

FRANCE OVERSEAS  
THROUGH THE OLD RÉGIME

By HERBERT INGRAM PRIESTLEY

JOSÉ DE GÁLVEZ, VISITOR GENERAL OF NEW SPAIN  
CALIFORNIA, THE NAME (WITH RUTH PUTNAM)  
SOME MEXICAN PROBLEMS (WITH MOISÉS SÁENZ)  
THE MEXICAN NATION, A HISTORY  
THE COMING OF THE WHITE MAN  
THE LUNA PAPERS  
TRISTÁN DE LUNA, CONQUISTADOR OF THE OLD SOUTH  
FRANCE OVERSEAS: A STUDY OF MODERN IMPERIALISM  
FRANCE OVERSEAS THROUGH THE OLD RÉGIME

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Institute of Social Sciences, University of California

# FRANCE OVERSEAS THROUGH THE OLD RÉGIME A Study of European Expansion

BY

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## PREFACE

This book is an introduction and companion to *France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1938). Like its predecessor, it was developed after the author had spent some years studying and teaching European expansion with particular emphasis upon the Spanish American evolution, but with the usual attention to the activities of the several expansionist nations of Western Europe.

In the course of such employment it became obvious that no synthetic portrayal of the outward thrust of the colonizing states was readily available for readers of English, and that the chief lack was an account of the French contribution to European expansion. Since the day when the five Western nations joined in mutual rivalries for overseas empire, no other phase of world development has attained so great importance. Indeed, all interpretation of modern history hinges upon extra-European rivalries of imperial states and their consequent reactions. To those who are historically minded, eclectic interpretations based upon partial though accepted treatments are inadequate. When as much truth as possible is gleaned from the record of the past, the picture becomes more clearly intelligible, as the fuller view of the cavalcade of the centuries reveals the complicated motivations and the historical accidents which have brought the world into its 1939 tragedy of terrors. What began as a glorious passage in the history of Europe has become in these latter days the greatest menace to civilization.

The present volume and its companion offer a pioneer genetic treatment in English of the work of France overseas. Few other documented histories of the subject have appeared in any language. Even the French historians have been oftener propagandists for the colonial cause, generally unpopular in France, than objective narrators of an historical process. English writers on colonialism and imperialism have also been prone to favor close English interpretations.

*France Overseas* is the story of the building of an empire, from its remote beginnings in Europe, its motivations and its racial causes and geographical influences; this volume carries the narrative to the close of the Napoleonic era, the companion volume moving from the resurgence of imperial ambitions with the seizure of Algiers to the moment of the beginning of the redistribution of the African colonies with the

Italian entry into Ethiopia. Since that moment the attitudes of the colonial powers have reacted to the body blows suffered by the Peace of Versailles with too great uncertainty to be dealt with in historical perspective.

The author has based this volume chiefly on French authorities, some for facts, some for organization, others for interpretation. As far as practicable, conclusions have been checked against other accepted authorities, but it is in essence a French-told tale. It is not an ungrounded criticism of French imperialism nor acceptance of chauvinistic interpretation. While its scope precluded exclusive reliance upon primary sources, these when available have been carefully used, and authorities followed are in all cases dependable and adequate. Acknowledgment is due to Georges Hardy and his writings for much of the material here used. The work has been successfully used in manuscript form as reading for classes in European expansion, and it is hoped that it will afford synthesis and guide for more intensive studies of the history of a movement now undergoing revolutionary changes. The annotation is intended to provide direction to material for additional reading as well as reference to authorities.

Professors Lesley B. Simpson, M. M. Knight, and James Westfall Thompson have read the manuscript in whole or in part; Dr. Engel Sluiter criticized early chapters referring to Dutch colonial movements. Mr. David Davies assisted in annotation and bibliographical work. Mrs. Irene Quintana Campa and Mrs. Eleanor Ashby Bancroft helped in proof reading. Mrs. Catherine A. Edwards and Miss Vivienne Paire made the index.

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## CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE . . . . .	v
INTRODUCTION: FRANCE AND THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE. . .	xi
CHAPTER	
I PREPARATION FOR OVERSEAS EXPANSION . . . . .	1
II THE CRUSADES AND THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR . . .	12
III THE AGE OF DISCOVERY AND THE EARLY FRENCH COLONIES; CARTIER AND ROBERVAL . . . . .	29
IV BRAZIL AND FLORIDA . . . . .	44
V FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV (1589-1610); ACADIA AND CANADA; CHAMPLAIN . . . . .	55
VI THE COLONIAL POLICY OF RICHELIEU; CANADA BEFORE COLBERT . . . . .	65
VII THE WEST INDIES UNDER RICHELIEU AND COLBERT	76
VIII GUIANA THROUGH THE OLD RÉGIME . . . . .	93
IX MADAGASCAR TO THE REVOLUTION . . . . .	109
X MAZARIN AND COLBERT . . . . .	124
XI COMMERCE WITH SPANISH AMERICA . . . . .	135
XII THE AMERICAN COLONIES UNDER COLBERT; CANADA	146
XIII SENEGAL UNDER THE OLD RÉGIME . . . . .	158
XIV INDIA, 1664-1719 . . . . .	170
XV INDIA, 1719-1754; DUPLEIX . . . . .	183
XVI FALL OF FRENCH INDIA . . . . .	196
XVII THE MASCAREIGNES, 1640-1810 . . . . .	208
XVIII LOUISIANA AFTER 1713 . . . . .	224

CHAPTER		PAGE
XIX	THE FALL OF NEW FRANCE . . . . .	237
XX	THE FRENCH ANTILLES, 1674-1763 . . . . .	253
XXI	THE FRENCH ANTILLES, 1763-1789 . . . . .	264
XXII	THE SITUATION OF FRANCE AFTER 1763 . . . . .	276
XXIII	THE COLONIAL WORK OF THE OLD RÉGIME . . . . .	291
XXIV	THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE COLONIES . . . . .	316
XXV	THE COLONIES UNDER CONSULATE AND EMPIRE . . . . .	343
APPENDIX: CIVIL AND MILITARY COLONIAL EXPENDITURES		
		<i>facing</i> 360
INDEX . . . . .		361

## MAPS

	PAGE
SECTION OF A MAP OF SAINT CHRISTOPHE, SHOWING PLANTATIONS . . . . .	<i>facing</i> 84
CAYENNE . . . . .	<i>facing</i> 94
INDIA IN THE DAYS OF DUPLEIX . . . . .	172
LOUISIANA AS DEPICTED BY LE PAGE DU PRATZ, 1757 . . . . .	<i>facing</i> 224
SECTION OF NORMAN'S CHART SHOWING PLANTATIONS ON THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, 1758 . . . . .	<i>facing</i> 228
THE WEST INDIES AS MAPPED BY BRYAN EDWARDS . . . . .	<i>facing</i> 254
GUADELOUPE . . . . .	<i>facing</i> 266

## INTRODUCTION

### FRANCE AND THE EXPANSION OF EUROPE

To American readers a survey of French overseas expansion will be welcome because we ourselves, following European patterns, have some sort of imperial colonial interest. Until recently we assumed tutelage over dependent and retarded peoples in various parts of the world—a relationship which is colonization in the French sense. We cannot be sure that this relationship has actually ended. We have studied the English process and system of expansion, are indeed ourselves its product. It has almost become axiomatic with us that the overseas spread of England has been the only true colonization. But we have neglected the interesting experiments which the French have been making on the fringes of civilization to advance the condition of the peoples within their empire, and to make their occupation of overseas dependencies reasonably profitable.

France, today, after four hundred years of colonial rivalry second only to the British Empire in overseas power, deserves more attention for her expansive enterprise than she has received. For she stands, with other Western powers, on the periphery of white civilization, committed to the task of maintaining the traditions and procuring the advancement of European culture among a multitude of races non-European in culture and origin and non-Christian in faith. The future of European coöperation with these peoples, who are now emerging into national existence or are endeavoring to create new social and economic systems, is in the hands of the dominant nations. The permanency of our present type of civilization may yet depend as vitally upon the wisdom and justice of these colonial relations as upon the interplay of the mutual adjustments of the great states of Europe.<sup>1</sup>

France has been a great colonial power since the beginning of the seventeenth century; her experience and successes have vindicated her right to profess the existence of a French genius for colonization. Certainly she stands guardian today at many a danger point where civilizations and cultures clash.

This colonial responsibility is matched in territorial magnitude by that of no other power save Great Britain. The "Empire" of the latter,

<sup>1</sup> See the exposition of the French "conscience coloniale" in O. Homberg, *La France des cinq parties du monde* (Paris, 1927), ch. I.

exclusive of the Dominions and including India, measures 6,000,000 square miles, while the modern colonial holdings of France, including Algeria and Tunisia, cover about 3,058,000 square miles. Moreover, certain broad analogies in the two colonial realms strike our attention: First, the nearest approach in the French scheme to the British Dominions is North Africa. Syria, because of intricate political difficulties, stands outside of this comparison. In the second category stand India and Indo-China, where civilization is older than that of Europe and where the white man's presence and tutelage are endured as transitional. In the third rank stand the real colonial territories, largely confined to Africa and the South Seas. In most of these areas, French or British, the problems of governance are so nearly similar that each power watches with interest the methods and policies of the other in order to learn how to achieve better success, rather than with the old jealousy.

The modern French empire spreads from the spots where the beginnings were made under the Old Régime. Little that was not prospectively conquerable is under France today; strangely enough, though an epoch of responsibility to retarded races is dawning, very little of her present colonial policy is essentially unlike that of Richelieu or Colbert. Hence it is profitable to examine the processes by which she developed her old but lost empire under the ideals of monopoly and autocracy.

The expansion of each of the Western nations has been largely conditioned by factors involved in geographical location. Europe is a relatively small peninsula on the northwestern extremity of Eurasia. It is much broken by arms of the sea, a feature which helped give diversity of political groupings and social organizations while contributing, through the superior ease of water-borne transportation over that by land, a relatively great amount of interaction by travel and trade. Out of these conditions and the evolution of several neighboring nation-states, each having common traits of political development and comparable access to the sea, there early arose a keen international rivalry in trade which did more than anything else to spread Europe overseas.

The gradual rise of the European nation-states synchronized very closely with the movement of Moslem peoples which checked the trade facilities of the Italian cities with the Levant. The development of nation-states was partly due to the growth of vernacular languages within areas which had more or less well-defined and defensible "natural frontiers"; in addition, there had grown up in several cases a ruling house, fairly successful in dominating rival nobles, whose head stood among the latter as "primus inter pares." In each country the king ruled by concentration of the power in his own hands and by the de-

velopment of a spirit of patriotism in which the monarch as hero of the people consolidated regional pride and power. This combination of circumstances made the nation-states of western Europe strong enough for overseas adventure when, the old ways having been cut off by the Moslems, Venice and the other Italian city-states were unable to consolidate sufficient power to compete with them. Such city-states never—not even Venice—acquired the political power needful for the transatlantic or the Asiatic phase of expansion. These important considerations had marked repercussion on international politics when the discovery of America and of the route around Africa moved seaborne trade out of the Mediterranean into the Atlantic.

The power of the Italian cities, and of the Western nation-states as well, was threatened by the growth of the Ottoman Turks, whose impact was first felt upon the Eastern Empire.<sup>2</sup> For about one hundred years, from 1343 when the pretender, John Cantacuzène, invited their intervention to help him obtain the throne of Byzantium, until 1453 when Constantinople fell to them, the Turks grew in power to check European advances toward the East. Through the next eighty years Turkish control over the waters of the Levant became firmer. By an alliance with France (1535), which helped Francis I to protect himself from Hapsburg domination, the Moslem sultan Soliman (1494–1566) fastened himself upon the frontiers of the Hapsburg dominions, got control of the Euphrates valley, built a stronghold on the Persian Gulf, others on the Black Sea, and took possession of Egypt. His first-rate sea power gave him complete control of the trade routes to the Far East. In 1544 he even tried to defy the naval strength of Portugal. In the eastern Mediterranean, Venice had to give up the Morea in Greece and the Aegean Islands. Algiers and Tunis, driving out ambitious Spain (1535–1543), soon invited Turkish suzerainty and became bases of pirate raids upon the coasts of southern Europe; by 1551 Tripoli joined them. In spite of their growing wealth and power, the Christian nations were forced to turn their attention westward. It was in this movement toward the Occident that a thousand years of Asiatic expansion found its European check, the opening of the route around Africa to India flanking the westward thrust of Islam.

The first European state to consolidate her territory, entrench her kingship in supremacy over the clergy and the nobles, and launch into overseas expansion, was Portugal, whose nationality had been forged

<sup>2</sup> Ch. André Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord* (Paris, 1931), 510–521; W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe, 1415–1789* (New York, 1924, 2v.), I, 100–131; R. B. Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New* (New York, 1925, 3v.), III, 346–349.

as an incident in the struggle of Castile against the Moors. From 1095 Portugal was a county, and a kingdom in 1140; in 1263 the full modern territory was rounded out when the Moors were expelled. In 1415, with the capture of Ceuta, the little nation began a brilliant series of voyages along the coast of Africa which culminated in 1486 with the rounding of the Cape of Good Hope by Bartolomé Díaz, and the arrival of Vasco da Gama at Calicut in 1498. The leading commercial country of the world until 1580, Portugal saw her Golden Age concluded when the throne was seized by Philip II and consolidated with that of Spain.

This other Iberian land moved swiftly in the wake of Portugal after 1492. Spain had missed early unification because within her borders lay the rival kingdoms of Aragon and Castile, each with its own movements of consolidation of kingly power against rival nobles and the reconquest of Moorish areas. When, however, the two realms were joined in 1479 by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel, Spain began to emerge into national life. By 1492 the last vestige of Moorish dominion was wiped out by the fall of Granada. Out of the Castilian enlargement grew Aragon's interest in Italy. The voyage of Columbus turned Spain toward building her majestic kingdoms in North and South America. Isolation of Portugal in the Peninsula turned her toward the African shore and conquest.

The period of Iberian overseas monopoly (to 1588) thus initiated was one of sharp rivalry between Portugal and Spain. In 1493 the papal Line of Demarcation sought to conserve the acquired rights of Portugal along the African littoral and leave open her way around the Cape of Good Hope to the Spice Lands of the Orient, in which she was so soon to absorb the Venetian share of the trade, and deprive the Arabs and other Moslem powers of their part. Spain, keeping to the west of the imaginary sea-boundary, might reach the spices by westward sailing only.<sup>8</sup>

This Line of Demarcation lay, when adjusted at Tordesillas in 1494, so as to give Portugal a corner of Brazil, thus dividing her attention between Orient and Occident, while to Spain it gave such huge continents that she never was able to conquer and hold the stupendous areas conceded by valid international law and sanctioned by treaty. Spain's greatest overseas spread was coincident with the reigns of Charles V (1516-1556) and Philip II (1556-1598). Before the latter date she had conquered and occupied the Caribbean, New Spain, Peru and the Philippines, and in North America had begun

<sup>8</sup> The bulls of Alexander had their precedent in those of popes Martin V, Eugenius IV, Nicholas V, and Sixtus IV granting African coastal monopolies to Portugal (A. Archin, *Histoire de la Guinée Française* (Paris, 1911), 186).

to expand New Spain up to the present New Mexico. She even had designs on Newfoundland in 1555.<sup>4</sup> Always in the minds of the Spanish rulers, the entire papal grant remained as the ideal goal of expansion; and the rigid and exclusive system of colonial control developed by Spain, rather than that of Portugal, became for the rival nations the norm, the type in large degree, which they used as the model for their competing colonial enterprises.

The Iberian monopoly and demarcation were challenged sharply by two rivals which lay outside the scope of papal solicitude, England and France. They worked zealously, sometimes in accord, to break the privileged position of the Iberians, seeking to reach the East, not by the routes conceded to Spain and Portugal, but by the Arctic seas, or through the heart of Asia; they spent years on the American coasts in search of a "dubious" strait which, lying perhaps outside the ocean routes of the Iberians, would lead to the Spice Lands. Later, they capitalized the energy of their adventurous sea-dogs by countenancing buccaneering against the Spaniards in the Caribbean; their infraction of the monopoly on the sea led soon to insular and continental settlements in America, while their merchant adventurers contested with Portugal and Holland for the trade of the East Indies. As important a rival was the latter state which, revolting from Spain in 1568, continued to challenge first the Hapsburg kingdom and then England, until Spain was defeated in 1648; Holland herself in turn had to yield to England after 1688.

England was only a moment earlier than France in this invasion of the Iberian monopoly, save that the voyage of the famous Venetian John Cabot, who skirted the northeastern coast of North America in 1497, laid the basis of England's claims, giving her a priority in discovery. In 1524 Verrazano's voyage for France, bringing back a vague notion of bodies of water within the continent, and a superior delineation of the Atlantic coast, had a much greater influence in furthering discovery than did the voyage of Cabot. England persisted for over a hundred years in trying for a Northwest Passage, out of reach of Spanish ships and infantry, while France, initiating her penetration of North America by the voyages of Jacques Cartier in 1534-1535 and 1540, was gradually led by the St. Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi into the heart of the continent and thence

<sup>4</sup> F. C. Davenport, *European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies* (Washington, 1917-1929, 2v.), I, 215; "Información hecha en la villa de San Sebastián, el año de 1555, para acreditar las acciones marineras de los capitanes armadores de Guipúzcoa durante la guerra con Francia," printed by C. Fernández Duro, *Disquisiciones náuticas*, VI, "Arca de Noé" (Madrid, 1876-1881, 6v.), 355-378, and by E. Ducéré, *Histoire maritime de Bayonne: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime* (Bayonne, 1895), 333-334.

westward by land to the Rocky Mountain region. The voyage of Estevan Gómez during the same year as Verrazano's, to spy upon French designs, resulted in Spanish indifference to the northern lands and ocean.

The preparation for this competition between France and England in overseas expansion is full of piquant interest. Each had to develop national unity and trade instincts before venturing overseas. England was perhaps even earlier than Portugal in welding her population into nationality. Two important factors in the process were the early movement of the serfs into a free agricultural wage-earning class, and the law of primogeniture, which transmitted estates to first sons only, forcing the younger ones into the middle class. The protection afforded by insularity and the centralism of the Norman conquerors helped, while the preservation of Saxon local institutions strengthened solidarity and the tradition of antiquity and stability. The law, as in Spain and Portugal, was thought to stand above the king, but his failure to control tax collection and the deliberations of the legislative bodies left him less autocratic than his near continental neighbors.

In England an incipient spirit of cohesion in support of the king was easily aroused by Henry III (1216-1272) and by the contest of the barons with the pope to exclude Italians from church benefices and to preserve state positions for Englishmen. Under this Henry, the first parliament met, and under Edward I an embryonic representative system was initiated. With strength came expansion into Wales, a losing struggle for dominion over Scotland, and a century of conflict for expansion into France. Just when the final defeat in France at Chatillon (1453) might have directed surplus English energy into overseas channels, the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485) threw England into years of fratricidal struggle between rival claimants for the kingship. The wars brought about the elimination of many ambitious noble families, made of the Parliament an agency of other nobles, and gave the king a strong position.

Henry VII, beginning the House of Tudor in 1485, was the great restorer. His Privy Council renewed the lost power of justice, especially against the nobles; the use of the clergy and the middle class in affairs of state strengthened him, as did his disuse of feudal levies and the substitution of mercenaries in his armies. Crown finances were made as independent of the Parliament as might be, though subsidies were frequently asked. Henry was unable to superimpose his Privy Council over Parliament, as had been the process of autocracy in France and Spain—a feature of comparative governmental history of which English-speaking peoples have been perhaps too boastfully conscious, in view of the recent expositions of practical uniformity of Euro-

pean governments in their formative period. Aid, fairly meager in contrast with the overseas investments of Spain and Portugal, was given to John Cabot's voyage, so that from this energetic Tudor's time dates the legal claim of England to a part of the American continent which Spain was really not strong enough to hold, but which Gómez on his voyage to "Oriental Cathay" had reported "too much like Spain" for occupation.<sup>5</sup>

France was the fourth competitor for overseas dominions. Because she has been able to keep the tradition of expansion alive throughout the rhythmic ebb and flow of her existence as a nation, because the character of that national life and expansion has been determined by elements at once geographical, social, and political, it is worth while to survey the combinations of influences which, from far-away beginnings, marked pointedly by great power of expansion in the eleventh century, when she spread into Spain, England, Italy and the Levant, made of her a great colonial power in the days of the Old Régime, and in the modern era give her control of the fortunes of many million inhabitants of the extra-European world.

To the creation of this present imperial responsibility the contributing factors have been the development of a French people on the foundations of Iberian racial stock, the survival of the Roman tradition, the evolution of the feudal régime into the nation-state, and the rivalry with competitors, other expansive powers which share with France analogous development and comparable destiny. It is worth while to examine briefly the historical influences which gave her adaptability for her success in that interesting process called the Europeanization of the world. With current challenges to her colonial power incessantly iterated by the rampant powers of Europe, parvenus in the imperial conflict, perusal of her past in colonization presents testimonial that French overseas enterprise has roots in the past which may not too easily be pulled out.

<sup>5</sup> Peter Martyr, *Decades* (MacNutt, tr., New York, 1912, 2v.), VI, chap. X; *Documentos para la historia de . . . Indias*, XXII (Madrid, 1874), 74; A. de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos* (Madrid, 1601-1615, 8v.), Decade III, lib. viii, cap. viii; see H. Harrisse, *The Discovery of North America* (Paris, 1892), 230 ff.

FRANCE OVERSEAS  
THROUGH THE OLD RÉGIME

## CHAPTER I

### PREPARATION FOR OVERSEAS EXPANSION

In large measure the inner political life of France, as well as her outward thrust, has been determined by the geographical features of her continental area. She is in fact a narrow isthmus lying between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, a bridge across which the trade of nations and the migrations of peoples have passed in ceaseless procession. Her coasts lie upon three important bodies of water, the Mediterranean, the English Channel, and the Atlantic. From Marseilles communication is easy between the Mediterranean and the English Channel through the deep Rhône valley and the Saône. The Garonne, the Seine, the Loire, and the Meuse have also served as routes of communication from southeast to north and northwest, in ancient Gaul as well as during Roman times and throughout the national existence. The river systems made their influence felt in the division of the country culturally and politically during the formative period of the nation. Easy access on north and south have made expansive conquest and reciprocal invasion alternate frequently, as the strength of the population has compared with that of neighboring peoples.<sup>1</sup> For example, the inroads of French knights into Spain and Portugal against the Moors, and of the Burgundians (the abbé of Cluny and his monks), were defensive-offensive movements motivated largely by the geographical setting of the French territory and its relations with neighboring lands.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> More than sufficient information on the sources for the history of France will be found in the appropriate volumes of Ernest Lavisse, ed. *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'à la Révolution* (Paris, 1900-1911, 9v.), and with greater detail in A. Molinier (continued by Bourgeois, André, Hauser, and others), *Les sources de l'histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie, 1494* (Paris, 1901-1906, 6v.). Specific references to them, made in C. Guignebert, *A Short History of the French People* (New York, 1930, 2v.), I, 41-42, provide at least a partial guide to selections for readings. Emphasis on the commercial development, and on industrial conditions lying back of this, is found in the works of Levasseur, Heyd, and others specifically mentioned in the following notes. Henri Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique et sociale de la France . . .* (Paris, 1929), 12, quoting Strabo (e.g. London, 1923), Book IV, ch. I, paragraphs 2, 14.

<sup>2</sup> The modern problem of "security" has analogous bases; G. Fagniez, *Documents relatifs à l'histoire de l'industrie . . .* (Paris, 1898, 1900, 2v.), I, Intro., 1-38.

Though the barbarian Celts had but simple manufacture and agriculture, primitive Gaul had an active commerce which gave contacts with far-away lands. The Celts adapted a metallic coinage from the Greek and Italian merchants of Massilia and Rhoda who came into Gaul by way of the Rhône and set up trading posts to buy silver-bearing lead, furs, wool, salted goods, and slaves, exchanging these for artifacts of their own lands. Mediterranean traders went freely through Celtic Gaul, even if they did not penetrate far or frequently into the less civilized Belgic Gaul. Probably the Gauls themselves did not go far from home with their produce, though Burdigala (Bordeaux) and Carbilo were ports near the present Saint-Nazaire; few of the tribes were great sailors. The country supplied by its own industry its need of cloth, linen, chariots, pottery and jewelry. Copper and iron were used, while tin, gold, and silver were mined and manufactured in small but probably remunerative quantities.<sup>3</sup> The Phoenicians, beginning about 1000 B. C., established trading posts on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul; the Phocians built Massilia about 600 B. C., and extended its comptoirs from Agde to Nice.

