mesopotamia, Russia, and other large tracts of Asia and Central Europe, was to suffer—the peaceful industry of a large portion of the human race. Moreover, the continuity of Chinese history is a living rebuke to narrow-minded pedants who hold that all human empires and nations have their day and then collapse. Nor must we overstate the isolation of China before the 19th century. The ancients knew of the Chinese—possibly the 'Sinim' mentioned by Isaiah were Chinamen—and throughout the Middle Ages Chinese trade found its way along the Baghdad route; Italian travellers visited the Great Khan, and Italian traders, from Genoa and Venice, brought to Europe Chinese as well as Indian goods, bartered by bazaar merchants in towns along the caravan route; further, when the invading Turks practically closed that route, the navigators who explored the Cape of Good Hope route to the East and those who discovered the West Indies and America were searching for Cathay (China) as well as for India.

India, like Persia, was invaded by Aryans about 1600 B.C. It is probably to the Aryan conquest of a non-Aryan, Negroid population that the Caste system, which is the root of the religious and social life of the Hindus, must be attributed, the higher Castes¹ representing the purer Aryan breed. In both India and Persia the Aryan conquerors became orientalised in character and habits. The Punjab was first penetrated by these early Aryans, just as it was the Punjab which Alexander the Great afterwards conquered, the gateway to India from the North-West. North India has from time to time

¹ 'Castes' must not be confused with the ancient Hindu philosophical division of mankind into four classes—Priestly, Warrior, Trading, Labouring. There are countless castes, and the system spread into non-Aryan South India.

been invaded by Mongolian and Semitic conquerors, but, like China, she remained on the whole isolated from the Western World, except for a stream of commerce through Baghdad, until the 15th century A.D. We shall find that when Portuguese, Dutch, English, and French traders began to penetrate India in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, they found the peninsula divided into many 'native' states evolving from the gradual break-up of the Mohammedan 'Mogul' Empire, itself an Empire of Semitic conquerors.

'Brahmanism' and 'Hinduism' are mainly based on the Caste system and the superiority of the Brahmans or Priestly Caste. The preaching of Buddha, five centuries before Christ, was destined to convert many millions, in India, China, Thibet, and elsewhere, to a religion of lofty spiritual ideals,¹ but it was a religion of contemplation rather than action: it inculcated the idea that, this world being incapable of betterment, the individual should aim at escape from it (Nirvana) by purifying the mind from all earthly ties. It is, therefore, a religion that makes little appeal to the energetic races of the West and North. Moreover, like the Monotheism of the Egyptian Priesthood, or of the most intelligent followers of Zoroaster in Persia, it was never understood by the masses and became engulfed in a mass of superstitions and idolatrous legends.

We have still to consider, before coming to the 'Classical' Ancient World, one more system of civilisation which had its beginnings in 'prehistoric' days—the pre-Hellenic civilisation of Crete, Cnossus, 'Troy,' and the islands and coasts of South Greece and Asia Minor. We cannot here pretend to enter upon the 'Homeric' and similar questions. It concerns us only to mention that, when the Hellenic Dorians invaded Greece—the Iron age superseding the Bronze age, as the users of Bronze in their day had overcome the users of Flint—rather more than 1000 years B.C., they inherited a civilisation that had advanced far in such matters as Navigation, Archi-

¹ Buddhism as a civilising force must be included amongst the debts which we owe to the Ancient World.

tecture, and Sanitary Engineering, and that had left legends, belonging either to the old Aegcan age proper or to an earlier invasion of Hellenic tribes, on which were founded the Homeric poems, the first great contribution of Greece to the World's Literature.

We do not propose even to attempt to summarise in a chapter the course of the Classical civilisation of Greece and Rome, out of which the civilisation of the Western World has grown. We will merely attempt to summarise the debt which the Modern World owes to the Ancient. Especially we would emphasise the lesson taught by M. C. du Pontet in *The Ancient World*, a book to which we acknowledge our great indebtedness: the world is not and never has been divided into water-tight compartments either of Time or Space; if civilisation has not evolved as one universal whole, at least Western civilisation has been a continuous growth, subject at times to reactions, and in every age not only have men lived a 'social' life in their own states or tribes, but there has also been from before the dawn of History a constant interaction between the existing organised societies of the known world. We would also emphasise the belief which inspires Mr. F. S. Marvin's *The Living Past*, that, in spite of differences of view as to what is meant by 'Progress,' yet there has been in the History of Mankind, notwithstanding apparent set-backs, a continuous Progressive tendency, to which the old theocracies, such as Egypt, the religious thought of the Jews, the clear thinking of the Greeks, the administrative and legal genius of the Romans, the universality of the Catholic Church, have all contributed their share. The contributions of later generations, from the 'Renaissance' onwards, will be considered in more detail.

At this point it may be well to consider briefly the main divisions of Mankind. The human race has been classified and subdivided by scientists and historians with an almost bewildering diversity of methods—according to colour, texture of hair and skin, shape of the skull, features, e.g. the position of the eyes or the

Main
Divisions of
Mankind.

shape of nose and cheekbones—Biblical and legendary traditions, etc. It will, however, suffice for our purpose to distinguish three main races: the Caucasian or White Race; the Mongolian or Yellow and Red Races; and the Negroid or Black Race. A very large proportion of the earth's surface is inhabited by mixed races produced by the migrations of peoples. The Negroid race appears at one time to have inhabited a very large belt of the globe, including Central Africa, Australia, and Melanesia, where the 'natives' still belong mainly to that stock, together with large parts of India, and possibly of Europe. Caucasian races—the 'Hamitic' Egyptians, Semitic Akkadians, Assyrians, Phoenicians, Arabs, Jews, etc., and Aryan or Indo-European Hindus, Greeks, Romans, Celts, Teutons,¹ etc.—gradually encroached on these backward races, sometimes exterminating them, in other cases forming a mixed race such as the modern Hindus, among whom the higher Castes represent the purer Aryan stock, and yet again in some parts of the world merely establishing themselves as rulers over a Negroid or mixed population. The only examples of the opposite tendency in Historic times are afforded by the southward migration of the Bantu races in Africa and the artificial immigration of slaves into America and the Indies. In China, America, and Siberia the Mongolian race seems to have been first in the field, and therefore developed without any need of exterminating or mixing with Negroid races.

We have already seen how Indo-European or Aryan tribes invaded Persia and India. In 'Sanskrit' we have the eldest survivor of the family group of Aryan tongues—
The Aryans. not itself the original mother-tongue of the Aryan group, but the eldest sister of the family. Without belittling the achievements of other races, we may say that Western civilisation is mainly the product of those branches of the

¹ The Slavs are probably a mixed race of both Aryan and Mongolian descent, or, more accurately speaking, an Aryan race which absorbed large elements of alien blood. The latest classification—'Alpine' types, etc.—cuts across all our old divisions.

Aryan race which migrated into climates and localities favourable to the development of an energetic white race, and that it is, above all, to the 'Classical' Greeks, or Hellenes, that we owe the distinctive forms which Western civilisation has developed.

Much had been accomplished before the so-called Dorian invasions and, still more, the maritime expansion of the Ionians introduced the period of Classical civilisation. But what had been accomplished **The Greeks.** by Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Hittites, Aegeans, Etruscans, Chinese, and Hindus might never have led to anything higher than the Oriental types of Civilisation and Barbarism. Most races are capable of developing in the course of ages from Savagery to Barbarism, of learning the use of fire, of improving the natural stone implements of the Old Stone age into the artificial tools of the Neolithic period, of domesticating animals—a gift which modern Man seems to have lost—of practising elementary methods of agriculture and weaving; many races are capable of taking the first steps along the road of civilisation, the use of stone or brick buildings, the establishment of some degree of order and justice, and of religious and moral principles which may be based on pure conceptions however adulterated they may become in their popular forms. Again, we find that the general instinct of Palaeolithic Man to record his impressions in primitive pictures leads to the development of primitive methods of 'writing' messages or records, the work generally of the Priests, including such various systems as the cuneiform writing of Babylonia, the hieroglyphs of Egypt, the cumbrous alphabet of China, the picture-writing of Mexico, and the coloured threads of Peru. The real Art of Writing, however, as an instrument for expressing thought, was developed by the Greeks from the system of the Phoenicians—a Semitic race of traders, colonisers, and navigators—who, in their turn, probably owed something to the Egyptians.

This illustrates one side of the work of the Greeks. Their geographical circumstances enabled them to adopt what was of value in the ancient Eastern World; they then applied

their own gift of clear thought and passed on the result to the Western World. Their native islands and the valleys of Greece proper, divided from each other by rugged mountain-ranges, urged them to maritime expansion and forbade isolation. In 600 years, from about 1000 to 400 B.C., we have a period of intellectual development in Greece unparalleled in human history with the possible exception of the last 200 years of our own era. During those years Greek culture, centred first at Miletus, then at Athens, produced Poetry, Drama, History, Sculpture, and Architecture, destined to be the models of all times. Simultaneously the Greeks, who fortunately knew nothing of the modern distinction between 'Science' and the 'Humanities,' laid the foundations of modern Mathematics, Astronomy, and Medical Science. Their efforts in the latter directions were probably only limited by the lack of figures; the Alexandrines produced a system of alphabetical numerals, but the modern numerals were not introduced to Europe until the Arabs adapted them from the system evolved in India.

In the sphere of Politics it must be admitted that the Greeks failed in practice, in so far as their disunion and the early decay of civic virtues led to their conquest by Macedonia and Rome. Yet this very disunion enabled them to experiment in intensive government on a small scale. Modern World-States owe their origin not to the great, inorganic theocracies and despotisms of the Old World, but to the Greek City-States. The 'modern' historian still turns to Athens and Sparta in order to observe the tendencies of oligarchic and democratic governments free from many of the outside elements which cannot be eliminated when we examine Modern States.

Again, the Greek victories over Persia were the charters, written in blood, which made possible the rise of Western civilisation. In yet another sphere of Politics, we owe to the Greek philosophers not merely the beginnings of Political Thought, but treatises which still possess a practical value. If we make allowances for the existence of Slavery, the small

size of the Greek States, in which accordingly Democracy was direct instead of representative, and the absence of the great modern religions and of many mechanical devices, we find no great gap separating Greek thought from our own.

If the Greeks laid the foundations of our intellectual, scientific, and political development, we must also acknowledge our debt to the Jews. Jewish Monotheism is the foundation from which Christianity arose; **The Jews,**¹ through Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Judaism, their influence affects a very large proportion of civilised Mankind. The moral teaching of the Prophets is worthy of comparison with the intellectual teaching of the Hellenes.

To the Romans we owe the survival and distribution of the gifts of both Greek and Jew and to these gifts the Romans added the products of their own practical, **The Romans,** administrative, and legal genius.

The Romans lacked many of the attractive qualities of the Greeks, but they possessed gifts of a practical nature and a knack, necessary for worldly success, of adapting means to ends, and of improving without destroying, which more than adjust the balance. Their literature, on the whole, was more imitative and artificial, less inspired than that of Greece; their professional games were spectacular and sanguinary as compared with the 'amateur' Olympic Games of Greece—the former may be considered the ancestor of the Bull Fight and of Transatlantic Professionalism, the latter of Public School Sport; the Roman People, unlike the Athenians, were for long content with the shadow of power, leaving the substance to the Senate; at length the Senators, corrupt and debauched with ill-used power, the People, impoverished owing to Slave-Labour and free imports of Sicilian² and

¹ The Jews, of course, are not an Aryan but a Semitic race, another branch of the 'White'—Caucasian—stock.

² It is of interest to note that the policy of Athens was always influenced by her need of imported corn from Sicily and from the Black Sea, while Rome, with less reason, became dependent on Sicily, Egypt, and Britain.

Egyptian corn, and subsequently pauperised by free bread and games—'Panis et Circenses'—brought the State, which had by now grown from City to Country and from Country to World Power, to such a state of collapse that a Military Despotism was the only solution.

On the other hand, Roman Discipline, Roman Military and Engineering Genius, and above all Roman Law, were the means by which these men of action preserved and passed on to us Greek Thought, Hebrew Morality, and the Christian Religion, together with a tradition of order and the conception of civilised Mankind as a whole. The 'universal' Roman Empire offered Christianity the material for a 'universal' Church; the codes of the Roman Jurisprudentes, from the 'Twelve Tables' to Justinian, are still the basis of many modern systems of Law; the Edicta of the Praetors gave rise to the ideas, fallacious but beneficent, of a Law of Nature and a Law of Nations, and their influence may conceivably underlie English 'Case' Law and Equity. Above all, in spite of the corrupt Senatorial administration of the Provinces—as depicted by Cicero in the speech *In Verrem*—in spite of a Nero and a Caligula, in spite of the fact that the Emperors, being neither hereditary nor elected, became the nominees and puppets of armies, yet on the whole Roman administration under Julius Caesar and such Emperors¹ as Augustus, Tiberius, and the Antonines, was good enough to set up a new standard of government in the world. Biassed historians, such as Tacitus, cannot explain away the facts that Senatorial Provinces unanimously demanded to be annexed to the Imperial administration, and that in Judaea we find Pontius Pilate over-anxious to please his subjects.

For over 400 years the Roman Emperors preserved some degree of unity and order in the West, and for 1800 years they and their Byzantine successors held the Near East for

¹ Augustus carefully 'camouflaged' his monarchical rule under a veneer of Republican titles and forms. Cp. the *Monumentum Ancyranum*.

Europe. This tradition of order and of European unity survived their fall—or rather the disappearance of the Roman beneath a flood of alien immigration—together with their laws, their roads, and enough of their institutions to form the raw material of the Church, the Empire of Charlemagne, and the Feudal organisation which held Society together during the Dark Ages.

Is it straining a point to attribute to Roman influence the difference in racial characteristics which distinguishes the races of Western and Southern Europe from those of the Centre, the North, and the North-East?

ANCIENT HISTORY NOTES

(A) THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION

- (1) *Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.*: Patriarchal Monarchy succeeded by an Aristocracy. Class Division and Oppression. Draco's 'Code' of Maximum Penalties. The Areopagus.
- (2) *Sixth Century: Solon*.—Economic Reforms.
First step towards Democracy taken by substituting Wealth in Land for Birth as basis of Citizenship.
Re-division of Classes. Institution of Boule (Senate), a committee of Ecclesia (Popular assembly). The Tyrants.
- (3) *End of Sixth Century: Cleisthenes*.—Re-division of people in order that the tribes might not coincide with social classes. Enlargement of the Senate and of its powers. All citizens secure the right of Election and of trying appeals and cases involving retiring magistrates. All except lowest class eligible for office. Ostracism.
- (4) *Fifth Century*: Democratic and Naval policy of Themistocles. Magistracy opened to Thetes (lowest class) by his rival Aristides. Magistrates chosen by lot, except Polemarch. Areopagus deprived of political powers by Pericles and Ephialtes. Payment for services in Ecclesia and Law Courts. Land basis of citizenship abolished.

- (5) *Fourth Century*: Degeneration of Democracy after death of Pericles. Hasty Resolutions (*ψηφίσματα*) take place of considered Laws (*νόμοι*).

Citizens expect rich individuals and mercenary aliens to perform military and administrative duties.

(B) CHIEF FIGURES AND MOVEMENTS IN GREEK HISTORY

- (1) 1100-500 B.C.—Ionian and Dorian Migrations and Colonisation. Early Intellectual supremacy of Miletus. Rise of Athens and Sparta.

Poets: 'Homer,' Hesiod, Sappho, Alcaeus.

Philosophers and Scientists: Thales and Pythagoras.

Statesmen: Lycurgus (Spartan Constitution) and Draco (Athenian Code), Solon, and Cleisthenes.

- (2) *Fifth Century*.—Persian Wars. Confederacy of Delos. Commercial Rivalry of Athens and Corinth. Political Rivalry of Athens and Sparta. Peloponnesian War.

Poets (*inter ceteros*) and Dramatists: Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Cratinus.

Historians and Philosophers: Herodotus, Thucydides, Socrates, Plato.

Statesmen and Leaders: Themistocles, Aristides, Pausanias, Miltiades, Cimon, Pericles, Ephialtes, Alcibiades, Nicias, Lysander, Thrasybulus.

- (3) *Fourth Century*.—Spartan Hegemony. Cyrus's Expedition. Theban Hegemony. Balance of Power. Athenian Recovery. Macedonian War and Conquest. Alexander's Conquests.

Historians and Philosophers: Xenophon, Aristotle, Epicurus.

Orators: Demosthenes, Aeschines, Isocrates.

Leaders: Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Pelopidas, Cleombrotus, Conon, Iphicrates, Philip, Alexander, Seleucus, Ptolemy, Antigonus, Demetrius.

(C) ROME, CITY-STATE TO COUNTRY-STATE AND EMPIRE

- (1) *Circa 735-272 B.C.*—Rome gains supremacy in Italy. Republic established. Struggle between Patricians and Plebeians.

- (2) 272-133 B.C.—Roman Republic, City-State, conquers Mediterranean World—Carthaginians, Semitic maritime and commercial state, most formidable enemy. Theoretically democratic, practically governed by Senate. The City-State controls both shores of Mediterranean from Greece to Spain.

- (3) 133-52 B.C.—Discontent at home and in Italy. Rural population suffering from effects of Hannibal's invasions, slave-labour, and free importation of corn. Constitution attacked by the Gracchi and Marius, restored by Sulla. Franchise granted to Italians after Social War—thus the centre of Empire becomes Country-State instead of City-State. Corruption, misrule, slave-risings (Spartacus, etc.), piracy, party-strife (Cataline, Milo, Clodius, etc.), lead to break-down of Government. Populace, debauched by idleness and doles of corn, incapable of exercising power. Professional army (the work of Marius and Sulla) becomes arbiter. Conquest of Gaul and invasion of Britain by Caesar, Eastern conquests by Pompey.

First Triumvirate—Caesar, Pompey, Crassus.

- (4) 52 B.C.-180 A.D.—The creation and zenith of Empire. Caesar's reforms and murder. Octavius (Augustus) founds Monarchy under Republican guise, after the defeat of Caesar's murderers by the Second Triumvirate (Octavius, Antony, and Lepidus) and defeat of Antony by Octavius. Failure to establish Elbe-Danube Frontier, but Conquest of South Britain. Good administration on the whole with certain exceptions (Nero, Caligula, etc.).

- (5) 180-476 A.D.—Barbarian Invasions: Division of Empire and Fall of Western Empire. Roman element gradually submerged by Barbarians admitted into Empire. Vitality undermined by bureaucratic methods, taxation, struggles of military adventurers for the Throne.

Christianity officially adopted.

N.B.—In 552 Justinian (famous for his *Code*) temporarily reconquered Italy and established Ravenna as Capital of an Italian Province of the Byzantine-Roman Empire, but this cannot be regarded as a revival of a true 'Roman' Empire. For this period see next chapter.

(D) OCTAVIUS AUGUSTUS'S RISE TO POWER
(see *Momentum Ancyrarum*)

1st period, 43-31 B.C.—Second Triumvirate. Irregular position. Octavius, in West, posed as servant of the Senate, as opposed to Antony in East.

2nd period, 31-27 B.C.—'Rerum omnium potitus per universorum consensum.' Position still irregular. Military Despotism.

3rd period, 27-23 B.C.—Legitimised position through fear of Caesar's fate. 'Rem Publicam ex mea potestate in Senatus Populique arbitrium transtuli.' Still remained Consul: to his consular powers were added leadership of Senate ('Princeps Senatus') at home and 'Principatus' outside Italy—*i.e.* control of Frontier Provinces, Army, Navy, Foreign Policy—also title of Augustus.

4th period, 23 B.C. onwards.—Resigned Consulship. Received the 'Tribunicia Potestas'—*i.e.* sacro-sanctity of person and right of veto—to which were added 'Imperium intra Pomœrium' (Consular Rights)—'Conventio Senatus' (convoking Senate), 'Relatio' (initiation of Legislation), 'Edicta' (Proclamations), 'Nominatio' (nominating candidates for election to office)—and 'Proconsulare Imperium,' which secured the powers described above as 'Principatus.'

Note.—He avoided the title of 'Rex,' and, in deference to the Senators, the Dictatorship and permanent Consulship which the People would have bestowed.

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CHAPTER II

THE MEDIAEVAL WORLD

The 'Barbarian' Migrations: Teutons and Turanians: The Franks and the Papacy: The Empire: Racial Strains of Modern Nations: The 'Northmen': The Magyars: Spread of Christianity: Mohammed: The Saracens: The Turks: The Crusades and the Eastern Empire: France and England: Germany and Italy: Empire and Papacy: The Hundred Years' War: Feudalism: Trade and Industry: The 'Hansa' and England: Guilds: English Trade Policy: Italian Trade: Mediaeval Thought and Learning, Architecture and Art.
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IN this chapter, as in the first, we do not profess to write a 'History,' but merely try to give such an introductory summary of developments as may enable our readers to understand what are the foundations on which the Modern World is built. In brief, we attempt to describe the genesis of the 'Barbarian' Migrations which overwhelmed the Roman World, the extent to which these 'Barbarians' overthrew, adopted, or altered the existing organisation and culture, the foundation of some of the modern nations, and the chief institutions of the intermediate period between Ancient and Modern civilisation. The failure of the Romans to establish an Elbe-Danube Frontier resulted, roughly speaking, in the establishment of the Rhine and Danube as the dividing lines between the worlds of Rome and Barbarism. But this dividing line was constantly¹ crossed. More and more the Romans recruited their legions from the tribes beyond the frontier and entered into arrangements with border tribes by which land was allotted in return for military

¹ For the Romans, as for the English on the North-West Frontier of India to-day, it was almost equally difficult to advance, to retreat, or to stand still.

alliance; this was a development of the old system of 'coloniae'—settlements of Roman soldier-citizens in the midst of alien populations—and suggests that we may here find one of the germs of Feudalism. Moreover, Barbarian traders as well as soldiers constantly overflowed into the Provinces, and the process was accentuated as the original Roman and Italian stock became numerically insufficient and unwilling to bear their own burdens and as the vigour of the populations of the Provinces became sapped by excessive taxation and bureaucratic government.

We must distinguish between the invading tribes which belonged by blood to the European family of races and those which were alien intruders, and show how these invasions were part of a movement which affected the greater part of the Eurasian world. Beyond the entrenched frontiers of the Roman Empire was a mass of Barbarism for our knowledge of which we depend largely on the works of Julius Caesar and of Tacitus. The latter, unfortunately, sacrificed scientific accuracy to his sense of dramatic contrast, and loved to compare 'decadent' Rome with virile Germany, to paint the virtues of his heroes—*e.g.* Germanicus—in juxtaposition to the vices of his villains—Tiberius, for example—and to fashion History into an instrument with which to belabour his political opponents and advertise the wares of his Party.

Roughly speaking, one may say that these 'Barbarians' consisted mainly of the following tribes of the Teutonic branch of the Aryan race: the Franks along the right bank of the Rhine; the Angles and Jutes in Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark;¹ the Saxons and Frisians along the North Sea coast of Holland and Germany from the Rhine to the Elbe; the Allemanni and Burgundians round the sources of the Rhine, Danube, and Rhone; the Lombards (Langobardi) in the Elbe valley; while farther to the East were the Goths (Ostro-Goths = Eastern, Visi-Goths = Western) and the Vandals along the Danube valley.

¹ We make no apology for using modern political nomenclature to indicate approximately geographical districts.

In the Baltic districts and in large parts of Russia and Poland were various Slavonic tribes of Aryan origin which never migrated into Western Europe; the Adriatic Sea and the mountains of Bohemia have marked the farthest Western limits of the Slavs, with the exception of those who, in modern times, have migrated across the Atlantic. It has been the fate of the Slavs to act as the buffer between the Aryan and Turanian races; they have, in many districts and in many ages, suffered from invading Turanians from the East or Teutons from the West, and have undergone considerable racial adulteration, but the Slav element still preponderates in Central, Southern, and Eastern European Russia, in Poland, and in a great part of Bohemia and of the Balkans.

Pressing on these Aryan races was another mass of Barbarism belonging to the Turanian race, a branch of the

Turanians. Yellow or Mongolian family of Mankind. Lapps and Finns¹ had been settled in Europe in pre-historic ages, but they were not migratory or expanding peoples. The real Migrations started when the Turanian 'Huns' moved from China through Russia and settled in Hungary, about 376 A.D. They may be said to be the first of four waves of Turanian invaders who successively converted Eastern and Central Europe into a terrestrial Purgatory—Huns, Avars, Magyars, Turks. So far as Western Europe is concerned, these 'Huns' played but a small part directly; even the invasion of Attila was only a horrible incident. Indirectly, however, they started the great movement of peoples which overthrew the Roman Empire in the West and laid the foundations of the modern nations.

The first waves of Barbarians who were driven by Hun pressure to overflow into the Empire were those whose permanent influence was destined to be the least—the Goths and the Vandals. Their period may be said to be 376-476, after which they began to decline. In 376 the Visigoths settled in the Eastern Empire,

The First Waves of Barbarism.

¹ Elton in his *Origins of English History* includes a wave of Finnish invaders among the elements of the pre-Roman population of Britain.

and shortly afterwards they threatened both Constantinople and Rome. The latter was saved from Alaric the Goth by Stilicho the Vandal, but Ravenna was made the capital. Goths and Vandals then overran Gaul and Spain, and the Roman garrison was withdrawn from Britain—already harassed by Picts and Scots in the North and Teutonic raiders along the East coast—in a vain attempt to save the continental possessions. Thus by 410, the year in which Alaric sacked Rome after Stilicho had been murdered by his suspicious employers, Britain, Spain, and Gaul were all lost, the first two permanently. In 445 Attila the Hun succeeded to the chieftainship of his tribe and, after an attack upon the Eastern Empire, invaded Gaul, but was beaten back at Châlons by Aetius; Châlons (451) counts with Marathon, Salamis, Tours (732), Plassey, the Marne, etc., as one of the decisive contests between Progress and Barbarism. Attila next invaded Italy, but on his death in 453 his savage Kingdom collapsed. In 476 the Emperor of the West abdicated, and a German 'Patrician' was invested by Zeno, the Eastern Emperor, but this was a mere attempt to conceal the truth; in reality Roman rule in the West was at an end. The possession of Britain was being fought for by Romanised Britons, untamed Britons of the West, Picts, Scots, Angles, Saxons, and Jutes; Italy was in the hands of the German, Odovacer; the Visigoths held Spain and most of Gaul, while the Burgundians had occupied the Rhone valley; 'Africa' and the Mediterranean islands were held by the Vandals. There still remained fresh hordes of Barbarians to come before the raw material for the new nations was complete. The next period marks the decline of Vandals and Goths and the expansion of Angles, Saxons, Franks, Lombards, and Saracens—or Moors.

Two more great 'Romans' played their part in this period: Boethius, 'the last of the Romans,' 'Consul' of the Ostrogoth Theodoric, translated Euclid, Plato, Aristotle, and Ptolemy, and wrote, in prison, his own *Consolations of Philosophy*, which was translated into English by King Alfred; Justinian, through his general, Belisarius, recovered 'Africa,'

Rome, and Ravenna, while the Lombards overran and secured North Italy; his *Codex* and *Institutes* formed the basis of modern Europe's Law. In Spain the Visigoths succeeded in repulsing the efforts of the Eastern Empire, but were conquered by the Moors in 711. The Goths, however, held out in Galicia and Asturias, and sixty years later, with the help of Charlemagne, established their position, and thus laid the foundation of the Christian Kingdoms of Castile and Leon.

Meanwhile the Franks, from 510 onwards, conquered that part of Gaul which was held by the Visigoths. Their territory

The Franks. did not include the Rhone valley (Burgundy), but did include Belgium and the east bank of the Rhine.

Being orthodox Catholics, the Franks were more congenial than the heretical (Arian) Goths to the native Gauls and to the Popes. The greatest of the early Popes, Gregory the Great (590), who sent Augustine's Mission to Kent, made terms with the Lombards in Italy, and though not yet claiming supremacy for the Roman Pope, yet refused to acknowledge the right of the Patriarch of Constantinople to the title 'Universalis Sacerdos.' The Franks and the Papacy soon formed an alliance, equally advantageous to each. The early Frankish Kingdom, known as Merovingian after the Meroving Dynasty, was generally divided into three parts. Moreover, the Kings tended to become mere cyphers in the hands of the 'Mayors of the Palace,' leading officials of the Court. When one family contained the 'Mayors' of all three Kingdoms, and also produced successive leaders of such distinction as Pippin, Charles Martel, and the second Pippin, it was inevitable that sooner or later facts must be acknowledged and the possessors of power succeed to the Throne. Thus the second Pippin became King in 751, and the Caroling Dynasty was founded.

The succession of the Carolings provides a convenient point for picking out of the mass of facts into which this period is apt to resolve itself one or two considerations bearing on History as a whole. In the first place, it should be

noted that, while all forms of government are apt to become bureaucracies—that is to say the officials tend to control their nominal superiors—yet this tendency was especially marked and assumed a peculiar form in the case of governments based on a 'Feudal' organisation of Society. This question will be discussed at a later stage of this chapter.

The next points deserving emphasis are the alliance of Papacy and Frankish Kings, to which attention has already been drawn, and the resulting development of Papal claims, both spiritual and temporal. The Franks, as has been said above, were orthodox Catholics; moreover, the victory of Charles 'the Hammer,' son of Pippin, over the Moors¹ at Tours in 732, which saved the rest of Europe from the fate of Spain, made the Franks, and the House of Pippin in particular, the champions of Christendom. Papal pressure was largely contributory to causing the deposition of Childeric, the last Meroving, in favour of Pippin, the son of Charles. Charlemagne, after the death of his father, Pippin, in 768, and of his brother, Carloman, in 771, immediately carried on the family tradition: he first attacked the pagan Saxons; next joined the Pope in a war against the Lombards, as a result of which he assumed the Lombard Crown; then, after further Saxon campaigns, assisted the Goths in Spain in their struggle against the Moorish conquerors; and then in succession fought against pagan Danes, Czechs, and Avars—the latter the second wave of Turanian invaders, who had now succeeded the Huns and whose defeat made the way for the third wave, the Magyars, in Hungary.

Finally, in 800 A.D., Pope Leo III., finding an excuse in the fact that temporarily there was no Roman Emperor in the East, the Empress Irene having blinded and deposed her son, crowned Charlemagne as Roman Emperor in the West.

The importance of this can hardly be exaggerated. The Papacy, from its own point of view, gained enormously by the

¹ We reserve the discussion of the rise of Mohammedanism for that part of this chapter which deals with the Crusades.

creation of a Western Emperor who was the Pope's ally, and by the contrast between the vigorous, if disorderly, lands under Pope and Western Emperor and the diminishing and semi-orientalised realms of Eastern Emperors and Patriarchs. Christianity as a whole gained by this alliance between Pope and warrior-Emperor, and the old Roman idea of the unity of the ordered Roman world as opposed to Barbarism was partly revived in the ideal of a united Christendom; on the other hand, we shall find that the Empire exercised a maleficent influence on Germany and Italy.¹

Another consideration to which attention must be drawn is the fact that by 800 A.D. throughout the Western countries of Europe, by a process of conquest, absorption, and elimination, the respective racial elements of the new nations had been settled with two great exceptions; these exceptions are (1) the presence in Spain and Portugal of the Moors, (2) the absence in 800 of most of the 'Danish' or 'Northman' stock which still remained to be added to these races.

Thus in Italy there had been added to the Graeco-Roman, Celtic, and aboriginal stocks a strain of Teutonic blood, of which the most lasting traces were left among the upper classes in Lombardy. In Gaul and the Iberian Peninsula the bulk of the population remained Romano-Celtic, while the conquering Teutons became an aristocratic minority and rapidly absorbed the speech, manners, and appearance of the natives, although even as late as the Revolution there lingered some sense of racial difference. In what is now Belgium the population remained, as it had been in Caesar's time, mixed; to this day the Fleming is mainly Teutonic, the Walloon mainly Celtic. Different branches of the Teutonic race continued to occupy their ancestral homes in Central and North-Western Europe—Germany, German-Austria, Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian Peninsula—and the Teutonic conquest of

¹ But for the alliance of the Papacy and the Franks, it is possible that the Lombards might have built up an Italian Kingdom. The Empire postponed for centuries Italian and German national union.

Eastern and Central Britain was of such a nature that the resulting English race—including the Angles of the Scottish Lowlands—was more akin to the populations of Denmark and of Holland than to those of the Romano-Celtic or 'Romance' nations. In the West Scottish Highlands, the mountainous districts of Wales, Cornwall, and North-West England, as in Ireland, a large Celtic and pre-Celtic element still remains, and in later ages intermarriage introduced a considerable strain of this Celtic blood into the people of Central and Western England; in Northern Scotland the predominating blood is probably 'Danish' with a large Celtic admixture, while English, Norman, Spanish, and Scottish settlers have modified the Irish breed, and English, Normans, and Flemings have mingled with the native Welsh. The people of South-East Scotland and of Eastern England are predominantly Teutonic, and the 'Danish' invaders merely intensified this racial homogeneity, but even here we must not exaggerate. The Angles and Saxons did not settle among the Britons and become absorbed by them in Northumbria, Mercia, Wessex, etc., as the Franks settled among the Gauls, yet they must have preserved many women and slaves, and the Romanised Britons held out in London and other strongholds long enough to influence both the blood and the institutions of their conquerors.¹ With these exceptions it is in the main true to say that the Romanised Britons were to a great extent exterminated while the wilder tribes survived.

We must now consider the remaining movements of tribes which completed the 'Migrations' and introduced yet other elements into the populations of Europe—the overseas expansion of the Northmen, the rise of Mohammedanism, leading to the Moorish and finally the Turkish invasions, and the invasions of the Magyars, a Turanian people akin to the Huns and Avars who preceded and the Turks who succeeded them.

¹ Subsequent settlements—e.g. Huguenots—also modified the purity of our Teutonic blood in a beneficial way.

The 'Northmen,' 'Normans,' 'Danes,' or 'Vikings,' as they are variously termed, repeated in the 9th and 10th centuries, on a wider scale, the exploits of their kindred Angles, Saxons, and Jutes of five centuries before. From the end of the 8th century they began plundering raids, especially directed against monasteries and towns near river mouths, along the coasts of the British Isles and France. The second period, the late 9th and 10th centuries, marks the stage of settlement—in Iceland, Greenland, Scotland, Ireland, Normandy, and the 'Danelagh' districts of England—while Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean in one direction, and the North American coast, probably from Labrador to New Brunswick, were visited by these enterprising Sea-Kings of Norway and Denmark. At the end of the 10th and during the 11th centuries comes the third stage—the political conquests of Rolf in Normandy, 896, of the Scandinavian Sweyn and Cnut and the Norman William in England, of the Norman adventurers in Sicily and Naples, and of the Swede Rurik in Russia.

The Northmen rapidly acquired the Christianity and culture of their victims. Thus the Normans were superior to the subjected English in manners, learning, and administrative capacity, even though some of their institutions, particularly in the administration of Justice, were more barbarous and less humane than those which they displaced—*e.g.* the Anglo-Saxon 'Compurgators.' Fortunately the 'Conqueror' preserved and strengthened such English institutions as the Fyrd, the Shire Court, the Juries of Inquisition (see p. 169). We cannot discuss in detail the influence of these invaders on English and European institutions, but we shall have occasion to point out their important bearing on the development of Feudalism, and must note this new influx of blood into the populations of the British Isles, West France, the Baltic districts of Russia, and, to a far smaller extent, Sicily, South Italy, and the coasts of the Iberian Peninsula.

A very different type of invader meanwhile had overrun

Hungary from the latter end of the 9th century. The Magyars, essentially an Asiatic race, succeeded Avar and Hun as a scourge in Central Europe. The campaigns of the 'Saxon' Emperors, Henry the Fowler and Otto the First, threw them back from Germany, but in Hungary they settled down as a race of alien conquerors which has never mingled with the native Slavs. Although in parts of Hungary the Magyars form the bulk of the population, yet right up to the War of 1914 for the most part they constituted an alien oligarchy of territorial despots.

It is now necessary to say something of the conversion in turn of these various waves of Barbarians to Christianity and of the rise of Christianity's greatest rival Mohammedanism and its influence on Eurasian history.

Even before the 'Fall' of the Roman Empire in the West Christianity had begun to spread beyond the Imperial bounds. The 4th century A.D. is perhaps the decisive century of the Christian era: at the beginning of the century (313) Constantine the Great issued his Edict of Toleration; eleven years later Christianity became the official religion of Emperor and Empire; the next year witnessed the first General Church Council at Nicaea, which produced the first version of the Nicene Creed; while during the same period the Faith was adopted by some of the outer Barbarians, the Visigoths being the first converts. Since the Missionary Journeys of St. Paul in the 1st century there had certainly been no combination of events in religious history to equal in importance these events of the 4th. The conversion of the Romans and Greeks was almost inevitable since their own Paganism made no appeal to faith or enthusiasm save in such rare cases as that of Julian, the apostate Emperor; Roman Paganism was a matter merely of observance of ritual and of literary superstition; the more educated Romans were agnostic philosophers. Christianity only had to break down a barrier of indifference on the part of the educated, and of superstition and vested interests among the masses. In the

case of the Barbarians, on the other hand, it was faced by a savage but deep-rooted and congenial creed, based largely on the worship of Violence, War, and Nature. The Ostrogoths, Vandals, and Burgundians soon followed the example of the Visigoths, and the Franks were converted before their period of conquest began. During the 6th century the Lombards and Allemanni received the Faith; in 597 Augustine arrived in England, and during the 7th century the conversion of the English was fairly rapid. The Christianity of the Romano-Britons had survived in Wales, and thence spread to Ireland and Scotland. Thus the English were approached from both sides, by Roman and Celtic missionaries. The Synod of Whitby, 664, decided that this island should belong to the Roman system. This is not only important because it gave England the advantage of Roman organisation, as opposed to the clannish and monastic system of the Celtic Church, with the result that in England ecclesiastical unity set the example to the tribal kingdoms, whereas in Ireland civilisation was local and perished when the Danes destroyed the monasteries; of even wider importance is its significance as a sign of the success of the policy initiated by Leo the Great and revived by Gregory the Great, the acquisition by the Roman Bishopric of the spiritual hegemony of Western Christendom. The remaining Barbarians of Western and Central Europe were gradually converted until only the Saxons remained Pagans, and they succumbed to the vigorous 'muscular Christianity' of Charlemagne in the 9th century. The Scandinavians were converted during the 11th century, and their emigrant kinsmen, the Northmen, conformed during the same period. The Wends of East Prussia, the Magyars, and some of the Lapps, Finns, and Slav tribes still remained pagan.

Mohammed—to use the form of his name most familiar to English readers—was born in Mecca in 570 or **Mohammed.** 571 A.D., of the ruling Koreish tribe. The people of Arabia—mainly a Semitic race—although Pagans for the most part, yet were ripe for some higher form of religion,

having been introduced to Monotheism by Jewish refugees after Titus's destruction of the Temple and by heretical Christians who had fled from the persecution of the Orthodox. It was not until he had reached the age of forty that Mohammed proclaimed his divine mission to teach that Allah alone was God. Forced to flee from Mecca, he established himself at Medina—one of the three sacred cities of Mohammedanism: Mecca the place of his birth, Medina the place of his burial, and Jerusalem—on the trade-route from Mecca to Syria. After several campaigns, including the 'War of Nations' or 'War of the Fosse,' Mecca surrendered, and before his death Mohammed controlled the Yemen and the greater part of Arabia. His monotheism, fatalism, and reliance on the sword as an instrument of conversion all appealed to his compatriots. Within a hundred years of his death his followers had conquered Syria, Persia, Egypt, 'Africa'—the Moors—and Spain, but their attempt on France was beaten back by Charles 'the Hammer' at Tours in 732, the centenary year of his death. Attempts on Rome and Constantinople during the 9th century also failed. Mohammedanism, like Christianity, split into religious and political divisions. Baghdad succeeded Damascus as the seat of the principal Khalifate, but there was also a Khalifate at Cairo and an Emirate of Spain at Cordova, while a double dispute arose over the points whether the Khalifate was intended to be elective or hereditary, and if the latter, in which branch of the Prophet's collateral descendants.

The Arabian or Saracen rule on the whole was mild, tolerant, and, within the limits set by the Koran, progressive. The Arabians gave the lead to Europe in trade, **The** agriculture, and science; as we have seen, the **Saracens.** Arabs introduced numerals and algebra; there were splendid libraries at Cairo and Cordova, while Haroun-al-Raschid of Baghdad, made famous by *The Arabian Nights*, was the friend of Charlemagne.

His descendants, however, like those of Charlemagne, were

decadent. In 1055 Togrul Beg, a Seljukian Turk, gained the temporal power, the Khalif retaining a shadowy supremacy as Mohammed's successor. We are reminded¹

The Turks. of the relations of Pippin, Mayor of the Palace, to the Merovings, or of those of the Count of Paris to the later Carolings. The outcome was the same; the last legitimist Khalif was put to death two centuries later, and the Turks usurped his place. The Turks, who were divided into several tribes, of which the small but warlike tribe of Ottomans eventually became the leading spirits, were, like their Turanian kinsmen, the Huns, Avars, and Magyars, brave soldiers but incapable of progress or orderly government. Under their sway at a later time, irrigation, trade, and agriculture broke down, and Mesopotamia lost its old prosperity, while we shall find Turkish rule blighting in a similar way the Balkan districts of Europe. Meanwhile the Seljukian Turks as converts to Islam insisted on the martial and aggressive side of Mohammed's teaching and threatened Christendom in two directions. By their conquest of Armenia and most of Asia Minor they directly attacked the Eastern Empire, while by reversing the tolerant policy of the Saracens towards Christian pilgrims in Syria, which they conquered from the Cairo Khalfate, they affected the whole body of Christendom.

The Turks, however, were not yet destined to succeed. The state of the Eastern Empire in the first years of the 10th century had contrasted favourably with that of Western Europe, where Charlemagne's Empire had broken up, or of Islam, divided into three parts. The victory of the Seljukian Turks, however, in 1071, and the loss of Armenia and Asia Minor threatened destruction to the Empire, which had already lost most of its European possessions to Serbs and Bulgars. Nevertheless the First Crusade, promoted by the Pope, the Eastern Emperor, Feudal adventurers, and monks of the Cluniac movement, easily overthrew the divided forces of Islam in

¹ Cp. also the relations of the Mikado to the Shogun during the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries in Japan.

1095, set up a Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem, and a Christian County in Syria, and restored part of Asia Minor to the Empire; the Turks were hemmed in in their part of Asia Minor between the Empire and the new Kingdoms of Jerusalem and Armenia. The military orders were founded—Templars, Knights of St. John, etc.

The next contest between Cross and Crescent, the Second Crusade, 1144, was caused by a Saracenic revival under Zangi of Mesopotamia. It was preached by St. Bernard, as the first had been preached by Peter the Hermit, was led by Conrad III., the Emperor, and Louis VII. of France, and resulted in the crushing defeat of the Crusaders, the consolidation of Islam, and the decay of the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem.

In 1187 Saladin, the descendant of Zangi, a noble type of the cultured Arab, captured Jerusalem, and, in spite of the heroism of Richard I. of England, the Third Crusade failed to rescue the Holy Places, largely owing to the quarrels among the Christian leaders. Saladin, however, granted free access to the Holy Places to pilgrims. With the deaths of Saladin and Richard the crusading spirit in its highest expression died away.

The Fourth Crusade, 1198, overthrew not the Infidel but the Eastern Empire! The 'Latin Empire,' ruled by Frank and Fleming nobles, lasted for nearly sixty years. In 1261 Michael VIII. restored Byzantine rule, but, although the restored Empire lasted for nearly two centuries, yet its survival was due rather to the strength of Constantinople and the divisions of Islam than to any real national vigour. Production had almost ceased, the people were decadent and slavish, while commerce passed into the hands of the Italian traders, especially those of Venice, which enforced Free Trade on Constantinople. The Ottoman Turks were the protagonists of Islam from the middle of the 13th century, and although the battle of Angora saved Constantinople in 1402 and seemed to have crushed the Ottomans, yet the latter made a surprising recovery and, after conquering Adrianople and the European territory behind Constantinople, they

finally in 1453 captured the city under Mohammed II., the only efficient defenders being Venetian and Genoese mercenaries. The results of the Fall of Constantinople will be discussed in a later chapter. Among other results of the Crusades we must note (1) the revival and strength during the early Crusades of the ideal of Christian unity under the spiritual leadership of Rome; (2) the growth of National feeling owing to quarrels among the Christian leaders; (3) the development of Trade interests which were affected by the Turkish advance, but were of sufficient strength to inspire men to open up new routes in the place of those they had lost; (4) the promotion of Culture and Science arising from the introduction of Western Europeans to the civilisation of the Saracens. There was a strong, though limited revival of Learning in the 12th century, which helped to prepare the way for the real Renaissance.

Meanwhile in Western Europe the Empire of Charlemagne did not long survive his death. For a time it looked as though five national States might evolve out of its dis-
France and ruption, France, Germany, Italy, Upper and
England. Lower Burgundy, and in the case of France this process began. The Carolingian Kings, like the Merovings before them, became mere cyphers, and Hugh the Great, Duke of Paris, became Protector of the King. Hugh's son was elected King in 987, and thus began the great Capet Dynasty, which was to do for France what the House of Alfred and the Normans and Angevins did for England. Although in the course of History we often find dynastic and national interests clashing, yet we must remember the facts that England and France owed their early unity and, comparatively speaking, orderly development to their Monarchies, and that in the 15th century the Spanish nation was built on the same foundation. Hugh Capet owed his success partly to the support of the Church, partly to that of the great Feudal nobles who elected him and, confident in their own strength, allowed the Monarchy to become hereditary, and partly to the central position of his family domains, including Paris and Orleans. Normandy

was a vassal State, while the rulers of Burgundy were for a time in a double position as vassals of France and also of the Empire. Rolf and his Vikings had settled in France in 896; during the 11th century Norman adventurers drove the Greeks and Saracens from Southern Italy and founded the Feudal State of Sicily and Naples, and another host of adventurers founded the Norman Kingdom in England. The main feature in French history for the next three centuries is the struggle of the national dynasty to absorb the great Feudal dependencies—Normandy, Anjou, Aquitaine, Brittany, Burgundy,¹ etc; three vassal houses in turn—those of Normandy, Blois, and Anjou—gained the Throne of England, and thus attained an equality with the French King who, as regards their French domains, was their nominal superior; in fact, in the case of Henry II. and Richard I. of England, the Anglo-Angevins were vastly superior in the size and resources of their dominions, and all the chief river-mouths of France were under alien control—the Seine, Loire, and Garonne under England, the Rhone under Burgundy. Yet the French had certain advantages; they held strategically the 'inner lines'; the Anglo-Angevin Empire was an unnatural conglomeration of rival elements, the permanence of which was neither probable nor desirable—if France was to expand to her natural limits and England lay an insular foundation for her future maritime Empire—and such Kings as Philip Augustus (1180-1223) made full use of every weakness in their opponents' position.

The course of events in Germany and Italy forms a complete contrast to the national development of England and France. The last Franconian or Carolingian **Germany**
 King was succeeded by Henry 'the Fowler' of **and Italy.**
 Saxony. Henry seems to have had some idea of creating a German nation. He was the champion of Christianity against

¹ The *Duchy* of Burgundy—west of the Saône—must be distinguished from the *Kingdom* of Burgundy, or Arles, east of the Saône and Rhone; the latter formed part of the Holy Roman Empire from 1032, and was absorbed by France piecemeal during the succeeding centuries.

the pagan Magyars and the Wends of Prussia, and by his Mark system of frontier fortresses (cp. the Anglo-Welsh and Anglo-Scottish Marches) he gave Germany a rampart which preserved her from alien irruptions during the civil wars that succeeded the restoration of the Empire by his son Otto (936-973).

The Saxon Empire was in the first place a triumph of German Kingship, but, as its bounds were extended until they included practically all Charlemagne's Empire except France, it lost its national characteristics, and German and Italian interests were sacrificed to Imperial, cosmopolitan ambitions. Possibly it was for the good of Christendom and Humanity that the ideal of Christian unity should be kept alive, but it was certainly disastrous for Germany and Italy. Both countries suffered from being merely parts of a cosmopolitan system, while other States were growing up on a national basis; both also suffered from the lack of a hereditary national Dynasty—a misfortune which was afterwards one of the main causes of Poland's collapse during the 18th century; in both countries the parts were stronger than the whole, with the results that from the middle of the 13th century Italy became a 'geographical expression,' divided politically into such units as the Papal States, Sicily and Naples and such City-States as Venice, Genoa, and Florence, and from the end of the 15th century became the prey of foreign invaders and one of the 'battlefields of Europe,' while Germany was also divided into scores of great and small States under the nominal leadership of the elected Emperor, but in reality 'enjoying' an amount of local autonomy which prevented internal organisation or combined resistance to foreigners.

Without going into details which would be out of place in an introductory summary, we may perhaps thus sum up the events and tendencies a knowledge of which is necessary to an understanding of the foundations of modern Europe. The chief motive which prevailed on Otto I. to intervene in Italy and revive the cosmopolitan Empire was his desire to gain the supremacy over the Church

in Germany. If the Pope was Spiritual Head of the Church, then the Pope must be subservient to Otto, in order that the latter as Emperor might rule the Church through the Papacy. Hence the necessity of reviving the position of Emperor. After some initial failures, Otto secured the Imperial Crown in 962, and established his power over Italy which he had found in a state of anarchy, disputed succession, and civil war. He confirmed the Pope in the spiritual 'Patrimony of St. Peter,' and the temporal government of part of Central Italy, but insisted that no Pope should be consecrated until he took the oath of fealty to the Emperor. This success and his further triumphs in securing the deposition of one Pope and the banishment of a claimant to the Papacy marked the temporary supremacy of the Emperor over the Papacy and, to a less extent, over Western Christendom.

This, however, was but the first step in a struggle between Empire and Papacy which engrossed the energies of Germany and Italy and prevented their being used for the suppression of local and Feudal privileges, and for national purposes. The Emperors did not insist—as William the Conqueror *did* insist at Salisbury—on the allegiance to the Sovereign of the vassals of tenants-in-chief. Moreover, the Popes were not inclined to accept their position. For nearly a hundred years from 962 the Empire remained at its height, and almost seemed to promise to develop into a German State with vassal States in Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia. But in addition to the disruptive tendencies of local autonomy and Feudal privilege, a new power was introduced into Europe, as a support for the Papacy, in the Cluniac system of Monasticism. Briefly put, this meant that instead of every new monastery becoming independent (cp. Greek ἀποκίαι) they remained attached to the parent monastery. This gave unity to a great and zealous monastic movement which worked for the Papacy and which gave proof of its influence at the time of the First Crusade.

At the very time when the Capetian Monarchy was developing its strength in France and the Norman Monarchy in

England, the Empire fell into the hands of a child, Henry iv., who, after a long minority, found himself faced by Hildebrand, Pope Gregory vii., the greatest Pope since Gregory the Great.¹ The clash came over the question of Investiture; Henry iv. died during the dispute; his successor, Henry v., last of the Saxon Emperors, compromised on the same lines as those adopted by Henry i. of England and Anselm.² But whereas in England the arrangement worked favourably for the Crown so long as the King was strong, in the case of the Empire the moral victory remained with the Papacy. The struggle between Pope and Emperor raged both in Germany and Italy—in the latter it revolved round the Imperial faction of Ghibellines and the Papal party of Guelphs—for nearly two hundred years from 1073, and from 1138 the Empire, under the Hohenstaufens, in spite of the efforts and ability of Frederick Barbarossa, was losing power and prestige as compared with the French and Plantagenet Monarchies. Italy, divided as we have shown above, practically broke away from the Empire after 1250. Germany was injured by the clash between the Empire and France and the defeat of the Imperial allies of John of England at Bouvines in 1214. The interregnum from 1254 to 1273, during which two claimants, Richard of Cornwall, brother of Henry iii. of England, and Alfonso of Castile, struggled unsuccessfully for the Imperial Crown, still further impaired the Imperial interests and prestige, to which German interests were more and more sacrificed.

In 1273 Rudolf was elected, though not consecrated, as first Hapsburg Emperor. Henceforward for more than a century three great families were rivals in power—the Hapsburgs, whose origin was in Switzerland, the Cantons of which gradually established their independence of the Hapsburgs during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries; the Wittelsbachs of Bavaria; and the House of Luxemburg. The end of the struggle and political connection between Empire and Papacy came in the 14th century when the Pope fell entirely under

¹ See p. 24.

² See *British History*, p. 51.

French influence and was removed temporarily to Avignon, as a result of which the Electors drew up the Golden Bull declaring that Papal support should no longer be necessary for the election of the Emperor.

From 1438 onwards the Empire, though still nominally elective, became practically hereditary in the House of Hapsburg; from this date until its abolition in 1806 by Napoleon only two Emperors belonged to any other family. But even thus there was no national Dynasty or union. As Emperors the Hapsburgs owed their position to influence, intrigue, and the preservation of a balance among the Electors; their dynastic interests were bound up with their family dominions, parts of which were neither German nor Imperial. This dual position of the Hapsburgs is the key to the understanding of many of the problems of later history.

The contrast between the history of France and England on the one hand and that of Germany and Italy on the other is well illustrated by the Hundred Years' War. **The Hundred Years' War.** It is a delusion to look upon this war as the fantastic product of adventurous Knights, the raw material of the Troubadours' songs. In spite of an artificial veneer of chivalry and pageantry, the Hundred Years' War was really fought mainly for practical motives; it was modern rather than mediaeval in type. Edward iii. had a keen eye for England's commercial and maritime interests; he fought to defend our seamen in the Channel against French rivals, and our customers, the Fleming Burghers, against their Count and the French, and to break up the Franco-Scottish alliance; his claim to the French Throne was in part a mere artifice by which the Flemings might be enabled to fight for Edward without acknowledging the fact that they were opposing their Lord the King of France. On the other side the best of the French leaders were quite consciously carrying on the policy of Philip Augustus and aiming at the union of France and the elimination of Feudal 'inferiors' who, by virtue of occupying the English Throne, were in practice equal or even superior to their nominal Overlord; they also resented the

Anglo-Fleming alliance as heartily as Edward resented that between France and Scotland.

Moreover, the results of the war were important from the national point of view and for their modernising effects. National consciousness was promoted in both nations; a long step forwards was taken towards the union of France under a national Monarchy; the continental ambitions of the English Crown¹ were checked, and England was forced to accept, what was in truth her greatest asset, insularity, the foundation of her future maritime, commercial, and colonial Empire; the triumph of the English Yeomen, who proved again, what Edward I. had already proved at Falkirk, that the combination of archers, pikemen, and cavalry would defeat either the shock tactics of Feudal chivalry or the defence of pikemen and dismounted men-at-arms; the success in the later stages of mercenary, professional soldiers; and finally the realisation that the bond between English Knight and English Yeoman was stronger than the class bond between English and French Knights—all these tendencies worked towards the decay of the cosmopolitan and class-conscious side of Feudalism.²

It is now time to discuss shortly a subject to which we have already frequently alluded. 'Feudalism,' says Guizot, 'was the first-born of Barbarism.' When the **Feudalism.** Roman system of universal Empire, the Pax Romana, collapsed, some system had to take its place unless Western Europe was to sink back into the anarchy of savagery. Now, in spite of the seeming complexity and artificiality of Feudalism, it is hardly too much to say that it was the natural outcome of existing conditions. What were

¹ These ambitions were a constantly recurring danger in English history: cp. Cnut's Anglo-Scandinavian Monarchy, the Norman, Angevin, and Plantagenet ambitions, Cromwell's Dunkirk adventure, the French and Dutch connections of the later Stuarts, 'Hanoverianism,' and finally the Prussianising influence of the Prince Consort.

² Constitutional aspects are reserved for another chapter. The word Feudalism is derived from *Feudum*, a Mediaeval Latin word meaning a Fief.

the elements of which a new system was to be compounded? In the first place there were the Teutonic tribes whose traditional organisation was one of villages of free landholders possessing an element of Monarchy in the war-Leader, whether King or elected leader; an element of Aristocracy in the hereditary nobles, who had the right to discuss policy and measures; and an element of Democracy in the Folk-Moot of free men, who could signify approval or disagreement. Land-tenure had developed, probably from communal, tribal tenure, into individual tenure of strips of arable land, so scattered as to divide up good land and bad among all, while there were common rights of pasturage. This system was modified (*a*) by the existence of a small Slave-class; (*b*) by the gradual development of 'Gesiths' or 'Thegns' from the bodyguard—'Comites'—of chiefs, a process by which a class of large holders grew up whose tenure depended on service, past or future, to their superiors; (*c*) by the process of migration and conquest; (*d*) by the influence of Roman institutions.

The idea of land-tenure in return for service was familiar to those who came into contact with Rome: for instance, Roman 'Coloni' were garrisons of soldier-farmers, while many Barbarians held 'beneficiary' lands in return for service; while 'servile' or labour tenure was exemplified by the 'villani' on the Roman estates. Land was the main, almost the only, form of wealth and mark of social position among the Teutons.

Nothing then could be more natural than the establishment in Gaul by the conquering invaders of a class of landed aristocrats amidst a population of dependents. This was a mere repetition of an historical process familiar in every age and region—compare the Spartan conquerors with their Perioeci and Helots. Some system of military, judicial, and agricultural administration was necessary, and therefore the Feudal State arose. In the case of England the process is less clearly defined because the Teutonic Conquest was more thorough, and to a large extent the new-comers drove out the

natives and settled in their place. Yet even here the invaders must have been influenced by Roman traditions, and by the survival of large masses of Celtic women and a certain number of Celtic bondsmen, quite apart from the long-continued independence of some of the towns, such as London and Bath, and the successful resistance of the Celtic tribes in the West. Thus their institutions must have been modified from the first, and the 'Danish' invasions, which promoted the growth of Feudalism everywhere, but especially in England, by driving the weak to 'commend' themselves for protection to the strong, accentuated a process that was already in operation. The tendency was in a similar way promoted in Spain and Germany respectively by the Moorish and Magyar invasions. Feudalism was an improvised system of defence, thrown up by Western Europe against anarchy and alien attacks. English Feudalism, therefore, existed before the Norman Conquest. The latter defined it, but cannot be said to have introduced it, and even after the work of the Norman lawyers the division of classes and the conditions of tenure were less stereotyped in England than elsewhere. 'Feudalism' must not be dismissed, as it is so often dismissed by politicians and journalists, as a mere synonym for reaction and oppression. It gave Europe a military, judicial, and economic organisation during a critical period which threatened a relapse into savage anarchy. 'Serfs' were not without rights; the customs of the Manor, interpreted to a great extent by the tenants themselves, provided a safeguard that few of the 'Bold, Bad Barons' of fiction would defy. Moreover, the serfs, like other classes, were secured in their tenure of land; at no subsequent period has so great a proportion of the population of Western Europe, including these islands, held a direct stake in the lands. Conditions were squalid among all classes, but food and clothing, except in times of famine, were plentiful. Even the greatest noble held his land on condition of Public Service—an arrangement which compares favourably either with absolute ownership or with confiscation disguised under crippling taxation. On the

other hand there were grave disadvantages attached to the Feudal system. It was essentially founded on class division. Even the generous side of chivalry was restricted in its operation by considerations of class; a chivalrous Knight might treat with respect a defeated Knight or a Lady in distress, yet think little of butchering low-born prisoners. When the system decayed, as we shall find, many irksome privileges and restrictions remained. Moreover, from a political point of view Feudalism was marred by what we may call the disruptive tendency. This was most disastrous in the Empire where, as noted above, the Sovereign surrendered his rights of suzerainty over the vassals of vassals. In France the power of great vassals, such as the Dukes of Normandy, Burgundy, etc., was the greatest obstacle in the path of national unity. It was not until the 17th century that the national Monarchy really established its supremacy, and even after that the Feudal noblesse, deprived of power and duties, preserved many obnoxious privileges.

In England, as elsewhere, Feudalism at first promoted Monarchy by making the King supreme Landowner and the Fount of Justice, King of England instead of merely leader of the English. But after Alfred's successors had reconquered the Danelagh, the great Earls—in theory Royal nominees administering districts of the conquered territory as the King's representatives, but in reality hereditary and territorial magnates—concentrated about their persons the local sentiment which looked back to the days of the separate Kingdoms, the Danish separatist sentiment, and the disruptive tendencies inherent in Feudalism. Thus Harold of Wessex followed the example of Hugh Capet and usurped the Throne, while the Earls of Mercia and Northumbria in 1066 stood apart from Wessex and obviously hoped to assert their independence. The Norman Conquest crushed this tendency, but until the Wars of the Roses the Feudal nobility retained the power on the one hand to check, in conjunction with the Church, the excesses of a despot, but on the other hand to exploit the

weakness of a Stephen, a Henry III., or a Henry VI. and bring about periods of anarchy and local oppression. Fortunately the Wars of the Roses destroyed the military power of the nobles, and the policy of the Tudors gave us, instead of a privileged and merely ornamental nobility like that of 18th-century France, a political nobility to which in a great measure we owe our constitutional development.

We must realise that Agriculture was almost everywhere the main industry, that manufactures were of a simple nature and lacked the mechanical background of modern life, that the Units in Industry were the Family and the Guild not the Factory, and the Units in Commerce the Town and the Guild rather than the Nation. The City-States of Italy and the Hansa Towns were the pioneers of modern Trade. England, in commerce as in politics, was the first to realise the conception of national industry and commerce. The 'Hansa' or 'League' of Towns and England began with a League between Hamburg and Lübeck in 1241, and within fifty years included eighty-five towns, controlling the continental coasts of the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the mouths of the Elbe, Oder, Weser, and Rhine. Their main business was carrying, but, realising the interdependence of commerce and industry, they insisted that goods produced in Hansa towns must be carried in Hansa ships, established fisheries and factories, and, generally speaking, drew raw materials from the interior of Germany, Russia, Norway, and, above all, England, and manufactured and sold back the finished articles. The word 'Sterling,' derived from Easterling (Easterner), shows that the English hardly knew any money except that of the Hansa merchants of the 'Steelyard'—their English centre. This trading League at one time looked like developing into a great Teutonic State, including Germany, the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and the Baltic districts of Russia. Its failure to achieve this or to maintain its prosperity was due to a variety of causes: (1) that fatal spirit of disunion which was to be the bane of German history and to prevent the national organisation of

the German peoples until they were, at least temporarily, crushed together under the Prussian sword in the 19th century; each city was eager to fight for its own hand and to profit by the misfortunes of its rival cities within the League; (2) the lack of a national hinterland—the Hansa cities were entirely dependent for their materials on alien peoples, and began to decline when these latter developed their own industries and used their own materials; (3) the Protective policy¹ of England—Edward III. not only fought in order to preserve their markets for English agriculturists, but encouraged his subjects to manufacture their own goods; he prohibited the use of foreign cloth, introduced Flemish weavers to instruct his subjects, and encouraged English exporters of cloth by allowing them to use any port for their goods and escape the export duties imposed upon the 'Staplers'—exporters of raw wool, who were compelled to trade only through the 'Staple' towns where the tax could be collected.

Thus English Trade assumed a national aspect. Before this reign it had been the affair of towns, and Town Charters always demanded, in addition to some measure of self-government in matters of Taxation and **Guilds.** Justice, the establishment of a Guild. The mediaeval Guilds, whether the Merchant Guild which supervised the general trade of the town or the Craft Guilds which managed separate industries, differed from modern Trade Unions in that they represented both Masters and Men and insisted on a proper standard of work as well as proper conditions. Although there were disagreements between the Masters on the one hand and the Journeymen and apprentices on the other, or between the Guilds and the unprivileged citizens outside the Guilds, or again, in German towns, between Merchant and Craft Guilds, yet in days of hand-work and domestic industries

¹ The contention of some of the latest writers on the subject—that Edward III. had no complete policy but was an opportunist driven by circumstances—does not affect our argument as to the results.

there was no hard and fast division between Employer and Employed.

The Protective policy of Edward III. was carried on by most of his successors except Henry VIII.¹ and Mary.

English Trade Policy. Edward IV. and Henry VII. were particularly active in promoting our industries, the latter even anticipating the policy of Reciprocity in his commercial treaty with Flanders. Elizabeth carried still farther the policy of promoting English Industry and Shipping; goaded to action by the intrigues and 'penetration' of the German merchants of the Hansa, she finally confiscated their ships with the curt message that she 'felt the greatest contempt for the Hanseatic League and all their proceedings'! She also encouraged her seamen to lay the foundations of our maritime greatness and procured for her subjects the secret of dyeing cloth. This had hitherto been a Florentine monopoly.

The Italian cities suffered like the German and Flemish cities from lack of union and from dependence on foreign sources of supply. Just as the introduction of

Italian Trade. Spanish sheep into England enabled England to supplant Spain as the main wool-producing country, so the introduction of weaving into England led by degrees to the limitation of the supply of English wool to Flanders and Florence. The next stage saw English cloth, freely admitted by the Free Trade policy of the Flemish and Italian cities, cutting out Flemish and Florentine cloth; Florence then concentrated on dyeing until here again England supplanted her.

Venice and Genoa built up their prosperity on the strength of their position on the trade-routes from the East to Europe,² and insisted on enjoying the privilege of Free Trade with the feeble Byzantine Empire. The advance of the Turks administered a fearful blow to this prosperity, and the discovery of the Cape Route by the Portuguese, followed by the establishment of stations which closed the Persian Gulf and the Red

¹ On the other hand, Henry VIII. promoted our shipping and was responsible for the building of ships that could carry heavy guns, and so, indirectly, for the defeat of the Armada.

² See maps in Seebohm's *Era of the Protestant Revolution*.

Sea against Venice, caused the decay of the Merchant Cities of the Mediterranean and introduced the new era of the Atlantic Powers.

We have already referred constantly to the important influence of the Roman Church and, to a less extent, the Western Empire, in keeping alive the ideal of the unity of the civilised world. If the Mediaeval World fell behind the Classical World in the realms of **Mediaeval Thought and Learning.** political administration and freedom of thought, on the other hand it substituted a living Faith for the old Philosophy of the Few and Superstition of the Many. Bishop Stubbs summed up Mediaevalism in a phrase when he said that men fought for 'Right or rights.' The first Crusade and the Baronial strife of King Stephen's reign may be taken as examples of Mediaevalism at its noblest and its worst; in the struggle leading up to Magna Carta we may find traces of both high idealism and selfish class egotism among John's opponents.

To a certain extent Catholicism put Thought into chains; the scope of education was limited, and even the Classical authors were interpreted, to some extent, in accordance with the requirements of Theology. This limitation could be illustrated by reference to the works of the typical Schoolmen—Thomas Aquinas, etc.—or even of Dante, the intellectual giant of the period. Yet these very limitations enabled Christianity to take firm root, and we must not exaggerate their merely restrictive side. The culture of the Saracens led to an early Renaissance in the 12th century, and there was an undercurrent of idealism which survived the Renaissance and the Reformation, and handed on to the thinkers of later ages some conception of Natural Right and Divine Justice. We shall have further opportunities of discussing the later course of these currents of thought.

Meanwhile Universities and Schools were founded—Paris, Bologna, Oxford, Florence, Cambridge, Winchester, etc.—and, in proportion to the populations, large numbers benefited by these foundations. In Merton College and Win-

chester we have the first examples respectively of the residential College and the 'Public School' to which the British Empire owes such a great proportion of its leading men and noblest successes; in brief, Christian principles took root, and the educational mechanism was prepared to deal with the revival of Learning, the Religious controversies, and the Discoveries and Inventions which mark the next epoch in History.

We shall return to the subject of Mediaeval Culture and Art and the work of the Mediaeval Church in the next chapter, when we come to consider the Renaissance and **Art and Architecture.** the Reformation. Intricate workmanship and a loving care of detail are perhaps the outstanding features of Mediaeval art, which lacked realism and anatomical accuracy. Richly and delicately illuminated manuscripts and stained-glass windows may be taken as the typical masterpieces. In the realm of Architecture the Middle Ages are the Golden Period of Western Europe. During the 12th century the Romanesque School produced some of its masterpieces in France and England, the Normans in particular excelling as builders. 'Romanesque' (including 'Norman') churches and castles are modelled upon Roman methods; they are distinguished by round arches, thick walls—since the 'flying buttress' was not yet used—and wooden roofs and ceilings, and give a general impression of solidity and permanence. The 'Gothic' School of architecture began to prevail from the beginning of the 13th century. The name was given by the Italian architects who remained adherents of the Romanesque School, and was intended to imply scorn of the new school as barbarians. Gothic architecture, however, with its pointed arches and flying buttresses, which enabled the builders to lighten the masonry of the walls, has given Western Europe many of its most beautiful cathedrals. Ornamentation increased as time went on. Guildhalls as well as churches were left as a legacy to posterity. But the soaring, graceful lines of Gothic architecture seem naturally adapted to ecclesiastical buildings, and the arts of fanciful sculpture and of stained-glass work grew up to glorify the Gothic

buildings. Modern architecture and decorative art have no masterpieces that can be compared with the Norman churches and castles, the Gothic cathedrals and guildhalls, the wood-work and the stained glass of the Middle Ages.

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CHAPTER III

RENAISSANCE, REFORMATION,
AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERIES

The Renaissance : Mediaeval Culture : The New Learning : Outstanding Figures : Inventions : Influence of Renaissance on Religious and Political Thought : Civilisation's Debt to the Roman Church : Divisions in the Church : Luther : Zwingli : Calvin : Henry VIII. : The Counter-Reformation : History of the Papal Claims : The Jesuits : Political Conditions in Europe : National and Dynastic States : Dynastic Marriages : Genealogy : Geographical Discovery : Charles v. : His Wars against Turkey and France : Beginning of Franco-Austrian Rivalry (Charles VIII. and Italy) : Balance of Power : Charles v. and the Reformation : Religious Wars of 16th and 17th centuries : Dutch Independence : French Huguenots : English and Scottish Civil Wars : Elizabethan War with Spain : Thirty Years' War : Political Results.
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ALTHOUGH the Renaissance was sufficiently real and definite to cause a complete revolution in the intellectual life and indirectly in the religious and political outlook of the Western World, yet one must carefully avoid the tendency to look upon it as a sudden change, a series of concrete facts or events to which a definite date may be assigned. Nothing could be more misleading than the false simplification of History which avoids difficult explanations by means of a catch phrase and a date—for instance '1066 : Norman Conquest : Feudalism' ; '1453 : Capture of Constantinople : Renaissance'—and the danger lies in the fact that by this method a superficial appearance of knowledge can be acquired at the cost of a minimum output of energy on the part of both instructor and pupil !
Even during the 'Dark Ages' the barbarous conquerors

had been gradually conquered by the civilisation of the conquered, and the Church, as we have seen, had 'led Captivity captive.' Norman architecture, Religious and Mediaeval Heraldic art, the growth of Universities are evidence of the intellectual and artistic stirrings of the 11th century. During the 12th and 13th centuries the progress of Thought was such that in this period we find a premature Renaissance which laid the foundations of the true Renaissance, and to this period belong many of the finest 'Gothic' cathedrals and guildhalls. Yet, if considered as a whole, Education and Thought in this period tended to run along grooves under the guidance of the Mediaeval Church. The corner-stone of the Mediaeval conception of Life was the idea of the unity of Christendom ; the universal Church, the Holy Roman Empire, the Latin tongue were the pillars of the edifice. Education was mainly concerned, in Western Europe, with Theology and Logic, and the text-books were the works of the 'Fathers,'¹ some of the Latin 'Classics,' and the works of Aristotle as interpreted by 'scholastic' Churchmen, such as Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, or Albertus Magnus. These limits to Learning did not, as we have seen, include the Byzantine Empire in their sway or hinder the progressive work and thought of the Mohammedan scientists in Syria and Spain, and even in Western Europe a few bold spirits could be found who refused to be confined within the ruts dug by Religion and Custom—men like Abelard of Brittany in the 12th century who introduced a wider study of Aristotle, or Roger Bacon, the Englishman, in the 13th, who argued that all knowledge did not end with Aristotle and advocated the methods of observation and experiment on which modern science was afterwards based. The main part, however, of the work of laying the foundations of the new order was borne by the City-States of North Italy, in which, and particularly in Florence, much of the spirit of the Classical World

¹ Athanasius, Basil, Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine—4th and 5th centuries.

survived.¹ To the cultured Italian, Latin as written by the great authors of antiquity naturally appealed as the literary instrument of civilised and educated men, while the modern languages of Italy and France, derived from conversational Latin, adulterated by contact with alien tongues, appeared almost barbarous. Yet it was the great Italians, Dante, 1264-1321, and Petrarch, 1304-1374, who by their use of the Italian tongue gave the greatest stimulus to the growth of national, modern literatures, and thus indirectly dealt a blow at the Mediaeval conception of a united Christendom led by Rome, and who encouraged the wider study of Greek as well as Latin authors. Both of them, it is true, used Latin as well as Italian as their literary instruments, and Petrarch was inclined to despise and apologise for his Italian poems, yet his Sonnets and Dante's *Divine Comedy* disproved the prevalent idea that great literature belonged only to the 'dead' tongues.

The 13th and 14th centuries, then, marked the re-birth of the study of Ancient Literature and Art for their own sake—the humanistic study—and the birth of new national literatures and schools of art. The 15th century cannot claim a monopoly of the Renaissance, but marked the full development and process of the movement and its penetration into England, France, and Germany. It is in this connection that 1453, the year of the Fall of Constantinople, is a significant date, for it converted into a full stream the former trickle of Greek scholars into Western Europe.² We shall find that this date is of similar significance, as marking the culmination of a long process, with regard to the new era of geographical discoveries.

Perhaps the finest fruit of the Renaissance may be said,

¹ Italian architects had always favoured the 'Romanesque' style of building (based on late Roman basilicas) as opposed to the 'Gothic,' and they now began to look back to the older models of Greece.

² The advent of Chrysoloras of Constantinople as Professor of Greek at the University of Florence, shortly after Petrarch's death, had been a striking event in the 14th century.

without insular prejudice, to have been borne in the Elizabethan period, late 16th and early 17th centuries, of English Literature.

It is impossible, in a compressed account, to attempt to give an exhaustive, or even a representative, list of the names and achievements of the leaders in this movement without laying oneself open to the charge, in the one case, of compiling a mere catalogue, in the other of making an arbitrary and inadequate selection. The latter charge appears to be the less damaging in the case of a work which purports to give merely a clear sketch of main features. We therefore suggest the following as a list of some of the representative leaders in different sides of the Renaissance, and suggest that our readers should at least gain some acquaintance with the significance of the work of these men and supplement it, wherever possible, by the study of the original works themselves, and by the addition of other names equally illustrious.

Among the precursors of the literary movement the names of Chaucer and Wyclif should be added to those already mentioned—Abelard, Roger Bacon, Dante, and Petrarch; as examples of the painters and sculptors who added to the patient skill and detailed workmanship of the Middle Ages a sense of form, a realism, and a knowledge of anatomy based upon the study of the masterpieces of ancient Athens, we select Niccola of Pisa, the sculptor, Leonardo da Vinci and Michael Angelo, who were poets, sculptors, and architects as well as painters, Raphael and Titian, the painters, as nobly representative of the Italian School at a time when Florence, Rome, and Venice led the artistic world; the influence of Classical models is equally clear in the architectural masterpieces of Rome and Venice. Rubens, Rembrandt, and Van Dyck may be taken as leaders of the Flemish or Dutch School of Painting and Velasquez of the Spanish. In Germany, always the home of fine craftsmanship, Albert Dürer and his followers developed the art of engraving (woodcuts and copperplate), and we shall find also that to Germany we owe

Some
Outstanding
Figures.

the art of printing. In Erasmus and Dean Colet we may see types of the enthusiastic teachers of the New Learning. France produced a new school of Lyric poets, the first of any merit since Classical times. England, like France, lagged behind the Italian cities, but when the work of Erasmus and Colet and Sir Thomas More had had time to penetrate through the Court, the Universities, and the Public and Grammar Schools,¹ the result is seen in the work of a group of poets and dramatists who equalled, if they did not surpass, even the men of Athens in the 5th century B.C. Shakespeare, Spenser, Marlowe, Ben Jonson, and Sidney did for English Literature and Language what the Elizabethan sailors and statesmen did for the English State; Milton, the poet of the Puritan Movement, was essentially a child of the Renaissance and made his debt to the Ancients almost too palpably evident; English prose-writing did not yet reach the standard of the great prose-writers of Greece and Rome, but Sir Thomas More, Sir Walter Raleigh, Francis Bacon, and Milton started it definitely on the right road, while the Authorised Translation of the Bible, prepared at the order of James I., is the model and standard *par excellence* of the English tongue.

It is not only owing to the new intellectual outlook and literary output that the 15th century may be said to mark the culmination of the movement which led to the development of the modern world and civilisation as we know them to-day. It was also an era of geographical discoveries, political and religious change, and scientific inventions, and all these elements acted and reacted upon each other. Gunpowder, for instance, although not a new invention, now came into such general use that, as a royal monopoly, it greatly helped the Tudor rulers of England to take advantage of the exhaustion of the nobility after the Wars of the Roses and, having abolished private armies, to set up the first model of a modern State. It also enabled European mariners and soldiers to subdue the New

¹ The reigns of Henry VI. (Eton), Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth were very prolific in the foundation of schools and colleges.

World. Again, the revival of Mathematics and Science, which accompanied the new interest in Greek¹ Thought, led to the study of Astronomy and Navigation by such men as Müller and Copernicus (Kopernic, a Pole), and this, together with the discovery of the use of the magnetic needle and the compass—hitherto only known to the Chinese—and the study of Geography by such men as Prince Henry 'the Navigator' of Portugal, made possible the maritime discoveries of Columbus and his contemporaries and followers, which we must describe presently. Of at least equal importance is the debt owed to the German and Dutch craftsmen who invented printing from movable type, which enabled books to be produced rapidly and accurately, while the invention of paper greatly reduced the cost of production. It had taken forty-five copyists two years to produce two hundred volumes for the library of Cosimo, father of Lorenzo 'the Magnificent,' and in manuscript work it is inevitable that many errors and variations slip into the texts. Printing enabled Western Europe to cope with its own new literature and the books imported from Greece; two hundred and thirty-eight volumes were brought from Constantinople to Venice by a single scholar in 1423, while, as we have seen, the advance of the Turks led to a general migration of scholars. The first books of considerable size to be printed were the Mayence Bible (1456) and Psalter (1457); in England Caxton's Press started work in 1474; Caxton worked with Mansion, who, in his turn, had learnt the art from Gutenberg, who first printed a book in 1450.

Perhaps the most important of all the aspects of the Renaissance from the point of view of the historian is its effect on Religious and Political Thought. It has been said that Mankind develops 'from Status to Contract,' that is to say from a state in which custom is accepted without much questioning—

Influence of Renaissance on Religious and Political Thought.

¹ The idea of antagonism between Classical and Scientific studies would have been received in the 15th century with incredulous contempt.

whatever is, shall be—to a state in which men analyse and demand to know the reason why. In the history of Modern Western Europe the Renaissance is a very distinct landmark in this advance. Men shook off the shackles of custom in Education, Literature, and Art, and, as a natural corollary, they began to think and reason about political and ecclesiastical dogmas, customs, and institutions. Moreover, a new national consciousness began to question the old cosmopolitan conception of Christendom. We shall find, when we come to deal with the political aspect, that at first the new ideas tended to strengthen Monarchies. Like Voltaire in the 18th century, the new school of thinkers inclined to destroy all privileges except those of the Monarchs, who stood for the nations against cosmopolitan Church, Empire, and Feudalism. But just as was afterwards the case in Revolutionary France, the same arguments that at first strengthened the kingly power were capable at a later stage of being used by the enemies of Absolutism.

Before we attempt to trace the course and results of the movements which are known as the Reformation, we must utter one note of warning. Even if it is not quite true to say, with Talleyrand, that every nation gets the government it deserves, yet it is fairly safe to affirm that any institution that survives for centuries, in spite of abuses to which all human institutions are liable, must have filled some very real need or needs. It is only right, then, before we look into the abuses which had grown up in the Roman Catholic Church—abuses which the best members of that Church acknowledged and endeavoured to eradicate—and whether we believe or not that the Mediaeval Church had outlived its utility, that we should summarise the debt that civilisation owes to that Church. In brief, we may say that the organised Church saved Christianity, converted the Teutonic conquerors of Western Europe, introduced them to some degree of civilisation, preserved some rudiments of education and culture, set an example of order and justice in ages when

Might was Right, helped to establish the French State, and gave the first example of national unity to the Angles and Saxons in England, held up high ideals before generations that were mainly barbarous, preserved a civilised system of law in contrast to the Tribal and Feudal customs and codes, supplied administrators and 'clerks'—*i.e.* educated men—to all civil governments, offered to the poor man and serf the only opportunity of rising in life, mitigated the horrors of Feudal warfare (cp. the Truce of God, etc.), organised resistance to the Mohammedans, and in addition to all this carried on what seems to modern notions the main duty of the Church by offering to all the consolations of Religion and by striving for the Peace and Unity of Christendom. The culture and civilisation which centred round the Mediaeval Church, narrow and stereotyped though they may have been, were the only ray of light in the 'Dark Ages' from Alaric to Charlemagne. The latter greatly promoted the work of the Church in respect of Education, and, although the late 9th and the 10th centuries mark a reaction and a falling away from his standards and ideals, yet post-Charlemagne Europe never again sank to the level of the real Dark Ages and, as we have seen, the Europe of the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries gave to later ages the foundations of the revival of Art and Literature, and there was at any rate a variety and scope in Education sufficient to justify us in saying that the University of Paris 'specialised' in Theology, that of Bologna in Law, and that of Oxford in Science and Theology.

On the other hand, there can be no question as to the reality of the abuses which had gradually grown up in the Church. The Mediaeval conception of Christendom as a single Church must attract all Christian thinkers. It is easy to see the damage which disunion and the internecine strife of warring sects has done to Christianity, and one is inclined to regret the disruption that followed the Reformation, just as one may regret the violence of the French Revolution; more accurately speaking, it is rather the circumstances—the abuses, blunders, and obstinacy—that

**Civilisation's
Debt to the
Roman
Catholic
Church.**

**Divisions in
the Church.**

made these upheavals a necessary preliminary to Reform which one should regret. Yet it is an interesting thought that possibly, human nature being what it is, some measure of disunion and rivalry is necessary to efficiency. In Politics the strife of Parties is often pernicious, and writers such as Bolingbroke have advocated the abolition of the Party system; but Burke and others have replied that the fear of rivals is the foundation for efficiency and honesty, and possibly this applies to matters ecclesiastical as well as to political affairs. There are, of course, many problems in dealing with which Christendom may and must act as one force; nothing proved this more conclusively than the War of 1914-1918. But the Reformation decided, possibly for all time, that Christendom should be at the best a coalition of independent sects and at the worst a house divided against itself.

There had been from the earliest times schisms within the body of Christendom; the most important, in its lasting effects, before the time of the 'Protestant Reformation,' was the separation in 866 A.D. of the Eastern from the Roman Church. In spite of many attempts at reunion, especially during the final advance of the Turks on Constantinople (1439-1453), the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Churches have remained separate. Of late years there has been a promising movement towards union between the Orthodox and the Anglican communions.

Among the most important 'Heresies' was the Arian Heresy, condemned by the Council of Nicaea. Among the followers of Arius, who died 336 A.D., were the missionaries who converted the East Goths, and the latter were greatly handicapped by their heretical views in dealing with the conquered populations, whereas conversely, as we have seen, the Franks were welcomed by the Papacy as allies. Other important sects were the 'Albigenses'—named after the French town Albi—or 'Cathari' (pure), a very ancient sect which was active in Italy in the 11th, and in Southern France during the 12th century, until brutally suppressed by the Crusade of Simon de Montfort's father, and the Waldensians

—named after Peter Waldo of Lyons—a sect which protested against the Clergy rather than against doctrines. The great Englishman Wyclif, during the reign of Edward III., and his Bohemian disciple, Huss, who was burnt to death at Constance in 1415, protested mainly against the claims of the Papacy and the abuses practised by the Clergy, especially the higher Clergy, and, like the Waldensians before them, insisted upon preaching and reading the Bible in the tongues of the peoples. Wyclif gave us the first complete English translation of the Bible. Gradually Wyclif and, in his turn Huss, became committed to doctrinal changes. Heresy, during the 15th century, was considered to be alike treasonable towards the State and blasphemous towards God. The 'Lollards,' Wyclif's followers, were persecuted by the Lancastrian Kings, who owed their position partly to the support of the Church, and the Hussites, after a gallant fight in the 'Huss Wars,' were suppressed mainly owing to internal dissensions. Nevertheless the influence of Waldo, Wyclif, and Huss lived after them and helped to call men's attentions to various abuses which the Roman Church would have done well to remedy but with which the Church Councils of Constance and Basel failed to cope.

Foremost amongst these abuses were: (1) 'Simony'—the sale of ecclesiastical positions and influence; (2) 'Pluralism'—the concentration of several offices in the hands of a single man, with the consequent enrichment of the individual and neglect of his duties; (3) the scandalous lives of some, though by no means all, of the Popes and Clergy, especially the higher Clergy, both Regular (Monks) and Secular (Parochial), aggravated in the effects on public opinion by the 'Babylonian¹ Captivity' and the 'Great¹ Schism'; (4) the sale of Indulgences and Pardons.

Although theological problems constitute an important part of History, yet it is our intention to avoid introducing controversial arguments on religious subjects. Seeing, however, that this question of 'Indulgences' was the immediate

¹ See pp. 38, 39, 65.

cause of Luther's first defiance of Rome, it is necessary to explain the meaning of the phrase. The abuse, like many abuses, grew out of a very beautiful conception; priests had the power of granting pardon to contrite sinners, thus purging them of guilt but not of penalties, whether in this world or in Purgatory. The virtues of Christ and of the Saints were considered to provide a fund of grace on which repentant sinners could draw, after confession to a priest. In course of time the practice grew up of allowing money payments occasionally to take the place of penalties, and it was even considered possible to escape by this means some part of one's time in Purgatory. The Papacy had to some extent connived at this practice, since Leo X. had issued Indulgences, which could be bought for the benefit both of the living and of the dead, to provide money for rebuilding St. Peter's. In the hands of unscrupulous priests and charlatans this system was corrupted until there was what one can only describe as a Tariff for the buying and selling of pardons. It was the arrival in the neighbourhood of Wittenberg of one Tetzel to sell Indulgences for the benefit of St. Peter's reconstruction which roused Luther to his historic protest. In October 1517 he nailed to the cathedral door at Wittenberg, where he was a professor, a copy of his ninety-five contentions against Indulgences.

There can be little, if any, doubt that Luther at first had no more intention of breaking away altogether from the Roman communion than Wesley in the 18th century had of leaving the Church of England. The development of Lutheranism was to some extent the result of the political conditions of Western and Central Europe in general and of Germany in particular. These conditions we must subsequently describe when we come to deal with the great Wars of Religion.

Luther's views rapidly developed into the denial of the Papal authority and a demand for a new system of organisation. In 1520 he was excommunicated, and in 1521 the Imperial Diet at Worms put him under the 'Ban of the

Empire,' but his friend the Elector of Saxony gave him a secure refuge.

The influence of his demand for free investigation in the search for religious truth and the hopes and ideals thus aroused naturally reacted in different ways on different classes of Society, and Lutheranism was thus partly responsible for the Peasants' War in Germany (1524-1525). Luther, however, so far from sympathising, feared that the revolt would discredit his movement, and espoused the cause of the nobles. Thenceforward Lutheranism became more and more associated with the interests of the ruling classes, thus leaving the way clear for other leaders—Zwingli and Calvin—to appeal to the more democratic elements, although we shall find that the Calvinists, however revolutionary under oppression, were at least as tyrannous as any other sect when in power. The name 'Protestant' arose out of a protest on the part of the signatories to what would nowadays be called the 'Minority Report' of a Diet at Speyer in 1529 against the decision of the majority to uphold the anti-Lutheran declaration of Worms. In 1530 these 'Protestants' drew up a definite, though moderate, Lutheran Creed, known as the 'Confession of Augsburg,' and when the Emperor denounced this, the Protestant powers, under the leadership of the rulers of Saxony, Hesse, and Brandenburg, formed the defensive League of Schmalkalden.

While Lutheranism thus established itself as the religion of some of the Princes and ruling classes of Germany, two more 'popular' sects of Reformers had grown up elsewhere. In 1518 Zwingli at Zurich followed the example set in the previous year by Luther at Wittenberg by denouncing Indulgences. He subsequently developed his creed, with the support of a large number of adherents in Switzerland, in the direction of democratic Church government. It must be remembered that in civil affairs the Swiss were more democratic than were Luther's fellow-Germans. Zwingli and Luther also differed doctrinally as to the nature of the Communion Service. Without

Zwingli,
Calvin, and
Henry VIII.

going into the details of Theology we may summarise the points of the controversy as follows: the Roman Catholics believed in the actual 'transubstantiation' of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Our Lord; Luther rejected this doctrine, but held that, while in substance they remained bread and wine, yet after consecration some new element was added to them. Zwingli held that the Communion was merely a commemorative service; while Calvin, although he rejected any belief in a miraculous element, yet believed that Communion was a necessary means to salvation.

Calvin, originally intended for the Roman Priesthood, was converted to Protestantism in 1533, wrote his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* at Basel, and in 1536 began his work at Geneva. He differed from Luther and from Henry VIII. both in his doctrine, which was more radically 'reformed,' and in his ideas on the problem of Church government. He opposed the Lutheran and Anglican State-Church systems, and set up a separate ecclesiastical system of government under a mixed 'Consistory' of ministers and lay elders. Thus Calvin was the founder of Presbyterianism, which John Knox, his disciple, introduced into Scotland. In many respects also Calvinism, with its belief in Predestination, and its rigorous, and even tyrannous, moral code, inspired the other Puritan sects, and gave their fighting spirit to the French Huguenots, the Dutch Protestants, the Scottish Reformers and Covenanters, and the English Puritans.

The Church of England, unlike the English Puritans, looked for inspiration not to the 16th-century reformers but to the old Fathers of the Church. Henry VIII. and his Parliament, in their prohibition of appeals to Rome, their Act of Supremacy, 1534, and other acts, claimed that they were purifying the Church of abuses and of Papal usurpations, and were returning to the spirit and institutions of the primitive Church. Elizabeth's Act of Supremacy makes the same claim, and it must be remembered that many English Kings had in the past resisted Papal claims—cp. the Customs of the Conqueror, the Investiture dispute, the Constitutions of

Clarendon, John's resistance to the Pope, the various Acts of Provisors and Praemunire, etc.

Henry had gained his title 'Defender of the Faith' by an argument against Luther, and his 'Six Articles' in 1539 showed that, while insisting upon an independent national government of the Church, upon reform of abuses and the use of the English tongue, he was no Protestant. Edward VI.'s 'Protectors' carried the Church some way towards Calvinism; Mary attempted to force a complete reaction; Elizabeth returned to the *via media* of her father, and although she admitted more Protestantism of doctrine than he had done, yet it soon became clear that extreme Puritans could not remain within the Church.¹ The Hampton Court Conference called by James I. marks the admission of this fact.

Thus the 16th century saw the growth of a national branch of the Catholic Church in England, some Lutheran State Churches in Germany, popular Protestant sects in Switzerland, Scotland, and what is now Holland, and in addition Protestant minorities in France and other orthodox countries.

Before we consider the evil results of the Protestant Reformation, the Wars of Religion, and the consequent legacy of disunion and even hostility, we must notice **The Counter-Reformation.** one more beneficial result. The rapid spread of Protestantism spurred the Roman Church to effect an internal reform of its abuses such as it had failed to effect previously in spite of many Councils and other attempts. The Council of Trent, 1545-1563, owing to Jesuit influence, carried through salutary measures to secure better discipline and efficiency among the Clergy, to abolish abuses, and to improve education. By these means it not only strengthened the Church for the performance of its religious duties, but also inspired a reaction which enabled Rome to stem, and in some instances drive back, the flood of Protestantism. The Council also issued definite state-

¹ The majority remained in the Church before the Conference and hoped to control it.

ments of doctrine, which while defining the position of those who remained within the fold, made the breach between Rome and Protestantism unbridgeable. For instance, it condemned the views of all the 'reformed' sects as to the Sacraments, and insisted upon the 'Vulgate,' the old Latin version, as the only orthodox translation of the Bible. Moreover, the claims of the Papacy, which, as we have seen, were the cause of constant disputes in Mediaeval times between Popes and Emperors and Kings, were so far accepted that the doctrine of the Spiritual Supremacy of the See of Rome became a necessary article of belief. This alone, in spite of the policy of Mary, 1553-1558, rendered the reconciliation of the English Church with Rome impossible. It may be useful at this point to summarise the steps by which the Papacy evolved and established these claims.

Leo the Great, 440-461, persuaded the Emperor Valentinian III. to declare, in a decree of 445, that the power of the Bishop of Rome was supreme, owing to Peter's merits and apostolic headship and the majesty of Rome. Six years later, however, Constantinople was raised to ecclesiastical equality, but this second decree was not accepted in the West. Gregory the Great, 590-604, became temporal ruler of Rome, under the merely nominal control of the Eastern Emperor, and by his missionary enterprises and diplomatic skill established the temporal influence and spiritual supremacy of Rome. The growth of the Monastic movements strengthened the control of the Papacy over the Church, and the alliance with the Frankish King, Pippin, 752, and the Emperor Charlemagne, 800, strengthened the political power of the Papacy as well as that of the Franks. The reforms of Leo IX., 1049-1054, and his journeys throughout large parts of Europe which led to the institution of Legates—just as the journeys of English Kings led to the institution of itinerant Justices—were followed by the emancipation from Lay Control of the Papal Elections; Nicholas II., by a decree in 1059, vested the right of Election

**History of
the Papal
Claims.**

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in the Cardinals—the suburban Bishops and Deacons of the Lateran¹ and certain parish priests of Rome.

It remained for the great Gregory VII., 1073—Hildebrand, formerly an adviser of Leo IX.—to state the Hildebrandine conception of the Papacy, which, after centuries of dispute, was accepted by the Roman Church during the period known as the Counter-Reformation. The Pope, he claimed, may depose, reinstate, or transfer Bishops; no Council may speak for Christendom, no book be accepted as authoritative, without his sanction; the Roman Church is infallible and must be accepted by all Catholic Christians as such; in the name of righteousness the Pope may even restrain civil Governments. We need not enter again into the details of Gregory's relations with William the Conqueror; nor of the quarrels with the Emperor Henry IV., caused by the Pope's attempts to put his theories into practice, nor yet into the story of the long struggle between Popes and Emperors. It is the Hildebrandine conception of the Papacy which we wish to emphasise. The Crusades and the coming of the Friars further strengthened the Mediaeval Papacy, while the triumph of Innocent III. over King John of England may be taken as an example of the practice of these theories by the most powerful of the Mediaeval Popes.

The 'Captivity,' 1305-1377, during which period seven successive Popes resided at Avignon, in a state of scandalous luxury and of political subservience to France, followed by the Great Schism, 1378-1417, during which, owing to disputed elections, there were two and at one time three Popes, combined with the disgraceful characters of certain Popes to destroy temporarily much of this power. But the theory remained and, as we have seen, was accepted as an article of faith during the Counter-Reformation period.

Among the most active and effective champions of the utmost claims of the Papacy must be recognised the Jesuits,

¹ The Cathedral Church of the Roman Bishopec. All Cardinals are titular Cardinal Bishops or Deacons of the Lateran or Priests of some Roman Parish.

or members of the Society of Jesus. This organisation was evolved between 1534 and 1539 by a Spaniard, Ignatius Loyola. Himself a former soldier of Charles v., **The Jesuits.** he organised his followers, under the sanction of a Papal Bull, on military lines of discipline: absolute obedience must be paid to superior officers; the General, chosen by the general assembly of the Order, was to be supreme and to rule for his life-time; there must be no questioning, since the end justified the means and absolute obedience cannot allow questions. English readers are apt to connect the Jesuits mainly with plots against Elizabeth and with the atrocities of the Inquisition in the Netherlands, the Indies, Mexico, and Peru. We must, however, remember that Loyola and his followers were devoted men who sacrificed all in order to defend the objects of their faith and veneration; the Jesuits—except for the period from 1773, when the Order was abolished by the Pope, until their restoration in 1814—have produced the most zealous and successful missionaries of modern times, from the Jesuits in Canada and Patagonia to the present-day Missions in West Africa; the Inquisition was not the instrument of the Jesuits, but had been founded as a system of secret tribunals under the Papacy in the 13th century to fight against Albigensian and other heresies, and had been revived in Spain by Isabella to root out Jews, Moors, and Mariscoes before the foundation of the Jesuits; Charles v. revived the Inquisition in the Netherlands to attack Protestantism.

We must now turn to the consideration of the political conditions in the Europe of Charles v. and the era of the Wars of Religion. The processes by which England and France developed into strong national States will be described in a chapter on constitutional developments. For the purposes of this chapter it is enough to say that, after a temporary revival of Feudal anarchy, marked by the Wars of the Roses—the result of the 'Family Settlement' of Edward III.—the Tudor Despotism gave England a strong government, supported by

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the mass of the nation, which fitted this country to play its part in the new epoch. The development of France followed rather similar lines; the Hundred Years' War and a Family Policy resembling that of Edward III.—*i.e.* the accumulation of landed estates in the hands of various members of the Royal Family by means of marriages or Crown Grants, with the result that various cliques of nobles were attached by kinship and interest to various branches of the Royal House, *e.g.* Armagnacs and Burgundians, Lancastrians and Yorkists—temporarily undid the work of the great Capetian Kings, Philip Augustus, 'Saint' Louis IX., Philip IV., and brought about a relapse into Feudal anarchy and disunion during the reigns of the early Kings of the House of Valois, which started with Philip VI. (1328-1350). The success of Charles VII. (1422-1461) over the English, however, and the astute diplomacy by which his successor, Louis XI., gradually overcame the ambitions of Charles 'the Bold' of Burgundy, gave France internal peace and increase of territory, and thus enabled Charles VIII. to play his part backed by a strong nation. The subjection of Feudalism to the Crown was not so complete in France by the end of the 15th century as it was in England, yet these two Western Powers stand out as national States in strong contrast to the conditions that prevailed in Germany.

Before we can make clear the conditions of the German portions of the dominions of the Emperor Charles v., we must allude to the growth of a third Western national State—Spain—and must also master the details of certain dynastic marriages which had great influence on the growth of nations and on international relations. The Arab civilisation in Spain reached its highest point during the 10th century when Cordova, with its University, Public Baths, and fine buildings, its extensive commerce and progressive industry, art, and science, presented a contrast to the rest of Europe and to the future history of Spain; this epoch, in fact, was the only period at which Spain led the world in industry, education, and general progress. During the 11th century the Khalifate fell to pieces and the little Christian Kingdoms, Castile, Aragon, Navarre, and


Portugal, began to push back the Mohammedans. By the end of the 13th century Portugal had already reached practically its present boundaries, while 'Moorish' rule had been ousted from Cordova and Seville, and was almost confined to the Kingdom of Granada in the mountainous South. In 1492 the city of Granada fell, after a long siege, into the hands of Isabella and Ferdinand and Moorish rule disappeared from the Peninsula. The expulsion of the Moors from Spain in 1609, after a century of oppression at the hands of the Inquisition, deprived the Spanish Empire of its most industrious class and, together with the collapse of its Sea-Power, did much to reduce Spain from its short-lived greatness.

The marriage in 1469 of Isabella of Castile to Ferdinand of Aragon, which may be taken as the beginning of the Kingdom of Spain, is one among many marriages the importance of which must be grasped. New States, based on nationality, were growing up round national Dynasties, but there were also cases, from the 15th to the end of the 18th centuries, where dynastic and national interests clashed and unnatural conglomerations grew up instead of organic States.

The Hapsburgs, in particular, were so successful in increasing their family dominions by the marriages of Hapsburg heirs to neighbouring heiresses that their success became proverbial: 'Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube.'

The following details will explain how the Hapsburg Dynasties were established in Spain and the Netherlands as well as in Austria, and how Bohemia and Hungary were added to the family dominions of the Austrian Hapsburgs: for a time all of these dominions, both Austrian and Spanish, were united under the rule of Charles v., but on his abdication, in 1556, the Austrian Dominions were given to his brother, Ferdinand, who was also elected Emperor, while his son, Philip II., became ruler of Spain, the Netherlands, and the Italian and American possessions of the Hapsburgs. The position of the Austrian Hapsburgs as Emperors must be kept quite distinct in the mind from their position as hereditary

THE HAPSBURG MARRIAGES AND DOMINIONS



rulers of the family dominions. The post of Emperor was elective, although in practice, as we have noticed, the Hapsburgs almost established a prescriptive, or customary, right.

Emperor Maximilian I. (Austrian Hapsburg) married (1477) Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles 'the Bold.' Thus the Netherlands fell under Hapsburg sway. The actual Duchy of Burgundy had been seized by Louis XI. of France; the Netherlands had been gained by marriage, and now, by marriage, went to the Hapsburgs. The son of this marriage, Philip, married Joanna, the daughter of the Spanish Sovereigns Ferdinand (of Aragon) and Isabella (of Castile), and thus Charles V., son of Philip and Joanna, inherited the Austrian and Spanish dominions. His brother, Ferdinand, who succeeded him as ruler of the Austrian dominions and as Emperor, married Anna, the heiress of Bohemia and Hungary, thus adding those Kingdoms to the family possessions of the Austrian Hapsburgs. Charles's son, Philip II. of Spain, the Netherlands, Milan, the Sicilies, and the 'Indies,' by his marriage with Mary of England and his subsequent negotiations with Queen Elizabeth and Mary Queen of Scots, hoped to join Britain to the Hapsburg dominions, but in this case the family fortune failed to materialise. Portugal, however, fell into Philip's hands in 1580 as the result of both marriage policy and conquest, and it was not until 1640 that the Portuguese regained their independence under the House of Braganza.

The Hapsburgs of Austria and Spain were not the only Dynasties which owed something to diplomatic marriages: Charles VIII. of France married Anne, Duchess of Brittany, in 1491, in spite of the threats of Ferdinand and Isabella, and of Henry VII. of England, and thus absorbed the last of the great Feudal Dependencies of the French Crown; the final success of France in the Hundred Years' War had rid the French Kings of the old English peril, while Louis XI. had annexed the French portions of the Burgundian possessions.

The Tudors in England also looked to marriage as a means towards dynastic and national ends. The marriage of Henry VII. to Elizabeth of York went far towards securing the Tudor Dynasty; Henry VIII. and Protector Somerset hoped, in vain, to marry Edward VI. to Mary of Scotland, but the marriage of Margaret, daughter of Henry VII., to James of Scotland resulted ultimately in the Union of the Crowns of England and Scotland under James I. of England and VI. of Scotland.

In addition to Religious Reforms, the New Learning and Inventions, and what we may call the modernisation of the political conditions of a large part of Europe, this **Geographical Discovery** epoch was also marked by Geographical Discovery. The Greeks and Romans had known very little of the world outside the Mediterranean lands—Southern Europe, North Africa, and Western Asia—and Western Europe, but Alexander the Great reached the Punjab and, by way of Persia and Egypt respectively, many vague rumours and some of the products of the Far East and Central Africa permeated to Rome. The Semitic Phoenicians had been more daring seamen and had discovered Britain, explored the Red Sea, and on at least one occasion—Hanno's voyage 500 B.C.—sailed along the West Coast of Africa as far South as Sierra Leone.¹ The Jews penetrated Central Africa, through Egypt, and had trading connections with the Far East—Isaiah's 'Sinim' being probably Chinese. In the aggregate, however, there was very slight connection between Classical Europe and the Far East, while Central and Southern Africa, shut in by the Sahara by land and defended by unwholesome coasts and savage inhabitants from adventurers by sea, remained unknown. The geographical knowledge of early Mediaeval Europe was even more limited, until the Crusades reintroduced Western Europeans to Syria and Egypt. There can be no reasonable doubt that Danish adventurers from Greenland colonies, founded by settlers from Danish Iceland,

¹ A passage in Herodotus, purposing to *disprove* this, goes far towards *proving* it.

reached the Eastern coast of North America from Labrador to Maine—'Vineland'—but these adventures added nothing to the real knowledge of Mediaeval Europe. In the 13th century the Polos, Venetian merchants, visited the Mongol Emperor of China at Peking, and after their return in 1295 Marco Polo published an account of their travels, and excited great interest by his tales of Japan (Zipangu) and of the spice markets of Ceylon and the Moluccas. In days when transport was too slow for the conveyance of fresh meat for long distances, when artificial ice was unknown, and when a large proportion of cattle had to be killed before the winter because there were no artificial foods for the months when grass is scarce, a supply of spices, to preserve meat and to mitigate the nastiness of bad food, was a matter of the first importance. In the interest of this trade Venetian and Genoese merchants crossed the Isthmus of Suez by land and sailed through the Red Sea. The bulk of the Spice Trade was in the hands of Mohammedan merchants who sold to these Italian traders, but the danger of the disturbance of this trade owing to the aggressive attitude of the Turks during their final campaigns against Constantinople turned men's attention to other possible routes. The Portuguese took the lead in these new enterprises. Prince Henry 'the Navigator' founded a school for navigation and geography and sent out constant expeditions to explore the West Coast of Africa. The discovery and colonisation of Madeira was one of the first rewards of his zeal, and before his death Gil Eannés¹ had rounded Cape Bojador, Nuno Tristram was slain after passing Cape Verde, and Cadamosto carried out a trading voyage as far south as the Gambia River. Prince Henry died in 1460; the following year Pedro de Cintra reached Sierra Leone, and the next ten years were spent in exploitation rather than exploration; in 1471 Fernando Po reached the island which bears his name, and by 1475 the Equator had been crossed. Diego Cam was the next great Portuguese explorer; he discovered the Congo River and sailed up its mouth as far as the Yalala

¹ Gil and Nuno were Portuguese; Cadamosto a Venetian merchant.

Falls, while in a subsequent voyage he reached the neighbourhood of Walfisch Bay. By order of his Sovereign, John II., Diego and other Portuguese mariners of this period set up stone pillars to commemorate their farthest discoveries. In 1486 Bartholomew Diaz, having sailed from Lisbon, actually rounded the Cape of Good Hope, so named by King John because there was now good hope of reaching India—though Bartholomew had named it the Cape of Storms. By this time the Spaniards were taking a hand in exploration, and in 1492 Christopher Columbus made his great voyage in the service of Ferdinand and Isabella. The object of Columbus, as of the Portuguese, was to reach the spice lands of the East Indies, India, China, and Ceylon. None as yet knew the size of the World, and therefore, even when it became realised that he had not reached the East Indies, as he at first thought, yet the idea that he had come near to doing so stirred up the Portuguese to greater efforts on their chosen route. Accordingly, in 1498 King Emmanuel of Portugal sent forth Vasco da Gama, a nobleman, with orders to complete the Cape voyage to India, and after an adventurous voyage, the difficulties of which were increased by the hostility of the Arab traders along the East coast of Africa, he actually reached India. In 1502 the Portuguese conquered Calicut, and during the following years their occupation of Ormuz on the Persian Gulf put an end to the trade which had been carried on between Arabs and Venetians, while Goa, Colombo, and Malacca became markets which supplied Lisbon with Eastern goods and made it, for the time, the centre of the Spices and Silk Trade.

Thus Portuguese exploration opened up the coasts of Africa—the interior remained unknown for many generations, until the time of the great English explorers—and established a new route to the East, thus shifting the centre of the world's commerce from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic nations, first Portugal, then England, Holland, and France. Spanish exploration, aiming at the same goal, produced a very different result. The great Genoese, Columbus, believed that in

his first discovery—San Salvador in the West Indies—he had fulfilled his hope and reached the East Indies: Haiti he took for Japan, Cuba for the Mainland of Asia, the inhabitants he considered 'Indians.' Even his second voyage, along the coast of South America to the Orinoco, did not convince him. His successors, not knowing the extent of the American Continent nor realising the existence of the Pacific, underestimated the importance of their discovery of the New World, but, by persevering in their attempts to sail round America to the Far East, they hastened the task of exploration. The first man to circumnavigate the globe was Magellan, a Portuguese seaman in command of a Spanish fleet, who sailed round the South of America, by the straits named after him, and thus sailed round the world (1519-1522). This voyage dispelled the idea that there was a short route to the East by way of the South-West Passage, but it opened up to the Spaniards the Pacific coasts of America. In 1519 Cortez had begun the conquest of the great Aztec Empire in Mexico—a conquest made possible partly by the supreme courage and superior weapons of the 'Conquistadores,' partly by the help of native allies who welcomed the chance of overthrowing the oppressive and cannibalistic Aztec realm, but also aided by the hesitating, half-friendly attitude of the Emperor Montezuma and the bold, unscrupulous treachery of Cortez and his followers—and between 1526 and 1533 the bold but ruffianly Francisco Pizarro, also helped by internal dissensions among the natives, conquered the Empire of the Peruvian Incas. The Peruvians, though less warlike, were in some respects more civilised than the Mexicans. They were not cannibalistic, their institutions were comparatively mild, if unprogressive, and, in some respects, combined Socialism with Theocratic Despotism—*i.e.* Emperor and Priests, with divine sanction, ordered all the details, economic and domestic, of their subjects' lives and of the distribution of wealth. Their Sun-Worship was superior to the Pantheism of the Mexicans, in which human sacrifices to the War-God played so great a part, and their progress in ornamental feather-work, agri-

culture, and road-making was very considerable; in fact, their roads, their terrace-gardens and fields, and their postal arrangements compared more than favourably with anything found in the Europe of those days or in most of South America to-day. Historians are apt to dwell only on the results of these discoveries and conquests on the White Race; in a review of World History it is only right to suggest the doubt whether, from the point of view of Mankind as a whole, the gains have not been more than counterbalanced by the loss. Spanish brutality, inspired partly by lust for gold and partly by religious bigotry, exterminated the native population of the West Indies, while in Mexico and South America generally the ruling classes and most civilised elements were killed off and a mixed race has grown up composed of European elements, lower-class and less-civilised natives, and Negro blood introduced by the Slave Trade. On the other hand, after a period of brutality and licence, Spanish rule was humanised by the reforms of Charles v., instigated by the better elements in the Church, and the native race, so far from dying out, forms the greater part of the population of large parts of Central and Southern America.

In North America the advent of the White Man—English, French, Dutch—has, in the final result, proved even more fatal to the natives. The French in Canada lived on good terms with most of the tribes; the early English explorers were inclined to deal in a friendly way with the Amerindians, as victims of Spanish cruelty, and the English Government were always on friendly terms with the 'Five Nations' in North America; apart from these firm allies of England, it may be said generally that the natives preferred French to English and Home-English to Colonials, and this preference was justified by the fate of the 'Red Indians' after the establishment of the independence of the United States. It may be argued that the sacrifice of a small population of natives is more than compensated for by the growth of a great nation, but it cannot be denied that the record of the white colonists in the matter of cruelty and treachery was

at least as bad as that of the 'savages'; that the latter never injured the Pennsylvanian Quakers, the only settlers in what is now the United States who treated them fairly; and that the history of drink-traffic, fraudulent land concessions, and wars of extermination—in the interest, for instance, of settlers in Florida, or of gold-seekers in the Rockies—makes a very ugly tale.

The discovery and colonisation of North America was mainly the work of English and French seamen who were, in the early days, searching for 'the North-West Passage' to Asia, just as Columbus had looked for a West route and Magellan for a South-West passage. In 1497 John Cabot, and possibly his son Sebastian, reached the coast of North America, having previously touched at Newfoundland. This was the first re-discovery of the Mainland since the times of the Danish Vikings, as Columbus had not yet made his second voyage, in which he reached South America. Considerable doubt exists as to the nationality of the Cabots; some English contemporaries refer to them as 'Venetians,' others as 'Sonnies of Genoa.' Neither is it certain that Sebastian, who afterwards made several voyages for Spain and died at a great age in England, accompanied his father. But we know definitely that North America was discovered by John Cabot in an English ship from Bristol with an English crew. In 1535 the great French Captain Cartier sailed up the St. Lawrence to an Amerindian village which he named Mount Royal (Montreal). In 1572 Sir Francis Drake landed on Panama, and in 1577 he sailed round the world. In 1583 Sir Humphrey Gilbert, in Newfoundland, and in 1584 Sir Walter Raleigh, in Virginia, made the first attempts to found English colonies in the New World. Among other Elizabethans who looked for the North-West Passage were Frobisher, Davis, and Hudson, the last of whom discovered in 1609 the river which bears his name. Sailors like Drake and Hawkins left a tradition which led to England's participation in the Slave Trade between Tropical Africa and Tropical America, and to the rise of the English and French 'Buccaneers,' who during the 17th century

harassed the Spaniards and occupied certain West Indian islands. The actual growth of the English, French, and Dutch Empires must be reserved for a later chapter.

It may safely be stated that the chief 'Powers' in the Europe of the time of Charles v. were Spain, Austria, Turkey, France, and England, while the 'Empire,' still in **Charles v.** theory and extent a greater organisation than any national State, was in reality a mere shadow, and left Germany divided and unorganised as a national unit. It will also be seen that Charles v. (1519-1556) was both Emperor and ruler of Austria and Spain together with the Netherlands, Naples, and Sicily, and the 'Indies' and 'America.'¹ In some respects Charles v. must be considered as one of the gigantic, and therefore interesting, failures of History, because, although in fact it was more remarkable that he succeeded to the extent he did than that he failed to make a complete success of a superhuman task, yet his opportunities were only equalled in magnitude by the problems which arose in his time. German Protestant historians are apt to blame Charles for not espousing the cause of the Reformation and creating a national, Protestant, German State as the nucleus of the Hapsburg Dominions; Catholic historians are apt to criticise the hesitating and compromising policy which allowed Protestantism to take root and spread. In truth Charles was the cosmopolitan ruler of a cosmopolitan Empire, and, of the various nationalities and creeds over which he ruled his personal sympathies were mainly attracted by the Flemings, from whom he derived some of his blood, and the Orthodox party in the Roman Church, as represented by his tutor, afterwards Pope Hadrian vi. His actual resources

¹ The Spanish and Portuguese claimed a monopoly of all the newly-discovered lands. They based this upon right of priority in discovery and upon a Papal Bull of 1493, modified by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. According to this all the newly-discovered African lands and Brazil were assigned to Portugal, all other American lands to Spain. Of course the other European Powers could not be expected to respect this claim, especially after the annexation of Portugal by Spain in 1580.

were inferior to his apparent power. The Germans themselves were divided by interest and religious sympathies, while the gulf between the Spaniard and the North German Lutheran elements of his dominions was wide as the poles. Moreover, his French rivals were always ready to take advantage of his troubles, even though this entailed the co-operation of the most Catholic King with Protestants and Turks, and overshadowing all these difficulties was the necessity of defending Central Europe from the Turk; the harassed Charles must find time and means to save the Cross from the Crescent, European Civilisation from Turanian Barbarism.

The secular rivalry of the French may be traced back to the invasions of Italy by Charles VIII. of France from 1494 onwards; or possibly it would be more accurate to say that they originated in the rivalry between Louis XI. (1461-1483) and Charles of Burgundy, through whose daughter, Mary, the Hapsburgs inherited their dominions in Flanders, and that, even before his first invasion of Italy, Charles VIII. had confirmed the hostility of the French and Austrian Courts by his invasion of Brittany and marriage with the Duchess Anne, who had been already married by proxy to Maximilian I.¹

These invasions of Italy by Charles VIII. are often taken as a convenient date to mark the beginning of 'Modern History'; the Fall of Constantinople (1453), the Discovery of America (1492-1497), the nailing of Luther's contentions to the wall (1517), the accession of the Tudors (1485) are also used for this purpose, although, of course, all historians recognise that 'periods' overlap and grow out of one another, and artificial divisions can only be defended on the grounds of practical utility for teaching purposes.

At any rate Charles VIII.'s invasions marked the end of the great period of Italian City-States; ² Italy became one of the

¹ Moreover, Maximilian's daughter, Margaret, had been affianced to Charles, so that a double wrong was inflicted on Maximilian.

² Florence threw off the rule of the sons of Lorenzo 'the Magnificent,' and for a time fell under the influence of that extraordinary reforming

'cockpits of Europe,' in which united, and therefore more powerful, national States and ambitious Dynasties fought out their quarrels; the rivalry of the French and Austrian Courts, destined to prolong the Thirty Years' War and to continue as the Bourbon-Hapsburg feud down to 1755, introduced a new element into diplomacy, a Machiavellian system of working relentlessly for national and dynastic ends. This Franco-Hapsburg rivalry also gave rise to the British policy, definitely realised by Henry VII. and Wolsey, of promoting and preserving the Balance of Power; henceforth wars and diplomacy begin to aim at such material objects as colonial and commercial expansion, the reduction of national rivals, the promotion of dynastic interests; but in the 16th and 17th centuries we still find Religion as one of the causes of War—in fact, we have still to deal with the greatest Religious Wars since the Crusades.

It is probable that the greatest of these Religious Wars—the Thirty Years' War—would never have taken place had it not been for the hostility of France which so seriously handicapped Charles V. Francis I. of France, 'the Gentleman King' (1515-1547), not only succeeded to the Franco-Hapsburg rivalry in Italy and along the Franco-Burgundian borders, but was also for a time the rival of Charles for the Crown of the Holy Roman Empire. The third of the coterie of brilliant young Kings who controlled Europe at this time, Henry VIII. of England, scholar and athlete, under the guidance of his Minister Wolsey, a disciple of Henry VII. in his policy of preserving the Balance of Power (with the difference that Henry VII. *made* while Wolsey *spent* money on foreign affairs)

Dominican, Savonarola. He at first welcomed the French, as the 'Scourge of God,' and then set up an idealised Republic. The Florentines, however, soon tired of his austere reforms, and he was burned to death, while Florence was absorbed in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Venice, whose commercial greatness must in any case have suffered from the advance of the Turks and the opening up of the new trade-routes by the Western Powers, was fatally injured by the League of Cambray (1508), although she retained her independence until Napoleon destroyed it in 1797 (Treaty of Campo Formio).

added fuel to the flames of Franco-Hapsburg rivalry. Henry VIII. and Wolsey sided with Charles until his great victory at Pavia, and then with Francis, and the 'divorce'¹ of Catherine of Aragon, aunt of Charles v. (1529-1533), had political and religious significance quite apart from Henry's personal desires. We have already discussed Henry's attitude towards Religion and the nature of the English Reformation.

It will now be clear that Charles v., already handicapped by the cosmopolitan and unorganised nature of his dominions, throughout the greater part of which he was himself a foreigner, was hopelessly embarrassed, in his attempts to deal with the religious problem, by the constant interruptions of foreign affairs. The Empire alone, or, as the French in those days called it, the *Germanies*, consisted of between two and three hundred States—Kingdoms, Arch-Duchies, Duchies, Arch-Bishoprics, Bishoprics, 'Free' or 'Imperial' cities, Knights' domains, etc.—of which the seven Electorates—the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Archbishoprics of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence—were the foremost, since their rulers elected the Emperors, while the Knights had so far fallen from their former military importance that they looked forward to any chance of disturbing the established order of things. The Germany of Charles v. and Luther presented many contrasts; commercial prosperity side by side with discontent and want among Knights and Peasants; exaggerated reverence for ceremonies and sacred 'relics' contrasted with zeal for the new knowledge amongst students and age-old hatred of the exactions of Rome among Knights, Students, and Peasants alike. Luther's earliest supporters were Students and Knights, and his teaching also encouraged the Peasants in their new hopes. After the Knights had been suppressed by the greater Princes in 1522 and their leaders, von Hutten and von Sickingen, both Lutherans, had perished,

¹ The name 'Divorce' is habitually used, although in reality Henry contended that the marriage had never been valid.

and after the Peasants' revolt had been not only crushed by the Princes but condemned by Luther, the latter learned to look for support to those of the Princes who favoured reform, and, so far as Catholicism and Lutheranism were concerned, the religious problem became purely a problem for the ruling Princes. Charles v. at his first Diet¹ at Worms (1520), in accordance with the law as it undoubtedly stood, outlawed Luther and condemned his teaching, but there was no attempt made at punishing Luther in person, and two years later a Diet at Nuremberg adopted a non-committal policy. The Elector of Saxony was at this time Luther's principal supporter, and between the years 1524 and 1526 (the Peasants' War took place during 1525) the Princes came together in rival Leagues, Catholic and Protestant, which foreshadowed the future division in the Thirty Years' War. The Diet of Speyer (1526) left each ruler free to decide the religion of his own domains, a compromise caused by the Emperor's entanglement in a war with France and frequently repeated during the ensuing period of German history.

We have already traced the growth of 'Protestantism' up to the Augsburg Confession and the formation by Catholic and Lutheran Princes of defensive Leagues. A premature religious war on a small scale was followed by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555. This practically repeated the compromise of Speyer. Each ruling Prince was confirmed in his freedom to choose between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism, unless he were an Ecclesiastical Prince, but there was no recognition for Calvinists, nor was there any freedom for subjects; they must conform to their ruler's religious views or emigrate.

Charles v. had thus failed to preserve his dominions in their entirety from the inroads of the Reformed Religion, and had also failed to produce a satisfactory settlement.

¹ The National Assembly for the whole Empire, possessing, however, small power of enforcing its decisions, although in theory there was an Imperial Court of Justice and Imperial forces raised in the 'Circles' created for that purpose.

Nevertheless he had avoided religious warfare on the great scale.

From his abdication and the accession of Philip II. of Spain and the Emperor Ferdinand, in 1556, we come to a period of **The Wars of Religion.** practically a century of embittered religious wars, though we shall find that in addition to religious causes there were also secondary and, so to speak, more modern motives behind these wars.

Philip II., by his attempt to stamp out 'Heresy' in the Netherlands, brought about the real storm. Charles V. had been responsible for severe persecutions in the **The Netherlands.** Netherlands, but he was considered to be a Fleming, and the people bore with him. Philip, on the other hand, was essentially a Spaniard in habits and sympathies, and the new resident Regent of the Netherlands, his half-sister, the Duchess of Parma, was equally foreign. In 1566 many of the nobles, supported by wealthy burghers and, to some extent, by the mob, organised a demonstration against the policy of Philip and the excesses of the Inquisition. They assumed, as so many sects and parties have assumed (cp. 'Whigs,' 'Tories,' etc.), a name at first flung at them by their enemies, and became known as 'the Beggars.' The attempt at suppression by the notorious Alva and the 'Council of Blood,' as his special court was called by the populace, served to strengthen the determination of the Netherlanders. At first the whole of the Netherlands was united in opposition to Spain under the leadership of both Protestant and Catholic noblemen, chief among whom was William 'the Silent' of Orange and Nassau; in fact, some of the worst of the Spanish excesses, including the so-called 'Spanish Fury,' in which the leaderless Spanish soldiers, after Alva's recall, plundered and burnt Antwerp, were committed in the Southern Provinces. After 1576, however, Philip sent a series of milder governors, and the Southern Provinces—practically modern Belgium—whose inhabitants were mainly Catholic and more than half of them—the Walloons—of Celtic origin, became reconciled to Spanish rule. The Protestant and Teutonic

inhabitants of the Northern Provinces, however, remained staunch under the leadership of William. In 1579, by the Union of Utrecht, seven Provinces—Holland, Zealand, Gelderland, Utrecht, Groningen, Friesland, and Overijssel—drew up a constitution, and two years later they formally declared their independence. In 1584 William, who had been chosen as hereditary president of the Dutch State, was murdered at Philip's instigation. In spite of this, however, the Dutch, with English help and also indirectly assisted by the French Huguenot Rising, with which we must deal next, established their independence, although it was not officially recognised by Spain until the Peace of Westphalia (1648).

Protestantism in France had started as the result of the work of such scholars as Lefèvre, and the persecution of Protestants began in the last years of Francis I. **The French Huguenots.** (1515-1547). This policy was continued by his son, Henry II., although at the same time French hostility to Charles V. was helping the cause of Protestantism in Germany. After Henry's death in 1559 his three sons succeeded each other to the Throne and, since none of them left heirs, the direct Valois line came to an end. Thus the reign of Elizabeth in England began in the reign of Henry II. in France and ended in the reign of Henry IV. ('Henry of Navarre'), the first of the Bourbon Dynasty, after witnessing the extinction of the direct Valois line by the deaths of the brothers Francis II. (1559-1560), Charles IX. (1560-1574), and Henry III. (1574-1589).

Of these Francis is important mainly owing to his marriage. His wife, Mary Queen of Scots, was the daughter of James V. of Scotland, whose father, James IV., had married Margaret, the daughter of Henry VII. of England, so that Mary had some claim to the English Throne, while her mother was Mary of Guise, and thus Francis fell under the influence of the Guise family, the Duke of Guise and the Cardinal of Lorraine, the most active leaders of the French Catholics. The reign of Charles IX., who succeeded at the age of ten, was engrossed

by the rivalries of the King's mother, Catherine de' Medici (a Florentine), the Guises, and the Bourbons, who were allied with the Huguenot leader Coligny. For a time Catherine tried to strengthen her position by an Edict of Toleration, intended to reconcile the Protestants without estranging the Catholics. This policy failed, and civil war broke out as the result of an act of violence perpetrated by Guise and his followers. In 1570 Catherine again came to an arrangement with Coligny, and even considered his plan of a war against Philip II. of Spain, which would have improved the French frontier and, indirectly, have helped the Dutch Protestants. In 1572, however, the Guises regained influence and, having poisoned Catherine's mind against Coligny, persuaded her into deceiving the King, by stories of a Huguenot plot, into agreeing to the massacre of Huguenots on St. Bartholomew's Day, August 23, 1572. During the civil war which ensued Charles IX. died, 1574, and was succeeded by Henry III., the last of the Valois. The three leading figures now were three Henries: Henry the King, Henry of Guise, and Henry of Navarre, who now led the Huguenots. Henry of Guise was murdered at the instigation of Henry the King; Henry the King was murdered in revenge by members of the Catholic League; and Henry of Navarre, whose chief victory was that of Ivry, ascended the Throne as Henry IV., the first of the Bourbons. He was never a very sincere Protestant and, with the cynical argument that 'Paris is worth a Mass,' he became reconciled to Rome. His chief Minister, however, was a Huguenot, Sully, who did a great deal in the way of reforming the finances and administration of France. The Huguenots, whose Protestantism was of the Calvinist persuasion, were forbidden to hold services in Paris and certain other towns and districts, but were granted¹ political and military, as well as religious, rights in La Rochelle and other towns. This formed an excuse for Richelieu at a later time to attack the Huguenots as a danger to the State.

Although Coligny's policy was not put into practice, yet

¹ By the Edict of Nantes (1598).

there can be no doubt that the civil war in France served to some extent to divert Philip's attention from the Netherlands. The secular rivalry of Spain and France prevented any such combination of the Catholic or 'Counter-Reformation' Powers—Spain, France, Scotland, and the Catholic German States—as might have overthrown both William of Orange and Elizabeth of England and have suppressed Protestantism.

The cautious policy of Elizabeth and her simulated matrimonial negotiations, now with Spain, now with France, were inspired by the fear of some such union. The outbreak of religious warfare both in France and in Scotland—where, after many vicissitudes, the Protestant nobles evicted Mary and brought up James, her heir, as a Protestant—left Philip as the champion of Rome and Elizabeth, after the murder of William of Orange, as the champion of the Reformation. Her general policy of religious settlement is best described as the *via media*; she avoided the extreme Catholicism of 'Bloody' Mary and the extreme Calvinism of Northumberland, the last Protector of Edward VI., restored the system of Church government of her father, Henry VIII., but in her Prayer-Book, a modified edition of the second Prayer-Book of Edward VI., admitted more 'advanced' doctrine than would have been accepted by Henry VIII. For the first twenty years of her reign she was careful to avoid any breach with Spain, although English and Spanish seamen fought each other in the 'Indies,' but from about 1575 onwards she connived more and more at unofficial English intervention in favour of the Dutch and the Huguenots, while Philip was the chief inspirer of the Catholic League in France. The immigration of French Huguenots into England not only improved the methods of English manufacture of silk and textile goods, but also strengthened the Protestant and anti-Spanish elements. The influence of these Huguenots can also be traced in the English Civil War (1642-1649), when their descendants formed a definite Puritan element in the Eastern and South-Eastern

The
Religious
Struggle
in Scotland
and England.

shires. In fact, our Civil War was in the main a religious war between Puritans and the 'High Church' Party, but its constitutional aspects were of such importance that it will be better to deal with it in a chapter on constitutional development.

The defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English in 1588 must rank with Luther's denunciation of Indulgences in 1517

**Elizabeth's
War with
Spain.**

as one of the outstanding events in World History in the 16th century. Its importance from the point of view of the naval, colonial, and commercial expansion of England was not fully realised at the time; but the bearing of the victory on the position and prospects of the Reformed Churches was so strikingly obvious that contemporary Protestants were inclined to ascribe to a miracle a victory which nothing but a miracle could have prevented. Thanks partly to Henry VIII. and mainly to the school of seamen and shipbuilders in which Hawkins is the principal figure, the English ships so surpassed the Spanish ships, in spite of their size, had no more chance in an action fought on Drake's plan—long-range fighting—than armed liners to-day would have against super-dreadnought battle-cruisers of half their tonnage. Moreover, the English fleet was manned by skilled sailors from Devon and the South coasts, accustomed to follow such leaders as Drake, Grenville, and Hawkins in adventures in seas where every port was held by an enemy, while the Spanish strength lay mainly in musketeers and soldiery for boarding, and such guns as they had could not for the most part be depressed sufficiently to hit the low English ships. The underlying causes of Elizabeth's war with Spain were Religion and rivalry in the New World, where the English refused to recognise the monopoly claimed by Spain; unconsciously, in fact, our sailors fought for the 'Freedom of the Seas.' The pretexts were constant acts of hostility on the 'Spanish Main' and in the Netherlands; Catholic plots, in which Spanish agents and even ambassadors were implicated—and which necessi-

tated the execution of Mary Queen of Scots, although the mass of English Catholics were loyal; acts of piracy on our part both in American waters and in English ports; and atrocities and retaliation on both sides.

By the end of Elizabeth's reign there could be no doubt that Philip's great scheme, which had at first promised so well, to stamp out Protestantism had failed; England and Holland had definitely broken away from Rome; the French Huguenots had gained a respite; the forces of the Counter-Reformation were too enfeebled to attack as yet with success German, Scandinavian, or Swiss Protestantism, although the Thirty Years' War still remained to be fought before this hope was abandoned.

The compromise agreed upon at Augsburg, 1555 (see p. 81), preserved peace in Germany for the rest of the 16th century, but it was only an armed peace. The Calvinists, **The Thirty Years' War.** who were not even recognised in the terms, could obviously not be satisfied, and, after some Protestant rioting in 1607 had been suppressed at Donauwörth by the Catholic, Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, a new Protestant Union was formed under the leadership of the Calvinist, Frederick, Elector of the Palatinate. To this Maximilian replied by organising the Catholic League. In 1618 the Bohemian Protestants revolted against the Hapsburgs, threw the Emperor's representatives out of a window at Prague, and chose the Elector Frederick as their King. As he was the son-in-law of James I. of England, the German Protestants hoped that England would do for them at least as much as Elizabeth had done for the Dutch Protestants. James, however, had too much sense to entangle England in such a quarrel. He realised that Frederick was a usurper and that the English Puritans, though eager for war, would not grant adequate supplies; also this was bound to be a purely continental campaign, and moreover James had put into effect the policy which Elizabeth and Burleigh had favoured but lacked the courage—or possibly had too much tact—to pursue, namely, the restoration of peace with Spain, now that her naval

strength was shattered, and of commercial relations with the Spanish Netherlands. Nor was there any immediate prospect of help from France. The murder of Henry iv. in 1610 had frustrated his plan for the great enterprise of a war to crush the Hapsburg Power; Richelieu, the great Minister of Louis XIII. and practically the ruler of France, was not yet ready to intervene; Catholic—and Cardinal—though he was, his enmity to the Hapsburgs surpassed his hatred of Protestantism, but in 1620 he was engaged in destroying the political and military privileges of the Huguenots, and therefore could not ally himself with German Protestants. Frederick and the Bohemians were utterly crushed at the battle of the White Hill in 1620. Frederick is known to history as the 'Winter King,' because after one winter in Bohemia he never entered his usurped capital again. Bohemia lost all hope of independence for three centuries. Christian iv. of Denmark attempted to help the failing Protestant cause, but was crushed by the Catholic Imperial forces and the army raised by Wallenstein, a rich Bohemian nobleman and the greatest military genius of his day with the possible exception of Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.

In 1629 the Emperor, Ferdinand II., was encouraged by his success to issue the Edict of Restitution, ordering Protestant rulers to restore all Church property seized since 1555. This roused the Protestant Princes to further efforts, and in 1630 they were joined by a powerful ally in Gustavus Adolphus, at the very time when the petty jealousy of the Catholic Princes and the suspicions justifiably roused by Wallenstein's unknown ambition and ostentation had led the Emperor to dismiss his greatest general. Gustavus was equally keen on protecting Protestantism and on increasing Sweden's territories around the Baltic. Some of the great Lutheran Princes—such as the Electors of Saxony and of Brandenburg—were still hesitating as to their policy. The Edict of Restitution, however, followed by the destruction of Protestant Magdeburg (1631) by the Catholic Tilly and the victories of Gustavus over Tilly at Leipsic and Breitenfeld, caused them

to overcome their distaste for Calvinists and fear of the Emperor.

This complete reversal of fortune led to the recall of Wallenstein. In 1632 Gustavus with his Swedish and Scottish army—among the Protestant Scots, who formed quite a large proportion of his army, just as Catholic Scots and Irishmen afterwards formed part of the armies of the French Kings, was Leslie, afterwards leader of the Scottish Covenanters—defeated Wallenstein in a rather indecisive battle at Lützen, but was himself killed. Wallenstein was murdered shortly afterwards, and when the Swedes and German Protestants were defeated at Nordlingen, 1634, and the Elector of Saxony deserted the cause, it looked as though the war would come to an end. This, however, was prevented by Richelieu, who for French ends formed an alliance between the German and Swedish Protestants and the 'most Catholic King' of France. Spain had already intervened on the Catholic side. Accordingly for more than a decade longer Germany was a prey to the ravages of Swedes, Frenchmen, and Spaniards, to say nothing of Italian and Scottish mercenaries. Finally by the series of treaties signed at Westphalia in 1648 the religious settlement of Germany remained exactly as it had been before the war, except that Calvinist rulers now shared with Catholics and Lutherans the privilege of deciding the religion of their subjects. The settlement of the Church Property question left the rulers in possession of such lands as had been seized up to 1624, disregarding the Edict of Restitution.

Meanwhile the population of Germany had been reduced by between one-half and one-third; her industries were thrown back, her people reduced to want and **Political Results.** even, in places, to cannibalism; her national unity was put off for more than two hundred years—and even then it was only achieved by the Prussian sword—the separate States of the Empire even acquiring the right to make treaties.

France gained Metz, Verdun, Toul, and all Alsace except Strassburg, while her soldiers under Turenne and Condé had

supplanted the Spanish infantry as the finest soldiers in Europe. This was the second stage in the decline of Spain, the first being the destruction of her naval power by England; commercial strength, the basis of naval and military strength, was never developed by Spain. The independence of Switzerland and of the United Provinces—Holland, etc.—was formally recognised.

Sweden gained parts of Pomerania and the control of the mouths of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser, together with three votes in the Diet for those of her new dominions which formed part of the Empire. Brandenburg became the most powerful Protestant German power, and thus the rise of Prussia is foreshadowed. Thus these Wars of Religion from 1566 to 1648 became complicated by political matters—the decline of Spain, the rise of Holland and England, rivalry in the New World and on the seas, the rivalry of Hapsburgs and Bourbons, the Balance of Power, the growth of France and Brandenburg, the constitutional struggles in Great Britain, etc.—which bring us to the subjects of our next chapters.

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CHAPTER IV

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV.

The Transition from Religious to Secular Wars : Louis XIV. : The French Monarchy—its Frontiers, Ambitions, Rivals : Colbert : The Dutch Republic : William of Orange : The English Revolution : Brandenburg and Prussia : Poland : The Turks : Russia and Peter the Great : The Spanish Succession : Genealogy : Utrecht.

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LOUIS XIV. came to the Throne of France in 1643, while the Thirty Years' War was still raging in Germany, although gradually waning owing to the destruction of the population and wealth on which the flames of war fed, and when the Civil War was opening in Great Britain. He died in 1715, by which time Spain had descended yet another step in her national decline by the Spanish Succession War ; France had extended her frontiers and placed a junior Bourbon Dynasty on the Spanish Throne, but failed to secure a hegemony in Europe ; the Austrian Hapsburgs remained both the chief rulers in Germany and the chief rivals of the French Bourbons ; England had settled her constitutional and religious problems in the essentials, although the Jacobites did not lose hope for another generation ; and Russia had emerged from Oriental savagery and begun her part on the European stage as a semi-European Power, a blend of Oriental Barbarism with Western Civilisation. He is not only the central figure of the late 17th and early 18th centuries, and a key to the right understanding thereof, but is also a link between the age of Religious Warfare and the age of Materialism. We have already seen how such problems as the Balance of Power, dynastic rivalry, colonial expansion, and

constitutional disputes had been mingled with religious motives in what we have called the ' Wars of Religion.' We now come to a period in which these questions hold the stage : a period wherein Bourbons, Hapsburgs, and presently Hohenzollerns strive for material ends in Europe, while France carries on a double struggle, only temporarily interrupted by the French Revolution, to overthrow the Balance of Power in Europe and to outbid England for supremacy on the seas and in overseas empire (1648-1815).

Of the personality of Louis we may say in brief that, while he was not a great man nor even a great statesman, yet he was a supremely great King. He was blessed with an absolute belief in himself, and he managed to impress most of his contemporaries with that belief. ' The profession of King,' he declared, ' is great, noble, and delightful, if one but feels equal to performing the duties which it involves,' and none felt more equal to the task than Louis himself. Whatever the ultimate cost to France of his grandiose schemes, yet he raised her to a pinnacle of greatness and made the French Court the model for all European Monarchies. His views on the subject of the divine sanction and unlimited powers of Kings were as thorough and strong as those of any 17th-century Stuart or modern Hohenzollern, and with a power of clear thought and expression equal to that of James I. he combined the dignity of appearance and manners of a Charles I. and a tactful bearing and knowledge of men like that of Charles II., who could be merry and condescending, haughty and commanding, each in turn and each at the right time. His dignity and the triumph of his personality survived the supreme test ; if Charles I. could maintain, or even surpass, his usual dignity on the scaffold, Louis XIV. could be dignified—and Charles II. could be genial—during a morning bedside reception and the process of being ceremoniously dressed according to Court routine!

So much—the personal triumph and historical importance of Louis XIV.—is universally admitted. The questions on which historians must attempt to exercise the faculty of

judgment are these: how far were Louis's wars, especially his later wars, necessary in the national, as distinguished from purely dynastic, interests? Can he be blamed for the financial chaos into which France fell and hence for the Revolution? Is he responsible more than any one other man—even Frederick the Great—for the tradition of unscrupulous diplomacy¹ and Machiavellian policy at which, in the long run, Prussia became the aptest pupil, and even the professor, and which converted Germany, the victim of Louis, into the scourge of France.

First we must get a clear notion of the strategical position of the French Kingdom which Louis inherited. We do not intend to imply that strategic 'necessity' of France. affords moral justification for aggression and annexation; possibly Mankind may in the near future evolve, through the League of Nations, some international code of Law and Conduct which will condemn and prevent such acts as Louis's conquest of Franche Comté and Frederick the Great's seizure of Silesia. But at least national expediency is a better plea than personal ambition.

The France of Henry IV. was not only exhausted by internecine religious wars, financial chaos, and general corruption, but was also endangered by almost indefensible frontier lines into which Spanish and Austrian salients of territory offered ready passages for her Hapsburg enemies. Although Henry united Navarre to the French Crown, yet the Spanish possession of Roussillon turned the flank of the line of the Pyrenees. Again, although Henry, by the sensible act of renouncing his claims to Saluzzo, in Italy, in favour of Savoy, obtained Bresse and Bugey and the alliance of Savoy and thus improved the position of France on her South-Eastern frontiers, yet the Spaniards in the Netherlands, including Artois, Hainault, and Flanders, and in Franche Comté, threatened the North-East and Eastern boundaries of France and were in dangerous proximity to Paris, while the Imperial

¹ Possibly it would be more just to fix the responsibility upon Cardinal Richelieu and the 'Great Elector' (see pp. 108, 109).

connections of Alsace, Lorraine, and the Bishoprics of Metz, Verdun, and Toul exposed Eastern France to the threats of the Austrian Hapsburgs.

The unscrupulous but able policy of Richelieu, who was the model from which both Mazarin and Louis copied their diplomatic aims and methods, while it threw back 'the Germanies' for two centuries, and destroyed the last real prospect of a strong Hapsburg 'Holy Roman Empire,' secured for France, at Westphalia—1648, years after Richelieu's death—the possession of Alsace (with the exception of the 'Free City' of Strassburg), and of the territories of the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun—practically French Lorraine, as it was from 1871 to 1914.

For a time during the minority of Louis XIV. and the régime of Mazarin and the Queen-Mother, Anne, the Spanish, owing to the rebellion of the Frondeurs, were again able to threaten disaster to France, but the genius of Turenne and the alliance of Cromwell turned the scale, and in 1659 was signed the Treaty of the Pyrenees.

France now obtained Roussillon, which gave her the strong Pyrenees frontier line, and strengthened her position on her other frontiers by the acquisition of Artois,¹ and of the right of passage for her armies through the Duchy of Lorraine—practically the German Lorraine of 1871-1914. Louis married a Spanish princess, Maria Theresa, and the Spanish danger was clearly at an end. Thus when Louis himself took over the government it almost seems that the problems of the frontiers were solved, and that Louis might have devoted himself to administrative, financial, and other reforms, and thus have removed the causes of the Revolution.