The natives used the site of later Narbonne for a trade center; the larger towns, as Nice, Toulouse, Bourges, Orléans, and others held recurrent fairs, probably on religious occasions.<sup>4</sup> Rome began the conquest of Celtic Gaul in 155 B. C. at the request of Marseilles, whose independence was threatened by Carthage. The Romans took firm hold by establishing military posts. Narbonne, founded 118 B. C., soon rivaled Marseilles. Intervening (58–51 B. C.) in the internal quarrels of shaggy-headed rival tribes, Julius Cæsar subdued the Gauls and extended the frontiers to the Rhine. Cities were founded; Lyons, of "rigid majesty," built under Augustus (43 B. C.) at the confluence of the Rhône and the Saône, became the rich metropolis. Four great roads led from Lyons to the ends of the land; with them were connected many others in relatively few years, Bordeaux to the west becoming another center of radiation similar to Lyons. The Romans avoided bestowing any sentiment of unity other than one purely administrative; but there was gradual acquiescence in the ambition of the conquered peoples to acquire Roman citizenship. Nearly all the Gauls received it earlier than other peoples.<sup>5</sup> The chief contributions made by the Romans were the gifts of geographical unity, an admixture of blood, and some

<sup>3</sup> Henri Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce de la France* (Paris, 1887–1889, 2v.), I, 20–21.

<sup>4</sup> C. Guignebert, *A Short History of the French People*, I, 41–42.

<sup>5</sup> Guignebert, *op. cit.*, I, 55–56. Jacques Barzun, *The French Race* (New York, 1932), discusses the Nordic-Latin race-origin controversy and the racial rivalry through French history.

share in Roman pride, stability, and legal and administrative development. The Roman heritage and Christianity, added to the Celtic racial basis, formed the foundations of French national feeling and culture. After the official recognition of Christianity by Constantine, the centralized church organization became an active agent in the government of the country.

Among the expansionist influences augmented by the Roman occupation, then, were a rapid and general increase in wealth, the growth of many towns, prosperous life of reasonable independence for large landed proprietors, and an impulse to commerce encouraged by wide and durable roads. Gaul ever since the establishment of the "Pax Romana" was an active participant in the commerce of the Mediterranean. The great fairs along the banks of the Rhine grew to be occasions of usual recurrence.<sup>6</sup> On the Atlantic side, barbarous Britain had little purchasing power, supplying only a little lead, tin, copper, and the very important export of wheat to France and Rome. Amiens and Paris were yet mere villages; Bordeaux had little production of materials for trade. During the wars between Cæsar and Pompey (49–46 B. C.), Marseilles lost her old commercial supremacy and did not recover it until the Crusades; but Narbonne became, during the first and second centuries A. D., the largest and richest city of Gaul.<sup>7</sup> Nîmes was provided with many anchorages; Frejus had an excellent harbor. The more famous Arles, connected with the sea by a canal, inspired the Emperor Honorius (A. D. 395–423) to rhapsodize:

. . . no place in the world is better adapted for distributing everywhere the products of the soil. The opulent Orient, Araby the perfumed, gentle Assyria, fertile Africa, proud Spain, and valiant Gaul—there all these countries meet to bring thither their best . . . The Rhône and the Tyrrhenian Sea there mingle their waters, as if to reproach and confound the nations whose soil they erode or whose shores they bathe.<sup>8</sup>

The seafaring life led to the formation of new social groups; on the sea were the *navicularii* charged with the duty of transporting to Rome the *annona* or tax in kind, especially in grain. The *nautae*, or mariners (some were land travelers also), were contractors of transportation, grouped, like the artisans, in *collegia* which centered in the towns, especially Paris, Arles, and Narbonne. These rich government-directed organizations were found on several of the waterways. Other

<sup>6</sup> E. Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de France* (Paris, 1911–1912, 2v.), I, 17–18, 553–554.

<sup>7</sup> G. Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française* (Paris, 1928), I. This text is followed in outline through several pages.

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France depuis les origines*, I, pt. 2, 338–339.

Though the barbarian Celts had but simple manufacture and agriculture, primitive Gaul had an active commerce which gave contacts with far-away lands. The Celts adapted a metallic coinage from the Greek and Italian merchants of Massilia and Rhoda who came into Gaul by way of the Rhône and set up trading posts to buy silver-bearing lead, furs, wool, salted goods, and slaves, exchanging these for artifacts of their own lands. Mediterranean traders went freely through Celtic Gaul, even if they did not penetrate far or frequently into the less civilized Belgic Gaul. Probably the Gauls themselves did not go far from home with their produce, though Burdigala (Bordeaux) and Carbilo were ports near the present Saint-Nazaire; few of the tribes were great sailors. The country supplied by its own industry its need of cloth, linen, chariots, pottery and jewelry. Copper and iron were used, while tin, gold, and silver were mined and manufactured in small but probably remunerative quantities.<sup>3</sup> The Phoenicians, beginning about 1000 B. C., established trading posts on the Mediterranean coast of Gaul; the Phocians built Massilia about 600 B. C., and extended its comptoirs from Agde to Nice.

The natives used the site of later Narbonne for a trade center; the larger towns, as Nice, Toulouse, Bourges, Orléans, and others held recurrent fairs, probably on religious occasions.<sup>4</sup> Rome began the conquest of Celtic Gaul in 155 B. C. at the request of Marseilles, whose independence was threatened by Carthage. The Romans took firm hold by establishing military posts. Narbonne, founded 118 B. C., soon rivaled Marseilles. Intervening (58-51 B. C.) in the internal quarrels of shaggy-headed rival tribes, Julius Cæsar subdued the Gauls and extended the frontiers to the Rhine. Cities were founded; Lyons, of "rigid majesty," built under Augustus (43 B. C.) at the confluence of the Rhône and the Saône, became the rich metropolis. Four great roads led from Lyons to the ends of the land; with them were connected many others in relatively few years, Bordeaux to the west becoming another center of radiation similar to Lyons. The Romans avoided bestowing any sentiment of unity other than one purely administrative; but there was gradual acquiescence in the ambition of the conquered peoples to acquire Roman citizenship. Nearly all the Gauls received it earlier than other peoples.<sup>5</sup> The chief contributions made by the Romans were the gifts of geographical unity, an admixture of blood, and some

<sup>3</sup> Henri Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce de la France* (Paris, 1887-1889, 2v.), I, 20-21.

<sup>4</sup> C. Guignebert, *A Short History of the French People*, I, 41-42.

<sup>5</sup> Guignebert, *op. cit.*, I, 55-56. Jacques Barzun, *The French Race* (New York, 1932), discusses the Nordic-Latin race-origin controversy and the racial rivalry through French history.

share in Roman pride, stability, and legal and administrative development. The Roman heritage and Christianity, added to the Celtic racial basis, formed the foundations of French national feeling and culture. After the official recognition of Christianity by Constantine, the centralized church organization became an active agent in the government of the country.

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<sup>6</sup> E. Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de France* (Paris, 1911-1912, 2v.), I, 17-18, 553-554.

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<sup>8</sup> Quoted in E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France depuis les origines*, I, pt. 2, 338-339.

groups were the wine merchants, the ship-builders, and carpenters. "By its agriculture, by the politeness of its manners, by the greatness of its riches," wrote Pliny, "Gaul is not inferior to any province; in a word, it is an Italy rather than a province."<sup>9</sup>

In the fifth century the Germanic invasions, harbingers of which had long existed, broke the rule of Rome and its unity.<sup>10</sup> The Visigoths marched in as allies of Rome in 415-419 and settled in southern Gaul, plunderers turned colonists. The Franks became important under Clovis (481-511), who consolidated divided tribes, thereby beginning the geographic life of France.<sup>11</sup>

The Merovingian dynasty reached its height under Clothaire I (558-561), and then endured nearly another two centuries, until 751; <sup>12</sup> but, beginning to decline after 638, gave way to the Carolingian line, which first achieved notable success when Charles Martel (major domus, 714-741) forced back an Arab invasion at Tours (732).

Frankish society was even more rural than had been the Gallo-Roman. Great proprietors on their villas lived at ease on the fruits of the soil, and enjoyed the chase or the campaign. City life deteriorated as the inhabitants built enclosures to protect themselves from pillage.<sup>13</sup> The Arabic invasions of the seventh and early eighth centuries made the familiar Mediterranean suddenly strange and hostile, and cut off commercial relations, east and west, for several centuries.<sup>14</sup>

Charlemagne (768-814) came near to realizing the old imperial ideal based on alliance with the church, yet his great "empire" was military, arbitrary, and artificial. He never brought the boundaries of his realm to a fixed or static condition; at the end of his reign he allowed feudalism to get root, and his successors inherited the task of overcoming a centrifugal social order. Yet this very break-up, lending as it did solidar-

<sup>9</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de France*, I, 553-554; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, I, pt. 2, 345-346, citing Pliny the Elder, who wrote the above in 77 A. D.; Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique*, 17. Commerce was second in importance to agriculture.

<sup>10</sup> Roman Gaul may be further studied, from the viewpoint of commercial expansion, in Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 23-55.

<sup>11</sup> The movements of the Salian Franks began between the Escault and the Lys in 358, but did not include the whole of Flanders until the ninth century. Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique*, 22.

<sup>12</sup> Commerce with the Mediterranean did not cease, as has been thought. A. Dopsch, *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Grundlagen der europäischen Kulturentwicklung . . .* (Vienna, 1918-1920, 2v.), cited by Sée, *Esquisse*, 23. Syrians and Jews were then active traders in Gaul; Wilhelm von Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge* (Leipzig, 1885-1886, 2v.), I, 1-10.

<sup>13</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de France*, I, 555.

<sup>14</sup> H. Pirenne, "Un contrast économique; Merovingiens et Carolingiens," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* (April, 1923), 229-234; cf. "Mahomet et Charlemagne" by the same author (*Revue belge . . .*, January, 1922), 77-86.

ity to congruous groups, helped to begin the sentiment of French nationality.

In the ninth century commercial activity slowed down in France as elsewhere in the West. The raids of the Northmen and the general insecurity brought into predominance a "closed economy." Taxes on movement of trade multiplied under feudalism, and many of them fell into the hands of the great lords. The robber barons, too, levied their ransoms on venturesome merchants who undertook to use the ways of communication.<sup>15</sup> Under Charlemagne, trade development had not been marked, although he had a definite commercial policy and sought to encourage traders. Since the sixth century, much of the commerce of the Frankish lands had been in the hands of merchants from Frisia, Saxony, Lombardy, Spain, Syria and other parts of the Orient, and the only appreciable difference under Charlemagne was that greater facilities were accorded to merchants.<sup>16</sup> In spite of all Charlemagne's efforts, neither commerce nor industry developed enough for the Frankish empire to be considered a great economic power.<sup>17</sup>

Commercial relations did subsist with the Levant, in spite of Saracen hostility. From the West went wheat, wine, oil, hunting dogs, and cloth; from the East came purple stuffs, silks, wrought leather, perfumes, unguents, medicinal plants, pearls, spices, papyrus, and exotic animals. Arles was always the head of this trade, and took on a most cosmopolitan appearance, with its Gothic population, Frankish officials, colony of Jews, Spanish merchants, and its seafaring swarm from all lands.<sup>18</sup> Commercial relations engendered political ones. Charlemagne made close contacts with Byzantium and with the Arabs. Haroun al-Raschid (786-809) "preferred his friendship to that of all the kings and princes of the land," and sent him rich presents.<sup>19</sup>

It has even been asserted that these contacts proved to be the beginning of French extra-territorial rights in the Levant, and that the emperor was constituted Protector of the Holy Places—the protagonist of Christianity—inasmuch as the prestige of the Byzantine emperors had declined during their contests with Oriental influences which resented

<sup>15</sup> Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique*, 90-91.

<sup>16</sup> Louis Halphen, "Études critiques sur le règne de Charlemagne," *Revue historique*, vol. 135, p. 236; Louis Bréhier, "Les colonies d'orientaux en Occident au commencement du moyen âge," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, XII (1903), 11-30.

<sup>17</sup> Halphen, *op. et loc. cit.*, 248; Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique*, 24-25. Both Halphen and Sée disagree with the conclusions reached by A. Dopsch, *Die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Karolingerzeit, vornehmlich in Deutschland* (Weimar, 1920-1922, 2v.), II, 151, 182-189, and Karl Inama-Sternegg, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1909), 585-591, 592-595.

<sup>18</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, II, pt. I, 339.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 299.

iconoclastic church doctrines.<sup>20</sup> These assertions are unfounded details of the built-up myth of the emperor's wide imperial control. While Charlemagne's successes over the Lombards, the Saxons, and the Avars, and his coronation at Rome, made him appear even to Moslems as the supreme representative of Christianity, the results of recent scholarship indicate that Pepin and Charles really represented the caliph's interests in Spain; Charlemagne may well have been protector of the Holy Sepulcher, but if so it was as a subordinate of the Moslem ruler.<sup>21</sup> He did carry on correspondence with the Latin patriarch and monks of Jerusalem, and supported schools and hospitals in the Levant. His hospital in Jerusalem became a sort of "foreign colony" with a great market crowded by traders of every tongue.<sup>22</sup>

As the Carolingians declined, the Northmen, having begun their incursions in 841, spread along the Loire and the Seine, but met the strongest opposition. In 885 they besieged Paris in an attempt to break through and plunder Burgundy, but were fought off by Count Odo and his brother, Robert, sons of the heroic Robert the Strong whose family became known as the Capetians. Later, in the celebrated peace of Saint-Clair-sur-Epte of 912, the Channel coast from the Somme to Brittany

<sup>20</sup> The Carolingians began to exert their influence in this way in 797, when negotiations were begun with the caliph. The religious struggle had begun in 726, when the assault of Orientalism upon the customs of the Greek church destroyed the influence of the Byzantine emperors.

<sup>21</sup> The literature of this question includes: Louis Bréhier, address at the Congrès française de la Syrie, held at Marseilles, January 3, 4, 5, 1919, in *Séances et travaux*; idem, *L'église et l'Orient au moyen âge; les croisades* (5th ed., Paris, 1928), 22-34; Arthur J. Kleinclausz, *L'empire carolingien, ses origines et ses transformations* (Paris, 1902), 169-170, 260-261; Gabriel Audisio, *La vie de Haroun al-Raschid* (Paris, 1930). F. W. Buckler, *Harun'ul-Rashid and Charles the Great* (Cambridge, 1931), ch. II; E. Joranson, "The Alleged Frankish Protectorate in Palestine," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XXXII (January, 1927), 241-261. Emanuel G. Rey, *Essai sur la domination française en Syrie durant le moyen âge* (Paris, 1866). Members of the Khazin house held the French consular post at Beyrout from 1655 to 1753. René Ristelhueber, *Traditions françaises au Liban* (Paris, 1918); also A. Boppe, *Les consulats du Levant* (Nancy, 1902); Francis Rey, *La protection diplomatique et consulaire dans les échelles du Levant et de Barbarie* (Paris, 1899). France successfully defended these rights in the Crimean War and at the Congress of Berlin, 1878. On the Échelles du Levant, see *Le parfait négociant, ou instruction générale pour ce qui regarde le commerce des marchandises de France, & des pays étrangers*, par le Sieur Jacques Savary (5<sup>e</sup> édition). . . . Avec un traité du commerce qui se fait par la Mer Méditerranée dans toutes les Echelles du Levant, Sçavoir, à Smirne, à Alexandrette & Alep, à Siede, à Chipre, à Echelle neuve, à Angora, & Beibazar villes de Perse, à Constantinople, à Alexandrie, à Rossette, au Caire, & au Bastion de France, Augmentée d'un Nouveau Traité des changes étrangers. Première Partie (A Lyons, Chez Jacques Lyons, Libraire, rue Mercière, au bon Pasteur, 1701).

<sup>22</sup> Buckler, *Harun'ul-Rashid and Charles the Great*, ch. II; Ernest Barker, "Crusades," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Eleventh Edition, at the word.

was ceded to the Northmen.<sup>23</sup> The Saracens committed frightful raids along the Mediterranean, and Hungarian raiders made frequent incursions into northern Italy and even into Provence before their definitive defeat in 955 at the hands of Otto I of the Holy Roman Empire. The power of the dynasty gradually gave way to feudalism, and a conflict of five centuries ensued before royalty recuperated its full prerogative.

Feudalism really received tremendous impetus with the Treaty of Verdun (843); by the end of the Carolingians, fifty-five petty states had grown up, in which the overlord ruled serfs (most of the common people) with complete autocracy. "Between thee and thy vassal there is no other judge than God." The dukes of France in time subdued these rival lords of the provinces, and founded the Capetian dynasty.

Feudalism caused a decline in the realm of trade; communications grew worse as the former proud roads of a centralized government fell into disrepair and became unusable.<sup>24</sup> In southern France traces of the old maritime trade subsisted; Marseilles and Narbonne keeping in touch with Barcelona, Pisa, and Amalfi, and through the latter with Alexandria, Smyrna, and Constantinople. The trade was largely carried on by Jews, and these also farmed many of the taxes levied by the seigneurs. Church estates, through surplus production and sale, grew by their nature to be commercial centers.<sup>25</sup> Industry, like trade, became narrowed to fit local needs; the towns cast up high defensive walls around restricted areas. The stores of goods supplied them but scantily from one harvest to the next; famine and disease skulked among the common people. Between the years 970 and 1040 at least forty-eight famines or epidemics occurred. Between 970 and 1100 sixty harvest seasons failed to yield a sufficient crop and the resulting mortality was terrible.<sup>26</sup>

Yet at the fall of the Carolingians, France, though not yet unified, had acquired two important characteristics of national life: the feudal barons, each in a growing center of civilization, constituted a sort of loose confederation coordinated by an aspiration for Gallic unity under the king of Paris; while suffusing all was the ideal of a common Christianity.<sup>27</sup>

The Capetian dynasty held sway from 987 to 1328; the heirs of Hugh Capet gradually gained larger resources. They clung to Charlemagne's ideal of the supremacy of the king, and profited from the re-

<sup>23</sup> J. W. Thompson, *The Middle Ages, 300-1500* (New York, 1931, 2v.), I, 316-319.

<sup>24</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de France*, I, 556, 557.

<sup>25</sup> Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique*, 91.

<sup>26</sup> Guignebert, *A Short History of the French People*, I, 160-161.

<sup>27</sup> Gabriel Hanotaux and Alfred Martineau, *Histoire des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1929-1933, 6v.), I, Introd., viii.

spect for legitimacy which had hedged the Carolingians. Twelve members of the house ruled successively without interruption. An important centralizing process began when Hugh did away with the old Frankish principle of inheritance of land by equal division among heirs and adopted the law of primogeniture.<sup>28</sup> The Capetians developed the ideal of legitimacy and heredity ("coöptation" of their sons in the power) and fought to reduce the sovereign powers of rival feudal lords. Of the latter, the most dangerous were the dukes of Normandy, who, under William the Conqueror, set up their rule in England (1066), creating there a power which menaced the growth of an integral France. The conflict began under Philip I (1060-1108) to bring on three hundred years later the disintegration called the Hundred Years' War. This influence was one of those centrifugal forces which sprang in reality from geographical setting; while it turned the country partially toward the Atlantic, it delayed the unification of France until after the Wars of Religion (1562-1598).

Louis the Fighter (VI), the first really important Capetian (1108-1137), may be said to have brought the French nation into existence by his grip on institutions, largely through his personality. His successor, Louis VII (1137-1180) managed, in spite of his share in the second crusade and his loss of Aquitaine, to retain a considerable prestige.<sup>29</sup>

Louis' son, Philip the Second (Philip Augustus, 1180-1223), made himself superior to all his vassals save the duke of Aquitaine, the English king. As a result of his destruction of the continental power of the Plantagenets, he was able to lay firm bases for later centralized, absolute monarchy.<sup>30</sup> His curbing of the *prévôts* by the appointment of *baillis* had a notable centralizing effect in promoting the consolidation of the royal domain.

The reign was marked, too, by profound economic changes. Though the feudal spirit remained strong, even developing as a temporary device to stop Asiatic invaders, the towns continued to develop, artisans and shopkeepers freed themselves from dependence on their seigneurs, and newly forming trade corporations obtained monopolies of their various activities. This growth was intimately linked with the rebirth of commerce. Emerging first were the episcopal towns, with their mixed populations and their weekly fairs. Then the bourgs, or fortresses, arose,

<sup>28</sup> E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France*, V, pt. 1, 215-247; Edward Jenks, *Law and Politics in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1898), 87-88; Thompson, *The Middle Ages*, I, 341-342.

<sup>29</sup> Thompson, *The Middle Ages*, I, 350-560.

<sup>30</sup> The numerous sources for this reign of forty-three years and its successors are listed by A. Molinier (No. 4421), *Les sources de l'histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie*, II, 1 ff.

following the same evolution as in the other states of western Europe.<sup>31</sup> The merchants created hanses for the purpose of gaining greater security and widened fields for their commerce.<sup>32</sup>

The hanse in London, a Flemish society, included the merchants of all the cities in Flanders and northeastern France, perhaps those of Paris also. As early as 1157 it began producing and distributing fine woolens, arms, and many varieties of manufactured metal goods. The towns of Flanders traded actively with England and various Baltic and North Sea cities. Their geographic position and their trade in their own artifacts protected them when the northern hanse of Cologne suffered by the shift southward of the trade routes through the Portuguese discoveries.<sup>33</sup>

The hanses established great periodical fairs for sale of their characteristic products. The famous Lendit, about 1109, was the most notable of those held about Paris. Others were held at Beaucaire, Nîmes, and in the Champagne, where the merchants of France, Flanders, and Burgundy traded for Mediterranean imports.<sup>34</sup> The importance of the fairs of the Champagne, at Chappes, from the ninth until well toward the close of the eleventh century under Syrian influence, has been emphasized by Thompson.<sup>35</sup> Feudal lords like the counts of Champagne and Flanders began to see the advantages of attracting both local and foreign traders. Roads, bridges, and ports, which had been declining since the Roman era, were improved to help the trade. Some of these developments had earlier origins, yet their success took on new vigor during

<sup>31</sup> H. Pirenne, *Medieval Cities, their Origins and the Revival of Trade* (Princeton, 1925), 66-67.

<sup>32</sup> E. Gee Nash, *The Hansa: Its History and Romance* (London, 1929), contains many original illustrations and is full of antiquarian interest though loosely written; it contains nothing on the French hanses. Further material in Helen Zimmern, *The Hansa Towns* (New York, 1889); Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III, pt. I, 403-409; Pirenne, *op. cit.*, 123-126, shows how the professional merchants, rising from the class of foot-free adventurers, had need of such mutual protection. D. K. Bjork, "The Peace of Stralsund 1370," in *Speculum*, Oct., 1932, pp. 447-476, has copious notes on hanse activities.

<sup>33</sup> J. A. Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion* (London, 1930, 2v.), I, 5-6; See Pirenne, *Medieval Cities*, for the influence of the guilds and hanses upon the development of urban liberties during the eleventh century ("L'origine des constitutions urbaines au moyen âge," *Revue historique*, vol. 57, 1895). See also H. C. Diferec, *De Geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen Handel* (Amsterdam, 1908), 46 ff.

<sup>34</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 560-561. Until the crusades, the Italian cities led the commercial renaissance, especially during the eleventh century. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the French cities began to feel it; in the latter period Marseilles became again a great commercial center, and put its consuls into the towns of the Levant (Sée, *Esquisse*, 95-96).

<sup>35</sup> Thompson, *An Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages* (Paris, 1928), 269, and Index.

the period 1180-1223. In 1200 the first known bill of exchange was written, showing the growth of wider reaching commerce.<sup>36</sup>

Louis IX (The Saint, 1226-1270) under the regency of the able Blanche of Castile won successes against revolting barons, and increased the royal prestige by zealous execution of justice. The royal judicial power was enhanced when the nobles were forced to permit the king to hear appeals from their courts—Louis' greatest contribution to nationality. His use of the centralizing *enquêteurs* and seneschals and of Roman law brought distinct gains.