For a time indeed it looked as though internal reform was to be the principal care of the young King. Colbert, a pupil of Mazarin, took up again the task that Sully had attempted,

¹ Dunkirk was ceded to Cromwell, but Charles II. very sensibly reversed this revival of the Mediaeval policy of continental conquest and sold it to France.

Treaty of the Pyrenees, 1659, and Louis's Subsequent Policy.

financial and administrative reform. The corruption of officials was, for the time, punished and checked, roads, canals, shipping, both naval and mercantile, were vigorously taken in hand by the Government, which also protected French industries from foreign competition, and promoted French exports and credit by insisting upon a high quality in French goods. This policy may seem to the modern mind, especially to the mind educated in the dogma of English 19th-century Free Trade, to err on the side of excessive government interference. The French, however, have always accepted and welcomed centralised government, and at any rate the immediate results were so good that for a time France threatened to rival or surpass England and Holland as a commercial, maritime, and colonial power.

But Louis was not yet satisfied with the extent and continental influence of his Kingdom. It is possibly not altogether unjust to blame him for his aggressive and ambitious policy, and to attribute his later wars rather to personal and dynastic interests than to national needs. Certainly his policy and wars were unfortunate for France. On the other hand, we must in justice remember that aggressive policy was a feature of the age, that nationality was not accepted by rulers as the necessary basis of States, that in any case the Hapsburg government of the Spanish Netherlands was more opposed to the principle of nationality than French government would have been, that the Hapsburg Powers still appeared strong enough to threaten danger to Paris, and finally, that many Frenchmen followed Julius Caesar in considering that the Rhine was as much a 'natural boundary' of Gaul as were the Pyrenees. Whatever his motives and justification, Louis embarked upon a policy which more than exhausted the resources built up by Colbert and compelled Colbert to attempt most of his reforms while the country was engaged in war. In 1662 Dunkirk was bought from Charles II. of England. In 1667 Louis laid claim to the Spanish Netherlands through his wife, the eldest child of the late Spanish

**Louis's
Ambitions
and Later
Wars.**

**Colbert's
Reforms.**

King, Philip IV., and half-sister of Charles II. of Spain. He based this claim partly on the assumption that the land-laws of the Netherlands applied to the succession of its rulers, partly on a confusion between the French Monarchy and the Frankish Empire. He even suggested tentatively that he could legitimately claim the Spanish Crown.

This claim to the Netherlands caused the 'War of Devolution,' 1667-1668; it also occasioned general alarm throughout Europe and led to the Triple Alliance of English, Dutch, and Swedes in 1668. Before the threat of this alliance Louis made peace at Aix-la-Chapelle. Spain regained—temporarily as events proved—Frisland, but Louis secured certain strong towns in Flanders and Hainault, including Lille, Charleroi, and Tournai, which added a line of defence for Paris in the North-East. For the next twenty years, while Louis's cousins, Charles II. and James II., were on the English Throne, the diplomacy of Western Europe became a game of bluff and intrigue in which many of those who took a hand held hidden cards, and supposed partners finessed against each other.

**Louis and
William of
Orange.**

The only certainty was the hostility between Louis and his great enemy William of Orange. The great-grandson of William 'the Silent' was born just after the death in 1650 of his father, William II., whose attempt to overthrow the constitution of the United Provinces led to the eclipse for twenty-two years of the House of Orange.

The constitution, as settled by the Union of Utrecht in 1579, secured to each of the seven confederated Provinces practically the rights of an independent State, with its own provincial Estates, which controlled finance, and its own elected Stadtholder, who appointed burgomasters and magistrates, while the central Government, the Council of State, controlled by the central representative Estates-General, appointed the Captain-General and Admiral-General and organised defence. In practice for nearly a century—from 1579 to 1650—the chief Provinces, including Holland and Zealand, habitually elected the head of the

House of Orange as their Stadtholder, and therefore William, Maurice, Frederick Henry, and William II. had acted as Stadtholders of the Provinces as a whole, had arbitrated in cases of dispute between Provinces, had combined the offices of Captain-General and Admiral-General, had largely controlled foreign policy, and, like the Hapsburgs in the Empire, had been virtually hereditary holders of an elective office. The House of Orange found its supporters among the Peasantry, the Nobles, the Clergy, and throughout the Province of Zealand; its enemies were the Oligarchies of Capitalists or Burghers in the towns of Holland, rich, exclusive, and suspicious alike of democratic and monarchical tendencies.

The failure and death of William II. in 1650 threw the controlling power into the hands of the rich and commercially efficient merchants of the Estates of Holland, and in John de Witt, the chief minister, 'Grand Pensionary' of Holland, the Dutch found a leader who managed to keep the ship of state afloat through twenty years of storm and, in addition to combining personal honesty with astute diplomacy and frugal simplicity with oratorical charms, was inspired by a fanatical belief in Republican institutions and a personal and hereditary hatred of the House of Orange.

In 1651 the first storm broke. Dr. Dorislaus, an envoy of the English Republic, had been killed in 1649 by exiled Scottish Royalists at the Hague as a reprisal for the death of Charles I. at the beginning of that year. The victim of this vicarious revenge had been negotiating various commercial matters, the chief of which concerned the fact that the Dutch had gained from the English merchants much of the trade with the English West Indies, since the loyal colonists had preferred to deal with the followers of the House of Orange, whose head, William II., had married a daughter of the 'martyred' King of England, rather than with regicide rebels. In 1651 the English 'Rump' Parliament demanded that the young Prince, afterwards Charles II., should be expelled from the Provinces, and that the Dutch

Republic should be united with that of Great Britain. When this was refused, the Rump passed the Navigation Act, 1651, declaring that foreign ships might only import to England the products of their own respective countries; in other words, goods must be carried to England in English or colonial ships, or in the ships of the country which produced the goods, and thus the Dutch carrying trade with England and her colonies must, for the most part, cease. This act, afterwards re-enacted by Charles II., laid the foundations of the British carrying trade, and also secured for the American colonies a greater tonnage in proportion to their population than they ever attained between the dates of their Rebellion and the last year of the German War. The threat to their trade drove the Dutch to war, but the valour and skill of their sailors, led by Tromp and Opdam, could not prevent the English, with the advantages of even superior seamanship, heavier gun-power, and the leadership of Blake, from mastering the seas and putting a stop to Dutch commerce and fishing, while the Portuguese recaptured those stations in Brazil which had been seized by the Dutch during the Spanish possession of Portugal. De Witt was now ready for peace (1654) and found in Oliver Cromwell a congenial spirit. The Dutch were compelled to accept the Act of Navigation, and de Witt readily agreed to Cromwell's suggestion that the House of Orange—kinsmen and supporters of the Stuarts—should be banished.

The maritime and commercial rivalry of English and Dutch still continued, and the cause of Republicanism, injured already by the feeling that the descendants of William 'the Silent' had been sacrificed to foreign pressure and personal grudge, was so far weakened by the English Restoration in 1660 and the determination of Louis XIV. to control personally the government of France that the Estates of Holland revoked the Act of Exclusion—of the House of Orange—in September 1660. For the best part of five years an unofficial warfare was carried on between Dutch and English sailors and merchants along the coasts of West Africa, India, the

East Indies, North America, and the West Indies, and in March 1665 war was openly declared. Charles II. disliked the Government of de Witt, which had gladly obeyed Cromwell's command to expel himself and his nephew William of Orange from the Netherlands; he also had the intelligence to appreciate the importance of Dutch rivalry in maritime, commercial, and colonial affairs. The English nation was divided: merchants, sailors, and extreme Monarchists disliked and distrusted the Dutch; extreme Protestants and Republicans looked with more suspicion on Charles's cousin the young Louis XIV. As time went on, especially after the Restoration of William III. in Holland in 1673, the majority of Englishmen sank their dislike of Holland in their fear of French designs both in the Netherlands and within the English Court and Parliament—where King and Parliamentary opposition were equally greedy for French gold—but by that time the Dutch, engaged and almost exhausted in Europe, were no longer such formidable rivals to our East India Company and other maritime and commercial interests.

In the war of 1665-1667 the English fleet was successful over the fleets of Tromp, Ruyter, and Opdam, the last of whom was killed, in the main battles, in spite of the fact that the Dutch now possessed guns fit to match those of the fleet which Blake had inherited from Charles I., but owing to the Plague (1665), the Fire (1666), financial exhaustion, and the disgraceful incident of the Dutch raid on the Medway, Charles and England were ready for peace in 1667. The English, by the Treaty of Breda, gained New York—formerly New Amsterdam, renamed after James, Duke of York, an efficient Lord High Admiral whatever his shortcomings as King—and the Navigation Act was retained, but relaxed so far as to allow Dutch ships to carry to our harbours goods from Germany and the Spanish Netherlands.

War and loss of shipping and commerce had weakened the position of de Witt. He was obliged to grant William an education in affairs of state at the public expense. Moreover, he seems to have been losing his acuteness and foresight,

although he still showed diplomatic ability. The immediate success of the Triple Alliance of 1668 in bringing Louis to terms (see p. 97) seems to have blinded de Witt to the **William** real dangers of the situation; Louis was biding **and de Witt.** his time, and Charles of England was not to be relied on. In fact, the secret Treaty of Dover (1670) between Charles and Louis, the defection of Sweden from the Triple Alliance, and the agreement between Louis and the Emperor opened the way for Louis's next attempt upon the Dutch, whose Calvinism and Republicanism he detested as much as he envied their territory, harbours, and trade. De Witt felt himself compelled by public opinion to allow William to become Captain-General at the age of twenty-two, but he imagined that by means of the 'Project of Harmony,'¹ passed into law in 1668, he had prevented any danger of the union of the office of Stadtholder with that of Captain-General. As a result his jealousy of William led him to cut down the Dutch armaments and forces in a way which led to disaster when the storm burst in 1672, while among the consequences of defeat was a wave of popular feeling which led to the murder of de Witt and his brother in 1673, and to the appointment of William to not merely the Stadtholderate but the Hereditary Stadtholderate of the most important of the Provinces.

The generalship of Condé and Turenne had in effect opened the road to Amsterdam and the conquest of Holland when the hesitation of Louis gave William time to collect the population and cut the dykes, thus **The Dutch War, 1672-1678.** flooding the low country and isolating Amsterdam as an island. Some of the credit of this must be given to de Witt, who had prepared for this necessity. Charles II. brought England into the war on Louis's side, and Sweden also had rejoined her traditional ally. The great Ruyter, however, held the seas against the Anglo-French fleets—mutually suspicious allies—and gradually Louis's friends left him and the ranks of his enemies were increased. First the Emperor and the 'Great Elector' of Brandenburg (see p. 108)

¹ A modified form of the 'Perpetual Edict.'

joined the Dutch ; then Spain, Lorraine, the Palatinate, and Denmark joined the coalition against France ; in 1674 the English Parliament and public opinion forced Charles to reverse his Dover policy—probably not altogether against his wishes now that his nephew was the leader of the Dutch, and England's two great rivals were committed to a policy of mutual destruction—and at last France was left, with Sweden alone as an ally, to fight on until exhaustion led to the acceptance of the Peace of Nimwegen (1678).

By the terms of Nimwegen France regained Franche Comté and acquired such privileges in Lorraine as amounted to annexation, although the Duchy was not formally annexed until, after the Polish Succession War, Fleury's diplomacy secured the reversion which took place in 1766. Thus from one point of view Louis had gained the victor's spoils ; moreover, he secured for Sweden the recovery of those of her German territories which the Great Elector had seized. Nevertheless the treaty also marked the success of William and his emergence as one of the chief figures on the European stage. The independence of his country was preserved, although her strength had been so overstrained that her days as a first-class European and maritime Power were numbered even in her triumph ; the Spanish Netherlands, with Charleroi restored, were preserved as a barrier between France and the Dutch Provinces ; France had reached and passed the zenith of her strength and energy ; finally William had more than rebuilt the structure of European opposition to France which de Witt had founded.

It is difficult to gain a clear and fair conception of the character of this strange man, the object of such keen dislike amongst many of his contemporaries and of such blind worship from the Whig historians of Macaulay's school, whose influence, direct and indirect, was so vital both in the political development of Europe and in the constitutional and financial development of Great Britain. Of his greatness as a man and a Dutchman there can be no doubt, and he was great in spite of the disadvantages of ill-

health, and of a personality and manners which repelled friendship and prohibited popularity. Naturally cold and calculating, he was soured by the experiences of his youth, and no warm human feeling was allowed to stand in the way of his ambition. In 1673 he was ready to profit by the foul murder of the de Witts, just as in 1692 he shut his eyes to the massacre of Glencoe but profited by it and shielded the tools of his ambition ; he betrayed his uncle and father-in-law, James II., in 1688 with as little scruple as he showed in breaking the terms made at Limerick in 1691 with the Irish Catholics. That he cared little for England and less than nothing for constitutionalism must be admitted by his warmest admirers, nor can we blame a Dutch patriot if he looked upon the English Throne as a mere tool to be used in the prosecution of his war with France. He would not come to England as the guardian of James's son, nor even as the Consort of his devoted wife, Mary—to whom at first he was not faithful—and as King he did his best to retain all that was left of the Royal Prerogative, and to direct England's foreign policy for the good of Holland. The heir of the House of Orange and a Stuart on his mother's side, the victim of and protagonist against Republicanism in his youth, he was not likely to cherish the limitations forced upon him by Whig constitutionalism and Tory suspicion ; but as a Protestant and an alternative to James, and as bound by his position to accept the Bill of Rights (see p. 184), he was accepted, though never liked, by the majority of the ruling classes in England. The qualities which made him great were his patriotic love of the Netherlands, the one passion and enthusiasm of his life, the persistent courage with which he fought for Dutch independence, and the clear brain with which he foresaw the means to his ambitions. If he sacrificed health, family ties, and even honour to ambition, at least his ambition was partly unselfish and aimed at what he conceived to be for the good of his Dutch countrymen. Even his hatred for Louis and for France was so profound as to contain an element of nobility. His indirect influence on the

constitution and finances of England will be discussed in another chapter. At present we must confine ourselves to his duel with Louis XIV., the first bout of which had ended at Nimwegen (1678).

After Nimwegen Europe enjoyed, or rather endured, a period of armed peace, during which Louis quarrelled with the Papacy over the questions of Church government and the temporal power of the Pope. The position taken up by Louis and Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, was very similar to that which had led Henry VIII. of England to a breach with Rome. Bossuet maintained that in temporal matters the King was the head of the national Church, and in ecclesiastical matters Church Councils were superior to Popes; Pope Innocent XI. maintained the Hildebrandine conceptions (see p. 65). The struggle, however, did not culminate in a schism; Louis and his subjects were good Catholics at heart, political motives inclined both sides to compromise, and Madame de Maintenon was as keen on agreement as Anne Boleyn had been on a breach. Just as Henry, to prove himself Orthodox, had punished extreme Protestants by means of his Six Articles Act, so Louis in 1685 brought to a climax the ill-usage of Huguenots by revoking the Edict of Nantes (see p. 84). This mistaken act—mistaken because there were more Huguenots unconverted than Louis had supposed, and because Richelieu had removed the real danger of Huguenot political and military disruption—greatly incensed public opinion in England and Holland, promoted the movement towards the English Revolution of 1688, and deprived France of the services of many skilled artisans and enterprising traders, who carried their ability and hostility towards the 'Most Catholic King' of France to England, Holland, Prussia, and South Africa.

During these years, in which Louis both quarrelled with the Papacy and infuriated Protestant Europe, his reorganisation of the army, the navy, and the frontier fortresses, including Strassburg, which he seized in 1681 in spite of the terms of Nimwegen, alarmed all his neighbours, while his

diplomacy failed to gain any new friends and lost those whom he had. Thus the German rulers were alienated by a series of encroachments culminating with Strassburg, the Poles and other Catholics were shocked by his intrigues with the Turks, the Turks were irritated by Admiral Duquesne's suppression of the Mohammedan pirates of Algiers and Tripoli, and as a result the increased defensive strength which he certainly gave to France was counterbalanced by the formation against him of the League of Augsburg, an alliance including the Emperor, Spain, Sweden, the United Provinces, and the North German Princes. Another miscalculation turned England from a doubtful neutrality to enmity, and indeed brought about a second Hundred Years' War which proved fatal to the French Monarchy and to the maritime and colonial enterprises of that Monarchy.

During the reign of Charles II. in England Louis had felt that in the readiness of both King and Parliamentary leaders to accept French gold he held England on a leading-rein. In truth the 'Merry Monarch,' who concealed beneath a flippant exterior the cleverest brain of his generation, gave and probably intended to give Louis very poor value for his money. Nevertheless Charles and a great many of those who afterwards became known as the Tory party were at least opposed to war against France. In addition to religious and personal motives it might be argued that so long as the French did not actually gain possession of the Spanish and Dutch Netherlands it was to England's interest that her principal rivals should fight each other, thus bringing about the exhaustion of Holland, our rival on the sea and in the East, and the absorption of French energies in European affairs. In fact, the Tory policy might have avoided that duel between England and France in which England drove France out of India and North America, and reduced her to the bankruptcy which brought on the Revolution of 1789, while France had her revenge by enabling the thirteen American colonies to make good their revolt from England.

The English Revolution and the War of the League of Augsburg, 1688.

To consider the 'Might-have-beens' of History is as fascinating as it is futile. If James II. had never lost his Throne, or if William had been content to act as Regent for James's son, and to bring him up as an English Churchman, the wars between England and France from 1689 to 1815 might have been avoided, the Bourbons might still be reigning in France, the English flag might still be floating over the whole of North America with the exception of a small French enclave round Quebec, there would probably never have been an 'Irish Question' as we know it to-day, and almost certainly there would never have developed the Prussianised German Empire which caused the late Great War.

Be that as it may: Louis found in James II. (1685) a man of very different character to that of the late King. 'Brother James' was blunt and obstinate where Charles would have been flippant but apparently compliant. Family ties, religion, and the sympathy natural between one who was and one who probably wished to be a despot inclined him towards Louis, but the sturdy patriotism—which had already marked his conduct as Lord High Admiral, and which in later days moved him to applaud the gallantry of the very English sailors whose victory off La Hogue over his French allies destroyed his main hope of restoration—prevented his accepting Louis's directions meekly and persuaded him that without French help his English forces could secure him from any evil results from William's schemes. The causes which led up to the Revolution and the invasion of England by William III. must be described in another chapter. For the present we need only note that Louis, deceived by James's confidence and irritated by his independence, moved his armies from the frontiers of the Netherlands into Germany in 1688 and thus enabled William to invade England in answer to the invitation proffered by the principal English magnates. Louis fondly hoped that James would be driven to seek French aid and pocket his pride while William would be cut off in England and finally crushed by the Anglo-French forces. This Machiavellian scheme rebounded on to Louis's

head; James was defeated, with scarcely a blow struck in England itself, and William gained the greatest success possibly of his life, certainly the greatest since 1673, by adding England to the allies who fought France during the years 1688-1698.

William's success in the field was not equal to his success in diplomacy; in fact, as a military leader he lacked both inspiration and the ability to inspire others, and was only great in his refusal to admit defeat. The campaign on land resolved itself into a struggle for the border-fortresses, such as Namur and Mons. The importance of the struggle lay in the fact that France became gradually exhausted during these last days of the 17th century, and was thus handicapped in the series of great wars which marked the 18th century. Also, although a French victory off Beachy Head (1690) enabled the French to land munitions in Ireland and to keep England in a state of anxiety, yet Russell's victory off La Hogue (1692) sealed the doom of Ireland and secured England in the command of the sea. The Treaty of Ryswick (1698) marked on the whole a slight ebb in the tide of Louis's success; although France kept Strassburg, yet she surrendered all the other towns and territories seized since Nimwegen and acknowledged William as King of England; moreover, she agreed to the admission of Dutch garrisons into some of the fortresses on the borders of France and the Spanish Netherlands.

The story of Louis and William, and indeed of Western Europe, would naturally proceed at this point to the questions leading to the War of the Spanish Succession, **Chief Figures** the last of Louis's wars and the first of the 18th **of the Period.** century. Since, however, one of the objects of a book like this is to give the reader some idea of the chronology as well as the continuity of History, we will summarise the developments which took place in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe during Louis's long reign, and refer to some others of the distinguished contemporaries of Louis XIV., whose reign in France lasted from the last years of Charles I. through

the reigns of Cromwell, Charles II., James II., William III. and Mary II., William III., and Anne into the beginning of that of George I., and among whose contemporaries, in addition to these sovereigns and such Frenchmen as Mazarin, Colbert, the Turennes and Condés, were Michael the First and Peter the Great, the most famous of the Romanoffs, Queen Christina and Charles XII. of Sweden, John Sobieski of Poland, who saved Vienna from the Turks, and Frederick William Hohenzollern, the Great Elector of Brandenburg, who laid the foundations on which his descendants built the Prussian Kingdom. A short summary of the work of each of these will enable the reader to understand the political map of Europe after the Treaty of Utrecht with which this chapter will end.

In 1640 Frederick William began to reign over dominions which were divided by politics as well as by geography into three parts: The Mark of Brandenburg—the country round Berlin—was a German State, theoretically subject to the Emperor and possessing a Diet, of nobles and burghers, which checked the power of the Elector; East Prussia, which, upon the dissolution of the Teutonic Knights after the Reformation, had become a Duchy under the branch of the Hohenzollerns to which the last Grand Master had belonged, had lapsed to the Brandenburg Hohenzollerns owing to a process of deaths and marriages, but was held under the suzerainty of the Kings of Poland, whose dominions in what subsequently became West Prussia cut off Brandenburg from East Prussia; lastly there were certain family possessions scattered along the Rhine—Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg—over which, during the Thirty Years' War, the Elector's sway was, to say the least of it, shadowy.

The Great Elector was the first of the Hohenzollerns to earn the epithet 'Great' by a series of successes against apparently insuperable difficulties gained by a policy as determined and clever as it was unmoral and unscrupulous. By playing off noble against burgher he established his personal, auto-

cratic rule over Brandenburg and East Prussia; by withdrawing from the Thirty Years' War he secured time and peace which he used to build up the first great Hohenzollern army and to collect money, while by diplomacy he secured several gains at the Peace of Westphalia (1648), in particular Magdeburg and Halberstadt, athwart the Elbe, and East Pomerania, which brought Brandenburg nearer to East Prussia, although they were still divided by a corridor of Polish territory running along the Vistula to Danzig; lastly, by his dexterity in playing off against each other his two great enemies, Poland and Sweden, he managed—although at one time conquered by Charles X. of Sweden and compelled to serve under him against Poland—to obtain from both of them the acknowledgment of his claim to East Prussia freed from the old suzerainty of the Polish Crown.

Of Sweden it may be said that the ability and ambitions of a few individuals during the 17th and early 18th centuries carried the nation out of its depth, and it was only at the cost of great exhaustion that she **Sweden.** eventually regained the dry land of feasible aims and reasonable frontiers. On the death of Gustavus Adolphus at Lützen in 1632, his friend Axel Oxentstjerna carried on his policy of war in Germany until the young Queen Christina (1632-1654) exerted her personal influence to bring about the Peace of Westphalia. Oxentstjerna also by his 'Form of Government,' the first written constitution of Modern Europe, divided political power between the Crown and a close Oligarchy. After the abdication of Christina, one of the remarkable women of history—the patroness of philosophers and writers, and the bosom friend of a notorious French harlot, the Queen who rode like a man, forced her views on Oxentstjerna like a statesman, intrigued both before and after her abdication like a typical woman of her age, and sacrificed her Throne to her religion like a saint—Charles X., a heroic soldier but no statesman, after wars with Poland, Denmark, and Brandenburg, yielded, as we have seen, to the diplomacy of Frederick William the evacuation of East Pomerania and

**Brandenburg
and Prussia.
The Great
Elector.**

the acknowledgment of the independence of East Prussia. His successor, Charles XI., was crushingly defeated by the Great Elector in 1675 at Fehrbellin—the first great victory of Brandenburg-Prussian Militarism—but was saved from most of the results of defeat by the loyalty of his ally, Louis XIV., and made use of popular feeling to overthrow, with the help of people and Church, the régime of the nobility and restore the popular despotism of the Crown. Charles XI. proved himself to be an excellent ruler. He was succeeded by another of the great soldier-heroes of the House of Vasa, Charles XII., who, like many great soldiers, failed as a statesman. Faced by a coalition of his country's foes—Denmark, Poland, and Russia—Charles crushed Denmark, defeated Peter the Great of Russia at Narva, thus restoring Sweden's military prestige, shaken at Fehrbellin, overran Poland and Saxony, and forced Stanislaus, his friend, as King upon the Poles instead of Augustus of Saxony. Louis XIV. attempted to gain the help of this youthful genius in the War of the Spanish Succession, but the great Marlborough by a personal visit secured his neutrality. Charles next turned against Russia and anticipated the career of Napoleon. His army, weakened by famine and ravaged by disease while wandering through the Ukraine in a vain attempt to unite with Mazeppa's Cossacks in a march on Moscow, was utterly crushed by Peter at Pultawa (1709), and Charles himself with difficulty escaped to Turkey. There, as we shall find, he managed to revenge himself to some extent on his great foe, but, before describing the results of his reign, we must shortly summarise the history of Poland, Russia, and Turkey up to this point.

There were very many factors which might have moved a political prophet in the early 17th century to foretell a brighter future for Poland than for its neighbours in Brandenburg or Russia. Geographically its territories, unlike those of Brandenburg or Sweden, were all contiguous, while its position in Europe was conveniently central; from an ethnical point of view the vast majority of its inhabitants were members of the Slav family, while in

religion an overwhelming majority were Roman Catholics, and the Reformation had caused less trouble in Poland than in any country to the Westward. Moreover, the Poles were a warlike race, famous for the wild valour of their cavalry, and were inspired by the historical fact that for generations during the Middle Ages Poland had stood as the rampart of Western civilisation.

In spite of this the history of Poland was doomed to be the history of brilliant failure. The unity which might have resulted from ethnical and religious homogeneity was marred by class divisions and social oppression, excessive even for 17th-century Europe. The extension of Polish boundaries to include Baltic provinces such as Livonia and Courland in the North and the Ukrainian Cossacks in the South introduced elements of discontent at home and causes of jealousy abroad, and overtaxed Poland's strength. Above all, a constitution which prevented strong administration and encouraged disorder and corruption within, while opening the door to interference from without, proved so baneful to the Poles as to make one think that in this case at least a people suffered from a constitution worse than it deserved. Indeed, believers in hereditary Monarchy can find even stronger arguments on their side in Polish history than in the story of the late Roman and Holy Roman Empires. From the middle of the 16th century the Polish Monarchy, which had been, like the Holy Roman Empire, elective in theory but hereditary in one family in practice, became really elective; the Royal power was submerged by the privileges of the Feudal nobility and great Churchmen, and the Diet was so hampered by absurd rules of procedure as to become farcical. Austrian and French intrigue influenced the election of Kings, and the power of Poland began steadily to decline. We have already seen that the Great Elector extorted from Poland the renunciation of her suzerainty over East Prussia (1657); that Sweden occupied Livonia (1660); and that Charles XII. drove one candidate from the Throne and ensconced another in 1704. One great character shines out in the gloom of Polish history

in the late 17th century. John Sobieski led his countrymen to victory over Ukraine Cossacks and the Russians between 1648 and 1667, and saved Poland from the Turks in the war of 1672-1676. He became King of Poland in 1674, and performed the task for which European civilisation must always preserve his name in 1683, when he saved Vienna from Kara Mustapha and started the real decline of the Turkish Empire.

The history of Turkey is the history of Asiatic barbarism at its worst, struggling, as Persia had struggled in the days

of Athenian greatness, to stop the process of

Turkey. European civilisation and make the Balkan Peninsula the centre of Oriental stagnation. The Turks themselves, a race small in numbers, which rapidly lost the purity of its blood and became a religious sect rather than a nation, had many good qualities. They were hardy and brave soldiers, and in their Janissaries—sons of conquered Christians seized as tribute and trained as soldiers—they produced the first professional soldiers of post-Renaissance Europe. They were even tolerant, in comparison with contemporary Christians, except in periods of fanaticism when, like all primitive people, they indulged in orgies of massacre and hysterical cruelty. But the main characteristics of the Turk were always his Orientalism, which made him an alien in Europe, and his total lack of administrative ability, which, while it bred corruption and forbade prosperity, also threw power into the hands of individual members of other races—Armenians, Greeks, Jews—and enabled conquered peoples to preserve their own tongues and customs.

Europe never united against the Turks; France often made with them an open alliance. To the Emperors and to the Slav races—conquered Serbs and Bulgars together with Slav subjects of the Emperors, Poles and, from the end of the 17th century onward, Russians—fell the task of defending the civilisation of the West. After 1683 the Turks should have been turned out of Europe; the Holy League of the Emperor, Poland, and Venice, was formed in 1684; the Turkish portions of Hungary were conquered by the Emperor,

and the Morea district of Greece was gained by the Venetians under Morosini in 1686; above all, the victories of the great Eugene, together with the capture of Azof by Peter the Great, drove the Turks, at the Peace of Carlowitz (1699), to give up the conquests of Suleiman 'the Magnificent' (1520-1566) and to retire practically behind the Danube.

The exhaustion of Europe after the War of the Spanish Succession and the defeat of the Russians by Ali Cumurgi enabled the Turks to reconquer Greece and Azof, but Prince Eugene's capture of Belgrade in 1717 opened the Danube to Austria. We shall find that the vacillations of the Emperor Charles VI. threw away Austria's great opportunity in the 18th century, and left Turkey and Russia as the two chief protagonists in South-Eastern Europe.

We have already mentioned (p. 28) that Rurik, a leader of the Northmen, is traditionally supposed to have consolidated some of the Slav tribes into the germ of

Russia—the land of the 'Rous,' Finnish for **Russia.** Northmen. It has been said that Russia is the last-born child of European civilisation, but it is probably more true to say that Russia in the essentials does not belong to the system which Western Europe has built up on Graeco-Roman foundations. Since the Tartar invasions of the 13th century under the successors of Genghis Khan, European Russia has been at least semi-Oriental, while Asiatic Russia is more Mongolian than Aryan. For two centuries Russia was actually subject to the Mongolian hordes whose headquarters were in North China and Central Asia; then the Princes of Moscow and above all Ivan 'the Terrible'—an epithet applied to him by foreign critics—threw off the Tartar yoke, and Ivan assumed the title of Tsar and tried to unite the various principalities which existed round such centres as Moscow, Novgorod, Kiev, and Perm. It was, however, an Oriental despotism tempered by anarchy over which Michael Romanoff in 1612 established the sway of his Dynasty. His successor, Alexis, established, in theory, the autocratic power of the Tsar, and began Russia's Westward expansion

by helping the Ukraine Cossacks in their revolt from the Poles. His reign, however, ended in anarchy, and he was succeeded in 1676 by a child, Theodore. On the latter's death in 1682, his brother, Ivan, and half-brother, Peter, became joint Tsars, with Princess Sophia as Regent and Basil Golitsin, a powerful noble, as the real ruler. Golitsin succeeded in retaining Kiev for Russia by the Treaty of Andrusoff, but in return was compelled to help Poland in her war against the Turks, and his failure in the Crimea gave the opportunity to the young Peter to establish his personal authority (1689). Ivan was mentally and physically deficient and presented no danger; Sophia was placed in a convent and Golitsin banished.

Peter the Great, for sheer genius and the combination of apparently contradictory characteristics, presents one of the most engaging character studies in History.

Peter the Great. Able, energetic, far-seeing, ambitious, patriotic, yet at times, like Alexander the Great, he spent days and almost weeks on end in drunken stupor; generally boyish, merry and genial, a stout friend and a man of his word, even in diplomacy, he was subject, like most Northerners, to fits of black depression, and if thwarted was capable of indulging in a ferocious cruelty, as when he had his son Alexis flogged to death and personally witnessed the torture, flogging, and roasting of hundreds of rebels.

In 1697 and 1698 Peter visited England, Holland, and Germany, and thoroughly investigated their Industries, Arts, and Politics; it is a measure of the expansion of Western civilisation that what Peter did in the 17th century investigators from far Japan were to do in the 19th. Peter's conscientious thoroughness was such that he actually laboured in a shipyard in order to grasp the method of work; he also attended a Parliamentary debate. It is interesting to note that he took home with him skilled shipwrights, architects, sailors, soldiers, gunners, and scientists, but did not import any Members of Parliament!

On the surface and in the matter of customs and manners Peter succeeded in large measure in occidentalising Russia.

Foreign traders and officials were protected; 'German' ideas and habits—shaving, smoking, Western clothes, emancipation of women from the harem, etc.—were enforced at the cost of a rebellion bloodily suppressed. But at heart the mass of Russians remained, as they still remain, Oriental in their fatalism, their ignorance, their 'superstition,' and their 'servility'—or so their characteristics appear to Western minds, although from another point of view these qualities might be called religious sincerity and contented docility. One of the unfortunate results of Peter's reforms was the establishment of German influence over, if not control of, the official and Court classes and Russian industries, an influence which tended to alienate the sympathies of the masses, and which assumed a new importance at the foundation of the German Empire in 1871.

In foreign affairs Peter was determined to introduce Russia into the company of the European Powers. In founding Petrograd, on some land conquered from Sweden, he was swayed by three ideas: he wanted a new capital less opposed to his reforms and Western policy than Moscow; he wanted a window through which Russia could look out to the West; he wanted a Baltic port for Russia's trade and as a centre from which her power in the Baltic could spread.

As we have seen, Peter's Baltic ambitions were on the whole successfully accomplished. Pultawa more than redeemed Narva, and by the Peace of Nystädt, in 1720, Russia obtained Ingria, Esthonia, Livonia, and part of Carelia. His Black Sea ventures were not so happy. Here again he aimed at a port in the first place with an eye, if the preamble to his will is authentic, to Constantinople in the future and after that 'the Indies'; Western policy was to go hand in hand with Eastward expansion. But the capture of Azof and the Peace of Carlowitz (1699) were cancelled by the disaster on the Pruth in 1710 and the Peace of Passarowitz (1718) which left Austria for the moment the most successful enemy and most likely heir to Turkey. Nevertheless Peter had not only established Russia as a power in the North and one of the


factors that must be reckoned with in Europe, but also she was henceforward one of the parties concerned with the affairs of Turkey, and during the 18th century, owing largely to the failure of Charles VI. to seize Austria's opportunity, she became the outstanding figure in South-Eastern Europe.

We must now return to Western Europe and the last round in the contest between Louis and William. Before doing so, however, it is perhaps worth noting that the statesmen of Western Europe, although they did not fully grasp the importance of contemporary developments in Central, Northern, and Eastern Europe, yet were sufficiently alive to their significance to try to turn circumstances and personalities to their own ends. Thus France and Saxony as well as Denmark, Brandenburg, and presently Russia, intrigued to influence the elections of Poland's Kings; Louis XIV. made a bid for the alliance and Marlborough for the neutrality of Charles XII. after Narva; while early in the 18th century Alberoni, an Italian Minister governing Spain, attempted to unite Russia and Sweden in the enterprise of invading Scotland in order to restore the Stuart Dynasty in England!

The Peace of Ryswick ended, in a sense, the duel between Louis and William. It is true that the War of the Spanish Succession was the crowning triumph of William's policy and diplomacy, and that England's participation in it was directly due to the accession of William, since it was the bravado of Louis in acknowledging James, the 'Old Pretender,' as James III., on the death of James II. in 1701, that finally decided English Parliamentary opinion in favour of the war. Nevertheless William died in 1702, owing to an accident caused by his horse stumbling over a mole-hill, whence arose the Jacobite toasts to 'the little gentleman in black,' and thus took no part in the war; moreover, the new war assumed the 18th-century aspect of a contest between England and France for colonial, commercial, and maritime power, and lost the personal and purely continental characteristics of William's wars. It is as true of the War of the Spanish Succession as it was when the wise Athenian

wrote it two thousand years ago that 'great events are produced by great causes, though the actual pretexts may be small.' Thus the overseas rivalry of England and France, the mutual jealousy of Hapsburg and Bourbon, the struggle between French Hegemony and the Balance of Power, were the underlying causes of the war, but, in order to grasp the actual pretext, it is necessary to learn the facts, trivial in themselves, which are contained in the following genealogical table and explanation:—

GENEALOGY ILLUSTRATING THE SPANISH SUCCESSION.



* Renounced claim by special provision of Treaty of Pyrenees in consideration of dower of 500,000 crowns to be paid by Philip IV. But this dower had never been paid, so that it was argued on behalf of the Dauphin that the renunciation fell to the ground.

(1), (2), (3) ————— = 3 original claimants.
 (a), (b) = 2 eventual claimants, representatives of claims of Louis the Dauphin and Leopold I.

It will be clear from the table that on the death of Charles II. of Spain the lineal claimants to the Throne would be (1) Louis, Dauphin of France; (2) Joseph Ferdinand, Electoral Prince; (3) Leopold I., Holy Roman Emperor. Obviously neither England, Holland, nor the Austrian Hapsburgs could afford to see France established in Spain, and the Spanish possessions in the Netherlands, Italy, and 'the Indies.' No less obviously France could not allow an Austrian Hapsburg to re-create in more than its old extent the Empire of Charles V. European diplomacy, therefore, employed its ingenuity, with scant regard to the wishes of the Spanish people, in formulating Partition Treaties, according to which Spain itself and the lion's share of its possessions were to be bestowed upon the Electoral Prince, Joseph Ferdinand, the least formidable of the rivals. That proud Spain should be the *corpus vile* for the deals of diplomatic huxterers is a criterion of the decay of which we have noticed various stages—e.g. the destruction of the industrial classes by religious persecution, the defeat of Spain's naval power by Elizabethan sailors, the Thirty Years' War, and the war against France and Cromwell.

In 1699 Joseph Ferdinand died. England and Holland renewed the diplomatic game, endeavouring to persuade Louis and the Emperor to agree to a new scheme of partition equally distasteful to themselves and the Spanish people. Louis agreed and even took the lead in this policy, but the Emperor delayed his decision, hoping for a will in favour of the Archduke Charles. On the death of the poor invalid, Charles II., in November 1700, it was discovered that he had made a will which, although the testamentary right of Kings over their dominions is opposed to all constitutional theories and particularly to that of Hereditary Monarchy based on Divine Right, yet made the best settlement that was possible in the circumstances from the point of view of the Spanish Nation and Empire.

He bequeathed his dominions to Louis's younger grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, on condition that the Crowns of France and Spain should never be united. If Louis refused to enter-

tain this proposal, the Crown and dominions of the Spanish Monarchy were to be offered to the Archduke Charles, younger son of the Emperor. Thus the two elder brothers, Louis, Dauphin of France, and Joseph, heir to the Austrian domains, passed on their claims to younger brothers, in deference to European opinion. Nevertheless war was almost inevitable. Louis could hardly be expected to sacrifice his grandson in order to aggrandise the Hapsburgs; neither the Hapsburgs nor Holland could watch unmoved the triumph of the Bourbons; the Spaniards not unnaturally objected to the vivisection of their Empire by means of Partition Treaties. England for a time hesitated. As happens again and again in her history she was faced with a dilemma; either she must fight to preserve the Balance of Power against a State which in the future might conceivably challenge her maritime position, or she must stand aside and trust to avoiding a future clash of interests by allowing that State to expand at the expense of its neighbours. William of course stood for intervention. Louis, possibly thinking to secure England's neutrality by embarrassing William, acknowledged the 'Pretender' as James III. on the death of James II. in 1701; he also hardened English suspicions by acts which showed that he looked upon Spain's shipbuilding yards, her fortresses and harbours in the Netherlands, and her American possessions as perquisites of France. Thus Louis really solved England's problem, and Western Europe was convulsed by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713).

For once both England and Austria started the war with their armies commanded by great leaders—Prince Eugene, whose exploits against the Turks have already been described, and the Duke of Marlborough, who betrayed James II., intrigued against William III., corresponded with the enemy, and out of all his affairs, whether War, Diplomacy, or Love, made money which he could not bring himself to spend, but yet was one of the few generals of whom the historian can say that he never fought a battle which he did not win, nor besieged a town which he did not take. The war by land

included four fields of action: the Low Countries, along the borders of the Netherlands and France, and round those Barrier towns which had witnessed William's campaigns and were fated to be the scene of so many English fights; the valley of the Danube, along which lies the main route from France to Vienna; Italy; and Spain herself. The Spanish campaign was only notable for the adventures and exploits of the gallant Peterborough, and for the fact that in the Peace terms we could do nothing for the few adherents of the Archduke Charles who had risen in Catalonia; the campaign in Italy was also of secondary importance, dependent on the issue of events elsewhere. The two main fields of operations, which we may call the Netherlands front and the Danubian front, were joined up by the brilliance of Marlborough in 1704. In many respects this was the critical year of the war. Vienna was threatened by Franco-Bavarian armies from the Danube valley and from Italy, and by Hungarian forces to the East; Marlborough, in order to come to the rescue of his allies, was not only faced with the necessity of deceiving his opponents, but was also obliged to deceive his Dutch allies, whose selfish caution would have opposed his leaving their frontier. Marlborough's success in surprising both friend and foe, effecting a junction with Eugene, and carrying on operations far away from any base with hostile forces on his lines of communication, was as signal a triumph for his strategy and diplomacy as his conduct of the actual battle of Blenheim was for his tactical skill; recognising that the French centre was not so impregnable by nature as the French imagined, he directed against it an attack Napoleonic in its concentration of weight on the critical point, broke their line, and rolled up one wing. Blenheim was a really decisive battle; France could not afford this loss of veteran soldiers and of prestige, while Europe grasped the truth, already suggested by her short experience of Cromwell's army, that now, as in the days of Creçy and Agincourt, the island kingdom possessed the finest military raw material in the world. The same year was marked by decisive events at sea—the capture of Gibraltar and the defeat

of a French fleet by Sir George Rooke, who had already previously destroyed the Spanish plate fleet. The remainder of the war was made up of the series of victories—Ramillies, Oudenarde, the capture of Lille, Malplaquet—by which Marlborough secured the Netherlands, captured the French border fortresses, and opened the way for an invasion of France; the failure of the allied campaign, under Peterborough, Galway, Stanhope, and the Archduke Charles himself, in Spain; and some fighting in Italy. Incidentally the Methuen Treaty, arranged by the English ambassador of that name, not only opened Portuguese ports to our troops, but was destined to be the most permanent treaty of English history, and promoted the welfare of English export trade with Portugal and of the Portuguese wine trade with England.

From 1704 onwards a definite movement towards peace made itself evident both in England and in France. In 1709 the movement came to a head; English Toryism began to make headway now that England's maritime and commercial interests seemed to be safe, and Marlborough's position became the more unstable owing to the waning influence of his wife over Queen Anne, while France, in addition to the burden of casualties and taxes, was threatened by famine. The allies, however, demanded of Louis, in addition to the surrender of Mons, Namur, and Strassburg, co-operation in expelling his grandson from Spain. Louis, arguing that if he must fight anyway, he preferred to fight for rather than against his grandson, appealed to the French nation, and its noble response enabled the war to drag on for three more years. The slaughter at Malplaquet was followed by the appointment of a Tory ministry under Harley and St. John, and the dismissal of Marlborough followed. Meanwhile during 1711 the English Government agreed upon the preliminaries of peace negotiations with the French and the allies were presented with a *fait accompli*.

Most of the allies protested, but the Emperor alone attempted to fight on. By the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), together with the Treaties of Rastadt and Baden (1714),

which are generally included under the name of the 'Peace of Utrecht,' the following main lines of settlement were agreed upon: Philip was recognised as King of Utrecht, 1713-1714. Philip v. of Spain, on condition that the Crowns of Spain and France should never be united; 'the Indies' were retained by Spain, but the Spanish Netherlands, henceforward the 'Austrian Netherlands,' were given to the Emperor, who also received Naples, Milan, and Sardinia; the Dutch gained the military control of certain fortresses in the Austrian Netherlands; France surrendered the Rhine fortresses seized during the war, but retained Strassburg and her Ryswick frontiers; she acknowledged England's claims to the disputed districts of Newfoundland, Acadie (Nova Scotia), and Hudson's Bay, but retained certain fishing rights in respect of Newfoundland which were destined to be a source of trouble right up to 1904; England also gained Gibraltar and Minorca in the Mediterranean, St. Kitts in the West Indies, and the 'Assiento' or agreement by which certain very limited trading privileges were granted in Spanish America; Sicily and part of the Milanese were the reward of the Duke of Savoy, who thus began the process, followed by his House during the 18th and 19th centuries, of 'eating up Italy leaf by leaf like an artichoke.'

The Allies and the Whig pamphleteers raised against this settlement an outcry which has been subsequently sustained by the Whig historians. Their denunciations have not been moderated by the fact that the man mainly responsible for the terms of Utrecht was St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, the most able statesman and writer of his age in the Tory camp.

No doubt the desertion of our few friends in Spain was deplorable, even though inevitable, and the policy of negotiating behind our allies' backs can only be excused on the grounds that the Dutch had been treacherous allies and the Imperialists insisted upon carrying on a war which had become abhorrent to all the other parties on both sides. It may appear weak to go to war to keep Philip off the Throne of Spain, and finally to acknowledge his claims. But when

once our own interests were safeguarded, England could not be expected to fight on in order to deprive the Spanish people of the King of their deliberate and enthusiastic choice. Moreover, owing to the death of the Emperor, Joseph I., in 1711, the Archduke Charles had become Emperor; it was infinitely to be preferred that the Throne of Spain should go to a junior scion of the House of Bourbon, who was not the direct heir to France and whose problematical claim was renounced beforehand in case it might ever materialise, rather than to one who was already Emperor and ruler of the Austrian Dominions.

The settlement at least gave Europe the peace which all the nations needed; it resisted the temptation to reduce France beyond the proper limits out of vindictiveness, although the French Monarchy never again was in a position to threaten the liberties of Europe; it recognised facts in its acknowledgment of the Prussian 'Kingdom,' and of the right of England to settle its own succession question; it may have left in its colonial and maritime decisions many openings for future disputes—*e.g.* the Newfoundland Fisheries, the Nova Scotia boundary, the Assiento restrictions—but it laid the foundations of the British Empire; finally it gave to Spain the King she desired.

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CHAPTER V

THE BALANCE OF POWER AND THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

PART I. EUROPE.—The 18th Century: Preliminary Years: England and France: Spain, Austria, and Italy: France and Austria: 'Family Compact' and Polish Succession: Walpole and Fleury: Austria, Russia, Turkey, and Persia: The 'Pragmatic Sanction': Maria Theresa and Frederick the Great: Austrian Succession War: General War: The 'Diplomatic Revolution': The Seven Years' War: The Partitions of Poland. PART II. OVERSEAS EMPIRES AND TRADE DURING THE 17TH CENTURY.—The Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch Empires: French and English in America: The East: 18th-Century Wars (1740-1783) in India: From Clive to Warren Hastings: Indian Government: America, 1740-1783: Pitt, Hawke, and Wolfe: Canada: Underlying Causes of the American Rebellion: Pretexts: Prospects of the War: Washington and Saratoga: French Intervention: Sea-Power: Results.

Note on India before the 17th Century: Bibliography.

PART I. EUROPE.

THE old King did not long survive the wreckage of so many of his schemes, only relieved by the loyalty of his people, the success of his grandson, and the restoration of peace. The death of his son in 1711 and of his eldest grandson in 1712 left his infant great-grandson as heir to the Throne. With the accession of Louis xv. and George I. in 1715 we come to the 18th century proper, the *locus classicus* of the Balance of Power. With the reduction of France, the transference of Spain from a Hapsburg to a junior Bourbon, and the rise of Russia and Prussia as counterweights to Turkey and Austria, the establishment of England as the leading maritime and commercial

power with France as her chief rival and Spain and Holland as rivals still, but rivals whose power steadily declined, finally with the virtual elimination of religion as a cause of war, we find ourselves in an atmosphere very different from that of the 17th century. We come, in fact, to an age of materialism and brutal common sense. In this chapter we intend to deal with this side of the 18th century—diplomacy, expansion, war, commerce, and industry—reserving for a special chapter constitutional developments, political thought, and the English and French Revolutions.

The first decade after 1715 was a period in which the main characteristics of the century were not yet fully marked.

Preliminary Years. The accession of Philip v. to the Throne of Spain might reasonably be expected to lead to a family alliance between the French and Spanish Bourbons, on the lines of the old Austro-Spanish Hapsburg alliance, while England, Austria, and Holland might be expected to form the rival camp. As a matter of fact, circumstances, particularly the dynastic ambitions of Philip of Spain, Elizabeth Farnese, his wife, the Emperor Charles vi., George of Hanover and England, and the Regent Orleans of France, prevented the expected from happening for more than fifteen years.

George realised how precarious was his tenure of the English Throne, and therefore desired friendly relations with the French Government, under the Regent Orleans, in order to checkmate the schemes of James Edward; he also desired the friendship of the Emperor in order to obtain Imperial ratification of the cession of Bremen and Verden by Denmark to Hanover. The Regent Orleans, who was only surpassed in iniquity and intrigue, even in his intriguing House, by Philip 'Égalité,' the regicide of 1793, hoped that his nephew Louis xv. might die as a child, in which case the help of England would be necessary to enforce the terms of Utrecht and secure the Throne of France for himself. Philip of Spain looked forward, in the event of the death of his nephew, to breaking those terms, while his wife concentrated her undoubted energy and ability on seeking principalities in Italy for her sons. The Emperor

still cherished hopes of reversing the decision of the late war and securing the Crown of Spain; meanwhile he squandered on opposition to Spain in Italy the energies which might have pressed home Eugene's victories over the Turks, and have enabled Austria to anticipate the rising power of Russia and make herself mistress of the Danube and the Near East.

Taken as a whole, we may say of the first half of the 18th century that there has never been a period when statesmanship was less far-sighted or when more opportunities have been thrown away, and this by rulers and ministers who prided themselves upon being business-like disciples of expediency. Only one useful object was attained; Europe avoided a general war from 1713 to 1733. For this credit must be given to Dubois and Stanhope, Fleury and Walpole. Apart from this national interests were largely sacrificed to personal and dynastic interests; the Dynasties had to a great extent made the national States: they now began to ignore nationality, in fact, as Alberoni put it, to 'carve up nations as though they were cheeses.'

England would have been wise to expand the preliminary treaty of commerce of 1715 into the full alliance for which Spain's great minister, Alberoni, an Italian by **England and** birth, worked in vain in 1717; thus we might **France.** have solved the question of trade with Spanish America, which subsequently caused the war of Jenkins's Ear, formed a main cause of the discontent of our American colonists, and was not settled until Canning recognised the Spanish Colonies as independent States in the 19th century. Stanhope preferred a French alliance, and at least this helped to secure peace; Walpole, although a Whig, also worked for peace and refused to sacrifice English interests to Hanover. France secured the peace which she needed, but neither Dubois nor Fleury made any real effort to reform her finances, develop her Empire in America, India, or the Indies, or promote her trade; the 'Mississippi Scheme,' the French equivalent to our 'South Sea Bubble,' but an even more ambitious and

disastrous affair, the offspring of the fertile Scottish brain of Law, was the only experiment in those directions.

Spain, after Alberoni's wise attempt to secure an English alliance, was driven to wild schemes by the ambitions of its King and Queen. At least, however, Alberoni tried seriously to improve industry and communications, and if he and, after his fall, Spain's Dutch minister, Ripperda, were driven by the self-willed queen to wild adventures, at any rate for a while Spain avoided the leading-strings of France and became again a Power in Europe; moreover, an adventurous policy increased Spain's prestige and could not add to the hopelessness of her internal condition, since in Spain Peace means stagnation. Elizabeth's intrigues in Italy drove Austria in 1718 to join England, France, and Holland in a quadruple alliance; the English destroyed a Spanish fleet at Cape Passaro, the French invaded Spain, George I. received satisfaction over Bremen and Verden, Alberoni was dismissed, and Elizabeth was comforted by promises of Duchies in Italy for her son Don Carlos. She next inveigled the Emperor into an alliance with Spain against his late allies, but peace was preserved, and Spain and Austria soon separated and continued to waste their energies on Italian intrigues. In 1731 Austria and Spain once more came to the verge of blows, but Walpole persuaded the Emperor to allow Don Carlos to succeed to the Duchy of Parma by giving England's guarantee to the 'Pragmatic Sanction,' a document which we must explain at a later stage. These incessant intrigues finally resulted as follows: the Duke of Savoy exchanged, in 1720, Sicily for Sardinia; as King of Sardinia and Prince of Piedmont he founded a Kingdom destined one day to fulfil Alberoni's dream of a united Italy; the Spanish Bourbons were established in Italy, as Elizabeth Farnese had hoped; Carlos ruled over Parma from 1731 to 1735 when he received the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, and although he subsequently left Naples to become King of Spain, yet his House continued to reign, and we shall find a Bourbon ruler of Naples when Nelson visits that port and,

Spain,
Austria, and
Italy.

at a later date, when Garibaldi raids Naples; Parma was returned to the Emperor in 1735, but reverted to Don Philip, younger brother of Carlos, in 1748, after the War of the Austrian Succession; Austria held Sicily for some years after 1720, and subsequently retained parts of Tuscany and Lombardy, but in order to do so sacrificed her great opportunities both in Germany and in the Near East.

Neither French nor Austrian statesmen realised until too late in the 18th century the fact that their old reasons for mutual fear were no longer valid. The rise of Prussia in the 18th and of the German Empire in the 19th century was due to the stupidity and traditional jealousy of French and Austrian statesmen. France neither became reconciled in time to her old rival, nor did she accept the overtures of the rising Power, Russia. She preferred to continue her traditional policy of patronising friendship with Sweden, Turkey, and Poland.

In 1729 a son was born to Louis xv.; this disposed of all uncertainty as to the French succession and, the Regent having resigned his position on the King's reaching his thirteenth year and died soon afterwards, in 1723, there was now nothing to prevent an *entente* between the French and Spanish Bourbons.

'The Pyrenees exist no longer' is a phrase attributed by some to Louis xiv., by others to the Spanish Ambassador, and by others again to a French newspaper; this dictum of 1700 became true in a modified way in 1733 when the first¹ Family Compact of the Bourbons was signed at the Escorial. France and Spain thus came together to meet the crisis of the Polish Succession War (1733-1735) in which France, supported by Spain and Sardinia, upheld the claims of Stanislaus Leszczynski while the candidate of Austria and Russia was Augustus of Saxony. To such a pass had Poland come through want of an hereditary Monarchy! This war cannot be altogether ignored in a World History, since it marks a

¹ In 1721 there had been a Family Compact restricted to the arrangement of marriages between the two branches.

France and
Austria.

'Family
Compact'
and Polish
Succession.

distinct stage in the decline of Poland towards partition; also as a result of it France secured the Duchy of Lorraine. Augustus III. was accepted as King of Poland by the Treaty of Vienna (1735-1738), but Stanislaus was to succeed to Lorraine for his life-time so soon as the death of the Grand Duke of Tuscany should enable compensation to be made to the present Duke, Francis of Lorraine, husband of Maria Theresa. On the death of Stanislaus the Duchy was to revert to France. Thus the diplomacy of Fleury completed the work of Richelieu, who had secured the Bishoprics comprising 'French Lorraine,' and of Louis XIV., who had acquired Alsace. It is also necessary to make these constant allusions to the bandying to and fro of Italian Duchies and Principalities, since only thus will it be clear to our readers how Italy came to be divided not only among Italian or semi-Italian Powers—Venice, the Papacy, Sardinia—but also among various Bourbon and Hapsburg rulers.

Walpole managed to save England from being embroiled in the Polish War by her Hanoverian interests. He and Fleury also managed to preserve the Anglo-French understanding, but it became every year more difficult to do so. A large party in France, led by Chauvelin, who had proved himself a good war minister during the late war and whose name is still used as a synonym for bellicosity, chafed against a policy which seemed to sacrifice the commercial and colonial prospects of France to perfidious Albion. Fleury was a very old man, and possibly must be excused for his want of energy in carrying on such internal reforms as the Regent had started and for his failure to grasp the opportunities that lay open to France beyond the seas. But in his policy of friendship with England and of reconciliation with Austria, in which he would have anticipated the *renversement* of 1756, he tried to lead France along the only safe path. In his European policy he was also opposed by men such as Belle-Isle, who realised truly that the expedient policy for France to follow in Germany was that expressed by the phrase 'Divide et impera,' but failed to realise that Austria

was no longer the real source of danger, and therefore insisted upon helping Prussia and Bavaria to rise at the expense of the old enemy.

In a similar way Walpole was opposed both by discontented Whigs, such as Pulteney, Carteret, and Pitt 'the elder,' and by Bolingbroke's Tories. Bolingbroke's opposition was merely party warfare; peace with France was, after all, the real Tory policy. The opposition of the Whig discontents was also to some extent merely factious; on the other hand, some of them desired to see a return to the purely continental policy of William III.

Two converging floods overwhelmed Walpole and Fleury. On the one hand, disputes over English trade with the Spanish Colonies came to a head over the incident of 'Jenkins's Ear.' On the other hand, France was involved in the general war which followed on the death of Charles VI. of Austria. Owing to the Family Compact it was inevitable that these two disturbances should combine to produce one general war; moreover, England, as the only signatory to the late Emperor's Pragmatic Sanction who intended to keep good faith, was to some extent a party to the European dispute.

Charles VI. was a well-meaning man who coquetted with many ambitions but concentrated his energies only on two, both of them ill chosen and unfortunate. His concentration during the early years of his reign on the attempt to make good his claims in Spain, if possible, and at least in Italy, led to the neglect both of his real interests in Italy—the development of the Tuscan Ports—for the chimera of extensive possessions in the interior, and also to the loss of the position which Eugene had won in the East. Fortunately for Austria, while Charles VI. dissipated her strength in Italy the Turks attempted a policy of expansion in Persia. The great Persian, Nadir Shah, saved his country from Turks, Afghans, and Russians, and meanwhile Turkey lost the opportunity, offered by the Polish Succession War, of attacking Austria and Russia. In 1736 Russia made an excuse for attacking the Turks while they

Austria,
Russia,
Turkey,
and Persia.

were busy elsewhere, and Austria, after a pretence of mediation, joined Russia. The Russians, after many failures and successes, began to master the Turks, and also started their now traditional policy of stirring up Serbs, Bulgars, Roumanians, and Greeks against their Mohammedan rulers, but meanwhile the Austrians, after a series of crushing defeats, made a peace ignominious in itself and treacherous towards their allies. By the terms of Belgrade (1739) Austria gave up Belgrade and retired behind the Danube and the Save. The French, well served by their great diplomat, Villeneuve, now intervened to persuade the victorious Russians to make peace. This was accomplished by persuading, or bribing, the Swedish Diet to support the war party, known as the Hats, against the peace party, the Night-Caps, and to threaten Russia with war.

The net result was as follows: Austria lost territory, prestige, and opportunity; Russia gained Azov and for the first time had appeared as the champion of the Christian subjects of the Porte—'the angel in shining armour from the North,' as Mr. Gladstone afterwards put it; France restored her prestige among the secondary Powers; Turkey proved to be far less moribund than had been anticipated.

Charles equally failed in his other objects. His short-lived attempt to promote in the Netherlands an 'Ostend East India Company' merely provoked England's jealousy, while his attempts to increase the German elements in the Austrian Dominions only served to arouse the suspicions of his kinsmen in Bavaria. Finally he found the second and last main object of his life. Having no son, he spent all his energies in persuading the Powers to sign the Pragmatic Sanction; in other words to agree to a revision of the laws of succession in the Austrian Dominions so as to make his daughter, Maria Theresa, succeed him, instead of either of the daughters of his elder brother, the late Emperor Joseph I. Prince Eugene warned Charles of the worthlessness of signatures and scraps of paper; 'a well-drilled army,' he said, 'and a well-filled treasury are worth all the treaties in Europe.'

If Maria Theresa started her reign handicapped by the legacies of a father who had acted as though the pen were really mightier than the sword, no such mistakes had been committed by the father of her great rival Frederick the Great who, like herself, succeeded to the Throne in 1740. Frederick's father, Frederick William the First,¹ a vulgar and debauched bully, whose brutality verged on insanity and manifested itself in such incidents as his attempt to strangle Frederick in his boyhood after flogging him until his own strength gave out for the heinous offence of studying music, was a prudent, astute, and economical ruler, a Prussianised equivalent of our Henry VII. He gave Prussia what Eugene desired for Austria, a large, well-drilled army and a treasury well filled as the result of economy and of improved methods of managing the extensive royal domains. He loved his money and his soldiers so well that he very sensibly avoided expending them in war. He joined in the League of 1720 against Sweden, but managed to avoid serious fighting, and to secure Stettin and a part of Pomerania round the mouth of the Oder more by threats than use of force. He sent some troops to help Charles VI. during the Polish Succession War, hoping to receive Jülich and Berg in Rhineland, but realised too late that the Emperor was opposed to any further increase of the Prussian Monarchy, and that George II. of England, in his capacity as King of Hanover, was also jealous of the rise of the rival Kingdom within the Empire. Hence the Prussian Court had some reason to regard Austria with suspicion, and equally Maria Theresa's cousins, of Bavaria and Saxony respectively, might reasonably resent their own deprivation under the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction. Nevertheless the rulers of Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony had all signed, and there can be no excuse on moral grounds for their action so soon as the death of Charles VI. and

Maria
Theresa and
Frederick
the Great.

¹ Called the first because he was the first Frederick William to reign since the Electorate had been promoted into the 'Kingdom' of Prussia in 1701.

the embarrassments of the girl-queen gave them their opportunity.

The personal characteristics of Frederick and Maria Theresa are such as almost to fit them for the melodramatic treatment applied to History by Tacitus and Macaulay; the villain and the heroine could be delineated without taking quite such liberties with the truth as are generally incurred when a historian idealises or denounces the characters of History, which, being human, are for the most part more or less equally compounded of virtues and failings, wisdom and folly. The young Queen was graceful and dignified, able to win over the loyalty of rough Magyar nobles by womanly appeal or to apply herself to the laborious details of government like a politician; deeply religious, she disliked science and despised art; a practical reformer—who gave Austria and Bohemia a combined Chancery, unified the control of finance and war and the administration of justice, reformed the army after its initial defeats, giving Austria the best artillery in Europe, improved the position of the peasantry, and in particular abolished serfdom on the royal estates—she nevertheless recognised the fact that a conglomerate and polyglot accumulation of races like the Austrian Dominions could never be reformed into a unitary, national State, and therefore she avoided such measures as those which, under the reforming zeal of her son, Joseph II., were destined to bring the Hapsburg Dominions to the brink of ruin.

Frederick resembled her in his capacity for work and systematised industry; also, if we except a strain of physical cowardice shown in an early battle, in his courage, especially the moral courage with which he faced disaster. In all else they were the poles asunder. Frederick was a cynic, and in many respects the most unscrupulous of an unscrupulous House. Treaties to him were scraps of paper, loyalty to allies was a futility; his rule was to follow expediency, to do as he expected to be done by, to betray before he could be betrayed. Like most of the Hohenzollerns—and Hanoverians—he quarrelled with his father and his son. His father's fiendish

ill-treatment fully excuses most of these unpleasant traits in Frederick's character, but unfortunately his success led to the cult in Prussia of just those characteristics which have to-day become identified with Prussianism. His use of force and war as an instrument of statecraft to be used whenever it seemed likely to pay; his disregard of honour—'It is the duty of a man to be ready to give his life for his country. A King must do more—he must give his honour'; his cynical falseness and brutality, whether in tearing up treaties or dismembering weaker nations—all these Machiavellian qualities became part of Hohenzollern statecraft. In smaller matters he was also an epitome of his House. His love of culture survived the blows of his brutish father, but, like others of his House, he lacked all sense of humour and never realised his own limitations; a capable performer on the flute, he unfortunately fancied himself a poet of parts, and in return for his hospitality to and admiration for Voltaire compelled that already soured soul to listen to the perpetrations of the Royal Muse!

The behaviour of Frederick in 1740, on the death of Charles VI., may be taken as absolutely typical both of the man and of his country. The possession of Silesia was coveted by Prussia and the Hohenzollerns because the course of the Oder, defended by the fortress of Breslau, was the easiest route for armies between Berlin and Vienna; the Elbe route entailed forcing one's way through Saxony and the difficult mountain pass of Pirna between Saxony and Bohemia. The commercial and strategical value of Silesia's coal and iron was not yet fully realised. Military expediency suggested the desirability of seizing Silesia; the troubles besetting the young Queen presented the opportunity which a ruler and a nation never noted for chivalry were not slow to take. After an attempt to blackmail and bribe Maria Theresa by the offer, in return for Silesia, of fulfilling the engagements of the Pragmatic Sanction, Frederick marched his troops into Silesia and, early in the following year, overthrew an Austrian army at Mollwitz.

Austrian
Succession
War.

The French war party forced Fleury to join in the attack upon Austria as the ally of Charles Albert of Bavaria, the son-in-law of the late Emperor Leopold and a candidate for the Imperial Crown. In 1742 Charles Albert was elected Emperor; the succession of Hapsburg to Hapsburg was broken by the lack of a male heir to that House, which had risen to greatness mainly owing to its fecundity in princes and the prudence of those princes' marriages. Two sons-in-law of the House were now rivals for the position; Charles Albert gained the first success, but, Emperor though he was, was chased from his Bavarian capital by the Austrians. Two years later the Imperial refugee died, and Maria Theresa's husband, Francis, Grand Duke of Tuscany and ex-Duke of Lorraine (see p. 130), was elected Emperor; the descendants of Francis and Maria Theresa assumed her family name of Hapsburg, and their descendants were successively elected as Emperors until Napoleon abolished the Holy Roman Empire; they subsequently continued to govern the Austrian Dominions, as Emperors of Austria and Kings of Bohemia and Hungary, etc., until the collapse of 1918.

Walpole, like Fleury, had been forced into war against his will and judgment. In 1739 hostilities broke out between England and Spain, nominally concerning the **General War.** ill-treatment of English sailors, including Jenkins, really about the whole problem of trade with Spanish America. This was a vital English interest, but Walpole rightly saw that this question could not be isolated. War would give the Jacobites their chance; until 1745 it was not realised how poor that chance was. It would also entail war with France; the Family Compact of the French and Spanish Bourbons at Fontainebleau in 1743 would have ensured this even if England and France had not espoused opposite sides in the Austrian Succession War. In the general war that must result English colonial and commercial interests would be sacrificed to the dynastic and continental interests of Hanover; this is precisely what happened. Carteret and George II. were right in holding that England and Hanover

were in honour bound to support Maria Theresa, but they were scarcely justified in committing us to a purely continental war in the interests of Austria and Hanover, which resulted in a peace—Aix-la-Chapelle—in which the commercial and colonial questions, for which we had originally gone to war, were completely ignored. The time to 'conquer America in Germany' was not yet.

Thus several wars, separate in their origins, were combined in one great war, the allies on both sides being in many cases mutually suspicious and at cross purposes. German historians generally refer to the campaigns which Frederick waged along the valleys of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Morava during this war and the Seven Years' War as the 'Silesian Wars'; there was also a Franco-Bavarian war against Austria and Hanover into which England was dragged by Whig policy, and an Anglo-Spanish war into which the Bourbons brought France. The results were not particularly gratifying to any party.

By the Treaties of Klein-Schnellendorf (1741), Berlin (1742), and Dresden (1745), Frederick had calmly betrayed his allies and made with Austria, to suit his convenience, **The Diplomatic Revolution.** pacts which he broke in 1744 and 1756, also to suit his convenience. There was, therefore, little confidence in or affection for Frederick in France, or indeed among the German States. On the other hand, the French, perhaps deliberately, had thwarted Frederick's plans for the capture of Vienna in 1741 and for a campaign in Moravia in 1742, so Prussia also was displeased with her ally. Prussia alone gained any solid advantage by the terms of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), but even in this case the cession of Silesia was merely the acknowledgment of a fact, and Frederick knew that the arrangement would last only so long as he had the force necessary for retaining his stolen goods.

On the other side of the alliance, most thinking Englishmen felt that English lives, money, and interests had been sacrificed by Hanoverian-Whig policy to Austrian and Imperial ambitions, while Austrian statesmen and their Queen reflected

that the alliance of England and Hanover had not sufficed to recover Silesia, but that the allies had concentrated upon retaining for Austria her possession of the Netherlands, which, owing to the conditions concerning garrisons dictated by English and Dutch susceptibilities, was a doubtful blessing if not wholly a burden.

This general dissatisfaction of allies with allies was coupled with the universal feeling that the peace was merely an armed truce in the struggles between Austria and Prussia in Germany and between England and the two Bourbon Powers on and beyond the seas. The history of this struggle in America and India will be best treated connectedly in a sketch covering the whole 18th century. For the moment we must continue to follow the current of events in Europe. If the late war had proved the efficiency of Frederick and his Prussian troops, it had equally given evidence of the remarkable rallying power of Austria and Hungary and of the practical reforming ability of Maria Theresa. The Empress, as she now was, set to work to reverse the decision of the first two Silesian campaigns. She found an ally in the Tsarina Elizabeth (1742-1762). In 1743 Russia had secured part of Finland from Sweden at the Peace of Abo, thus resuming her advance after a period of anarchy following on the death of Peter. France had annoyed Elizabeth by foolishly preferring a Swedish to a Russian alliance, and Elizabeth was also roused to action by jealousy of Prussia and dislike of Frederick the Great. It seemed to be so certain that France and Prussia would remain as allies while England would support Austria that Elizabeth, who was also influenced by English money, made an alliance with England, and hoped to expand a secret treaty, which she had concluded with Maria Theresa in 1746—before Aix-la-Chapelle—into an alliance between Russia, Austria, England, and Saxony to partition Prussia.

Meanwhile, however, other influences were at work. The Austrian Minister Kaunitz, discontented with the English alliance, worked first in Vienna and afterwards as ambassador in Paris for an Austro-French alliance. In France he was sup-

ported not merely by Madame Pompadour, the King's mistress, but by many statesmen who inherited from Fleury the desire to come to an understanding with Austria. An Austrian alliance would give France the following advantages: the friendship of Russia, the possibility of occupying the Netherlands unopposed and so striking at England, finally the co-operation of the Austrian army which, since its reorganisation, might be expected to equal the Prussian army and in artillery to surpass it. Russia and Austria might be expected to overpower Prussia, and in fact this expectation was to be more than justified; in spite of the brilliance and indomitable courage of Frederick and the steady stream of English gold during the Seven Years' War, Prussia was beaten to her knees by 1761, and it was only the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth and the accession of a friendly Tsar that saved Prussia from the loss of Silesia or even from partition. If France sacrificed her interests to those of Austria, this was not the fault of the general policy of the Diplomatic Revolution as expressed in the First Treaty of Versailles, 1756, but rather of the detailed working out of that policy by the Second Treaty of Versailles in 1757. We must also remember that the understanding with Austria came a generation too late, while the Russian alliance, which was also too late, was impaired in its efficiency by reason of the secret and unofficial intrigues by which Louis xv. strove to preserve in Poland the traditional friendship with France and hostility to Russia. Again, if France almost threw away an Empire during the Seven Years' War, we must attribute some of the blame to Fleury's neglect of the navy, but most of it to Geography; the traditional school of English historians,¹ and possibly we may add the American Mahan, seem to overlook the fact that France is not an island and therefore continental interests must come first. England only became a maritime power when she steered clear of the European aspirations of Norman, Angevin, Plantagenet, Lancastrian, and, to some extent, Cromwellian policy; she only 'conquered America in Ger-

¹ See Seeley's *Expansion of England*; Hassall's *Balance of Power*, etc.

many' when Pitt broke away from the traditional Whig policy of subordinating English to Dutch, Hanoverian, or Imperial interests. France of necessity gave her first attention to Europe. Before we turn from Europe to the course of events in America and India, which made the Seven Years' War one of the most decisive wars in World History, we may summarise as follows the actual facts of the Diplomatic Revolution and the Seven Years' War in its European aspect.

Frederick the Great was aware not only that Maria Theresa and Elizabeth were planning his overthrow but that Kaunitz,

The Seven Years' War. Maria Theresa, the Pompadour, and an Austro-phil party in Paris were working for an Austro-French alliance. He knew also that England and Russia had some sort of understanding. The English Government were also awake to the plans of their late Austrian allies. In 1756, therefore, Frederick proposed and England accepted an Anglo-Prussian alliance. The Treaty of Westminister, by which this alliance was effected, brought to a head the tentative approaches of Austria to France, and was answered by the Treaty of Versailles (May 1756). Thus the Diplomatic Revolution was completed; England still faced France, and Austria faced Prussia, but the alliances, instead of being England and Austria, with Russia friendly but ineffective, against France, Spain, Prussia, Bavaria, and Saxony, as in the late war, were now England and Prussia against France, Spain, Austria, Russia, and Saxony. It was the knowledge, conveyed by spies, that Saxony was preparing to join his foes that drove Frederick to start the Seven Years' War in Europe—or the third Silesian War—by an attempt to overwhelm Saxony and strike at Vienna before his foes were ready. The Saxons, however, delayed him in the Pass of Pirna sufficiently long to enable the Austrians to complete their preparations. Frederick accordingly was committed to a war against all the great Powers of Europe with but little help from outside except the invaluable assistance of English money. George III. and Bute, by stopping England's subsidies in 1761, incurred the hatred of Frederick and his sub-

jects. In spite of his own genius and the steady discipline and rapid manœuvring of his troops, Frederick, like Napoleon in 1813, was gradually borne down by weight of numbers, and the Prussian Kingdom was only saved by the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth in 1762. The Treaty of Hubertsburg, (1763) confirmed Prussia in her possession of Silesia.

The remainder of Frederick's life was devoted to promoting an understanding between Prussia and Russia, consolidating the Prussian Dominions, and diverting **The Partitions of Poland.** Austria's attention from German and Western affairs without bringing on another general war. The central point of this policy was the Partition of Poland in 1772. Tsar Peter of Russia, whose accession had saved Prussia from defeat, reigned for less than a year; his wife, the great Catherine—herself a Prussian and spiritually akin to Frederick¹ in her vigour, her industry, her grasp of politics, her love of French culture, and her complete lack of moral restraint both in matters of State and matters of personal behaviour—then forced him to abdicate in her favour, and probably instigated his murder. Catherine was obviously a person whose enmity would be dangerous to Frederick but with whom a deal would be facilitated by the mutual understanding between two brilliant cynics. The first deal consisted in mutual support in forcing Poniatowski, a favourite of Catherine, on the Poles as King Stanislaus II. Favourites promoted to power often disappoint their patrons, and in this respect Poniatowski proved himself a Becket. He actually attempted to introduce decent government, so Frederick and Catherine did another deal and intervened to persuade the Polish Diet to preserve the 'liberum veto,' which meant that one member could by his individual veto hold up any project of the King and Diet. In 1772 came a more extensive deal. From 1768 Catherine had been engaged so successfully in a war against

¹ A good idea of the moral standards of the 18th century may be drawn from the contemplation of the characters of Frederick and Catherine, the two rulers of the period to whom the title 'Great' was applied.

Turkey, brought on by the efforts of France to divert Russian attention from Poland, that Austria contemplated intervention to prevent Russia from absorbing European Turkey. Frederick persuaded the rivals to settle their differences at Poland's expense! Russia took a slice of 'White Russia,' which racially belonged to Russia; Austria took part of Galicia, including Lemberg, a district inhabited by Poles, Russians, and Jews; Prussia took part of West Prussia, which since the 15th century had divided East Prussia from Brandenburg, but did not yet acquire Dantzic, Thorn, or Posen.

Maria Theresa wept as she signed the fatal document, as our great Elizabeth wept over the death-warrant of Mary Queen of Scots. At any rate Catholic Austria proved herself a less hateful mistress to the Catholic Poles than either Protestant Prussia or Orthodox Russia.

The Poles now made a real effort to reform their government; in 1791 they established an hereditary Monarchy and a Parliament, and abolished the 'liberum veto.' Catherine, however, forbade these reforms, which, she said, savoured of French Jacobinism! In 1793 Frederick William II., nephew and successor of Frederick the Great, took advantage of the war in which Prussia and Austria were engaged against revolutionary France to desert his ally and arrange with Catherine another partition behind Austria's back. Austria's protests were stifled by promises of help towards securing Bavaria for her, a project in which Frederick the Great had thwarted Joseph II., Maria Theresa's son, and which was not destined to be fulfilled. The next year Kosciusko rallied the Poles, but, on his defeat by Catherine's troops, the Polish King was forced to abdicate, and in 1795 Russia, Prussia, and Austria divided all that was left of Poland: Prussia kept Dantzic, Thorn, and the country round Posen, acquired in 1793, and added the district round Warsaw, but yielded Cracow and its neighbourhood to Austria; Russia added to her gains of 1793 a further slice of 'Black Russia' and the Duchy of Lithuania. We shall find these arrangements upset by Napoleon, and a resettlement made in 1815, but the fate

of Poland for over a hundred years was really settled in the critical years 1791-1795. It is easy to understand why the Poles gave Napoleon such loyal and efficient military support.

PART II. OVERSEAS EMPIRES AND TRADE DURING THE 17TH CENTURY.

We may now turn from the rather sordid tale of Eastern Europe to the story of Great Britain and France in the New World and India.

We have already described the geographical discoveries of the 15th and 16th centuries, and therefore, in order to understand the condition of affairs in America and India during the period from the 'War of Jenkins's Ear' to the War of American Independence, we

**The
Expansion
of Europe.**

need merely summarise the main facts of the oversea expansion of Europe up to and including the Treaty of Utrecht and enumerate the principal possessions owned at the beginning of the 18th century by the colonising Powers of Europe. We will begin with Portugal as being the first of the Western colonising Powers in historical priority. Towards the close of the 16th century

**The
Portuguese
Empire.**

Portugal, thanks to the enterprise of her early mariners, was in a position strategically almost to control the chief trade-routes. Madeira, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, Portuguese East and West Africa, Muscat and Ormuz on the Persian Gulf, Goa, Calicut, and Diu in India, Timor and Malacca in the Malay Archipelago, Macao in Chinese waters were among Portugal's fortified trading stations. In addition she owned Brazil. Her subservience to Spanish interests, however, during the critical period 1580-1640, and her lack of population and industrial resources at home enabled the Dutch to drive her from most of her strongholds in the East, and even temporarily to occupy a fraction of Brazil (1633-1654). Portugal regained her independence from Spain in 1640, and at the beginning of the 18th century possessed all the places enumerated above *except* Malacca, Ormuz, Muscat, and Calicut.

Spanish America stretched from Chile and the Argentine district in the South to what is now California but was then included in Mexico. The Spaniards also owned Florida, and vaguely claimed the wild lands West of the Mississippi. Their West Indian possessions included Cuba, Hispaniola, and Porto Rico; in the East they claimed the Philippines; and they also held the Canary Isles and St. Helena and certain stations on the mainland along the West coast of Africa.

The Dutch had by the beginning of the 18th century ceded New York—formerly New Amsterdam—to England, and had also retired from a portion of Brazil which they held temporarily (1633-1654). Their Empire, however, was still extensive, including as it did Guiana, the Cape of Good Hope, Java, stations in Borneo, Sumatra, and other of the East Indian 'spice islands,' and also in Ceylon and India, and even in Siam. For a time the Dutch East India Company was a successful rival of the English Company, but Holland, like Portugal, lacked the population and home industries necessary as the foundation of a Colonial Power; moreover, the Dutch overstrained their strength in their struggles against Cromwell, Charles II., and Louis XIV. If the Spanish neglected the trading opportunities offered by their Empire, and exported mainly landlords and missionaries in return for shiploads of precious metals, the Dutch went to the opposite extreme and treated an Empire as a shop which must return prompt dividends; they were not willing or perhaps not able to build for the future.

The French owed their early enterprises in America to the same motives which had influenced the English pioneers—Cabot, Drake, Hudson; viz. the twin desires to capture Spanish treasure-ships and to discover a North-West Passage to the East. Thus Verrazano—an Italian, like the Cabots—in the service of Francis I. captured two of Cortez's treasure-ships in 1522 and explored the coast of North America in 1524; Jacques Cartier in 1534 sailed up the St. Lawrence as far as an Indian village to which

**Spanish
Empire.**

**Dutch
Empire.**

**French and
English in
America.**

he gave the name Mont Royal—Montreal; in 1604 pioneers of a French trading company established themselves at Port Royal in Acadie (Nova Scotia), and in 1608 Champlain, the 'father of New France,' formed the first successful French settlement in Canada by the foundation of Quebec. On these exploits and the achievements of the explorers and missionaries who pressed Westward, up the St. Lawrence and along the Great Lakes, France based her claim to the ownership of undefined tracts of territory in Canada and Newfoundland, while the explorations of the Jesuit, Marquette, and the explorers Joliet and La Salle, between 1673 and 1682, revealed the secrets of the Mississippi, the Illinois, and part of the Missouri, and gave France her claim to 'Louisiana,' a vast tract of country connecting the French-Canadian settlements on the St. Lawrence with the mouth of the Mississippi. Of course these huge territories were not really settled or controlled by the French; Quebec and Montreal became real French towns and fortresses, and along the St. Lawrence there were a certain number of Seignorial estates, reproducing the French semi-feudal conditions of society in the New World, some settlements of Huguenots, and, apart from these, just a few hundreds of dauntless explorers, hunters, missionaries, and traders, living almost the life of the Red Indians, intermarrying with them, and establishing a few stockaded strong-posts here and there.

Meanwhile the claims of France were not unchallenged. To the North of French Canada the beginnings of English Canada were made by the fur-traders of the Hudson Bay Company's territory, leading a life similar to that of their French rivals. To the South of the French settlements lay the English colonies proper, real settlements of English populations which, if less adventurous than their French rivals and less popular with the natives, were really opening up the country and laying the foundations of permanent Anglo-Saxon communities. We have already noted the attempts by Raleigh and Gilbert, in Elizabeth's reign, to found colonies in Virginia and Newfoundland. In the reign

of James I. John Smith successfully formed a settlement in Virginia, while English settlers in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia (Acadie) challenged the claims of the French. During the reigns of James I. and Charles I., from 1620, the year in which the *Mayflower* sailed from Southampton¹ to found New Hampshire in a New England across the Atlantic, to 1628, colonies of a type very different from loyal Newfoundland and aristocratic Virginia were founded by Puritan refugees from the régime of Laud; at one time Oliver Cromwell himself contemplated joining a party of English emigrants from the United Provinces to America! These Puritan—'New England' or, as the Southern Colonists afterwards called them, 'Yankee'—colonies included Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Pym was what we would now call a director of the Massachusetts Bay Company.

The Roman Catholic Lord Baltimore also founded a colony of refuge in the reign of Charles I., the first colony which belonged to a 'Proprietor.' The Catholics tolerated Protestants, but one is ashamed to record that in 1715, when a Protestant proprietor succeeded, Roman Catholics were disfranchised in their own colony.

The reign of Charles II. added New Jersey, including Manhattan Island and New York City—formerly New Amsterdam—conquered from the Dutch; Pennsylvania, granted to William Penn for Quakers; and the Carolinas, founded by Royalists. Georgia was founded as late as 1733.

If the French set up vague claims to the lands along the Mississippi, the English replied with equally vague and ambitious claims to the effect that each English colony had the right to extend Westward as far as the Pacific! Thus, although at Utrecht in 1713 France recognised English claims in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay Terri-

¹ A storm drove her into Plymouth, and that was therefore the last English port touched at; hence the American Plymouth. These 'Pilgrim Fathers' and their families had been living in Holland (Leyden) before the *Mayflower* venture.

tory, yet there were still numerous causes of dispute; the French claim to share the Newfoundland Fisheries gave rise to disputes over fishing rules that were not settled till 1904; the problem of the boundary between French Acadie and English Nova Scotia led to endless disputes and raids on the part both of New Englanders and French Canadians; above all, there remained the unlimited and mutually antagonistic ambitions of both nations with regard to the wild and unknown West.

English possessions and ambitions also clashed with French and Spanish claims and interests in other parts of the world. In the West Indies England owned the Bahamas and Jamaica—the latter acquired in Cromwell's time; the Indies had been a Spanish monopoly until the English and French buccaneers unofficially wrested some islands from Spain's grasp, after which the Governments completed what the pirates began. England also owned the Bermuda Islands and even some territory in Central America, British Honduras forming a wedge in the mass of Spanish territory. In South America what is now British, French, and Dutch Guiana was in 1713 purely Dutch; England had owned a slice of territory there, but had ceded it to Holland in exchange for New York.

English interests in the West thus clashed very thoroughly with French and Spanish claims. The Spaniards did not develop a trade with their own colonies, but, like all nations in those days, would not allow others to do so. The limited rights of trade secured by England in the Assiento clause of the Treaty of Utrecht merely whetted the appetite of English and Anglo-American traders and led to smuggling and retaliation, and the same may be said of the Slave Trade, run largely by Bristol ships, from West Africa to America.

England in the 17th century followed the Portuguese and Dutch in acquiring stations—such as Cape Coast Castle—on the Cape Route to India, but it was in India The East. itself and the East Indies that our interests brought us into conflict first with the Dutch and then with the French, and India, as much as America, was one of the scenes of the Anglo-French duel of the 18th century. The

Dutch had profited by the subordination of Portugal to the Spanish Crown from 1580 to 1640 to oust the Portuguese from their East Indian and Indian stations until Goa in India and Timor in the Malay Archipelago remained the only important Portuguese possessions in the East. The English, however, followed hard upon the heels of the Dutch. In fact, the first important expedition of English merchants to the spice regions, in 1591, preceded the first great effort of the Dutch by four years, but this first attempt failed, and it was not until 1600 that the great East India Company obtained its charter from Queen Elizabeth.

The importance attached to Spices and the privileges granted to Trading Companies appear curious to modern readers. As we explained (p. 72), our ancestors had no artificial cattle foods for the winter and few 'root' crops. It was therefore necessary to kill the herds in the autumn down to the capacity of winter pasturage. They also lacked artificial ice, and accordingly needed spices both to preserve meat for the winter and also to mitigate the offensive flavour of that which was decomposed. The almost sovereign powers granted to Companies—the monopoly of trade, the right to maintain armed forces and to fight natives or rival Companies of other European nations even when the home Governments were friendly, etc.—were absolutely necessary in days when might was right in the far East, the far West, and the far South, and when no merchants would risk life and capital in opening up trade unless they obtained these privileges.

The rivalry between the Dutch and English East India Companies during the 17th century resulted in the expulsion for the time being of the English from the East Indies,¹ but in India itself the English Company made the most progress, although the Dutch still held a few stations in the Peninsula and the important positions of the Cape and Ceylon on the route to it. During the reign of James I. the English defeated the Portuguese and established a station at Surat, expelled

¹ The massacre of the English at Amboyna (1623) is one of the chief incidents of this conflict.

the Portuguese from Ormuz, and made a commercial treaty with the 'Great Mogul'¹—the descendant of the Mohammedan conquerors from the North and nominal overlord of most of the principalities and races of India.

The reign of Charles I. saw the establishment of English factions at Madras and at Hoogli—the latter station being subsequently removed to Calcutta; the Navigation Acts and Dutch Wars of the Commonwealth and Charles II. injured the Indian prospects of the Dutch, and Charles handed over to the East India Company the town of Bombay, part of the marriage portion of his Portuguese wife, Catherine of Braganza, and also gave them a new charter, enabling them to absorb certain rival English concerns.

In 1664, however, a more formidable rival even than the Dutch appeared in India. Colbert persuaded Louis XIV. to charter a French East India Company; five years later the French established a station at Surat, beside those of the English and Portuguese, and they followed this up with settlements at Chandernagore, near Calcutta, and Pondicherry, near Madras.

Early in the 18th century, after the death of the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, the practical power of the Emperors so decayed that, outside a comparatively restricted area round Delhi, their capital, the various rulers—Hindu 'Rajahs' and Imperial officials, 'Nawabs' and 'Subahdars'—more or less forgot their theoretical subordination to the Mogul Emperor; the official Nawabs, like the Carolingian Counts or the Earls of the England of Alfred's successors, began to look upon themselves as hereditary sovereigns just as much as did the Rajahs, who were descended from Hindu ruling Houses.

In 1741 the great Dupleix became the Governor of the French stations, and he immediately set to work to profit

¹ A note at the end of the chapter summarises the main facts of Indian history in so far as they are necessary for the understanding of general history. The details of Indian internal history are so difficult—mainly owing to the names involved—that this study is best relegated to specialists.

by the divisions among the Indians. 'Sepoys'—native troops drilled and led by Europeans—had been employed by the English in defence of their factories since the time of Charles II. Dupleix now started the practice of employing French-trained Sepoys in the wars which constantly took place between native rulers, in return of course for commercial and territorial concessions which, together with the enhanced prestige gained by the French, bade fair to give them the commanding influence in India. The English replied by adopting the same policy, and thus the process began by which a Trading Company almost unconsciously became a territorial power and eventually, as we shall see, the Flag in this instance followed Trade and British India was evolved.

We thus come to the Austrian Succession and Seven Years' War period, which we have already described as regards its European aspect. We must now summarise its events and results in India and then turn again to America and show how France lost an Empire while England gained one and lost another. Owing to the genius and organisation of Dupleix and the skill of the Privateer, Admiral La Bourdonnais, the French had rather the better of things in India during the War of the Austrian Succession, and even occupied Madras. Nevertheless England retained the command of the sea, and at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle the *status quo ante* was restored. Meanwhile the English Company had produced a genius in Robert Clive, clerk turned soldier, who excelled Dupleix at his own game and was destined to secure the triumph of England over France in India. In 1751 the English and French Companies supported rival claimants to the position of Nawab of Arcot, and thus in the East—as we shall find was also the case in the West—English and French fought against each other during the period in which Europe was enjoying the respite of armed peace between the Austrian Succession and Seven Years' Wars. In 1754 Dupleix was recalled; in 1756, just before the official war started, Clive seized Arcot and defeated a besieging army

Austrian
Succession
and Seven
Years' War.

of French and natives. At the beginning of the war the French persuaded Surajah Dowlah, Nawab of Bengal, to attack the English post at Calcutta, while Count Lally attempted a combined naval and military attack upon Madras. Clive, however, overthrew Surajah in the battle of Plassey, one of the decisive victories of World History, in which, as at Marathon, Salamis, or Zama, Europeans defeated overwhelming numbers of Asiatics. Not only was Calcutta retaken and vengeance wreaked for the 'Black Hole,' in which most of the English prisoners had perished of thirst and heat, but English soldiers and English-led natives acquired a prestige which endured for a hundred years; one thousand English troops with four thousand sepoy had overthrown fifty thousand Hindus. In 1760 Colonel Eyre Coote defeated Count Lally in the battle of Wandewash. No native troops were engaged on either side, and therefore this victory, followed by the siege and capture of Pondicherry, undid the work of Dupleix and enhanced English prestige at the expense of French. The French had been defeated at sea, both locally and in home waters by Hawke at Quiberon Bay, and could therefore send no more help, and by the terms of the Peace of Paris (1763) France forfeited all rights to military establishments in India, though the restoration of Pondicherry and other trading stations left openings for intrigue, as we found during the American and Napoleonic Wars.

Clive's career¹ gave us an Empire in India, and it became necessary to organise some machinery of government. In 1773 Lord North's Regulating Act placed under one Governor-General all the Company's stations, the chief centres of which were still Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The first Governor-General was also the greatest—Warren Hastings. He purified justice and ad-

From Clive
to Warren
Hastings.

¹ Clive acted as Governor of Bengal from 1765 to 1767, and meanwhile, in 1763, shortly after the Peace of Paris, the victory of Munro at Buxar had completed the results of Plassey and made the Company supreme over the whole of North-East India, the native rulers of Bengal and Oude becoming vassals.

ministration by substituting Englishmen for the corrupt native magistrates and tax-collectors, but his greatest achievement was that, when cut off from aid from home during the American War, while England fought against France, Spain, Holland, and the American Colonies combined, Hastings held intact our Indian Dominions and defeated the Mahrattas and Hyder Ali of Mysore. Like most great Anglo-Indians, including Clive, he was attacked by jealous enemies. Macaulay and other Whig Party historians adopt the unfair method of taking for granted the truth of the detailed accusations against him but pretending to defend him by pointing out the difficulties of his position. Every modern authority—V. A. Smith, Sir Alfred Lyall, Trotter, Grier, Professor J. W. Neill, G. W. Hastings, Sir James Stephen, G. W. Forrest, etc.—agrees in vindicating Hastings of the charges on which he was impeached, and paying a tribute to his noble work for England and India. Perhaps his greatest justification is his reputation among the natives.

In 1783 Fox's India Bill was deservedly rejected by the Lords and caused the defeat of the notorious Coalition Government of North and Fox, but in the following year the younger Pitt—Prime Minister, thanks to the insistence of George III., at the age of twenty-four—introduced a measure which gave British India a system of government which lasted till 1858. The Company retained its control of patronage as well as commerce, but the Crown, advised by the Government of the day, could veto appointments to the highest offices, and an Indian Board, appointed by the Government, was to control the military and civil policy and administration by means of the Governor-General.

We must now trace the course of events in America during this same period—1740-1783. Although England had become involved in the War of the Austrian Succession partly as a result of her quarrel with Spain over trading questions in America, yet during the war and at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) the colonial and commercial issues were completely over-

looked. The war between England and France, however, had the effect of bringing to a head the rivalries of English and French in North America, and the period of official peace from 1748 to 1756 was a period of unofficial war in these Colonies. In 1749 London merchants and Virginians combined to form an 'Ohio Company,' whose activities were bound to clash with the French claims to control all the country to the West of the Alleghanies from Canada to Louisiana. In 1754 a Virginian force under George Washington, at that time an officer in the Colonial Militia, was defeated by the French, who captured the site of an intended Ohio Company fort, where Pittsburg now stands, and established there the French Fort Duquesne. In the next year a force of English Regulars under General Braddock, dispatched at the request of the Colonists, was defeated near the same spot by a mixed force of Indians, French, and Canadians. Thus the 'Seven Years' War' (1756-1763) was, so far as America was concerned, merely a continuation of a pre-existing state of warfare. Our defeats in America in 1754 and 1755 and the naval reverse when Byng failed to relieve Minorca in 1756 did not promise well for England's oversea Empire. Nevertheless we had on our side certain solid advantages. The French Colonials numbered about one hundred thousand as contrasted with a million and a half of English settlers, most of whom looked to the New World for their permanent home. The English Government on the whole offered its Colonists more support and less interference than the French. Moreover, the Island Power had certain inherent advantages over the European Land Power if only it could find a statesman who would use and not thwart nature.

This statesman we found in the elder Pitt. He chose the right leaders, inspired, supported, and trusted them, and meanwhile, by means of subsidies to Prussia, Pitt, Hawke, stirred up the maximum of European troubles and Wolfe. for France with a view to 'conquering America in Germany.' The victory of Admiral Hawke over the French fleet at Quiberon Bay, and the capture of Louisburg and Cape Breton

at the mouth of the St. Lawrence in 1758, opened the sea path to Quebec while closing the way to French reinforcements. In 1759 the young General, Wolfe, aided by daring seamen who negotiated by night and without pilots narrow waters deemed impassable, scaled the Heights of Abraham and tempted Montcalm to give battle. Wolfe's victory, in which both commanders gave their lives, sealed the fate of Quebec and ultimately of Canada. Meanwhile Fort Duquesne had been captured and the remnants of Acadie secured. In 1760 the conquest of Canada was completed by the fall of Montreal, so that, although peace did not come till 1763, the Seven Years' War in America was really a Six Years' War, from 1754 to 1760. Between 1760 and 1763 we captured Havana and Manila from Spain, but restored them at the Peace of Paris in exchange for Florida.¹ French Canada and certain West Indian islands were retained by England, while Louisiana¹ was divided between England and Spain, the former obtaining all territory to the East of the Mississippi, while the latter gained the mainly unknown lands to the West, including New Orleans.

Thus France was expelled from North America, and England was faced only by the decadent power of Spain. In spite of our cession of Cuba, the Philippines, and Martinique—the latter to France—and our failure to settle the question of the Newfoundland Fisheries, we occupied a marvellous position. Yet almost immediately it was realised, as Shelburne indeed realised at once, that the removal of the French danger, followed as it was by the suppression of the Indians as a serious factor by the defeat of Pontiac, opened the way for the development of troubles which had long existed in the germ although active symptoms had been prevented by the medicinal effect of interests and dangers common to England and her Colonists. The quarrel between England and the thirteen Colonies which resulted in the division of the Anglo-Saxon

¹ Florida was regained by Spain in 1783, but occupied by the U.S.A. in 1810 after a local rising. Louisiana was returned by Spain to France in 1800 and sold to the U.S.A. by Napoleon in 1803.

race¹ and brought about the development of the United States as a new Power and the growth of new conceptions of Empire inspired by the collapse of the 'old Colonial system,' is one of the great landmarks in World History, both from the point of view of international relations and also from that of the development of political and constitutional theories. Indeed this movement must be included not only in the present chapter, which deals mainly with international and colonial affairs, but also in the chapter on constitutional history. The War of the American Rebellion was for England both a foreign and a civil war, and to many English Whigs George Washington appeared as a Party leader and the spiritual descendant of John Hampden. The importance of the subject is equalled by the difficulty which must be encountered in dealing with it by any historian who on the one hand believes it to be the duty of the historian to endeavour to determine and tell the truth, and on the other hand considers that in cordial relations between the British Empire and the United States lies the best hope for both these communities and the world at large. Unfortunately the ordinary American text-book, as educated Americans admit, rakes up the ashes of old conflicts and is blind to the British side of the case; whereas in England historians, orators, and journalists tend to go to the opposite extreme and apparently hope to gain the goodwill of Americans by an unfair depreciation of England's attitude and behaviour. Personally we hold that, in the interests of Anglo-American friendship, the less said about the past the better; there is much for each side to be proud of and much for each to be ashamed of. But History must endeavour to set forth facts, and we hold it to be a poor compliment to Americans to fancy that their esteem can be won by false flattery, distortion or concealment of facts, and the repetition of libellous misstatements concerning the

¹ In the 18th century the American Colonies were still mainly Anglo-Saxon in population, although even then Irish, Dutch, and German elements existed and also a growing negro and a dwindling native population.

English protagonists and their policy and actions. The first fact to emphasise in justice to both sides is that in days of sailing ships communication between England and America was sufficiently difficult to prevent friendly visits by individuals of the one to the other except in the case of urgent business or on the part of rich men or officials. Moreover, the population of Great Britain was small and there was very little regular emigration. Thus mutual knowledge and understanding were lacking, and differences in characteristics were growing up which were increased by the presence of some foreign elements—*e.g.* the Dutch of New York—and by the rather difficult and suspicious attitude towards the home Government bequeathed by the Puritan settlers of New England to their descendants.

These differences and suspicions had been very noticeable during and even before the Seven Years' War. For instance, the prospects of success of Braddock's expedition had been marred by the half-hearted help afforded by the Colonists and by their anxiety to make a profit out of the English troops, while on the other hand the English Regulars had probably annoyed the Colonists by their half-contemptuous attitude towards their advice and local forces. It must also be borne in mind that the various Colonies felt towards each other a jealousy and suspicion at least equal to that with which they regarded the Mother Country; if the French or Indians raided or threatened a certain Colony, the inhabitants of that Colony were ready to fight, but the Colonists as a whole were not prepared to pledge themselves to any regular system by which all should contribute in just proportion for the defence of all and each. This attitude was afterwards to create some of Washington's most difficult problems, for the Rebellion and even independence did not eradicate it. In a large measure the English Colonies enjoyed self-government under their separate Assemblies according to charters granted freely during the 17th century. There were exceptions of course, such as the 'proprietary' Colony of Maryland, but, speaking generally, the one point in common between the

aristocratic communities of slave-owning landlords, such as Virginia, and the Puritan communities of farmers and traders, such as Massachusetts, was the enjoyment of self-government, each under its own Assembly, and the history of the American Colonies before the Rebellion is concerned not only with French and Indian wars and a general growth of population and wealth, but also with interminable squabbles between Colony and Colony and between Governors and Assemblies.

Although these English Colonies thus enjoyed a large measure of self-government and, compared with the contemporary Colonies of Spain, France, Portugal, or Holland, were extraordinarily free from interference, yet under the 'old Colonial system' they were subject to trading restrictions which modern oversea communities would not stand. Colonies were looked upon as 'Plantations' existing mainly for the good of the trade of the Mother Country. Their duty was the production of raw material to sell to the home manufacturers, and they were also expected to buy the finished articles. Thus, while every encouragement was given to Colonial planters, farmers, trappers, etc., Colonial manufactures were restricted and in many instances prohibited; also Colonial trade was—in theory, for there was much smuggling—restricted to trade with the Mother Country and, by the Navigation Acts, imports and exports must be carried in English or Colonial ships to and from Colonial ports, while trade with English ports must be carried in English or Colonial ships or in ships of the country that produced the goods; incidentally we must remember that this rule did not work entirely to the detriment of the Colonies, since American shipping was encouraged as well as English, and, in fact, the tonnage in proportion to population in Colonial days contrasts favourably with that of later periods. In the general result, however, Colonial interests subserved English interests to such an extent as to justify the argument, used by Chatham and Burke, that England indirectly received a fair return for money and lives spent on defending the Colonies. But this was not the main line of argument on which the Colonists based

their case. Indeed, they resented trade restrictions and objected to English attempts to stop smuggling and observe treaty obligations, and at the same time refused to agree to alternative methods of contribution. England was left with a very heavily increased debt at the end of the Seven Years' War, and both taxpayers and Members of Parliament as well as the King began to think it unfair that the home country should support the burden of the whole Empire. It is admittedly false to say that George III. was personally responsible for the loss of the American Colonies, or that a tyrannous Government tried to exploit the Colonists. An overwhelming majority of his people, of both parties, agreed with the King's attitude in supporting and encouraging the attempts of the Whig Ministry of Grenville and Bedford, of Townshend in the mixed Ministry of Chatham and Grafton, and finally of Lord North's Tory Government to raise money. Moreover, the sum at which English Ministers aimed was only one-third of the annual cost of the English forces in America, and the Colonists were invited and given time to raise the money in their own way through their own Assemblies. The cry 'No Taxation without Representation' must therefore not be interpreted as meaning that the Colonists were willing to pay on condition that they were represented in an Imperial Parliament—men like Adam Smith and Franklin were already considering the possibilities of Federalism—but must be taken to mean that they wished to continue as they were without either taxation or representation, enjoying Imperial protection but free from Imperial responsibility or expense.

In fact, the lack of sympathy on both sides produced a dilemma. If the English Government waited for a free grant they would get nothing, whereas if they arbitrarily enforced a tax they laid themselves open to the charge, which appealed strongly to Burke, Fox, and a minority of Whigs, that although obeying the letter of the law they were violating the spirit of the constitution as established by Grand Remonstrance and the Bill of Rights, and were hammering in the thin end

of the wedge which would lead back to Strafford's 'Thorough' system of government. Burke and Pitt—now Chatham—also argued that from a practical point of view the 'game was not worth the candle.'

Such were the real causes of the Rebellion. The pretexts and incidents leading up to the outbreak may be summarised as follows: in 1764 Grenville and Bedford introduced a measure to enforce the use of stamps—

The Pretexts.

as in England—for such legal transactions as making a will, giving receipts, cashing cheques, etc. Six of the Colonies protested and were supported by Lord Chatham, who drew a distinction between Customs and these new 'internal' taxes; in 1766 the Rockingham and Burke Government withdrew the measure, but passed a 'Declaratory Act' maintaining the rights of the English Parliament to exact such taxes; also efforts were made to check Colonial smuggling, especially with the Spanish Colonies, in accordance with the terms of peace. In the same year the Government of Grafton and Lord Chatham failed to procure a settlement, possibly owing to Chatham's illness, and Townshend, their Chancellor of the Exchequer, added some small new Customs duties. In 1773 Lord North introduced the ingenious Tea Duties; the Colonists would get tea cheaper than formerly from British India and Ceylon—the first Imperial Preference in the modern sense—because instead of the tea coming through English ports where a heavy duty was paid, it would go straight to the Colonies, where a light duty would be charged. The Colonists, however, refused to surrender their principle, and tea arriving at Boston was thrown into the sea; the English reply was to annul the charter of Massachusetts, thus abolishing its Assembly and making it a Crown Colony, and to remove the Customs House to Salem in order to prevent the use of Boston as a port; the Massachusetts Assembly, however, met at Concord and began to raise troops, while George Washington took the lead in a Congress at Philadelphia in which twelve Colonies were represented, Georgia standing out as being in the main loyal to England.

The first fighting took place in 1775 at Lexington, when English troops tried to seize some supplies, and the battle of Breed's Hill, or Bunker's Hill, followed next, when the English drove the rebels from a position near Boston, but suffered losses out of proportion to those that they inflicted.

At first sight it would appear that the war must be a foregone conclusion in favour of England, mistress of the seas, victor of the Seven Years' War, superior in wealth and population. On the other hand, the fighting took place in a country vast and largely uncivilised, where the Colonists' knowledge of the country and skill in marksmanship and woodcraft almost counterbalanced their inferiority to the regular troops in discipline, and the immense distance from their home base was an even more serious handicap to the English. If England possessed many allies among the Colonists, this advantage was counteracted by the pro-American activities of many English political leaders; if the average subordinate officer of the English troops was superior in military knowledge to the average Colonial officer and the English command was possibly less hampered by personal feuds and jealousies than was George Washington, on the other hand none of the English Generals—of whom Lord Cornwallis was clearly the best—showed the determined leadership which enabled Washington to survive disasters and convert defeat into victory. There is little doubt but that from a military point of view the war should have been settled in our favour in 1777, though it is more open to question whether we could have held down the Colonists after conquering them. In that year the rebels' attempt to invade Canada¹ was crushed by the French Canadians and English, General Howe defeated Washington at Brandywine and captured New

¹ The English Colonists of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland remained loyal, as also the French Canadians, who realised that conquest by the New England rebels would entail loss of political and religious rights; in fact, the American attempt on Canada was clearly opposed to the principles of the 'Rights of Man' and the 'Declaration of Independence.'

York and Philadelphia, while the scheme indicated by both strategic and political considerations was put into force, to wit, the conquest of the New England States, the backbone of the Rebellion, by naval blockade and combined military movements along the Hudson and the St. Lawrence. Unfortunately Howe's inactivity allowed Washington to extricate his army, beaten, dispirited, badly equipped, and divided by intrigue, from certain destruction or capture after Brandywine, and, more disastrous still, Clinton's slow progress along the Hudson led to the isolation and surrender at Saratoga Springs of Burgoyne's force from the St. Lawrence.

Saratoga must rank among decisive battles because it not only saved the American cause from imminent collapse but decided the French to enter openly upon a war of revenge with England; hitherto Frenchmen, such as Lafayette, had taken part merely as individual volunteers. Thus, although without French help the Americans could scarcely have hoped to gain their independence, yet they may claim that their own efforts produced success enough to secure the official alliance of France which proved decisive. If France had declared against England from the first, we should probably have held the thirteen Colonies by the same method by which we had gained Canada; that is to say by the destruction or blockade of our European enemies in order to secure for ourselves the command of the sea. As it was, the dispersal of our fleets along the American coast and our feeble strategy allowed the French—who were subsequently joined by the Spanish and Dutch, so that England was faced by a combination of the three greatest Sea Powers of Europe—to dispute the mastery of the seas just long enough to turn the crisis of the war against England; in 1780 Lord Cornwallis, who had been sent South to help the Loyalists and conquer that part of the country, after winning several battles in the open, was hemmed in at Yorktown owing to lack of supplies; de Grasse, the French Admiral, beat off an English fleet which attempted to relieve him, and the surrender of his forces (1781) really settled the fate of the Colonies.

Probably only a minority of the Colonists, even if we exclude Loyalists from our calculations, had hoped for independence at the beginning of the struggle, but circumstances and a determined minority won over the waverers. Outside America, England was saved by the efforts of her fleets under Rodney, and by General Eliot, who commanded at Gibraltar, and by Warren Hastings in India. Rodney defeated the French and Spaniards at St. Vincent in 1780, and threw supplies into Gibraltar which enabled Eliot to hold out till peace came in 1783; Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote defeated Hyder Ali of Mysore and the Mahrattas; finally, in 1782, Rodney crushed de Grasse at the Isle of Saints, a victory which might have saved our American Empire had it occurred three years earlier. Rodney seems to have initiated¹ the manœuvre known as 'Breaking the Line,' tactics subsequently developed by Nelson.

From a military point of view this war was an episode in the duel between England and France, the French revenge for the loss of Canada. From a constitutional point of view it was almost a civil war. The 'Declaration of Independence,' 4th July 1776, must stand with Magna Carta, Grand Remonstrance, and the Bill of Rights,² as one of the great statements of political principles, while Paine's *Rights of Man* was not without influence on revolutionary thought in France and elsewhere. Indeed, the ideals of their American allies, together with the financial burdens of a war in which France gained only honour and revenge, helped to promote the movement which resulted in the French Revolution. A new nation was born, and the British Empire passed through a period of eclipse which to many contemporaries suggested a collapse, but out of which a new conception of Empire was evolved.

¹ Possibly we should say 'revived,' since the Athenian *διεκπλοῦς* and *περιπλοῦς* were very similar.

² Nevertheless the Colonists differed from the Puritans and Whigs inasmuch as the latter asserted, the former denied, the supremacy of Parliament over all groups and individuals. See Professor Pollard in *History*, October 1918.

A sense of historical proportion, it may be hoped, will gradually cause the mutual recriminations and bad feeling arising from this quarrel to die down, just as the bitterness of the Napoleonic struggle between England and France has been sweetened by time. It is unfortunate that the majority of American historians have kept the old grudges to the fore, possibly because American history up to 1917 lacked any other formidable foreign enemy for use as a whetstone for the patriotism of young citizens. The more modern and scientific school of historians, however, is beginning to admit that immediately after the cessation of hostilities England pursued a conciliatory course: an old supporter of the Colonists' case was sent as our first ambassador; at Versailles England forced the Americans' French allies to grant more extensive territory to the new Republic than the French statesmen wished; it was Canning's policy and England's fleet which preserved American independence and the Monroe doctrine during the first half of the 19th century; and England again saved America from being faced by a European alliance, led by Germany, during the Hispano-American War (1898); moreover, public opinion in England prevented intervention during America's Civil War (1860-1865), although the Federal Navy's Blockade caused a cotton famine in Lancashire, and many episodes took place which might have been regarded as *casus belli*; the same determination not to take offence marked English statesmanship when President Cleveland interfered with warlike threats in our dispute with Venezuela in 1897, and in spite of constant references to England by American politicians and journalists of a kind which the United States would not tolerate from any foreign Power.

As to recriminations concerning the war of 1775-1783, neither side can afford to rake up the past. If England used Hessian troops and Red Indians, the Colonists allied themselves with the traditional enemy, France, and endeavoured to outbid us for Red Indian support. In the Seven Years' War French, English, and Colonists had all used Indian allies. The atrocities were not all on the side of the Indians; one of their

reasons for preferring England was the fact that some Colonial Assemblies had previously offered blood-money for Indian scalps, female as well as male ; the bitterest accusation against the English was our offer of freedom to black slaves who joined us ; the Loyalists both inflicted and suffered from atrocities, and many thousands of them subsequently migrated to Canada and built up the loyal colony of Ontario. In short, the best service which an historian can perform is to summarise these facts and advise both sides to let bygones be bygones, since neither can afford to cast stones.

INDIA BEFORE THE 17TH CENTURY

From one point of view a very large proportion of a ' World History ' should properly be assigned to the history of India, China, and the East generally, quite irrespective of their isolation from or connection with the Western World ; after all, Oriental history is the story of a very large portion of the human race. We admit this, but at the same time are prevented from acting according to the logical conclusion of our admission by the following considerations : (1) we lack the necessary special knowledge ; (2) the proportion of this work forbids such an attempt ; (3) we are deliberately taking Western civilisation as the central theme round which our history revolves. We therefore make no attempt to describe the various Hindu Empires—the Maurya Empire, Asoka Maurya, the Vijayanagar Empire, etc.—or the early Mohammedan conquests, but confine ourselves to the following observations :—

(1) The teaching of Gautama—' the Buddha '—whose date is approximately the end of the 6th and the beginning of the 5th century B.C., although his followers did not long maintain numerical importance in India itself, is one of the great influences for good of World History. Buddhist missionaries spread their humane and civilising doctrines far afield—China, Thibet, Burma, Japan, etc.—also Gautama and Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, did much to influence and reform Hinduism. The humanity of Buddhists and Jains is extended to include the treatment of

animals, a point in which followers of other religions might with advantage learn a lesson.

(2) Mohammedan invaders from the North-West began to make headway in India proper from the latter part of the 13th century A.D. to the middle of the 14th. This introduced a new religious element into India, which complicates Indian problems in a way comparable to the effects of the colonisation of Ulster by Protestants on Irish problems.

(3) From 1340 to 1556 Islam lost ground. In 1556 the great Akbar succeeded to the Mohammedan ' Mogul ' Empire, founded by his grandfather, Babur, King of Kabul. From the time of Akbar to the death of Aurangzeb (1707) the Mogul Empire was probably the greatest in population and wealth in the world, but it remained an ill-organised Empire, held together by a religious minority, and largely dependent upon the characters of individuals. We have seen how European traders began to enter India during the great Mogul period—1556-1707 ; the subsequent extension of English and French influence, as described elsewhere, was made possible by the collapse of Mogul rule during the early 18th century, and the growth of virtually independent Monarchies under the successors of various hereditary Hindu princes and Mohammedan viceroys.

The best short History of India in the English language is V. A. Smith's *Oxford History of India*. His warning to the effect that early Indian History and Geography can only be understood when we allow for the changes in the courses of certain rivers, his exposure of certain fallacies concerning Caste, and his bibliographies are especially valuable.

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CHAPTER VI

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

English Constitutional History to the end of the 18th Century,
and the French Revolution.
Bibliography.

AN outline sketch of general history, if it is to preserve its character and proportion, must obviously avoid the tendency to develop into a series of separate chapters on the internal affairs of individual nations; it must therefore for the most part relegate 'constitutional' history to the specialists. On the other hand, human society as a whole and Western civilisation in particular have been so influenced by certain developments, local or national in their beginnings, that exceptions to this rule must be made at the arbitrary discretion of the writer. The evolution of representative institutions among the English-speaking peoples, the English, American, and French Revolutions, the decay of Feudalism and the substitution of a new basis of society through the movement known as the Agricultural and Industrial Revolution, are developments of this class. In this chapter, therefore, we intend to attempt to describe the main features in English constitutional growth and theory as far as the 18th century, the causes and meaning of the French Revolution, and the economic conditions which were partly the cause, partly the result of those constitutional developments.

We have already referred to the Feudal system and argued that, with all its faults, it played its part in enabling Western civilisation to emerge from the Dark Ages; we have also summarised the changes brought about by the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the discoveries and inventions which

accompanied them. We will now start by tracing in broad outline the growth of the British Constitution and the various theories underlying this growth, and will emphasise some of the points by which British history is distinguished from the contemporaneous history of other Western nations.

Without going back into the misty land of prehistoric Celtic and Teutonic customs, we may for our present purpose content ourselves with saying that Juries are the direct ancestors of representative assemblies, or at least that both modern Juries and modern Houses of Representatives have developed out

The Germs of Representative Institutions.
(a) **Juries.**

of the same germs: the old Juries of 'Inquisition' which assisted early Kings in England and elsewhere to elicit information such as that contained in Domesday Book; the Juries which decided cases in which Frankish Kings were involved—one of the many instances of kingly privilege turning out to be the germ of popular liberty; the Anglo-Saxon Juries of 'Compurgators' who could swear an accused off from a charge, and thus save him from the 'ordeal'; to say nothing of other Juries of more doubtful authenticity, such as the 'Twelve Senior Thegns' of the Danelagh. The reforming and organising genius of Henry II. assured the permanent incorporation of Juries in the judicial machinery of the country, although his Juries corresponded more nearly with our witnesses, men who knew the facts, than with modern Juries; also he adopted actual trial by 'Petty' Jury only for civil cases; criminal cases still went to the ordeal, but 'Grand' Juries were instituted by Henry, to decide whether or no the accused should be exposed to the ordeal, which virtually meant that the prisoner's fate was in their hands since, except through bribery or influence, there was no escape for those committed to the ordeal.

It was John's need of money which seems first to have suggested the expedient of summoning representatives of various localities to meet the King at court instead of sending officials to meet the local Juries of Inquisition as had been done, for instance, in the preparation of Domesday.

This was not a deliberate constitutional innovation; it was merely an expedient for temporary necessities. Nor did contemporary opinion recognise it as an important innovation. After all, the 'minor' tenants-in-chief—from whose ranks the 'Knights of the Shire' would naturally spring—had as much right in theory to sit in Great Council, to which they were summoned *en masse* through the Sheriffs, as had the 'major' tenants-in-chief who were summoned personally. This personal summons became a hereditary privilege, and was the basis of our Peerage; the summons *en masse* was traditionally ignored until first John, then Simon de Montfort and Edward I. summoned Knights to represent the Shires, who would be elected by the minor tenants and such other 'free' tenants as attended the Shire Court for the purpose. Thus almost unconsciously our ancestors became possessed of the protoplasm of representative institutions. The next step was the summons by Simon of members for certain friendly Boroughs, an innovation which Edward I. adopted and developed into a regular part of the constitution. From the time of the 'Model Parliament' of 1295 representatives of Shires and Boroughs have been an integral part of Parliament; on one occasion only, in 1640, did the King, Charles I., attempt to revert to the old Grand Council, *i.e.* Lords Spiritual and Temporal and high officials, but this assembly, when it met, immediately advised him to summon Parliament.

The division of Parliament into two Houses is one of the most important developments of English history; if Parliament had split into three or more Houses—for instance Nobles, Clergy, and Commons, as happened in France—or even had the Knights of the Shire continued to sit with the Peers to whom they belonged by blood and interest, then the English Monarchs could have played off the two 'upper' Houses against the 'lower,' the Burgesses by themselves would have lacked influence, and the English upper classes might have become, like the French,

a close oligarchy cut off by blood and tradition from the *bourgeoisie* and *canaille*. As it happened, the Knights of the Shire, a large proportion of whom would always be sons or nephews of Peers, gave influence and confidence to the Commons' House in which they sat with the Burgesses, and also formed a link—the country-gentleman class—between nobility and commoners, thus tending to obscure and mitigate class divisions in England. Yet, like many of the outstanding developments of English history, the division of Parliament came about by a natural, gradual,¹ and mainly unconscious growth.

'Parliament,' strictly speaking, consisted of the King and the assembly of Lords Spiritual and Temporal, expanded by the addition of the representatives of Shires and Boroughs; the Proctors of the Lower Clergy, although summoned by Edward I., habitually ignored their summons and preferred to meet in Convocation; hence to-day clergy of the established Church are debarred from becoming members, since they allowed their own right to lapse, but did not acquire those of the Commons' estate. This large assembly could not debate, although it could listen to a speech. Accordingly, after business had been opened by the King or his minister, the 'Commons' by a natural instinct would withdraw together to debate; their conclusion would be conveyed to the King by their 'Speaker,' who, alone of the 'Commons,' had the right to speak in Parliament itself. During their absence at debate the Lords would remain and debate in Parliament House—Westminster Hall—and after a time the room to which the Commons withdrew became known as the 'Commons' House.' During the 16th century, by which time custom had confirmed the hereditary nature of the claims of the descendants of the great tenants and officials to be sum-

¹ In the number of *History* published in April 1918 Professor Pollard, in reply to a letter of mine, sketched in outline this development in an article which could scarcely be improved upon; readers interested in this side of History would be well advised to consult the article and also Professor Pollard's *Evolution of Parliament*.

moned personally, the phrase 'House of Lords' began to be applied to the Parliament House in which the Lords sat for debate, while the Commons attended only at the beginning and end of the session. The name 'Parliament' was then used as including both Houses, but strictly it implies the joint assembly in the presence of the Monarch. From the above it is easy to understand the growth of the custom—violated by Charles I. in 1641—which precluded the Monarch from entering the Commons' House.

The Commons, originally summoned to suit the King's convenience, lacked the historic, or almost prehistoric, rights which pertained to the Great Council itself as the descendant of Witenagemot. Nevertheless, since their main function was, from the first, to devise methods of raising money for the King's Government, they soon began to claim some vague rights from which the theory of control—or Power of the Purse—developed. According to Magna Carta, a statement of 'rights' about equally composed of clauses which really made for better government and of others which threatened to perpetuate the anarchic privileges of the Feudal nobility, the Crown renounced its right to take *extra* aids, reliefs, etc., without the consent of the Great Council; in other words, taxation, which fell in the first place upon the great Feudal landholders, was to be limited in some degree by the assembly of these great tenants. Similarly, during the Edwardian period (1272-1377) we find claims by the Merchants that *extra* duties on wool, etc., must not be levied without the previous consent of the taxed; fortunately the Merchants' claim was adopted by Parliament, and thus the danger of a fourth Estate was avoided. The third Edward even granted for a time the privilege of auditing accounts, but he withdrew the concession as soon as he felt strong enough to do so.

The Lancastrian Dynasty could only maintain its usurped position by concessions to the various cliques to which it owed its success. The nobles, owing to the unfortunate

result of the 'Family Policy'¹ of Edward III., were split up into parties, each one of which possessed a royal leader; the Lancastrian Kings vacillated between satisfying and resisting the demands of their particular clique. The support of the Church was held by the first great law against Heresy—De Heretico Comburendo. The Commons were propitiated by the concession of rights and privileges upon which as precedents the Parliamentarians of the 17th century largely based their claims. The chief of these may be summarised as follows: in 1406 Henry IV. granted Parliament the 'Proper Audit of Accounts'; this, together with the fact that Henry frequently granted redress of grievances as the price of supplies, established a more definite claim to the 'Power of the Purse,' while in 1407 the Commons gained the right to originate Money Bills, instead of merely voting on suggestions brought forward by the King and his Ministers. In the sphere of Legislation a corresponding advance was registered; hitherto Parliament had 'petitioned' the King to make a law on some given subject, and the King, if he assented—with the words 'Soit droit fait comme il est désiré'—himself determined the actual wording and form of the law; Henry V. conceded the point that either House of Parliament might introduce the actual Bill, which, if the King assented—with the words 'Le Roy le veult'—became law—an Act—as it stood; the King might reject but might not alter.

This steady development did not continue. The collapse of Lancastrian rule entailed the temporary eclipse of this 'premature constitutionalism,' and the Wars of the Roses, the last triumph of the Feudal Baronage over Crown and Commons alike, albeit a temporary triumph which led to their destruction, was followed by the Yorkist period of purely personal despotism; the Yorkists' partiality for the privileged Merchant Class, as opposed to the unorganised masses outside the Guilds, and the renouncement of 'Benevolences' by Richard III. cannot be said to falsify the general truth of this description.

¹ See Cecil Smith, *British History*, pp. 128, 129, 154-157.

The Tudors were enabled, or indeed almost forced, by the mutual destruction of the turbulent Feudal nobility and the general desire for internal peace and strong government, to establish a despotism. But it was a despotism *sui generis*. In its general efficiency and its success in fulfilling certain tasks demanded by a majority of those classes which then formed public opinion—to wit the re-establishment of central and local order and government, the breach with Rome and the evolution of a middle way in religion between the two extremes represented respectively by the Protector Northumberland and Queen Mary, the dissipation of the Spanish peril, and the apprenticeship of English seamen, merchants, and adventurers in new seas and lands—it resembles the 'Benevolent Despotisms' of the 18th century; but, unlike them, it did not rest on military power nor destroy the other Estates of the Realm. It resembled the Greek Tyrannies in that it relied on popular support, but, unlike them, it was not unconstitutional. The achievement of Henry VII. in destroying the military power and the privileges of the nobility and substituting modern government based on the equality of all subjects under the Law was more complete than the cumulative efforts in this direction of Henry IV., Sully, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV. in France a century later, but of course his opportunities were correspondingly greater. In 1485, after thirty years of mutual slaughter which was confined to their own ranks and those of their retainers, the nobles were for the time being represented either by minors or by exiles or by friends of the new King. At first, as Bacon says, 'the great Lords he took not to his Council,' with the exception of a few friends such as Oxford; thus Henry became, what the Lancastrians had not been, master of his own Council. By the next generation it was safe to use the nobles freely once again, their teeth having been drawn by the Court of Star Chamber, an instrument devised to enforce the Statute against keeping retainers—'Livery'—and interfering with justice—'Maintenance'—while their interests were subsequently attached to the Crown

by lavish grants of estates after the suppression of the Monasteries by Henry VIII. Thus England bred a political nobility, possessing more duties than privileges, whereas France under the Bourbons was burdened by a courtier-nobility, conciliated by privilege but not trusted with power or duties; the French Revolution, therefore, came to complete the work which the Crown had started, and in the process of doing so destroyed the Crown itself.

Even more striking was the attitude of the Tudors towards Parliament. Our knowledge of Stuart history is apt to mislead us into looking upon antagonism as the normal attitude of Parliament and Crown. This is a complete misconception when applied to Tudor times. Some opposition there was to Empson and Dudley, to Wolsey, to Mary's extreme policy in religion, to Elizabeth's grant of Monopolies, and occasionally to her foreign policy, above all to Somerset and Northumberland when Tudor government was exercised in commission by men of lesser breed. But so far was antagonism from being the normal attitude that we may almost say that Crown and Parliament formed a mutual admiration society. The King was master of his Parliament as of his Council, and with Parliament's help became master of the national Church, but this mastery depended not upon force nor, to any extent that really counted, upon interference with elections, but upon acknowledged leadership towards national goals. Consequently the Tudors, instead of fighting Parliament like the Stuarts or leaving it in abeyance, as did the Bourbons, used it and even increased its routine work and granted it 'privileges'—freedom of speech, freedom from arrest for Parliamentary actions, favourable interpretation of speeches and decisions, access to the Sovereign for all Peers and for the Commons through their Speaker. These privileges, however, were not too closely defined; for instance, Elizabeth held that free speech implied merely the right to answer Aye or No with impunity. Again, the Commons granted Tonnage and Poundage, but until 1625 they never ventured to refuse it. Conversely Parliament pressed on the Crown new

functions in the exercise of which Parliamentary support was added to Royal Prerogative. The Star Chamber, subsequently the *bête noir* of Stuart Parliaments until the Long Parliament abolished it, was the creation of the Parliament of Henry VII., and by its efficient work justified its creators; a Parliament of Henry VIII. undertook the task of enforcing the payment of those Benevolences which had been denounced by Parliament and renounced by Richard III. in 1484, and gave the force of law—with the proviso that new offences entailing loss of life or liberty should not be created—to the Royal Proclamations whose normal use was the interpretation of existing laws *quoad terrorem populi*—a use of which we had regular experience during the German war in the shape of Proclamations interpreting the Defence of the Realm Act, and to which a close parallel can be found in the Edicts of Roman Praetors; these two extensions were not really desired by Henry VIII., and were subsequently withdrawn.

Taken as a whole, the Tudor period was a time of co-operation between Crown and Parliament and of steady training of the Commons in routine work, which almost seemed to promise that, if Tyranny was the 'Birth-pangs of Greek Democracy,' Tudor Monarchy should give painless birth to English representative government.

This fair promise was thwarted by three main obstacles: (1) Religious feuds, (2) lack of money for carrying on the King's Government, (3) the personal characters of the Stuart Kings and their principal supporters and opponents.

The Reformation had in its early stages strengthened the Crown, since the King in Parliament had stood out as the champion of the national State against the cosmopolitan Church and the leader of a popular movement against clerical monopoly—whether that monopoly took the shape of sacerdotal celebrations of Latin services, monastic occupation of lands and wealth, or clerical opposition to the spread of the New Learning amongst the laity. But in History it often happens that, as the addition of guns to the walls of Constantinople in 1453 broke down

under their weight the defence which they were intended to strengthen, so an institution may be broken by its own weight: for instance, the family policy of Edward III. bred trouble for the Royal Family, which it overloaded with estates; or again, Feudalism, which at first enhanced the position of the King by establishing him as supreme landowner and fount of Justice, finally proved itself the persistent enemy of national Monarchy.

Thus again the Protestant elements in England co-operated with the Crown in breaking the connection with Rome, and in fighting the Romish Spaniard. But when the **Religious Troubles.** war languished and the Government desired peace, the essentially fissiparous nature of Protestantism revealed itself. The logical Protestant, who insisted upon the right of the individual to think for himself, might easily find the Anglican Church and the Royal Supremacy only less objectionable than the Roman Church and the Papal Supremacy; the Puritan or Independent objected to all authority, until his own party gained power under Oliver Cromwell; while the Presbyterian, although as rigid in his church discipline as either Anglican or Roman—'new Presbyterian is but old Priest writ large'—objected to all systems save his own. In a recent book entitled *Outlines of History* there appears a controversy between the author, Mr. Wells, and the historian, Mr. E. Barker: the former attributes the Puritan Rebellion to economic causes, the latter sees it as a struggle for 'freedom of conscience.' May we with due modesty suggest that there is truth on both sides, since religious questions were combined with economic, political, and constitutional disputes, but that Mr. Barker is right in laying most stress upon the religious aspect? After Grand Remonstrance there was no need to fight over constitutional questions, but for the fact that religious differences caused each side to suspect the good faith of the other. Nevertheless Mr. Barker is wrong in speaking of 'freedom of conscience.' To a religious man in the 16th and 17th centuries the only true freedom was the freedom of himself and his fellow-believers, and freedom to persecute

his opponents. The really 'tolerant' rulers, Elizabeth or Charles II., probably lacked deep conviction; Philip II., Laud, Cromwell, William III., all 'tolerated' their friends and persecuted their opponents, and can be described as oppressors or champions of toleration only by the partiality of biased historians.

The main causes of the Rebellion of 1640 and the Revolution of 1688 were religious; they were England's share of the religious warfare that devastated Western and Central Europe (see third chapter). Yet the results which gave to these English civil struggles their real significance in History were constitutional; they produced constitutional machinery and political ideals that profoundly affected Western civilisation. The constitutional troubles revolved round Parliamentary privileges, especially the Power of the Purse, and the Royal Prerogative. Our present interest must be concentrated rather upon the results than either the details or the rights and wrongs of the dispute. One may, however, safely assert that some degree of collision over the question of Money and the interpretation of Privileges was inevitable, and that the points at issue were for the most part not definitely settled by constitutional law but rested on precedents, of which a large body could be cited by both sides with the preponderating fraction in favour of the contentions of the Crown.

The Parliamentarians took as their slogan the cry that the King must 'live on his own,' in other words, carry on the government of the country on the proceeds of the Crown lands, the Feudal dues, and the emoluments of Justice, eked out by Customs duties and Parliamentary subsidies which must be kept as low as possible. This was demanding an impossibility.¹ The expenses of government constantly increased, while the Feudal dues grew steadily less. Moreover,

¹ It was only the fines from nobles and bribes from foreigners under Henry VII., the plunder of monasteries by Henry VIII., and the parsimony and Spanish treasure-ships of Elizabeth's reign that kept the Tudors financially 'above water.'

the Crown was not even allowed to exact its 'own' in peace; having refused to grant Tonnage and Poundage to Charles I. for life—a refusal for which there was no constitutional precedent, although the Tudors always allowed Parliament to go through the routine of granting these duties—Parliament objected to Charles's attempt to 'live on his own' by exacting those Feudal payments due to the Crown as supreme landlord, such as forest fines¹ and payments for Knighthood, which had largely fallen into abeyance. The disputes about taxation and constitutional questions were not really settled until the 'Long Parliament' took them in hand in 1640 and 1641, abolishing the Prerogative Court of Star Chamber and its ecclesiastical equivalent High Commission, reasserting the vague claim to control Ministers by the condemnation of Strafford and Laud, above all confirming definitely and finally Parliament's power over the purse.

Before the Long Parliament there were only vague claims and appeals to precedent on both sides. James and Charles claimed that what Kings could concede Kings could withdraw; that Customs duties belonged not to the sphere of debate and legislation—the province of Parliament—but to that of practical affairs—the province of the King's Government, which alone could know the conditions of trade from day to day, and the treatment meted out to English trade by foreigners; that the opposition exaggerated and misinterpreted the privileges conceded by former Kings. As a matter of fact, Coke and Pym created a new conception of Magna Carta in their own image and based many claims on the so-called statute 'De tallagio non concedendo,' which in reality had no existence as a statute but was merely a monkish gloss and mistranslation of Plantagenet French. The earlier protests of the Commons, for instance the 'Protestation of the Commons,' which James I. tore out of their Journal, or the 'Petition of Right' of 1628, were not legally binding—as

¹ Fines on landholders who had encroached upon the Royal Forests, and attempts to force the burden of Knighthood on holders of estates worth £40 a year and upward, or to fine defaulters.

Strafford pointed out, a Petition instead of a Bill entailed putting the clock back two hundred years, and left the King all the latitude implied in 'Soit droit fait'—and were so vague in their language that, for instance, Charles could maintain that Ship money and Customs duties were outside their meaning. After Grand Remonstrance there need not and would not have been a civil war but for two things, viz. : religious differences and the personal characters of the protagonists on both sides.

James I., a learned man and in many of his ideas¹ two centuries ahead of the times, completely misunderstood the men of his day. Practical Tudor Sovereigns had been content to leave theory alone; James was a theorist and a logician who actually wrote a treatise on 'Divine Right'—*The True Law of Free Monarchy*—and insisted upon his sanctity as God's vicegerent, a claim that sat awkwardly on a shambling, slobbering, rickety glutton. One may say that Elizabeth shelved awkward questions, such as Monopolies; James insisted upon general principles, but saved his neck by occasionally 'conceding' details; Charles contested the details and lost his head.

On the other hand, the extreme Puritans, who considered that they alone were saved and that Anglicans and Papists were doomed to damnation hereafter and were in this world 'vessels of destruction,' to be treated as the Amalekites had been treated by Israel, were at least as difficult to deal with by the way of conciliation and bargain.

After the Civil War, which was not a popular uprising against the Government but a faction-fight between two minorities, High Church and Puritan, the success of the latter being due to their greater wealth, the intervention of their Scottish allies, and the genius of Oliver Cromwell, there followed the eleven years' military despotism of Cromwell (1649-1660), which so far exceeded in oppres-

¹ Cp. his desire for Parliamentary Union with Scotland, fixed income for the Crown; the reference of Election cases to the Law Courts, mutual toleration between Catholics and Protestants, etc.

siveness the eleven years' despotism of Charles, Laud, and Strafford (1629-1640) that an overwhelming majority of the nation enthusiastically welcomed the return in 1660 of King, Parliament, and Church. The Restoration Settlement was simply a return to the constitution of 1641. It included all those changes and definitions which had been made up to and including Grand Remonstrance, but did *not* include either such revolutionary measures as the Militia Bill, giving Parliament the power of appointing military officers, and the Root and Branch Bill, abolishing the Episcopacy—both of which had been proposed in 1641 but failed to become laws—or the 'experiments' of the Commonwealth, such as the abolition of the Second Chamber, the creation of a new Council with increased powers and the revival of a Second Chamber consisting of life-peers, or again the suggestions, brought forward by Sir H. Vane and certain enlightened officers but never adopted by the Rump or Cromwell, in favour of an extension of the Franchise¹ and Parliamentary Union with Scotland² and Ireland.³

There is no doubt that some of these ideas remained as a legacy of the period; moreover, although religious tolerance was still not a matter of practical politics, as every sect in turn proved when in power, yet there was a definite suggestion in the Declaration of Breda (1660) that there must be mutual toleration among Protestants, and henceforth persecution veiled its bigotry under a plea of political necessity.

The actual constitutional changes brought about during the Early Stuart and Commonwealth periods, as distinguished from temporary experiments and the legacy of ideas and influence, were these: the much-disputed and doubtful point of taxation was settled; Parliament was confirmed in its claim to the power of the purse; the King still ruled as well as reigned, determined his own policy, and chose his own Ministers, but his dependence on Parliament for money, his partnership with Parliament in legislation, and the memory

¹ Postponed till 1832.

² Postponed till 1707.

³ Postponed till 1801.

sums up our laws of succession, which can only be legally altered by the King in Parliament; nevertheless Act of Parliament had been substituted for the act of God as the basis of our Monarchy, and the rights of hereditary succession were limited by the provision that no Sovereign should belong to the Roman Church or marry a member of that Church. By the Bill of Rights (1689) the constitutional rights of Parliament over the purse were restated, the Crown's prerogative of suspending laws was abolished, while the right of dispensing with the law in a particular case was, rather vaguely, restricted; it is now limited in practice to Pardons granted through the Home Secretary. The Act of Settlement (1701) once more showed that the King in Parliament was the legal controller of the succession. In addition to many clauses of a purely temporary interest, including an attempt to check the growth of Cabinet and Party government by excluding Ministers from the Commons, it was enacted that without consent of Parliament the Sovereign could not engage England in war in defence of the foreign possessions of the Crown, that the Sovereign must belong to the Established Church, that Judges, instead of depending upon the Crown, should have secure tenure of office unless *both* Houses petitioned the Crown for dismissal. This preserved Justice from Party or Governmental as well as Royal influence, and any attempt to bring the Courts under the sway of a Minister or of the Party majority in the Commons should always be treated as an attack upon the chief safeguard of the personal liberty of Englishmen. The Mutiny Act (1689), subsequently transformed into annual Army Acts, was a compromise between the old position and the claim made in the Militia Bill of 1641; officers still receive commissions from and owe allegiance to the Crown, but discipline can only be maintained by means of these annual acts; also, of course, Parliament holds the purse-strings.

The constitutional balance of power thus survived the Revolution, but the Parliamentary began to weigh down the Royal elements. Parliamentary government, as distinguished

from Royal government limited by the danger of deadlock owing to Parliament's control of the purse, cannot be dated before the reign of George I. Three stages must be remembered in connection with the transition: (1) the development of purely Party Cabinets, (2) the retirement of the King from Cabinet meetings, (3) the evolution of the Prime Minister and of the resultant corporate responsibility of the Cabinet.

Growth
of Party
Cabinet.

There is a universal tendency, particularly noticeable in English history, to transfer the practical details of government from the official organs, which tend from time to time to become unwieldy, to smaller bodies of inner Councillors and Ministers, which smaller bodies, at first unofficial, gradually become in their turn the recognised instruments of government. The Curia Regis, the 'Ordinary' Council, Privy Council, etc., are examples of this tendency in the past, while in our own time we have had the 'War Cabinet,' a select committee of the inflated Cabinet, and the Imperial Council, a meeting of representatives of all the Cabinets of the Empire, although the latter has not yet developed any executive powers. This tendency showed itself during the 16th and 17th centuries: Queen Elizabeth, for instance, carried on a large part of her work through 'Secretaries'; while Charles II, generally confided in some particular Minister or Ministers—Clarendon, Danby, the Cabal, etc.—but these Ministers were not necessarily nor officially consulted, the five members of the Cabal did not equally share the confidence of the King or of each other, nor did Ministers look for support to an organised majority in the Commons. William III. and Anne endeavoured to preserve the independence of the Crown by governing through mixed Cabinets of Tories and Whigs, but the two parties were so sharply divided on the question of foreign policy and European war, the Tories standing for Peace and the Whigs for War, that one-party Cabinets became a practical necessity.

The accession of George I. is a landmark in English constitutional history, the importance of which is apt to be under-

estimated owing to the glamour cast by Whig historians on the 'Glorious' Revolution of 1688. Not only did the accession of the Hanoverians in 1714, followed by their successful defence of their Throne in 1715 and 1745, put into effect the theories by which the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement disposed of the Divine Right of Kings, but two other important results followed. The dilemma of the Tories, whose creed—'Church and King'—prohibited them for the present¹ from supporting whole-heartedly either 'usurping' King or Papist Pretender, necessitated a series of Whig Governments, thus confirming that Party system which still seems to offer the only plan by which Parliamentary government can avoid the chaotic inconsistency of the Athenian Ecclesia. Again the King's inability to speak or understand English and his lack of interest in English affairs led to his retirement from the Cabinet, and this resulted in the emergence of Walpole through successive stages—(1) Stanhope, Townshend, and Walpole; (2) Stanhope; (3) Townshend and Walpole; (4) Walpole and Townshend; (5) Walpole—in the character of first Prime Minister. With the Prime Minister and Cabinet thus established, though quite unofficially, it remained to develop customs and conventions in the typically English way. Walpole's difficulties when he retained office after defeats in the Commons over the Excise Scheme (1733) and the Spanish War (1740) helped to establish the convention that a defeated Government either appeals to the country—by advising the King to dissolve Parliament—and abides by the result or advises the King to call upon an opposition leader to form a Ministry and either carry on the government or appeal to the electors. The revival of the Tories under George III., by ensuring the existence of an alternative Party Government in opposition instead of mere groups, stabilised the Party system which the King intended to destroy, just as his success in beating the Whigs at the bribery on which they

¹ In fact until Bolingbroke's *Patriot King*—published shortly before his death in 1751—persuaded them to rally round the King *de facto*; hence the Tory support of George III.

had relied during a generation of office provoked the reaction which was to destroy openly organised corruption and substitute class-pledges for personal bribes.

It must be understood that, although in theory the King is still at liberty to choose his own Ministers, yet in practice he chooses a leader of that party or alliance of parties which commands a majority in the Commons, and this leader then forms his Government and submits his list of colleagues to the King. This convention, together with that one, explained above, ruling a Government's course of action in case of defeat, makes the Cabinet the link between the Executive and Taxative powers, weighs down the constitutional balance in favour of Parliamentary control, and prevents the danger, described above, of a deadlock. The constitution of the United States, based upon the written English constitutional laws of 1689 and 1701 but not upon our unwritten conventions, and influenced by the works of Locke, who wrote in justification of the Revolution of 1688, set up an elaborate balance between (1) State and State, (2) State and Federal authority, (3) Executive, Legislative, and Judicial authorities; the result has been one Civil War and many deadlocks—either the lawyers of the Supreme Court holding up legislation or the President and Senate vetoing the policy each of the other.