The reign was notable for the growth of governmental machinery; the use of inquisitors to concentrate the judicial powers in the royal hands, the differentiation of functions of the parts of the old *curia regis*, the growth in importance of Roman law, all served to make the king the "fountain of law and justice," the founder of the absolute monarchy. But Louis stands in the history of France for the prestige of the kingship through personal virtue; ". . . he was the most popular citizen, not only of France, but of all Europe. Even the Mohammedan world venerated him."<sup>37</sup>

Under Philip IV (The Fair, 1285-1314) absolutism was further augmented by the organization of the national finances and the development of new sources of revenue to meet the cost of government. In 1314 Philip asked consent of the third estate to levy taxes on the towns—a beginning of popular control of taxation. Again, Philip increased his power by destruction in 1307 of the Order of Knights Templars.<sup>38</sup> The thirteenth century was also striking for the numerous ways in which the freedom of the people was augmented, and for the growth in power of the communes.<sup>39</sup> For three hundred and fifty years the Capetian dynasty worked to create a real France in area and institutions. The nation was undoubtedly gathering strength adaptable to overseas effort. The king finally won direct control of all parts of the kingdom except Flanders, Burgundy, Brittany, and Guienne. There had developed a moderate amount of national consciousness centering upon him.

There had also been a marked development of the great commercial fairs held in cities like Rouen, Dijon, and Caen; those of Toulouse and Beaucaire for the growing Mediterranean trade assumed especial importance. Rouen, Rheims, Orléans, Toulouse, and Paris were busy centers of trade. Paris was especially notable for the wealth of its commercial establishments, where in 1292 no less than sixteen Italian commercial organizations maintained representatives. La Rochelle in

<sup>36</sup> Guignebert, *A Short History of the French People*, I, 226; Sée, *op. cit.*, 93-94.

<sup>37</sup> Thompson, *The Middle Ages*, 300-1500, I, 540.

<sup>38</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III, pt. 2, 175-200.

<sup>39</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 563.

the thirteenth century rivaled Bordeaux and Nantes in the wine and salt trade. The Norman ports were active in exporting wines and fish, and importing English woollens.<sup>40</sup> There were, of course, hindrances to commercial development, especially quarrels between the trades concerning their several rights and monopolies, while the hostility of the church to the practice of taking interest on loaned money was an obstacle against which thirteenth-century commerce contended, not without some measure of ingenious success.

<sup>40</sup> Sée, *Esquisse*, 98; on the exterior commerce of France during this period see the entire chapter VII, 90-107; Guignebert, *op. cit.*, 273.

## CHAPTER II

## THE CRUSADES AND THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

In spite of the disintegration of the feudal régime, there was a renewal under it of overseas enterprise which had fallen into decay during the Carolingian period. It was a time of restless search for vivid adventure, in which France led. Maritime navigation was renewed with the eleventh century, especially during the movements of the Normans.

The restlessness of the period was shown in the religious pilgrimages to the shrines of Saint-Martin de Tours, Mont Saint-Michel, and Notre Dame de Vézeley. Beyond the borders of France the devout sought Saint-Michel du Gargano, Santiago de Compostela, Monte Casino, Rome, and even Jerusalem. Fervid pilgrims, moved by curiosity, hope of cure of disease, or piety, followed the path of adventure, deserting shop and field to become rovers or mariners, earning their expenses as they went. The nobles, marching each spring on feudal wars, were stirred by a wanderlust unknown in any earlier period.<sup>1</sup>

There was too an added commercial movement. The port of Rouen had a special wharf at London built for itself, and her maritime customs assumed the force of law on the sea. Dieppe, Nantes, and La Rochelle also became the scenes of renewed shipping activity.<sup>2</sup>

In all this the Normans were particularly active. The blood of old Norse pirates sang in their veins; their children were brought up on the sea tradition; their huge and hungry tribes of offspring obliged

<sup>1</sup> G. Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 3.

<sup>2</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 561; cf. F. R. Sanborn, *Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law* (New York, 1930). See Sir Travers Twiss, *The Black Book of the Admiralty* (London, 1871-1876, 4v.), III, *Introd.*, lxxx-lxxxi.

A gild merchant established at Bayonne about 1215 shows that active trade went on from that port and La Rochelle, Bordeaux, Royau, and Oleron, with Flanders, Spain, and England. *Ibid.*, III, lxxii. F. R. Sanborn, *Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law*, 61, calls to attention that the gild statutes of Bayonne were English rather than French in origin, having been given by King John. The same author accepts (pp. 63-64) the French origin of the Rolls of Oleron, and dates them in the first half of the twelfth century. For the influence of the laws of Rouen, Sanborn, *op. cit.*, 187. Authorities on the expansion of France preceding and incident to the crusades are listed by Thompson, *An Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages*, bibliography, especially for chaps. XVI and XVIII.

unprovided-for sons to harry the shores of Europe from the North Sea to Sicily. In their strictly governed duchy, lovers of disorder and pillage, too closely restrained, were driven to seek outlet elsewhere. They rounded the northern end of the Scandinavian peninsula, reaching the White Sea. By 914 they had voyaged the Don and the Volga, reaching the Caspian. During the eleventh century they overran sunny Spain in quest of booty, though professedly to protect pilgrims to Santiago de Compostela or Rome, or drive Moslem pirates from the shores of Languedoc, Provence, and Italy.<sup>3</sup>

The first expedition into Spain, under Roger de Toeni, seigneur of Conches, occurred in 1018; another, in 1063, was led by the Aquitanian Guy Geoffroy. That of 1073, under Eble II, count of Rouci, a Champenois, penetrated to the heart of Andalusia. Toward the end of the century the Burgundians, under Duke Eudes I, helped the Spaniards with the encouragement of the powerful monks of Cluny, warm friends of the kings of Castile and Navarre.<sup>4</sup>

These invaders often sided with local factions or married into the group they had come to defend. It was Henry of Lorraine, count of Burgundy, who married Teresa, daughter of the King of Castile, and subjected the basin of the Minho about 1095; their son repelled the Spanish authority and founded the kingdom of Portugal (1140) and the royal house which ruled it down to 1853.<sup>5</sup>

The Norman settlements in Italy during the years 1016-1073 were the natural outcome of religious pilgrimages. The sister shrines of Mont Saint-Michel in Normandy and Mont Saint-Michel du Gargano on the Adriatic were in close touch from the eighth century on, and many Normans visited both. After a return from the Holy Sepulcher and Gargano, they found Salerno attacked (1016) by Moslems, and in 1017 began their fight with the intruders, this move being followed by a genuine migration directed against the Arabs and Greeks.<sup>6</sup> The first Norman principality was established about 1030 at Aversa, just north of Naples, where two leading Norman bandits, Roger and Robert Guiscard of the house of Hauteville, soon began to attack castles and towns, Robert seizing Campania, Apulia, and Calabria. At first excommunicated by the pope, but by success turned into grand seigneurs, they were

<sup>3</sup> Norse voyages westward reached Iceland in 867, and settlement began there in 874. The voyage of Bjarni Herjulfson to the New England coast in 986 presaged those after the turn of the century by Lief Erikson and Thorfinn Karlsefni which gave the intrepid Northerners high rank among pre-Columbian deep-sea navigators.

<sup>4</sup> A. A. Tilley, *Medieval France* (Cambridge, 1922), 80.

<sup>5</sup> Henry Morse Stephens, *Portugal* (The Story of the Nations) (New York, 1891), 20-23, 425.

<sup>6</sup> Guinebert, *A Short History*, I, 182.

finally accepted as useful defenders. By about 1072 the Normans ruled from Benevento to Palermo; in 1130 Roger II was recognized as king of the Two Sicilies.<sup>7</sup> The Sicilian invasion demonstrated a highly developed capacity for colonial adventure.

Northmen employed everywhere the outstanding features of their French dukedom. Vassals were directly subject to the sovereign, castles were held by his grace and consent, alienation of land was under his control, his officers were sole judges in decision of criminal cases, and the clergy was under even more exacting control. The centralizing genius of Norman French government was carried everywhere.

This absolutist system developed a surprising spirit of religious tolerance. Catholic Normans, Greek Schismatics, Moslems, and Jews enjoyed equal ranks and offices, and all were protected by law.<sup>8</sup> The court of Roger II was vivid with Byzantine splendor, Oriental palaces and Occidental churches by Moslem architects happily blending eastern and western forms. The medical school of Palermo flourished, and scholars associated with the noteworthy Saracen Edrisi, author of the famous "King Roger's Book" of Arabic geography, built up a geographic interest of high order. This mixed culture was of course superficial; Roger could be ferocious in the best style of his piratical forbears, as instance his massacres and pillaging in Corfu and Greece.

The conquest of England by William, duke of Normandy, was institutionally of a piece with the Sicilian enterprise, though hardly the result of commercial interest, for trade between England and Europe was then limited to small exchanges of lead and tin for French wines and fine cloth. In the tiny clinker-built craft shown on the Bayeux tapestry, the wine-drinking Normans permitted the merchants of Rouen to export wines into England; under Henry II Bordeaux and Bayonne also exported wines, the monopoly remaining French until the fourteenth century, when the Gascons were forced to share it with the English. When the English lost Aquitaine in 1455, the Gascons recovered much of the trade, but their monopoly had been broken by northern and southern trade organizations.<sup>9</sup>

William centralized control much as did the conquerors of Sicily. A strong hand was kept on the new fiefs; no count held his county in full proprietorship—the personage in each such entity being "the king's own man," the sheriff, who held his power by the royal will alone.<sup>10</sup> It

<sup>7</sup> C. H. Haskins, *The Normans in European History* (New York, 1915), 206.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 225; E. Curtis, *Roger of Sicily and the Normans in Lower Italy* (New York, 1912), 304-308.

<sup>9</sup> Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, I, 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> W. A. Morris, *The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300* (London, 1927), 17-39, shows the development of the Saxon office; 41-74, its development as a baronial institution, and *passim*, its use as an ægis of centralism.

was perhaps the most conspicuous contribution of the Norman conquest that it initiated the close identity of England with Christendom and the institutions of Europe. It was a real labor of organization, demonstrating the adaptability and efficiency of the Normans in overseas enterprise. Under Henry II of the Plantagenet line, Norman and English assimilation was practically achieved.

These pilgrimages and conquests were direct forerunners of those other great medieval movements of expansion—the crusades, pious enterprises conceived in emotional religiosity for the recovery of the Holy Places, especially the Sepulcher of Christ in Jerusalem, which had fallen into the hands of the Mohammedans. With the rise of the Seljuk power, abuse of Christian pilgrims became a motive impelling retribution. Several of the crusades, particularly the later ones, served also, or even rather, important political ends. The papacy used them to gain control of the Greek population of Byzantium and Moslem provinces, but managed to avoid provoking such conflicts as brought it, on the western side of Europe, into bad relations with the Holy Roman Empire.

The crusades belong in a class with those motives for expansion and colonization which produced the earlier Norman expeditions. The feudal lords, cramped by ambitions of royal houses and church restrictions such as the Truce of God, grew tired of peace and yearned for far-off battles. Each one aspired to more liberty of action, greater wealth, and personal security.<sup>11</sup> It is probable, moreover, that in view of the primitive agriculture and the insecurity of the countryside, France was in actuality over-populated. Furthermore, the popes desired to reduce discontent and private warfare by encouraging diversion from internal strife through journeys to the Holy Land.

The inroads of the Turks had affected not only the religious interests of Europe in the Levant but its Mediterranean commerce as well. The seacoast towns of Provence and Languedoc lost trade as did those of Italy. That is to say, the crusades were from the first commercial wars as well as religious.<sup>12</sup> They were essentially French and Norman enterprises, too, however many knights of other lands participated in them.<sup>13</sup> The first crusade was preached in France by a French pope, Urban II, who turned from advocating the peace and Truce of God to favor a holy war, and by single-minded priests like Peter the Hermit of Amiens. Most of the nobles were from the provinces of France, though common people of many Christian countries joined them; the Latin seigneuries erected in Syria were ruled by French lords. Antioch and Jerusalem

<sup>11</sup> Thompson, *The Middle Ages, 300-1500*, I, 561-601.

<sup>12</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 6-7.

<sup>13</sup> Hanotaux sees them as concerted French plans, obedient to vital necessity, and to a general design. *Histoire des colonies françaises*, I, *Introd.*, vii.

were conquered, and Godfrey of Bouillon became head of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1099.<sup>14</sup>

This ephemeral kingdom, estimated to have cost the lives of six hundred thousand Europeans, fell to the Moslems in 1187, yet its creation was not without durable economic and other results. The nobles who went gave to Philip I some satisfaction by their absence. Commerce between the East and the West was greatly increased, resulting in the formation in France of associations of merchants and trade-gilds. Often the needs of the crusaders permitted the king to purchase their fiefs at bargain prices; the acquisition of the viscounty of Bourges, for instance, served to give him control beyond the Loire, where he had hitherto had no real power. All this helped to stabilize the monarchy.<sup>15</sup>

The last third of the eleventh century was marked by the general rise of individuals of the lower ranks. Workingmen formed corporations and peasants' communities, just as traders formed gilds. Liberties and privileges were granted to them by their lords on crusade, who sold charters for money wherewith to march away. Settled ways of business and labor had their reflex in demands for greater security and stability. The manumission of serfs began and the lot of the common people was bettered.<sup>16</sup>

Louis VII of France joined with St. Bernard and Conrad III of Germany to urge and direct the second crusade, and when it miserably failed to check the infidels, Philip Augustus of France joined, if only for a time and half-heartedly, with Frederick Barbarossa and Richard the Lion-Hearted in the third great effort (1189-1192).<sup>17</sup>

While the crusades went on for another hundred years, they early lost their original religious purpose. The peoples of Europe shared very meagerly in them; the merchants preferred even a troubled peace with the Moslems to outright war. The fourth crusade was preached by the curé of Neuilly, Foulques, under inspiration of Innocent III; it was composed almost entirely of nobles from northern France, whom the self-interested Venetians diverted from Jerusalem to Zara and Constantinople. In the latter a Latin "Empire" (1204-1261) was set up under Baldwin, count of Flanders. But the pope cursed this crusade as a perversion of the holy purpose.

The crusade led by Jean de Brienne (1218-1221) failed, as in effect did the one led by the emperor of Germany, 1228-1229. The sixth crusade, led by Louis IX (1248-1254), finally brought that pious monarch

<sup>14</sup> *Histoire anonyme de la première croisade*, Louis Bréhier, ed. and tr. (Paris, 1924), *passim*.

<sup>15</sup> Guignebert, *A Short History*, I, 184.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 188.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. G. C. Sellery and A. C. Krey, *Medieval Foundations of Western Civilization* (New York, 1929), 170-172.

to his enforced sojourn in the Holy Land, where he was able to strengthen the hand of the Christian population. The seventh (1270) cost him his life.<sup>18</sup>

Why did none of these movements succeed in creating a French possession overseas? Godfrey of Bouillon was head of the chiefly French kingdom of Jerusalem, though he refused "a crown of gold, where the King of Kings had worn a crown of thorns." He established a regular feudal organization, but his erection of four great baronies deprived the kingship of strong central control. The soldier-monks, Hospitallers and Templars—French-founded orders—were able to hold the precarious kingdom until Godfrey died in 1100, but under his less competent successors it dwindled away. The kingdom of Cyprus (1191) founded by the third crusade, and that of Constantinople by the fourth, were even more transitory.<sup>19</sup> In 1291 the crusades ended with the capture of Acre by the Moslems; future efforts were adventures which usually failed of object and aim. The churches and forts of the Latin kingdoms were torn down, and the scenes of the old rivalry were left to "mournful and solitary silence." The chief causes of failure were unwise decentralization of control and savage attacks by the Moslems, Bulgars, and Greeks. Not much was left but ruined castles and the tradition, still prevalent, by which the Europeans in the Levant became known as Franks.<sup>20</sup>

The general renovation of Occidental life as a result of the crusades has often been dwelt upon. For France herself there was a net gain, in spite of the dismal failure of the Latin states, in the strong influx into the Levant, alongside the ancient Greek Catholics, of French and Italian colonists and merchants, and of Greeks or Syrians belonging to the Roman church. To both alike, France was, above all European states, the protecting power; during the sixteenth century the Turks by several treaties recognized this tutelary relationship to the Christian population.

The French king, too, found his prestige enhanced throughout the entire Levant and even among the Mongols; his authority at home was greatly increased because, the old feudal families being enfeebled by expenditure and loss of life, he could impose the principles of centralization. Then, too, though the crusades failed of their professed end, they did prevent the Turks for four hundred years from getting a foothold in eastern Europe.

When the church decided during the first crusade that the serf who marched to the struggle could no longer be held by his lord, and might

<sup>18</sup> On the relation of the seventh crusade to the history of Tunis, see Ch. André Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 422.

<sup>19</sup> Lavis, *Histoire de France*, III, pt. I, 383-389.

<sup>20</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 7-13. Thompson, *The Middle Ages*, I, 597.

indeed sell his land without the seigneur's consent, a long step was taken in the emancipation of the lower class. The crusades drew together all classes, peasants, bourgeoisie, and nobles, so that the earlier rigid sections of society were considerably blended. Evidence of this is manifest in the Assizes of Jerusalem, Godfrey's governmental system, which elevated the bourgeoisie of that kingdom in a manner which certainly influenced later French institutions.<sup>21</sup>

Economically, the opening of new trade routes served to restore Marseilles to its earlier activity; Narbonne and Montpellier shared in the movement, and all three had consuls in the Levant.<sup>22</sup> New instruments of navigation, new introduction of the products and artifacts of the East, new industries, new agricultural crops—all these the crusades contributed to the coming of modern times.<sup>23</sup> Maritime codes, such as the Rolls of Oleron and the Consulat de Mer of Marseilles, contributed to the law of the sea for navigators.<sup>24</sup> The conspicuous growth of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa in Levantine trade, as direct outgrowth of the crusades, was equally cause and effect of the development of the medieval *portolani* or sailing charts which were forerunners of modern navigation charts.

The horizon of man's mind was widened by the geographical discoveries which accompanied the new contact with Arabian knowledge. The great journeys made to the East during the thirteenth century contributed to this. Frenchmen were active among the Franciscan explorers foremost in the move to evangelize Asia which owed its origin to the spirit of Saint-Louis and of the Council of Lyons. The missionary John de Plano Carpini,<sup>25</sup> and after him the Frenchman André de Longjumeau,<sup>26</sup> and others, went as far as Grand Tartary. Mangou Khan suggested that the king of France should acknowledge himself as a vassal. The Franciscan of France, William of Rubruck sent by Saint-Louis, journeyed, like Carpini, to far Karakorum (1254), partly to correct the idea of France's subordination. Vincent de Beauvais, author of the *Miroir Historial*, recorded most of the geographical knowledge of his time. French effort pioneered the brief opening of the route to the Far East at this time, preparing the way for the Venetian merchant Marco Polo.

<sup>21</sup> Thompson, *The Middle Ages*, I, 598-601.

<sup>22</sup> Sée, *Esquisse*, 96-97.

<sup>23</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, III, pt. I, 399-400.

<sup>24</sup> T. Twiss, *The Black Book of the Admiralty*, III, *Introd.*, *passim*. See also Sanborn, *op. cit.*, 62-64.

<sup>25</sup> C. R. Beazley, ed., *The Texts and Versions of John de Plano Carpini and William de Rubruquis* (London, Hakluyt Soc., 1903), 107-109. See also Rubruck's journey in Hakluyt Soc. Pubs., W. W. Rockhill, ed.

<sup>26</sup> E. R. Huc, *Christianity in China, Tartary and Thibet* (London, 1857, 2v.), I, 189.

One of the frequently overlooked developments of medieval geography was the exploration of Africa by Arabs, Jewish Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, and Majorcan cartographers. Europeans in various epochs penetrated into the Soudan, reaching Touat and Timbuctoo, while knowledge of Abyssinia was disseminated through the geographical work of missionaries.<sup>27</sup>

Although occurring after the crusades, it was a long time before such voyages brought material change to the old classical Latin geography. Those Frenchmen who, impelled by the quest of Prester John, transported their five galleys into the Red Sea and there conducted corsair voyages in 1182 illustrate this fact; so also the circumstance that in 1329, after Nubia had lost its Christian crown to the Moslems, Philip VI of France sent two Dominicans to Cairo to negotiate with the sultan for the restitution of the Holy Places, and to demand the control of the coast of Cæsarea or Escalon, being disdainfully refused.<sup>28</sup>

Journeys of this character were sequels of a great enterprise "au long cours" organized in 1291 by the Genoese brothers Vivaldi, who sailed away through the Pillars of Hercules and down the Moroccan coast into an eternal silence. They had the purpose to execute a ten-year cruise to India and Grand Tartary; after their disappearance their fate impelled as many efforts at rescue and new discovery as did the legend of Prester John.

On the western side of North Africa, while Christian influences were growing in Morocco, an unknown cardinal sent a messenger from Tabelbert or Tabelbala to make a report on the possibility of extending the faith beyond the region of the oases. Joining a salt caravan of six thousand camels, this messenger penetrated into the Soudan at some date prior to 1283.<sup>29</sup>

As early as 1447 West Africa was quite well known to cartographers who, after 1375, placed on their maps most of the essential features of nearly one-third of the continent.<sup>30</sup> A journey by a Genoese to Touat in 1447, and another by a Florentine to Timbuctoo in 1470, seem to have no recorded follower until 1618, when a French sailor, Paul Imbert, penetrated to the latter city. These are repeated instances of European adventures which had none of the imperial connotations of the later days of rivalry.<sup>31</sup>

Highly intriguing is the story of the Languedoc of Toulouse, Anselme

<sup>27</sup> Ch. de la Roncière, "La découverte de l'Afrique au Moyen Âge" (in *Memoires de la Soc. Roy. de Géog. d'Égypte*, V, VI, and XIII, and numbered I, II, III), I, v.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 65, 67.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 109-112.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 137.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 164-172.

d'Isalguier, who was a predecessor of the famed Genoese Antonio Malfante in penetrating to the heart of Africa, reaching the *boucle* of the Niger in 1405. There Isalguier lived eight years at Gao (Gago), capital of the once great Songhai empire. Returning with nostalgia to his native France, he brought his wife, a Negress who bore the name of a princess of Gao, Casaïs. More important, he brought a diary of his experiences and a dictionary of native languages, both known to one of his friends, a chronicler of Charles VII, and also to a later writer of the time of Louis XIV. These two recorders furnished enough details from Isalguier's account to enable the French savant, La Roncière, to puzzle out with the aid of the Catalan Atlas of Charles V by Abraham Cresques and the planisphere of Mecia de Vilaldestes, both Majorcan cartographers, the caravan routes which radiated in those days from Timbuctoo to Touat, Hoggar, and Sokoto. On the fringe the gold fields of Bambouk, hub of the Mandingo, Touareg, and Songhai kingdoms, with Gao the political center of the latter, marked the borderline between Islamic and pagan Africa.<sup>82</sup> Gao flourished in 1375; the Vilaldestes map of 1413 shows two routes approaching it, one from Tunis by the Hoggar, and the other from Morocco through Tafilet and Touat. Isalguier probably returned by the former.

His greater successor, Malfante, was employed by the Genoese house of the Centurions to go inland to find the gold of Bambouk whereby to redress the monetary balance of Mediterranean trade. This had been upset as a consequence of the occupation of Paris by the English for a moment during the Hundred Years' War; the invader circulated his own coinage, thereby raising difficulties for the money of Charles, who launched a career of inflation to stem the trouble, raising his own coins to ten times their true value and debasing them. The gold which had been coming out through Tunis attracted this famous Genoese house, which, because of the change in business conditions incident to the discovery of America, turned to the sugar trade of the West Indies during the first quarter of the sixteenth century.<sup>83</sup>

One tremendous spiritual consequence of the crusades was the breakdown of many old antipathies. In the religious field the Christians observed that the Mohammedans were not "idolators," and even possessed the great virtue of charity. Saintly Thomas Aquinas himself vouchsafed the opinion that "infidels who have never observed the Christian faith ought not by any means be constrained to embrace it." Though this generous attitude toward aliens was to vanish with the great discoveries and mercantilism, it is pleasant to record a moment of comparative good

<sup>82</sup> La Roncière, as cited above, V, 135-139.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 31.

will among the races. These early missionary movements closed during the fourteenth century by reason of the interposition of Islam in central Asia, and the hostility of the Ming dynasty in China, which came to power in 1368.

With the house of Valois, Philip VI (1328) began the long Hundred Years' War (1339-1453) for the expulsion of the English from France. At its close with the victory of Châtillon (1453), France had won an acknowledged national unity.<sup>84</sup>

Under Charles VII (1422-1461) the nation was served for the first time by a royal army which superseded the old feudal levies; the *taille*, assessed for its support, came to be levied without grant of power from the Estates General. The standing army was one of the distinctive characteristics of the end of the feudal age. Two other steps marked the growth of absolutist power; the Estates General were not convoked between 1439 and 1461, while the nobles, exempt from the *taille*, grew indifferent to their loss of representation and did not join the middle class to curb the king's power, as happened in England. This absence of check on royalty served as much to give character to French expansion as to domestic institutions, and to differentiate both from analogous developments in the English-speaking world.<sup>85</sup>

Until the close of the thirteenth century the struggle with England had been indeed "feudal," over landed possessions involved in the Norman tenure. Now the rivalry became commercial, over the Gascon wine trade and manufacture of wool in Flanders, and the fisheries of the Bay of Biscay and the North Sea. France annexed Flanders and invaded Gascony, but the issue brought on war.