An English Government which avoids defeat either may choose its time to appeal to the country or—which it seldom does—may wait until that Parliament has reached its legal limit, fixed by William III. at three years, by the Septennial Act of 1716 at seven, and by the Parliament Act of 1911 at five.

If the 18th century saw the end in England of the old dispute between Crown and Parliament, it also witnessed the beginning of a new issue between Parliament and People. We will, however, refer to the movements for Parliamentary and other reforms in connection with our account of the constitutional history of the 19th and early 20th centuries, which witnessed the fight for the franchise, the devolution of local self-government, and sundry disputes between the two Houses of Parliament. Before leaving the subject, however, we should

remark that the American Rebellion not only re-emphasised the case against arbitrary taxation but also enunciated certain 'rights' of subjects against all Governments and Parliaments.

We must now note some points in which the constitutional history of France before the Revolution contrasts with that of England. The other continental Powers were so far behind France that from a purely constitutional standpoint their history need not long delay us. We have already noted some of the steps by which the French Monarchy absorbed the great Fiefs, so that the French King, originally no more than 'Primus inter Pares' (Peers), became the despotic ruler of a strong national state. Yet even the reforms and government of Henry IV., Sully, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV., did not bring the French state up to the same condition of unity and efficiency as England attained under the Tudors. The decisive points of difference may be summarised thus. The English nobility lost its privileges but retained its work—political, social, military, rural—while the French noblesse retained many privileges—sinecure posts at court, preferential treatment with regard to taxation, some relics of Feudal dues and monopolies—but were trusted with practically no duties apart from that of officering the royal army. The English, and in those days the Anglo-Irish, aristocrats took the lead in all local affairs; the French nobles were in many provinces mainly absentee courtier-landlords, only known among the tenants through their agents' efforts to enforce harsh game-laws and outgrown claims. The noblesse were a caste apart, whereas in England sons of peers, either untitled or with courtesy titles according to their rank, were to be found sitting as members of the Commons, and, in the case of younger sons, founding commoners' families; in fact, the stream of recruits from Peerage to Commons was as constant as that from Commons to Peerage,¹ and the existence of the class of country-gentlemen provided in England a link or buffer between classes which was wanting on the Continent. The higher clergy in France

¹ See Sunderland's *Peerage Bill*; Cecil Smith, *British History*, p. 355.

were, like the noblesse, a privileged class; indeed, by birth the majority of them were noble. Up to and including the 16th century there were many indications of a growth of a French Parliamentary system on lines very similar to that in England; this development, however, was stopped dead by several causes: the absolute division between classes and the want of an intermediary class corresponding to our county gentry; the division of the French Parliament—États Généraux—into three houses representing¹ the three 'orders'—États—Nobles, Clergy, Commons; jealousy between various provinces and districts; lastly the circumstances of French history, such as the reaction after the Huguenot Wars, which allowed the États Généraux to disappear from the stage from 1614 till 1789.

If the French Monarchy had been less successful than the English in dealing with Privilege and the Nobility, the case was the same in respect of Law and Taxation. Until the time of Napoleon's Code there was no uniform system of Law for the whole of France; not only were there local variations but there was also a jumble of Roman, Feudal, and Customary practices. Taxation had fallen back to the chaotic condition from which Sully had attempted to redeem it. Large blocks of the revenue were farmed out, as in the old Roman Republic, to speculators, who made what profit they could, while in some cases private individuals, in return for a loan, had a claim on some portion of the revenue for years ahead. Thus Taxation was neither 'convenient,' 'certain,' nor 'economical.' Nor was it 'equal'; the unprivileged classes alone were liable to the 'Corvée'—forced labour; the 'Gabelle,' which compelled every family to purchase salt, a State monopoly, according to its number, hit the poor harder than the rich; while in the case of the theoretically universal 'Taille' many influential men, as the Duke of Orleans admitted, arranged matters with the tax-gatherers and 'paid what they

¹ In 1789 the five thousand nobles were represented by 270 deputies, the Clerical Estate by 291, including both higher and lower clergy, the Tiers État by 578.

pleased'! Moreover, the price of salt varied grotesquely in different parts of the country, a fact ingeniously illustrated by the map in Webster's *French Revolution*. Local customs, or *octroi* duties, in provinces and towns added to the general confusion by hampering trade and preventing uniformity in price and the cost of living. The wars of the 18th century, of which all had failed except that of the American Rebellion—and that brought no tangible gain to France—had reduced the country to bankruptcy, and had reinforced the theories of the French Philosophers with the theories of Paine as interpreted by Lafayette's volunteers.

It is difficult to estimate the real influence of these philosophers on the actual outbreak and course of the Revolution.

The Philosophers. It is easy to dismiss the question with a sneer at the notion of peasants and the Paris mob being swayed by philosophical theories; yet, as usual, the easy sneer is misleading. From the time of Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des Loix* (1748) France had not lacked political thinkers, and the intellectuals of the 18th century imported a great many ideas from the English thinkers and worked them out with French logic and thoroughness. For instance, Voltaire, the client of Frederick the Great and the upholder of a centralised, benevolent despotism which should crush all privileges save its own, was clearly influenced by the 17th-century English philosopher Hobbes with his hypothesis of the State founded upon a contract among the subjects to give absolute power to a Sovereign person or body; while Rousseau, in his sane works, such as the *Contrat sociale*, shows more affinity with Locke, the philosophic apologist of the 1688 Revolution, with his mutual contract between Sovereign and subjects and his conception of divided Sovereignty with a balance of power between Executive and Legislative, albeit Locke would have shuddered at the extreme democratic conclusions which Rousseau drew from his compact and abominated the anarchic tendencies of his wilder works which condemned the State itself as the destroyer of the 'Golden Age.' These philosophical treatises

undoubtedly influenced the aristocratic and bourgeois leaders of the Assembly of 1789; moreover, interpreted in a violent fashion by journalists such as Marat and mob-orators, they probably percolated to the masses. In one respect Voltaire, the cynical client of courts, and Rousseau, the convincing—though insane—enemy of kings, joined forces; both alike in their different periods and methods denounced privilege, rank, and tradition, whether in Church or State, the cynical contempt of Voltaire being succeeded and reinforced by the white-hot hatred of Rousseau.

It would also be possible to trace the influence of Adam Smith, Diderot, and the French Encyclopaedists on the policy of Turgot and also in the Eden Treaty with England in 1788. The influence of this on the causation of the Revolution was, however, only indirect. The Eden Treaty, one of the commercial measures of the younger Pitt, was a movement in the direction of free trade between Great Britain and France. It certainly benefited the French export trade in wine and England's trade in manufactured articles, especially cloth and iron, but it ruined the industries of North France; the Industrial Revolution (see pp. 253-271) was beginning to affect the situation, and England's plentiful and conveniently situated coal enabled her to undersell her French rivals. Indeed, the Eden¹ Treaty provided one of those ounces of practice which are worth a ton of theory and helped to prevent any European nation in the next century from responding to Cobden's invitation to universal free trade.

As List pointed out in his *National System of Political Economy*, England held such advantages between 1780 and 1850 that she must, if restrictions were removed, have become

¹ England already enjoyed mutual free trade with Portugal under the Methuen Treaty of 1703. Since Portugal manufactured little cloth of her own, and England produced no port wine or cork, this proved of mutual benefit. The Methuen Treaty and our long hostility to France account for the popularity of port in England; the Eden Treaty perished before claret-drinking attained in England the vogue it enjoyed in Scotland and Ireland—both of them attached to France by sentiment and tradition.

the world's workshop. In an economic world in which every portion was specially adapted for a special industry—as

The Towns.

Lancashire is adapted, by climate and proximity to sea and mines, for cotton-manufacturing, or East and South-West France for wine-growing—practice would certainly support theory; in the actual world universal free trade would mean starvation for districts such as North France or Brandenburg, which can support a large population behind tariff walls but could not stand against free competition. Capital and to a greater extent Labour cannot be rapidly transferred; accordingly the year 1789 witnessed closed works, ruined bourgeois, and unemployed mobs in North France, and the latter element gravitated towards Paris, and made possible the worst features of the Revolution. Other causes of disaffection in urban France were crushing taxation, high prices resulting from several bad harvests, inefficient centralised government, and, among the wealthier bourgeois, a sense of social inequality.

The social and economic grievances of the rural population were similar to those of the townsmen—unequally distributed

and excessive taxation and resentment at the privileges of ecclesiastics and noble landlords, the latter being in many cases represented by agents. The village curés, who performed the duties of pluralist absentees often for starvation wages, were for the most part on the popular side until the enactment of the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (see p. 197).

There were very few personal serfs left in France. The Revolution indeed took place in France because conditions there were more advanced than in any other European state, sufficiently advanced to rouse an appetite for more reforms, whereas the peasants of Prussia, Austria, Hungary, or Poland were incapable of organised action. In England matters had advanced sufficiently far to satisfy, for the time, the bulk of the population, and the evil side of the Industrial Revolution was not yet severely felt. France was in an intermediary position between advanced England and backward Europe,

and might have been saved by a strong reforming Government.

The Peasant-Proprietors, the Metayers who shared their produce with their landlords, and the tenant-farmers were all alike crushed by taxation, irritated by its unfair incidence as between classes and localities, and by the 'Corvée,' and harassed by iniquitous game-laws and obsolete relics of Feudalism, such as the Lords' monopolies of wine-press or mill.¹

Louis XVI. himself, though a man of little statesmanship or strength of purpose, was honestly anxious to improve matters, but he was hampered by a naturally indolent disposition and a lack of great servants. Turgot, the best of his Ministers, was no Sully or Richelieu; Necker, a Swiss banker by profession, was able to describe clearly the financial symptoms, but possessed neither the ability nor the firm support of his master which were necessary to effect a cure; the Queen, Marie Antoinette, was a faithful, if frivolous wife—like Henriette Marie—but was execrated partly as an Austrian and the emblem of an unpopular alliance,² partly owing to certain tactlessly frivolous *bon mots* which were remembered, or invented, against her, partly as representing, together with Charles, Comte d'Artois, afterwards Charles X., the reactionary influence at Court.

A King such as Joseph II. (Emperor 1765-1790) might have saved France, but by the irony of fate Joseph was doomed to attempt reforms on the unreformable Austrian Dominions. The position in Austria can be summed up almost in a sentence. Maria Theresa (1740-1765³) had preserved the Hapsburg Dominions, with the exception of Silesia, secured the Empire for her husband, Francis I., improved Austro-Hungarian

¹ Originally the Seigneurs had supplied Press or Mill, just as they supplied military protection, to tenants unable to help themselves, but this basis of Feudalism—mutual benefit—had by now crumbled away.

² Cp. Margaret of Anjou in England and the last Tsarina.

³ After her husband's death in 1765 Maria continued to rule the Austrian Dominions as co-Regent with her son until 1780, although Joseph II., of course, became Emperor after the usual farce of Election.

commerce and the army, and introduced certain practical reforms such as the institution of a common chancery for Austria and Bohemia, the establishment of separate Departments for Justice, Finance, and War, under a supreme Council of State, and the abolition of personal serfdom on the royal domains. Her son Joseph, energetic, well intentioned but autocratic and tactless, brought his dominions to the verge of disruption. He attempted to form a centralised national State out of his conglomeration of races, to increase the German element by incorporating parts of Bavaria in the Austrian Dominions, and to abolish serfdom; he 'failed in all that he attempted,' and his opponents—nobles defending Feudal privileges, Belgian municipal oligarchies defending local autonomy, and Frederick the Great defending the smaller German States in the Bavarian War—were all able to pose as the champions of Liberty. His successor, Leopold II., saved the situation by returning to his mother's methods, and the Hapsburgs realised the lesson, afterwards systematised by Metternich, that the Austro-Hungarian miscellany was incompatible with constitutional or nationalistic reforms.

Frederick the Great was content, like his father, with purely practical improvements, mainly enacted on the royal estates, while the hopeless constitutional position of Poland and the backward state of Russia have been already described and present few considerations of interest for this chapter.

Before leaving the causes of the Revolution we must refer to the existence of intrigues. Without attributing quite such importance to them as Mrs. Webster does, we must admit that there can be no doubt that the Prussians were fishing in troubled waters—although Prince Henry in 1789 settled in Paris as being a secure home!—and Philippe 'Egalité' of Orleans with his partisans was pulling strings in order to bring about the ambitions of his House—thwarted by the birth of Louis XVI. and his brothers (see p. 129)—and was largely responsible for the forcible removal of the Court from Versailles to the Tuileries in October 1789, and for the agitation which destroyed the popularity of the Crown and finally enabled a

minority¹ of the nation to murder the King in 1793, Orleans voting for his death.

The details of the course of events after May 1789 have been told so often, and there is so little possibility of suggesting any new standpoints, that we will content ourselves with giving a bare summary and short notes on phrases and personalities such as may be of use to any general readers who may utilise this book as a short work of reference.

**The Course
of the
Revolution.**

The most important and interesting of the reforming leaders in the first Assembly were a nobleman, Mirabeau, a bishop, Talleyrand, and a rich bourgeois, Bailly. The first important step taken was the insistence by the Third Estate that all deputies should sit and vote in one House, the result of which was that the commoners, with their allies from the other orders, could easily outvote the reactionaries. The dispute which took place before this result was brought about is sometimes called the question of the *vote par ordre* or *vote par tête*. The most dramatic incident in the dispute was the oath of the tennis-court: the Commons, finding themselves shut out from their hall, on the pretext, possibly true, that rearrangement was needed to provide accommodation for the united deputies, swore that they would not separate but would carry through their scheme. The united Assembly called itself the 'National Constituent Assembly,' and set to work to draw up a Constitution. Unfortunately, while the deputies discussed constitutions and compared themselves and each other with Brutus and other republican heroes, Paris remained hungry. The King had assembled loyal troops near Paris, but had subsequently removed them at Mirabeau's request. The Duke of Orleans and Desmoulins, an eloquent mob-orator, were meanwhile busy, and on 14th July the first sinister sign of forcible revolution took place: a mob, small in numbers and containing a large criminal element, forced the Bastille to surrender, and dis-

¹ Robespierre himself in 1792 found it advisable to profess loyalty to the Crown.

covered not scores of political victims but seven prisoners of whom at least five were criminals and one an idiot! The governor was murdered in cold blood, and there was really little glory attached to what Charles James Fox described as the greatest thing that has happened in the world and the best. Yet the significance of the incident was great: 'This is a revolt,' said Louis; 'Sire,' was the answer, 'it is a Revolution.' Rioting now broke out sporadically in other districts, and there was a certain amount of destruction of chateaux and murder of their inhabitants. France could now have been saved only by a determined alliance between the King and the moderate reformers, the removal of the Court and Assembly away from the vicinity of Paris, and the rigorous prosecution of reforms together with the suppression of disorder. Instead of this, Necker, who enjoyed prestige and popularity beyond his merits, had been dismissed just before the Bastille incident, while Bailly, who became Mayor of Paris, and Lafayette, who organised and commanded the new 'National Guard' of citizens, were both broken reeds, amiable and self-confident, but without either genius or even practical ability. In August the Assembly discussed the 'Rights of Man,' and abolished all Feudal and Ecclesiastical rights and privileges. On the night of 5th-6th October, a mob of women and rioters marched from Paris and brought back the Royal Family to Paris, Lafayette appearing too late on the scene, and Louis refusing to employ soldiers. This eventually led to the supremacy of the Paris mob, but for the time being things promised to improve, since the King's courage and good-nature restored much of his popularity and the better-class citizens rallied round Lafayette.

The Assembly during the next two years produced a paper Constitution; the main points of interest in it were as follows: limited Monarchy was to be instituted, but the King was to possess only a suspensive¹ veto, which implied the power to

¹ Cp. this Constitution with the English. (a) Our monarchs possessed a *permanent* veto, which has now fallen into disuse; (b) the

irritate but not to control; there was to be only one House and the executive Ministers must not have seats in it; the clergy became civil servants—by the 'Civil Constitution of the Clergy'—and this antagonised the rank and file of the clergy, hitherto mainly friendly to the reforming cause, in spite of the effort to readjust clerical emoluments; we find the clergy as the moving spirits behind La Vendée and similar movements, and the far-seeing cleric, Talleyrand, now ceased to support the Revolution and soon retired to England; paper money was issued in the form of 'assignats,' redeemable from the proceeds of the sale of Church lands, but these assignats were soon issued in such numbers as to become worthless.

In addition to Talleyrand another clear-sighted, if venal, leader now drifted away from the left. Mirabeau wished for a Constitution more closely akin to that of England, and he tried to persuade Louis to escape to Rouen and rally the moderate elements. Mirabeau, however, was now distrusted by both sides and died in 1791. In June of that year Louis attempted to escape not to Rouen but to the frontier, to join the extreme reactionaries, led by his brother Artois, and gain foreign aid. He was stopped at Varennes and returned to Paris as a prisoner. This did much to weaken the cause of moderation and of limited Monarchy, and to strengthen the extreme revolutionaries. The latter also gained by the self-sacrificing but foolish decree that the deputies of the National Constituent Assembly might not be re-elected to the new Assembly.

The most prominent members, therefore, of the new 'Legislative' Assembly, which met in October 1791, were the more extreme Girondins, so named because their chief leaders came from the Gironde—the district round Bordeaux—and the even more extreme Jacobins, named after a Paris club, which met in the disused Convent of St. Jacques.

English Parliament consisted of King and *two* Houses; (c) in spite of the clause in the Act of Settlement, Ministers did and do sit in Parliament, and thus we avoid the risk of deadlock between Executive and Legislative.

The Girondist Ministry forced Louis, against his own will and also against that of the Jacobins, to declare war in April 1792 against the Emperor, Francis II., who had received many of the French *émigrés*, and was being urged by them to rescue his aunt, Marie Antoinette. The Prussians then joined Austria, and their General, the Duke of Brunswick, issued a proclamation threatening vengeance if harm befell the King or Queen. This development of affairs had a double result: it aroused French enthusiasm against the foreigners and the Court, and also threw power into the hands of the Jacobins—Danton, Robespierre, Carnot, Marat—who now espoused the bellicose policy which they had formerly resisted and who possessed more practical ability than the Girondist talkers—Vergniaud, Brissot, Roland, etc. In August the Paris mob invaded the Tuileries and murdered the Swiss Guard; in September suspects were arrested wholesale and murdered in prison—the first ‘Reign of Terror’¹; on 21st September a new Assembly met, known as the National Convention, and proclaimed a Republic, and the Jacobins, who had already secured the ‘Commune,’ or municipality of Paris, and the National Guards, now dominated the Assembly; although they represented but a fraction of France, yet they alone were organised, knew their own minds, and possessed practical, if ruthless ability. A Revolutionary Tribunal was set up to hasten the trial and execution of suspects, and on 21st January 1793 Louis was guillotined although his enemies had only secured a majority of one—including Orleans²—in a House invaded and overawed by a mob organised by the Jacobin leaders. The Jacobins now organised the ‘Committee of Public Safety,’ as a supreme executive body to carry on external and internal war, while *députés en mission*, or *commissaries*, were sent to the armies to spy and report on the generals, and this organised ‘Reign of Terror’ lasted from August 1793 till October 1795. The Queen was guillotined

¹ Generally known as the ‘September Massacres.’

² Orleans himself was afterwards guillotined by a stroke of that ‘poetic justice’ which also overtook Robespierre.

on 16th October 1793, and the Dauphin, the only child of Louis, was almost certainly murdered, although some modern French Royalists, repelled by the idea of rallying round the hated House of Orleans, maintain that he escaped through the substitution of another child.

The Committee reduced to order a chaos in which the Convention, the Commune, and the separate Sections of Paris had all contended for power. Local committees were organised throughout France. The principal organisers of the Terror were Marat, who was fortunately murdered in his bath by Charlotte Corday in 1793, Siéyès, who had a genius for turning out paper Constitutions and saving his own skin, and Robespierre, whose execution in July 1794 stopped the Terror in Paris, though it continued for a year in La Vendée and the South; the military organisers were Carnot and Danton, the latter of whom was removed from the Committee very shortly and brought to the guillotine in March 1794 by Robespierre’s jealousy.

Before summarising the events of the war we must say a few words concerning some of these men.

Marat, at one time a ladies’ doctor, then a journalist and editor of *L’Ami du Peuple*, may be dismissed as a bloodthirsty brute, inspired by social jealousy, love of gain, and, above all, a pervert’s love of blood. His writings and recorded sayings occasionally reveal a gift of clear foresight, but his general ferocity became, as time went on, increasingly suggestive of insanity.

Carnot, ‘organiser of victory,’ was a military and administrative genius. He it was who organised the training camps of the volunteers and conscripts, and so arranged things that a nucleus of regular troops stiffened each ‘half-brigade’ of recruits; he dispatched his deputies to overlook the generals, condemned to death such old Royalist generals as he suspected of any intention of deserting to the enemy, as Dumouriez and Lafayette had done, promoted other professional, ex-Royalist officers such as Bonaparte, Lazare Hoche,

Jourdan, and discovered military genius when it belonged to former civilians, as in the case of Moreau; he encouraged these officers to develop new skirmishing tactics which greatly surprised the Prussian and Austrian infantry; in a word, he created the spirit and the armies which were to raise Napoleon to European supremacy.

Danton, whose greatness is best explained in his own phrase—*de l'audace, de l'audace, toujours de l'audace*—was a War Minister who combined the infectious enthusiasm of the elder Pitt with the perseverance and loyalty to his generals of Castlereagh. It was his influence at Paris that enabled Carnot to do his work. His period of actual office was short, and he was not personally keen upon the Terror, although he did not interfere with it so long as he thought that internal enemies threatened France. He and his party were subsequently attacked as 'Indulgents' by Robespierre. After the death of Marat, Robespierre was probably more responsible for the massacres than any single man with the possible exception of Siéyès, although there were many subordinate officials, such as the loathly Hébert or Carrier, the inventor of the wholesale drownings—*noyades*—at Nantes, who far surpassed him in brutality. Robespierre was probably a genuine fanatic; he believed in Rousseau's idea of the reign of Nature and Love, but was ready to wade through a reign of blood in order to attain it; he believed in some Supreme Being, and joined with Danton in suppressing the blasphemous and filthy rites in honour of 'Reason.' Mean, cold, inhuman in his attachment to pure theory, he was typical of those tyrants who urge 'Necessity, the Tyrants' plea,' and believe that the end justifies the means, and, as always happens with such characters, he defeated his own ends. He seems really to have been 'incorruptible' in money matters, but was a prey to jealousy, as shown in his sacrifice of Danton, and to a conceit which manifested itself in personal foppishness. His was essentially an inhuman and unloveable character. His overthrow was brought about by the moderate 'Thermidoriens,' a party named after one of the months of the Revolu-

tionary calendar, a short-lived absurdity which need not detain¹ us.

With the advent of the Thermidoriens the Terror came to an end except in the Gironde and the South, where a civil war still raged which must be described in our next chapter. The Jacobin Club was closed, and Siéyès proved his wise versatility by drawing up a new Constitution, providing a Directory of five rulers, having under them six departmental Ministers, with a two-chambered Assembly comprising a Council of five hundred and a Council of two hundred and fifty 'ancients.' It is at this point that Bonaparte appears in a leading part upon the stage. Having distinguished himself in the repulse of the English from Toulon, he next saved the Directory, in October 1795, by a 'whiff of grape-shot' from a combined Royalist and Jacobin attack. After his Italian and Egyptian campaigns, he returned to Paris, and in November 1799, by a *coup d'état* reminiscent of Cromwell's expulsion of the Rump, brushed aside the Directory and Councils, and forced a remnant of deputies to appoint him as 'First Consul,' with Siéyès and Roger Ducos as colleagues. The elaborate paper Constitution drawn up by Siéyès was quite unworkable, but Bonaparte built up a practical scheme which contained within itself not only the framework of his despotism but also a centralised system of administration which endured through-out Consulship, Empire, Monarchy, Second Republic, Second

¹ It would be easy to draw a comparison between the French and Russian Revolutions; each was started by moderate, mainly well-born leaders: Mirabeau, Talleyrand, Lafayette, Bailly, and Prince Lvoff, Miliukoff, etc.

In each case there followed a period of fervid, patriotic talkers—Vergniaud and Kerensky. Finally in each case a party succeeded pledged to extreme measures at home and pacifism in foreign affairs; these revolutionary 'pacifists' were converted by foreign opposition into belligerent crusaders, and in both cases produced a fanatic—Robespierre and Lenin—and an organising military genius—Danton, Carnot, and Trotsky. Their methods of terrorising old officers and promoting new were also similar, and in each case the new régime adopted the national ambitions of the old—cp. the Rhine Frontier and Constantinople.

Empire, and Third Republic. As Richelieu had known, the French people need centralised government; the Revolution had threatened disruption, but Napoleon conquered this new disruptive tendency more thoroughly than the Bourbons had conquered Feudal disruption. The organisation of departments and communes, with their prefects and mayors, was, humanly speaking, permanent.¹ Of even greater importance was the 'Code Napoléon,' started under the Consulship, which at last codified French Law and gave France a definite and uniform system. Bonaparte provided himself with an able band of Ministers—Gaudin, with whose aid he restored French finances, a gigantic task, Carnot, Minister of War, Talleyrand, Foreign Minister, etc.—and it is not derogatory to his greatness to confess that Cambacérès was as necessary to his success with the Code or Gaudin in finance as was Berthier as Chief of the Staff in the field, or Talleyrand in diplomacy and foreign affairs. Bonaparte had the genius to see what was needed, and to choose and inspire his instruments. Jealousy and a self-confidence which amounted to superstition were deadly weaknesses which developed later.

He presided himself at the meetings both of the Consuls and of the Council of State, and the groundwork of Empire was thus prepared. In 1802 the 'Concordat' with the Vatican restored Roman Catholicism; shortly afterwards the Order of the Legion of Honour emphasised the stability of ordered government; on 18th May 1804 the Senate proclaimed General Bonaparte as the Emperor Napoleon I. The Emperor at once strengthened his influence by promoting eighteen generals to the rank of Marshal, and by attending Mass at Notre-Dame.

Thus, as Burke had prophesied, Revolution led through Anarchy to Terror, and through Terror to Military Despotism.

Results. In summing up the results one is at once met by the difficulty of distinguishing between the results achieved by the Revolution and the work of Napoleon, also between direct and indirect results. Thus the Revolution

¹ So also was the machinery of Education set up by Napoleon.

destroyed privileges, but it remained for Napoleon to construct a system of equal law. Of the Revolutionary ideals 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' only the second survived as a political influence after the first few months. Liberty of the individual owed very little to the French Revolution, even if we admit that the Revolution hastened the disappearance of the remnants of Serfdom, and increased the number of Peasant-Proprietors. It was in England that independent Judges, trial by Jury, and Habeas Corpus set the fashion of safeguarding the rights of the individual, and it was in England that the movement against Slavery and the extreme opposition to government interference (*laissez-faire*) were about to grow. Even if we interpret Liberty in the sense of national independence we must admit that the Revolutionary armies, which set out to vindicate Liberty and Nationality, ruthlessly crushed national opposition to their prescriptions, while Napoleon surpassed the 18th-century despots in cynical disregard for the interests and wishes of conquered peoples. The Revolution in its early stages stimulated the desire for national unity and independence in Italy, Poland, and elsewhere, and indirectly the opposition of Spaniards, Portuguese, Russians, and Prussians to Napoleon's tyranny marked an almost universal conception of nationalism—which Metternich and others did their best to suppress.

In the next chapter we deal at length with these international and universal results. 'Fraternity' was drowned in the blood of class-warfare. The ideal of 'Equality' before the Law and in such matters as taxation and military service was carried wherever the French armies and French administration held sway, while in England, whither these militant crusaders never penetrated, the constitutionalists and economists had already gained acceptance for these theories. Between the destructive Revolution and the constructive Empire France certainly gained some necessary reforms and was transformed into a progressive modern State. But, like all revolutions and usurping military despotisms, they charged her a fearful price in men and wealth. An honest historian

cannot answer the question—Is a violent Revolution ever worth the price? One is, however, on safe ground in saying that Revolution should be the very last expedient, and that peaceful, constructive reforms combined with order are preferable, be they never so slow. Progress with order is the ideal of all decent citizens. If the choice must be made between the two we come to one of the great dividing lines of humanity: the 'Conservative' will prefer order, the 'Radical' progress.

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CHAPTER VII

WARS AND PEACE CONGRESSES

The Wars and Peace Congresses of Europe, 1792-1830.
Bibliography.

PART I. THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

WE have seen that the intervention of Austria and Prussia proved to be one of the great turning-points in the French Revolution; it was equally pregnant with influence both on the international affairs of contemporary Europe and on the future development of the whole world. From this intervention there sprang the Revolutionary War which in turn gave birth to the Napoleonic era; these wars and the 'Settlement' which followed involved the whole of Europe and all those lands and seas which were the bones of European contention. For the historical roots of modern problems we must of course go farther back into history than 1792, yet it is true to say that Franco-German enmity, Anglo-Irish and Anglo-American relations, the unification of Germany and Italy, the status of the smaller European nations, economic, constitutional and colonial developments, and the conditions leading up to the Great War of 1914-1918, were all alike profoundly influenced, or even moulded, by the events of the period 1792-1815. In 1788 the political and commercial *rapprochement* between England and France almost suggested that the hundred years' rivalry was coming to an end with the collapse of France's last hopes of Empire in India or America, and the satisfaction of her *amour propre* through the War of American Independence; the old Franco-German rivalry, as between Hapsburg Austria and Bourbon France,

was yielding to the soothing influence of the Diplomatic Revolution and the marriage of Louis XVI. with Marie Antoinette; Prussian militarism and hatred of Austria had been doused with cold water by Pitt's refusal to be entangled in an intrigue against Austria in 1788, and by the cool diplomacy of the new Emperor, Leopold II.; Prussian military efficiency, as Valmy, Jena, and Auerstadt were to prove, not long survived the death of Frederick the Great, and the rebirth of Prussia's militarism and the birth of her hatred for France may be traced to the reaction against Napoleon; England's relations with America were rapidly improving before the quarrel leading up to the war of 1812; the Union with Ireland was a war-measure; the results of the Industrial Revolution were intensified by the war; the conservative elements throughout Europe were driven by the Revolutionary excesses into reactionary measures which in turn excited their opponents to further extremes; the fate of the smaller nations from the Boers to the Belgians, from the Poles to the Irish, was involved in the war and the peace settlement.

It appeared to be almost as certain as anything connected with War or Politics can be, that the war between Revolutionary France and the Austro-Prussian alliance would end in the speedy and complete **Course of the War.** collapse of the former. That it did not so happen must be ascribed equally to the genius of Danton and Carnot and to the fault of the allies in general and the Prussians in particular. The old French army had been broken up, and although it was soon to be proved that, given enthusiasm and organising genius, soldiers and even leaders could soon be trained, yet for the present equipment and discipline were bad, and the generals were mainly aristocrats who were not fully trusted; in fact, within eighteen months Generals Lafayette and Dumouriez had deserted to the enemy, and Custine, despite his victories, had been executed to prevent any possibility of his following their example.

The Proclamation of the Prussian General, the Duke of Brunswick, the results of which on the internal affairs of

France have already been described, was followed by an invasion of France which ought to have led to the occupation of Paris within a few weeks, but which was allowed to recoil after the loss of a few victims of the cannonade—it can scarcely be called battle—of Valmy (20th September 1792). This victory, which was gained under the command of Dumouriez—Lafayette having already escaped across the frontier—was as important in its results as it was insignificant in its military aspect. Dumouriez invaded the Netherlands and led his now enthusiastic soldiers to victory over the Austrians at Jemappes to the tune of the new ‘Marseillaise,’ while Custine advanced into Imperial Rhineland and captured Mainz. These early successes, however, did not last, and 1793 again brought France to what ought to have been her collapse. Dumouriez deserted, fearing his countrymen’s vengeance after an Austrian victory at Neerwinden, while Mainz was recaptured by the Prussians—a loss which sealed Custine’s fate. Moreover, the most formidable menace was at home; in the west of France the peasants of La Vendée, led by priests antagonised by the Civil Constitution (see p. 197), and by nobles who in those parts had retained their old influence, rose, at first victoriously, against the Revolution, while in the south-east the city of Lyons declared against Republican and godless Paris.

The gross inefficiency and mutual distrust of the allies again saved Revolutionary France; the Austrians wasted time, trying to forestall the treachery of their ally, while the Prussians left their allies in the lurch in order to perpetrate with Russia, unknown to Austria, another Partition of Poland (see p. 142).

Meanwhile a more formidable foe had been roused by the Revolutionary zealots. In February 1793, carried away by the enthusiasm roused by their victories and before the tide of success had been temporarily checked at Neerwinden and Mainz, the Convention had declared war against Great Britain.

Englishmen had at first generally sympathised with the

Revolution. When it became more violent, however, three parties grew up. Fox exclaimed of the fall of the Bastille, ‘How much the greatest event that has happened in the world and how much the best.’ Burke, on the other hand, condemned the Revolution in the strongest language, and attacked it in a pamphlet entitled *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, which did much to turn the average Englishman against it. Although he had attacked English policy in America and in India, and had carried his measure of Economical Reform, yet he was constitutionally Conservative. He objected to violence and mistrusted Democracy. He attacked Lord North and Hastings, because he considered their policy to be violent and unconstitutional, but was shocked by the disorder in France, and the attack upon the Crown, the Church, and the Nobility. Pitt at first held, very wisely, that the internal affairs of a country are its own concern, so long as it does no harm to the interests of other States. It was not his business as Prime Minister either to praise or to blame the Revolution. Gradually, however, his view changed. In 1792 the French issued the ‘Edict of Fraternity,’ offering help to any people against their Government; in 1793, after conquering Belgium, they broke international treaties by opening the river Scheldt to ships, and, as masters of Antwerp, they became dangerous neighbours to England. Thus Pitt could no longer say their actions did not concern us. Finally the French declared war, irritated by English criticism and the welcome we gave to refugees, and believing that the people would rise against the Government and join France.

When once Pitt was committed to war, he became the life and soul of the opposition to France, and it was in part to his former good government that England owed the wealth by which she was finally enabled to conquer. Burke’s Whigs practically joined Pitt in a new Conservative-Tory party, and reactionary measures were taken at home. Two Revolutionary Clubs had been started in London, and, in consequence of fear of their designs, *habeas corpus* was for a time suspended, while freedom of meeting and speech was restricted.

A very wise Aliens Act was also passed, giving the Government power to supervise and, if necessary, remove foreigners. In reality the revolutionaries in England were not many nor formidable, but when the war began to cause want, it is doubtful whether we could have maintained it and carried it, through years of struggle, to a triumphant ending if our Tory Government had not been, to some extent, repressive and opposed to democracy. There was no widespread education in those days, and but little knowledge of political happenings, so that the lower classes might have declared against a war the necessity of which they could not understand. The riot in Birmingham, when the house of Dr. Priestley, a French sympathiser, was destroyed, showed that, at any rate for the present, the majority of Englishmen were loyal; but it was not mere spasmodic loyalty that was wanted, but grim determination to carry on a war which practically lasted for twenty years. The 'Radical' Whigs who followed Fox were justified in opposing the beginning of war if they considered it wrong, but their disloyal attitude during the war cannot be defended. They were greatly reduced in numbers as the war went on.

A decisive fight between England and France alone would have been, as has been well said, as impossible as a duel between an elephant and a whale. The English had a fleet of 153 ships-of-the-line and a corresponding number of cruisers to France's 86, and after Lord Howe's victory over the Brest fleet, on the 'glorious first of June' 1794, the main French fleets were blockaded in their harbours, and, except for some minor engagements in the Mediterranean, could not even put to sea to fight again for three years. On the other hand, the French army, increased by new levies to nearly 500,000 men, was over ten times the size of our available army and, in those days, new recruits were soon drilled into steady soldiers: the 18th-century musket did not demand the skill and training which is necessary for the modern rifle. A sea-power has always certain advantages over a land-power. It can preserve its territory and commerce intact, while it destroys the enemy's ships,

**Sea-Power
and
Coalitions.**

ports, and merchandise, and harasses him by landing troops on weak points on his coast, doing whatever damage is possible, and then re-embarking its men as soon as the enemy's troops collect in dangerous numbers. But although it can thus inflict more harm than it suffers, it needs a strong army to finish off the war. This we had not got in 1793, but, thanks to our fleet, and Pitt's policy, our commerce was steadily increasing, and we could afford to 'subsidise' allies: Austria, Russia, Prussia had men, we had money. Pitt therefore used our money to form Coalitions on land against France.

In 1793-1794 Spain, Holland, Austria, Prussia, England, and Sardinia formed a Coalition. But, though England was victorious at sea, and the French Royalists, mainly consisting of peasants led by a few nobles and priests, made a wonderful fight in the district of La Vendée, the allies fared badly on land after the first few months. The Committee of Public Safety, ruthless though it was at home, carried on the war with admirable efficiency. The soldiers were enthusiastic, and a wonderful body of young officers was coming to the front, some of them old Royalist officers, others men from the ranks. Every general felt that a defeat might bring his neck under the guillotine, and, although some, like Dumouriez, deserted to the enemy, the majority carved out brilliant careers by undertaking almost impossible tasks. An English army under the Duke of York was driven out of Holland, and the English and French Royalists were defeated at Toulon, mainly owing to the skill of Napoleon Bonaparte, then a young artillery officer, though we succeeded in destroying some of the French ships and the arsenal before retiring to sea.

When, in 1795, the settled Government of Five Directors restored internal peace to France, Prussia and Spain took advantage of this change to desert the allies. In 1796 Spain, partly owing to fear of France, partly from her old jealousy of England's commercial and colonial policy, joined France. Holland was conquered, and thus we had to face the old naval combination of the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland.

Prussia retired into neutrality and, except for intrigues in Poland, refused to take any active part in European politics for ten years, even when both sides insulted her Government and invaded her territory.

The year 1797 was critical for England, and there can be no doubt that, if the fleets and naval commanders of the enemy had been as efficient as our own, Ireland certainly and England probably would have suffered invasion. Had the enemies' fleets formed a junction they could have overwhelmed one of our fleets, and, to prevent this, we had to keep six fleets at sea on blockade work all through that year. Blockading work, especially in the days of sailing ships, was hazardous and wearying for both men and ships, but the only method of naval defence is to 'make the enemies' coasts your frontiers,' and prevent their ships from sailing. We were hampered by two fearful difficulties, discontent in the fleet and a spirit of rebellion in Ireland. The sailors grumbled at their poor pay, bad food, and harsh discipline, and many of them were serving against their will, since necessity drove us to recruit by means of 'Press-gangs.' During the year two mutinies took place, at Spithead and the Nore respectively. The Spithead mutiny ceased when the popular Lord Howe was sent to promise redress of grievances, and the fleet returned to their duty against the French. At the Nore the outbreak was still more dangerous, for the fleet, under Admiral Duncan, was watching a powerful Dutch fleet in the Texel. The Dutch might have put to sea and landed troops in Ireland, where a rebellion would undoubtedly have taken place.¹ Duncan saved the situation. Although left with only two ships, he remained on guard against the Dutch, and deceived them by signalling constantly as though he had a great fleet out of sight of the enemy's coast. His firmness helped to end the mutiny, and it was found that, apart from their grievances, the sailors were almost uniformly loyal. With his own hands Duncan threw a mutineer into the sea, and Parker, a leader with revolutionary views, was justly hanged. When the

¹ As it was, the Rebellion took place in 1798 and failed.

Dutch at last sailed out, Duncan utterly defeated them at Camperdown—October 1797—while, before this, Admiral Jervis and Nelson had won a remarkable victory off St. Vincent with 14 ships against the Spanish Cadiz'squadron of 27 ships-of-the-line. It was after this battle that the number of officers surrendering to Nelson was so great that he handed their swords to his boatswain, who calmly tucked them away under his arm. Collingwood also greatly distinguished himself in this battle. Thus, if France was producing a body of great generals, England was equally well supplied with brilliant admirals, while in India Wellesley, who first saw service in Holland in 1794, was acquiring that training which, combined with his natural genius, afterwards made him a match for the greatest French generals.

On the Continent, meanwhile, our allies had fared badly. Napoleon Bonaparte was sent by the Directors as General into Italy, and after a remarkable campaign **European War.** against the Austrians and Sardinians, who between them held a great part of Northern Italy, crossed the Alps, invaded Austria and forced the Emperor **Bonaparte in Italy.** to make peace by the Treaty of Campo Formio. Italy at this time was divided into many small and weak states, and the result of its disunion was, that its interests were never observed. It made little difference to Italy, as a whole, whether different parts of it were held by Austrians, French, Sardinians, Pope, or Spanish Bourbons. At Campo Formio Bonaparte granted Austria a large slice of Venetian territory as compensation for the French annexations in Lombardy and Belgium. The expense of the war to England now amounted to £42,000,000 a year, and Pitt was obliged to enforce the use of paper-money instead of payment in gold by the Bank of England.

In the Rhine country Moreau and Hoche made good the defeat of Jourdan by the Archduke Charles, Austria's best general, and would have struck at Vienna, down the Danube, had not Bonaparte arranged a truce.

In 1798 the French Directory, having failed to destroy

our supremacy at sea, and to conquer England through Ireland, tried to attack our Empire in the East. England, after the Treaty of Campo Formio, had to fight alone against France, Spain, Holland, and the Irish rebels, but after 1797 the worst of the danger was for a time over. The Directors, some of whom were afraid ¹ of keeping a victorious and popular Bonaparte general like Napoleon Bonaparte near France, in Egypt. gave him the Toulon fleet and an army of 30,000 men, and a free hand to work out his ambitious schemes in the East. There is no doubt that his original hope was to conquer the Mediterranean and the near East, then to advance on a career of conquest through Egypt to India, and from there possibly to outstrip Alexander the Great by conquering the entire Eastern World. French agents meanwhile stirred up Tippoo Sahib of Mysore to attack Madras. Having escaped Nelson, Bonaparte landed at Alexandria, seizing Malta during the voyage. Nelson, after a long chase, in which for a time he lost all knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts, arrived too late to prevent the French from landing. The French fleet was anchored close to the land, in shallow water, but, with his usual daring, Nelson sent in half his ships to get between the enemy and the shore, while the other half attacked from the open sea. Although the two fleets were exactly even, the English seamanship and gunnery were so superior that 11 out of 13 French ships were sunk or taken. Bonaparte was thus cut off from reinforcements and from returning to France. He persevered in his scheme, and won a victory over the Turks at Mount Tabor. At Acre, however, he was repulsed by the Turkish garrison, mainly owing to Sir Sidney Smith, who commanded a few English ships from which he landed men and supplies. 'That man,' Napoleon afterwards said, 'made me miss my destiny.'

¹ The death in 1797 of Lazare Hoche, Bonaparte's most brilliant rival and a convinced Republican, added justification to these fears, as did also Bonaparte's efforts to rob Moreau and Masséna of the credit of victories in Germany.

Thus English sea-power had again triumphed over French land-power. Bonaparte retired to Egypt and thence returned to France in a small ship, deserting his army, which could not possibly pass through the English ships. France thus lost 30,000 veterans. After this we shall find that all Bonaparte's schemes were aimed at the defeat of England. We shall find two more attempts at breaking our sea-power, and opening the way to our coasts, foiled by Nelson at Copenhagen and Trafalgar, and Bonaparte's effort to unite Europe against our commerce leading eventually to his fall.

During Bonaparte's absence, Pitt had formed a new Coalition of England, Austria, and Russia, against France and her allies.¹ The Austrians and Russians, under the great Suvarov, had driven the French out of Italy, thus undoing the results of Bonaparte's victories; the Austrians had defeated them in Germany, and driven them back to the Rhine, while the English had landed in Holland. France was in greater peril than she had known since 1794. Masséna, however, defeated the allies at Zurich. Bonaparte, on his return, in spite of his failure in Egypt, overthrew the Government, and, under the title of First Consul, became practically the despotic ruler of France; he then joined the army and completed Masséna's campaign; after this the victory of Moreau at Hohenlinden, and Bonaparte's invasion of Italy and victory at Marengo, drove Austria to make peace at Lunéville, as Russia had already done. In India Lord Wellesley, the first Governor-General who posed the reduction of the whole Peninsula under English rule or control, and his famous brother Arthur Wellesley, defeated Tippoo Sahib, who was killed at the siege of his capital Seringapatam. In a war with the Mahrattas Arthur Wellesley gained the victory of Assaye, and General Lake that of Laswaree, and the Mogul—or Mohammedan emperor, whose capital was Delhi—became our pensioner.

¹ Note the initial letters of this Second Coalition form the word 'Ear.' A mnemonic for the First Coalition is Shapes, *i.e.* Spain, Holland, Austria, Prussia, England, Sardinia.

The annexation of the Carnatic completed our conquest of Southern India, while in the North-East we now controlled the Ganges valley..

Sir Ralph Abercromby with 20,000 men landed in Egypt, defeated the French in two battles, and forced them to surrender or leave the country. He himself fell in the moment of final victory, having remained on horseback for hours after receiving his fatal wound. An Anglo-Indian army under Sir David Baird ascended the Red Sea, and, after a wonderful march across the desert, descended the Nile to Cairo, but arrived at Alexandria too late to take part in the fighting. Malta, which before Bonaparte's seizure had belonged to the Knights of St. John, was now annexed by England, and became a most useful naval station in the Mediterranean.

In Europe the intrigues of Bonaparte and the claims of England to search neutral ships and prevent trade with

**Armed Neu-
trality and
Battle of
Copenhagen.**

France led to the formation of the 'Armed Neutrality of the North,' a coalition of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia to exclude English trade from the Baltic and to resist our naval policy. The Tsar was half mad, and had fallen under Bonaparte's influence. Denmark possessed a fleet, and, in order to prevent Bonaparte from using it, Sir Hyde Parker and Nelson were sent to Copenhagen. Parker would have wasted valuable time and probably failed in his object, but Nelson sailed with part of the fleet up the Strait to Copenhagen, captured most of the Danish ships after a desperate struggle, in which the land-batteries helped the Danes and reinforcements from the land constantly aided their fleet, and, by a threat of bombardment, forced the Regent to ask for terms and to leave the Armed Neutrality. In this battle Nelson put his telescope to his blind eye, in order to avoid seeing Parker's signal of recall. Possibly Parker intended Nelson to use his discretion, and is thus not entirely blameworthy. After the battle the Tsar Paul's death saved Russia from an attack by Nelson. The new Tsar Alexander came to terms with England,

Thus another attempt against our sea-power had failed, and, as debt was increasing, the war in Europe had ceased, and our naval, imperial, and commercial position was intact, the country was eager for peace. Bonaparte also wished for a short period of peace, in order to work out his plans in France, where he aimed at acknowledged Absolutism. Accordingly the Addington Ministry, which succeeded Pitt in 1801, opened negotiations with Bonaparte, and on 25th March 1802 the Treaty of Amiens was signed. France promised to withdraw from Rome and Naples, and to give up all Egyptian claims. England was to give back Malta to the Knights of St. John, recognise Bonaparte as First Consul, and restore to France Martinique in the West Indies, Pondicherry in India, and other conquered colonies. From Holland we took Ceylon, and from Spain the Trinidad. Bonaparte did not intend the Peace of Amiens to be more than a temporary peace.

**Treaty of
Amiens, 1802.**

**The
Napoleonic
War.**

He was determined to avenge the Nile and Copenhagen, to overthrow our sea-power, and, having done this, to resume his schemes of universal Empire. For the present he needed a short period of peace in which to strengthen French influence over the vassal states in Italy, Holland, and Switzerland, and the allied state of Spain, and to rebuild the French Navy. It was only by peace that he could recover Martinique, Pondicherry, and other colonies, from which he hoped to harass our Empire, and by peace he hoped to evict us from Malta, and thus weaken our naval position in the Mediterranean. In this last point, however, he failed.

Reasons.

In 1802 he annexed the Italian possessions of the King of Sardinia and the Italian duchy of Parma. He threw troops into Switzerland to hold the Alps, and tried to shut out our trade from North Italy and Holland. He then criticised our Government, and demanded that we should expel the French royal family from England, punish the English newspapers for their attacks upon himself, and keep our promise to evacuate Malta. The Knights of St. John were not yet ready to return, and in any case we did not intend to give up Malta

while Bonaparte's attitude was so threatening. When we demanded ten years' possession of Malta, and remonstrated about his Italian policy, Bonaparte publicly insulted our ambassador, and sent so insolent a message to the Government that we prepared for war, and after another attempt at negotiations, war was declared. Bonaparte had hoped that Addington would give way, and showed his annoyance by seizing 10,000 peaceful English travellers, whom, contrary to all customs of war, he kept imprisoned during the entire war. On the outbreak of hostilities, the great majority of Englishmen wished Pitt to resume office, and, in 1804, Pitt, Fox, and Grenville defeated Addington. Pitt offered to serve with Fox, but the King, quite reasonably, refused to call Fox to office, so Pitt formed a Ministry with his friends.

Bonaparte strengthened his position in France by publishing reports of Royalist and English assassination plots, and presently had himself proclaimed Emperor. His position depended upon his popularity, especially with the army, and it was therefore necessary for him to win such victories as to make enthusiasm for his person take the place of the old revolutionary enthusiasm of his troops.

Pitt formed a new Coalition with Austria and Russia against France, Spain, and the vassal States. Napoleon realised that it was English ships and money which really foiled his schemes, and looked upon every victory over his European enemies as a step towards victory over England. He secured Prussia's continued neutrality by a hint that he would allow her king to annex Hanover.

In 1805 he made one more attempt to defeat our sea-power and invade England. He collected an enormous army and a fleet of transports at Boulogne. His plan was as follows: Admiral Villeneuve was to sail out of Toulon and tempt away Nelson and his blockading fleet to the West Indies; then he was to return, join the Spanish fleet and the Brest fleet, and hold the Channel while Napoleon crossed. Villeneuve succeeded in escaping from Toulon, join-

**Bonaparte
becomes
Emperor
Napoleon
1804.**

**New
Coalition.**

**The Attempt
at Invasion.**

ing the Spanish fleet, and enticing Nelson to the Indies. The Brest fleet, however, was held securely by the English blockading fleet under Admiral Cornwallis; and Villeneuve, on his return, was met off Ferrol by Sir Robert Calder with a squadron only half the size of the enemies' fleet. Calder, however, captured two Spanish ships, and drove Villeneuve into Ferrol. From there he sailed to Cadiz; while Napoleon, realising the defeat of his plan, broke up his camp and marched against Austria.

Nelson, after returning to England, sailed against Villeneuve, and at Trafalgar finally vindicated our naval supremacy. Before the battle he hoisted his famous signal, 'England expects every man to do his duty.' The allies possessed 33 ships against our 27, but, since the enemy had been continually shut up in harbours while our fleets were at sea, their sailors were no match for the English. Nelson and Collingwood adopted the tactics by which they and Rodney before them had gained their great victories. They cut the enemies' line and destroyed their centre before the wings could come into action. The allied fleet was either destroyed, captured, or driven into Cadiz, where we subsequently took the remaining ships. Nelson fell in the hour of victory; but his work was complete. In spite of weak health and poor physique, Nelson's naval genius, his patriotism, his sense of duty, his simple religious faith, and his death in action had made him for ever the most beloved of England's national heroes; the sorrow for his death surpassed the national joy over the victory. His flagship, the *Victory*, may be still seen at Portsmouth; and sailors still look upon him as the ideal admiral, not only owing to his genius, but also because of his personal influence. He inspired his officers, and showed a personal kindness to and care for his sailors, in days when press-gangs and cruelty were a part of the life at sea. Napoleon made no further effort to face us openly at sea, although in 1807 we thought it necessary to seize a new Danish fleet at Copenhagen. He now turned his attention to the conquest of Europe, as a means by which he

**Trafalgar,
21st October
1805.**

could attack our commerce, and thus deprive us of the wealth by which we had foiled his schemes. The credit of our success was not only due to Nelson, Collingwood, Hardy, and well-known heroes, but to all the officers and men, without whose extraordinary efficiency we could never have been successful in our battles and still more difficult blockades. Our naval successes were followed by successes in India and in the Colonies. In 1806 we took the Cape from the Dutch, and in 1810 we captured Mauritius from France; but an attempt in 1807 to conquer Spanish South America failed owing to General Whitelocke's defeat at Buenos Ayres.

On the Continent Napoleon's victories over the allies atoned for his failure against the English fleet. Before the day of Trafalgar he had crushed an Austrian army at Ulm, as a consequence of which he captured Vienna. From there he advanced North-East, and beat the allies at Austerlitz. Austria was compelled to make peace at Pressburg (December 1805) on terms by which she lost her Italian possessions and the Tyrol, while in 1806 her ruler gave up the old title of Holy Roman Emperor. The Imperial organisation had been abolished after Lunéville and Amiens by the Diet of Ratisbon, 1803, and in 1804 the Austrian Dominions had been converted into an hereditary Empire. The failure of the Coalition hastened

Pitt's end, and on 23rd January 1806 he died. As a peace minister he had proved himself the best type of reformer; his reforms were 'constructive,' that is to say, they improved without destroying, and avoided exciting revolutionary feeling. As a war minister he may be criticised on many points, but none can deny that he had enabled England to weather one of the worst storms of her history. Only forty-six years old when he died, for nearly half his life he was Prime Minister, and he had done more for England than any other man who has ever held that office.

After Austerlitz Napoleon adopted a policy known as his

family policy. He began to set up kingdoms for his relations under the vassalage of the French Empire. His brother Louis became King of Holland, another brother, Joseph, King of Naples, whence he expelled the Spanish Bourbons. The small German States were formed into the Confederation of the Rhine, of which he was 'Protector.' This policy, combined with continual insults, forced the weak king of Prussia, Frederick William III., to take up arms. For years Prussia had lived on the reputation gained in the days of Frederick the Great, and it was hoped that, if only she joined in the war, her army would prove more than a match for the French. Events proved that her army had lost efficiency; her chief officers were old, incapable, and in some cases actually cowardly; her organisation impaired by 'Red Tape'; and her people lacking in patriotism, partly owing to the class distinctions, by the rules of which the nobles were officers, the peasants privates, while the middle class was not allowed to serve at all. Moreover, she had lost her opportunity by waiting until Austria was beaten before striking. Two battles, at Jena and Auerstädt (October 1806), overthrew the Prussian army, and after that strong fortresses with large garrisons surrendered without striking a blow. Blücher almost alone made a fight. The Russians were harder to beat, and at Eylau nearly checked Napoleon's career. After the battle of Friedland, however, the Tsar came to terms, and by the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon and Alexander practically divided Europe. The Prussian army was limited to 40,000 men, her fortresses occupied by the French, an indemnity was exacted, while out of her territories two new States were formed, the Polish duchy of Warsaw, and a kingdom of Westphalia for Napoleon's brother Jerome.

If Napoleon had been content he might now have preserved his huge Empire, including France, Belgium, and part of Italy, with subject States in Holland, Warsaw, parts of Italy, Westphalia, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and allies in Spain and Russia. His determination to crush English commerce,

however, together with his personal ambitions and breach of faith with Russia in Near Eastern affairs, led him on to quarrels with Russia and Spain which finally caused his downfall.

By his decrees issued at Berlin he tried to shut English trade out of Europe. Spain and the vassal States were forced, **The Berlin Decrees.** Tsar persuaded to agree that the British Isles were in a state of blockade, that no English ship or neutral ship which had touched at an English port should be admitted to their harbours, and that English goods found in these countries should be destroyed. This plan was doomed to failure, if for no other reason because Europe could not then afford to refuse English goods and goods carried by English ships. We owned most of the factories and the greatest part of the carrying trade of the world. Napoleon's own armies were largely clad in English clothes, and the allies were not likely quietly to dispense with cloth, linen, tea, sugar, coffee, and muslin. But there was a yet stronger reason for failure in the advantage of a naval and commercial power over a purely military. Napoleon attempted to surround Europe with custom-houses and military posts; but this plan was both expensive and inefficient, for English goods were still landed both on hostile coasts and through our ally Portugal, which latter Power respected our navy more than Napoleon's military might. Moreover, England answered him by 'Orders in Council' by which all the coasts of France and her allies were declared to be in a state of blockade; and the English fleet made this blockade so real that European shipping practically disappeared from the seas.

Discontent grew up on all sides. In Prussia the people were secretly excited and organised; in Russia the nobles and people tired of the French alliance, and began to press the Tsar to renew war. Moreover, Portugal's fidelity to England led Napoleon to quarrel with Spain. General Junot occupied Lisbon, and forced the Portuguese royal family to escape by sea; but, having once interfered in the Peninsula, Napoleon

proceeded to develop his family policy in Spain. The King of Spain was engaged in a quarrel of long standing with his son. Napoleon appointed himself as arbitrator, **The Peninsula.** and then either forced or persuaded them both to renounce their claims. They were sent into France, the Spanish nobles who were with them were induced to accept Joseph Bonaparte as king, and the French troops then seized Madrid, proclaimed Joseph, and put down a rising in the town.

This policy, as Napoleon's great minister, Talleyrand, pointed out, was a fatal mistake. Spain was converted from a willing ally into a bitter foe, and, although her troops were not formidable, yet the nature of **Results of Napoleon's interference.** the country and people made her an admirable instrument for his enemies. The coasts of the Peninsula offered an opening to the great naval power of England. Again Spain, in Napoleon's words, was an easy country to conquer but a difficult country to hold. The French troops had hitherto spared France much of the expense of war by living on the country of the enemy. Spain was so poor a land that food had to be carried in from France. England held the sea, so all supplies must come through the Pyrenees, and there were only two roads available. Moreover, the Spaniards, in spite of their inefficient army, knew how to use their wild country in a local guerilla warfare, and could fight with the utmost ferocity, especially when their priests aroused their religious fanaticism. Spain became a running sore which exhausted the strength of France. It was a country 'where large armies starve and small armies are beaten'; and for the first time on the Continent Napoleon was faced not merely by governments but by a nation in arms—a fact which encouraged his enemies in England, Russia, and Prussia.

The English Government, in which Castlereagh was the leading spirit, saw its opportunity. During the threat of invasion of 1805 not only had volunteers been **The Peninsular War.** raised, but our regular army had been increased to quite a considerable force. Our sea-power enabled us to

land troops at any friendly or undefended port, and it was accordingly determined to send 20,000 English soldiers to help the Portuguese and Spaniards.¹ In July 1808 **Baylen.** the Spaniards gained a victory at Baylen, where General Dupont and 15,000 French soldiers surrendered.

A few days later Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal, and proved his own ability and the worth of the English troops by crushing Junot at Vimiera. After the battle **Vimiera and the Convention of Cintra.** Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived, and refused to allow pursuit. By the Convention of Cintra the French gave up Lisbon and all Portugal in return for a safe passage to France. The English generals were recalled and tried. Dalrymple was deprived of command, while Wellesley was quite rightly acquitted, and sent back to Portugal to command in the war.

While Wellesley was in England the command in the Peninsula was given to Sir John Moore. Napoleon, infuriated by the two defeats, determined to end the Spanish trouble, and entered Spain in person with the **Napoleon and Sir John Moore in Spain.** 'Grande Armée' of 250,000 veterans. He scattered the Spanish levies and entered Madrid, and might have fulfilled his boasts but for the bold advance of Moore, who with 25,000 troops fell upon Napoleon's line of communications, and thus caused a diversion. Napoleon was obliged to send 100,000 troops after Moore, who retreated before them, continually fighting with their van, but avoiding a general battle until he had drawn them into the north-western corner of Spain. An English fleet was awaiting him at Corunna, and, having arrived there, Moore attacked Soult and drove him back, and though he himself was slain the troops were safely embarked. His campaign was of the utmost importance: the moral effect of his bearding Napoleon was great, and by his action Southern Spain was saved for a time, and Spanish resistance enabled to continue. Also a

¹ The Peninsular War is treated at disproportionate length because the general campaign is explained in the notes on the Statesmen at the Congress of Vienna.

critical time was tided over; for Napoleon now heard that Austria had seized the opportunity of his trouble in Spain to prepare a fresh war, under the influence of English persuasion and irritation at the Continental System, the name given to the policy started by the Berlin Decrees.

Wellesley returned in April 1809 to carry on a marvellous campaign. With 20,000 English troops he was face to face with over 200,000 French veterans. His allies, **Wellesley's Return.** though useful in guerilla warfare, cutting up small parties of French and attacking their communications, were obstinate, jealous, and of small use in pitched battles, though he gradually drilled a certain number of Portuguese into decent soldiers.

In favour of his chances was, in the first place, his own personality: stern and reserved, he hated display of emotion and bombastic rhetoric, and thus was not deceived by the high words of the Spanish commanders and 'Juntas' or committees of government; but he inspired absolute confidence in his troops, and produced an army with which, he said, 'he could go anywhere and do anything.' 'The sight of his long nose among us,' said one of his veterans, 'was worth 10,000 men.' His erect, slight figure and well-bred appearance were typical of the stern aristocrats who headed England's relentless opposition to France. Of equal importance was the advantage of sea-power. We have already seen that this enabled **His Character.** us to land troops at will and rescue them if hopelessly outnumbered. Furthermore, it ensured our supplies; not only reinforcements and provisions, but at one time even fox-hounds were taken by sea to the Peninsula. Above all, it gave us a secure base for operations in Lisbon, which on three sides is defended by the sea and the mouth of the Tagus, while Wellesley presently secured the land side by his famous triple fortified lines at Torres Vedras.

A map of the Peninsula will show that the country is split up by mountain ranges into a succession of valleys. Wellesley's plan in this, his second campaign, was to hold

Lisbon and his base by means of Torres Vedras and the fleet, and to attack the enemy as opportunity offered by marching up one of these valleys, so as gradually to gain possession of the fortresses that commanded the roads into Spain. If they attacked him in overwhelming numbers he could retreat to Torres Vedras and trust to famine; for the French supplies had to come from France by a road leading from Bayonne, through San Sebastian, Burgos, Valladolid, and Madrid, and the farther they advanced into Portugal the greater would be their difficulty, especially since Spanish guerillas infested the neighbourhood of the road.

He first attacked Soult in the Douro valley, and forced him to abandon his guns and baggage at Oporto. Then he marched up the Tagus, and defeated Victor and Joseph at Talavera. Soult now appeared in his rear, so by forced marches, for which his troops were to become famous, he returned to Portugal. For this victory he was created Viscount Wellington, but he would have preferred reinforcements to titles. Unfortunately 40,000 troops, which would have enabled him to invade Spain, were sent to attack Antwerp, a town too strong and too far inland for our success. The naval and military commanders failed to

co-operate, and after losing many men from fever on the island of Walcheren, the expedition returned. This expedition, if successful, might have saved the Austrians by threatening Napoleon's communications. The conception was good, but the scheme failed through weak leadership and failure to adapt means to the end. Meanwhile Napoleon, after a temporary check at the hands of the Austrians under the Archduke Charles on the Danube and the

peasants of the Tyrol, forced the Emperor to seek peace by the battle of Wagram, and was enabled to send 70,000 fresh troops to his ablest general, Masséna, whom he ordered to drive Wellington into the sea. By the Peace of Vienna (1809) France took from Austria the Province of Illyria. Metternich, a former ambassador at

Paris and *persona grata* with Napoleon, now assumed control of Austrian policy.

When Masséna advanced into Portugal, Wellington slowly retired on to the lines of Torres Vedras, which he had completed in the winter of 1809-1810, wasting the country, and taking the people and live-stock with him. During his retreat he defeated Masséna's vanguard at Busaco, September 1810. The result was exactly as he had foreseen. The lines, defended in front by 30,000 English troops, 600 guns, and all the militia of Portugal, and on the flanks and rear by water, could not be stormed, and in March 1811, after losing 20,000 men by famine, while the English hunted foxes, Masséna was forced to retreat. Wellington pursued him to the borders of Spain, and from this time the French were forced to fight a defensive war. They were never able to invade Portugal again, and the fighting now took place round the fortresses on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier. In 1811 Wellington besieged Almeida and repulsed Masséna's attempt to relieve it at Fuentes d'Onoro, while in the south Lord Beresford besieged Badajos and beat Soult at Albuera.

This was the bloodiest victory of the campaign: our Spanish allies fled, and the battle was only won by the gallant charge of 1500 Fusiliers, who stormed a steep hill held by 7000 French.

In 1812 Wellington captured Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos by storm. He then invaded Spain, and won the brilliant victory of Salamanca over General Marmont. This battle proved Wellington to be the greatest tactician of the day. The French greatly outnumbered him, but during the battle Marmont temporarily exposed his left wing. Wellington seized his opportunity, crushed this wing before the rest of the French army could come to its help, and 'in forty minutes defeated 40,000 men.'

He now adopted a new plan for his third and last Peninsular campaign. He suddenly changed his base from Lisbon to the north, and by forced marches cut the French lines of

**Wellesley's
Plan of
Campaign.**

Talavera.

Walcheren.

Wagram.

**Torres
Vedras.**

**Fuentes
d'Onoro.
Albuera.**

**Ciudad
Rodrigo and
Badajos.
Salamanca,
1812.**

communication at Vittoria, on the one road by which supplies could be sent to their main forces. The French were forced to retreat or starve, and as they retreated Wellington attacked and crushed them at Vittoria, captured every gun and wagon they possessed, and followed them into the Pyrenees. Soult, with a fresh army from the east, attempted to relieve the fortresses of St. Sebastian and Pampeluna on the French frontier, but was driven back in the two days' battle of the Pyrenees. The fortresses fell, and in 1814 Wellington invaded Southern France, captured Bordeaux, and defeated Soult at Toulouse. By this time, however, Napoleon had fallen. His efforts to enforce the Continental System against England had led him on to ever greater violence, until he threw away the supremacy in Europe which was his from 1806 to 1810. He annexed Rome, Central Italy, and the north coast of Germany from the same motives as had led to his interference in Spain. At last, in 1811, the same policy led to his fatal quarrel with Russia. Alexander gradually realised the strength of the opposition in Russia to the Continental System, which ruined its trade, and began openly to abandon it. Possibly he was also annoyed at Napoleon's Austrian marriage, and he certainly resented French aggrandisement in North Germany and interference in Poland and Turkey. In 1812 Napoleon collected an army of 600,000 men, including 20,000 Prussians, who were forced to serve, and thousands of Italians, Poles, and South Germans, and invaded Russia. The Russians, following Wellington's plans, retreated slowly, and left the French to starve. After one battle at Borodino, Napoleon took Moscow. This, however, did not end the war, as he had expected. Moscow was burnt, provisions failed, and the French were forced to retreat through the snows of the Russian winter. Such was the destruction wrought by the cold, starvation, and Cossacks that only 60,000 men succeeded in recrossing the frontier. The Prussian troops joined the foe, and a really national war was started

The Vittoria Campaign, 1813.

Invasion of France. Toulouse, 1814. The General European War.

The Russian Campaign.

by the Prussians, who had benefited by their former defeat. The Russians were almost as exhausted as the remnants of the Grande Armée, and early in 1813 it was doubtful whether the allies would press their advantage. The Prussian King had hesitated until York, the commander of the Prussian force in Russia, forced his hand by making a convention with the Russians, and French victories at Lutzen and Bautzen in May discouraged the allies and promoted distrust of each other and of their commanders. Napoleon, however, stayed his hand in the hope of preserving his alliance with Austria and bringing up troops from Italy and France. The French troops in the Grande Armée had not numbered more than 250,000, and the military reserves were not yet exhausted; it was in respect of officers, non-commissioned officers, and steady veterans that the Russian disaster was irreparable. Austria, which up to 1809 had borne the brunt of the continental war, was now, under the sway of Metternich, determined not to court or even risk another disaster, and Napoleon's marriage had gone some way towards mollifying the sense of past wrongs; moreover, Austrian statesmen were traditionally and reasonably suspicious of Prussia, and viewed with equal distaste the advance of Russia towards European hegemony and the threatened extension of Stein's¹ national and popular propaganda from Prussia to Germany as a whole. Austria was prepared, therefore, to remain neutral, and even to arbitrate, on terms that only powerlessness to defy both Austria and France could have extorted from Prussia. Napoleon might retain Holland, Italy, Belgium, the Rhine Frontier, the leadership of the Rhenish Confederacy, and confine Prussia to the east of the Elbe, if he would merely restore to Austria the provinces lost in 1809, to Prussia Western Poland, and to their former rulers those North German territories and ports which he had annexed in order to enforce his commercial policy. Napoleon, misjudging Austria's determination and strength and trusting to bluff, refused these terms. Austria then joined Russia and Prussia

¹ See p. 243.

on her own conditions, a point that must be remembered in connection with the peace settlement. In addition to these three Powers and England, with her Peninsular allies, Sweden also had joined the ranks of Napoleon's foes. After Tilsit the Tsar Alexander had attacked Sweden and compelled her to surrender Finland, and also to join in the commercial combination against England. This defeat led to the deposition of the King, Gustavus IV., and the Swedes, in the vigour of the reaction, invited Napoleon's marshal, Bernadotte, to become Prince Royal—Regent and Heir to the Throne—a course to which Napoleon very grudgingly assented. Russia's rejection of the commercial policy gave the Swedes the opportunity of reasserting their right to trade, and Bernadotte was further influenced by the hope, backed by the Tsar's promise, of adding Norway to his Swedish dominion, even if his ambitions with regard to the Throne of France failed to materialise.

Napoleon attempted to hold the line of the Elbe, but was defeated by weight of numbers in a three days' battle at Leipzig. He was gradually driven back into France, and, though he gained some victories by his old plan of attacking separate divisions of the enemy as they advanced by three different routes, his army was too reduced in size and lacking in veterans to face the huge number of his foes. Wellington's campaigns prevented his generals in Spain from giving him help; and finally, after the battle of Laon, Paris was taken, and Napoleon forced by his marshals to abdicate. Louis XVIII. was restored, and France was granted most generous terms.

England, meanwhile, had become entangled in a new war. Our naval policy had caused the Americans, urged on by Napoleon, to declare war upon us in 1812. While our struggle with Napoleon lasted we could spare but little attention to the smaller war, and it had resolved itself into a succession of duels between English and American ships, the most famous being the victory of the English *Shannon* over the American *Chesapeake*. Our ships, however, had

suffered one or two reverses—a new experience for our sailors, since, as Oman points out, in sixty-seven duels of English ships against French, Spanish, and Dutch, we had been in every case victorious—one of the most wonderful records in the world's history. An American invasion of Canada was repulsed by a small garrison, helped by the loyal Canadians, French and English. In 1814, however, we could spare more powerful ships and a military force for America. The American vessels were destroyed, and in 1814 General Ross won the battle of Bladensburg and burnt Washington. At New York and New Orleans, however, we failed; and finally peace was restored with but little result, except bad blood on both sides.