Upon the commercial expansion of France the Hundred Years' War had disastrous effects, even more marked than on agriculture. With bridges and roads in disrepair, and brigandage rampant, there was little incentive to manufacture or transportation. The ships of the hanse of the north and those from Italy ceased to call at La Rochelle, where the trade had been captured by Bretons and Castilians. Commercial exchange was limited to neighboring towns,<sup>86</sup> although Charles VII and Louis XI created at Lyons a notable fair which grew as the earlier ones died, and in the sixteenth century became the greatest one in France.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Similar disorders troubled the disrupted German duchies at the beginning of the fifteenth century, while the Italian cities were victims of mutual rivalries. The Turks had overthrown the Serbian empire and promised to threaten Europe but for attacks in Asia Minor upon their base.

<sup>85</sup> James Westfall Thompson, *Economic and Social History of Europe in the later Middle Ages* (New York, 1931), 318.

<sup>86</sup> Guignebert, *A Short History*, I, 373.

<sup>87</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 564-565; H. Hauser, *Travailleurs et marchands dans l'ancienne France* (Paris, 1920), 42.

Once-prosperous Provence was impoverished; the Mediterranean ports were ruined; both nobles and merchants sat in poverty in their own places.

By the reign of Charles VII relations with the Levant had practically ceased.<sup>38</sup> But Frenchmen sailed under the banners of Malta, Savoy, Florence, or Naples, in order to fight the Mohammedans without violating the "capitulations," or later took service with the western nations to guide their whaling voyages and discoveries.<sup>39</sup> The numerous voyages to Asian lands during the century following the Polos were chiefly by Italians; Frenchmen had little if any share in them. The war was responsible for the organization of the so-called "Societies of Mercers," analogous to the holy brotherhoods of Spain, whereby merchants protected their caravans against brigandage. The "king of the mercers" even levied taxes and executed justice, in spite of the royal power.<sup>40</sup>

France began gradually to share in the new navigation which later brought the New World into being. Three periods are distinguishable in her participation. The first, lying entirely within the Hundred Years' War, and still a matter of debate, preceded the great voyages of the Spaniards and Portuguese; initiated by merchants of Dieppe and Rouen under Charles V (1364-1380) it perhaps continued during the reign of Charles VI (1380-1422) on the Guinea coast. The second, contemporary with the efforts of Columbus to find royal support for his westward quest, began under Charles VIII (1483-1498) with voyages not yet thoroughly verified, but so strongly insisted upon by several French writers that the possibility of their having been made cannot be passed over in silence.<sup>41</sup> The third period, following da Gama and Columbus, lies within the reigns of Louis XII (1498-1515) and Francis I (1515-1547). In each period the city of Paris and one or other of the four admiralties of France took a leading part in the maritime adventure.<sup>42</sup>

The earliest of these asserted activities were by a group of Dieppe

<sup>38</sup> Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française* (Paris, 1899-1932, 6v.), II, 273-275.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 5; W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, I, 112.

<sup>40</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 567.

<sup>41</sup> The voyages of the Middle Ages are well summarized in J.N.L. Baker, *A History of Geographical Discovery and Exploration* (New York, 1931), chs. II, III. Progress of the Portuguese, ch. IV. Baker ignores French voyages here.

<sup>42</sup> Pierre Margry, *Relations et mémoires inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la France* (Paris, 1867), conclusion, 345-346. The four admiralties were those of France, Guyenne, Bretagne, and the Levant. Their rivalries resulted in anarchical conditions of French maritime control. La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, II, 439-453.

The last of the admirals of France, Henry II of Montmorenci, was executed in 1632 by Richelieu for complicity in the revolt of Gaston d'Orléans, brother of Louis XIII. Léon Guérin, *Histoire maritime de France* (Paris, 1862-1863, 6v.), III, 3-4.

merchants on the Guinea coast. The legend, still repeated by Norman mariners to their children, runs that in 1364 two vessels left Dieppe, reached Cape Verde at Christmas, and anchored in the Baie de France, after which they traded near Rio Sestos. In 1365 four vessels from Rouen and Dieppe traded at Cape Verde and Petit Dieppe. In 1367 three loges or comptoirs existed, named Petit Dieppe, Rio Sestos, and Petit Paris. Between 1368 and 1375 posts were established at several additional places; in the 'eighties La Mine (Elmina) flourished, having a church and a fort. After 1410 the Dieppoise sent but a single vessel every other year to Grand Sestre and La Mine; about 1413 the voyages ceased altogether, perhaps because of the civil wars arising from the madness of Charles VI in 1392. A few bold mariners may have kept on, in spite of Portuguese hostility, merging the first and second periods mentioned.

The arguments supporting this French pretention to have antedated the Portuguese on the Guinea coast are numerous if not labored. The story is told with circumstantial detail by Père Jean-Baptiste Labat, who professed to have had access to the Archives of Dieppe.<sup>43</sup> Labat's work was published in 1728, whereas the archives in question were destroyed by English bombs in 1694.<sup>44</sup> Arcin asserts that a copy of the articles of agreement between the Dieppe and Rouen merchants in 1365 had been found in England.<sup>45</sup> The story was argued at length by Pierre

<sup>43</sup> Jean-Baptiste Labat, *Nouvelle relation de l'Afrique Occidentale* . . . (Paris, 1728, 5v.), I, 8-9, says: "The burning of the city of Dieppe in 1694 is the reason for my not reproducing here the entire document; but the date and other circumstances are drawn from the manuscript Annals of Dieppe, whose age and authenticity cannot be questioned. They may be seen in the office of M. ———, avocat du Roy in the same city, . . . who willingly lends the curious items which he has collected." "En 1380, on équipa à Rouen la *Notre-Dame-de-Bon-Voyage*, vaisseau de 150 tonneaux; elle revint de la *Côte-d'Or* au bout de neuf mois richement chargée. En 1381, le 28 septembre, partirent de Dieppe pour la *Côte-d'Or*, les vaisseaux la *Vierge*, le *Saint-Nicolas* et l'*Espérance*. En 1383, partirent encore trois autres navires. C'est en l'année 1392 que Jean de Bethencourt et la capitaine Servan, sous la direction de Robert de Braquemont, dit Robinet, partirent, avec quatre ou cinq vaisseaux, pour aller reconnaître et aborder de nouveau, à l'extrémité des côtes du Maroc, les Iles Ténérife et Lancerote. (Tous ces détails sont extraits du Mémoire de E. de Fréville *Histoire du Commerce maritime de Rouen, depuis les temps les plus reculés jusqu'à la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*." Cited in *Documents authentiques et inédits pour servir à l'histoire de la marine normande et du commerce rouennais pendant les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles* by E. Gosselein. (E. Augé, Rouen, 1876).

<sup>44</sup> The bombardment of Dieppe by the ships of Lord Barclay is described in Michel Guibert, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la ville de Dieppe* (Dieppe, 1878, 2v.), I, 85-94. See the same, 305-307, for the narrative and bibliography.

<sup>45</sup> A. Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 181; he says: ". . . A copy of the articles of agreement between the Dieppe and Rouen merchants has been discovered in England. It is entitled 'Briev estoire del navigaige Mousire Jehan Prunaut

Margry,<sup>46</sup> and retold by Petit<sup>47</sup> and Hardy<sup>48</sup> with reserve. Saintoyant thinks it has no serious foundation,<sup>49</sup> and La Roncière calls it a legend.

Villault de Bellefond,<sup>50</sup> sieur d'Elbe, while in 1669 and 1670 making a voyage along the Guinea coast, found traces of an earlier French occupation. A castle then held by the Dutch bore the arms of France. Dapper, the Dutch author,<sup>51</sup> averred that the inhabitants of the region said that the French had been masters there before the Peace. Fleuriot de Langle wrote: "The chiefs of Cap Monte claim to be descended from the French, and are lighter in color than the other Negroes."<sup>52</sup> The accumulated evidence, while hardly constituting historical proof, leans to the side of a persistent and widely believed Norman tradition.

Entirely historical is the colorful episode of the Norman gentleman, Jean de Bethencourt, chamberlain of Charles VI, who, after having been ruined by English raiders, sailed from La Rochelle in 1402 in company with the "good and honest chevalier Gadifer de la Salle" of Saintonge to colonize the Fortunate Isles—the Canaries. After converting most of the natives, he tried to expand his enterprise to the African shore. Landing to the south of Cape Bojador, he was able to do nothing but conduct raids. In the progress of conquest of the islands he quarreled with La Salle, and went to Castile for help, where the Castilian monarch, when appealed to, decided to accept homage for the islands and give Bethen-

Roanois, en la tiere des noirs homes et isles à nous incogneus, avec les étranges façons de vivre desdits noirs et une colloque en lor language."

<sup>46</sup> *Les navigations françaises . . . du XIV au XVI siècles*, "Les Marins de Normandie aux côtes de Guinée avant les Portugais," (Paris, 1867), 13-70.

<sup>47</sup> M. Petit, ed., *Les colonies françaises* (Paris, 1902, 2v.), I, 560-561.

<sup>48</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 14.

<sup>49</sup> J. Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1929, 2v.), I, 41-43. Numerous other references are given in H. Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce de la France*, I, 355, who accepts the tradition. R. H. Major, ed. Pierre Bontier, *The Canarian; or Book of the Conquest and Conversion of the Canarians . . .* (London, 1872) discredits these voyages; see also C. R. Beazley, *Chronicle of Guinea* (London, 1896-1899, 2v.), II, 64, who feels that the existing records are too late to serve as proof. Ch. de la Roncière, "La découverte de l'Afrique au moyen âge," II, 10-17, studying all the evidence, puts Petit-Dieppe and Petit-Paris of 1364 down as pure legend, otherwise Gadifer de la Salle would have known of them in 1404 when he proposed to explore the Guinea coast.

<sup>50</sup> *Relation des costes d'Afrique appellées Guinée* (Paris, 1669), cited in Arcin, *op. cit.*, 183.

<sup>51</sup> *Cosmographie*; Binger, *Priorité des découvertes maritimes en Afrique*, lists nine voyages between 1364 and 1410, as cited by Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 183.

<sup>52</sup> Arcin, *op. cit.*, 184; A. Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung der Europäischen Kolonien* (Gotha, 1906), 13, found the voyages doubtful, as they first appeared in Colbert's time. The question was studied by L. Bstancelin, *Recherches sur les voyages et découvertes des navigateurs normands en Afrique, dans les Indes orientales et en Amérique* (Paris, 1832?).

court protection. The latter's activities in the Canaries, which included ousting La Salle and introduction of Norman and Spanish colonists and laborers, continued until 1405, when he returned home.<sup>53</sup> In 1418 his successor deeded this "Canary Kingdom" to Castile and then sold it to Portugal. There was a long and varied conflict for this useful approach to Africa; the Spaniards were left in possession of the islands definitively in 1477. Norman voyages along the coast of Africa continued in spite of the Portuguese-Spanish quarrel. Bethencourt's Gothic church still stands at Fuerteventura, Santa María de Betancuria.

Bethencourt possessed marine charts, especially that of the coast of Africa down to Cape Bojador, which show previous knowledge of the area. His daring and ability opened new horizons to nautical art; <sup>54</sup> his career gave great impulse to deep sea navigation,<sup>55</sup> and he may be called a worthy predecessor of Jean Ango.

The Bethencourt episode was thus carried on into the epoch of Henry the Navigator, 1415-1460. Spanish claims to the Guinea coast were often asserted, as in the Ordinance of Valladolid in 1475 by Ferdinand and Isabella; this in spite of the fact that Pope Martin V in 1432 had given the Portuguese the right to dispose of the infidels there by force, "with plenary indulgence for those who might perish." Thus Portugal was sovereign over the African coast. The donation was confirmed and augmented by Eugenius IV, Nicholas V, and Sixtus IV, in bulls which form the background of the papal delineation of 1492.<sup>56</sup>

Within the Mediterranean the commerce of France was quickly resumed, the animating personality being the famous but unfortunate entrepreneur Jacques Coeur. A son of Pierre Coeur, a rich furrier of Bourges, he had been shrewd enough to accumulate a great fortune be-

<sup>53</sup> Arcin, *op. cit.*, 165, *Pierre Bontier*, lists the Portuguese voyages, 1418-1472.

<sup>54</sup> R. H. Major, ed., *The Canarian; or Book of the Conquest and Conversion of the Canarians, passim*. See also Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, II, 112-119, for a résumé of this incident. See also his "La découverte de l'Afrique," II, 17-24. R. B. Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire . . . I*, 145-158.

<sup>55</sup> J. F. Lafitau, *Histoire des découvertes et des conquestes des Portugais dans le Nouveau Monde* (Paris, 1734, 4v.), I, 26-27.

<sup>56</sup> "Pierre Bergeron, speaking of Bethencourt, says in effect: 'Mesme il a frayé et ouvert le chemin à tant d'autres depuis à entreprendre de plus grandes choses, qui ont esté et seront en admiration aux siècles suivants. Cela est un honneur et los immortel pour la France, qui en a resseny de si excellents effets.'" L'Abbé A. Anthiaume, *Cartes marines, constructions navales, voyages de découverte chez les Normands, 1500-1650* (Paris, 1916, 2v.), I, 31, citing Léon de Duranville, *Précis des travaux de l'Académie de Rouen* (1854-1857), 250.

Pierre d'Avity said: ". . . Bethencourt gave courage to the Portuguese and Castilians to make new discoveries." Anthiaume, *op. cit.*, I, 31-32; cf. M. Besson, *La tradition coloniale française* (Paris, 1931), 14-24.

fore the end of the Hundred Years' War.<sup>57</sup> He set out for the Levant in 1432, in disgrace for irregularities concerning the coinage of money, intent upon purchasing spices.<sup>58</sup> Shipwrecked on Corsica while returning, he was robbed and stripped to the skin, but set off undismayed to the Levant again to make another fortune, and returned to become steward of Charles VII in 1438 or 1440.<sup>59</sup>

His success was won by coercing the merchants of southern France into a comprehensive effort to make his own Montpellier rival Genoa and Venice in the Levantine trade. His fleet of seven ships, manned by the scum of the seaport towns, was busily plying to Barbary and "even to Babylon." His agents on land and sea numbered three hundred. The business included transport of Christian and Moslem passengers, and trade in slaves, some of whom he heartlessly shanghaied from the streets of his own town. He maintained a silk factory in Florence, and dye works and paper mills in southern France; he worked mines in Lyons, and supplied salt to a number of towns. His comptoirs were sprinkled all along the Mediterranean. France now began to compete with Genoa, Venice, Catalonia, and Marseilles.<sup>60</sup> To be sure, he founded no colonies, but he reestablished French prestige in the Levant by negotiating through his nephew, Jean Village, a treaty with the sultan of Egypt in 1445, effecting consular relations with Alexandria.<sup>61</sup> "The glory of his master he noised abroad in all lands and nations," said one of his contemporaries, "and the gems of his crown he made to shine on distant seas."<sup>62</sup>

All this success was too much for jealous rivals whose business he had ruined. Accused of having poisoned Agnes Sorel, the king's mistress, and then charged with theft and malversation, he was disgraced by Charles VII and sent to jail in 1451. Escaping after two years, he went to fight the Turks, and died at Chio (1456). But his work of commercial revival survived him. The French ports of the Mediterranean rapidly recovered, those of the Levant were developed, and new commercial treaties were made with foreign powers. Merchants of Montpellier

<sup>57</sup> Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 186.

<sup>58</sup> *Mémoire justificatif en faveur de Jacques Coeur, composé par le pape Nicolas V et lu par lui en plein consistoire*; Basin, édit. Quicherat, IV, 347-349. (No. 4421 in A. Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France des origines aux guerres d'Italie, 1494*, IV, Les Valois, 1338-1461).

<sup>59</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, IV, pt. 2, 145-149.

<sup>60</sup> On Jacques Coeur, and his times, see Charles de la Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, II, 272-287, 557-558, IV, 8; and J. W. Thompson, *Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages*, 320-327.

<sup>61</sup> P. Clément, *Jacques Coeur et Charles VII* (Paris, 1853, 2v.), I, 139.

<sup>62</sup> Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 373-374; Clément, *op. cit.*, 140-141.

were sent on missions to Tunis, Bougie, Oran, Fez, and Egypt, where they met happy receptions.<sup>63</sup> Coeur has been called the greatest French minister of commerce and trade before Colbert.

Under Louis XI, Charles VIII, and Louis XII, France moved with western Europe out of the older stage of feudalism, ecclesiastical culture, and agricultural economy into a new era marked by the rise of bourgeois control of commerce and industry. Like England and Spain, she felt the awakening of national power in new loyalty to a dynasty ruling an individual state. Monarchy and nationalism were making an end of feudalism.

With the struggle to augment the state revenues as to meet the new conception of government we need not be detained, nor with the troubles incident to maintenance of the court and the standing army. For the first time, now, the crown became concerned for its own sake in the development of agriculture and industry. Trade guilds were put under control of the crown officers, woolen and silk manufacturing was earnestly encouraged, mining was given an impetus.

The restoration of commerce came through Louis XI's reopening or creating no less than sixty-six fairs and markets. The reopening of the Lyons fair, elsewhere mentioned, was intended to prevent French merchants from trading in the rival fairs at Geneva. Even so, the Lyons fair was thought to be too close to the border, and was suppressed in 1484 but restored ten years later. Louis also tried, like a genuine mercantilist, to injure the fairs of Flanders by setting up competing ones inside the border at Calais. Charles VIII set up some two hundred and seventy-five fairs, and made special concessions to the mercantile interest. Rivers and roads were improved, and seigniorial tolls and local custom duties began to feel early effects of the bourgeois struggle against them. New type commercial treaties with foreign states gave aliens the right to travel in France and engage in trade, while naturalization was made easier. While Louis XI was a moderate protectionist, an early measure of the reign of Charles VIII opened commerce to foreigners in a true liberal spirit of free trade.

This mildness did not include the arch-rival Venice, who was not allowed to import merchandise into Languedoc. Louis' galleys competed for the Mediterranean trade, even fought the galleys of Venice until the latter were forced to use armed convoys. In 1480 the monarch urged his nobles and officials to go into trade, declaring that their cate-

<sup>63</sup> Georges Chastellain, *Temple de Jehan Bocace: de la ruine d'aucuns nobles malheureux* (Paris, 1617), cited by Clément, *op. cit.*, Pref. xxi-xxii, and by Lavissee, IV, pt. 2, 149.

gory would not be injured thereby.<sup>64</sup> Trade with England grew, under favorable treaties, as it did also with the Hanseatic League; relations with Spain and Portugal were varied, though generally friendly. Toward Italy the rivalry continued, the invasion of 1494, elsewhere alluded to, being partly dynastic and partly bent upon monopolistic control of the Mediterranean trade.<sup>65</sup> During the reign of Louis XII France attained a prosperity happily contrasting with the misery into which she had fallen during the Hundred Years' War. But the Italian policy brought European jealousy and economic isolation.

When Louis XI (1461-1483), "the king of the bourgeois and merchants," added Provence to his realm by inheritance in 1481 he was not slow to value this thriving condition. He even attempted, though in vain, because of the failure of eleven towns invited to cooperate, to organize their ship-owners in a great commercial company centered at Aigues-Mortes or Marseilles,<sup>66</sup> and to restrict the trade on French seas to ships under his own flag.<sup>67</sup> The opposition was perhaps due to fear that foreign merchants would profit more than the French, as had happened at Lyons.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>64</sup> L. Gouraud, *Recherches et conclusions nouvelles sur le prétendu rôle de Jacques Coeur* (Paris, 1900). Léon Say and Joseph Chailley, *Nouveau dictionnaire d'économie politique* (Paris, 1891-1892, 2v.), I, 427-430.

<sup>65</sup> J. W. Thompson, *Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages*, 462-473.

<sup>66</sup> See Thompson's review of the opinions of numerous authorities on the French motive in the Mediterranean, *op. cit.*, 478.

<sup>67</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, IV, pt. 2, 412.

<sup>68</sup> On Coeur and the influence of several other notable merchants see Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 168-170; Louisa Stuart Costello, *Jacques Coeur, the French Argonaut and His Times* (London, 1847), *passim*; Clément, *Jacques Coeur et Charles VII*; Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce de la France*, I, 367-381; W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge*, II, 483-484.

Concerning Cousin, see below. Margry credits him with the voyage to Brazil in 1488-1489, Pierre Margry, *Les navigations françaises et la révolution maritime du XIV<sup>e</sup> au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1867), 119.

## CHAPTER III

### THE AGE OF DISCOVERY AND THE EARLY FRENCH COLONIES; CARTIER AND ROBERVAL

France became a nation with the close of the Hundred Years' War chiefly because her feudal states had been subjected to firm royal control. Church and bourgeoisie were likewise under the king's hand, and the nation could turn to territorial competition with her neighbors, several of whom were likewise emergent upon political unity. The death of Charles the Bold in 1477 ended feudal kingship and marked the beginning of national monarchy. Burgundy, which threatened to develop separate existence, was forced under the control of Louis XI. But out of that struggle came the origin of the House of Hapsburg, whose ambitions for two centuries influenced France's foreign policy and conditioned her overseas expansion. Provence was annexed, as has been said (1481), and Roussillon was bought from Aragon by Louis XI, the great expansionist, whose reign is tentatively credited with the overseas adventures already noticed.<sup>1</sup> In spite of temporary reverses under his son Charles VIII (1483-1498), when the Estates General assembled to correct abuses in a final flare of popular sovereignty,<sup>2</sup> France entered a struggle for possessions in Italy, whose rival cities had not developed the strength for external activities which had been the marked phenomenon of western Europe.<sup>3</sup> This movement created the dawn of the Renaissance for France; it brought not only new culture, but firm establishment of the royal power.<sup>4</sup> The strife began when Charles VIII attempted to seize from Ferdinand of Aragon the crown of Naples, to which each had claim. Though successful (1495), Charles was so beset by the jealous pope that he had to hurry back to France.<sup>5</sup> In one respect he saw some small progress in the rules governing navigation and international relations. In 1497 he celebrated a treaty with Henry VII of

<sup>1</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, IV, pt. 2, 411; for the extension of France at the beginning of the sixteenth century, *ibid.*, V, pt. 1, 133-134. French sea captains, watching the work of the Spanish explorers, felt sure "that a ship sailing straight west beyond Ireland would come to the land of Prester John." (Quoted in M. Beson, *Histoire des colonies françaises* [Paris, 1931], 5.)

<sup>2</sup> G. B. Adams, *The Growth of the French Nation* (New York, 1912), 143.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. J. W. Thompson, *The Middle Ages*, 300-1500, II, 1046-1047; and Sellery and Krey, *Medieval Foundations*, 353-354, 547-555.

<sup>4</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 568.

<sup>5</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, V, pt. 1, 1-24.

England, obliging ship-owners (*armateurs*) of both countries to furnish bond before their ships should leave port that their crews would observe the existing peace. Until that year treaties between these crowns had been of small concern to private persons, and maritime commerce little else than piracy. The opening of the era of deep-sea navigation thus had its early effect in regularizing international intercourse.<sup>6</sup> Louis XII (1498–1515) made no headway in Italy against Ferdinand, nor against the energetic Pope Julius II, whose struggle with Venice he espoused, only to be driven out because too successful.<sup>7</sup>

Francis I of Angoulême (1515–1547) had for arch-enemy the great Hapsburg Emperor Charles V. These two virile young royalties brought to the story of expansion a brilliant page, but to their two countries exhaustion from their bitter rivalries.<sup>8</sup> France was quite checked in her European expansion, and a century was to pass before she could recuperate her then dawning prestige and power.<sup>9</sup> But Francis began the French struggle for a real place in the extra-European world.

In the first stage of it, the battle of Marignano in September, 1515, Francis gained control of all northern Italy. This political ambition was checkmated in 1516 when Charles V became head of Spain and Spanish America, and heir to Ferdinand's claims in Italy; he was already ruler in Franche-Comté and the Low Countries. In 1519, too, he defeated both Francis I and Henry VIII of England in the sordid rivalry for the emperorship.