While our Peninsular veterans were absent in America, Napoleon escaped from Elba, of which island he had been made ruler, by way of honourable imprisonment. He landed in France, his old soldiers soon rallied to his banner, and the King fled. England and Europe at once prepared for war, and, as was often the case, Belgium became the 'Cockpit of Europe.' Wellington, now a duke, commanded a force of 30,000 English, mainly raw recruits; 22,000 Germans, and 20,000 Dutch and Belgians, the latter worse than useless; while Blücher commanded 120,000 Prussians. Napoleon had collected a fine force, mostly veterans, 130,000 strong. He immediately tried to defeat his enemy in detail, so as to outnumber them in the separate battles. The English and Prussians naturally wished to unite their forces. Napoleon beat the Prussians at Ligny on 16th June, and ordered Grouchy to drive them away from the English; while Ney fought a drawn battle at Quatre Bras with the English vanguard, who had attempted to join Blücher.

Napoleon now hoped to crush the English while the Prussians were out of the way, and on 18th June attacked Wellington at Waterloo. The English army occupied the slightly rising ground which crossed by the road to Brussels, at which town Napoleon hoped to dine in triumph. The two farms of Hougoumont

**Napoleon's
Escape.**

**The Hundred
Days.
March to
June 1815.**

**Ligny and
Quatre Bras.**

**Waterloo,
18th June.**

and La Haye Sainte were the main positions in our front, and these were held by picked English and Hanoverian infantry, while the English cavalry were in reserve and on the wings. Napoleon had 72,000 picked troops available against 23,000 English, 22,000 Germans, and a mob of 20,000 Dutch and Belgians. The latter, with some of the Germans, soon broke, and fled to Brussels. In spite of this our army stood firm, and repulsed first an attack on Hougomont, then an assault on Picton's divisions on the left. Napoleon next launched 15,000 cavalry against the English centre, but our infantry, formed in squares, repulsed attack after attack. By this time the Prussians were advancing on Napoleon's right, for Grouchy had been sent in the wrong direction, and thus Blücher could rally his men and return. Napoleon made one more effort by dispatching his reserve of guards against the weary English. These too were beaten, and the English Guards and cavalry now charged in front, the Light Infantry on the left flank, and the Prussians on the right flank. The French were scattered; and Napoleon, fearing the Prussians, fled across France, and surrendered to a British man-of-war. The credit for the victory may be awarded thus: Wellington by his resistance defeated Napoleon's plan, and the arrival of Blücher had been included in his scheme of battle. To Blücher and the Prussians must be given the credit of keeping their engagement with Wellington and converting an indecisive battle into a complete victory. They began to enter the battle sufficiently early to relieve the worst of the pressure on Wellington's men, and supplied fresh troops to push the pursuit. Neither side was free from blunders by the higher command: the Prussian position at Ligny was badly chosen, as Wellington pointed out; on the other hand Gneisenau, chief of the Prussian staff, may have expected English help at Ligny. On the French side, Napoleon's contradictory orders¹ prevented D'Erlon's

¹ Possibly he was no longer at his best; he may have been suffering from the beginnings of his fatal cancer, or, as is more probable, he missed the help of Berthier, his old chief of staff, Murat, his great cavalry leader, and Davout, the soundest tactician of his marshals.

corps from taking part either at Ligny or Quatre Bras, while Grouchy also was confused by his orders; even if Grouchy had given up his futile attempt to pursue the Prussians and had 'marched on the guns' of Waterloo, it is doubtful whether he could have intervened in time or with any decisive effect; Ney probably blundered in launching his cavalry too soon upon the unbroken British squares; in a word, what Napoleon gained strategically, by concentrating his forces against the far-flung allied positions, he lost to Wellington's superior tactics.

PART II. SETTLEMENT AND 'REACTION,' 1814-1830.

Criticism of the settlement which followed the Napoleonic War and abuse of the statesmen who made it have become almost a habit of mind and unquestioned fashion among modern amateurs in politics. It must be granted at once that many of the provisions were unfortunate, and some of them iniquitous, and that subsequent international history has so largely been concerned in undoing the settlement that, as in the case of the intervention of foreign Powers in France in 1792, so also with the diplomatic arrangements of 1815, a grasp of the facts and of the results that arose from them is essential to any understanding of the affairs of the 19th and 20th centuries. Nevertheless, as our generation discovered in 1919, it is easier to criticise a rearrangement of the map than to make it, and it is easier to reconcile the diverging interests of allies during a campaign, difficult though this often proves, than to prevent a breach between the victors. Possibly the most just appreciation of the statesmen of 1815 and their achievements may be obtained if we first attempt an impartial introduction of the individual negotiators, together with some indication of their respective views and mandates, then consider the compromise arrived at through their joint endeavours, remembering to their credit that at least they secured a period of comparative peace, and finally follow up the results of their efforts to our own times.

**The
Settlement:
Treaties of
Paris and
Congress of
Vienna,
1814-1815.**

The first Treaty of Paris (1814), followed upon the abdication of Napoleon, after a vain attempt to persuade the allies to allow his infant son to succeed, and his banishment to Elba—a retreat which, as Sir Charles Stewart pointed out on behalf of the English negotiators, was too near France for safety and too large to be adequately guarded, but which was chosen in deference to the generous impulses of the Tsar. It secured the restoration of the Bourbons on the condition, also imposed by the Tsar, of the King's acceptance of a fairly liberal constitution, and settled certain questions immediately, referring others to the Congress of Sovereigns and Diplomats at Vienna. The escape of Napoleon interrupted the Congress and caused a few alterations to be made, to the disadvantage of France, at the second Treaty of Paris in 1815; but we shall find, when we come to summarise the actual terms of the Treaties and decisions of the Congress, that, at least in regard to France and her late subject-ally Holland, the majority of the negotiators, in face of Prussia's objections, insisted upon amazingly generous terms. Some of the reasons for this will appear when we consider the personalities of these negotiators.

Probably the first in influence, as he has subsequently been first in the black list of Liberal historians, was the Rhenish count and Austrian diplomatist and statesman, **Metternich**. Metternich. By nature courtly and conciliatory, he had avoided enmity, and by practice perfected his natural tact as ambassador successively at Dresden, Berlin, and Paris, before becoming Austrian Foreign Minister during the critical years following Wagram. Responsible as he was for Austria's *rapprochement* with Napoleon, the negotiation of the marriage of Napoleon and Marie Louise, and the alliance by which Napoleon guarded against Austrian intervention during his advance into Russia, he nevertheless persuaded the Tsar that Austria must not be considered an enemy of Russia. Metternich prided himself on his practical grasp of realities, his immunity from illusions, and his habit of looking to the morrow rather than the passing day. It may be urged that a greater

statesman would have looked beyond the immediate morrow and would have distinguished between realism and cynicism, illusions and ideals; that, for instance, he was wrong in opposing all popular movements towards German unity, in vetoing any suggestion of restoring the old Empire, in preferring Austrian to German interests. But we must remember the other side: the Holy Roman Empire had never since the Thirty Years' War shown any sign of developing into a national state; Austria's appeal to Pan-German patriotism in 1809 had fallen very flat except in the Austrian Tyrol—where the real motive was loyalty to Church, Emperor, and Home—and in the case of one Prussian regiment which made an attempt under Schill; Prussia was the traditional foe of Austria; the threatened supremacy of Russia meant the end of Austria's Near Eastern ambitions; finally, the Hapsburg possessions in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Illyria, the Tyrol, etc., which had always proved a truer source of strength than the Hapsburgs' Imperial functions, were essentially a congeries of mutually unsympathetic races held together only by common loyalty to their Emperor, King, or Duke—the Hapsburg ruler—and all movements towards national and democratic states must needs be fatal to their continued union. Moreover, Metternich genuinely doubted the truth of the assumption that Liberalism would make for the happiness of humanity. Austria, therefore, had made her bargain in 1813, and she cannot be blamed if, when taking her place on the judge's bench in 1814 and 1815, she declined, through her mouthpiece Metternich, to pass a death sentence on herself by going back on this bargain.

In Talleyrand France found a representative as courtly, as cynical, and as astute as Metternich, and if there is some uncertainty whether the Frenchman's patriotism was, as Metternich's undoubtedly was, the guiding motive of his life, at least his policy invariably fulfilled the interests of France, and his foresight extended beyond Metternich's morrow. It is interesting to note that he opposed the sale of Louisiana to the U.S.A. **Talleyrand.**

We have previously met the nobly-born bishop leading the reforming party among the clergy during the early stages of the Revolution, but gradually parting company with the revolutionaries when they insisted upon the short-sighted policy which estranged all good Catholics—the 'Civil Constitution of the Clergy'¹; supporting Napoleon during his rise to power and early successes, but leaving him before his short-sighted or pride-blinded ambitions led to quarrels with Spain and Russia. The absence of Talleyrand from Napoleon's side in 1813 was responsible for the breach with Austria, which his astute, if dishonest, diplomacy would certainly have avoided on terms favourable both to Napoleon's and Metternich's plans.

His most signal service to France was performed in 1814 and 1815. He not merely clinched the arguments which persuaded the allies to reject any proposals for a Bonaparte or Bernadotte Dynasty, but also gained the support of all the allies, with the exception of Prussia, which was outvoted, for the fiction that France was the victim rather than the accessory of Napoleon, and must be included among the allies on the bench, not associated with the Emperor in the dock. This argument, combined with the plea that harsh terms would destroy any chance the restored Bourbons might have of popular favour, accounts for the wonderfully generous terms granted to France by the Paris Treaty of 1814, and also for the comparatively lenient conditions imposed even in 1815 after the French people had exposed the fiction.

Having secured for France a voice in the negotiations, Talleyrand made the most of the causes of contention among the allies in order to increase the influence of his country as a make-weight; in fact, by December of 1814 the Powers were actually divided into two potential alliances—Austria, France, England, and the Rhenish States against Prussia and Russia. Talleyrand then expounded the theory that the war, which had started as a struggle between Monarchy

¹ He accepted the Constitution under protest, but soon afterwards left the country.

and Republicanism, had ended as a contest between legitimate and usurping Dynasties, and that the work of the peacemakers was the restoration of Europe in accordance with the principle of pre-war Legitimacy. The catch-phrase 'Legitimacy' was entirely to the taste of Metternich, who held that the choice lay between rule by the old Dynasties and rule by military despotism, and that those critics were in error who imagined that there was any third alternative, or that 'Liberalism'¹ was practicable. Nor was this prescription distasteful to Castlereagh, who, although he held no brief for reaction or despotism, probably cherished no enthusiasms for Liberal ideals; he desired peace; like Metternich he viewed with disfavour any further disturbance of the Balance of Power through Russia's aggrandisement; he was left quite cold by the Tsar Alexander's ardent dreams of a world regenerated by a régime of Christian peace and love combined with order and progress, under the aegis of the great Monarchies, and was equally unresponsive to Stein's hopes for a German nation; on the other hand, he opposed Prussia's intention of crushing France, and granted, in England's name, most generous terms to both France and Holland in the colonial settlement.

Until quite recently Castlereagh, one of the greatest of our Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs, has received scant justice. The poems, inexcusable except on the ground of Castlereagh. moral degeneracy in the author, in which Byron pours out his venom over the dead bodies of Castlereagh and George III., have been too readily accepted as true in substance if false in taste. Castlereagh's record as the one statesman who accorded steady support to Wellington during the Peninsular War, at times when the amateur strategists and the mob would have had him broken for his retreats; as the statesman who helped at least to restore peace to a distracted world, and managed to avoid committing England to any reactionary alliances without quarrelling with her late allies,

¹ See correspondence between Metternich and Disraeli in Monypenny and Buckle's *Disraeli*.

should at least be weighed in the balance against his policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other peoples which, when applied to Sicily and Greece, appears to some minds to argue a lack of sympathy, and against his share in bribing the Irish Parliament to accept the Union, and his possible overestimation of the dangers of revolution as evidenced by his share in the restrictive measures of 1819. If he lacked the eloquence of his rival Canning he also lacked his *penchant* for underhand intrigue against colleagues. Like Metternich he was at least a courtly gentleman and a true patriot, and, unlike Metternich, he deservedly gained a reputation at the Congress for honest diplomacy and personal integrity.

If Metternich, Talleyrand, and Castlereagh in combination provided common sense, diplomatic astuteness and caution, and intense, though narrow, patriotism, the **Alexander.** Tsar Alexander supplied imagination and ardent idealism. Metternich, in his autobiography, quotes Napoleon as saying that Alexander exercised a 'singular spell' over impressionable people, but that there was always 'something wanting,' and that this 'something' was constantly changing. Metternich adds that his character 'showed a peculiar mixture of masculine virtues and feminine weaknesses'; that his quick versatile mind was always ready to seize upon new ideas, which, in the course of about three years, he would magnify into a system; during the fourth year the consequences of this system would begin to damp his ardour, and in the fifth year the obsession of a new idea would begin, although his friendship with the inspirers of the discarded system would continue. This 'periodicity of his thoughts' is rather borne out by the facts of his career. On his accession to the throne in 1801, following upon the murder of the brutal and half-mad Paul, his mind was full of pacific intentions; he accordingly retired from the 'Armed Neutrality' in time to prevent Nelson from following up the battle of Copenhagen by the bombardment of St. Petersburg; but he also made a secret treaty with Bonaparte, aiming at the maintenance of a balance of power between Austria and Prussia; by 1803 he was beginning to

distrust Bonaparte, owing to the occupation of Hanover; in 1804 Pitt persuaded him to break with France; in 1805 he made the Treaty of Potsdam with Prussia; within two more years, however, he began to change his views, and, although at the beginning of 1807 he was in alliance with England, Prussia, and Sweden against France, yet at Tilsit, that same year, he opened his interview with Napoleon by exclaiming 'I hate the English,' and agreed to the ruthless suppression of Prussia; he then invaded Sweden in order to enforce upon her Napoleon's commercial policy; four years later, disillusioned by the results of this commercial policy and by Napoleon's intrigues in Germany and Poland, breach of faith with regard to Turkey and marriage with an Austrian, he was quarrelling with Napoleon, although he still refused an alliance with Prussia; next year came the period of Stein's influence, the result of which was seen when, after the Russian campaign, Alexander entered in 1813 upon the War of Liberation.

Metternich holds that he showed consistency only in his affection and veneration for the Emperor Francis, who had first impressed the young Tsar by his premonitions of the result of the incapacity of the Austrian generals and the unbalanced counsels of Alexander's entourage in the campaign of 1805. It is probably, however, only fair to Alexander to give him the credit for consistency in his attachment to those liberal, and even revolutionary, principles which he absorbed from his tutor, La Harpe; his apparent change of face in his later years was probably caused by the disillusionment of a broken man, whose death quickly followed the death of his ideals. It must be admitted, however, that there were occasions when, carried away by mood or temptation, he showed a side of his character which was at least materialistic if not cynical; to wit, he celebrated his alliance with Napoleon in 1807 by an attack upon Sweden, not only to force that country into the commercial system, but also to annex Finland to his own realms; in 1808, in order to secure leisure for wresting the Danubian Provinces from Turkey—a project

which Napoleon's duplicity was to arrest—he renewed at Erfurt the deal arranged at Tilsit, thus dooming Prussia to yet increased penalties, and Spain, as it seemed, to national extinction; in 1812 he secured the alliance of Bernadotte by promising—a promise which he fulfilled—to wrench Norway from Denmark and hand it over incontinently to the Swedish Crown.

Alexander may be considered to be the sole representative of Russia, since his attendant Ministers were mere servants, although Nesselrode was an able man.

Prussia was represented by King Frederick William III., von Humboldt, and Prince Hardenberg; Stein attended the conference among the Tsar's following in an unofficial¹ position. The only possible doubt about the character of the Prussian King is whether, like his predecessor, he tried to assume the Machiavellianism of Frederick the Great, but lacked the brains necessary for success, or whether he was rather as weak as foolish and was driven into duplicity by sheer lack of character. The latter view is indicated by the facts and accepted by most historians. Frederick William II., after burning his fingers in 1788 and 1789 in an attempt to take advantage of Austria's trouble at home and war with Turkey, had seemed to gain some advantage by typically Prussian means when, in 1793, he deserted his Austrian allies and signed the second Partition of Poland behind their backs, and again when, in 1795, he secured Warsaw in the third Partition. In truth, however, his treachery, culminating in the Treaty of Basle with France in 1795, sowed the seeds of universal dislike of Prussia which bore fruit in the shameful years between 1805 and 1813. Frederick William III., who succeeded in 1797, decided in favour of continued neutrality, although he probably had no conception of the truth that caution was necessitated by the corruption of the Prussian State, under Ministers such as Haugwitz, and the inefficiency of the once great army under the command of dotards who

¹ Cp. the presence of Venizelos in London in February 1921. The Tsar was more influenced by Stein than by any of his own Ministers.

had even lost elementary personal courage. In 1805, when even Haugwitz advised bold measures, the King clung to his neutrality, supported by Hardenberg, who was consistently pacifist from 1795 to 1806. This neutrality was at least indirectly responsible for the Austrian disaster at Ulm, even if it be not the fact that Bernadotte's march through Prussian territory at Anspach alone made the complete victory possible. While French troops violated her neutrality in the West and Russia threatened her in the East, Prussia looked like falling between two stools. Even Frederick William was stirred to action; and, since the French had done what the Russians had only threatened, he sent Haugwitz with an ultimatum to Napoleon. That corrupt statesman, however, allowed Napoleon to procrastinate, and finally proceeded to Vienna, where the adroit Talleyrand entertained him while the Russo-Austrian forces were overwhelmed in the Austerlitz campaign. By a complete change of rôles, Haugwitz was now, on his own responsibility, negotiating a French alliance, while Hardenberg was officially arranging for a junction in North Germany between the forces of England, Russia, and Prussia.

The royal weather-cock at first denounced Haugwitz, but gradually swung round, influenced by the fear of Napoleon's armies and the proffered bribe of Hanover. His great desire was to secure the promise of Hanover from Napoleon without the plot becoming known to the English, and he decided to ratify Haugwitz's treaty with the proviso that, when peace was restored, George III. should have a voice in the matter. Napoleon, however, having forced Austria to accept the terms of Pressburg, and after organising Western Germany as a Federation of the Rhine under French suzerainty, no longer valued Prussia's neutrality. The death of Pitt and the admission of the pro-French Fox to the Government encouraged him to hope that he might frighten or bribe the British Cabinet into making terms. He first turned upon Haugwitz in simulated fury at Prussia's duplicity, and compelled the Prussians to defy England by acknowledging the Hanoverian

intrigue and closing their ports to English ships, and then having, as he hoped, frightened Fox by the threat of a Franco-Prussian alliance, he attempted to bribe him by the promise of the restitution of Hanover. Napoleon subsequently overreached himself in an attempt to separate England and Russia, and thus convinced both Fox and the Tsar of the necessity of fighting on. But Prussia deservedly fell between two stools. The discovery of Napoleon's offer to England drove even Frederick William to war, but feeble leadership brought about the disaster at Jena and the disgrace of Auerstädt before the Russian armies could intervene, while the incurable vice of intrigue prevented Haugwitz from coming quickly to terms with England.

After the initial disasters Frederick William, who at least showed some physical courage at Auerstädt, tried for a time to play the man. Haugwitz was dismissed, and Stein, the one consistently great statesman produced by any German State outside Austria during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, came into power. His tenure of office, however, was brief, since the King, who never liked either the man or his views, dismissed him when he suggested the elimination of the entire old gang of politicians and officials. Hardenberg, converted at last from his belief in ignoble neutrality, controlled Prussian policy during 1807 until, when the Tsar at Tilsit had made his bargain with Napoleon, the latter insisted upon the dismissal of Hardenberg, but, with a profound ignorance of what he was doing, suggested Stein as his successor. In 1808 the Spanish uprising and new demands made by Napoleon on Prussia moved Stein to advise a new appeal to war, but the fresh compact between Napoleon and Alexander at Erfurt frightened the Prussian King into dismissing Stein and accepting terms which converted Prussia into a third-class vassal of France. In 1812 he was once more terrorised into contributing troops to the Grande Armée, and even after the Russian *débâcle* it was only the initiative of York, in making a convention with Russia, and the advance of Russian troops, that persuaded the Hohen-

zollern to join in the War of Liberation. Even then, in spite of proclamations to his people in which he apologised for the past and appealed to national enthusiasm, he feared and suspected Stein's policy of rousing German feeling for a national war, under Prussia's leadership, for national independence and liberty. The great reforms of Stein and of Hardenberg must be reserved for fuller treatment in another chapter; what concerns us here is that Stein, together with Scharnhorst, had wished to arm the people for a national uprising in 1808; that during and after Stein's period of power in 1807-1808, Scharnhorst so reorganised the Prussian military system that it became a school of patriotism, that it included all classes of society—not merely noble officers and peasant soldiers as heretofore—that, by means of short service, a vast trained reserve¹ was formed behind the small army to which Napoleon limited Prussia's forces, although this organisation could not be openly effected until 1813; that Stein favoured the Pan-German 'Tugendbund' movement, although official Prussia eyed it with suspicion; and that in 1813 Stein called a National Assembly in East Prussia, although York only consented to deal with it and to organise the Landwehr¹ on condition of Stein's withdrawal.

Hardenberg in 1813, although more decidedly in favour of war than the King, yet played a waiting game and, when war was declared, supported official Prussia rather than Stein, who could only appear at the Congress of 1814 in the Tsar's entourage.

The King and Hardenberg entered the Congress with the hopes of regaining Prussia's lost territories in Poland and West Germany, and of annexing Saxony, a state which clung to Napoleon. Russia, however, coveted Warsaw, and, since Prussia dared not risk a quarrel with the Tsar, for whom moreover Frederick William had conceived an affection which amounted almost to infatuation, Prussia's representatives reconciled themselves to the loss of the ill-gotten gains

¹ (a) the active army, (b) the Reserve, (c) the Landwehr for Home defence, (d) the Landsturm, or general arming of the people.

of 1793 and 1795, and turned their attention to recompense at the expense of Saxony. It was on the Saxon question that the Conference was threatened with dissolution into two camps—Prussia with Russia against Austria, England, and France.

The final arrangements may be summarised as follows: France, which in 1814 had escaped all penalties, was in 1815 compelled to restore the plundered art-treasures, to pay an indemnity of roughly £30,000,000, to banish the Bonaparte family and the officials who had served Napoleon during the Hundred Days, to receive and support allied garrisons in the frontier fortresses for five years—they were subsequently removed after three—and to return to the frontiers of 1789 with slight modifications. Prussia's desire to deprive France of Alsace, Lorraine, French Flanders, and part of Picardy, and thus reduce her to a second-rate Power within the frontiers that had failed to give her security in the days before the Grand Monarque, was thwarted by Austria and England, and these Powers also prevented the fulfilment of the Tsar's scheme—to unite the whole of historic Poland as a self-governing Kingdom with the Tsars as hereditary Kings, and to recompense Austria in Italy and Prussia in Western Europe; they also prevented the complete absorption of Saxony by which Prussia had hoped to compensate herself for the loss of the Warsaw region to Russia. The net result of these territorial disputes was that the Tsar secured for his Polish kingdom the lion's share of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; Austria resumed the Polish territories secured in 1795 with the addition of Cracow, which was in theory to be administered as a Free City; Prussia recovered the Polish districts which connected East Prussia with Pomerania and Brandenburg—subsequently known as West Prussia—and gained Thorn and the Posen province—or 'South Prussia'—but lost her gains of 1795—Warsaw and 'New East Prussia'—for which she was compensated in Western Germany by means of nearly half of Saxony.

The German states, which had been reduced in number

from several hundred before 1789 to thirty-eight, ranging in importance from the first-class Powers of Austria and Prussia, through the Kingdoms of Hanover, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, down to small Duchies and the four Free Cities—Hamburg, Frankfort, Bremen, and Lübeck—were formed into a Confederation. The permanent Presidency over the bi-cameral Diet was bestowed upon Austria; there were no ecclesiastical states; each state was to be supreme over its own affairs, but inter-Germanic wars were forbidden as well as external wars by individual members of the Confederacy.

Switzerland also retained its Confederate constitution, as opposed to the revolutionary ideal of a centralised republic; it secured Geneva and two other cantons from France, and its neutrality was guaranteed by the Great Powers.

The problems of Italy, where aspirations for unity and independence were voiced mainly by the French 'King of the Two Sicilies,' Napoleon's marshal, Murat, were settled in accordance with the principles of Legitimacy rather than of Nationality; the Papal States were restored, the Bourbon Ferdinand recovered Sicily and Naples, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and various other Duchies were restored; the interests of the Piedmontese Dynasty were met by uniting Genoa to the Kingdom of Sardinia; above all, the Austrian Empire, which, in addition to its gains of Polish territory and its diplomatic successes, had recovered the Tyrol and Salzburg and the Dalmatian coast, annexed Venetia,¹ and recovered Lombardy. Belgium was united with Holland in the Kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange, which also secured the throne of the independent Duchy of Luxemburg. This arrangement has been hotly condemned, and certainly failed badly, in part owing to the traditional hostility between Catholic Belgium and Protestant Holland, in part owing to the attempt of the Dutch to shift taxation on to Belgian industries. Nevertheless it was not a wholly foolish attempt. The union of Belgian industries with Dutch commerce, shipping, agriculture, and colonial possessions

¹ Formerly held by Austria from 1801 to 1805.

might have resulted in a strong second-class Power, and, if the Belgian Walloon is akin to the French, yet the Flemings belonged to the Dutch or Low German family. The Dutch were generously treated in the matter of colonies: their East Indian possessions were restored, although England retained Ceylon and purchased Cape Colony. England also retained Malta and Heligoland in European waters, and, among other islands, Mauritius, Tobago, and Trinidad.

Spain suffered no losses save that of Trinidad, and was allowed to deprive Portugal of Olivenza, but the restoration of Ferdinand VII. was in itself a national disaster. Norway was unwillingly united with Sweden, and Denmark ceded Heligoland to England.

An international agreement was reached with regard to the navigation of rivers, such as the Rhine, which ran through many countries, and had hitherto been blocked by many tolls and tariffs. The Slave Trade, owing to the efforts of Castlereagh and the enthusiasm of the English people, was condemned by the representatives of all the European Powers; it had already been abolished throughout the British Empire through the work of Wilberforce and Fox, and was now doomed to abolition in the French dominions within five, and in the Spanish within eight years. The 'Holy Alliance' was signed by the Tsar, the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Prussia, whereby these monarchs pledged themselves to promote and defend Christian principles and internal and external peace. Castlereagh refused to sign for England, but entered upon a quadruple alliance to keep Napoleon's family from the French Throne, while the Regent wrote to the Tsar expressing his moral (!) agreement with the latter's ideals. Napoleon was exiled to St. Helena, and Louis XVIII. again restored as a constitutional monarch, but, like Charles II. of England, he was handicapped by a Parliament more Royalist and reactionary than the King. The main faults found with this settlement are that it ignored Nationality and opposed itself to Liberalism. It is true that Napoleon had also crushed alike aspirations for national independence and for represen-

tative institutions, proving himself in that respect rather the descendant of the 18th-century despots than the child of the Revolution, albeit he proclaimed in 1815 his intention of ruling henceforward as a constitutional monarch. Nevertheless the example of French administration of an equal system of law had made the people of Europe impatient of what remained or was restored of privilege; moreover, memories of Stein in Prussia and of the Cortes even in Spain kept alive Liberal traditions among some elements of the inhabitants. For the present, until after the years 1848 and 1849, this Liberal ideal was combined with national patriotic aspirations; it was in the second half of the 19th century that continental Liberalism and patriotism became divorced, and that the former allied itself with cosmopolitanism, the latter with militarism.

Constitutional, economic, and, for the main part, colonial developments must be treated in another chapter; our immediate task is to describe the gradual breakdown of the territorial and international arrangements of 1814-1815, and the growth of the questions which led to the war of 1914, and which still remain to be settled.

In one sense, in spite of the suppression of national movements, the principle of nationality gained a lasting triumph: internationalism—the co-operation of avowedly independent sovereign States—was substituted for the cosmopolitanism which had inspired alike the ancient Roman Empire, the Mediaeval Church and Empire, the Revolutionary ideal, and, to some extent, Napoleon's scheme of universal empire. Cosmopolitanism has survived into the 20th century in two shapes: Prussian schemes of world-empire and revolutionary conceptions of the united Proletariat; the Prussian scheme, one hopes, has received its death-blow, while Russian events seem to prove that 'Red' cosmopolitanism implies the substitution of universal and endless class-warfare for occasional national wars. Moreover, we must remember that cosmopolitanism under the rule of Rome was synonymous with stagnation and

**Inter-
nationalism
versus
Cosmo-
popolitanism.**

decay, and that, in the modern world, language is an effective bar to cosmopolitanism. Although nationality is impossible to define, compounded as it is of various elements, such as Race, Language, Geographical Conditions, Historical Traditions, Religion, Common Interests, nevertheless it is a fact that must be faced by practical statesmen in their endeavour to organise general peace and co-operation.

The settlement of 1814-1815 set up a double international organisation. In the first place there was the Holy Alliance, which, when Metternich's influence and the hard lesson of facts had broken down the Tsar's idealism, became a defensive and offensive alliance between the despotic rulers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Up to the second French Revolution of 1830, and especially after the accession of Charles x., brother of Louis xvi. and Louis xviii., in 1824, this alliance had the support of the French Court; indeed, French troops represented the despotic interests when they intervened in 1823 to help Ferdinand vii. to free himself from the restraints of a Liberal constitution. After 1830 France broke away from this policy, but the mutual agreement between the three great despots continued. In 1848, it is true, the King of Prussia was temporarily tempted to throw in his lot with the national Liberal movement in Germany, but this inclination was short-lived, while in 1849 the Russian Tsar saved the Hapsburg despotism in Hungary. Even after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 Bismarck renewed an understanding between the Austrian and Prussian Courts, out of which, in 1879, grew an alliance to which Italy adhered in 1882; moreover, the clash of Austrian and Russian interests in the Balkans did not prevent the understanding known as the Dreikaiserbund of 1872, and Bismarck always worked for a secret compact—an 'insurance' arrangement—between Berlin and St. Petersburg, although events in the Balkans and the personality of the Kaiser Wilhelm ii. eventually made this impossible.

The Alliance of Despots during the 19th Century.

If the Holy Alliance was a League of Courts rather than of Nations, the quadruple alliance between England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, also formed in 1815, to preserve the Peace and work out the details of reconstruction by means of conferences,¹ was a League of Governments. The rock upon which it broke up was the question of intervention in defence of more or less arbitrary Governments. At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 Metternich reached the zenith of his power. France was admitted into the group of Great Powers, which we may call the first 'Concert of Europe,' as a reward for certain reactionary measures, and as a mark of favour towards her new Foreign Minister, the Duc de Richelieu, and the allied garrisons were withdrawn; the question of the Slave Trade was shelved, to England's annoyance, but it was decided, in deference to English opinion, not to intervene forcibly in aid of Spain's efforts to reconquer her revolted colonies; to Austria and Prussia was delegated the task of suppressing revolutionary movements and propaganda, especially in the Universities and the Press, in all German states. The mingled folly and crime of German Liberalism played into Metternich's hands, and the German Confederation became virtually the tool of the Austrian and Prussian Courts. In 1820 another Congress was held at Troppau to deal with questions arising out of revolutionary movements in Spain, Portugal, and Naples. Metternich persuaded the Tsar to agree to intervention in cases wherein the results of revolutions threatened other States; but Castlereagh, through the mouth of his brother, protested against this theory. In spite of British objections, Austria was commissioned, at Laibach in 1821, to intervene in Naples. No sooner had Austrian troops restored the autocracy of Ferdinand i. in Naples than the necessity arose of intervening in Piedmont. The defeat of revolution in Italy, however, did not end these troubles. The revolt of the Greeks from Turkish rule in 1821 put the Tsar in a very

¹ Cp. the conferences of 1920 and 1921 of the representatives of the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan.

difficult position; the influence of Metternich discouraged him from supporting revolution, but on the other hand his own religious feelings and those of his subjects inclined him to help the Greeks. For the moment this question was shelved by Metternich, but the Spanish problem led to the break-up of the Concert in 1823. In the face of British objections, France was commissioned to restore by force of arms the despotism—which entailed a revival of the Inquisition and of class exemptions from taxation—of Ferdinand VII. in Spain. British opinion, expressed by Castlereagh, Wellington, and, after Castlereagh's death in 1822, Canning, objected to this constant interference in the affairs of other nations. The first two of these statesmen really believed in non-intervention, whereas Canning, as he showed by his attitude towards both Greeks and Spanish colonists, while opposing intervention by the forces of autocracy, favoured a policy of active interference in behalf of struggling nationalities and Liberal movements. From 1823 onwards there was a widening gap between England, in which fear of revolution had receded and movements for peaceful reform were recovering from the thirty years' reaction caused by the French Revolution, and the other great European Powers. An unfortunate result of this was the estrangement between the Tsardom and British Liberalism which followed as a matter of course when, in 1849, the Tsar Nicholas took Metternich's place as the champion of established order. This estrangement made Liberals as anxious as Imperialists to attack Russia in 1854—the Crimean War—and so unwittingly to play the game of Turkish misrulers and Prussian diplomatists. On the other hand, England's defection in 1823 saved the future of constitutional government in Europe. Moreover, Canning's policy was rewarded by two marked triumphs, the one during his lifetime, the other after his death.

In 1823 Canning encouraged President Monroe of the U.S.A. to promulgate the 'Monroe Doctrine.' The enormous importance of this, to both North and South America and the British Empire, must be considered in the chapter on extra-

European affairs. Its immediate effect was to prevent European intervention. Between that year and 1826 England recognised Mexico, Peru, and Brazil as sovereign States. In 1829 Turco-Egyptian retaliations for Greek atrocities determined the Tsar to put religion and Russian sentiment before attachment to Metternich's system, and to intervene. England and France, moved partly by sentiment, partly by disinclination to allow Russia to act alone, dispatched fleets, and the battle of Navarino opened the way for Greek independence.

After the Second Revolution, 1830 (see following chapter), France under Louis Philippe, the Orleanist 'Bourgeois' King, for a time associated herself with England, and **The Years of Europe** was divided into two groups: the **Revolution**. moderately liberal Western Powers, wherein limited Monarchy, unprivileged Nobility, and enfranchised¹ Middle Classes provided scope for cautious progress, and the three autocratic Powers. The revolutionary movements of 1830 were crushed in Germany, Italy, and Poland, but Belgium gained her independence, under a constitutional monarch, Leopold of Coburg, largely owing to the diplomatic support of England and France, although King William of Holland did not acknowledge the new State until 1839.

¹ After 1832 in Great Britain.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE MODERN STATE

The Industrial Revolution and its Results: Political Democracy: Reforms and Revolutions: 19th-Century Despotisms: Social Theories and Practice.
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THE popular movements in England, France, and Belgium, during the years 1830-1832, make a convenient point from which to start a summary of the great developments indicated in the headings of this chapter; developments which, while apparently belonging to different departments of History, are really closely connected with one another.

We may indeed say that the so-called Agricultural and Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries provided the material basis upon which Political Democracy was built. Modern Democracy as much as modern Imperialism, the Labour movement as much as Capitalist Trusts, require as preliminaries large populations living by trade, and the mechanism of rapid transit and communication; the modern Press is as essential to modern Democracy as their prophets to the Hebrews, the Orator to the ancient City-Democracy, the preacher and the pamphleteer to the age of Anne. It is no exaggeration to say that the last two centuries have witnessed greater changes in Man's mode of living than all the ages since prehistoric man discovered fire and domesticated animals. In its material aspects the England of George I.—in which agriculture was the chief industry, and the hand-loom the principal aid to manufacture, in which the wheel, the sail, and the oar were the only aids to the legs of men and beasts—was nearer akin

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to the Rome of Caesar, the Greece of Pericles, and the Egypt of Joseph than to late-Victorian England.

For the modern epoch of invention Englishmen have been more responsible than the men of any other race. Every schoolboy can reel off twenty names of Englishmen who in the 18th and early 19th centuries were pioneers or inventors in agricultural methods, the engineering of roads and canals, the application of mechanical devices to manufacturing processes, or of steam to machinery. At a later period the nations of Europe and America took a fuller share in the harnessing of electricity, the conquest of the air, the advance in medical, surgical, and general science. But if a short history is to avoid becoming a mere catalogue, it is better to deal with results and relegate details to purely economic and technical writers. One must, however, point out first that, although, as we have said, the last two centuries have been the period of invention and material change beyond any other period known to history proper, yet it is wrong to suppose that these changes came absolutely as a bolt from the blue sky.

The enclosures of land into larger and more contiguous estates had, since the 16th century, continually eaten into the old system of English agriculture, and the introduction by William III. of the Dutch Banking System and of the National Debt, which, by enabling individuals to lend their money on the security of the nation, encouraged the habit of investing money at interest, consummated a Commercial Revolution which, together with the Agricultural upheaval, was a necessary preliminary to the better known Industrial Revolution.

The results of this great movement affected every phase of life with which the historian is concerned. Indeed, a considerable school of modern historical thought, taking Man's economic circumstances and experience as the basis and motive-power of all his actions and development, find a connecting thread whereon to string all the periods and interests of general history, looking backward and forward, in the great series of movements which, although foreshadowed by the commercial developments of the Hansa, the Lombard

and maritime Italian cities and the Dutch, and the agricultural upheavals of 16th-century England, yet first attained its real nature in the England of the 18th century. Thence it spread rapidly to Western and Central Europe, and to the American and Australian continents, and more slowly to the Far East (where Japan now stands industrially with regard to China as England stood to the Europe of Napoleon's age), and to those increasing regions in Asia and Africa which are controlled by Europeans. In spite of the present ruin of the industrial regions of Russia we may probably take it for granted that, unless some appalling catastrophe is to submerge modern civilisation, this industrialised basis of life, modified to meet social and political conditions, will both be maintained and further extended. The question whether this new world is happier or less happy than mediæval, ancient, or barbarous societies, although entertaining as a subject for debate, is of no real importance to our purpose; there can be no accurate measurement of past or present happiness; it is doubtful whether any society, having acquired new tastes, would willingly retrace its steps, and in any case industrialisation alone can enable the world to support its present—let alone its threatened—population. Even if we admit that up to date the evil results at least counterbalance the good: greater productivity and populations—greater social contrasts and class-division; fewer famines—more poverty; increased average life—new diseases; medical and surgical inventions—new instruments of war; the improvement of some backward races—the destruction or debauchery of others; more widespread education—more mental indigestion and unpractical discontent; even so we must remember that two centuries are a fraction of time in Man's history, and that we are living in a transitional state. It may be worth something to mankind that some idea of Progress, vague though it be, has gripped the mind of the Western masses. Evolutionary thought was used to justify the inhumanity of the *Laissez-faire* school and the brutality of militarism; on the other hand, as Dean Inge has pointed out, it has substituted

the idea of the Ascent of Man from Apé for the ancient conception, common to Jews and Greeks, though modified in the case of the former by Messianic hopes, of the Descent of Man from the Divine, and for the mediaeval attitude of submission to the evils of this world as the ordained means of preparation for the next.

Industrialisation may be summed up as the development on an artificial base of large populations ; among the immediate symptoms were big towns, big factories and estates, and, as a consequence, bad labour conditions, uneven distribution of wealth, and increased class divisions. The particular developments which we wish to emphasise are the growth of modern democracy in all its phases, social and political, the attempts by certain schools of thought—Socialists, Individualists, Syndicalists, etc.—to devise remedies for the dark side, and the extension of this new type of human society, or its influence, over the non-European world.

It is necessary to be on one's guard to-day against the modern tendency to find in economic conditions the ultimate and only cause of every movement in history and politics ; nevertheless, one is on safe ground in pointing out that the beginning of the industrialisation of England and North France coincided with the beginning of a demand for the democratisation of the franchise in England, and with the spread of revolutionary doctrines in the French manufacturing towns. During the 17th and early 18th centuries the dispute between Crown and Parliament in Great Britain had been fought out ; it remained for the 19th and 20th centuries to settle the relations of Parliament to People and of Lords to Commons. It was clearly recognised by the middle of the 18th century, as is proved by the large measure of support accorded to Wilkes in his disputes with Government and Commons, that a 'representative' chamber which represented only the merest fraction of the nation, which was controlled for fifty years by a small group of Whig landlords and then wrested from their grasp by the even greater skill in

manipulating patronage shown by George III., in which the growing industrial towns were denied representation, and finally, which attempted to keep its proceedings and debates hidden from the public, could be at least as tyrannous as any Stuart King. Bolingbroke argued in favour of reform ; Burke, while constitutionally conservative, procured some measures to check open corruption ; Pitt, inheriting his father's views, made one effort, which failed, to secure moderate reform, and, but for the French Revolution, would undoubtedly have tried again with success. The reaction against Jacobinism caused this problem to be left over, in an aggravated condition, for the next century to solve.

The following summary may be taken as indicating the milestones along the road of democratic advance in Great Britain and France. We will subsequently summarise the facts which illustrate the extension of the industrialism and political ideals of England and Western Europe throughout large portions of the globe.

The first of these milestones is the period 1830-1832. In Great Britain the counter-revolutionary reaction, although temporarily buttressed by the Six Acts, had receded ; the pendulum was swinging in the direction of reform. During the third decade of the century the Six Acts were withdrawn, the Criminal Law humanised, and the demand for political reform constantly grew. The Reform Bill of 1832 was important for three reasons : it enfranchised the middle classes, as additional to the landed class, and at the expense of rotten boroughs and close corporations ; it set a precedent for constitutional reform without violent revolution ; it marked the end of the real equality between Lords and Commons, for since 1832 the Lords have never claimed to do more than to appeal from the Commons to the People ; they have caused General Elections, but have never overridden one.

In France the Revolution of 1830 was caused by the reactionary policy of Charles X., who succeeded his brother, Louis XVIII., in 1824. Louis, like our English Charles II.,

had been cautious and easy-going, and had checked the zeal of those followers who were more loyalist than the King.

Second French Revolution, 1830. Charles X., in want of tact and of a true perception of the limitations of his position, resembled our James II. Guided by the reactionaries, whom of old he had led as Comte d'Artois, he tampered with the constitution of 1815 by restricting the franchise and suspending the freedom of the Press. The year of Revolution (1830) witnessed the failure of a revolt of the Poles against Russia, with the consequent loss of the constitution which had never worked peacefully, the eventually successful revolt of the Belgian people against the Dutch Court, some local revolts in Italy, crushed by Austrian troops, and a successful revolution in Paris, which inspired the others and resulted in the substitution of an Orleanist, Louis Philippe, pledged to constitutional rule, for the Bourbon Charles. The intrigues of over a century thus matured at last, but, if Louis Philippe was more honest than most of his House, his short-lived success added nothing to its prestige. The 'Bourgeois' King for some years maintained a measure of popularity with the help of wholesale bribery and a pose of affable simplicity; but the manual labourers of France gradually realised, as did their fellows in Great Britain, that the acquisition of political power by the middle classes was by no means beneficial to Labour. In consequence of this feeling there grew up serious agitations in both countries.

In Great Britain the Chartists, although their movement ended in a ridiculous fiasco,¹ and the rank and file had no understanding of most of their demands, some of which—for instance, the demand for annual general elections—were merely ludicrous, nevertheless suggested the main lines—voting by 'ballot, abolition of property qualification for members, payment of members, redistribution of seats, and extension of the franchise in the direction of 'one man, one vote; one vote, one value'—along which, for weal or woe, British Democracy

Chartists and Reforms of 1867, 1885, 1918.

has subsequently moved. The Parliamentary Reform Acts of 1867, 1885, and 1918 were three steps by which the inhabitants of these islands gained a completely democratic franchise; by the last of the three women¹ gained the vote, theoretically and, to some extent, truly as a recognition of war-service; but it must be candidly admitted that had it not been for the violence of the pre-war Suffrage movement and fears of its revival, the question would never have become one of practical politics. Indeed, both Governments of every political hue and employers have during the last century almost insanely encouraged violence in both political and industrial disputes by granting to violent methods, whether shown in riots or strikes, concessions which were either right and should have been granted at once, or were wrong and should never have been yielded to force. Other Acts which have been passed with the intention of completing our democratic system are: the Municipal Reform Act of 1835, and the County Councils or Local Government Act of 1888, which between them secured the democratic rights of ratepayers in local affairs; Redistribution of Seats which accompanied the Acts of 1832 and 1885; the provision for Payment of Members in the Budget of 1912, at the expense, not of those constituencies which chose to elect paid members, according to the old law of the land, but of the taxpayers generally; the Parliament Act of 1911, which provisionally settled the relations between the two Houses by abolishing the Lords' power of interfering with 'Money Bills'—to be defined by the Commons' Speaker—and substituting a suspensory for an absolute veto over other legislation; thus the Lords could no longer insist upon an appeal to the People, but the measure was described as provisional, and accompanied by a promise

¹ Constitutionally and legally there is now (1922) almost complete sex equality; the few inequalities remaining only affect minorities and balance each other: e.g. women have advantages in respect of Property and responsibility (or rather the responsibility of the males!) for Debt and Crime, but suffer certain slight disadvantages in respect of Divorce Laws and the age-restriction of the Franchise.

¹ See Cecil Smith, *British History*, pp. 451-2, etc.

of legislation to reform the Lords—a promise still unfulfilled ten years later.

Meanwhile in France the agitations of the 'forties also culminated in a fiasco in 1848, but with a difference: in London it was the Chartists who ended their career in gloriously in a four-wheeled cab; in Paris this ignominious fate overtook the first and last King of the intriguing House of Orleans. The outbreak actually occurred as the result of a riot following upon the suppression by the Government of an Opposition banquet. It is curious to note that the historians Guizot and Thiers led respectively the Government and a moderate group of the Opposition. Like Thucydides, Sallust, Gibbon, and Macaulay, Guizot failed in politics! Nevertheless, modern politics show plenty of examples of the utility of including some possessors of historical knowledge in a democratic assembly. No sooner had the 'Second Republic' been established than dissensions broke out between the Moderates, led by Lamartine and General Cavaignac, and the Extremists, led by Barbés. The Extremists had adopted socialistic principles and insisted upon the establishment of Government workshops; the non-communistic Moderates in the Government welcomed the failure of these workshops, and were not unready to use the disturbances which attended their abolition as an excuse for suppressing the Extremists. The election of Louis Napoleon, nephew of the great Emperor, as President in 1848 was followed by a series of intrigues culminating with the establishment of a ten-years' Dictatorship, which was allowed quietly to become the 'Second Empire,' on the double basis of a military *coup d'état* and a plebiscite, in 1851 and 1852 respectively. The 'Third Republic' was established as a result of the failure of the Empire in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871, but, having abolished the Empire, was under the necessity of crushing the Communists of Paris. In many respects French Parliamentary Democracy resembles our own: the President occupies a position constitutionally similar to that of our King, and unlike that of the American

Third French Revolution, 1848.

President, who controls policy, acting as his own Prime Minister; but the franchise has not yet approached so nearly as our own to being 'universal,' and a system of alliances of small groups has given an instability to French Governments from which we have been largely saved by our two-Party, or at least two-Coalition, basis.

Outside France the movements of 1848, the 'Year of Revolution,' and the following years, failed. Switzerland alone, after a short religious war, re-established her federal constitution on a democratic basis. The hopes of German Nationalism and Liberalism were quenched by the failure of the King of Prussia to espouse their cause. Two risings in Vienna, although they caused the retirement of Metternich and the abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph, were ruthlessly suppressed. A national insurrection in Bohemia was crushed; while the Magyars of Hungary, who rose to vindicate both their own liberty and their claim to deny liberty to their Slav fellow-subjects, although under Kossuth, Bem, and Görgei they successfully resisted the Emperor's Austrian and Slav armies, were forced to submit when the Tsar put his forces into the field, actuated both by his conception of the duty of Legitimate Monarchs towards each other, and by his desire to punish the Polish auxiliaries who had joined the Magyars. In Italy the Austrian troops crushed risings in Naples and Venice, and utterly defeated Charles Albert of Sardinia at Custozza and Novara, while an embryonic Republic at Rome was suppressed by French Imperial troops in 1849 after accomplishing little except the conversion to reaction of the hitherto reforming Pope, Pius IX.

The result of these years was that in Central and Eastern Europe the cause of Despotism was saved until the late Great War. The Austrian Dominions were probably incapable of reform; nothing save **Russia.** Despotism could hold together such a congeries of jarring elements. This is also true of the diminishing Turkish Empire,

Internal Developments of the Monarchical Powers.

which will occupy much of our time when we return to international affairs, but presents no aspect of interest from the point of view of constitutional development and the progress of civilisation. Russia, with her vast distances and lack of education and means of communication, was at the best only capable of very gradual reform. Alexander II., who succeeded Nicholas I. in 1855, emancipated the Serfs, but, in setting up communal ownership of land by the village—*Mir*—he failed to satisfy the 'land hunger' which drove the Peasantry in large numbers to favour the Revolution in 1917, and to turn against it when their new interests in the land were threatened by Communism. He also created *Zemstvos*—representative local assemblies—which did excellent administrative work up to the Revolution, inspired some efforts to improve roads and education, instituted juries for non-political cases, and was on the point of calling a representative advisory assembly when he was foully assassinated. The reign of his successor, Alexander III. (1881-1894), was a time of contest between reaction and Nihilism. The Nihilists, who, like Voltaire, accepted nothing for granted, included both idealists and criminals. On the whole reaction gained ground, but the beginning of industrialisation—as evidenced by the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1900—led to the growth of a proletariat among which revolutionary ideas flourished. The well-meaning but weak Tsar Nicholas II., who succeeded in 1894, was just the monarch to cause and suffer from revolutions. The influence of his wife and of the reactionaries caused him to disappoint moderate reformers, while extremists on both sides desired no settlement but the annihilation of their opponents. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) brought the revolutionary movements to a head, but, in spite of assassinations on one side and massacres on the other, the results were doubtful. A Parliament was formed in 1906, consisting of two chambers, the Council of Empire and the Duma, and the power of legislating was divided between these chambers and the Tsar. Nevertheless the functions of executive government were retained by the Tsar and his bureaucrats, and we shall find corruption

and terrorism still the outstanding features of Russia when we deal with that Power on the eve of the last Revolution.

The history of 19th-century Germany presents a very different story. Although from 1849 onwards Liberalism and Nationalism became divorced, and the cause of national unity became more and more identical with that of Hohenzollern Despotism and Prussian Militarism, yet in matters of social and industrial progress Germany advanced from a place among the most backward races of Europe to the very front rank. This advance may be dated from the disaster of Jena and Auerstädt; the poisonous dose, although almost fatal, proved in the long run to be a tonic. Previous to this, Prussian military and civil administration and diplomacy, and in particular the administration of the royal domains, had been efficient so long as a great Elector, a Frederick William I., or a Frederick the Great held the reins. But in every other respect Prussia herself and, to a still greater extent, the other German States ranked with Poland, Hungary, and Russia as being too backward even to feel the need of reform, while Auerstädt showed that, given a weak Hohenzollern, even the Prussian military system was feeble.

We have already referred to the reorganisation of the army on a national basis by Scharnhorst, and the political ideals of Stein. If Stein failed to bring about his political ideals, which were his own, yet his honesty, energy, patriotism, and administrative ability fitted him to co-operate with others in practical reforms. In the abolition of Serfdom, and of many of the privileges of the nobility, together with many reforms in the direction of popularising local government and equalising privileges, Stein in the years after Tilsit was probably putting into action Hardenberg's plans, and in 1810 and 1811 it was Hardenberg who completed Stein's work in this direction by making the nobles equally subject to taxation, and by dividing the Feudal holdings in such a way that the peasants became proprietors of two-thirds in return for the surrender of one-third to the former lords. Thus Prussia

avoided the divorce of the People from the Land, which was the curse of the agricultural revolutions of the 16th and 18th centuries in England; the pioneer in progress from Feudalism suffered as pioneers do, and others profited by England's object-lesson. Humboldt at the same time introduced educational reforms, on the Napoleonic model, into Prussia. The Zollverein, or Customs Union of German States, from which Austria was excluded, inspired by the economist List and first formed in 1834, not only marked an advance by Prussia, at the expense of Austria, in the direction of a German State, but also the beginning of a period in which Germany made up for the time lost during the Napoleonic Wars, and took an increasingly important place among the industrialised and commercial states. After the foundation of the Empire the 'grandmotherly,' or perhaps it were better to say 'school-mastery,' government proved by a series of social reforms that much could be done for, if little by, the People. The German Imperial Reichstag before 1918 did not have complete power of the purse because the German Emperor possessed large revenues as King of Prussia, and also budgets were passed for long series of years ahead to cover naval and military expenditure. Moreover, the constitution as interpreted by Bismarck did not include the principle of the responsibility of the Chancellor to the popularly elected House, and, although this was nominally conceded in 1907, it was not acted upon until 1917. Moreover, as War-Lord the Kaiser, by proclaiming that the nation was in danger, could override all civil government. The Upper House (Bundesrath) embodied the federal idea, and resembled a meeting of Sovereign Princes and envoys.

In Prussia itself the franchise allowed extra voting power to the educated, the well-to-do, and the official class. This was also the case in Belgium before the war. Italy, from 1870 onwards, possessed a Parliamentary Monarchy, with Ministers dependent upon a Lower House elected on a democratic basis, but both in Italy and Spain the Monarch retained more prerogatives than his English prototype. In Portugal

Parliamentary Monarchy produced the worst features of each system—an extravagant Court, and a corrupt Parliament. When King Carlos attempted to stop corruption by dictatorial methods, he and his eldest son were assassinated (1908), and two years later his second son, King Manuel, fled from Lisbon. Portugal now enjoys a precarious Republican régime, in which 'Party Politics' are so extended as to include civil servants, military officers, and all public servants!

Political Democracy and modern industrial conditions inevitably stimulate the demand for education; conversely, improved general education is a necessary element in the proper working of the machinery of modern life. From Mediaeval times onwards the Church—both of Rome and of England—, societies such as the Friars or the Jesuits, and individuals—*e.g.* King Alfred, William of Wykeham, Henry VI., Cardinal Wolsey, Dean Colet, Erasmus, Dr. Bell, Wesley, etc., in England—had done their best. From the time of Napoleon in France and Humboldt in Prussia, and of Forster and Gladstone in England, modern Governments have begun to face the question, on which the practicability of modern conditions depends, whether education can be extended to the many without losing its virtues. The Ancients would unhesitatingly have answered 'No.' An industrial and non-slave state cannot accept that answer as conclusive. It is possible and even probable that the experiment of offering to all alike an education which tends to produce a speculative type of mind will be condemned by posterity as a failure predetermined by folly; another generation may devise methods of testing the youthful intellect, and allot to each individual the education for which he is fitted; it may produce thinkers for the staff of both the military and industrial armies, men of instinctive action for the officers and minor leaders, skilled handicraftsmen for the ranks. But the social conscience of this generation has committed us to an experiment in universal 'culture.' It has also committed us to the experiment, already noted, of sex-equality; we must not admit

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the truth of the pessimistic saying that equality means levelling each of several parties down to the lowest qualities of each.

The widespread enthusiasm for 'Social Reform' which has distinguished the period since the middle of the 19th century, and the growth of various new movements and parties throughout the Western world, can be best understood if treated in connection with the schools of thought which inspired them. It is not surprising that England, the historic champion of the rights of individuals, the fountain-head of the Industrial Revolution and the home of Political Economy,¹ should have produced the 'Manchester School' of individualists, whose theories, translated into political practice, made this country during the two generations following the Napoleonic Wars, the scene of the most amazing material development side by side with the most revolting social deterioration that the world has ever witnessed in combination; nor is it surprising that the practical reaction was felt earliest and strongest in England, although, in this case, the inspiration came partly from German thinkers. The followers of Adam Smith were far more dogmatic and less broad-minded than their master. The *Laissez-faire* School to such an extent idolised the 'Economic Man,' whose one duty and aim was to 'buy in the cheap and sell in the dear market,' that it is no exaggeration to say that one of Cobden's main motives in his agitation for the repeal of the Corn-Laws was the hope of making it possible to reduce the wages of the industrial workers in conformity with the reduction in the price of bread. Although the Manchester free-trade manufacturers denounced interference by the State in industry, yet they clamoured for State intervention to prevent effective unions of workmen, claiming that the individual workers should deal with their employers man to man. This driving of the workmen's associations underground tended to breed revolutionary

¹ The influence of the French Encyclopaedists, etc., is entirely overshadowed by that of Adam Smith.

discontent. This tendency was also promoted by the loathsome conditions of work in the new factories, and of life in the growing slums, and by the increasingly uninteresting nature of work as a result of the division of Labour. The old-fashioned handicraftsman was the master of a complete craft; the bootmaker really made boots and tended his own tools; under factory conditions not five per cent. of 'skilled' labourers have tasks which excite any interest or call for any real skill; they only work at a fraction of the task, and do not understand the machinery which they tend. During the Railway Strike of 1920, schoolboys, running electric trains, probably gained in a week as much intelligent grasp of the machinery as do many 'skilled' men whose life and 'interest' are supposed to centre round it. The reaction against *Laissez-faire* may be traced in many aspects and in many countries. Unfortunately from the point of view of those who look for human progress, economic theory and policy seem to bound and rebound from one extreme to another; the coach of humanity bumps from side to side instead of progressing smoothly along the ruts of the *via media*.

In the sphere of international commerce the case against the *Laissez-faire* School was ably argued by the German, List, the inspirer of the Zollverein, in his book on *National Economy*, and his appeals to history were so substantiated by the practical experience of Free Trade in France in 1788, and in Germany and the U.S.A. during the early years of the 19th century, that, outside Great Britain, Free Trade has never again been considered 'practical politics' by any great industrial Power. If non-interference and cosmopolitanism were carried to absurd lengths by the Manchester School, it is probably also true that American and German Industrial Trusts pushed Protection equally towards a *reductio ad absurdum*, while 'nationalist' reaction was turned to unholy uses by the Prussian School—Treitschke, Nietzsche, and Bernhardt.

The reaction against non-interference in social and industrial conditions may be traced, in both theory and practice, in the development of moderate Social Reform on the one

hand and in the growth of 'extremist' cults at the opposite end of the scales to *Laissez-faire*. The inspirers of Social Reform were writers such as Kant and Hegel, Carlyle and Ruskin, statisticians such as Booth and Rowntree, social workers such as Toynbee and Fawcett. The *Political Economy* of J. S. Mill shows signs of the growth of a 'social conscience' even within the orthodox school of economic thought. It would be absurd in a 'general' history to attempt to trace the practical results of the teaching of these and similar thinkers even in the history of this country. From the small beginning made by the Earl of Shaftesbury with his Factory Acts, successive attempts have been made by leaders of every party to ameliorate conditions.

It is possible, however, and necessary to state briefly some of the outstanding facts in the history of the international Labour movement, and to explain the meaning and origin of some of the most 'advanced' social theories. Trade Unions are not the offspring of the old Mediaeval guilds, which represented the interests of industries as a whole, not merely the Labour interests, and lost their *raison d'être* when nations supplanted towns as the units of commerce; the Reformation period put an end to the existence of the latter in England, save for the City Companies which continued to exist as trustees of charities and as a species of clubs, while the Constituent Assembly and subsequently the Code Napoléon forbade in France all non-official combinations. Our Trade Unions are rather the result of a natural reaction against the abuse by capitalists of the opportunities, in themselves good and even necessary, placed in their hands by the Industrial Revolution. Combinations of workmen were first legalised in England in 1824, but with such restrictions that their utility was practically nought, if their members kept within the legal limits, until these restrictions were removed by Disraeli and Gladstone during the years 1872-1876. Further legislation by the Campbell-Bannerman Government in 1906, legalising 'peaceful picketing' and freeing Unions from responsibility for

damages done during disputes by individual members, may be said, according to one's personal point of view, either to have completed their legitimate emancipation, or to have placed the Unions in a privileged position above the law as it applies to other citizens. In France legal recognition did not come until 1884, and is still far more circumscribed than is the case in England. In the United States and the German Empire the movement has not attained the same influence as in England; in America immigrants and Negro Labour militate against it, as also do high wages and wealth of opportunities for individuals; in Germany the rivalry between 'socialist' Unions and 'patriotic' Unions and the numerical strength of Peasant and Catholic voters (as also in France) detracted from its strength. At the beginning of the 20th century Socialist leaders 'captured' the orthodox Labour movements in France, Germany, and Great Britain, and at the same time the realisation of their new power by the workers led to a sudden irruption of Labour members into practically every Parliament; for instance, in 1906, 50 Labour-Socialists were returned to Westminster, and in 1912 110 Socialists were elected to the Reichstag. Payment of members was a corollary of this development. It must, of course, be pointed out that 'Labour' is a party name; workmen, like all other classes, are divided on political and economic issues into as many parties as exist, and, although it is good that Parliament should include individuals of every class, yet it is imperative, unless Class Government is again to defeat Democracy, that members should interpret their obligations as being to the constituency and the community as a whole. Side by side with Trade Unions has grown up a Co-operative movement which also originated in England—in co-operative stores started at Rochdale in 1844—and has become almost world-wide, attaining great importance in France, Russia, and Germany. The Socialist leaders have made constant efforts to gain control of this movement, which came into existence for purposes not of politics but of mutual trading benefits.

'Socialism' is, of course, a phrase which is open to very many interpretations. In some form or another the idea has existed in every historical age, and among most of the races of mankind. Most of the ideas of 'modern' Socialists have been the subject of debate from at least the time of Plato to the modern school debating society, and, in practice, communistic institutions can be cited in the cases of many barbarous tribes, of the early Christians at Jerusalem—but there the institution was not enforced by State-law and, to judge by St. Paul's evidence, was an economic failure—and of the Inca State of Peru. The political thought which gave rise to the English and French Revolutions, however, had very little sympathy with either economic communism or universal State-interference. The English constitutionalists insisted upon the rights of individuals, while in revolutionary France the socialistic doctrines of Baboeuf carried very little weight with the champions of the Rights of Man.

The idealistic Socialists of the early 19th century—St. Simon, Fourier, Owen—were of importance mainly as reinforcing the demand for Social Reform. It remained for Karl Marx (*circa* 1840-1882) and his friend Engels to elaborate the idea of class-antagonism between the natural partners—Capital and Labour. From this idea has grown the type of 'Socialism' which demands that the State should eliminate the individual capitalist, the school of 'Syndicalism' which wishes the Trade Unions to control industry, and the 'Guild-Socialism' which endeavours theoretically to find a compromise between the interests of the Unions and those of the Community.

In order to avoid either a sudden overthrow of existing institutions, such as took place in Russia (1917-1920), or the gradual decay which would accompany a prolonged period of unrest such as Great Britain experienced in 1920 and 1921, moderate progressive thought is aiming at an *entente* in which Capital and Labour may recognise their mutual reliance—Capital may accept the 'living wage' as the first charge on industry, Labour may have the opportunity, through Joint

Boards or Whitley Councils, of discussing grievances peacefully, may look forward to some share in management and, by means of profit-sharing, employees' shares, piece-work payment, in addition to a minimum wage, etc., may acquire an interest in industry that will make the workmen themselves to a large extent 'Capitalists.'¹ But these ideals all depend upon the maintenance of such conditions in industry that there may be profits to share, a demand for goods, and goods to meet the demand.

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CHAPTER IX

THE EXTENSION OF WESTERN CIVILISATION

Motives of Expansion: Self-governing Dominions: Tropical Africa: India: China: Japan: Central and South America: The U.S.A.

Note on Ireland: Bibliography.

It is almost impossible for any writer on modern History or modern Politics to avoid re-stating the truism that 'Empire' and 'Imperialism' are extremely ambiguous words, because, although a truism, this caution **Motives of Expansion.** is a necessity in any attempt to analyse the outstanding feature of modern times. Some of the motives of 'Imperialism' are in themselves creditable; some are of questionable virtue, but are part and parcel of human nature; others are, like most things human, partly good and partly bad. The objection to 'Empire' and 'Imperialism' as descriptive names is illustrated by their use, or abuse, in English Party strife: the 'Imperialist' uses these phrases as synonyms for progress and altruistic zeal; the 'Little Englander' uses them in a sense more in accordance with their derivation, but entirely meaningless when misapplied to the Confederation of States under the British Crown—for which, however, no other short descriptive phrase has yet been invented, so dependent are we on the Ancients for our language of politics, even when our political facts have outgrown their ideas and language—and emphasises their connotation of selfish and forceful dominion. There can, of course, be no question as to the truth of the statement that sheer love of dominion is a natural attribute of strong nations as of strong individuals. Evolutionary argument can very easily make out a strong

case in favour of this natural law as a factor in human progress, but the historian, as well as the sentimentalist, can be equally convincing as to the evil which can be and has been wrought by an excess of this element; and it is conceivable that the increasing horrors of warfare and the increasing interdependence of nations may make it necessary for humanity in self-defence to find new outlets for energy and ambition.

The other 'motives of Imperialism' have been so adequately analysed by Professor Ramsay Muir in *The Expansion of Europe* that we cannot do better than to summarise his conclusions, and perhaps add some comments and illustrations. 'National Pride' is a stimulus to the desire for domination, and the instinct to conquer, or at least to expand, has invariably followed upon the achievement or consciousness of national unity: corroboration of this statement may be found by the student of modern history in the story of the Hundred Years' War, in the epic of 16th-century discoveries and conquests—Portugal, Spain, England, Holland, France, all following the same instinct—in the more recent awakening of this ambition in Imperial Germany and Japan, United Italy, the United States after the Civil War, even in the new or re-awakened desires of certain 'Balkan' States to-day.

'Propagandist zeal,' when it takes the form of a passion for disseminating national institutions and political theories, is nearly akin with national pride and the instinct of domination. Its results may be good or evil: the extension of Anglo-Saxon principles of government to new Anglo-Saxon communities is an admirable achievement; the attempt to introduce those same principles into Egypt, India, China, Turkey, Persia, may eventually produce a new epoch in History, but, to judge by present results, is just as likely to prove as mischievous as the attempt on the part of the Russian Soviet to propagate its own peculiar nostrum. Religious propaganda has been responsible alike for the magnificent work done by the Jesuits in Canada and Patagonia, and by combined medical and missionary work in Africa and elsewhere, and, on the other hand, at least in part, for the atrocities

which attended the irruptions of Mohammedanism into Europe, India, and the Slave-Coast, and of Christianity into Mexico and Peru, although, in the latter case, later missionaries tried to repair some of the damage wrought, and, of course, lust and greed are always apt to masquerade as religion.

Desire for gain, one of the most potent of all the motives of expansion, does not merely connote the gold-fever which inspired the Conquistadores or the Buccaneers. Under this description we must consider the demands of legitimate trade: the demand for pepper and spices which drove men to war and discovery in days when lack of artificial cattle-foods made it necessary to kill off a large proportion of the herds every autumn, and there was no cold storage in which to keep the carcasses; the demand for tropical raw materials in modern industries, which, in a protective world, has driven nations to stake out their claims; the need of food-stuffs and of outlets for both surplus capital and surplus population.

These latter needs were not acutely felt in Europe or Britain until the days of 19th-century industrialism, but nevertheless there would always be merchants ready to risk money in strange lands with a chance of great rewards, and there were always undigested elements even in a small population—criminals, fanatics, the persecuted, the ne'er-do-well, the younger son, etc. Finally, the sheer spirit of adventure must be given credit for its part in this great world-movement.

Colonies may be classified and sub-classified *ad nauseam*, but, with one exception, all colonies fall under one of two types: dependencies, or independent States. **Self-governing Dominions of the British Crown.** The Greek colonies were independent, although the 'allies' of a Greek Power were often subjects; the United States and the Central and South American States are the modern equivalent. Roman possessions, from the original *coloniae*—agricultural settlements of ex-soldier citizens, to act as a garrison¹ amidst an alien

¹ Cp. the 17th-century British settlers in Ireland, James the First's Baronets, etc.

population—to the farthest and latest additions, were essentially dominated, in early days by the Roman City-State, subsequently by the Imperial, though cosmopolitan, armies. To this type belong Crown Colonies, Protectorates, and all modern colonial Empires, again with one exception. That exception is, of course, the Confederacy of the Dominions of the British Crown—the ‘Colony’ of Newfoundland, the ‘Dominions’ of Canada and New Zealand, the ‘Commonwealth’ of Australia, the ‘Union’ of South Africa. India, a confederated Empire in itself, the West Indies, Rhodesia—in combination either with the Union or with the tropical possessions—and Ireland may eventually find the solution of their problems in this direction. Self-government in the Colonies began with the very large measure of home-rule enjoyed by the original American colonies. It has developed in our modern Empire to such an extent that, for instance, the inhabitants of the nine provinces of Canada would definitely sacrifice a large measure of self-government if their province became States of the American Union. Theoretically in certain matters, such as Foreign Affairs and questions of Peace and War, the policy of the Dominions is controlled by that of the King’s British Ministers and the British Parliament. In fact, especially since 1914, the views of the Dominions have received the fullest consideration, and the only obstacle which prevents the creation of the machinery of a closer federal union is the fear of the inhabitants of the Dominions that such machinery might subject them to the interests of the greater population of Britain. In the present confederacy, absolute home-rule is combined with a union which is closer than an alliance yet less rigid than a formal federation. The keystone of the whole edifice is the hereditary, non-political Crown, above all parties and localities; the King is not the English King of Canada, but King of Canada, King of England, Emperor of India, etc.

The following are some of the outstanding events and dates in the history of the Dominions during the 19th and 20th

centuries. After the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), and the war against Pontiac’s Indians, the Quebec Act of 1774 had secured for the French Canadians their own religion, language, customs, and laws, and was largely responsible for their loyalty during the American Rebellion; Pitt’s Canada Act of 1790 provided for the mutual independence of French, or Lower, Canada and Upper Canada—Ontario—settled by loyalist Americans, Scottish emigrants, and a certain number of colonists who trekked southward from the Hudson Bay territories. These provinces, together with Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, made up our North American possessions at the opening of the 19th century; each province was governed by a Governor and Executive Council, advised but not controlled by an Assembly. After abortive rebellions in 1838, Lord Durham was sent out to Canada with special powers, but his rather arrogant character and the remonstrances of the Opposition at home led to his speedy recall. Nevertheless, his masterly report supplied the basis upon which the institutions of our Dominions have been built up, and resulted in the immediate federal union of Upper and Lower Canada. In 1867 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick joined Upper and Lower Canada in a federal union, known as the Dominion; to this Dominion in 1870 the North-Western Territories were transferred from the Hudson’s Bay Company rule, a change which caused the rebellion led by the half-breed, Louis Riel; British Columbia joined the Dominion in 1871, Prince Edward Island in 1873; Manitoba, Alberta, and Saskatchewan complete the Dominion. Each of the nine provinces has an Assembly of one chamber (except Quebec and Nova Scotia, which have two chambers), a government responsible to the Assembly, and a Lieutenant-Governor who stands outside politics; the Federal government, which controls all matters not definitely delegated to the provincial authorities, is known as ‘the King’s Privy Council of Canada’—a Canadian party-cabinet, in fact—and is responsible to the elected House of Commons and the Senate, the members of

which are appointed for life, and limited in number to eighty-seven, while the Governor-General, representing the King, remains outside politics.

The most important developments in the general history of Canada since her federation have been either in the realm of economic expansion, or of Imperial relations. In the first connection we have the opening up of the prairie wheat lands, of which Winnipeg is the centre, and on which Great Britain increasingly depends, the creation of such railways as the Canadian Pacific (1871-1885) and the Grand Trunk, the discovery and working of gold along the Alaskan border, the growth of a great machinery-making industry, the settlement of fishing and sealing disputes with the U.S.A., etc. In the second category come the military aid given by Canada in the Sudan and South Africa; the rejection of the Liberal policy, advocated by Sir Wilfred Laurier, of trade-reciprocity with the States, in favour of the Conservative policy, advocated by Sir Robert Borden, of preference for Britain; finally the magnificent part played by Canada in the Great War, and her consequent emergence in diplomatic conferences as no longer the 'Daughter' State, but as an equal of Great Britain united by common allegiance to the Crown.

Among the great leaders of modern Canada must be remembered Sir John Macdonald, Conservative leader and first Federal Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Liberal Prime Minister and French Canadians' leader, and Sir Robert Borden, Conservative Prime Minister and Coalition Prime Minister during the Great War, while Lord Strathcona, originally Donald Smith, Lord Mount Stephen, and Sir Charles Tupper, are memorable for their work in connection with the Canadian Pacific and other schemes of development. Among the most successful Governors-General were Earl Grey and H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught. Scrupulous conduct towards both our old allies, the Six Nations, and other natives—of whom in all there are now about 100,000, very many of whom, including Riel's grandson, served with distinction in the Great War—has been, on the

whole, a creditable feature of both British and Dominion rule.

Newfoundland, together with the Labrador coast, prefers to remain outside the Canadian Federation, and possesses a government and bi-cameral Parliament of its **Newfound-** own. The oldest of the American possessions **land.** of the Crown—in whose name it was claimed by Sir Humphrey Gilbert in Elizabeth's reign, soon after the attempt to settle Virginia, while Labrador had been visited by Cabot in 1498, and proclaimed English by Martin Frobisher in 1576—it enjoyed during the century which followed the Peace of Utrecht (1713) a more peaceful period than that through which the colonists on the mainland passed. Nevertheless disputes between Newfoundlander and French fishers were not finally settled until the Entente of 1904. In addition to its famous fisheries the island has developed an important industry in the production in its forests of wood-pulp to be converted into paper. Its hardy population provides an efficient naval reserve, and its sons served both by land and sea during the Great War.

The history of Australia lacks the romantic glamour which Red Indian, Zulu, and Maori lend to the stories of Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand. There has **Australia.** also been a freedom from warfare with rival white races, which lends some appearance of applicability to the motto: 'Happy is the country which has no History.' Nevertheless, Australians undoubtedly possess in a marked degree just that national consciousness which History helps to nurture. In the place of warfare with other men they can look back on successful warfare against drought, desert, and other natural features; they feel pride in the purity of their Anglo-Saxon stock, and believe in their destiny as the founders of a white South; and they have led the world in many political and economic experiments—including female franchise and compulsory arbitration in Trade Disputes—and have set an example to other nations by producing 'Labour' Governments which have combined patriotism

with advanced views, as they proved by introducing universal cadet training, by their naval policy, by modifying their Trade Union restrictions on immigration when the facts of population proved their dangerous tendencies, etc. The exploits of H.M.A.S. *Sydney* and of the Anzacs in the Gallipoli peninsula and on the Western Front proved that the peaceful atmosphere of their homeland had not impaired their fighting qualities.

Various explorers, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English, of whom the most famous were the Dutchman, Tasman, and the Englishman, Dampier, had visited Australia before the end of the 17th century, but it was left for Captain Cook, who first landed on the island continent in 1769, and named the coast New South Wales, to realise that there were parts fitted by natural fertility for colonisation. The loss of our thirteen American colonies, and the failure of attempts to utilise West Africa as a dumping-ground for criminals, led Pitt to send out Captain Phillip's expedition which in 1788 landed in Botany Bay, and subsequently founded the first settlement at Fort Jackson. The transportation of criminals into New South Wales was finally stopped in 1840, although Mr. Gladstone attempted to revive it in 1848.

The general lines of constitutional development have run, in each State, through the following stages: (1) Nominated Council; (2) the addition of elected representatives; (3) a purely representative Council; (4) a government responsible to a State Parliament.

The following are the chief facts and dates connected with Australia's constitutional and economic growth. In 1788 the first criminal settlement began the colonisation of New South Wales; within ten years of that time free colonists began to arrive, and in 1840 transportation ceased; in 1850 the first railway was opened, and in 1851 the whole aspect of affairs was changed by the discovery of gold; in 1823 a Council was nominated; in 1842 a Legislative Council was set up in which twenty-four of the thirty-six members were

elected; in 1854 a new constitution was drawn up, and in 1856 the first Parliament met. A settlement was made in what is now the State of Victoria in 1834, after an abortive attempt in 1803. The capital city, Melbourne, was founded in 1837, and in 1842 it was enabled to send six representatives to the New South Wales Council at Sydney. In 1850 the new colony was separated from New South Wales under the name Victoria; in 1855, after five troublous years owing to outbreaks of violence in the new gold-diggings, a constitution was granted.

A military post was established in Western Australia in 1826, in answer to rumours of French designs, and settlers first arrived in 1829. At first lack of fresh water and of a harbour led to terrible privations, and at a later stage, lack of labour drove the settlers to procure convict-migration to Perth—from 1848 to 1868, when all forms of transportation were stopped. After the usual stages responsible government was secured in 1890. South Australia was founded in 1836 as a result of the famous pamphlet of Wakefield (1829), who advocated a system of importing labour out of the profits acquired by selling land in large estates; he maintained that non-convict labour would never be content to work for others so long as land was as cheap as in the established settlements. The scheme proved a failure, but better times began with the importation of sheep and cattle, and the discovery of copper and silver. In 1872 the local Government completed a trans-Australian cable from south to north, and the northern territory was placed under the control of South Australia until it should itself grow to statehood. A Parliament was established in 1856. The first settlement in Queensland was that of 1824 in Moreton Bay, a prison for convicts of so terrible a class that no settlers were allowed within fifty miles. After the abolition of this post, Brisbane was founded in 1841. At first the new colony was governed from New South Wales, but a constitution was granted in 1859. The labour problem has always been a difficulty, and at times led to the kidnapping and virtual enslavement of

South Sea islanders—Kanakas and others—and the importation of Indian and Chinese coolies. With modern medicine it is hoped that white labour may eventually be enabled to endure the tropical and sub-tropical conditions in the cotton-fields and sugar plantations.

Tasmania was colonised from New South Wales in 1803. At first famine and trouble with the natives, who were more warlike than the few and backward aborigines¹ of Australia proper, hindered progress. After the extermination of the natives, the last survivors of whom died out in Flinders Island, the agricultural and fruit-producing activities of the settlers so thrived that they were soon exporters of food. In 1824 Van Diemen's Land became a separate colony; representation came in 1850, after the 'Patriotic Six' had held up all business in the old nominated Council by refusing to sit, and thus preventing a quorum from being formed, and convict immigration ceased in 1852. In 1856 a responsible government was established, and the name of the island was changed to Tasmania.

The federation of Australia came in successive stages: in 1885 a Federal Council was formed, of two members from each colony—henceforth known as States—to perform certain fixed duties; in 1890 at Melbourne, and in 1891 at Sydney, attempts were made to evolve a constitution; a second convention in 1897 was more successful and, after being submitted to the people by a Referendum, the constitution was accepted, and in 1901, by act of the Imperial Parliament, the Commonwealth of Australia came into being.

The student of politics and of constitutional history will find it well worth while to study the points of difference between the federal systems of Canada and Australia, and to note the different experiments in the constitution of Second Chambers. The fundamental theory of the Australian con-

¹ The brutal treatment of the natives by early Australian settlers is accounted for by the nature of the convict-settler and the backwardness of the natives. Modern Australians are doing their best to preserve and teach the few survivors.

stitution, as of the original constitution of the United States before the Civil War modified it in practice, is the need of safeguarding the individual States; all powers which are not specifically assigned to the central body belong to the separate States. In Canada the Federal powers include all functions which are not definitely assigned to the provinces. Canada, in fact, is federal, Australia confederate. The demands of Social Reformers and Labour, however, tend to centralise authority in Australia, as in all loose federations, while in unitary States there has been evident of late years the exactly opposite, centrifugal¹ tendency owing to the influence of nationality and geography. Canadian Senators are nominated for life by the Crown on the advice of the Ministry of the day, and, as their number is limited, it more often than not happens that a Government, possessing a majority in the Lower House, is faced by an adverse majority, created by the appointments of its predecessors, in the Senate. The Australian Senate is elected; six senators are elected by each State for six years, half of the Senate retiring every three years. The House of Representatives is elected by the whole body of the people divided into equal electoral divisions. Thus Senate and Lower House are elected at different times and by different bodies of electors, but both are equally representative, and the possible danger of this equality can be seen in the deadlock that occurred between the two Victorian Houses, over a Tariff Bill, in 1863.

The neighbouring Dominion of New Zealand has enjoyed a history as romantic and eventful as that of Australia is dull, from a military and ethnographical point of view. Discovered by Tasman in 1642, and visited by Cook in the next century, the islands were not formally occupied until 1839. In that year, after a series of attempted settlements by English, French, and Australian adventurers, the islands were added to New South Wales.

¹ Cp. the recent history of Scandinavia, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain and Ireland, etc.

Constitutional Experiments in Canada and Australia.

New Zealand.

The following year witnessed a great influx of colonists, the separation of the new colony from New South Wales, and the conclusion of the Treaty of Waitangi with the Maoris. By the terms of this treaty the English Crown was acknowledged as supreme and was entitled to buy land, or authorise settlers to do so, from the natives. Unfortunately tribal land was held communally, and therefore the chiefs were selling that over which they had no rights. This blunder, similar to the blunders made by earlier generations of Englishmen in connection with Indian and Irish land, led to disputes and a series of wars, in which the Maoris—a mysterious Polynesian race, whose appearance and traditions suggest a Malayan origin—proved themselves man to man more than our match. Their ingenuity evolved stockades, which in some small measure compensated for their lack of firearms, and their chivalry was such that they considered it a breach of the rules to cut off supplies of water or ammunition!

Since 1869 peaceful relations have been maintained; there is now the best of feeling between the two races, the Land question has been dealt with by Acts of 1862, 1894, and 1909, and a tendency towards extinction has fortunately ceased to operate so far as can be judged by study of the birth-rate and death-rate since 1906.

The growth of population and of industries—agriculture, timber, coal, gold, etc.—was followed by the demand for a constitution. Several experiments were tried; a federal government over two provincial governments, north and south, worked badly, and the institution of six, and subsequently nine, provinces brought no improvement, while the trial of a Council of Ministers who were not necessarily¹ members of Parliament, led to a deadlock. Since 1876 New Zealand has been governed by a Council of Ministers responsible to a single, two-chambered Parliament, and in 1907, after refusing federation with Australia, it acquired the title of 'Dominion.' Among other constitutional and social ex-

¹ In Great Britain herself and in Australia it is Convention not Law which insists upon Ministers being Members of one House or the other.

periments must be noted female franchise and total prohibition. It is to States defended by outside forces or by position—as the Dominions have been defended by the British Navy, or Switzerland by international agreements and geographical situation—that we must look for experiments which a less secure community cannot afford to risk until others have provided object-lessons.

South Africa, and indeed Africa as a whole, became as much involved, during the 19th century, in the vortex of European and World Politics as the Atlantic coast of South Africa. America had been during the 17th and 18th centuries, and as, in the opinion of some alarmists, Australasia and the Pacific regions generally are destined to become during the 20th. We have already seen how the Portuguese pioneers were succeeded by the English and Dutch East India Companies' servants, how the Dutch, reinforced by German Protestant and French Huguenot emigrants, established the first settlement at Cape Town, and how, as a result of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, England succeeded to the rule over these rather turbulent colonists, who had already been in revolt against the Dutch home Government. An equally formidable legacy was the so-called Native problem. The real natives of the Cape, Bushmen and Hottentots, did not present much difficulty; the former soon became extinct, the latter were for the most part enslaved by the Dutch 'Boers,' who also introduced slaves from West Africa. But as the white man advanced from the south, the Bantu tribes, mainly negroid, but with a dash of Arab blood, descended from the north, and trouble ensued from the first. Space forbids us to follow in detail the many Kaffir wars, the various attempts to define spheres for white men and coloured, and to set up friendly buffer-tribes. We must confine ourselves to a summary of the following events and developments: the Great Trek, the rise and fall of the first Boer Republics, the Zulu War, the first Boer War, the development of the gold industry, the second Boer War, the grant of self-government, and the rise of the Union.

Trouble began as early as 1815 with the punishment of some Boers for cruelty towards natives, the rising at Slachter's Nek, and the execution of some of the leaders. The abolition of slavery in 1833, after long disputes, although absolutely essential if South Africa was ever to be opened to white labour, caused discontent in itself, which was aggravated by the alleged inadequacy of the compensation and the difficulties put in the way of proving claims. Attempts to enforce English law, language, and institutions, and exaggerations by missionaries of the undeniable brutality of many Boers towards natives, increased ill-feeling, and the refusal of the Home Government to endorse the policy adopted by D'Urban, the Governor, of annexing the lands of tribes which, driven onwards by the pressure of the all-conquering Zulus, under Tshaka, the black Napoleon, had invaded the colonies, finally led to the Great Trek (1836-1840). In all, upwards of 10,000 men, women, and children were contained in the various parties of trekkers; some of the pioneers were massacred by the Zulus under Dingaan, Tshaka's successor, but others, in alliance with his rival Mpanda, managed to defeat Dingaan and establish themselves in what is now Natal, while other parties moved to the lands across the Orange and the Vaal. Natal, where English traders and missionaries had anticipated the Boers, was declared an English colony, under the Cape Government, in 1843; it became an independent Crown colony in 1856, and received a responsible government in 1893. Although in 1848 the Orange River territory, between the Orange and the Vaal, was proclaimed British, and the Boers were defeated at Boomplatz, yet in 1852 the independence of the Transvaal Boers was recognised, and in 1854 the Orange Free State was voluntarily created as an independent State. Little England governments at home not only opposed extension of the Empire by force, but discouraged schemes of federation, which were favoured by many of the Orange State Boers themselves. Incompetent government, impending bankruptcy, and threatened destruction, at the hands of the Zulus and their off-shoot, the Matabele, brought

an end to the first Boer Republics. In 1868 the Basutos voluntarily became subject to the Crown, and submitted to us their grievances against the Boers; the next year, after a dispute with the Orange State, we annexed land which became the territory of Griqualand, the capital of which, Kimberley, is the centre of the richest diamond field in the world; in 1877 we annexed the Transvaal and the Orange State, and in 1879 we fought the Zulus, whose renewed power, under Cetewayo, threatened the Boers with extinction. The disaster at Isandhlwana and the disgraceful incident of the death of the gallant young Prince Imperial of France were atoned for by the gallantry of Rorke's Drift and the final triumph of modern weapons over assegai at Ulundi.

The removal of the Zulu peril had a result on the Boers similar to that of the conquest of French and Indians on our old American colonists. A powerful minority, headed by Kruger, had always protested against the policy of Bartle Frere and Shepstone, and in 1881 a rising took place, and some British detachments were defeated at Majuba and elsewhere. Mr. Gladstone meanwhile had come into power at home; his election speeches had encouraged the Boers, but as head of the Government he declared that their independence of the Crown would not be tolerated. Nevertheless, he agreed after Majuba to the independence of the Boers, with a vague proviso concerning our suzerainty, and even this was whittled down in 1884 to a right of veto on treaties with foreign countries. The discovery in 1886 of gold in the Transvaal completely changed the situation by attracting to Johannesburg a large number of British and other strangers. The heavy taxation to which these 'Uitlanders' were treated, together with the refusal of the Boers to grant any political right or redress of grievances, caused ceaseless disputes, and led, through the Jameson Raid of 1895, the petition of 1898, and the negotiations between Kruger and Sir Alfred—afterwards Lord—Milner, to the second Boer War of 1899-1902. In our chapter on the Great War we will refer to some of the military lessons taught by the failure of Buller to break

through trenches, occupied by skilled exponents of the modern rifle, by means of frontal attacks. The first period of the war was marked by the sieges of Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, the failures of Buller, Methuen, and Gatacre in attempts to relieve them, and the equal failure of the Boers in all offensive operations; the second part witnessed the turning movements and victories of Roberts, Kitchener, and French, the relief of the British garrisons, and the fall of the Boer capitals; the final stage was a long-drawn-out guerilla warfare in which equal ingenuity was shown in Kitchener's system of mounted infantry 'drives' towards blockhouses and wire, and their evasion by Botha, De Wet, and Delarey. By the Peace of Vereeniging the Boer States were incorporated in the Empire, but generous compensation was made for their material losses. The notorious congratulatory telegram from the Kaiser to Kruger after the defeat of Jameson, and his attempt to combine Russia and France with Germany in a league against us—an attempt thwarted by the peaceful attitude of the Tsar, and by the French refusal to make one of the conditions a mutual guarantee of territory in Europe, including the Lost Provinces—opened the eyes of many Englishmen to the German danger.

Before dealing with the general situation of Europeans in Africa, we must summarise constitutional developments. The Cape had gained representative institutions by the ordinary stages: a nominated Council in 1825, representative institutions in 1853, responsible government in 1872. Natal, as we have seen, became self-governing in 1893. Self-government was granted to the Transvaal and Orange State in 1907 on terms which even favoured the Boer farmers at the expense of the British townsmen. The Union was formed in 1910 on terms which reduced the States' Parliaments to mere provincial assemblies, and made South Africa an unitary rather than a federal Dominion. We shall see subsequently how the British, led by Jameson, and the moderate Boers, led by Botha and Smuts, so worked for a combined national and Imperial patriotism as to counteract the disruptive ten-

dencies of the reactionary leaders, De Wet, Delarey, and Hertzog.

The work of the greatest of the oversea Britons of the century, Cecil Rhodes, will be summarised in another part of this chapter.

Probably the most momentous of all South Africa's problems is that of the Bantu. The Pax Britannica has led to a great increase in the coloured population. If left to themselves inter-tribal warfare would be unending; under enforced peace can there be evolutionary progress? The white population will always be in a minority—managing the mines, while they last, doing the superior labour, managing the farms, administering, etc. How far can 'natives' be educated—outside the Kraal system and converted from polygamy—up to the capacity for civic rights? How can it be impressed upon the majority, who must continue, for many reasons, to live in kraals and practise polygamy, that population must be limited by its own powers of self-support?

During the last thirty or forty years of the 19th century Europe as a whole was affected by a wave of enthusiasm for exploration, conquest, and colonisation un-
The Scramble
for Colonies.
paralleled since the days of early Atlantic discoveries. The rejection of English Free Trade by all other nations led to a revival of the Plantation theory: the staking out by different nations of claims in land which could produce tropical raw materials. Furthermore, there was available an ever-increasing surplus both of population and of capital. In the political sphere, the ideals of Beaconsfield and Chamberlain superseded Little Englandism; France turned from European to African and Indo-Chinese ambitions after 1871, with the encouragement of Bismarck, who hoped that her adventures might turn out badly; Russia steadily advanced across Asia, her brilliant successes in that direction serving as a justification of the autocracy; while the new nations, Germany, the United States, Japan, and Italy, all launched out upon imperialistic adventures in the same spirit of national pride which had inspired the freshly united nation-states

of the 16th century. The net result was that, in addition to the self-governing British States, the following portions of the globe were parcelled out among the Powers before the outbreak of the Great War.

In Africa Abyssinia alone remained an independent native State, although Liberia, a home for repatriated negroes, was self-governing under the shadowy protection of the U.S.A., and the control of the white men in the hinterlands of Italian and British Somaliland, French and Spanish Morocco, and the Sahara districts of French Equatorial Africa was nominal rather than effective. Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and, in theory, Turkey were all of them landlords over parts of the unfortunate continent, as can be seen in a map, but it is with the clash of European interests that we are here concerned.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, as a result of the genius of the Frenchman de Lesseps, was an event in maritime history second in importance only to the discovery of the Cape Route (1486-1498). From a maritime point of view the Canal is the centre of the British Empire, and the main link between East and West. The Mediterranean cannot perhaps be said to have regained quite the importance which had belonged to it during the 'pre-Atlantic' era, but equally with the Atlantic it became part of the world's main ocean-highway. The near future may conceivably see a similar development of the Pacific, owing to the opening of the Panama Canal and the awakening of the East, but the Suez Canal must always remain the centre of the Eurasian hemisphere and of the British Empire, while new air-routes will tend to increase its importance and that of Egypt. Disraeli's great stroke in 1875—the purchase of 177,000 shares in the Canal Company on behalf of the British Government—showed that England was not blind to the meaning of the Canal. When misrule and financial chaos in Egypt, a Turkish province under the practically independent rule of an hereditary feudatory, the Khedive, threatened the interests of the Canal Company, France and England entered upon a system of

'dual control,' limited by certain 'capitulations' concerning payment of debt and the administration of justice towards Europeans. As usual, condominium worked badly, and after England had been left to deal alone with the Egyptian revolt under Arabi Pasha in 1882, and the Dervish movement under the 'Mahdi,' succeeded by the 'Khalifa' (1885-1898), the two Powers drifted to the verge of war. Fortunately the limitations between French Equatorial Africa and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan were settled without actual hostilities, and in 1904, under pressure from the growing German peril, the two Powers liquidated all the outstanding colonial disputes—Egypt, Morocco, the Newfoundland Fisheries, etc.

England was left in a very ambiguous position. Egypt was still nominally under Turkish suzerainty, but was in our 'sphere of influence'; English officers and officials, of whom Kitchener and Cromer were the outstanding figures, created the Egyptian army and civil service; the Sudan was under joint Anglo-Egyptian protection; Gladstone had pledged us to withdrawal at the first possible moment, but we could not withdraw without betraying the interests of ourselves, the native peasants—Fellaheen—the European traders, and the Canal Company, while we could not stay without incurring the charge of perfidy. During the Great War we annexed Egypt as a Protectorate, with a native Sultan, but our ultimate relations were reconsidered in 1921 by Lord Milner's Commission.

The Tripolitan adventure in 1911 of Italy, whose designs elsewhere in Africa had been forestalled by the French, or thwarted by her defeat at the hands of the Abyssinians, put England in the uncomfortable position of being forced either to quarrel with Italy through allowing Turkish troops to march through our Egyptian 'sphere of influence,' or to forbid Turkey to send troops through her own province. We chose the latter alternative. Fortunately Italy's action was at least as embarrassing to her German ally's Eastern and Mohammedan policy as it was to England.

In Africa, as elsewhere, the most disturbing element, during the period which followed the fall of Bismarck, was the

policy of Germany. Her colonies, Damaraland in the South-West, East Africa, and the Cameroons, were all acquired, between 1884 and 1895, with our approval and even encouragement, although all the pioneer work had been done by English explorers, missionaries, and traders; Livingstone, Stanley, Speke, Burton, had no German compeers, and we had actually been invited by native chiefs to set up a protectorate in East Africa. The Kaiser's telegram in January 1896, and the activities of German mercenary artillerymen during the Boer War, awoke Englishmen generally to the menace of German designs which, under the new régime, looked to the annexation and military and economic exploitation of all Central Africa as a part of Germany's schemes of domination on the seas and in the Near and Far East.

Cecil Rhodes in this, as in many other respects, was ahead of his countrymen. World History, as distinct from local or merely national history, must reckon with Rhodes as one of the great nation-makers of the second half of the 19th century; Bismarck, Cavour, Abraham Lincoln, the Mikado Mutsuhito, and Cecil Rhodes will probably be known to our descendants as the great makers of history of the period 1848-1901. Rhodes possessed a remarkable character; the devoted son of Oxford University was also a hard-headed colonist: the idealist who looked forward to a South African people which should combine British and Boer blood, and form the base of an Africa from the Cape to Cairo under the British Crown, was also the very practical and rather unscrupulous politician who inspired the policy of annexation in order to prevent German and Boer from spreading from East to West and cutting across the Cape to Cairo route, and also encouraged, or at least connived at, the gamble of the Jameson Raid. The annexation of Bechuanaland in 1885, and the establishment of the Chartered South African Company, in what is now Rhodesia, in 1889, are proofs of Rhodes's efficiency in practical measures. The Union of South Africa, the progress towards a British Cape to Cairo railway and air route, and the success of his Rhodes Scholarship Scheme, are examples of dreams

come true after the dreamer had died. He aimed in his Scholarship scheme at, firstly, an all-British, secondly, a Pan-Anglo-Saxon, and thirdly a Pan-Teutonic *entente* at Oxford. His ethnographical knowledge may have been deficient; 'Anglo-Saxons' to-day are not mainly Germanic, and Americans are not mainly Anglo-Saxon; moreover, the astute business man, who referred in his will to Oxford Dons as being 'children in business,' made the elementary blunder of imagining that the U.S.A. still numbered thirteen States, and therefore allotting to Americans more than their proportion¹ as compared with the Dominions! Yet these and other personal failings only add to the interest of a great man who was as human as he was great.

German policy clashed with the interests of France, at least as violently as with those of England. The Kaiser's pose as the particular friend of Islam was instrumental not only in pressing German influence at Constantinople, both with Abdul Hamid and with the 'Young Turks' who succeeded him, and exacting concessions in Asia Minor, in connection with the Baghdad Railway and other enterprises, which roused the suspicions of the Russian and Anglo-Indian Governments, but also led to interference in Morocco. The claims of France in Morocco were only recognised by the German Government after it had been forced to recognise, in 1911, that the Entente Cordiale would stand solidly together on that question; even then concessions were exacted which, by giving the Germans a connecting link of territory between the Cameroons and the Belgian Congo, paved the way to the realisation of their Central African schemes.

Meanwhile the European exploitation and penetration of Asia was almost as complete as that of Africa.

Asia.

The following is a summary of the situation.

The British in India, especially during the régimes of Wellesley (1798-1805), Hastings² (1813-1823), and Dalhousie

¹ Each State is entitled to so many scholars per annum.

² The Marquis of Hastings to be distinguished from Warren Hastings (1774-1783).

(1848-1856), in spite of the handicap of divided control between Company Directors, Home Government, and Governor-General, and in spite of a general unwillingness to advance our frontiers or embark on adventures, found themselves, with the elimination of serious European rivals and the collapse of the Mogul power, indubitably the predominant force in India. The religious fears of both Hindus and Mohammedans were roused by such events as the wars against the Mahrattas (Hindus) and against the Afghans (Mohammedans), and the annexation of Mohammedan Oudh. Moreover, our prestige suffered owing to the stiff opposition offered to our arms by both Afghans and Sikhs—a contrast to our old overwhelming victories over the more feeble Bengalis—and native priests made use of these facts, and also of the rumour concerning the new cartridges, and of the prophecy that Company rule would end a century after Plassey, to organise the revolt, mainly among troops and chiefs of the Central Ganges provinces, known as the Indian Mutiny. Our successful emergence from this catastrophe was due to our control of the sea and retention of Calcutta, the loyalty of the Sikhs and some of the North-Western districts, the passivity of the masses, the sheer hard fighting and endurance of our troops, and the genius and heroism of leaders such as Nicholson, Hodson, the Lawrences, Campbell, Havelock, Outram. The result was the extinction of the Company, the prophecy being thus unexpectedly fulfilled, and the conversion of India, for the time being, into a species of Crown Colony. The assumption by Queen Victoria, during Beaconsfield's Ministry in 1877, of the title of Empress of India, signified our recognition of the fact that India as a dependency is *sui generis*; it includes every type of government from province to allied feudatory. Throughout Asia as a whole there was a steady process of penetration by Western conquest or Western influence. The Anglo-Indian Empire spread eastward through Burma to the confines of Siam and the French Indo-Chinese dominions, westward until, by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, South Persia

came within the British sphere of influence, northward until Afghanistan became a buffer-state, prohibited from foreign alliances, between the Indian and Russian Empires. The Russian realm absorbed all Northern and Central Asia, and its extension southward and eastward brought about friction with England and an actual conflict with Japan.

The Westernisation of Japan and the 'scramble' for China are developments which have shifted the centre of interest of World Politics, and in a broad view of History must be considered as at least equivalent in importance to the growth of the new Western Powers—the U.S.A., Germany, and Italy. If we have up to this point appeared rather to neglect the history of China and Japan, our excuse must be that we have taken the rise and extension of Western civilisation as our guiding motive, and, although the history of China and Japan is the history of the most numerous family of the world's population, yet for centuries these nations only indirectly affected the Western world.

We have already seen that the discoveries of America and of the Cape were indirect results of the desire to open up routes for trade with China, India, and Japan, those semi-fabulous lands whose merchandise had hitherto come overland through the bazaars and caravan depots of Asia. The Chinese, looking down with the contempt born of five thousand years of civilisation on the barbarous foreign devils of the West, saved themselves from the political penetration that followed in the path of the trading companies in India by closing their ports against all foreign ships and traders. It was not until 1771 that foreigners were allowed to trade through Canton, and even then the restrictions were very severe, and attempts by British diplomatic missions, in 1792 and 1816, to gain further concessions were met by the Emperor with a definite and direct, if grandiloquent, snub. Smuggling by the traders, especially in the nefarious opium trade, and insults and occasionally violence on the part of mandarins and officials, led to the highly discreditable series of wars—Anglo-Chinese War, 1839-1842, Treaty of Nankin,

1842, Chinese War against English and French, 1856, Treaty of Tientsin, 1858, renewed war, 1860, Convention of Peking, 1860—the results of which were the cession of Hong-Kong (1842), the opening of several more Treaty Ports to European trade, the payment of large indemnities by China, and the reception of English and other Ministers; while the Russians extorted from Chinese embarrassments the cession of a strip of coast as far as Vladivostock, and the French, between 1859 and 1884, forced China to recognise the French Protectorate over Cochin-China, Tonquin, and Annam.

Meanwhile Japan, which had at first admitted European missionaries and traders—Portuguese Jesuits in 1549, followed by Portuguese and Dutch traders, and by the English East India Company in 1613—turned back on her tracks, possibly through knowledge of what missionaries and gold-hunters had done in Peru and Mexico, and closed her gates even more tightly and for a longer period than China succeeded in doing. The Shogunate, or government by the Shogun—originally the commander-in-chief—and his Council, had arisen at the end of the 12th century A.D., as a result of certain weaknesses in the rule of the Mikados;¹ the Court had become to a great extent subservient to Chinese influence, and, although to China the Japanese owed the art of writing, most of the germs of their culture—in spite of fundamental differences in language—and the introduction of Buddhism, nevertheless this foreign bias no doubt weakened their position; moreover, a system which to all intents and purposes may be described as Feudalism had grown up, during the long wars against the aboriginal Ainus, until the power of certain great clan-leaders overshadowed the Crown; finally, from 1272 till 1392 the Shoguns could always profit by the rivalry between two rival branches of the Royal House, and thus frustrate the attempts of ambitious Mikados, such as

¹ The Royal House of Japan traces its descent back to the legendary Mikado Jimmu-Tenno, 660 B.C., but there is not much certainty about Japanese history until the 5th century A.D. One cannot but hope that the warrior-Empress Jingo really existed in the 3rd century A.D.

Go-Shirakawa, Go-Toba, and Go-Daigo, to re-establish their temporal power.

Some of the Shoguns were really great men, and most of them were efficient. Yoritomo was the founder of this new constitution, at the end of the 12th century; during the 13th century the Shogun himself lost practical control of his Council, but the Government was still efficient enough to repulse the Mongol hordes of Kublai Khan, and to win, in the Straits of Shimonoseki, the Salamis of the East; during the 14th century, as a result of the civil war between the rival branches of the Royal Family and of the failure of the Mikado Go-Daigo, the Shoguns regained power. It was during the ensuing period—the Ashikaga Shogunate—that Japan developed new relations with China, which, under the Ming¹ Dynasty of native Emperors, had shaken off the Tartar yoke, and also received Portuguese sailors in 1542 and missionaries in 1549. It was a Feudal nobleman, Nobunaga, who overthrew this alien-loving line of Shoguns, and introduced certain European methods of fighting, including firearms, and temporarily subdued Feudal anarchy. His humbly-born follower, Hideyoshi, succeeded to power and expelled the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries; his brilliant campaigns against Korea and China suggest, as Mr. Porter points out in his history of Japan, that, but for his death and the change of policy among his successors, a Japanese Empire might have sprung up in Asia which might even have tried conclusions with Spain in America and the Philippines, and have anticipated England in Australasia. Iyeyasu, who after civil war secured the Shogunate, remodelled the constitution of Yoritomo, in such a way as to decrease still further the power of the Mikados, who indeed, although revered as divine even by the most powerful Shoguns, were very effectively hedged around with

¹ The last native Dynasty, overthrown in 1644 by the Manchus. The Manchu Dynasty survived till 1912; the Emperor still performs certain religious functions. The only serious attempt, before 1912, to overthrow the Manchus was foiled largely by the efforts of Gordon of Khartoum fame.

rules and regulations to prevent their intervention in mundane matters. Iyeyasu favoured the Dutch and English, especially Adams, his instructor in shipbuilding, but was not impressed favourably by the accounts he received, both from his Protestant guests and from his emissaries to Europe, of the practical results of Christianity in general and of Spanish Catholicism in particular. Justifiable suspicion of the Spaniards led to their final exclusion in 1624; the Portuguese brought their expulsion upon themselves in 1638, by aiding some native Christians in rebellion; English trade was allowed to languish owing to the rivalry of the Dutch and our own civil wars, and finally, in 1641, even the Dutch were confined to a small island and their trade limited; in 1790 Japan's intercourse with the West was further reduced to one small Dutch ship per annum.

If the Japanese lost problematical chances of forming a great Empire, at least they saved themselves from the fate of Mexico and Peru by this policy of isolation which lasted until the middle of the 19th century. The visits of the American, Commodore Perry, in 1853 and 1854, resulted in the opening of certain ports to American trade, and this concession was soon followed by similar conventions with Great Britain, France, Russia, and Portugal; the five Powers were also allowed to send Ministers to Yedo, and consuls to the treaty-ports, Hakodate, Nagasaki, and Kanawaga. Shortly before the visit of Perry a very significant domestic development had taken place. The Mikado Komei, profiting by the unpopularity of the Shogun owing to certain encroachments by the French from Indo-China, and to the belief that a famine was the result of the impious attitude that had relegated the Mikados to a position of impotence, reasserted his theoretical claims, and insisted upon exercising control over foreign affairs, and upon a strong anti-alien attitude. The Court nobles, educated in the college founded by Komei's father, were quite ready to take up their sovereign's cause against the Shogun. The onus of the unpopular concessions in the 'fifties rested upon the Shogun, who realised that Feudal armies

of Samurai could not resist warships and heavy guns. In 1863 a squadron of British, French, American, and Dutch ships gave a practical demonstration of this military maxim; the pro-European party had been weakened by the assassination of one of their leaders, and suspicion of foreigners had been increased by Russia's seizure of Tsushima, in the Korean States; although the British assisted the Shogun to persuade the Russians to withdraw, yet an unintentional breach of etiquette by some English travellers, resulting in the murder of one of them, estranged our friends, and brought about the bombardment of Choshu. This exhibition of force to some extent converted the Mikado, but the real revolution in Japan's internal and external policy must be dated from the accession in 1867 of the Mikado Mutsuhito, one of the great men of the world's history, followed by the resignation of the last of the Shoguns. Under the 'divine' descendant of the world's most ancient surviving Dynasty, modern Western methods were introduced in government, army, navy, industry, and education, but much that was useful in the old spirit of Japan was conserved; thus, for instance, Feudalism was abolished, and the warrior class of retainers—Samurai—pensioned off, but individuals of this class became the backbone of the new national army, and this new army proved itself against the rebellious Samurai of Satsuma in 1877, while the new navy first saw action against Korea in 1875.

The new Japan could not for long develop peacefully. The new Japan, like the Japan of the 16th century, was compelled by geographical considerations to take a special interest in Korea: on the one hand, both Japan and China wished to save Korea from the grasp of Europeans generally, and of the Russians in particular; on the other hand, the ambiguous position of the Chinese Court, which claimed or repudiated suzerainty according to circumstances, led to a series of disputes which culminated in the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The success of the modernised Japanese navy and army, and the stringent terms extorted by the victors at the Treaty of Shimonoseki—recognition of the independence of

Korea, the cession to Japan of Liao-Tung, including the fortress of Port Arthur, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and the payment of a large indemnity—startled the European Powers, and led Russia, Germany, and France to insist upon Japan's withdrawal from the Liao-Tung Peninsula. Whatever the right and wrongs of the question as between China and Japan, the motives of the European Powers were unblushingly selfish; China was to be their prey, and Japan must be warned off. Practical proofs of this were given in the seizure of Kiao-chau by Germany in 1898, together with concessions in Shantung, and of Port Arthur by Russia in the same year. Seizure was disguised under the term 'Lease,' and an excuse was found in the murder of some German missionaries. Wei-Hai-Wei, which had been occupied by Japan as security for her indemnities, was next 'leased' to England, by arrangement between England, China, and Japan, for so long a period as the Russians should hold Port Arthur. Japan endured but did not forgive this conduct: the sequel is seen in the Russo-Japanese War, and in the ultimatum to Germany in 1914 ordering the evacuation of Kiao-chau in the very words used towards Japan in 1895. Nor was European aggression limited to these forced concessions: Russian and French capital rapidly gained control of Chinese railways, and the Russians palpably aimed at controlling Manchuria and connecting Port Arthur with Siberia, while advantage was taken of the not unnatural 'Boxer' attacks on missionaries and foreign legations to give China another taste of modern civilisation and weapons in 1901, although mutual jealousies and the influence of England and the U.S.A. forced the Powers to guarantee the integrity of Chinese territory outside the concessions. The 'Anglo-Saxon'¹ nations stood for the 'Open Door'—*i.e.* equal treatment for the capital and admission of the trade of all nations—while the European Powers preferred to carve out monopolistic spheres of 'influence.'

The Anglo-Japanese defensive alliance of 1902, formed to

¹ We use this as a convenient description of the (mainly) English-speaking nations, not as an accurate ethnographical name.

preserve the *status quo* and Peace in the East, was a landmark in History. It marked the emergence of England from her 'glorious isolation,' and the acceptance of Japan as an equal by the greatest white Power. Its immediate effect was to relieve Japan from the fear of a repetition of the events of 1895, and to enable her to face Russia. The Japanese immediately began to question Russia's right to do what they had forbidden Japan to do, and more. Negotiations from 1902 to 1904 did not avail to make Russia recede from a position in which she dominated Manchuria, overawed Peking, and threatened Korea. The war of 1904-1905 showed that England's estimate of Japan was right. Even when we allow for the facts that Russia kept her European army at home, fought far from any base with inadequate communications, and was hampered by corruption, revolution, and want of naval coaling-stations and efficient ships, Japan's was a great achievement. A breach between England and Russia was just avoided, and the new Entente Cordiale between England and France, allies of the respective combatants, survived the strain. The victories of Admiral Togo and Generals Kuroki, Oku, and Nogi enabled Japan to achieve her immediate objects, but exhaustion and geography prohibited any attempt to crush Russia. The Treaty of Portsmouth (U.S.A.), 1905, arranged for the mutual evacuation of Manchuria, each party having a sphere of influence, the surrender to Japan of Saghalien and the Port Arthur and Liao-Tung lease, and the recognition of Japan's 'influence' in Korea.

Between 1905 and 1914 Korea was annexed by Japan, Manchuria was penetrated—and the Great War strengthened Japan's grip there—the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was renewed, and Russia joined the Anglo-French Entente group, while China underwent a revolution in 1911 and 1912 which has left her nominally a Parliamentary Republic with the Manchu Emperor pensioned off as a priest of ancestor-rites, in reality a mass of warring provinces, generals, doctrinaires, and brigands, and a prey to foreign intrigues. Anarchy in China, as in Russia, immensely complicated the problems of the

Pacific, discussed in 1921 at Washington by representatives of the British Empire, the U.S.A., Japan, and one of the *soi-disant* governments of China.

The Europeanisation of the Americas during the last century has been more rapid and more thorough than that

process in any other part of the world. It is true that the populations of Mexico and Peru and some other States are, in spite of European brutality and diseases, still mainly Amerindian, and also that the swampy forests of the Amazon still resist the encroachments of civilisation in parts of Brazil and Peru, although they have witnessed the atrocious side of civilisation in the treatment meted out to the natives by rubber traders.

Nevertheless, the continent as a whole was sparsely populated, and thus more easily settled by white populations than Africa and Asia, where white men will always be in a minority, while it presented few difficulties so great as those caused in Australia by the interior desert and its distance from Europe. Thus, although both in the North and South the white race is increasingly diversified, and in some parts its numerical supremacy is threatened, yet the English, Spanish, and Portuguese languages have between them penetrated almost the entire continent, and their chief rivals are other imported tongues, such as German in large districts of the U.S.A. and Brazil and small parts of Canada and the Argentine, French in Quebec and French Guiana, Dutch in Dutch Guiana, etc. In spite of all this it remains a question, which the future must decide, whether America between the latitudes approximately of Virginia and the Argentine can be mainly a white man's country. The increase in the black race threatens Nemesis for slavery and lynchings in the Southern States of the North, while the negroes are also multiplying in some of the States of Brazil; the natives are fortunately reviving in Mexico, Peru, Chili, and elsewhere; Chinese and Japanese, however rigorously excluded from California and British Columbia, show a great facility both in mixing with the natives, probably descendants from a common ancestral

stem (see pp. 4 and 5), and in outworking the men of all other colours and races.

The most important part, then, of American history since the point at which we last touched it—*i.e.* the recognition by England of the independence of the ex-Spanish colonies, and our seconding of the Monroe Doctrine—has been the extension of industrial civilisation and European languages throughout the continent. The westward expansion of the U.S.A. naturally led to wars with the natives, who were exterminated or displaced. There have also been incidents of passing importance, such as disputes with England concerning boundaries between Alaska and Yukon territories, British Columbia and Washington, British Guiana and Venezuela, and concerning fishery regulations, all of which were settled peaceably—in spite of the provocative language and brusque 'new diplomacy' of President Cleveland in 1895, and the tendency of journalists and politicians to play up to Irish-Americans by 'twisting the British Lion's tail.' In Central America and Mexico the principal facts of History have been: the war of 1846-1848, by which the U.S.A. extorted 600,000 square miles of territory, including California, from Mexico; the filibustering attempt on Mexico of the 'Emperor' Maximilian, under the auspices of Napoleon III.; the long period of peaceful rule and progress under President Diaz succeeded by a period of civil wars, brigandage, and intrigue by American and other capitalistic associations interested in oil, an anarchy from which Mexico at last shows signs of recovery; the revolution in Colombia, organised and financed in the U.S.A., and the resulting mutual recognition of the Republic of Panama and of the American claims to a Canal Zone. While South American history has been diversified by a war between Chili and Peru, and by various revolutions which have only slightly affected the general industrial development, the Argentine in particular has attracted British, French, and American capital and business managers, while German colonists as well as business men have swarmed into both the Argentine and Brazil.

The central feature, however, in the history of the American Continent south of Canada—apart from that general development of civilisation and natural resources to which we have already referred—is the emergence of the U.S.A. as a great World-Power. The purchase of Louisiana from Napoleon (1803), and of Florida from Spain (1819), the westward expansion through the hinterland behind the old thirteen States, the annexation of Texas (1845), the Mexican annexations (1848), the settlement of the Canadian boundaries and the purchase of Alaska from Russia (1867), and Cleveland's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, established the U.S.A. as the greatest American State with a general, if vague, interest in the affairs of all her Southern neighbours.

The Civil War (1861-1865) did not only lead to the abolition of slavery: this would have come by degrees from economic causes, and, in any case, the North did not originally engage to abolish slavery but merely to prevent the extension of slavery into the new 'Territories,' and to deny the right of any individual State to secede. The great importance of the war, which counterbalanced, from an American point of view, the adverse weight of death, suffering, loss, and lingering hate, and gives to Abraham Lincoln his secure place amongst the modern makers of nations—Cavour, Bismarck, Lincoln, Mutsuhito, and Cecil Rhodes—lies in the achievement of national unity. Inter-state jealousy had been the bane of the founders of the American Republic, just as it had been the main cause of friction in the old colonial days; the American Constitution aimed at placating this jealousy by safeguarding the separate States, and there can be little doubt that the claims of the Southern Confederates were more in accordance, at any rate, with the spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the extraordinary heroism of the outnumbered and ill-equipped Southerners, the skill and perseverance of Lee, and the genius of 'Stonewall' Jackson¹ almost compel sympathy with the South.

¹ Jackson, apart from some Indian skirmishes, learned the art of war as a military lecturer, as also did Foch. The examples of such

But, whatever our sympathies, we must see that the work of Lincoln and of Generals Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan changed the U.S.A. from a loose and mutually suspicious confederacy into a strong federal State. The mistakes made by the victors after Lincoln's assassination—the enfranchisement of the negroes leading up to the anti-negro 'Ku-Klux-Klan' reaction, and to the terrible record of lynch-law and torture from that time to this—only serve to emphasise his greatness.

One of the side-issues of the Civil War was a dispute with England. The moral issue of freedom versus slavery had kept England out of the war, although we suffered from the embargo on cotton, and were presented with legal *casus belli* in the illegitimate—because inadequate—blockade, and the seizure of Southerners on British ships. Nevertheless, sympathy or greed persuaded adventurous individuals to run the blockade, exchanging firearms, etc., for cotton. As Mr. Marriott well puts it: 'The North regarded our neutrality as rather more than malevolent. The South thought it inadequately benevolent.' The Federal Government had a definite cause of complaint in the 'escape' of the *Alabama* and other cruisers, fitted up for the South in English ports. After protracted negotiations the question of damages was submitted to arbitration, and Great Britain both apologised and paid the rather excessive sum of £3,250,000.

This incident added fuel to the anti-British sentiment in America. Nevertheless, from the time of Canning to the end of the second French Empire, it is true to say that it was the British fleet which preserved the Monroe Doctrine, and gave America the opportunity of peaceful development. This fact was illustrated yet more clearly when the U.S.A., like all other nations which had found new strength in national unity and new wealth through the new methods of production

men as Caesar, Foch, and Jackson incline one to think that generalship on the large scale is the job of a theorist, and that the qualities needed in a general and in a regimental leader of men are so entirely different that they are very seldom found united in one man.

and transport,¹ embarked upon a policy of Imperialism overseas. In 1898 it was the actual interposition of an English squadron that prevented hostilities between the German and American naval forces in Manila Bay, during the Spanish-American War. The results of that war, which arose out of American intervention in Cuba—inspired partly by humanitarian distaste for Spain's methods of fighting insurrection, partly by the interests of American capital in the island, and hastened by the explosion, now generally admitted to have been accidental, on the American warship *Maine* in Havana harbour—led to the annexation of the Philippines, which entailed the entry of the U.S.A. into the company of the rivals of the Far East, and also to the establishment of a virtual Protectorate over a nominally 'independent' Cuba.

The partition of Samoa between Germany and the U.S.A. and the annexation of Hawaii are other proofs of the fact that in America, as in Britain and Europe, the end of the 19th century witnessed the triumph of Imperialism. Roosevelt was America's Chamberlain. The achievement of the great feat of digging the Panama Canal, entailing as it did the preliminary feat of conquering malarial fever, may eventually, by its effects upon trans-Pacific navigation, prove to be a landmark comparable with the discovery of the Cape Route and of America, and with the completion of the Suez Canal. It necessitated not only certain arrangements with Colombia and Panama, but also negotiations with Britain which had certain vague claims in those regions. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty guaranteed equal treatment to the ships of all nations, but American politicians have shown a tendency to misinterpret this in favour of American coastal shipping. At the time of writing, however, the hopes of an Irish settlement and the success of the Washington Conference (1921) on

¹ To no other nation were railways of such overwhelming importance. Railways conquered the Alleghanies and opened up the West; they also broke down the old isolation which, before 1860, had left the Northern States powerless in Congress in face of the solid block of deputies from the slave-owning South.

Disarmament and the Far East, inspire the vision of new Anglo-American relations in which this and greater grudges will be forgotten.

NOTE ON IRELAND

The history of Anglo-Irish relations belongs in a sense to this and to the succeeding chapters, because there has hardly been any phase in the development of the British Empire and the United States and the relations between the two which has not been affected by the Irish problem, or any foreign enemy who has neglected to make use of the weapon thus supplied. Ireland was never subjugated by the Romans; nevertheless, after the withdrawal of the Roman legions from Britain she became the refuge of Romano-Celtic Christianity and culture, and at the beginning of the 7th century Irish missionaries, of whom Aidan and Cuthbert were the chief, were converting the northern English, while missionaries from Rome converted the South. After the Synod of Whitby (664) England became definitely attached to the Roman system and Irish influence decayed. The raids of the Danes overthrew the main centres of Irish civilisation, the monasteries; clans and monasteries, rather than national kingdoms and dioceses, were the centres of Irish civil and ecclesiastical organisation, and Ireland easily drifted into a chronic condition of anarchy, barbarism and internecine war. This condition tempted conquest, and in the reign of Henry II. Richard de Clare, Earl of Pembroke, known as 'Strongbow,' intervened in one of the endless clan wars, at the invitation of Dermot, King of Leinster; so, at any rate, runs the traditional story.

From that time onward England had an Irish problem. The first centre of our power was the 'Pale' round Dublin. In course of time the Anglo-Norman families, which introduced the patronymic 'Fitz' into Ireland, became in Elizabeth's words 'more Irish than the Irish.' Occasionally the English Government intervened and added to the already existing warfare. A typical example of what happened was the confiscation of the communal clan-lands by way of punishment for chiefs who, in Irish as opposed to English law, were not the owners. Attempts were

made, as, for example, in the reigns of Mary and Elizabeth, to colonise parts of Ireland—Queen's County, etc.—without much success. The Reformation failed to appeal to the Irish, possibly owing, in part, to the fact that the English refused to have the services rendered in Irish, which was then a living tongue, and therefore the Irish had only the choice between two foreign tongues, one familiar, the other abhorrent to them.

Commercial jealousy was another cause of trouble. Even Strafford, in many ways the most successful English governor and the founder of the linen industry, deliberately destroyed Ireland's woollen trade. The rebellion, which broke out after his recall, was stopped when our Civil War began; Irish sympathies were against the Puritans, and they were willing to release the Royal troops for use in England. Cromwell's massacres were the Puritans' reply. This period left a permanent legacy of hate. Moreover, the settlement of Ulster by Scottish Protestants in the time of James I. and by English Puritans during Cromwell's régime introduced a problem even more difficult than Anglo-Irish relations. The Cromwellian policy—'To Hell or Connaught'—did not succeed in anglicising South Ireland; hence there grew up in Ulster a population—at present considerably more than half of the population of the province—differing from the older population in race, religion, and interests, and resembling, in a way, Roman *Coloniae* planted among hostile natives. The Irish naturally espoused the cause of the later Stuarts, who lost the Throne owing to their fidelity to Rome. The Boyne Campaign was followed by a system of persecution in contradiction to the terms promised by William III. at Limerick, and throughout the 18th century the English Government tried to convert the Irish by a mixture of persecution and bribery.

Naturally all England's enemies—Spain and France formerly, Germany in our own time—have looked to Ireland as England's heel of Achilles. During the war of the American Rebellion Grattan's Protestant volunteers succeeded in forcing the Government so to relax old restrictions as to give the Irish Parliament a considerable measure of Home Rule, but for ten more years Roman Catholics and Dissenters had no votes, and even after 1792 the former, although able to vote, were not eligible for election. The younger Pitt hoped to rectify matters by means of commercial union, but the narrow interests of the Irish poli-

ticians and English merchants, together with the opposition of Fox, thwarted this scheme. Finally as a war-measure, necessitated by the rebellion of 1798, Pitt introduced and carried the Act of Union. Unfortunately circumstances made it appear that he had deceived the Roman Catholics. In 1795 his Lord-Lieutenant, FitzWilliam, had raised hopes of Emancipation, and undoubtedly Pitt hoped to be able to grant to Roman Catholics the right of election as members in the united Parliament. The obstinacy of George III. and a very large number of his subjects destroyed this hope. The Irish thus started the new era with a sense of grievance. Unlike the Scottish they were not won over by commercial prosperity, and the two peoples and religions of Ireland remained apart—whereas in Scotland Presbyterianism spread through the Highlands. Every Irish grievance was henceforth annexed as propaganda by the party of Home Rule, and the successive concessions over Emancipation, the Tithes question, and the Disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland, did not diminish the feeling of hostility. The introduction of Free Trade in corn, although it was in some measure intended to alleviate the effects of the Potato Famine of 1845, injured Irish agriculture, and during the last half of the century a steady stream of Irishmen emigrated and carried with them hatred of England. The 'sixties and 'seventies were marked by outrages caused by 'Fenians'—largely ex-soldiers from the American armies of the Civil War—and by the Land League, and by the formation of the Home Rule League by Isaac Butt; in the early 'eighties Gladstone tried to pacify Ireland by means of an Act to arrange for fixing rents, but, after the Phoenix Park murders, he was driven to coercive measures; in 1886 he granted money to help Irish tenants to buy land. But his great contribution to the question was his conversion to Home Rule, and his success in carrying with him the majority of his party into an alliance with the Nationalists, led by Parnell. The Conservatives, reinforced by Liberal-Unionists, including Chamberlain, Lord Hartington—subsequently the Duke of Devonshire—and Goschen, defeated Gladstone's measures in 1886 and 1893. Gladstonian Home Rule recognised British interests, strategical and financial, and was strictly limited; there were, however, three fatal flaws: (1) the position of Ulster was ignored; (2) British opinion was hostile; (3) English Liberalism was not whole-heartedly won

over; thus Home Rule was relegated to the background when Liberalism held a safe English majority, as in 1906, and only became a prominent plank when Irish votes were needed, as in 1886 and 1910.

After Gladstone's retirement in 1895 ten years of strong government by the Conservatives, combined with agricultural concessions, in the way of securing land for the peasantry, such as English labourers scarcely dreamed of, failed to gain Irish friendship. Nevertheless, agitation seemed to be abating, and there was evidence at least of sentimental affection for the Crown. In 1910 a situation again arose in which the Nationalists, who under Redmond's leadership had recovered from the shock and split caused by Parnell's disgrace, held the balance between the British parties. After the abolition of the absolute veto of the Lords in 1911, Asquith's Government passed a Home Rule Bill which drove Ulster into preparation for Civil War. By 1914 both sides in Ireland were arming.

At the outbreak of war Ireland at first was described as a 'bright spot.' Redmond's followers apparently competed in loyalty with Carson's Ulstermen. Unfortunately this was a passing phase. As we show in our chapter on the War, the necessary postponement of Home Rule and tactlessness over recruiting led to a reaction; 'Sinn Fein' Republicans, hitherto mere theorists, replaced Nationalist orthodox leaders, and the 1916 rebellion resulted. The suppression of the rebellion did not bring about reconciliation; indeed, many hitherto loyal Irishmen were converted to Sinn Fein principles by the weakness of the Government. After the war an attempt was made by Lloyd George's Coalition Government to satisfy both parties by a measure of Home Rule under which Ulster should have her own Parliament, while a common Council should exist to encourage the two Parliaments to draw together—as Quebec and Ontario had done in Canada. Ulster, whose loyalty during the war made her coercion more than ever morally and physically impossible, through her Unionist leader, Sir J. Craig, accepted the arrangement in spite of her preference for the Union. The Republicans refused to agree, and a horrible guerilla warfare ensued. A new effort for peace was inaugurated when the King opened the Northern Parliament in 1921. It is too early to describe details of a scheme which must accommodate itself in practice. We can

only say that after long discussions in London a 'treaty' was arranged which was accepted by the British Parliament by large majorities, and was passed by a bare majority at a meeting of Irish members known as the Dail Eireann (January 1922). South Ireland is granted complete 'Dominion' Home Rule, although strategical necessities compel Great Britain to reserve certain rights for her armed forces; in case of war we could not ignore the fact that the defence of the Irish coasts is essential to our existence.

The chapter of English rule has been a sad record of failure. Vacillation has resulted in the loss of credit for good intentions, without decreasing the resentment caused by strong measures. Nevertheless it is easier to criticise than to succeed in the government of a country circumstanced as Ireland has been. 'The curse of Ireland is her long memory'; possibly in this instance the less historians say or write the better will be the prospects for the future. We can only hope that the leaders of the Free State will succeed as Botha and Smuts succeeded in Africa; that the present outrages against loyalists and the attempts by criminals to foment religious hatred in North and South will be suppressed; and that we, or our children, will see a federal or unified Ireland as a loyal sister-state in the Empire.

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(Makers of the 19th Century.)

CHAPTER X

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW POWERS IN EUROPE

Germany : Italy : Bismarck : Cavour : Diplomacy and Wars :
The Near East.
Bibliography

THE latter half of the 19th century was a time of expansion of old and the birth of new nations in Europe, as well as throughout the rest of the world. Indeed, it was the new outburst of Nationalism in Europe which led to 19th-century Imperialism, just as Nationalism had led to discovery and conquest in the 15th and 16th centuries. It is the object of this chapter to trace in brief the story of the rise of new nations in Europe, and the resulting international rivalries which culminated in the catastrophe of 1914.

In Central Europe the failure of the movement of 1848 and 1849, and the refusal by Frederick William IV. of Prussia of the Imperial Crown offered, in spite of Austrian opposition, by the Frankfort Assembly in **Germany**. March 1849, did not merely lead to the temporary restoration of Austrian influence, and of the loose German 'Bund,' or Confederation, including both Austria and Prussia; it marked also the end of an epoch wherein the forces of Nationalism and Democracy had been united, the divorce of these old partners—from which, together with the Radical traditions of Fox in England, has probably grown up the unnatural connection between extreme Democracy and anti-patriotism—and the beginning of an epoch in which national ambitions and militarist despotism went hand in hand. This was especially the case with Germany, where the cause of national unity and expansion became identified with the cause of Hohenzollern militarism, and where excellence of national

organisation, combined with modern methods of communication and production, was speedily to introduce a new conception of warfare as the business of entire nations, and to transform Europe, as even Frederick the Great and Napoleon had never done, into an armed camp.

The accession of William IV. to the Prussian Throne in 1861, and the establishment of Bismarck in power the following year, brought to an end a period of peaceful reaction. Bismarck was, in many ways, a typical Junker, but he was also a supremely great man. A firm believer in Monarchy, a bold horseman, a hard drinker, a gluttonous eater: in all this typical of his class. But he also had the creative brain which knew its own ends, the ability to gain those ends, and the common sense, so lacking in his successors, which knew where to stop. Like most Prussian reactionaries, he was at first prejudiced in favour of Austria, but his experiences in the confederate Diet between 1851 and 1859 convinced him that both Austria and the 'Bund' were obstacles in the way of his ambitions for Prussia and Germany. His diplomatic career in Paris and Petrograd had helped to define his choice of means towards his end, and he had made up his mind, before assuming office, that Napoleon III. was 'half dreamer, half trickster.'

The history of the years from 1864 to 1871 are only intelligible if we look upon the three wars—Austria and Prussia against Denmark, Prussia against Austria and the Bund, Prussia against France—and the pretexts which brought them about as part of a carefully thought out scheme in which Bismarck really pulled all the strings, although we may admit that Napoleon III. and his advisers were attempting to play an equally cynical and far-reaching game, and must share the moral obliquity even if they failed to share the stakes. Even the historical school, which attributes all movements to Evolution and denies the influence of Personality, must admit that at least Bismarck seems to have been the instrument of Evolution while his rivals were but flotsam and jetsam thrown up by the tide of events.

The first of these wars arose out of a question which had for years been worrying the diplomats of Europe—the succession to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. These Duchies were personal possessions of the King of Denmark, but were not part of the Kingdom of Denmark; Holstein was a member of the German 'Bund,' and Schleswig was attached to Holstein both by history and sentiment, and by race; finally, the Duchies were subject to the Salic Law, while the Kingdom of Denmark was not, and so, when Frederick VII. died without leaving direct male heirs, the future of the Duchies presented a problem of which Palmerston said: 'Only three persons have ever really understood the business—the Prince Consort, who is dead, a German professor, who has gone mad, and I, who have forgotten all about it.' By the Treaty of London, 1852, all the Powers, including Prussia, had guaranteed the integrity of the possessions of the Danish Crown; and the heir, according to Salic Law, to the Duchies, Frederick of Augustenburg, had, in return for an indemnity, renounced his claim. The Danes might thus reasonably claim the Duchies for the new King, Christian. On the other hand, the German Diet had never recognised the Treaty, and the Danes, under Frederick VII., had put themselves partly in the wrong by trying to force the Duchies to accept a new Danish Constitution. At first the Diet intervened and sent federal troops into Holstein; but this did not satisfy Bismarck, who arranged with Austria a joint Austro-Prussian invasion, almost as distasteful to the small German States as to Denmark. The Danes were crushed by force of numbers, and looked in vain for help to France and England; Palmerston favoured intervention, but was opposed by half the Cabinet and by the Queen. The next step in Bismarck's programme was a quarrel between the allies. He first offered to hand them over to Frederick, on terms which amounted to a Prussian Protectorate, and then, by the Convention of Gastein, agreed to the temporary occupation of Holstein by Austria, and of Schleswig by Prussia; the next step was to accuse Austria of the incredible

crime of honesty, and, on the excuse that the Austrians were encouraging Frederick, the rightful heir, Prussian troops evicted them from Holstein.

In the war which ensued the Diet and the small German States espoused the cause of Austria, which was in fact their own. Prussia, however, was ready in every **Austro-Prussian War.** respect: Bismarck's diplomacy had secured the neutrality of Russia and of Napoleon III.—who was engaged in the Mexican¹ adventure—and the alliance of Italy, while Von Roon's military administration and the new needle-gun made victory a certainty. Seven weeks' fighting and the battle of Königgrätz, or Sadowa, drove the Austrians, in spite of successes in Italy, to seek Napoleon's good offices and ask for peace. The Treaty of Prague, 1866, brought to an end the Bund and set up a new North German Confederation under the leadership of Prussia, while Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and several small states were definitely annexed by Prussia. Austria was no longer a member, let alone leader, of the German States and ceded Venetia to Italy; but in other respects Bismarck reverted to his old pro-Austrian policy and treated her leniently, having an eye to the 'Dreikaiserbund' ideal—alliance with Austria and an understanding with Russia. In 1867 the South German States—Bavaria, Baden, Würtemberg, etc.—joined the commercial and fiscal union, Zollverein, which had been advocated by the great Protectionist-economist List, and also signed a military convention. The way was now clear for the overthrow of France and the completion of the Prussian German Empire.

We have seen how Louis Bonaparte, in spite of early failures which approached the ludicrous, had made use of the Napoleonic tradition, nurtured in the atmosphere of Bourbon and Orleans failures, and the French love of Monarchy, to establish himself first as President of the Second Republic in 1848 and then as Emperor in 1852. The man who could thus rise above failure and ridicule, who could maintain his position for nearly twenty

Franco-Prussian War.

¹ See p. 303.

years, and could, by his tact, win over Victoria from personal and national enmity to warm friendship, must have been something more than 'half dreamer, half trickster,' but he was surrounded by inefficient and corrupt advisers and was no match for the great Prussian. Napoleon's neutrality during the Austro-Prussian War had been secured in part by Bismarck's suggestions of 'compensations' for France; moreover, Napoleon had hoped for a desperate and even struggle which would leave Prussia and Austria alike exhausted and himself as arbitrator. The crushing victory of Prussia came as a shock; but a greater shock was the attitude of the victorious Bismarck towards Napoleon's 'compensations.' Not only did the Prussian reject the idea of French encroachments either in the Rhenish Palatinate or in Belgium or in Luxemburg, but he betrayed Napoleon's confidence in such a way as to rouse antagonism towards the French Empire in Bavaria, England, Holland, and Belgium. As Prussia could depend upon Italy—for reasons that will become apparent later—and had Austria crushed and Russia benevolent, all was ready for a war against isolated France. The actual pretext was, as is often the case, trivial: οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν γίνεται τὰ μεγάλα.¹ The Spaniards offered their Throne to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Owing to French objections the Prince withdrew his candidature and King William of Prussia 'approved' of the withdrawal. The infatuated Napoleon, egged on by the war-party and deceived into believing his army to be ready to the last gaiter-button, demanded, through his ambassador Benedetti, a promise that the King would not in future authorise this candidature. The King refused to comply; Bismarck passed on to the Press an account of what had happened at Ems between King and ambassador so worded as to inflame passions both at Paris and at Berlin, and to drive Napoleon into a blustering declaration of war with every appearance of being the aggressor. The war itself can be very shortly described. Within a

¹ Great developments do not spring from small causes but may be brought to a head by small pretexts

month superior numbers, leadership, and organisation had enabled the German commanders—Moltke, the Crown Prince of Prussia, Prince Frederick Charles and Steinmetz in the field, with Roon organising at home—to defeat the French at Weissenburg, Wörth, Spicheren, and Gravelotte, to shut in the army of the incapable, craven, or traitorous Bazaine at Metz, and to overwhelm at Sedan the army with which MacMahon was attempting to fight through to Metz. The French could only escape instant annihilation by surrender or by violating Belgian neutrality; Napoleon surrendered himself with MacMahon's army. When all seemed lost the national gallantry, inspired by Favre, Trochu, and Gambetta, and the advocacy of the cause of France abroad by Thiers almost deprived the Germans of the spoils of victory. The Government of National Defence, which succeeded the fallen Empire in September 1870, carried on the defence of Paris and a campaign on the Loire; Orleans changed hands three times; but at last the new levies were crushed, Paris fell (January 28, 1871), and meanwhile Bazaine had shamelessly surrendered Metz and the remnants of the old army. The signature of the Peace of Frankfurt (February to May 1871) was followed by the Communist revolution in Paris, which necessitated another bloody siege by the forces of the French National Government. We have already described the constitution of the third Republic; French monarchical sentiment was thwarted by the collapse of Bonapartism and the intransigence of Bourbons and Orleanists; the English Cabinet system was adopted, the titular Head of the State was elected for seven years' Presidency, the old centralised, Napoleonic system of local government was maintained. To the surprise of all the Republic has proved stable, although the subdivision of Parties into Groups has always made the life of individual Governments insecure. Our interest, however, in this chapter, is with the international aspects. Bismarck hoped to 'bleed France white' by means of indemnities, but the surprising recuperative powers of a patriotic nation composed largely of thrifty peasants, enabled France to pay her

debts so soon that the Prussian would have forced on her another war within five years, had it not been for the disapproval of England and Russia. The annexation of Eastern Lorraine and Alsace—except Belfort—French in sentiment at any rate since 1789, was repugnant to Bismarck's wisdom; as he foresaw, the Provinces never became reconciled and the spirit of revenge was kept alive in France. Thus we have another of the main underlying causes of the War of 1914.

In January 1871 King William was proclaimed German Emperor in the palace at Versailles. The new Empire may be described as a federation of German Sovereigns, held together by common interests, common fears, and the Prussian sword.

We must now summarise the rise of another modern State—United Italy.

On the whole the period from 1815 to 1848 was a time of reaction. It is true that in Italy, as in Germany, the great Napoleon, although his motives were mainly selfish, had left an ideal of efficient government ^{Italy.} and national unity; he had also proved that Italy could still produce a certain number of fighters. It must also be admitted that in the actual Austrian provinces, in Lombardy and Venetia, the government was neither inefficient nor really oppressive. Nevertheless, Austrian rule was a sign of the failure of Italian nationalism; Metternich's scheme of things apparently triumphed over the vague ideals of the Carbonari and the more definite ideals of the 'Young Italy' society inspired by Mazzini or of the reforming Catholics ('Neo-Guelphs') led by Gioberti—both of which parties aimed at the expulsion of the Austrians, the unification of Italy, and the reformation of the Papacy; while Austrian troops easily crushed revolutions in Naples and in Piedmont (1821), and Austrians and French competed against each other in crushing movements in Central Italy and the Papal States in 1831. In Sicily and Naples, the Papal States, and small principalities such as Parma and Modena corruption and oppression were rife. The hopes of the Catholic reformers were damped when Pius IX., after a few minor reforms, failed to rise to the

conception of a great reforming national movement, and the hopes of the Republicans faded away when the promising movements of 1848 and 1849 failed. Austria's difficulties in 1848 seemed to be Italy's opportunity, but Austria's recovery was followed by the crushing defeats of the Liberal King, Charles Albert of Piedmont and Sardinia, at the battles of Custoza and Novara; and the 'Roman Republic,' in spite of the efforts of Mazzini and Garibaldi, was suppressed by Napoleon III., who was pressed by his Clericals to help the Pope and was also anxious to prevent Austria from monopolising power and influence in the Peninsula. Thus Mazzini and Gioberti failed; but their ideals undoubtedly inspired thousands of Italians and entitle them to be known as the prophets of Italian freedom. The achievement of Italian liberation and unity was in the main the work of two men: Victor Emmanuel II., who became King when Charles Albert abdicated after Novara, and Cavour the diplomatist and statesman. The heroic Garibaldi is entitled to a definite share of the credit, although there were times when his rashness threatened to undo more than his courage had achieved.

The principal historical stages were as follows. During the Crimean War the King and Cavour, in spite of opposition, insisted upon sending troops to assist England and France; the prowess of these troops restored Italian prestige and enabled Cavour to make good his claim to representation for the Sardinian Kingdom at the Peace Conference at Paris. His remarkable diplomacy next arranged an alliance with Napoleon III.; Palmerston could only promise moral sympathy. The threatening attitude of France and Sardinia drove Austria to present an ultimatum, demanding Sardinian disarmament, in 1859. War ensued, and the victories of the allies at Magenta, San Martino, and Solferino seemed to make possible the dreams of Italian patriots. Napoleon, however, anxious to appease the Catholics and to preserve such a balance in Italy as would leave him arbitrator, made terms with Francis Joseph at Villafranca, which were ratified at Zurich: Lombardy was ceded to Sardinia, which now became the Kingdom

of Italy, but Venetia and Mantua remained in Austrian hands, while Napoleon exacted the full price for his aid—the cession to France of Savoy and Nice. Cavour resigned; Garibaldi raved; the King alone kept his head and realised the true limits of possibility.

The next step was mainly the work of Garibaldi. In 1860 he led his thousand volunteers—Red-shirts—to the aid of the Sicilians and Neapolitans against their corrupt Bourbon tyrant. The adventure succeeded; with great difficulty Cavour and the King restrained Garibaldi from an attack upon Rome, which would have brought about Austrian and French interference, and the King joined Garibaldi for the triumphant entry into Naples. With the union of Sicily and Naples to the Italian Kingdom, following upon the accession of the small central Duchies as the result of a plebiscite, all Italy was united with the vital exceptions of Rome and Venetia. Cavour unfortunately did not live to see the completion of his work.