Being now surrounded by the possessions of Charles, Francis had to fight for the life of his kingdom. He had the advantage of interior lines of communication, and a highly centralized state, whereas Charles held scattered territory and was strongly opposed by nationalistic and Protestant influences in the Netherlands; in Germany the Reformation was beginning, and the Turks were threatening the Danube. If Francis had let Italy alone he would have avoided the hostility of Leo X, who joined Charles to get Francis out. After a second invasion, Francis gave up, but shortly Charles in turn had to withdraw also, for the church in Italy could brook no rivals. Francis died in 1547, shortly after Henry VIII;

<sup>6</sup> L. Guérin, *Histoire maritime de France*, I, 391–392. All six volumes contain well-documented accounts of the chief episodes in which the French navy participated. Guérin concludes with a very brief chapter on the period 1814–1851. E. Ducéré, *Histoire maritime de Bayonne: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Adams, *The Growth of the French Nation*, 148.

<sup>8</sup> The early biographies of Sandoval and Robertson have useful material. See also A. H. Johnson, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century, 1494–1598* (2d ed., London, 1898), 252–258, and Roger Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, III, ch. XXIV; E. Armstrong, *The Emperor Charles V* (London, 1902, 2v.), chaps. I, VI, VII, XI, XII; II, chaps. I, XII, are all useful.

<sup>9</sup> Adams, *The Growth of the French Nation*, 148–149.

Charles, failing to reduce the German Protestants, abjured earthly glories and entered the Convent of St. Yuste in 1556, taking from the political scene within a decade the last of three great contemporaneous expansionist monarchs.<sup>10</sup> Under the circumstances, Francis deserves credit for preserving his state in the face of grave danger; it is not surprising that his colonial work was slight, and its policy wavering.<sup>11</sup> His first effort was to enlarge the opportunities for trade in the Mediterranean, which had fallen off about the end of the thirteenth century, while England and France were embroiled in the Hundred Years' War. We have already seen how Jacques Coeur, Charles VII, and Louis XI gave France again a temporary ascendancy on the Mediterranean, while Spain and Portugal established themselves on the coasts of Morocco and Algeria.<sup>12</sup>

Early in the sixteenth century the Turks halted European progress in the Mediterranean. Egypt fell into their hands in 1517, and their corsairs even seized and occupied Barbary. Within a few years the Barbarossa brothers drove the Spaniards from the coasts of Algeria and Tunis, set up their headquarters in the port of Algiers, defeated combined French, Spanish, and Italian fleets in 1516, 1517, and 1518. When finally in a close pinch, they entrenched their power by declaring homage to the sultan in Constantinople.<sup>13</sup> In Morocco, which was protected from the Turks by the Atlas ranges, a Holy War was waged by the *marabouts* or holy men along the littoral against the Spaniards at Melilla and the Portuguese on the Atlantic strand. Thus Africa was cut off from Europe. French strategy in Italy sought not only dynastic aims but a solid and advanced base of operation against the Turks. If successful, the French kings, as Protectors of the Faith, might absorb Mediterranean commerce and dominate the Italian principalities, or even reconstruct and rule the Eastern Empire.

A luckless crusade begun by Louis XII in 1499 had dwindled to sending four galleys to the Levant, and even these failed, because of the

<sup>10</sup> The struggle was sharpest during the decade 1520–1530, but was projected into the reigns of each monarch's son, finding temporary respite in the treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis, 1559 (Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, V, pt. 2, 9).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, III, 399 ff. For sources on Francis I, see Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, V, pt. 2, 1–2.

<sup>12</sup> Between 1502 and 1517 Venice struggled to overcome the ill effects of the discovery of the Cape Route by rapprochement with Egypt, even dreamed for a time of piercing the Isthmus by a canal as a means of competing with Portugal. Spain likewise turned toward Egypt momentarily, and France hoped for a position in Syria or Egypt. F. Charles-Roux, "L'isthme de Suez et les rivalités européennes au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Revue de l'histoire des colonies françaises* (1924), 165.

<sup>13</sup> Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire*, III, 346–349. See above, *Introduction*. F. Charles-Roux, *France et Afrique du Nord avant 1830* (Paris, 1932), 43–45.

defection of the Venetians and Rhodians. In 1501 another French expedition was wrecked through misunderstandings of its leaders. In 1518 a general crusade was talked about, Pope Leo X expecting much from Francis; but neither was capable of decisive action, and nothing happened save that a combined fleet was sent against the Turks, as mentioned above. From time to time French expeditions continued to visit Tunis.

In 1525 France, emulating Portugal, undertook to develop the Moroccan trade. Colonel Piton made his way to Fez for that purpose about the time when the Marseilles merchants began to be interested in Algiers, while the Lenche brothers founded "The Bastion of France" at La Calle.<sup>14</sup> In 1554 the king of Navarre and admiral of Guyenne, Antoine de Bourbon, obtained the free entry of the port of El Ksar es Seghir. The Dieppe, Honfleur, and Rouen corsairs kept up their fight against the Portuguese along the west Moroccan coast; in 1570 some Rouen merchants founded a company to trade for sugar cane and other products, carrying their operations down to Senegal and Guinea.

During the following eighteen years, nevertheless, the trade of Le Havre with the western ports of Morocco, particularly Saffi and Agadir, was brisk; from Le Havre the Rouen merchants sent and returned one hundred ships, excluding those trading on the African shores farther south. In 1573 no less than seventeen vessels went to western Morocco.

But European relations with the Ottomans during most of the sixteenth century were purely defensive. Charles V succeeded between 1535 and 1540 in reoccupying the shores of Algeria and Tunis, and exercised authority over the "kings" of Tunis and Tlemçen. But since central Europe was also threatened by the Turks, his hold on North Africa was always precarious. Plans for important expeditions from Spain against the Barbary States miscarried, and Philip's grand enterprise of 1569, which yielded the smashing victory of Lepanto (1571) and momentary reoccupation of Tunis, had no lasting effect on the problem of the Mediterranean.

The policy of Francis in that sea was to nullify the efforts of Charles.

<sup>14</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 71-99; Philippe Barrey, *Les origines de la colonisation française aux Antilles; la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales* (Le Havre, 1918), 12, note 1.

Two Marseilles merchants in the second half of the sixteenth century (1561, Levasseur, 217) obtained from the sultan the right to fish for coral on the island of Tabarca, where they erected the Bastion de France, a plain warehouse without fortifications. This group retained its rights in the face of other competitors; in 1604 Savary de Brèves got the capitulations renewed, and the right was conceded to the French to fish in all the jurisdiction of Algeria and Tunis. Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de la France*, I, 203.

He gave up the idea of using Italy as a *point d'appui* for dominating the Levant, and thought more of making it a base for fighting the Hapsburgs. An arrangement with even the Turks against Charles could be made, though this shocking *mésalliance* had no military value, its only advantage being the establishment of French protection over Christians resident in Africa and Asia Minor. The capitulations of 1528, 1536, and 1569 gave to France the right to trade in all Ottoman territory, erect posts, and establish consulates. But as the Levant had fallen in economic capacity under the Turks, the alliance failed to bring about regular commercial relations.

In the meantime, the European nations had begun their western exodus in a ferment of excitement. To resume the salient incidents of the early Age of Discovery: The Portuguese, after taking Ceuta in 1415, sought to develop a coastwise trade, advancing in 1419 to the Madeiras, in 1432 to the Azores, in 1441 they reached Cape Blanco, in 1445 Cape Verde, in 1455 the Cape Verde Islands, in 1471 Cape López, and in 1484 the mouth of the Congo.<sup>15</sup> Henry the Navigator died in 1460, but his countrymen were before that time bent on reaching India.<sup>16</sup> In 1486 Bartolomé Díaz rounded the Cape of Storms—Good Hope, his king renamed it. The way to India was now open.<sup>17</sup>

The Genoese, Columbus, having failed in Portugal to enlist interest, perhaps also in France and Venice, won support in Castile for his western exploit, and his immortal voyage of 1492 to San Salvador opened the new Occident.<sup>18</sup> His notion that he had reached the Far East strengthened the current misconception that the earth's circumference was shorter than is the case, thus encouraging future western discovery. His faith in a strait leading past the American obstruction motivated his own last voyage of 1504 and most subsequent discoveries for more than a century.<sup>19</sup> Thus the two Iberian countries were turned, one to the East, the other to the West,<sup>20</sup> while England soon began a rival maritime career in both areas.

<sup>15</sup> The bull of Nicholas V, conceding the coast of Africa to the Portuguese on January 8, 1454, is reprinted in Eugène Guénin, *Jean Ango et ses pilotes* (Paris, 1901), 175-182.

<sup>16</sup> R. H. Major, *Life of Prince Henry of Portugal, surnamed the Navigator* (London, 1868), 174, 1-3; Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 185.

<sup>17</sup> W. C. Abbott, *The Expansion of Europe*, I, 84-96, 102-108. For a brief summary of the early voyages and companies, see L. Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte et la politique coloniale . . .* (Paris, 1906), ch. I; cf. Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung*, 14.

<sup>18</sup> H. Vignaud, *Histoire critique de la grande entreprise de Christophe Colomb*, (Paris, 1911, 2v.), I, 371, on Columbus' belief that he had reached the East Indies.

<sup>19</sup> J. Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, I, 19-21.

<sup>20</sup> The bull *Inter caetera* of May 4, 1493, is reprinted in Guénin, *Jean Ango et ses pilotes*, 183-186. See the historical criticism of the several bulls of 1493 by H.

John Cabot of Venice, and Sebastian his son, probably born in Bristol, brought the English into the search for a western continent (Asia). It is said that John had studied how to reach the Indies at London, where he lived after 1484. In the decade after 1480 several unrecorded voyages were made to the west from Bristol in search of an island (Brazil) thought to lie on the way to India. In the late spring of 1497, with eighteen men on the *Matthew*, John sailed as "discoverer" for Henry VII of England, with the first English patent for western discovery, sighting Cape Breton Island and, perhaps, Labrador or Newfoundland.<sup>21</sup> Returning to England, he reported that he had reached eastern Asia, and was royally rewarded with £10. After the "success" of Columbus, Cabot, sailing again in 1498, skirted the coast of America from about 45° north, northward to 48°; then, turning southward to the latitude of Cape Hatteras (or the mouth of the Delaware—perhaps to the Chesapeake), he realized with dismay that he had not found Asia; his trade-minded backers lost interest. Sebastian Cabot perhaps made a similar voyage to Labrador in 1499.<sup>22</sup> In 1512 he was in England, but shortly went to Spain,<sup>23</sup> where he became *piloto mayor* of the *Casa de Contratación* in charge of Spanish discoveries.

The last voyage of Columbus, and those of his companions, revealed the coast of Central America and the northern and eastern outlines of South America. The Pacific was discovered by Vasco Núñez de Balboa in 1513; the coast of the Gulf of Mexico was explored in 1519; and Magellan performed his epic circumnavigation in 1519–1521. The Florentine, Verrazano, who ran the Atlantic coast from 34° to 50° north in 1524, was the first to join the quest for the strait officially for France. The king of Portugal had been told by his spies in 1522 that Verrazano was preparing to colonize in Brazil.<sup>24</sup> Within the next quarter-century

Vander Linden, "Alexander VI and the Demarcation of the Maritime and Colonial Domains of Spain and Portugal, 1493–1494," *American Historical Review* (October, 1915), 1–20. See also S. E. Dawson, "The Lines of Demarcation of Pope Alexander VI and the Treaty of Tordesillas," in Royal Soc. of Canada, *Transactions*, V, pt. 2, p. 467.

<sup>21</sup> H. P. Biggar, *The Precursors of Jacques Cartier* (Pubs. of Canadian Archives, V, Ottawa, 1911), ix–xiv. J. A. Williamson, *The Voyages of the Cabots* . . . (London, 1929), 157–175, 176–184, 196.

<sup>22</sup> J. A. Williamson, *Maritime Enterprise* (Oxford, 1913), 51–85, 89–103; Justin Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History of America* (Boston, 1884–1889, 8v.), I, 149.

<sup>23</sup> Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, I, 149; M. de la Puente y Olea, *Los trabajos geográficos de la Casa de Contratación* (Sevilla, 1900), 113–114.

<sup>24</sup> Andrade, *Chronique du roi Jean III*, pt. 1, 12–13, reproduced in Guénin, *Jean Ango et ses pilotes*, 190–191.

the west coast of North America was run by Cabrillo (1542) and Ferrello (1543) northward to about 42½° north latitude.

While the Portuguese and Spaniards are credited with the dominant colonial activity until 1598, the year of the death of Philip II, their predominance was early and insistently contested. Francis I was quick to challenge the world-division inaugurated by the papal bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494. Probably the Normans, Gascons, and Bretons, following up their known fishing voyages to Iceland, reached Newfoundland before the close of the fifteenth century;<sup>25</sup> certainly they frequented the great island early in the sixteenth, and visited the shores of America, the Antilles, and Africa.<sup>26</sup> The merchants' corporation of La Rochelle sent out many expeditions, and their corsairs were sailing far into the ocean during the reign of Charles VIII. The whalers of Bayonne frequently followed their prey as far as the shores of Newfoundland and the coast of Africa.<sup>27</sup> About 1500 the bankers Anjo at Dieppe entered the shipping business, and sent out numerous navigators bent on discovery and trade. From the time of Gonville to the outburst of the Revolution in 1789, there were few years indeed, and certainly not a decade, in which some French enterprise did not strike against either the Spaniards, Portuguese, or English in the American continent.

No accounts of their earliest exploits are to be found, for they sought by secrecy to avoid competition. From the legendary days comes the yet unraveled story of the Dieppe captain, Jean Cousin, who set out to visit the Dieppe comptoirs of Guinea, and who is reputed to have sailed in 1488<sup>28</sup> from the Azores to a river mouth, perhaps of the Amazon or the

<sup>25</sup> Pierre Margry, *Navigations françaises*, 110–116; Biggar, *The Precursors of Jacques Cartier*, 119; La Roncière, *La marine française*, II, 340, 399; and Martín Fernández de Navarrete, *Viages y descubrimientos que hicieron . . . los españoles* . . . (Madrid, 1825–1837, 5v.), III, Docs. 31, 32.

<sup>26</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States*, I, 199.

<sup>27</sup> Ducéré, *Histoire maritime de Bayonne: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 10–20; H. Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique sur la Guyane française* (Paris, 1842), quotes from P. Bergeron, *Histoire de la navigation* (Paris, 1630), 117, saying: "Toutesfoi, nos Normands et Bretons maintiennent les premiers avoir trouvé ces terres-là, et que de toute ancienneté, ils ont trafiqué avec les sauvages du Brésil au lieu dit depuis Port-Real. . . . Ce pays fut appelé par les Portugais terre de Sainte-Croix, à cause d'une croix que Cabral y fit solonnellement arborer; mais nos Français lui ont donné le nom de Brésil, pour ce que ce bois y avait en abondance en certains endroits."

Indian words from Brazil, such as aras, tapir, toucan, acajou, and ananas, adopted and spread by the French, argue the early contacts which the French claim. Ternaux-Compans, *op. cit.*, 2–3.

<sup>28</sup> This voyage is challenged by many writers, but its historicity is defended by P. Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français au seizième siècle* (Paris, 1878), 1–30;

La Plata, thence southeast to Africa, passing a cape which he named Cap des Aiguilles (Good Hope?), and returning to Europe along the African shoreline in 1489.<sup>29</sup> The papal Line of Demarcation obliged the French to keep north of the Azores, but did not shut them entirely out. Even as early as 1493 their corsairs lay in wait for Columbus on his return voyage, and he eluded them in 1496 by an unexpected change of route. In 1503 or 1504 the Norman, Binot Paulmier de Gonneville, sailing from Honfleur in *l'Espoir*, appears the first Frenchman to have made a voyage to Brazil the historicity of which is unchallenged. Gonneville was accompanied by two Portuguese pilots "*pour en la route es Indes ayder de leur scavoir*"; the French followed closely the progress of Portuguese discovery, and often used nationals of Portugal in their voyages.<sup>30</sup> In his search for the Indies, Gonneville was storm-driven to Bahia in 1504; he called the region he saw "the Land of Parrots,"<sup>31</sup> planted a cross, and took to France a chief who married the captain's daughter. In 1505 René Crignon discovered Cape Race, Newfoundland; in 1506 Denys of Honfleur also saw the coast of Newfoundland, and in 1509 reached Brazil.<sup>32</sup> By 1515 his compatriots were making regular voyages to this coast; in 1530 Saint-Brancard founded on Saint-Alexis Island a post which existed for a short time, until a Portuguese fleet destroyed it. It probably inspired the occupation of the country by Portugal in that year.<sup>33</sup>

Margry, *Les navigations françaises*, 128-134, prefers to leave the question in doubt. Cf. La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, II, 400-406, who finds that Cousin lived in 1488, but was neither Dieppois nor captain. Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 6, thinks that the legend of Cousin is an epitome of many French attempts to reach South America, or that the Dieppe captain may be confused with an officer under Paulmier de Gonneville. See Guibert, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la ville de Dieppe*, I, 3-7, for claims for Cousin and pertinent bibliography.

<sup>29</sup> Francisco López de Gómara, *Historia general de las Indias* (Saragossa, 1553), says that the mysterious pilot who died in the home of Columbus, after telling of his western island discoveries, was a Frenchman. Herrera and others called him Alonso de Huelva. See E. Prestage, *The Portuguese Pioneers* (London, 1933), 233-234.

<sup>30</sup> Abbé A. Anthiaume, *Cartes marines . . .*, I, 34, citing D'Avezac, *Campagne du navire l'Espoir de Honfleur* (Paris, 1869).

<sup>31</sup> Léon Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale en France* (Paris, 1891), 1-14, has a brief survey of the voyages of discovery and French share in them. Margry, *Les navigations françaises*, 135-180.

<sup>32</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 2. [See Treaty of Madrid, 1526, between France and Spain, Article XXXIII.] Pierre Margry, *Les navigations françaises*, 128-130. Cf. Ternaux-Compans, *op. cit.*, 4-6.

<sup>33</sup> *Collection des Voyages, Terra Australis Cognita*, "Binot Paulmier de Gonneville, to Australia" (Edinburgh, 1766), I, Art. III, 63-73. The French frequented

Other Normans and Bretons continued to visit the mouth of the St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, and possibly Labrador.<sup>34</sup> Possibly as early as 1550 a transitory French settlement was made on Sainte-Lucie, when some forty adventurers under one Rousselan, married to an Indian woman, remained on the island until their leader's death four years after their landing.

In none of these voyages did the French apparently take possession. They were private undertakings, or were under one of the four admirals of provinces, who levied heavy licenses upon the initiators. The king of France had no navy, and dared not challenge the Portuguese or the Spanish, save through the boldness of armateurs like Jean Ango. Such bold French mariners were unquestionably the first to assail the Iberian monopoly. Not yet challenging the territorial holdings of either power, the corsairs did come to international notice when, in 1512, Ferdinand of Spain objected to the use of the ports of Portugal by French vessels which preyed on his ships from the Antilles.<sup>35</sup> They were attacking Spanish and Portuguese ships without discrimination and suffering reprisals from each, in the vengeful spirit of the wars of religion. This did not prevent Magellan from taking at least a dozen Frenchmen with him on his great circumnavigation. Again, in 1523 and 1525 the Castilians complained bitterly of the corsairs who had captured a rich caravel in 1521, and in 1522-1523 had seized nearly all the booty sent home by Hernán Cortés from Mexico. No doubt these depredations inspired Article 33 of the treaty of 1526 between France and Spain.<sup>36</sup>

most the vicinity of Cape St. Augustine. They also knew the Bay of Itapinga, Cape Frio, and other ports, among them at least two which were called "The New Port, and the Old Port of the French." Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 7. Philippe Barrey, *Les origines de la colonisation française aux Antilles; la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales*, 21.

<sup>34</sup> Biggar, *Precursors of Jacques Cartier*, 116-127; Thomas Aubert, of Dieppe, in 1508 made a voyage to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and brought home the first Indians. Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, IV, 4; Besson, *La tradition coloniale*, 27; A. Supan, *Die territoriale Entwicklung*, 44. Abbé Raynal, *Histoire philosophique* (1776 ed.), V, 35, places this descent in 1650; see P. Barrey, *Les origines de la colonisation française aux Antilles*, 21.

<sup>35</sup> The account of the voyage of Americus Vesputius was published in 1515 at Paris and Saint-Dié. C. Fernández Duro, *Armada Española . . .* (Madrid, 1895-1903, 9v.), I, App. 14, 420, 421. For later complaints ("which throw light on the articles of Lyons") see Great Britain, *Cal. State Papers, Spanish*, 1538-1542, VI, pt. I, 294; also T. Buckingham Smith, *Colección de varios documentos . . .* (London, 1857), I, 116, translated in J. P. Baxter, *A Memoir of Jacques Cartier* (New York, 1906), 359.

<sup>36</sup> Pedrarias Dávila, governor of Panama, was in 1514 instructed to chastise any French who might be found in the West Indies. Herrera, *Historia general de los*

When they renewed war in 1536, Charles V and Francis I tried to use Portugal's coast ports to injure the shipping of each other. As Portugal needed clear sailing for her spice fleet to Flanders, and hoped by concessions to persuade Francis to keep away from her colonies, she favored France rather than Spain.<sup>37</sup> Accordingly a treaty was drawn up at Lyons on July 14, 1536; the Portuguese negotiator was aided by the Norman admiral Chabot de Brion, *bête noire* of Jean Ango's enterprises. Although a trusted agent of Francis, the admiral was also in the pay of Portugal. The treaty, in exchange for protection of Portuguese neutral shipping, allowed the French to take prizes into Portuguese ports of the mainland, the Azores, and Madeira; that is, these ports could be used for lying in wait for Spanish ships. Charles V soon saw the folly of the treaty, and protested against it; thus pointedly warned, Francis ordered in 1537, 1538, and 1539 that his subjects cease navigation to Portuguese colonial coasts. But when he learned of Admiral Chabot's duplicity the order was rescinded, and French depredations from Portuguese ports were renewed. Moreover, Francis had given permission for the voyages of Verrazano and Cartier; he was responsible for sending at least one galleon to Brazil, and in 1528 and 1533 he had, probably under pressure, clearly espoused the freedom of the seas.<sup>38</sup>

\*When the Truce of Nice of June 18, 1538, was broken in July, 1542, Francis had made his unblushing alliance with the Turks and other powers, while Henry VIII of England joined Charles in invading France. Under such imminent threat to Paris, Francis sought peace, and on September 18, 1544, his agents at Crépy-en-Laonnois agreed that no more voyages like Cartier's third one should occur, though trading might be permitted. So great was Spanish as well as Portuguese opposition to this concession that the article went apparently unratified,

*hechos de los castellanos*, Decade I, Bk. X, ch. XI. La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, III, 243 ff.; Fernández Duro, *op. cit.*, I, 15; Guénin, *Ango et ses pilotes*, *passim*; G. Marcel, *Les corsaires français au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle dans les Antilles* (Paris, 1902). M. de Navarrete, *Colección de los viages y descubrimientos . . . de los españoles*, IV, 12 ff.; also mentioned in F. Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 2. In that year (1526) there were three French vessels in the Rio de San Francisco, Brazil, and another in the Bahía de Todos Santos, met there by a ship of the fleet of García de Loaysa. Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 9.

<sup>37</sup> *Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens* (ed. N. Tomasseo), (Paris, 1838, 2v.), I, 88-89, in *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France*. In many cases the Dutch were utilized for the Portuguese carrying trade.

<sup>38</sup> The story of the French seizures at sea during the first part of the sixteenth century, 1522-1556, is told with documentation in Guénin, *Ango et ses pilotes*, 187-242. *Ibid.*, 203-205; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, III, 292, 297. The text of the treaty was first printed in Davenport, Doc. 17 (201-203). Margry, *Les navigations françaises et la révolution maritime*, 221; this was the result of protest in 1531 by the admiral of Provence against the Portuguese.

and in 1545 Francis again had to prohibit Frenchmen from entering overseas Spanish territory.<sup>39</sup>

The commands of kings had not prevented corsairs (Flemings, French, and Portuguese) from attacking Havana, Chagres, and Cartagena in 1537. Throughout the 1540's eight other French corsair attacks on the Spanish West Indies occurred, and as many during each of the following four decades.<sup>40</sup>

This movement into the Atlantic thus became a measure of state policy, most of the voyages of importance being made through the energy of the famous Jean Ango. This quaint blond-bearded vicomte of Dieppe, who held many high offices and patronized letters and arts, gathered a fleet of twenty to thirty well-armed ships, including a dozen of his own, the rest belonging to his townsmen and the shippers of Rouen. His well-prepared expeditions were directed largely by Italian experts. Ango set up a museum of colonial curiosities and products, which Francis himself visited at least once. The clever armateur enlisted the interest of Marguerite d'Angoulême as well as that of the king, which gave him useful though uncertain protection. His object was to prey on the commerce of Portugal, whose king in 1530 complained that the Normans had taken three hundred of his ships. Among Ango's enterprises was one seeking a way to India and China by the northern (Muscovy) route; he it was who organized the combination of Florence and Lyons armateurs who sponsored the work of Verrazano.

In spite of his great capacity, Ango was not entirely free to act, for every one of his expeditions had to be made under permit from the admiral of Normandy, Chabot de Brion, who always demanded a handsome share of the profits. Possibly it was his selfishness which drove Ango to seek out the great enemies of French expansion, the Portuguese, and brought him at last to disgrace.<sup>41</sup> The rugged Dieppois was

<sup>39</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 206-207; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, III, 302-303; *Cal. St. Pap., Spanish*, 1544, VII, 479-480.

<sup>40</sup> Ducéré, *Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 345-351, calendaring documents from the Vargas-Ponce collection, Arch. Hydrog. Madrid.

<sup>41</sup> His father Guillaume is credited with sending out Pierre Aubert for the discovery of Newfoundland, and the consequent growth of the fishing and fur industries of Dieppe. Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 9. Guénin, *Jean Ango et ses pilotes*, 74-142, 146, 168. For a description of Ango see David Asseline, *Les antiquitez et chroniques de la ville de Dieppe* (Dieppe, 1874, 2v.), I, 238 ff.; and for his relations with Henry II, see Guibert, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la ville de Dieppe*, I, 39-43. In 1530 the king of Portugal wrote to his ambassador in France, Juan de Silveira, complaining that French corsairs going to Brazil had, in time of peace, taken more than three hundred of his ships and caused losses of over 500,000 *cruzadas* (Navarrete, *Viages*, V, 237; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, III, 305-306). See the "Remonstrances très humbles" of the captains of France against

the earliest French champion of the principle of the "*mare liberum*," which Francis I defended intermittently in his conflict with Spain. To meet the piratical attacks of the Portuguese and Spaniards, Ango obtained from Francis in 1531 letters of marque enabling him to arm his ships for war. The right brought him claims for losses by both powers and in turn further losses of his own.

Ango tried to reach the Far East by eastward sailing as well. Two of his captains, the brothers Jean and Raoul Parmentier, sailed from Dieppe in April, 1529, "pour faire honneur au pays et au Roi"; they rounded the Cape of Good Hope, crossed the Indian Ocean, and reached far-off Sumatra before the year closed. Unhappily, they died in December before leaving the island, and their expedition, giving up the Moluccas and China, returned to France in 1532. Jean Parmentier, poet and navigator, was, said his friend and diarist, Pierre Crignon, "le premier françois qui a entrepris a estre pilotte pur mener navires à la terre Amérique; qu'on dict le Brésil. Et semblablement le premier françois qui a descouvert les Indes: iusques à l'isle Taprobane (Sumatra)." He also wrote many good and excellent "moralitez de farce et en grant quantité."<sup>42</sup>

Ango shared the belief of his time that the yearned-for Cathay could be reached by some strait through America in the north, hence his support of the famous Florentine Giovanni Verrazano. America was reached somewhere in the Carolinas, the voyage passing northward, apparently to the Hudson River.<sup>43</sup> His brother's map marked the coast between 40° and 42°; in 1528 he gave the name of "Gallia Nova" to this

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treatment as pirates, in *Nouvelles annales des voyages* (Paris, 1819-65, 188v.), Vol. 97, 53-78; Charles V and the king of Portugal in 1522 and 1540 ordered their captains to sink all ships and throw all sailors into the sea when found in the forbidden waters (La Roncière, *op. cit.*, III, 278 and 300).

<sup>42</sup> Lope de Sanzamos set out that year to drive the French from the coast of Brazil. They had taken the fortress of Pernambuco (Herrera, *op. cit.*, Decade II, Bk. X, ch. V). Ango died in 1551, ruined by his creditors through failure of the king to restore loans Ango had made to him (Guénin, *op. cit.*, 171). Their ships were of two hundred and one hundred-twenty tons. Pierre Crignon's account of the voyage is partially reprinted in Guénin, *Jean Ango*, 126-144. See Giovanni Ramusio, *Navigazioni et viaggi . . .* (Venice, 1554-1558, 3v.), III, 423-433; H. HARRISSE, *Jean et Sebastian Cabot* (Paris, 1882), 301-303; Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, IV, 16; Ch. Schefer, ed., *Le discours de la navigation de Jean et Raoul Parmentier de Dieppe* (Paris, 1883), ii, xii-xiii, xx; Asseline, *Les antiquitez . . . de la ville de Dieppe*, I, 232; Anthiaume, *Cartes marines*, I, 160-165. The Norman pilots seem to have acquired the earliest knowledge of the Asiatic archipelago, and drew the best early maps. Anthiaume, *op. cit.*, I, 47.

<sup>43</sup> G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France* (New York, 1928, 2v.), I, 48. J. G. Shea, in Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, II, 260-283; J. C. Brevoort, *Verrazano the Navigator* (New York, 1874), 36-51.

region. The vague map made by the brother, Jerome, showing three great inland seas in North America, served to animate future efforts with piquant interest<sup>44</sup> in new knowledge gleaned from adventurous seas.

For renewed quest of the Northwest Passage a captain of Saint-Malo, Jacques Cartier, received from Francis in 1534 a subvention to discover "certain isles and country where it is said one may find a great quantity of gold." This enterprise was "au nom du roi," and under oath of fidelity to vice-admiral La Milleraye, no longer mere private ambition. Cartier explored the coast of Newfoundland and went on to Labrador, where, stopped by the icepack, he returned to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, running along the west coast of Newfoundland, thus proving it an island and not a projection of the continent. In Gaspé Basin he took possession with due ceremony. This was the first colonial act of France in the modern era. Returning in September from this new, mysterious land, Cartier was sent by the king on a second voyage to get farther into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, establish relations with the Indian chiefs, and take possession of territory.

Setting out in 1535 with three ships and a hundred men, he found within the Gulf the island of Anticosti, then reached to his regret the fresh river where he had hoped for a strait. The St. Lawrence he followed as far as the disappointing village of Hochelaga, in truth no walled Tartar citadel, to which the name Montreal was given. From that point, finding no allure in the great river, he returned to pass a terrible winter at the mouth of the St. Charles River, where his followers had built a fort. He returned to France in 1536, with no booty save a few miserable Indians, to find his king at war again with Charles V; years passed before his enterprise could be renewed.

Though he had found no strait, he had discovered a land "which is as good land as it may be possible to behold, full of exceeding fair trees

<sup>44</sup> The geographical knowledge acquired by the early French voyagers was recorded, with some quaintness of credulity, to be sure, by Pierre Desceliers of Dieppe, the "first" French cartographer (M. Besson, *La tradition coloniale française*, 28-34). Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, II, 260-263; Biggar, *The Precursors of Jacques Cartier*, xxx; Williamson, *A Short History*, II, 351, says that Verrazano took possession in 1524, and that the Spaniards later caught and hanged him as a pirate. Charles de la Roncière, *Jacques Cartier et la découverte de la Nouvelle France . . .* (Paris, 1931), 39, says that Verrazano had been devoured before 1533 on the coast of Darien by cannibal Indians (Guénin, *Jean Ango*, 81). A reduced copy of the Mapamundo drawn by Hieronimus de Verrazano (c. 1529) is given in Brevoort, *Verrazano the Navigator*, and in *Report of the American Geographic Society*, 1873. See Winsor's discussion of this and other maps in *Narrative and Critical History*, IV, 25-29; for Verrazano himself, *ibid.*, 5-9. The claim of France to sovereignty in North America was based on this voyage.

of the nature and kinds of France, as oaks, elms, ashes, nuts, plum-trees, cedars, vines, white thornes . . . and other trees. . . ." <sup>45</sup> The Indians had vaguely indicated precious metals in the interior, and there was always the urge to outdo Spain and Portugal in reaching the Great Khan. Those jealous rivals knew beforehand that the French planned to occupy this far northern region, but did nothing to prevent the venture, since its remoteness eliminated danger to the colonial projects of either Power.

International policies checked effort for a time, but finally the Canadian enterprise was revived. A Picard, Jean François de la Roche, sieur de Roberval, intrigued by Cartier's stories, but itching more for gold and gems on the borders of Tartary than for farms to till, won a grant from Francis to be viceroy and lieutenant-general of Canada, Newfoundland, and Labrador; his colonists were nearly all persons released from jail. Cartier was made captain-general and master pilot. The project made a tremendous stir, and the Spaniards were now greatly upset by it, <sup>46</sup> for the new kingdom rivaled their own in possible area.

Cartier sailed first, Roberval having some privateering to finish, and arrived at Stadacona in August, 1541. Ascending to the mouth of the St. Charles, he erected, near the site of Quebec, a fort to which he gave the name of Charlesbourg Royal. Here he passed a winter of terrific suffering, cheered to endurance by the discovery of what he thought were diamonds and gold, though in small quantities. After nine months, as Roberval did not appear as expected, Cartier decided to return to France. Off Newfoundland, to his astonishment, he met Roberval, but unwilling to trust to his loitering superior, refused to return with him, and took "French leave," sailing away at night. Roberval went on to Charlesbourg, where famine, mutiny, and death took one-third of his men. Unsuccessful in his search for precious metals and stones, and in his efforts at settlement, he apparently made no progress beyond that of Cartier. By 1544 he was back in France, no colony surviving. <sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> "[pour] voyager, découvrir, et conquérir à Neuve-France, ainsi que trouver par le Nord le passage au Cathay." La Roncière, *Jacques Cartier*, 39; J. P. Baxter, *A Memoir of Jacques Cartier*, 146.

<sup>46</sup> Documents on the Spanish and Portuguese attitudes concerning Cartier's intrusions are in Baxter, *op. cit.*, 347-359; bibliography, 395-418. The three voyages are in Hakluyt (MacLehose, ed.), VIII.

<sup>47</sup> The "diamonds" turned out to be mica. The loss of prestige suffered by this expedition is illustrated by the proverb, "False as a Canadian diamond." Baxter, *op. cit.*, 226-227. Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 15; Cartier passed away on September 1, 1557; his widow died in poverty in 1575. La Roncière, *Jacques Cartier*, 225; Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal . . . Voyages* (Glasgow, MacLehose edition, 1904, 12v.), VIII, 283-288.

In spite of a royal edict opening overseas opportunity to all Frenchmen, no one ventured forth, and for half a century French efforts were directed toward more southern coasts. Nevertheless, Canada continued to be thought of as French. Canadian voyages had passed into tradition and engaged popular interest so vividly that they occupy, for example, a large place in the Fourth Book of Rabelais (*Pantagruel*) in which Jean Alfonse de Saintonge and Cartier are thinly disguised pilots under Pantagruel. <sup>48</sup> Probably the author was informed on French voyages toward India by the north.

The few voyages and puny colonial efforts of Francis I give him the reputation of a mere precursor, but it is undoubted that he did all he could to break the Iberian monopoly. He continued his support of Jean Ango, and paid the costs of Cartier's and Roberval's expeditions. He founded the port of Le Havre (Havre de Grâce) in 1517 to afford shelter for ships "which sail the Ocean Sea," a step in the transit of trade from its Mediterranean to its Atlantic phase. Of course, Havre was chiefly intended as a war port for use against England, Dieppe and Saint-Malo remaining the chief centers of equipment of vessels for America and the Indies. The ill-fated attempt to settle Canada was principally due to Roberval, private initiative still being essential in French colonial work. <sup>49</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Margry, *Les navigations françaises*, 223-341; the nephew and grandnephew of Cartier continued, perhaps yearly, voyages to the St. Lawrence; his descendants tried in 1587 to press into the lakes which fed the great river, seeking a way to the New Mexico found by the Spaniard, Antonio de Espejo, in 1583. This was about a century before the episode which brought La Salle and Diego de Peñalosa of New Mexico onto the same page of southwestern history. La Roncière, *op. cit.*, 231; C. W. Hackett, "New Light on Diego de Peñalosa," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (December, 1919), 313-335; J. G. Shea, ed., *The Expedition of . . . Peñalosa by Nicolás Freytas* (New York, 1882), Introd.; C. Fernández Duro, *Don Diego de Peñalosa* (Madrid, 1882), *passim*.

<sup>49</sup> "The sun shines for me as well as for others. I should like to see the articles in Adam's will which excludes me from the division." G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 50-76. The early period of French colonization is briefly reviewed by P. Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes* (5th ed., Paris, 1902, 2v.), I, 139-181; the factual presentation must be received with some reserve. For further elaboration, Kenneth H. H. Umstead, *The French in the Americas during the Sixteenth Century*, MS (Berkeley, 1939).

## CHAPTER IV

## BRAZIL AND FLORIDA

The merchants of Rouen were by no means pleased by the interdiction of the Brazilian trade in 1547; in 1551 they insisted that Henry II withdraw it, as he did. For many years Brazil was visited by nameless successors in adventure of Jean Cousin and Paulmier de Gonneville. Norman sailors, deserters or marooned for indiscipline, settled among the natives and became identified with them; possibly this practice lasted for a century. Hans Staden the German, who was twice in Brazil, found many of them and, when captured by the savages, pretended to be French in order to escape.<sup>1</sup> The Angos of Dieppe first organized the Brazilian trade, but Honfleur, Rouen, and Le Havre all had fleets trading with the coast, in spite of the Portuguese. In 1546 a fleet of twenty-eight ships left Le Havre for Brazil. It was Jean Alfonse de Saintonge<sup>2</sup> who gave the first scientific description of Brazil; Guillaume le Testu, "renommé pilote et singulier navigateur," and André Thevet were sent out in 1551 to make a map and description of that land. Testu, who died fighting under Drake against the Spaniards at Nombre de Dios, was the maker of a famous portolan map of Brazil, dated 1555.<sup>3</sup> Thevet, a Capuchin, was the author of *Singularitez de la France Antarctique*.<sup>4</sup> Other Frenchmen

<sup>1</sup> Ramusio, *Delle navigationi et viaggi*, III, 426 and verso; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 12-13; *Histoire d'un pays situé dans le nouveau monde*, in Henri Ternaux-Compans, *Voyages* (Paris, 1837-1841, 20v.), III, 115. Hak. Soc. Pubs., vol. 51, *The Captivity of Hans Stade* . . . , chaps. I, XLI, LII.

<sup>2</sup> P. Margry, *Les navigations françaises* . . . , 303-305; J. Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, IV, 59, 60, 68-72; see also J. P. Baxter, *A Memoir of Jacques Cartier*, index; P. Barrey, *Les origines*, 17.

<sup>3</sup> Ferdinand Denis, *Une fête brésilienne célébrée à Rouen en 1550* . . . (Paris, 1850), 4-19. It was not unusual for Brazilians to appear in the "Ceremonial of France" (*Ibid.*, 23). The story of this fête is repeated by Anthiaume, *Cartes marines*, II, 199 ff.; Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français au seizième siècle*, 130 ff., and by La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 10. Testu took possession in December, 1551, of a point near Cape San Agustín, whence former Havre adventurers had driven off the Portuguese (La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 11-12). The death of Testu is in *ibid.*, 130-131; the leader of the French expedition was Philippe Strozzi.

<sup>4</sup> Available in the Bancroft Library is the Venice, 1561 edition, *Historia dell' India America detta altramente Francia Antartica*.

known in early Brazil were Jean Duplessis and Guillaume de Moner, sea captains.<sup>5</sup>

A curious and piquant example of French interest in this country was a gorgeous Brazilian fête held to welcome Henry II to Rouen in 1550, to outdo Lyons, which had received him with splendor in 1549. The ulterior motive was to induce the king to remove restrictions on voyages to Brazil. Henry and Catherine de' Medici were given a royal entrée, in which living reproductions of Brazilian life constituted the spectacle. Some fifty Tupinambas and members of the "Tabagerres" (Tabayaras) visiting Rouen built an Indian village on the Seine, and "two hundred" French sailors who had been in Brazil joined the exhibit as natives. Needless to say, the court was delighted.<sup>6</sup> The most important personages of the realm witnessed the event. Thus as early as 1550, Brazil was in vogue in France. It is averred by some writers that Nicholas de Villegagnon himself, who was soon to lead Coligny's colony to this enchanting land, had twice before visited it, and that his initiative was responsible for the occupation.<sup>7</sup> This is probably doubtful, but within a year Thevet and Testu were on their way to study plans for an establishment in Brazil.

In 1551, fêtes and festivals laid aside, war with Spain was again approaching. Charles V, weary of attacks on his fleets, was beginning the armed convoys which were to continue for practically two centuries.<sup>8</sup> He had closely coöperated with the Portuguese in protection of their shipping, and in the articles of 1552 joined forces with them under specified plans: Portugal, being persuaded that "the corsairs were not a fleet in the pay of the French king, but robbers,"<sup>9</sup> agreed to send her fleets out to her colonial ports at specified times only, and Spain was to make corresponding preparations for defense against the French and the Turks.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français* . . . , 125, 128.

<sup>6</sup> F. Denis, *Une fête brésilienne*, 33-36.

<sup>7</sup> Claude Haton, *Mémoires de* . . . (Paris, 1857, 2v.), 36; Arthur Heulhard, *Villegagnon, roi d'Amérique* (Paris, 1897), 93; Coligny had an early interest in Brazil; Jean de Lery reported that he had at Châtillon cotton trees in bearing brought from America (*Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil dite Amérique* (Geneva, 1600), ch. 13).

<sup>8</sup> Woodbury Lowery, *The Spanish Settlements* . . . (New York, 1911) vol. II, ch. I, "The Spanish Treasure Fleets and Florida," 3-27. An interesting account of the size and qualities of French vessels of the sixteenth century, the composition of the crews, their uniforms, and life on the sea, is in Ducéré, *Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 3-9, 38-50, 62-66, 328-332.

<sup>9</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 210-211; text of articles, 211-214.

<sup>10</sup> E. D. Salmon, "The Naval Control of the Mediterranean from the Battle of Previsa (1538) to the Battle of Lepanto (1571)," Ph.D. thesis; Davenport, *op. cit.*, I, 214.

Henry's war, begun against Charles V in 1552, as noticed above, had an early reverberation in America when corsairs from Guipúzcoa, Spain, descended upon the French fishermen in Newfoundland; the troops of Charles landed and drove out five hundred French, and his vessels took many French ships at sea.<sup>11</sup> The French in turn attacked Cuba and Porto Rico; in 1555 the Huguenot Jacques de Sorès pillaged Havana.<sup>12</sup> But both France and Spain were weary of fighting, and agreed at Vauxcelles on February 5, 1556, to a five-year truce which contained an agreement by Henry, who thus repeated earlier pledges of Francis I, that during the truce his subjects should neither "sail to or trade in the Spanish Indies without special license from King Philip." French merchants protested in vain. Upon later occasions, in 1559 and again in 1598, France felt strong enough to refuse to make such a self-denying declaration. But Spain as late as the middle of the seventeenth century tried to invoke this short-lived truce of 1556 as abnegating the French American trade.<sup>13</sup>

It may have been failure in Canada, or the general trend of the negotiations of 1551 and 1555, which turned the first colonial effort of Gaspard de Coligny toward the shores of Brazil. Or it may have been these combined with Nicholas Durand de Villegagnon's flair for overseas adventure. For this Knight of Malta, vice-admiral of Brittany, had had a quarrel with an officer of Brest, and yearned to get far away from France. At any event, the reports of Testu and Thevet on Brazil were now available.<sup>14</sup> Admiral Coligny therefore commissioned Villegagnon to establish in America a center of French colonization. The preparations were diligently kept quiet so as not to arouse opposition in Portugal or Spain.

Jean de Lery, the Huguenot, averred that the undertaking was thought of originally by Villegagnon because of his "extreme desire to go to some far-off country, where one might freely and purely

<sup>11</sup> Davenport, *op. cit.*, I, 215; Fernández Duro, *Disquisiciones náuticas*, VI: "Arca de Noé (1881)," 355-378; Ducéré, *Histoire maritime de Bayonne: Les corsaires*, 333-344 (Documents).

<sup>12</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, III, 579-584. Irene Wright, *Historia documentada de San Cristóbal de la Habana* (Habana, 1927, 2v.), I, 23-31; Pedro Menéndez declared that Sorès was operating under patronage of Condé in France and of Queen Elizabeth of England; Sorès was suspected of having been the leader of an attack on Santiago in 1554, *ibid.* Irene Wright, *Early History of Cuba, 1492-1586* (New York, 1916), 232-241, 258.

<sup>13</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 216.

<sup>14</sup> Coligny had not yet become a Protestant, his conversion not occurring until 1558; and there is no proof that the first expedition was intended to found a Huguenot refuge. The gradual adoption of the Huguenot faith by Coligny is treated briefly but satisfactorily in A. W. Whitehead, *Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral of France* (London, 1896), 61-70.

serve God according to the reformation of the gospel," and he longed to take to such a place those who sought to avoid persecution.<sup>15</sup> This pious motive is much doubted, but surely he cherished a hope of offsetting the colonial power of Spain and of opening new trade routes to French consumers. At least so he wrote in 1565. Ten years earlier he had led his colony to an island off Rio de Janeiro, and set up a post there with the resounding name of "Fort Coligny and Antarctic France." The colony of six hundred included a number of masons, carpenters, tanners, and several persons of distinction. Unfortunately, a number of convicts also went.<sup>16</sup> The governor's guard was made up of Scotchmen.

After a dreary and dangerous voyage brightened several times by piracy freely practised against Spaniards and Portuguese, Villegagnon began a fort and settlement in November, 1555, upon the small island which still bears his name. The natives, though not entirely friendly, proved amenable.<sup>17</sup> The colonists neglected, as did most early American adventurers, to begin planting food crops, and soon suffered famine. The water supply came from the mainland, a fact which created a hazardous situation. The suffering was augmented by all the conditions of a pioneer camp, while there was abundant argument about religious questions. But later coming traders and adventurers were grouped in a settlement about the fort, and with gradual acclimatization came partial contentment.

Villegagnon sent back to France his nephew, Bois le Comte, for recruits to make him strong enough to withstand the neighboring Portuguese. When three hundred of these new colonists came in March, 1557, they included a number of Protestants from Geneva in charge of several ministers. Coligny now evidently hoped to build up a Huguenot refuge in America to relieve France of some of her internal discord.<sup>18</sup>

Such a plan, avowed with fervor by the theologically minded leader, reckoned without the religious rancors of the age; the colonists became divided among themselves over the proper method of celebrating the Lord's Supper. Villegagnon, with unique tolerance, allowed the Protestant ministers to use their own ceremony, and even, on one occasion, partook of the Sacrament at their hands, though he did

<sup>15</sup> Jean de Lery, *Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil, dite Amérique*, 2.

<sup>16</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 13, denied that "proscrits" were sent, nor were there any Calvinists in the first expedition.

<sup>17</sup> Lery, *op. cit.*, 20, 21; cf. Whitehead, *Gaspard de Coligny*, 316; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 15-16; the chief sources are listed on page 15.

<sup>18</sup> It is evident that the idea of a Huguenot refuge in America was not included in the design when the first expedition left France. But cf. Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français*, 246.

not, as has been claimed, become a Protestant.<sup>19</sup> The Calvinists' yearning to convert the natives caused a quarrel and separation of the two groups, Villegagnon definitely siding with the Catholics. The Protestants withdrew to the mainland, preparing to return to France at the desire of Villegagnon, which they did in January, 1558. Believing that a handful of remaining Huguenots were plotting to kill him, Villegagnon cruelly cast three of the Genevans into the sea, and began a rule of half-mad severity.<sup>20</sup> Then, hearing that the Geneva colonists returned to France were misrepresenting him there, he set forth for home about the end of 1559 to defend himself, never to return to his colony.<sup>21</sup>

There were still a few Protestants on the mainland who had been joined by some Norman interpreters previously familiar with the country; at the fort were the remnant of Catholics under Villegagnon's nephew, Bois le Comte. Discord grew, the leader being harsh to the Protestants, neglecting the means of conciliation and of growing food. The watchful Portuguese under the redoubtable Mem de Sá prepared an expedition to oust the intruders, the Jesuits aiding by providing a number of Indian allies. They mustered two thousand men who drove the remnant few score French out in March, 1560, after a siege of twenty days and an assault. Coligny protested to Lisbon and planned in vain an act of reprisal. The refugees on the mainland fled north to the neighborhood of Recife, where a meager colony vegetated until 1568, when it was repatriated.<sup>22</sup> An effort in that year to recover Fort Coligny by a naval expedition from France was defeated by the Portuguese.<sup>23</sup>

This was the first French trial of Catholics and Protestants together in a colonial settlement in the New World. Several others, equally unfortunate, were to follow before the use of Huguenots was to be found impracticable because of their menace to religious and national unity. The Brazilian episode had none the less fixed the minds of many Frenchmen on far-away adventure; for fêtes resembling that

<sup>19</sup> Some of his letters are reproduced in Gaffarel, *op. cit.*, 392-397.