In 1866 Victor Emmanuel, after Austria's refusal to cede Venetia, made an alliance with Prussia, and, although the Italians were defeated, yet Prussia's victory secured Venetia for Italy. Meanwhile Garibaldi had made several attempts on Rome, but the King realised that Italy could not alone afford to quarrel with France. The Franco-Prussian War gave him his opportunity; Rome was occupied in 1870 and, after a plebiscite in 1871, became the capital of Italy. Sardinia had at last completed the process, begun in the 18th century, of 'swallowing Italy leaf by leaf, like an artichoke.' The Papal territory was reduced to the confines of the Vatican; up to the present day there has been no complete reconciliation between the Vatican and the Kingdom of Italy.

The creation of two new States was naturally followed by the formation of new alliances. The pivotal ideal of Bismarck's policy was to keep France isolated, the more so when his cold-blooded attempt to force on another war in 1874-1875 was thwarted by the protests of the Tsar Alexander II. and of Queen Victoria, and by the revival of England's influence on the continent which

**Alliances and
Diplomacy
after 1871.**

accompanied the rise of Disraeli's Imperialism. Bismarck succeeded in the remarkable task of winning Austria's alliance, by encouraging her Eastern ambitions—the 'Drang nach Osten' through Bosnia to Salonika—and by allowing her so to arrange her frontiers with the new Italy as to keep all the strategical advantages and to retain large portions of old Venetian¹ territory, and yet maintaining friendly relations with Russia—at first by the regular 'Dreikaiserbund' and subsequently by secret 'Reinsurance' treaties (see pp. 246-50), and persuading Italy, in 1882, to join the Triple Alliance. But this policy was too clever to last. The clash between Austrian and Russian interests in the Near East was smoothed over by Bismarck in 1878, and again in 1884, but, sooner or later, the Hapsburg Empire and the Pan-Slav movement were bound to find themselves in opposite camps. The accession of William II. in 1888 and the fall of Bismarck in 1890 was followed by the collapse of the subtle diplomacy which had for so long held together two natural enemies. As early as 1891 French and Russian diplomatists were considering means of mutual support in the event of Franco-German or Russo-Austrian disputes, and in 1895 the Dual Alliance was formed, and Europe was divided into two armed camps. French isolation was thus ended; but Italy still remained in the German camp, divided as she was from France by African rivalries and threatened, if she left the alliance, by Austria from without and the Papacy within, while England was still so far estranged from France and Russia on Imperial issues that there was even some thought of her accession to the Triple Alliance; fortunately she resisted this temptation, or possibly German tactlessness frustrated it, and Salisbury and Chamberlain returned temporarily to the policy of 'Glorious Isolation.'

Future historians will probably recognise that the estrangement and even hostility between the Tsardom and the Western Powers after 1848, which lasted, in the case of England, until 1907, is the great tragedy of Modern History. If

¹ The Italia Irredenta which was only regained in 1919.

Russia and England had maintained the alliance which had broken the great Napoleon, it is likely that the world would have been spared the horrors of the late war and of the Russian Revolution, that the Near Eastern question The Near East. would have been solved, that most of our Far Eastern difficulties would never have arisen, and that the Russian Government would have been gradually and sanely reformed. There were, however, two factors which militated against Anglo-Russian friendship: English Liberalism was shocked by the conversion of Alexander's Holy Alliance to Metternich's principles, and suspicion of the Tsardom, which began during the time of Canning, was brought to a head when in 1849 the Tsar Nicholas helped the young Francis Joseph of Austria to subdue Kossuth's Magyars, who were struggling for their own freedom even if that included the freedom to oppress their Slav neighbours; and secondly, English Imperialism was alarmed by Russia's advance across Central Asia and her designs on Constantinople. These factors were the real cause of the Crimean War. England refused the Tsar's suggestion of an alliance based upon a mutual agreement to treat Turkey as incurable, hasten its decease, and divide the spoils. The pretext for the war was our refusal to allow Russia to act as the defender of the Christians in Turkey; we claimed this duty for the Powers as a whole—albeit everybody's business is always nobody's business—and entered the war to defend Turkey, 1854. Our real intention was to weaken Russia's powers of aggression in general and in the Black Sea bases in particular. The French attacked Russia nominally owing to a dispute as to the respective rights of Roman Catholic and Orthodox Monks in the Holy Places—a war for a Star and a Key, but really because Napoleon III. desired military glory to justify his position; he probably was keen to seize the chance of embroiling the two Powers which had together overthrown Napoleon I.

The restrictions placed upon Russian activities in the Black Sea were abrogated in 1870, by arrangement with Bismarck, in spite of England's protest. The rivalry between England

and Russia involved this country in the two Afghan Wars, and almost caused a second Anglo-Russian war in 1878. In order to understand this, we must give a résumé of Balkan history. Ever since the end of the 17th century, when the Turks ceased to threaten the conquest of Christian Europe, the peace of Europe has been disturbed by the problems connected with their threatened or actual collapse. At his best the Turk was a great soldier; at his worst he is a mad butcher; as a rule he is merely lazy and inefficient to such a degree that although individuals of the more progressive types—Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Albanians, etc.—rose to power and wealth, yet his rule was an unbearable burden on these and other subject races as communities. The Serbs of Montenegro had kept alive the torch of freedom. The Serbs round Belgrade were the next to wrest practical independence from the Turk. From 1821 to 1832 the Greeks struggled for freedom, and, after a war marked by atrocities on both sides, were saved from the Turks and their Egyptian vassals by the English, French, and Russians. Between 1830 and 1858 the Roumanians obtained large measures of self-government, but were divided in two provinces—Wallachia and Moldavia; by electing the same prince to rule them, under Turkish suzerainty, the provinces became united after 1859. In 1875 the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina revolted against the Turks, and the Bulgarians followed their example in 1876, while the Serbs and Montenegrins came to the aid of their fellow-Christians. In 1877 Russia and Roumania attacked the Turks, who, after the magnificent defence of Plevna, were threatened in their capital. English opinion was divided: on the one hand was horror at the Turkish atrocities against which Gladstone declaimed—although the Bulgars were responsible for similar outrages; on the other hand was admiration for the Turk's fighting powers and suspicion of Russia. The latter feeling prevailed, and, since the mischief had already been done in Anglo-Russian relations, it was probably a wise instinct which inspired the majority in England in addition to Disraeli and

the Queen herself. War was just averted, and a congress met at Berlin under Bismarck's aegis. The Treaty of San Stefano, setting up a great independent Bulgaria, was annulled and the Treaty of Berlin substituted. The independence of Serbia and Roumania was recognised; Bosnia and Herzegovina remained nominally Turkish, but were 'occupied' by Austria; Bulgaria was divided into two provinces, Bulgaria proper and Eastern Rumelia, the first to be independent, the second to be ruled by a Christian under Turkish suzerainty. Russia compensated herself in Bessarabia at the expense of the Roumanian ally who had helped her at Plevna; Roumania comforted herself with a slice of Bulgarian Dobrudja! England leased Cyprus for as long as Russia should hold Kars and Batoum. In 1885 the two Bulgarian provinces were united under Prince Alexander of Battenberg, but this led to bad blood between Russia and Bulgaria.

Macedonia, Thrace, and Albania remained under Turkish rule and were the scenes of constant fighting and massacre, the policy of Abdul Hamid being that of stirring up racial hatred between the Bulgar, Serb, and Greek elements whose settlements were, and are, hopelessly intermixed; while revolutions and massacres in Crete caused constant anxiety to the Powers. Another cause of trouble in the Balkans was intrigue by Austrian and Russian agents.

In 1885 King Milan of Serbia, influenced probably by Austrian agents and by jealousy at the threatened union of Bulgaria, attacked the latter principality and was defeated. After this Russian influence began to predominate in Serbia, whereas Bulgaria gravitated towards Austria; Russia procured the fall of Alexander, but could not prevent the accession of the—subsequently notorious—Ferdinand. In 1897 Greece attempted to free Crete from the Turks and was heavily defeated; the Powers saved her from destruction and arranged an international protectorate for Crete. The island itself produced the most famous Greek of post-classical days in Venizelos, who first drew up a constitution for his countrymen and then, in 1905, proclaimed the union of Crete with Greece.

By the beginning of the 20th century the situation was further complicated by the intrigues of the German Emperor William II., who aimed at bringing Turkey into the orbit of Germany, and hoped, by posing as the champion of Islam, to secure the control of the future Baghdad railway and other concessions, and to build up a great base from which he could threaten any of the rival European Powers with interests in the Orient and relations with Mohammedan races—*i.e.* England, France, Russia.

In 1908 a revolution in Turkey was welcomed by English Liberalism as the beginning of a new era. Unfortunately the 'Young Turks'—most of whom were sceptics or Jews—only proved more efficient than the old Turks in carrying out a more oppressive policy of Turkising the subject populations. They lacked the diplomatic skill of Abdul Hamid and drove into temporary union those hostile elements which he had kept divided amongst themselves. The first results of the revolution were that Ferdinand proclaimed himself Tsar of Bulgaria, and Austria annexed the occupied provinces Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1911 Italy invaded Tripoli, and it is a tribute to German diplomacy that neither Italy's alliance nor Turkey's servile friendship was lost. German prestige received another blow in 1912 when the Turkish army, trained by German officers and armed with German guns, was disastrously defeated by the Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, and Montenegrins, united at last by the atrocities of the Young Turks and the diplomacy of Venizelos, King Ferdinand, and King Peter of Serbia. The great feature of the war was the efficiency and heroism of the Serbs, who largely effaced the unpleasant impression left on Western minds by the murder, at the hands of Court and military intriguers, of the late King, the worthless Alexander, and his Queen in 1903. Austria and Germany were determined not to allow Serbia to develop into a strong state which would block their road to Salonika and serve as a rallying point for Austria's discontented Slavs. Accordingly they insisted upon the expulsion of the Serbs,

Montenegrins, and Greeks from Turkey's lost province Albania. Italy supported her allies, since, though suspicious of Austria, she also had designs in Albania. The Triple Entente Powers were not prepared to fight, and therefore the victors were dislodged from Albania. Serbia and Greece rather naturally asked for compensations from Bulgaria, which, with their aid, had occupied most of Macedonia and Thrace. The Bulgars rejected the Tsar's offer of arbitration, attacked the Serbs, and were overwhelmed in a war in which, while the Serbs and Greeks defeated their main armies, the Turks recaptured Adrianople and the Roumanians marched into their country to 'pacify' it! By the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, the greater part of Macedonia went to Serbia and Greece, the latter taking Salonika. Montenegro also gained territory which made her borders contiguous with those of Serbia, Roumania took the Silistrian district of Bulgarian Dobrudja, Turkey was left in possession of Adrianople and a strip of territory in European Thrace bound by the Enos-Midia line. Bulgaria was left with her territory increased indeed, but not in any proportion to her losses of men and money; on the Ægean she had only the wretched port of Dedeagatch, and, although she had brought her punishment on herself, she naturally felt bitter against Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and tended still more to fall under the influence of Serbia's great enemies, the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The German Emperor managed to maintain his influence in Constantinople and at the same time to appear to support his brother-in-law, the King of Greece. The 'Armed Camp' now enfolded the Balkans.

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CHAPTER XI

THE GREAT WAR AND THE SETTLEMENT

The Immediate Causes : The Campaigns : The Peace Negotiations : Problems of To-day.

Bibliography : Appendices.

WE have, in the last two chapters, traced the great causes which underlay the late war. We have described the irreconcilable hostility between Germany and France and between Austria and Russia and the division of Europe into two armed camps, with Italy as an unwilling ally of the Teutonic hosts. We have also traced the developments and noted some of the incidents which forced England into an unwilling realisation of Germany's hostility in the extra-European world, and have dealt with the diplomatic revolution by which Great Britain and France came together in 1904; we have seen that the Entente stood the strain of the Russo-Japanese War and that Russia entered the Entente in 1907. Thus the regular alliances were the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy, the Dual Alliance of France and Russia, and the Eastern Alliance of Great Britain and Japan, while there was a rather vague understanding between Great Britain, France, and Russia. We have seen Europe on the verge of war over the Morocco question in 1911, and again over the Balkan problem in 1912 and 1913, while the chronically bellicose Balkan races were also split into fairly well-defined camps, although Greece rather halted between two opinions. British statesmen made continuous efforts to improve Anglo-German relations, from the time of Salisbury's exchange of Heligoland for East African concessions—'exchanging a button for a pair of trousers'—to the efforts of Asquith, Haldane, and Churchill to secure a 'naval holiday.'

The efforts were fruitless. The Kaiser and von Tirpitz pressed on their naval programmes, and although the production of the ' Dreadnought ' type of ship by Admiral Fisher, in 1906, gave Great Britain a lead, yet, by largely eliminating old ships, it enabled Germany to start again on more even terms ; the enlargement of the Kiel Canal for the accommodation of Dreadnoughts in 1914 was one of the reasons which encouraged the Germans to fight at that date. Although English, French, and Belgian military leaders had discussed possible eventualities, yet Asquith and others made it clear that there was no binding alliance.

There can indeed be no doubt that the war-party in Germany hoped that Great Britain would stand aloof if war broke out over an apparently purely continental cause of dispute. The situation in Ireland, the Labour troubles in England and Russia, and a military scandal in France all encouraged the feeling in the summer of 1914 that ' The Day ' was dawning. The actual pretext occurred in the Balkans.

On 28th June 1914, a student named Prinzep assassinated the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife in the streets of **Murder of the Archduke of Austria.** Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The Austrians accused Serbian officials of complicity in the deed, but they offered no proofs in support of their accusation. The Archduke was personally favourable to Slav interests within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He hoped to establish a Triple Empire—Austro-Hungarian-Slav. These ambitions were opposed to Russian and Serbian hopes of a great union of Southern Slavs independent of Austria. The Austrian Government, however, was not content to demand investigation and the punishment of proved offenders, together with the suppression of anti-Austrian associations and newspapers. It presented an ultimatum giving a time limit of two days, which made all discussion impossible, and demanding terms—the surrender without trial of accused Serbians and Austrian management of investigations—which were incompatible with Serbia's existence as a free state.

Sir Edward Grey, whose diplomacy at the London Congress

had prevented war over the Albanian question, negotiated for time and international discussion. Russia supported him, but mobilised her troops in reply to Austria's mobilisation. At first Austria refused all discussion. At a later period, when she appeared likely to agree to ' conversations ' with Russia, Germany issued an ultimatum to Russia on the question of mobilisation and a similar ultimatum to France regarding her intentions in case Russia was involved in war. The French Government carried conciliation to such a point as to delay their concentration on the frontier, but they responded to Germany's mobilisation by a similar step. Austria and Germany then declared war upon Russia and, without any declaration, advanced through Luxemburg and Belgium against France.

The violation of Belgian neutrality brought England into the war. Before that international crime, it had been doubtful whether our Government would go to war in defence of the Entente. Interest and honour **Belgium.** impelled, but there was no written obligation and public opinion was doubtful. The only definite military arrangements were as follows: (1) English and French military authorities had discussed problematical measures in case the two Powers should combine against attack. (2) The British and Belgian Staffs had discussed problematical joint measures in case of the violation by any Power of Belgian neutrality. The Unionists promised to support the Government in a war policy, and Sir Edward Grey refused to agree to a German suggestion that England should remain neutral if the German Fleet abstained from attacks on France in the North Sea, and the German Government promised to take no territory from France in Europe. The French fleet had been concentrated in the Mediterranean on the strength of the Entente, and we could not afford to see the colonial empire and military power of France crushed.

The violation of Belgian neutrality, and the gallant manner in which Belgium fulfilled her treaty obligations, which forbade the passage of belligerent troops or arms, decided English

opinion and the Government. Belgian neutrality had been guaranteed by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Prussia in 1839, and in 1870 Bismarck had recognised this treaty, while France had submitted to military disadvantages rather than violate it. The Powers were bound only to joint intervention to defend the neutrality of Luxemburg, but each separate signatory Power was pledged to defend that of Belgium. The moral issue was the more clear from the fact that Prussia herself had suggested the neutralisation of Luxemburg, and both Belgium and Luxemburg were by treaty unable to make alliances and pledged to defend their neutrality. The British Government presented an ultimatum to Germany on 2nd August, and on 4th August declared war.

The threatening state of affairs in Ireland and the uncertainty of British intervention were not the only factors on

Initial Advantages of the Central Powers. which the German Government reckoned to secure speedy success. Russia was threatened with revolution and was actually in the throes of a strike in Petrograd; her railways and supplies were inadequate and mobilisation was expected to be slow; France had lately been involved in serious scandals connected with the equipment of her army; moreover, the advance through neutral Belgium promised to turn the flank of her Eastern defences, and public opinion tempted the French Command to concentrate on an advance into the Lost Provinces. If these were the negative advantages of Germany, she also possessed equally great positive assets. Strategically the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, held the 'inner lines' which, Napoleon declared, double the forces of the belligerent so placed; they reckoned on the adhesion of Turkey and Bulgaria, in which hope they were justified, and also on the alliance of Italy and Roumania and the friendly neutrality of the United States and Greece, but fortunately these hopes were not, in the long run, fulfilled. Again, Germany was far better equipped than her opponents and equally less scrupulous in her methods and use of weapons. The German Staff, studying with a view to European War

on a great scale, had learned from the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars lessons which the British War Office, thinking mainly of Colonial warfare, had overlooked. For instance, the British military mind was wholly obsessed with the lessons taught by the successes of Roberts, French, Botha, and de Wet—the importance of extreme mobility, skill in extended order movements, and the rapid and accurate use of the rifle and light field and horse artillery. These lessons were so thoroughly mastered that the British Regulars in the opening operations proved themselves to be as far superior to all continental soldiers in the use of the rifle as their ancestors had been in the use of the long-bow. The Germans, however, had realised, from a study of Buller's defeats in Natal and of the Far Eastern campaign, that, given a certain proportion of troops per mileage of front, modern warfare might resolve itself into trench or siege warfare in which outflanking manœuvres were temporarily to be ruled out and frontal attacks must depend upon overwhelming superiority of fire. Accordingly they prepared, although even their preparations proved hopelessly inadequate, masses of heavy guns, high explosive shells, machine-guns and, in spite of the Hague Conventions which they had signed, chemical weapons.

There is so much in connection with the actual military history of the Great War that is, and for many years will remain, controversial, that anything in the nature of a detailed narrative and criticism must be left to purely professional writers; a general text-book can at best only attempt an outline sketch.

The campaigns of 1914 were in the opening stages essentially open warfare, each side aiming at decisive and speedy successes. The Germans pressed for Paris by three routes—¹⁹¹⁴ through Belgium, through Luxemburg, and Campaign in the West. from Metz towards Nancy; the Belgians gallantly resisted their advance-guards and made a stand at Liège, but the heavy artillery of the invaders soon battered down that fortress and Brussels was occupied by 20th August; the immediate fall of Namur upset the defensive plans of the

French commander, Joffre, and the great retreat began. The English Expeditionary Force, under Sir John French, consisting of two army corps under Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, had advanced to Mons; its business now was to retire in conformity with the French and to endeavour to keep connection with the Belgian Army. Small though this British army was, it nevertheless performed invaluable service in engaging no less than five German army corps, each one of which probably outgunned our entire force; Smith-Dorrien's corps, when its commander considered it too exhausted to continue the retreat according to French's orders, held up the enemy and extricated itself from a desperate position in the pitched battle of Le Cateau; Allenby's cavalry division did work which, in combination with the same General's cavalry campaign in Palestine in 1918, must give pause to the school of thought which argues that trench warfare, tanks, and aeroplanes have obviated the necessity of cavalry. The French had meanwhile launched an offensive into Alsace, but the successes gained at Altkirch and Mülhausen were only local and temporary in their effects. The allies retreated fighting until 5th September, by which time the Germans had come within twenty-five miles of Paris and the French Government retired for a few weeks to Bordeaux. On 6th September Joffre retook the initiative in the battle of the Marne, one of the decisive battles of history since it threw back the invaders and altered the nature of the war, which from that moment, contrary to the prophecies of all military writers and pacifist propagandists of the period immediately preceding the war, was bound to become a long test of endurance. Whatever his motives, von Kluck swung his army round to the east, thus affording Joffre an opportunity similar to that seized by Cromwell at Dunbar or Wellington at Salamanca. Every available man was flung into the battle, including garrison troops from Paris hurried up in omnibuses and taxi-cabs, and the British force surprised the enemy by refusing to be too exhausted to take the offensive. The Germans were hurled back in what the allies hoped to

convert into a rout, but re-established themselves in carefully prepared positions beyond the Aisne, where more or less stationary trench warfare may be said to have begun towards the end of September. Both sides now attempted to outflank their opponents in the direction of the Belgian coast; the Germans occupied Lille and La Bassée and, on 9th October, captured Antwerp, the Krupp guns of which had probably been made purposely defective. A half-trained and badly equipped force of English Naval Volunteers had been rushed into Antwerp. The remnants of the Belgian Army got into touch with Rawlinson's Cavalry and established itself in a corner of Belgian territory in line with the British forces which had been moved, at French's suggestion, into the Ypres and Armentières section. At the first battle of Ypres, which raged for nearly three weeks from 11th October, the small British force faced odds in both numbers and gun-power such as have never been successfully faced in the history of civilised warfare; the result of this heroism was to save the Channel Ports and our nearest line of communication with France. By the end of the year the opposing trench systems extended from the coast to Switzerland.

Meanwhile the Russians had completed the mobilisation of their first armies far more rapidly than had been anticipated, and nobly threw troops into East Prussia in order to relieve the pressure on Paris and defeat the **The Eastern Campaign.** German war-scheme of crushing France rapidly and then dealing at leisure with Russia. After some initial successes this Russian force was defeated at Tannenberg and almost annihilated, probably owing in part to their having outmarched their supplies and in part to the skill and local knowledge of Hindenburg. The main Russian armies made a gigantic attack upon Austria-Hungary and captured Lemberg in September. This campaign was vigorously pressed during the winter of 1914-1915, and resulted in the temporary capture of Przemyśl and the occupation of the heights of the Carpathians. The Russians were, however, prevented from descending into the plains of Hungary by shortage of ammuni-

tion and by a combined German-Austrian attack upon Russian Poland, which resulted during the summer of 1915 in the occupation of Warsaw and large portions of Poland and the Baltic provinces by the enemy. Austria was thus saved from a collapse which had threatened to follow upon the Russian successes combined with the heavy defeat by the gallant Serbs of the first two Austrian invasions. In August 1914 the Serbs threw back 60,000 Austrians and invaded Bosnia; in December they defeated the second invading force so decisively that not a vehicle of any description was saved by the Austrians and retook on 14th December their capital, Belgrade, which they had been forced to abandon on 2nd December by absolute lack of shells. An English officer attached to the Serbs has described the dramatic moments when the Serbian guns, re-supplied by England through Salonika, opened fire for the first time for two weeks, and when King Peter attended service in Belgrade Cathedral while the enemy were still being pursued through the city.

In November 1914 Turkey openly joined the enemies of civilisation. The Young Turks had long been under German influence; the Turks were annoyed at the confiscation of some warships which were being built in England when war broke out; finally the escape of the German cruisers *Goeben* and *Breslau* from the Mediterranean into the Bosphorus increased the Germans' powers of persuasion and intimidation.

It will perhaps make this summary more intelligible as an account of the war as one whole if we now deal with all the subsidiary campaigns from 1915 onwards and with the naval operations, and then sketch the progress of affairs on the Western front—including the Italian—from the stage when trench warfare set in after the preliminary operations of 1914. The Russian campaigns were so vast, so bloody, and at one time bade fair to be so decisive that their inclusion among 'subsidiary' campaigns calls for explanation. Until the end of 1916 Russia bore her full share and saved the Western Powers from being overwhelmed before the British Empire

Russia,
1915-1917.

had time to bring its full weight to bear. But circumstances prevented Russia from repeating against the Germans the part she had played in the downfall of Napoleon, and therefore the Western Front must be treated as the main front.

The retreat of the Russians in the summer and autumn of 1915, the exhaustion of their munitions and their appalling casualties, did not eliminate Russia from the war even as an offensive factor. The English through the northern ports and the Japanese through Siberia made strenuous efforts to rearm our great ally, efforts which were to some extent thwarted by the corruption of Russian officials and the inadequacy of Russian railways. After facing a threatened Turkish assault through the Caucasus, the pressure of which was materially lightened by our attack on the Dardanelles, the Russians took the offensive and both advanced in small numbers in North Persia, with the intention of joining hands with the British Mesopotamian expedition, and in the beginning of 1916 made a wonderful advance over the snow in Armenia, under the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, who had been transferred to that front when the Tsar assumed the nominal leadership of his troops, after the disasters of 1915, with Alexeieff as the real commander; Erzerum was captured with 323 guns and 13,000 officers and men, and Trebizond fell soon afterwards. Finally, in June 1916 General Brussiloff initiated a grand offensive through the Austrian province of Bukovina which resulted in the capture of nearly 400,000 prisoners during three months; many of these were Czecho-Slovaks or belonged to other Slav races and were glad to surrender to Russia, but there were also very many thousands of valuable German and Magyar soldiers among the prisoners. Russia's effort was of the greatest assistance to Italy, though it failed to save Roumania.

In March 1917 the Russian Revolution began. At first many Western followers of democracy welcomed this cataclysm, forgetting that, whatever the faults of his government and the failings of the Tsarina's Court, Nicholas was a loyal ally, and also that History teaches

us quite clearly that revolutions, even when they start by being the work of moderate and even aristocratic parliamentarians, as both the French and Russian Revolutions did, nevertheless tend fatally to bring to the front a forceful minority of extremists. For a time the new Government remained moderate and loyal to the Allies; then came Kerensky, the Russian Girondist, extremist and unpractical but loyal; he inspired one more effort by part of Russia's armies and was then succeeded by Lenin's party, which, like the Jacobins, started by being pacifist and ultra-democratic but ended by being the champions of terror and aggressive force. How far German influence and gold was behind Lenin is not yet clearly known; at any rate, in December 1917, the 'Bolshevists,' as they are called, met envoys of the enemy, and in March 1918 signed a peace which afforded Germany her greatest triumph and threatened disaster to civilisation. For over a year longer British forces were engaged round Archangel and Murman, saving the munitions from the enemy and co-operating with the loyal Russians. It cannot be said that Russia is at peace even to-day (Dec. 1921), and Japanese troops are still round Vladivostock, where they originally performed services similar to those of the British in the North of Europe.

The Russian Revolution was the fourth and greatest disaster to the Allies in Eastern Europe. The autumn and winter of 1915 witnessed two failures which were connected with each other, and between them destroyed all hope of an early allied victory. The attempt to open a way through the Dardanelles for the British Fleet, had it succeeded, would have eliminated Turkey and overawed the Kings and Governments of Bulgaria and Greece. A preliminary attack by some out-of-date warships met with unexpected success, but warned the Turks and their German advisers of what was to follow. The subsequent combined operations by a fleet, consisting of the super-dreadnought, *Queen Elizabeth*, and for the rest mainly old ships, and military forces from Great Britain and India, the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps ('Anzac'), and some French troops, with

Sir Ian Hamilton in supreme command by land, were productive of a living epic of bravery which will make 'The River Clyde,' 'Anzac,' 'Suvla Bay,' etc., 'familiar as household words' to many generations, but were probably doomed to failure from the first owing to the impossibility of sparing strong enough reinforcements. Undoubtedly the expedition helped our Russian allies and used up many of Turkey's best troops, but in December 1915, after a visit by Kitchener, the evacuation began; it was completed by 8th January 1916 at the cost of one man wounded. The evacuation was one of the crowning achievements of the war, but it did not atone for the loss during the expedition of nearly 40,000 killed or missing and nearly 100,000 sick or wounded.

The realisation of our approaching failure in Gallipoli brought the treacherous King of Bulgaria into the war in October 1915. Hatred for Serbia more than outweighed traditional gratitude to Russia, and the Bulgarians gladly attacked the Serbs in the rear and flank when, smitten by typhus and starvation in addition to the losses of four campaigns within as many years, our gallant little allies faced a third invasion by the Germans and Austrians. King Constantine of Greece,¹ in spite of the persuasion of Venizelos, refused to help his Serbian allies, and a small Anglo-French force, operating from Salonika, failed to get into touch with the main Serb armies. Only the amazing hardiness of the Serbs and Montenegrins enabled some remnants of their male population to fight their way to the coast of Albania, whence they were transported to Corfu and refitted in time to take part in the defeat of the Bulgars in 1918.

In August 1916 the Roumanians, encouraged by the Russian and Italian offensives, joined the Allies. Unfortunately, instead of standing on the defensive against the Central Powers and dealing with Bulgaria at their backs, they invaded the coveted Roumanian-speaking districts of Hungary. After some preliminary successes they were crushed by a

¹ It is now clear that, but for Grey's mistaken diplomacy, Greece would have joined us earlier in the war.

German and Hungarian force under Mackensen and Roumania was overrun. The Germans' dream of an open road to the East was temporarily fulfilled. A small allied force—French, British, Serbs, Italians, and Venizelist Greeks—held Salonika and advanced as far as Monastir, but Constantine intrigued against the Allies, and on one occasion allied troops were treacherously shot in Athens. Our sea-power alone prevented the conversion of the Piraeus into a German submarine base. It was not until June 1917 that the Allies, having at last got rid of Constantine, brought Greece into the war on our side. In September 1918, after a battle in which the British contained the Bulgars by a threatened frontal attack while the Serbs and other allied troops pierced the lines and enveloped their flank, the unconditional surrender of Bulgaria marked the beginning of the end. But the Bulgars, by their typical astuteness in being the 'first of the rats' to leave a sinking ship, escaped their turn of the casualties and destruction by which they and their allies had annihilated over a third of the population of Serbia and Montenegro.

In addition to the Gallipoli and Caucasus campaigns the Turks involved the Allies, and especially the British Empire, **The Middle East.** in two important and several smaller operations: those which started with the defence of the Suez Canal and ended with the conquest of Syria and the overthrow of the main Turkish Army, and those which are generally known as the Mesopotamian campaign.

In December 1914 Egypt was declared a British Protectorate—a step which we appear to be retracing in 1921. The reasons for this were strategic: the Canal, roughly half-way between England and India and between Canada and Australia, is the naval centre of the Empire; Egypt is the natural rallying-ground of the forces of India and Australasia on their way to the West or the Near East; Egypt is destined to be one of the world's greatest air centres. Naturally, therefore, German and Austrian submarines and Turkish troops tried to cut the Empire's jugular vein, the Canal. The Turkish attack on the Canal was defeated in February 1915, and the only

other defensive fighting on the Egyptian borders was that in 1916 which led to the defeat of the Senussi, a Mohammedan tribe influenced by both Turkish and German emissaries, and of the Sudanese of Darfur; but a good deal of discontent was engendered within Egypt, partly by suspicion of the term Protectorate, partly by the methods of native headmen and officials whom we trusted to act for us in commandeering camels, goods, and labour, and arranging payment.

In 1914 an Anglo-Indian expedition occupied, after some successful fighting, Basra and the Shat-el-Arab as far as the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Two considerations made these measures necessary: it was essential to guard the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's pipes by which the Navy was supplied, and equally it was essential to prevent submarine operations and gun-running in the Persian Gulf, situated on the flank of the route from Aden to India.

Unfortunately early successes encouraged hopes of advancing through Baghdad, occupying Mesopotamia, joining forces with the Russians in Persia, and thus counterbalancing the Gallipoli failure. These ambitious hopes led to the gallant advance of Townshend, with a numerically weak and badly equipped force, to Kut and, after a brilliant victory there, on towards Baghdad. After the battle of Ctesiphon in November 1915 he was forced to retreat and was besieged at Kut, and at the end of April 1916, after the failure of attempts at relief by Generals Aylmer and Gorringe, his force, reduced to about 9000 men, was starved into surrender. In January 1917 General Maude recaptured Kut; in March he captured Baghdad and Samarra, the terminus of the Baghdad railway, and, after the death from cholera in November of this gallant leader and brilliant organiser, General Marshall pursued our advantages.

Meanwhile, in the Egyptian-Syrian field, General Murray drove the Turks out of Sinai by his victory at Rafa in January 1917, but was twice repulsed at Gaza. His successor, General Allenby, during the last three months of 1917, defeated the Turks at Gaza and Jaffa, and occupied Jerusalem. In September 1918, after capturing Jericho in the spring, he broke

the main Turkish armies in the battles of Megiddo, and in October he entered the capital of Turkish Asia, Aleppo. Meanwhile the Turks in Mesopotamia had surrendered to Marshall, and on 31st October Turkey followed Bulgaria's example and surrendered to the Allies, using her prisoner, Townshend, as an envoy.

The warfare in more remote regions must be summed up even more briefly. The first of Germany's colonies to succumb was Togoland, which surrendered to a Franco-British expedition in August 1914. The other German possessions in Africa showed unexpected powers of resistance; they were well stocked with machine-guns and other weapons, suitable for warfare in the thick jungle of the Cameroons and of German East Africa; the native soldiers were attached to masters who allowed them full licence towards the rest of the population; in East Africa the Germans were fortunate in the leadership of a real genius—Von Lettow; while the conquest of South-West Africa, or Damaraland, was delayed by the rebellion of a section of the Boers in the Union, under the leadership of Maritz, de Wet, Beyers, and Kemp. The speedy reduction of the rebellion by the loyal Dutch and English by the end of 1914, the great services of Botha both as Prime Minister and as leader in the conquest of Damaraland, the services of General Smuts both in German East Africa and in the War Cabinet in England, and the war record of South Africans both in Africa and on the Western Front, deservedly efface any resentment at the rebellion, although unfortunately the movement to secede from the Empire, which would ultimately mean the loss of South Africa as a White Man's country, was kept alive after the war by the party of Hertzog. The German island-colonies in the Pacific were rapidly conquered by the Australians, the New Zealanders, or the Japanese, and it was universally felt that never again must German strategical schemes and disturbing influence over the natives be allowed to threaten Africa or Australasia with the 'Kultur' of Militarism.

The Japanese, who entered the war as Great Britain's ally on 23rd August 1914 despite tempting suggestions from the other side, in combination with an Anglo-Indian force captured Germany's Far Eastern stronghold, Tsingtau or Kiao-chau, in the autumn of 1914, thus punishing at last Germany's share in the events that followed upon the Chino-Japanese war of 1895.¹

Finally, we had to face serious troubles along the frontiers of India, troubles which, whether inspired by Germans, Turks, or, at a later time, Bolshevists, have outlasted the war.

The very facts that we were able to land our main forces in France without loss, to maintain our ever-increasing forces in the West and at the same time to conquer Germany's colonial empire and undertake campaigns in Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Asia, and Africa, to maintain our coasts inviolate, save for raids by aircraft or cruisers which were annoying rather than serious, to thwart Germany's intentions with regard to Ireland, and to maintain our home population, in addition to all of which we played a predominant part in convoying America's forces during the latter stages of the war, suffice to show that the Allies' command of the sea, which rested mainly on the British Navy, was the foundation of all their hopes of safety and success. The naval war was in the main a process rather than a series of striking incidents; like trench-warfare during the middle years of the war, it was a continuous siege, while brilliant and gallant deeds on a comparatively small scale were so innumerable that we can only mention those which stand out as being exceptional not in merit but in proportion.

The essential points of the situation seem to be the following:

(1) The German Fleet was from the beginning to the end of the war confined to the protected waters behind its mine-fields; the only attempt of the High Seas Fleet as a whole to break through the English cordon led to the battle of Jutland, 31st May—1st June 1916, which although not con-

¹ See p. 300.

clusive in the sense of the destruction of the enemies' fleet yet prevented any further effort on the part of Germany's surface vessels at breaking the stranglehold of our blockade or cutting the communications between Great Britain and her overseas armies and sea-borne supplies. Henceforward the High Seas Fleet remained in harbour until the suggestion of a desperate fling at sea in November 1918 led to mutiny and the beginning of revolution. Prior to Jutland there had been minor battles, such as that in the Heligoland Bight in August 1914, wherein an English reconnaissance had tempted an enemy force to action and the *Arethusa* together with Beatty's battle-cruisers and some destroyers had sunk three German cruisers, and certain German raids on our coast towns, which were checked by the destruction of the *Blücher* and the severe punishment of other battle-cruisers in January 1915. The Austrian fleet was even more ignominiously sealed up by the allied forces in the Mediterranean.

(2) The isolated squadrons and ships of the enemy in distant waters were rapidly accounted for, with the exception, mentioned above, of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. Von Spee's cruiser squadron destroyed Cradock's small but indomitable force off Chili in November 1914, but Nemesis quickly followed; Fisher dispatched some battle-cruisers under Sturdee, who awaited the foe at the Falkland Islands, a strategic point to which they must come under the pressure of a hunt in which Japanese and Australian vessels joined, and the Germans came to an end as gallant and as inevitable as that to which they had sent Cradock.

The *Emden*, before its destruction by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, proved that surface vessels, if able to retain freedom of action, would have ruined our shipping and trade at an infinitely faster rate than submarines, while the *Königsberg* did considerable damage before she was driven to run for refuge up an East African river, where she was presently wrecked by monitors and aircraft.

(3) The British Blockade proved itself to be the most potent and relentless weapon in the Allies' hands. At times

it threatened to cause trouble with neutrals and especially the U.S.A., but we made no claims in excess of those allowed by the usages of war¹ and practised by the U.S.A. during their Civil War when their power of enforcing a real blockade was far less absolute than ours. The British Navy has never used its strength, as bygone naval powers did, to restrict freedom of the seas in time of peace; in fact it has opened and policed and charted distant seas for the use of all nations; it can, therefore, justly claim to exercise its rightful powers in war-time.

The German submarine 'blockade' also proved itself to be a fearful weapon, and in 1917 went near to ruining the allied cause by its depredations on the Mercantile Marine on which all else depended. This blockade was in itself contrary to the laws of war, because German sea-power was not strong enough to allow of the examination and capture of ships; surprise attacks and relentless sinking was the order of the day. This illegality did not worry a state whose Chancellor in 1914 had referred to treaties as 'scraps of paper,' but it brought its punishment in the entry of the U.S.A. into the war in April 1917. The ingenuity which devised new methods of defence and convoy, the collaboration of all the Allies, above all the devotion of our naval and mercantile sailors, enabled us to defeat this peril and to destroy over 200 German submarines. For a time the Suez route was closed by hostile submarines in the Eastern Mediterranean. Our own submarines did wonderfully effective service—in the North Sea, the Dardanelles, the Baltic, etc.—whenever legitimate targets were offered. Before leaving this subject we must allude to the heroic attempt by the *Vindictive* and other vessels to block up the German submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge in April 1918. Finally, it is too early even for experts to read with certainty the lessons of modern warfare. We improved our defensive armour as a result of Jutland's lessons,

¹ Fortunately the Lords had suspended the 'Declaration of London' to which Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey had agreed before the war, which would have deprived us of many of these established rights.

and improvised countless expedients in the way of camouflage, perception of approaching vessels under water, mining operations, etc. The general lesson seems to be that attack and defence still keep pace with each other and that combination—of surface ships, aircraft, and submarines—is indicated rather than the supersession and elimination of any one class.

Some of the outstanding names among the naval commanders were: Jellicoe, who commanded the Grand Fleet until December 1916, when he succeeded Admiral Jackson as First Sea Lord; Beatty, who commanded the battle-cruisers and succeeded Jellicoe in supreme command; Fisher, who returned to the Admiralty from October 1914 till May 1915; Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Isles; Tyrwhitt, who commanded the destroyers in the Heligoland battle and elsewhere; Robeck, who commanded in the Mediterranean; Captain Fox, whose flotilla, in October 1914, sank four German destroyers at the cost of only five English killed and wounded; Lieutenant-Commander Horton, the hero of submarine exploits in the North Sea, and Lieutenant Holbrook and Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith, who performed similar exploits in the Dardanelles; Admiral Keyes, who shared with Tyrwhitt the command of the raids on Zeebrugge and Ostend, and, succeeding Admiral Bacon, was for a time responsible for the wonderful mine-barrage and other defences of the Dover crossing; Commander Unwin of the *River Clyde*; Captain Fryatt of the Merchant Service, 'executed' by the Germans for the crime of defending his ship. But this is merely an arbitrary selection from a host of gallant and efficient men. Nor must the American Admirals Sims and Rodman be forgotten, who contributed so much to the smooth collaboration of the two navies.

Having now summarised the factors which contributed to the success or failure of the Allies, we must return to what was really one long battle extending through Belgium and North France as far as Switzerland and also along the Northern frontiers of Italy. Fighting never ceased; each side con-

tinually attempted to wear down the enemy by constant pressure, by local offensives to break through the defence, and by raids to maintain the offensive spirit of its own men and reduce that of its opponents. The year 1915 was a year of deadlock, although both sides gained minor advantages, generally at a disproportionate price. Among the prominent 'pushes' of the year were a French advance in Alsace, a German attack on Givenchy, near La Bassée, the British attack on Neuve Chapelle, the second battle of Ypres, notable for the first use of gas by the Germans by means of which they broke through some French territorial and African troops but failed to break the Canadians; if this foul weapon had been used on a large enough scale before any defence had been improvised, it might have proved decisive, and this fact emphasises the danger of trusting absolutely to international conventions. After this came the French attack on Souchez and British attacks at Festubert and Hooge, the introduction of liquid fire by the Germans and the realisation by the British authorities of the need of high explosive shells for the preliminary barrage to break down wire and other defences. In the autumn at the battle of Loos the British made their first use of gas. The year 1916 was marked by two titanic engagements: the defence of Verdun by the French, an epic of heroism whereby Pétain and other commanders foiled the army groups of the Crown Prince, and the battle of the Somme in which the British—now an army of 'continental' size under the command of Haig, who succeeded French in December 1915—kept up a constant attack to relieve the French and help the other allies. This battle might be subdivided into several inter-dependent engagements: it witnessed the introduction of the British 'Tanks,' and succeeded in its main object of diverting the enemy, while it also led to the retirement of the Germans from Bapaume and Péronne before the serious fighting began in 1917, and their reorganisation on the 'Hindenburg line.' The actual responsibility respectively of Hindenburg, who was now transferred from the East,

The Western
and Italian
Fronts,
1915-1918.

and of his lieutenants—Mackensen in the East and Ludendorff in the West—is a matter of doubt. But probability seems to point to Hindenburg as the master of defence, the others as the moving spirits in attack. The Hindenburg defences lay along the line noted by Napoleon as the natural line of resistance, and introduced new principles of elastic defence, écheloned strong posts offering a field of fire in every direction.

Meanwhile the tide of war had enveloped Italy. War was declared against Austria in May 1915, and during the summer, **Italian Campaigns.** although the frontier strategically favoured Austria, the Italians, who proved themselves true descendants of the Romans in engineering skill and road-making, crossed the Isonzo and occupied Montfalcone, Gradisca, and Mount Medetta. During the winter they also intervened in Albania and contributed a few men to the Salonika force, but were not willing to run serious risks on their own frontiers in order to help the Serbs, their possible rivals of the future in the Adriatic.

In the early summer of 1916 a great Austrian offensive temporarily drove the Italians back, especially in the Trentino, but later in the year—in correspondence with the Franco-British attack on the Somme and Brussiloff's great Russian offensive—the Italians under Cadorna again advanced, stormed many mountain positions and, on 9th August, captured Gorizia. In August war was declared between Italy and Germany, and the following year, after some further successes, the Italian front was broken at Caporetto by an Austro-German attack under Von Below; Socialist intrigue and treachery were largely responsible for the disaster. French and British troops were dispatched to stiffen the Italian front, and the Italian troops themselves stood firm on the line of the Piave, thus saving Venice. It was gradually becoming recognised that the Italian was part of one great front. The British attack at Cambrai relieved pressure by attracting German reinforcements. In 1918 Italian troops fought among the Allies near Rheims, while it was a British force

under Lord Cavan which made a breach in the Austrian lines, through which the Italian forces poured in the autumn of 1918 to destroy the Austrian army and Empire.

The year 1917 on the Western front was a year of great promise and great disappointments, and the position was complicated not only by the temporary Italian collapse but also by the events, mentioned above, ^{1917.} which eliminated Russia as a serious factor, although the Allies' expeditions, the loyal Russians, and the Czecho-Slovak prisoners managed to give occupation to a certain number of the enemies' troops, to checkmate the German and Magyar prisoners, and to save some of the stores at Archangel, Murman, and Vladivostock. In the spring the British felt their way forward to the new Hindenburg line. In April and May General Byng, with Canadian, British, and Anzac troops, and General Allenby attacked near Arras and captured many prisoners and guns, but did not recover Lens. Meanwhile General Nivelle, who had succeeded Joffre, launched a great attack on the Aisne. This failed with losses which the French could hardly afford, and Nivelle was succeeded by Pétain. In June General Plumer's brilliant victory at Messines, which resulted from the mining and explosion of the ridge—a triumph both for the Staff, the Engineers, and the miner-soldiers—was followed by the great attack by British and Anzacs on the Passchendaele Ridge, which lasted until November,¹ but was thwarted by incessantly wet weather. In November also Byng's army achieved a surprise attack at Cambrai, using secretly massed tanks instead of a preliminary barrage, and almost broke the German line sufficiently to pour through cavalry. Canals, however, hindered the pursuit, and the Germans scored a surprise with their counter-attack, using reinforcements which might otherwise have completed the rout of the Italians.

Meanwhile the United States had entered the war, goaded

¹ Disaffection in the French army after Nivelle's failure necessitated the continuation of our offensive.

by frequent outrages, such as that of the *Lusitania*, culminating in the German decision in favour of unrestricted submarine warfare from February 1917 onwards, and the

America. first American troops were landing in Europe during the late summer, while large armies were training and American ships were assisting the Allies. It was not, however, until late in 1918 that American man-power could approximately atone for the defection of Russia.

Early in 1918 it was obvious that, since Hindenburg's policy of exploiting the East, acting on the defensive in the West, and trusting to submarine warfare, was threatened by Germany's internal conditions and by the gradual but undoubted mastery of the submarine peril by the British and allied navies, after the terribly anxious period in 1917, therefore Germany's new advantage in man and gun power, gained by Russia's failure, would be used to force a decision before the American reinforcements really counted. For Ludendorff's great offensive the German troops had been carefully drilled during the winter in improved tactics: before the attack they were concentrated farther back than was the English custom, it being considered that the extra distance to cover was more than compensated for by the avoidance of loss during the counter-barrage; during the attack reinforcements marched always on to the points at which the first waves had succeeded: they 'contained' points of resistance but exploited successes, often in this way attacking a new point of the defences from behind; their transport, improvised though it was for lack of rubber, moved up nearer to the advancing troops than was customary. The British¹ forces, which now held a front of 125 miles in the most exposed parts of the whole line, could not hold every sector in force. For this no one was to blame, although it was terribly hard on Gough's Fifth Army which in the Somme region bore the brunt of the first German attack in March. The Germans threw into the attack overwhelming forces, varying from

¹ 'British' must be taken to include Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, Newfoundland, and other oversea contingents.

64 to 73 divisions, and were aided by a mist which rendered useless most of our outpost positions. In 1917 there had been no thought of an allied retreat and the so-called 'Pink Line' to the rear was not fully prepared; nor did most of our positions possess all-round fields of fire. In this sector it was possible to give ground for some distance without disastrous strategical results, and the Fifth and Third Armies fell back, fighting heroically but losing heavily in men and guns. The Germans were just held up in front of Amiens in time to prevent the separation of the British and French armies.

Gigantic efforts were made to replace the lost men and guns; moreover Foch, who, after a brilliant record¹ from the Marne onwards, had become in November 1917 a member of an advisory allied War Council, now became Generalissimo, with Pétain, Haig, and Pershing under him. While Pershing's main armies were trained, the more advanced American troops were brigaded with French and British troops, and thus reinforced the Allies at an earlier period than the Germans had expected.

In April came the second attack, in the Lys sector. The Portuguese troops broke and the British retreated fighting from the Ypres salient until on the 11th came Haig's orders to stand at all costs; exhausted though they were, his men obeyed as nobly as he had anticipated and were joined by French reinforcements. In May the enemy attacked towards Rheims and Soissons on the Aisne. The French, who, with some British troops, numbered eight against twenty-eight divisions, were forced back to the Marne, and Paris came under fire from specially made guns. In June the French, with Italian and American troops, held up a drive on Paris between Noyons and Montdidier, and in July they stopped the great final attempt on Rheims, Verdun, and Chalons.

The Germans had now made three great salients in the allied line, and a salient, while threatening to expose the

¹ Foch, like Stonewall Jackson, was a theorist and lecturer on military history and tactics who, when the time came, proved his theories in the field.

enemy to being enfiladed, also exposes the attacker to a flank attack. Foch had a strategical reserve. On 18th July the final battle started, with an attack by this reserve on the Rheims salient. The British then joined in the attack south-west of Soissons, and in August the Allies attacked from the Amiens direction, while Byng fought his way forward on the Somme and broke the 'impregnable' Hindenburg line with hammer blows which Foch afterwards described as the main element in the general victory. In September Pershing's force gained a victory at St. Mihiel; in October there was a general advance and the Belgian coast was regained; in November a British attack on the Sambre sector prevented a German rally on new lines; on the 6th negotiations began and on the 11th an Armistice was granted, while the Canadians on that day captured Mons, the point at which the British Epic had started four years and three months previously. The Kaiser fled to Holland and a German Republic was proclaimed. The Armistice terms included the surrender of most of the German Fleet, 5000 guns, 30,000 machine-guns, and 2000 aeroplanes.

One of the most remarkable features of the war was the development of aircraft and airmanship, especially perhaps in the case of the British, who, starting far behind the French and Germans, ended by being the greatest Air-Power. Aeroplanes proved their worth both for reconnaissance and artillery work and as weapons of offence; they wrought particularly appalling havoc during the final Austrian retreat. In long-distance raids, by day or night, it is hard to define military objectives, since any manufacturing centre is a munitions base, and the only effectual modern fortifications consist of entrenchments which can convert an 'open' city into a military position. Nevertheless a distinction can be drawn: in their scores of raids on England the Germans dropped bombs haphazard, thus killing without effecting any important purpose, although of course they selected military objectives if possible; the British raids

¹ Part of it was scuttled by its crews after surrender.

aimed definitely at specific objects. Zeppelins were of value at Jutland and elsewhere for observation purposes, but after their early raids we learned to deal with them. It took longer to cope with night-flying aeroplanes, but here again defence caught up offence. The 20th-century British airman seemed to embody again the spirit of the Elizabethan sailor.

In dealing from a British point of view with a war which was literally a war of entire nations it is necessary to say something of the 'Home Front.' We have not distinguished between the contingents of different parts of the Empire in this short account, because every part did its share, and the glory, like the toil and losses, should be treated as belonging to the united Empire as a single whole. In all the British Empire raised nine and a half millions of soldiers and sailors, including the mercantile marine, and suffered over two millions of casualties, of whom over seven hundred thousand, by land and sea, lost their lives. It may strike the imagination of school-readers of this book to be told that of the boys who left our Public Schools from 1914 to 1918 approximately one in every seven lost his life, while at least as many were permanently crippled. The total loss of life on both sides, not counting the losses since the Armistice, amounted to nearly seven and a half millions, while famine and pestilence, especially a novel form of influenza, were as destructive as war. Medical science in treating the wounded and preventing the diseases which generally attend warfare atoned for the devilish devices by which science was used to increase the horrors of war. Probably Serbia, France, and the Austrian Empire lost the largest percentage of their men, although Russia and Germany suffered the heaviest absolute losses. Until 1916 all the British soldiers were volunteers; the Territorials began to reach the fighting line towards the end of 1914, and they, together with 'Kitchener's' battalions of the army, supplied all the men needed during 1915. Conscription, however, was the most just method of preventing the exploitation of the patriotic majority, although the 'Conscientious Objection' clause in the Act of 1916

opened the way to abuses and recognised a principle which it is hard to defend—the right of a minority to evade the will of the majority. Canada also adopted Conscription, but Australia, where compulsory training already existed, preferred to raise her men on a voluntary system.

Ireland was at first omitted from the Act and in practice was never included. The fear of civil war at first receded

owing to the loyalty of both Ulstermen and Nationalists; one of Mr. Redmond's sons gave his life to the allied cause. Moreover the efforts of the Germans to win over Irish prisoners through the traitor, Roger Casement, failed. The postponement of the Home Rule Bill, however, although necessary, and possibly a tactlessness in dealing with Irish sentiment, led to the rebellion of 1916. This movement was foredoomed to failure; Casement was captured immediately on landing, the German efforts to land arms failed, and General Maxwell speedily reduced the rebels, of whom some of the principal leaders were executed, but unfortunately we had suffered a good many casualties among unsuspecting soldiers and policemen before it was realised that a rebellion was taking place, and also in the fighting which led to its suppression.

That would have been the time, if ever, to introduce conscription, but the opportunity was lost. Voluntary recruiting practically ceased in the South, and a confused policy—which pardoned some of the leaders who were equally to blame with others who were executed, which varied from repression to weakness and, after the accession to power of a new Government, instituted conscription but feared to enforce it—discouraged loyalists and promoted the conversion of Sinn Fein from being an academic movement to becoming an organisation of terrorism and masked warfare.

The agitation in Great Britain over the lack of shells, and especially of high explosive shells, in 1915 led to the formation of the first Coalition; the Unionists, who had consistently supported the Government during the war, joined Mr. Asquith's Government. The organisation of the munitions question was taken in hand by

Munitions
and Finance.

Mr. Lloyd George, and his energy, together with the zeal of the workers, produced such results that we were soon supplying the Allies and were able in 1918 to replace all our losses. In finance also Great Britain was the backbone of the Alliance. In addition to loans to Dominions and Allies, we guaranteed America's loans to our Allies. In all we spent about £8,000,000,000 and became a debtor instead of a creditor nation, the U.S.A. and, to a lesser extent, Japan being the gainers, although events were to prove that all alike suffer when wealth is squandered and the Exchange is upset. Most economists were surprised by the fact that the financial crash did not take place during the early stages of the war; but, if they were wrong in denying the possibility of a long war, they were right in their estimates of the ultimate results.

What Lloyd George did for the munitions problem had been done by Lord Kitchener, who became Secretary of State for War on 5th August 1914, in the matter of raising men during the first period. Mistakes in his position were inevitable, but when, on 5th June 1916, he was drowned by the mining of the *Hampshire*, while on his way to Russia, the country realised what it had owed to his prestige, his powers of organisation, and his fervent patriotism.

With few exceptions the non-military elements of the population rose to the height of the occasion. The King, both at home and in visits to the Army and the Fleet, and the Queen in her work for Hospitals set an example to the nation, while the Prince of Wales gained throughout the Empire's armies a popularity as warm as had attended his Oxford career and developed those qualities which, since the restoration of Peace, have made him our 'Ambassador of Empire' and the most potent influence for cordial relations with the U.S.A. The work of women not only gained them the Franchise in 1918 but also introduced a new factor into economics.

The disappointments of 1916 led to a popular demand for a smaller War Cabinet and more energetic leadership, and in December Mr. Asquith resigned, and, after the Unionist

Leaders
at Home.

leader, Mr. Bonar Law, had patriotically refused to form a Government of his own, a new Coalition Government was formed under Mr. Lloyd George, including Unionists, Liberal followers of the new Premier, and some Labour representatives. This Coalition afterwards triumphed at the Election of 1918, but Labour officially withdrew from it, and it became mainly Unionist. From the point of view of war efficiency two things were gained: whatever his opponents think of his other qualities, no one can deny that Mr. Lloyd George gave us energetic leadership, nor that his influence was used in 1918 in favour of unified command; furthermore, the inner or 'War' Cabinet was not only smaller and less clogged by routine than the full Cabinet, but also could conveniently include Dominion statesmen, and possibly foreshadowed a development which may give us unity in counsel without the encroachments of a federal system.

Prominent among our oversea statesmen were Sir Robert Borden of Canada, Mr. Hughes of Australia, the South Africans, General Botha and General Smuts, and from India the present Lord Sinha.

It is only possible to give in broad outline the principles that underlay the terms of Peace arranged at the Congress of **Peace and its** Versailles, 1919. As always happens, the allied **Problems.** statesmen found that it was easier to agree during war than in arranging the terms; necessary compromises are easier to criticise than to make. Even the acceptance by all parties of certain principles enunciated by the American President, Mr. Woodrow Wilson, in his famous fourteen points, hardly simplified matters, since there were reservations attached to their acceptance by some of the Allies, and there were also marked variations in their interpretation.

Possibly the central point is the inauguration of the League of Nations, the work largely of Mr. Wilson, Lord **The League of Nations.** Robert Cecil, and General Smuts, while Mr. Barnes was equally prominent in the application of international engagements to Labour problems. The League of Nations repre-

sents an attempt to prevent war and promote co-operation for the common good, not by ignoring national sentiment and attempting to restore the Cosmopolitanism which failed with the Roman Empire and could not be restored even by the Mediaeval Church, but by recognising nationality and aiming at a 'social contract' between Sovereign Powers. Unfortunately Mr. Wilson's idealism carried him ahead of his countrymen, and his rather arbitrary character made him irresponsible to advice. At present the U.S.A. refuse to join the League, and further difficulties are presented by the lack of a definite force to support the League's decisions, the improbability of unanimous agreement, and the fact that the League does not include all nations; the relations of Great to Small Powers also require defining.

The principle of Nationality was also recognised in the re-settlement of the map. Poland was restored; most of the Jugo-Slav districts of the Austrian Empire were joined with Serbia, after some trouble between **Europe.** Italy and Serbia, which gave rise to the dramatic coup of d'Annunzio at Fiume; Bohemia became the Czecho-Slovak Republic; Alsace and Lorraine reverted to France; Italy secured a rectification of her frontiers and the acquisition of Trieste and the Dalmatian Coast; some new states were formed out of Russia's Baltic provinces; Finland became independent; plebiscites were arranged to settle the problems of Schleswig and Holstein—as between Germany and Denmark—and of Silesia—as between Germany and Poland; an Austrian Republic was formed of the Austrian-Germans and a Hungarian Republic of the Magyars; Greece gained large acquisitions of territory in Thrace and round Smyrna, the independence of Armenia was recognised.

Unfortunately the fate of many of the new states remains uncertain. Austria lacks the industrial and agricultural resources necessary to support Vienna, and the Central European states generally are increasing their economic distress by a policy of mutual jealousy in regard to tariffs and in other respects. The anarchy and aggressions of

Russia—which has already waged a war with Poland since the general Peace, and throughout Europe and Asia has incited discontents to revolution—makes the future of all North, Central, and Eastern Europe uncertain. Armenia is hemmed in between Bolsheviks and Nationalist Turks; the latter are disputing the Smyrna settlement with Greece, which has alienated the Allies by restoring Constantine, and the Mohammedan world is disturbed by the Turkish problem. Constantinople remains in Turkish hands, but the Narrows are under international control.

Germany was deprived of all her colonies, which were distributed among the Allies under 'mandates' from the League of Nations; Britain and Belgium divided German East Africa, Britain and France the Cameroons and Togoland, the Union of South Africa secured German South-West Africa, New Zealand Samoa, Australia the other islands in the South Pacific, Japan those in the North. Britain also undertook mandates to set up a protected Arab state in Mesopotamia and to open Palestine for the Zionist movement without injuring the interests of the native Arabs. France secured control of Syria, and Italy also gained territory at Turkey's expense. The U.S.A., having withdrawn from the League, object to some of the mandates unless such concessions are made, e.g. concerning Mesopotamian oil and the ocean cable at Yap, that the mandatory powers might not find any recompense for their trouble and expense. These problems, however, concern modern politics rather than History.

The most influential statesmen at the Congress, besides Mr. Wilson, were the French and English Premiers, M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, the two statesmen who, above all others, had never faltered in their belief in and insistence on victory. The French were naturally most interested in obtaining future security for France and reparation, so far as it was possible, for the appalling devastation of the war area, not only through the inevitable havoc wrought by war but

Reparations.

also through the deliberate destruction by the Germans of mines, factories, trees and other sources of wealth. Belgium, which for the most part had been occupied without fighting, had suffered less, but there also were irreparable injuries, such as the destruction of the Library of Louvain and the devastation of Ypres and the surrounding district.

In brief it was arranged that, in addition to the territorial arrangements mentioned, Germany was to grant certain rectifications of frontier in favour of Belgium, the Sarre coal mines were to be ceded to France, and the territory in which they are situated was to be settled by the result of a plebiscite after fifteen years—during which the League of Nations would administer it through a Commission; the German Army was to be reduced to 100,000 volunteers, the Navy and Air Fleet to be as drastically restricted, compensation in kind or in money was to be made for damage by land or sea done to civilian property, stolen goods—machinery, railway stock, beasts, etc.—were to be restored or replaced by the enemy Powers. Britain, France, Belgium, and the U.S.A. occupied the Rhineland to enforce these terms. There was also a clause forbidding German fortifications within fifty kilometres of the Rhine. While a Reparation Committee assessed the sums to be paid, a preliminary payment of twenty thousand million marks was to be made by 1st May 1921. The arraignment was ordered of some of the most heinous war-criminals—for brutality to prisoners, attacks on hospital ships, etc.—and some farcical trials have subsequently taken place in German Courts at Leipzig. Difficulties have arisen over the questions of disarmament and compensation. The Allies—Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, and Japan—have been compelled to devise new methods to enforce obedience. It is hard to devise methods of payment which will not injure trade by even further upsetting the Exchange. Moreover, the total sum is so great that it could only be paid by a Germany which was restored to pre-war prosperity, and even then much would be left for the next generation. On the other hand, it is neither right nor expedient that France should

be left infinitely worse off than Germany, or Serbia than Bulgaria.

This question is one of those arising out of the war. For the British Empire another problem presses: the satisfaction of rational demands for Home Rule in Ireland, the independence of Egypt, and increased self-government for India without betraying the interests of loyalists or, in the Eastern dependencies, of the masses of peasants, and without imperilling the Empire. Civilisation as a whole is faced by economic problems of the utmost importance. The collapse of Russia under Communist tyranny hinders the restoration of international trade. It seems that the comparatively small part of Russia which had been 'industrialised' is irretrievably ruined, but eventually a peasant state may revive which will increase the world's stock of raw material and act as a buffer between East and West. Room must be found for Asiatic emigration, either in Siberia or in South America, unless the Western Powers are prepared to face another world-war. Above all, productivity must be increased and a *modus vivendi* found between the two natural allies who have fallen foul of each other—Capital and Labour. There are thinkers who hold that the demands of Labour for a higher standard of life in an impoverished world will lead to the collapse of the white race, or at least its reduction in numbers in its homelands and its relegation in other lands to the task of managing coloured labour. Nevertheless the proofs given during the war of widespread heroism and organising ability encourage one to hope that inventiveness and reason will triumph, and that in Industrial as in International affairs Discussion may supersede Force, and that thus Civilisation may be preserved and improved.

Peace
Problems.

NOTE

It would be a vain hope to aim at producing an absolutely 'up-to-date' History; too much is happening from month to month. Even while this chapter has been written a conference at Cannes (December 1921-January 1922) has endeavoured to secure some agreed basis both for a mutual defensive guarantee between Great Britain and France and for a future conference, at Genoa, to which German and Russian delegates are to be invited, to devise remedies for the universal ills, while at Washington another assembly of statesmen has secured agreement to some measure of decrease of naval armaments and to steps to diminish the likelihood and horrors of warfare and to solve the Pacific and Far Eastern problems; an understanding between America, the British Empire, and Japan is to be substituted for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Not till at least a century hence will it be possible to deal historically with the final results of the Great War.

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Century.	EGYPT.	OLD TESTAMENT HISTORY.	GREECE.	ROME.	THE ORIENT.
32nd B.C.	9th Dynasty.	The Deluge (traditional).			
22nd B.C.	14th Dynasty.	Abraham (") .			
13th B.C.	Rameses II.	The Exodus (") .	(Fall of Troy.)		
8th B.C.				Rome founded (traditional).	Confucius. Cyrus captures Babylon. Buddhism started.
6th B.C.	Persian conquest.	Capture of Jerusalem.			
5th B.C.			War with Persia.		
4th B.C.			ALEXANDRINE EMPIRE.		
3rd B.C.				Hannibal.	
1st B.C.	Becomes a Roman Province.	Subjugation of Judaea by Pompey.		Caesar's Conquest of Gaul.	
		THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.			

NOTE.—In a non-theological book it is impossible to give proportionate space to the life of Christ. Even from a secular point of view, however, it must be admitted by non-Christians as well as by Christians that the birth of Christ is the central date of History, and that the influence of Christianity on thought and practice and even on political institutions is one of the main features in the growth of Western Civilisation. For Greek and Roman dates see pp. 15-18.

COMPARATIVE DATE CHART OF MODERN HISTORY

Century.	ENGLISH.	EUROPEAN.	BEYOND.
4th A.D.		Constantinople re-founded as Roman Capital.	
5th	English land.	Fall of Western Empire. Clovis.	Mongol and Tartar invasion of India.
6th	Landing of St. Augustine.	Justinian's Code.	
7th	The Ages of Barbarism.		Mohammed.
8th	The Dark Ages.	Battle of Tours. Charlemagne.	
9th	Alfred. The Danes.	Charlemagne. Treaty of Verdun.	
10th	Mediaeval Civilisation.	Vikings found Normandy.	
11th	Norman Conquest.	Gregory VII. 1st	Capture of Jerusalem by Turks. Crusade.
12th		Portuguese Independence. 2nd Frederick Barbarossa. 3rd	Crusade. Crusade.

COMPARATIVE DATE CHART OF MODERN HISTORY—*continued*

Century.	ENGLISH.	EUROPEAN.	BEYOND.
13th	Magna Carta The Conquest of Wales.	Innocent III. Albigensian Movement. S. Louis accedes. Friars. Italian Renaissance.	Ottoman Empire founded. Marco Polo.
14th	H U N D R E D BLACK Wyclif.	DEATH. Papal Schism.	
15th	Y E A R S' W A R THE RENAISSANCE. Loss of all French Pos- sessions but Calais. Wars of the Roses.	Martyrdom of John Huss. THE RENAISSANCE. Capture of Con- stantinople. Invention of Printing. M. of Ferdinand and Isabella. Savonarola. Charles VIII. in Rome.	Vasco da Gama disc. Cape Route. Disc. of America.

COMPARATIVE DATE CHART OF MODERN HISTORY—*continued*

Century.	ENGLISH.	EUROPEAN.	BEYOND.
16th	THE REFORMATION. Accession of Henry VIII. Drake round the World. The	FORMATION. Accession of Francis I. Accession of Charles v. Jesuits founded. D. of Luther. The Armada. Henry IV. of France.	Cortes in Mexico. Pizarro in Peru.
17th	East India Com- pany formed. Civil War. D. of Charles I. Restoration of Charles II. Dutch Wars. Revolution.	Dutch East In- dia Company formed. THIRTY YEARS' WAR. Louis XIV. Peter the Great. Turks threaten Vienna.	Massacre of Am- boyna. Japan excludes Europeans. Aurangzeb, Great Mogul.
18th	War of Spanish Blenheim. TREATY OF Hanoverian dynasty. Walpole.	Succession. Charles XII. of Sweden. Pultawa. UTRECHT. D. of Louis XIV. Treaty of Pas- sarowitz. Accession of Frederick the Great. War of Austrian Succession.	

COMPARATIVE DATE CHART OF MODERN HISTORY—*continued*

Century.	ENGLISH.	EUROPEAN.	BEYOND.
18th	Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The elder Pitt. The younger Pitt.	Seven Years' War. Peace of Paris. Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. French Revolution. 2nd Partition of Poland. 3rd do. Bonaparte 1st Consul.	Clash of France and England in India and North America. Declaration of Independence.
19th	Castlereagh. Canning and Huskisson. Victoria. Parliamentary Reforms and Free Trade.	1st Empire. Russian Campaign. Waterloo. Congress of Vienna. Navarino. Louis Philippe. The year of Revolutions. Accession of Francis Joseph. Second Empire. Crimean War. Cavour. Italian Liberation War. Garibaldi. Bismarck. Königgrätz.	Monroe Doctrine. Indian Mutiny. War of North and South.

Industrial Revolution.

COMPARATIVE DATE CHART OF MODERN HISTORY—*continued*

Century.	ENGLISH.	EUROPEAN.	BEYOND.
19th	Disraeli and Gladstone. Boer War.	Franco-Prussian War. William I., German Emperor. Treaty of San Stefano. Treaty of Berlin.	Modernisation of Japan. 'Scramble' in China and Africa. Boer War.
20th	GREAT WAR.	GREAT WAR.	

COMPARATIVE DATES IN LITERATURE

Period.	ENGLISH LITERATURE.	EUROPEAN LITERATURE.
Plantagenets.	CHAUCER. Langland. Gower. Mandeville.	DANTE. PETRARCH. Boccaccio. Froissart.
Houses of Lancaster and York.	Malory.	Villon.
Early Tudors.	Drummond of Hawthornden.	Machiavelli. Ariosto. Rabelais.

COMPARATIVE DATES IN LITERATURE—*continued*

Period.	ENGLISH LITERATURE.	EUROPEAN LITERATURE.
Elizabeth.	SPENSER. Marlowe. SHAKESPEARE. Beaumont and Fletcher. *BACON. *Ben Jonson.	Montaigne. Camoens. Tasso.
Early Stuarts.	Hobbes.	CERVANTES. *Corneille.
Later Stuarts.	MILTON. Bunyan. Pepys. Herrick. Congreve. Clarendon. Locke. DRYDEN.	Pascal. MOLIÈRE. Racine. La Fontaine.
1700-1790.	Steele. ADDISON. Defoe. Pope. Swift. Gray. DR. JOHNSON. Fielding. Goldsmith. Burke. Gibbon. Sheridan. *Burns.	VOLTAIRE. Saint-Simon.
1790-1837.	Scott. Coleridge. Wordsworth. Shelley. Byron. Keats. Jane Austen. Lamb. Macaulay.	Rousseau. Alfieri. Schiller. GOETHE, Kant. Leopardi. Lamartine. Heine.

* Denotes Transition Period.

COMPARATIVE DATES IN LITERATURE—*continued*

Period.	ENGLISH LITERATURE.	EUROPEAN LITERATURE.
Victoria.	Dickens. Thackeray. Tennyson. Carlyle. Lytton. George Eliot. C. Brontë. Browning. Ruskin. Meredith. Swinburne. Stevenson. Kipling. Hardy.	Victor Hugo. Manzoni. BALZAC. Dostoievski. Tolstoi. Carducci. Daudet. Dumas. Ibsen. Maeterlinck.

APPROXIMATE DATES
IN ENGLISH ARCHITECTURE

ROMANESQUE (Round Arches)

Periods.

Pre-Norman or Saxon	601-1066
Norman	1066-1145
Norman Transition	1145-1190

GOTHIC (Pointed Arches)

Early English or Lancet	1190-1245
Decorated, including Geometrical and Curvilinear	1245-1360
Perpendicular	1360-1485
Tudor	1485-1600

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