<sup>20</sup> Gaffarel, *op. cit.*, 284-292; Lery, *Histoire d'un voyage fait en la terre du Brésil*, 88-89. The writings of Lery and Thevet made a very definite impression. The former went through six editions by 1600.

<sup>21</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 17-19; cf. G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 78-82.

<sup>22</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 19-24; Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français*, 212; Elizabeth Richards, "Villegagnon and his Brazilian Project," M.A. thesis, MS., 1923. Cf. Whitehead, *Gaspar de Coligny*, 312-319.

<sup>23</sup> This was the end of "France Antartique." Succeeding incidents of French activity on the coast of Brazil are included in a later chapter on Guiana, *q.v.*

at Rouen were held at Bordeaux and Troyès, while people began to read accounts of voyages of discovery, and a body of New World cartography began to develop.

The Treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis on April 3, 1559, meantime ended the struggle between Henry II and Philip II of Spain which had begun with the rupture of the Truce of Vauxcelles. This treaty, a forerunner of the Treaty of Vervins, 1598, was later brought to its logical conclusion in the great Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.<sup>24</sup> At Câteau-Cambrésis the French intrusions in the Indies received much attention. Not only were corsairs still preying on the Caribbean Islands, but there was prospect of a French descent upon Florida from Newfoundland,<sup>25</sup> while the colony by Villegagnon, though violating Portuguese monopoly, was in principle a threat against Spain herself.<sup>26</sup> The rupture of 1552 was said in 1557 by the Venetian ambassador to have been due to French occupation of the Indies.<sup>27</sup>

The negotiators discussed two alternative proposals: either the French should merely agree to keep away from the lands actually possessed by Spain or Portugal, or the Indies should not be mentioned in the treaty, but Frenchmen "doing what they should not" might be punished. As the first plan would have given too much leeway, a modified form of the second was agreed upon. "This was that west of the prime meridian and south of the Tropic of Cancer, . . . violence done by either party to the other should not be regarded as in contravention of treaties."<sup>28</sup> This compromise defined the most remote part of the sea as free on equal terms to all comers, although the French negotiators had protested that "in lands which the king

<sup>24</sup> At Câteau-Cambrésis Francis II, newly crowned, surrendered two hundred towns to Savoy and Spain, and abandoned his pretensions to Italy. He also agreed to the marriage of his daughter to Philip II. France held Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and their protection, as later evolved, served more than three hundred years afterward as the inspiration of the framework of the protectorate of Tunis (Pierre Lyautey, *L'empire colonial français* (Paris, 1931), 83).

<sup>25</sup> Herbert Ingram Priestley, *The Luna Papers* (Florida State Historical Society Pubs., De Land, 1928, 2v.), I, 195.

<sup>26</sup> *Papiers d'état du cardinal de Granvelle (Coll. de docs. inédits sur l'histoire de France)* (Brussels, 1877-1896, 12v.), IV, 659.

<sup>27</sup> E. Albéri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti*, ser. I, tom. III (1853), 304, cited by Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 220.

<sup>28</sup> Davenport, *op. cit.*, I, 220. This agreement gave rise to the phrase: "No peace beyond the line." The prime meridian was later held by Spain to run through the Azores, the French placing it in Ferro, at the west end of the Canaries. In 1634 Louis XIII ordered French cartographers to place it at Ferro (Davenport, 221). The Spanish line was nearly that of the Portuguese Demarcation Line of 1455, *Ibid.*; F. A. Isambert, *Recueil général des anciens lois françaises* (Paris, 1822, 28v.), XVI, 409-411.

of Spain did not possess they ought not to be disturbed, nor in their navigation of the sea, nor would they consent to be deprived of the sea and the sky."<sup>29</sup>

Coligny was undismayed by the failure of "Antarctic France," and undeterred by oral agreements with an enemy as relentless as himself, for he was growing more pronouncedly a Huguenot, and the religious wars were becoming more bitter. During a truce he sent out to Verazano's "Gallia Nova" a preliminary expedition for a Huguenot colony which made land in Florida, "*terre la plus belle du monde entier*," lavishly praised by Walter Raleigh while in France, and as yet unoccupied but lying within the papal grant to the Spaniards, whose king, Philip II, fidgety about rumored French expansion from Newfoundland,<sup>30</sup> had been working since 1557 to forestall it.

The first party was under the gallant and never-to-be-forgotten Jean Ribaut in 1562,<sup>31</sup> and the second under René de Laudonnière in 1564. The monument set up on the River May to denote Ribaut's possession "was adorned with an image of Peace holding in its hand no metal, but an olive branch." Ribaut planted a colony, Charlesport, on Port Royal Sound, under the white banner of France, but the climate, exhaustingly hot and humid, proved a serious obstacle, and the disappointed religionists returned in disgust to France. Laudonnière's settlement (1564) of Fort Caroline on the St. John's River was only deterred from a like move by Ribaut's timely arrival from France with a new group of recruits, soldiers rather than settlers, though some women were brought.<sup>32</sup> Hunger, disease, and desertions were ever-present enemies. A ray of hope came when the English freebooter and slaver, John Hawkins, in 1564 brought to Fort Caroline a cargo of longed-for provisions.<sup>33</sup>

But Philip II, smarting at repeated failures to colonize Florida himself, was in no humor to let go unpunished an affront to Spain and the majesty of the church, and a menace to the silver galleons which sailed home through the Bahama Channel. "The king of Spain cannot bear," said the queen of England to the French ambassador, "to

<sup>29</sup> Davenport, *op. cit.*, I, 221.

<sup>30</sup> Priestley, *The Luna Papers*, I, 123, 185, 193; II, 15-19.

<sup>31</sup> Jeannette T. Connors, *Jean Ribaut: The Whole and True Discoverye . . .*, (Florida State Historical Society Pubs., VII, De Land, 1927), *passim*. René Laudonnière, in Hakluyt's *Voyages* (MacLehose edition), VIII, 439-486; IX, 1-100; X, 53-55; XII, 87 ff.

<sup>32</sup> It was expected that in time no less than 40,000 Huguenots could be sent out to "purify the country" (Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 23).

<sup>33</sup> By 1563 the Elizabethan seadogs were also raiding the Spanish colonies. Drake, Hawkins, and Cavendish seized treasure fleets and plundered towns on the Caribbean littoral, and even found their prey on the Pacific shores.

have the French nesting so close to his conquests, or that his fleets going and coming to and from New Spain should be obliged to pass by them"; but Catherine de' Medici refused Philip's demand that the leader be disavowed and punished.<sup>34</sup> Charles IX asserted that "this territory is ours, that our mariners have sailed it for a long time, for which reason it had kept the name of Bréton coast."

Inevitably hostilities soon broke out, for Philip II after three expensive failures to fortify Santa Elena (Port Royal) finally put his Florida ambitions into the hands of that competent bigot, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, who reached the scene a week after Ribaut, and was more than a match for the debonair and fearless corsair. Knowing his danger, the latter chose the valiant defense of a brilliant offensive, and set sail to fall upon Menéndez' new establishment of San Agustín. But the Spaniard, also resorting to surprise tactics, fell upon Fort Caroline and destroyed it. Meantime, Ribaut's flotilla had been wrecked in a storm, most of his followers and he himself were captured and put to the knife without mercy. Menéndez wrote his king that Ribaut "could do more in one year than another in ten." Only a few Frenchmen, escaping, put to sea with Laudonnière, or were left to wander among the savages until fresh enemies should overtake them.<sup>35</sup>

Catherine de' Medici demanded justice and reparations, but was unable to follow unnoticed demand with retaliation, and Philip paid no attention. Vengeance was dealt two years later (1567) when the Catholic Gasçon Dominique de Gourgues, "un non moins résolu capitaine que parfait marinier," mixing patriotism with a profitable slaving expedition, went at his own cost to seize the Spanish fort San Mateo on the site of Fort Caroline. He hung its defeated garrison, "not as Spaniards, but as traitors, robbers, and murderers." This did not finish the Spanish occupation, however, nor did the French omit further attempts to hold the territory.<sup>36</sup>

Still a fourth intrusion into Spanish Florida was led by Nicholas Estrozi of Bordeaux and Gilbert Gil, a Catalan, between 1577 and 1580. These adventurers built a fort on the coast, planning to destroy San Agustín and Santa Elena with the help of Indian allies. The Indians proved disappointing when they took one hundred of the French

<sup>34</sup> Jeannette T. Connors, *Pedro Menéndez de Avilés* (Florida State Historical Society Pubs., III, De Land, 1923), 122, note 6; see also her *Ribaut*, cited in note 32; Herbert Eugene Bolton, *Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia* (Berkeley, 1925), 131-132.

<sup>35</sup> Whitehead, *Gaspard de Coligny*, 312-315, 319-335.

<sup>36</sup> Ducéré, *Les corsaires*, 95-106; Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 82-91; Herbert Ingram Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man, 1492-1848* (New York, 1929), 75-76; Paul Gaffarel, *Histoire de la Floride française* (Paris, 1875), 328-333; León Guérin, *Histoire maritime de France*, II, 259.

prisoners, but as the intruders were in the interior, Governor Marqués could not destroy them. He did demolish their fort, and in 1570 captured and executed Estrozi with twenty-three comrades, several others being put to death in 1580. In the latter year Gilbert Gil was defeated off San Mateo, losing fifty-four men. Gil had been subsidized by a brother of Estrozi, and there can be little doubt that these adventurers on the Florida shore were closely identified with the plans of Catherine de' Medici and Philippe Strozzi.<sup>87</sup>

"We seized everything but held only the wind," wrote Montaigne (1533-1592) of the American enterprises. "I fear that our eyes were bigger than our stomachs, and [we showed] more of curiosity than capacity."<sup>88</sup>

The French Catholic party could not ignore the Brazil and Florida failures merely because they were Protestant undertakings; they winced under the affront and undertook reprisals. In 1566 Peyrot de Montluc, a son of the *maréchal*, set out mystifyingly to "discover the secrets of the kingdoms of the Negroes"—possibly to conquer Brazil, but the leader was killed in the Madeiras. Another voyage was planned by Philippe Strozzi, known to the Spaniards as Estrozi, who was deterred from his enterprise by the massacre of St. Bartholomew's (August 24, 1572),<sup>89</sup> in which Coligny was killed. Possibly this enterprise, renewed, took the *Prince*, owned by a retainer of the duke of Anjou, to Florida in 1575 to create a kingdom for the duke. The voyage was backed by Philippe Strozzi and the marquis of Villars, admiral of France. The ship was captured by the Spaniards. Two vessels under the same auspices made a similar effort in 1576. In 1583 the *Chardon* landed Étienne Bellenger of Rouen and a band of twenty men in Acadia.

There was still a broader conception. When Dom Sebastián of Portugal was killed in 1578, Catherine de' Medici aspired to place her youngest son on that monarch's throne, opposing the candidacy of Philip II of Spain. When Dom Antonio was proclaimed king in 1580, she delayed helping him until Philip had seized the succession; but she had apparently planned to help him for a consideration, with the old

<sup>87</sup> Mary Ross, "French Intrusions and Indian Uprisings in Georgia and South Carolina (1577-1580)," *Georgia Historical Quarterly*, VIII, No. 3 (September, 1923), *passim*.

<sup>88</sup> [M. E. de Montaigne] *Essais* (Paris, 1657), Livre I, ch. XXX.

<sup>89</sup> On the voyages to Florida, 1575-1576, see Barrey, *Les origines de la colonisation française*, 19-20; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 83 ff., suggests that the Montluc voyage, whose purpose was known to none save the queen and the leader, may have been to find the Transvaal mines. Ducéré, *Les corsaires*, 108, indicates the destination as Madagascar; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 134-137.

question of Brazil still in her mind. The refugees from Villegagnon's failure had hung on near Recife some years. A small French force in 1572 settled among the Tamayo Indians near Cape Frio, and the Portuguese had needed eleven hundred men to make them surrender. In 1579 Jacques de Vau was sent by Philippe Strozzi, cousin of Catherine de' Medici, to make a secret reconnaissance of Brazil preparatory to leading a force of six thousand men against it. Strozzi was to be viceroy in some unspecified place. His instructions were to occupy the Madeiras, seize the Azores, and proceed to Brazil. On July 26, 1583, the opposing fleets met in a grand battle off San Miguel, at the close of which Strozzi, beaten and a prisoner, was transfixed by a Spanish sword and tossed into the sea. It was the end of another viceroyalty. The Azores were thus lost to France, about the time (1584) when a small fort manned by Normans, on the River Parahiba, eighteen leagues from Pernambuco, was being destroyed by a Spanish fleet.<sup>40</sup> In the same year Sarmiento de Gamboa tried to plant a Spanish colony (Port Famine) in the Strait of Magellan to prevent repetition of such raids into the Pacific as that of Drake in 1577-1580.

The desire to humble the Spaniards was now taken up by the "pope of the Huguenots," Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, who, in the spring of 1584, proposed to Henry III a plan to divert to the Isthmus of Suez the Oriental spice trade which once had gone through the Levantine ports or the Black Sea, or later around Africa. To this end the Venetians and Turks were to be enlisted in sympathy with France, while Gibraltar and Majorca would be closed to the Spanish fleets by force. The Isthmus of Panama was also to be captured, while the Sound was to be closed to Spanish ships by coöperation with Denmark; France would have access to the Moluccas without need of circumnavigating Africa, if Panama could be held.<sup>41</sup>

Such a comprehensive antecedent to the later plan of Napoleon I shows the continuity of French commercial ambitions. To Philip II it was startling enough, but it had the disadvantage of being proposed by a Huguenot, which aroused the suspicion of Spaniards and Guises alike. Du Plessis made no headway, and Philip won from the Catholic League the Treaty of Joinville on December 31, 1584, with its repudiation of the Turkish alliance and renewed promise not to sail to the

<sup>40</sup> R. Southey, *History of Brazil* (London, 1817-1822, 4v.), I, 312, 370; F. Varnhagen, *Historia geral do Brazil* . . . (Rio de Janeiro, 1877, 2v.), I, 277; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 169, 188, 199-200. Another port on the Amazon was sought for a new point d'appui, but nothing came of it.

<sup>41</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 296-306, and his "Les routes de l'Inde; le passage par les poles et l'isthme de Panama au temps de Henry IV" (*Revue des questions historiques*, vol. 76 [July, 1904], 157-209); Barrey, *op. cit.*, 20.

Indies. Nor could Catherine frighten Philip into any cession of Portuguese colonies to quiet her pretensions to the crown of Portugal; Dom Antonio, turning to Francis Drake for aid, obtained nothing, and a great French dream of empire to offset Spain was blighted.<sup>42</sup>

These early French failures were due not merely to hostile rivalry. The colonial sites were chosen without recognition of the hazards of strange climate, without appreciation of crop-sowing time or harvest. Colonists were military rather than agricultural, while food and other resources were inadequate and communications difficult. Indian hostility, religious quarrels, inexperience, made all efforts fumbling. France was merely studying the lessons the Spaniards had learned half a century earlier in the West Indies and Panama, and which the English learned at Roanoke in 1585, and again in turn were to find awaiting them in Carolina and Virginia.<sup>43</sup> Yet the early ignorance was to be replaced in relatively few years by the solid accomplishments of the seventeenth century. The years of Spanish colonial monopoly were drawing to a close with the irruption of England and France into the forbidden seas. By 1579 a new threat from the Netherlands brought a third rival, the Dutch, who were to figure as the leading maritime and colonial power down to the day of the great Colbert.

<sup>42</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 203, 205.

<sup>43</sup> For supplementary materials on this chapter see, in addition to works cited, Gaffarel, *Histoire du Brésil français au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*; it contains extracts from the letters of Villegagnon, pp. 377-385. See also Mario de Lima Barbosa, . . . *Les français dans l'histoire du Brésil* (Paris, 1923), and François Pyrard, *The Voyage of . . .* in Hakluyt Soc., vols. 76, 77, 80 (London, 1887-1890).

## CHAPTER V

### FRANCE UNDER HENRY IV (1589-1610); ACADIA AND CANADA; CHAMPLAIN

Following the death of Francis I, his son Henry II (1547-1559) controlled France for a twelve-year pause between the old territorial struggles of his father and the coming politico-religious wars (1562-1593). France now turned away from Italy and Levantine ambitions dominant since Charles VIII, and began to look to the Rhine country and the Atlantic for fields of expansion. Charles V was then winning initial successes in Protestant Germany, and Henry II was glad to help the Protestant enemies of Charles in return for imperial bishoprics on the borders of Lorraine. Charles, beaten in the end, agreed to a truce in the Peace of Augsburg (1555) in which both religions were recognized. After a brief try at reconquering Metz he gave up and shortly abdicated and retired, as has already been told.<sup>1</sup> France had been saved from absorption, had, indeed, grown in prestige and area.

The wars, England joining against France with Philip II of Spain, brought the latter's armies to the threshold of France; the capture of Calais in 1558 ended the last vestige of English tenure in France, while on the other hand Henry suffered loss of nearly all his possessions in Italy. But the house of Guise had become important; its duke Francis, the king's distinguished general, nursed claims to royal rank.<sup>2</sup> Opposing the Guises at first was the house of Châtillon, led by Admiral Coligny. Henry II died in a tournament in 1559, and was succeeded by his son. Francis II reigned a year and a half, during which time the religious wars began in demands for reforms, including separation of the Protestant group from the state, an ideal of theocracy begun in France under Louis XII and developed under the great French reformer John Calvin. The French Calvinists or Huguenots were recruited from the middle and higher classes, especially from the nobles of southwestern France between the Loire and the Pyrenees. The movement was thus political in essence, and a menace to the autocratic state chiefly because of the prestige of its adherents.

Francis II, under the influence of his wife, Mary Stuart, niece of the

<sup>1</sup> P. de Sandoval, *The History of Charles V* (London, 1703), ch. 31.

<sup>2</sup> Adams, *The Growth of the French Nation*, 161-163.

duke of Guise, favored that Catholic family, to the displeasure of the Huguenot Bourbons, who stood closest to the succession. The rivalry led the Bourbons to the unhappy Conspiracy of Amboise in 1560, in which they plotted to seize the king and exercise his power. Bloody reprisals by the Guises stopped when the house lost influence through the sudden death of the king. The new monarch, Charles IX, was but eleven years old (1560-1574) and under the control of his clever, conscienceless mother, Catherine de' Medici. Her policy of balance brought the Bourbon family into favor, and Admiral Coligny recovered his offices. Still other concessions to the Protestants alarmed the Guises, mutual reprisals ensued, leading to civil war from 1562 to 1589. Henry III (1584-1589) was to have been succeeded by his brother, but the latter died in 1584, making Henry of Navarre heir. In opposition to such a Protestant success the Guises proclaimed the decrepit Cardinal of Bourbon heir presumptive, and revived the Holy League to support him. The duke of Guise and Philip II of Spain, with grudges against the Valois and the Protestants, entered into an alliance under the Treaty of Joinville on January 16, 1585. This surrender by the Guises of the interests of France turned Henry of Montmorency and his friends to the side of King Henry III, giving the national party stronger support.<sup>3</sup>

Philip II, imperial-minded as well as Spanish, especially desired to keep the French out of the Indies. Many French Protestants were trading there, in spite of Spanish restrictions,<sup>4</sup> and the League's hope of keeping them out had not been fulfilled; the American shores were about to see their activities renewed in efforts at colonization. In fact, Philip II offered, in a bid for Catholic unity, to open the trade of the Indies to France provided the League would recognize him as protector of France and accept his daughter Isabel as wife of a French prince who should succeed the Cardinal of Bourbon.<sup>5</sup>

The rivalries of the nobles resulted in the formation of a Protestant Union to oppose the Catholic League; to check their mutual rancors and safeguard the realm arose the moderate Catholic *Politiques*, led by the Montmorencies. Affairs were hastened when the worthless Henry III was murdered (1589) by a Dominican monk who believed in tyrannicide, and Henry of Navarre the heretic succeeded him.

As the sixteenth century drew to a close, the predominance of Spain, greatest in 1580 upon the union with Portugal, began to break. Henry

<sup>3</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 223-228; Franklin Charles Palm, *Politics and Religion in Sixteenth-Century France* (New York, 1927), 171.

<sup>4</sup> Davenport, *op. cit.*, I, 224-225.

<sup>5</sup> *Mémoires et correspondance de Duplessis-Mornay* (Paris, 1824-1825, 12v.), II, 580 ff.

IV (1589-1610) went openly to war with Philip again in January, 1595, preferring this to the old secret intrigue. With his neighbors, England and the United Netherlands, the latter now first recognized as possessing international equality, and all three fearful of a Europe under a single sway, he formed an alliance at the Hague in April, 1596.<sup>6</sup> It was a splendid weapon with which to challenge Iberian monopoly; but Henry was the first to desert it, by concluding on May 2, 1598, at Vervins, a treaty with Spain. This reaffirmed the old oral agreement fixing a "line of friendship north of the Tropic of Cancer and east of the island of Fer," beyond which there should be no peace except that enforced by might. That is, the freedom of the seas should be enjoyed there only by the strongest or the fleetest.<sup>7</sup>

It cannot be surprising that the French king, with no overseas colonies yet, should have been for the moment content with this peace, as it confirmed the Treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis, even though it opened no concessions for oceanic trade. In England, on the other hand, there was a party which believed that offensive warfare in America would open up commerce, for here was the real struggle, with Spain as yet, for commercial and colonial supremacy.<sup>8</sup> Philip II had, indeed, as his reign drew to its close, failed to disrupt or conquer France, or to master England. At the moment it could hardly be realized how far the power of Spain had been spent; but it is not remarkable that Henry IV, struggling against the Catholics to possess his crown, and busy with the schemes of the Great Design, should have had so little time for colonial expansion. By becoming a Catholic in 1593 he removed his chief disqualification, and the terms with Spain gave him respite to turn to the needs of his kingdom.

Just before concluding the treaty, he had on April 13, 1598, issued the Edict of Nantes, conceding to the Huguenots not only toleration, free exercise of religion, and cities of refuge, but the right to practice their theory of the church as a state within the state. This menaced the centralized power of the king,<sup>9</sup> whose task it was to maintain the unity of the state, prevent the rebirth of feudalism, and win back prosperity in agriculture and commerce. His chief aid in these tasks, the Duke of Sully, with an eye on internal economic recovery, frowned

<sup>6</sup> Davenport, *European Treaties*, I, 229-231.

<sup>7</sup> M. Besson, *La tradition coloniale française*, 41; Palm, *Politics and Religion in Sixteenth-Century France*, 242; Charles de la Roncière, "Les routes de l'Inde; le passage par les poles et l'isthme de Panama au temps de Henri IV," *Revue des questions historiques*, vol. 76, 159.

<sup>8</sup> J. S. Corbett, *The Successors of Drake* (New York, 1900), 233, cited in Davenport, *op. cit.*, 239-240.

<sup>9</sup> Adams, *Growth of the French Nation*, 179; Palm, *Politics and Religion*, 242, 265.

upon colonies.<sup>10</sup> Henry saw both needs, and was active in repairing roads, building canals, making commercial treaties, and punishing piracy. He sought to convince the nobles that their category would not suffer by going into foreign trade; he even tried (1602) to organize an East India Company, as the Dutch were at the moment doing.

First of all, French trade in the Mediterranean and the Levant was actively cared for. After the battle of Lepanto (1571) Marseilles, profiting by Turkish hostility toward Venice and Spain, began to monopolize the commerce of the Levant. But in the eyes of the sultan she was merely a partisan of the Catholic League, and consequently of Spain; wherefore the Moslem corsairs attacked her ships, and in a few years destroyed her commerce.<sup>11</sup>

Henry tried to undo the damage by sending to the sultan an ambassador, Savary de Brèves, who renewed the capitulations accorded to Francis I. No foreigners not at peace with the Porte, except the Venetians and the English, might, under this new treaty of 1604, trade with Turkey unless under the French flag. The Barbary pirates were forbidden to attack French ships; the right of France to protect the Holy Places was restored. This brilliant diplomacy gave French commerce new life; Marseilles sent consuls to the chief Mediterranean ports to guard her interests; it is said that more than a thousand vessels plied the eastern waters, and the "Échelles du Levant" became a renewed sphere of French influence.<sup>12</sup> But the Berber corsairs scoffed at the prohibition by the sultan, and kept on harrying French commerce. When they destroyed "The Bastion de France" Henry IV planned a strong war fleet with which to stop the piracy, but did not live to build it. The Algerians continued to fight France for eighteen years after his death.

How to outstrip the rapidly growing Dutch trade was another problem. Although finding the English their bitter rivals, as the writings of Hugo Grotius attest, the Dutch, evading Spanish prohibitions by sailing under French names, had got control of the eastern spice trade,<sup>13</sup> and their inroads had brought on a tariff war with Spain. In view of the constant menace to the trade in the Mediterranean, Henry

<sup>10</sup> Sully's theory was based on his declaration that "le pâturage et le labourage sont les deux mamelles dont la France est alimentée, ses vraies mines et trésors du Pérou." Quoted in Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 234.

<sup>11</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 28; Ch. Julien, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 550-551; on the Marseilles trade see C. Pitois, *Histoire des pirates et corsaires*. . . (Paris, 1846, 4v.), I, 329-335.

<sup>12</sup> Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce*, II, 321-322; Jean Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique* (Amsterdam, 1726-1731, 8v.), V, 2d pt., 39, Treaty of May 20, 1604.

<sup>13</sup> In 1609 Simon Danza, a Fleming, was employed to guide a French fleet to the Orient (*Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, East India, China, Japan

made another vain attempt to carry opposition to the English as well as the Dutch still farther by creating a West India Company.<sup>14</sup>

Sporadic overseas adventures continued with advances on the movements which Francis I had fostered; the French could not be denied much longer a hold in Cartier's Canada. Newfoundland never ceased, after the early beginnings before 1500, to be visited by Basques, Normans, and Bretons, even during the civil wars; the fur traders frequently went up to Tadoussac on the north bank of the St. Lawrence after its establishment in 1600.<sup>15</sup> Although a thousand ships of all nations came yearly, the French tradition was thoroughly established in the region, and Henry IV confirmed it in 1598 by sending out a Breton, Troilus du Mesgouëz, sieur de la Roche, to Canada as his viceroy. This hardy patriot had been trying for twenty years to plant a colony in America.<sup>16</sup> "Moved by a singular affection for the reputation of the French name,"<sup>17</sup> he landed two shiploads, fifty Norman jailbirds, on desolate Sable Island, then sailed to the mainland to find a good site for a settlement. Beset by storms, he returned to France, deserting his motley colonists, eleven sorry survivors of whom, clad in furs only, were rescued five years later.<sup>18</sup>

In 1600, however, Pierre Chauvin and Monsieur Pontgravé, two traders of Saint-Malo, obtained a monopoly of the trade on the St. Lawrence, under the obligation of living in the country and taking out fifty colonists each year. Two good trading voyages were made, but Tadoussac, where sixteen wretched colonists were left, was a cold wet place, and of course the business failed. The Saint-Malo merchants resented the monopoly, Chauvin himself shortly died, and, though the trade was divided for their benefit, Pontgravé took his followers back to France.<sup>19</sup>

Then the governor of Dieppe, Aymar de Chastes, warm friend of

(1513-1616), Nos. 469, 473, 478), cited by La Roncière, "Les routes de l'Inde," *Revue des questions historiques*, vol. 76, 189.

<sup>14</sup> Hardy, *op. cit.*, 28-29; Gustave Fagniez, "Le commerce extérieur de la France sous Henri IV, 1589-1610, *Revue historique*, XVI (Paris, 1881), 45.

<sup>15</sup> Two vessels were prepared with munitions for the "defense of New France" in 1564 (E. Gosselin, *Documents authentiques et inédits pour servir à la histoire de la marine normande* . . .), 14.

<sup>16</sup> G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 76, 134.

<sup>17</sup> La Roncière, *Jacques Cartier*, 229.

<sup>18</sup> Wrong, *op. cit.*, I, 136; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 317-318. For details of French voyages after Cartier, especially by his descendants, *ibid.*, 307 ff. Mesgouëz was sent out to claim this region lest the English, animated by Frobisher's propaganda, should profit by Hakluyt's translation of Cartier's accounts of his voyages and take the region from France (La Roncière, *Jacques Cartier*, 228-229).

<sup>19</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 319.

the king, reorganized the company, and in 1603 sent Pontgrève out to explore again, in company with that genius for colonization, Captain Samuel de Champlain, who had won distinction in the wars of the League and had been impressed by the success of the Spanish in the West Indies and Mexico, where he had spent two years. They had orders to "examine the country and see what entrepreneurs could do in it, observe everything, and make a faithful report." Champlain was now Geographer Royal, his function on this voyage being to make maps.<sup>20</sup> His sound judgment, keen observation, and administrative skill made him for thirty years the outstanding figure of French imperialism.<sup>21</sup>

The two explorers ascended the St. Lawrence as far as the Grand Saut-Saint-Louis in 1603. The coast of Acadia was also examined, and the beginnings of its occupation planned. Their employer died before being able to join them, and was succeeded by Pierre de Gua, sieur de Monts, who had the title of lieutenant-general of Acadia and the monopoly of the St. Lawrence trade for ten years. He having been one of Chauvin's companions at Tadoussac, his experience there impelled him to seek a better location, and in 1604 he chose the island of Saint-Croix, at the mouth of the Saint-Croix River, now the international boundary.<sup>22</sup> Here was to be built a New France which would not cost the king a penny.

But there was no fresh water, the cold was extreme, and quarrels between Huguenots and Catholics were rife. A third of the colonists died of scurvy, the remaining forty-five going across the Bay to enchanting Port-Royal (now Annapolis), the second French settlement in North America. Efforts to find a site for settlement in a less rigorous southern region came to nothing. A new disaster came when the fur monopoly was taken from De Monts in 1607 after bitter complaints by the enemies of the company; so Champlain regretfully led his colonists home.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>20</sup> N. E. Dionne, *Champlain* (Toronto, 1905), *passim*; W. L. Grant, *The Voyages of Champlain* (New York, 1907), (*Original Narratives of Early American History*), gives sources for the work of Champlain to 1618; Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 144.

<sup>21</sup> He was, like Cartier before him, imbued with the Verrazano tradition that the streams and lakes of Canada would lead to China. He expected to be able to reach the East in a few weeks by going up the St. Lawrence to the "lake of Zubgara near the Seven Cities, then to follow the Gada River, which flowed into the Vermillion Sea [or Gulf] of California." La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 327.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 321. The location had been known to a French party which drifted to it in 1503 from a shipwreck in the Bermudas.

<sup>23</sup> Samuel de Champlain, *Works* (Toronto, 1922, 6v.), H. P. Biggar, ed., I, ch. 17; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 322.

De Monts had been genuinely concerned with the development of the country. One member of his group in particular, De Poutrincourt, had actually begun important agricultural work at Port-Royal, and urged the king to renew De Mont's privileges for a year. When he returned in 1610, Port-Royal was rebuilt by Poutrincourt, and given to him in full proprietorship. His son, Biencourt, controlled the colony until about 1624, when he was succeeded by Charles de la Tour. With Biencourt's coming in 1611, the Jesuits came to open missions and to possess a share in the colony. Just at its beginning their Saint-Saveur at Mount-Desert on the Maine coast was destroyed by the vigilant Samuel Argall of Virginia, and Port-Royal fell in the same year. The French settlements had ignored the English charter of Virginia, which ran from 34° to 45° north latitude. Though the proprietor was ruined, the refugees from Argall's piracy remained in Acadia, becoming the real founders of that province.<sup>24</sup>

Meantime, De Monts had set up in 1608 another "habitation" at Quebec, upon the advice of Champlain, who did the work. Although one hundred and eighty leagues from the sea, the new post, at the head of navigation, had a milder climate than the Bay of Fundy, and the country was better. Here a tiny fortress on a huge promontory gave the French a strategic position in the heart of the continent. Just a year earlier the London Company had founded Jamestown, claiming the coast from Florida to Newfoundland. A few years after the death of Henry IV (1610) Champlain explored as far as the Lake Huron country (1615) in a daring campaign against the Iroquois, which, though vain, secured a foothold which after a hundred years of trial made France an important colonial power. But, like her European rivals, she had a divided interest, Acadia and Canada making a spread too great for effective operations. In 1627 Quebec had but sixty-five inhabitants, and Canada only one hundred, whereas the feared and hated English had 4,000 in Virginia by 1622.<sup>25</sup>

Practical policies of exploitation and native relations had meantime begun to be formulated by Lescarbot the historian, advocate for Canada before the Parlement de Paris. The first efforts had been in search of such precious metals as had rewarded the pioneering of the Spaniards. But the Acadians had found that agriculture offered "a fair hope by the production that the ground had already made."<sup>26</sup> The fisheries and the fur trade were bringing rich returns. The natives

<sup>24</sup> Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 163-167.

<sup>25</sup> C. C. Colby, *The Founder of New France* (Toronto, 1915, 3v.), I, 81-82; Wrong, *op. cit.*, I, 170 ff.

<sup>26</sup> M. Lescarbot, *Nova Francia, a Description of Acadia, 1606* (New York, 1928), 93.

about Quebec were the low-grade people whom the French named Montagnais—a race which appeared on the scene between the voyages of Cartier and Champlain, and who had little of the culture of the hostile Iroquois of the Mohawk valley, that great confederacy which Champlain unwisely turned against him when he espoused the cause of the Hurons and Algonquins in 1609 in the fateful battle near Crown Point. When the Dutch founded New Amsterdam in 1623 they provided an alliance for the Iroquois which gave the latter the balance of power between the colonial powers for many years. Before 1641 they were buying firearms, against Dutch law, from these rivals of France. After the British took the Dutch colony, they inherited the same opportunity and will to harm the northern neighbors.

The fur trade then centered at Montreal, beyond which the French were not welcomed by their Huron and Algonquin friends. Yielding to Champlain's appeal, they gradually allowed white men to enter and explore the lands beyond the rapids. The prosperity of the colony was sadly affected by the opening of the fur trade to non-company buyers, and by the too frequent encroachments of Dutch interlopers. The crown came to the rescue by restoring the monopoly in 1622, but did not then apply it below Quebec, notwithstanding that the free trade of the lower river had been a handicap to the work of Champlain. In 1614 the fur monopoly was conceded for eleven years to a Rouen—Saint-Malo Company for the territory westward from Matane in the Gaspé peninsula.<sup>27</sup>

As the company did very little for the trade, its monopoly was canceled and regranted to William and Emery de Caen, Rouen merchants. The monopolists agreed to take out three hundred families of colonists each year, and to support six Recollect priests. Obviously the settlement of Canada rested lightly on the minds of government officers.<sup>28</sup>

Champlain would have had better success along the St. Lawrence and in Acadia had it not been for conflicts of religion. Huguenots and Catholics at Port-Royal were unable to forget their differences. "I have seen," said Champlain, "the minister and our curé dealing each other fisticuffs over differences of religion and thus settling their points of controversy."<sup>29</sup>

The coming of the Recollects was due to the earnest appeal by Champlain to the Estates General in 1614, when he was in France, for he had known the order at their convent in his native town, Brou-

<sup>27</sup> H. P. Biggar, *The Early Trading Companies of New France* (Toronto, 1901), ch. VI.

<sup>28</sup> Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 198, 248.

<sup>29</sup> Benjamin Sulte, *Histoire des Canadiens-Français, 1608-1880* (Montreal, 1882-1884, 8v.), I, 58.

age. Four priests came, with the papal blessing, in 1615, and began their labors among the Hurons, the Montagnais, and the natives near Quebec. Their small success may be attributed quite as much to this wide dissipation of energy as to their poverty and lack of finesse.

After their failure in Acadia the Jesuits began to plan operations at Quebec. Succeeding, in 1625 they founded Notre-Dame-des-Anges, making it the center from which their later work radiated. They had the wealth which the humbler Recollects, vowed to poverty, had lacked. Not only in zeal for conversions, but in their explorations and their agriculture did they set a high standard of service.

The part played by the French court in colonial expansion had not so far been a very serious or responsible one. Henry IV had been more interested than Francis I, but was too much occupied with affairs in the Mediterranean and general problems of trade to give more than nominal support to the American adventure. Indeed, all the expenses of the New World conquests had been borne by private persons or fur companies save in one or two uncharacteristic episodes. The royal treasury was yet in no condition to undertake doubtful enterprises; neither was the king free from European policies unconnected with overseas expansion.<sup>30</sup>

Nor were the people generally interested; only a few choice spirits had been bitten by the love of adventure. Most Frenchmen saw across the seas great danger and little profit, especially since neither precious metals nor diamonds had been discovered. The great Sully, nourished as a home patriot à *outrance*, condemned roundly the overseas enterprise as sheer folly. "I place among the number of things done against my opinion the colony which was sent this year to Canada," he said. "No kind of wealth is to be expected from any of the countries of the New World north of the fortieth degree of latitude."<sup>31</sup>

It was also normal that the enterprising Henry should find himself concerned with the Orient, given his close relations with the Dutch and their example. The grand pensioner Oldenbarneveltdt and Prince

<sup>30</sup> Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 29-41; M. Sully, *Mémoires des sages et royales économies d'estat . . .* (in J. F. Michaud, *Nouvelle coll. des mémoires . . .*, Paris, 1836-1839, 34v.), II, 516.

For further details on the colonial policy of Henry IV and the efforts of François de Noyer to combine all the small companies (c1613) into a great one "de long cours," see La Roncière, "Les routes de l'Inde," *Revue des questions historiques*, vol. 76, 203-209. De Noyer was a veritable predecessor of Richelieu and Colbert in his ambition for French expansion. The movements under "Le Bon Henri" to take territory or establish trade in the Antilles, Cayenne, the Moluccas, and India, are described in later chapters.

<sup>31</sup> A. Grandidier, H. Froidevaux, and G. Grandidier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens concernant Madagascar* (Paris, 1903-1913, 8v.), VII, 1-3.

Maurice both urged him to undertake active operations in America; but it was the stormy Pieter Lintgens of Amsterdam who set his face toward the East Indies. His hope indeed was "to bring from both ends of the earth everything that nature has produced." With this in view, Henry granted the 1604 charter for the first East India Company.

## CHAPTER VI

## THE COLONIAL POLICY OF RICHELIEU; CANADA BEFORE COLBERT

Prior to Louis XIII (1610-1643) a few of the kings, for example Francis I and Henry IV, turned intermittently from European strife to occasional colonial enterprises, but they had no opportunity to develop real colonial policy. The ideal was to imitate, and at the same time weaken, Spain.<sup>1</sup> Their transitional interest had been largely provoked by curiosity regarding the New World, combined with some hope of a colonial solution of religious trouble. When the work of unification and expansion begun by Henry IV and Sully was cut short by the king's assassination in 1610, Sully was retired and Marie de' Medici, managing her weakling son, Louis XIII, allowed the power of government to be dissipated, money to be wasted, taxes to be made newly burdensome, and colonies and marine to suffer decay. Only the energetic imperialist Samuel de Champlain, during these years, kept colonialism alive in Canada.<sup>2</sup>

But with the advent of her favorite, Armand du Plessis de Richelieu, chief minister from 1624 to 1642, there began a more logical plan for overseas expansion. The great cardinal, though still deeply engrossed in the struggle with Austria, held clearly in mind the idea that the struggle transcended the bounds of Europe, chiefly because the great overseas empire of Spain, linked to Austria by Hapsburg control, had increased the wealth and European prestige of the rival kingdom. France, enemy of the universal dominion with which Charles V had once threatened the world, must not only fight in Europe but also develop her own overseas possessions, thereby not only limiting the expansion of Spain but that of the two great commerce carriers, England and Holland.<sup>3</sup> Colonization now became an essential policy of statecraft, and France a major contestant for empire overseas.

Richelieu was the first Frenchman to grasp this conception and

<sup>1</sup> L. Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 73.

<sup>2</sup> "On a assez veu et ou parler de terres nouvelles," said Lescarbot the historian of Acadia, "it is time to colonize them." Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce*, II, 350-352; Franklin Charles Palm, *The Economic Policies of Richelieu* (Urbana, 1920), 21; L. Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte et la politique coloniale*, ch. 1, 36-38.

<sup>3</sup> G. Hanotaux, *Histoire du Cardinal de Richelieu* (Paris, 1896-1899, 2v.), II, 481; Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 75.

show an abiding will for sustained colonial action. Though a chronic invalid, beset by rivals and enemies throughout his life, tolerated by the monarch rather for his force of character, loyalty to France, and usefulness than from any personal attraction, he was master of an administrative wisdom which gave his country a logical economic policy. He grasped the needs of his country, and chose a mode of attack which was clearly outlined in his *Testament Politique*.<sup>4</sup>

It was inevitable that the problems and ambitions of the great cardinal should make him an ardent protagonist of mercantilism. Its devotees, overemphasizing the value of possession of gold and silver, of foreign trade, and of exclusive protectionism, were following logically the normal evolution of society from the feudal to the national stage, really making the state the great inclusive overlord; their policy, once the existence of trans-oceanic deposits of wealth became known, drove them to demand overseas domination, and hence adequate merchant and war marines for trade and protection.<sup>5</sup> Thence the step to universal rivalry and the extinction of competing claims. In the very nature of the case, if mercantilism be pushed to its logical conclusion, there can be but one nation, one political entity, which may survive to enjoy it. With these ambitions Richelieu was in 1626 made "grand master, chief, and superintendent-general of the navigation and commerce of France."<sup>6</sup> Shortly the older offices of admiral of France, admiral of Bretagne, admiral of Guyenne, and admiral of Levant were abolished; they had indeed checked expansion rather than helped it.<sup>7</sup> The vice-admiralties were also suppressed, being replaced by general intendencies of navigation and commerce.

The new superintendent was thus given final decision in all problems of the merchant marine and the navy. This work he looked upon as a sacred trust, refusing to receive compensation for it.<sup>8</sup> His colonial philosophy was built on standard protectionist ideas; France must sell as much as possible to, and buy as little as possible from, other states,<sup>9</sup> a policy advocated in France as early as the middle sixteenth century.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>4</sup> London, 1770. See also J. Caillet, *L'administration en France sous le ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu* (Paris, 1861, 2v.), II, 20-126.

<sup>5</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 75-77.

<sup>6</sup> Palm, *The Economic Policies of Richelieu*, 17-20.

<sup>7</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, II, 439-453.

<sup>8</sup> Palm, *op. cit.*, citing Richelieu, *Lettres*, II, 346, and *Mémoires*, XXIV, 275-276; J. Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France*, . . . (Paris, 1927), 151.

<sup>9</sup> J. H. Mariéjol, *Henri IV et Louis XIII*, in Lavis, VI, pt. II, 413.

<sup>10</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, 568; cf. A. Snow, *The Administration of Dependencies* (New York, 1902), 19-24.

The joining of the words "commerce" and "navigation" in Richelieu's title meant nothing less than seizure of colonial areas so as to justify a big navy program, and the concentration of the power over naval affairs in his own hands for the king. This was a costly move, for the admiral of France, Montmorency, alone had to be paid to renounce his admiralty 1,200,000 livres, but in the light of the advantages gained this was not too much.<sup>11</sup>

Richelieu created in 1624 a Council of Marine, which developed into the modern departments of the Marine and of the Colonies. In 1625 he announced before his Assembly of Notables a plan to build up the navy so as to give France "her ancient splendor" as mistress of the seas, for which she was "si riche de tous les moyens nécessaires." To do this he undertook to restate maritime law for French shipping, establish a bureau of accounts for its fiscal control, and form a corps of officers who should apply his rules. In order that an effective navy might be created, the Normandy ports, especially Le Havre, were set to humming with ship-building. And none too soon, for, when in 1626 he undertook to chastise the Barbary pirates, he had to buy for that purpose twenty vessels from Holland.<sup>12</sup> The inferiority of the French navy during the siege of La Rochelle (1627-1628) impelled him to plan its increase.<sup>13</sup> Surveys were made of his Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts; he began construction of a marine chart, established arsenals, and built up the fleet of galleys until by 1634 he had eighty-five or ninety ships of war of six hundred tons on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.<sup>14</sup>

The peoplement of new areas was explicitly planned. Frenchmen must be sent overseas to join forces with native populations, convert them to Christianity, and by mingling blood and social ideals create a great half-caste colonial society, as Spain had been doing for a hundred years. Campaigns were begun to enlist capital and private good will for the organization of great commercial companies such as the British and Dutch companies of 1600 and 1602. These were expected

<sup>11</sup> Albert Duchène, *La politique coloniale de la France; le ministère des colonies depuis Richelieu* (Paris, 1928), 6-7.

<sup>12</sup> Mariéjol, *Henri IV et Louis XIII*, in Lavis, VI, pt. II, 414. The Ordinance of 1629 proposed fifty ships.

<sup>13</sup> Details are in Ducéré, *Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 67-74. Palm, *Economic Policies of Richelieu*, 104; Caillet, *L'administration en France sous le ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu*, 314; Tramond, *Histoire maritime de la France*, 160-164. The marine so laboriously built up dwindled to nothing almost immediately after Richelieu's death (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, V, 126-129).

<sup>14</sup> Interesting details are in "Les constructions navales au Havre sous Richelieu . . . d'après les registres du tabellionage (1629-1642)" in Anthiaume, *Cartes marines*, II, 354-386 (Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 235).

to provide the money which the crown lacked, and, by organization, give protection from the attacks of pirates and national enemies.<sup>15</sup>

The French colonial companies were managed in such a way as to give the king control of their work. Isaac de Razilly, friend and adviser of royalty, and active, with his family, in many expansionist enterprises, indicated the nationalistic but medieval-minded spirit which animated the work when he counseled: "Make conquests and undertake trade with all prudence and secrecy."<sup>16</sup>

The first difficulty to be overcome was the menace to French prestige—Barbary piracy, in the Mediterranean. Treaties had failed, for the sultans in Constantinople could not restrain their African appanages; it remained to try direct negotiations with the Berbers. In 1628 Sanson Napollon, sent to Constantinople and Algiers, obtained in the latter port a treaty which recognized anew French possession of the Bastion de France and of La Calle,<sup>17</sup> conceded erection of a comptoir at Bône, but left the way open for recurring troubles.<sup>18</sup> In spite of the treaty, piracy went on with little interruption, and hundreds of French captives languished in Algerian dungeons. Richelieu resolved to try force; from 1636 on, French ships before Algiers kept up warfare, but without great resolution, because bombardment might cause vengeance to be wreaked on the Christian captives.<sup>19</sup>

Moroccan piracy proved easier to handle, especially when the sultan was in real control. The pirates had a refuge in a pseudo-republic, Salé, to which no Moroccan sultan's power reached. The chevalier de

<sup>15</sup> The spirit which animated the formation of the seventeenth-century commercial companies, and a discussion of their obvious merits for their times, are found in Louis Pauliat, *Louis XIV et la compagnie des Indes Orientales de 1664* (Paris, 1886), 5-35. See also A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation . . .* (Paris, 4 ed., 1921, 3v.), I, 159-163. The Estates General in 1614 had voted for free commerce for private individuals protected by a strong navy. Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 191.

<sup>16</sup> Mariéjol, *Henri IV et Louis XIII*, in Lavisse, VI, pt. II, 417-424, has a good brief account of the companies in their fields. Isaac de Razilly invented a "refrain" which epitomized the situation like a modern slogan: "Quiconque est maître de la mer a un grand pouvoir sur la terre." Razilly was an intimate adviser of Richelieu, to whom he presented (as did many others) a "Mémoire" on the "state of the nation" and its needs. His recommendations included: urging the nobles to subscribe to stock in colonial companies; royal aid in ship-building; creating new revenues for a naval program; punishing the Moroccan pirates; entering trade competition in all regions, and using men of affairs [not merchants] for founding colonies (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 489-496). Razilly died in Acadia in 1635.

<sup>17</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 71-74. The Dutch had made a commercial treaty with Morocco in 1610 (Arcin, *op. cit.*, 191).

<sup>18</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine . . .*, IV, 411.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 692-697. The French failed, leaving the Bastion to its fate.

Razilly forced them in 1630 to release their prisoners without ransoms, accept a consul, and accord religious liberty to Frenchmen.<sup>20</sup> The next year he made a treaty with Moulay el Oualid, sultan of Morocco, agreeing not to help the sultan's Spanish enemies, but to supply him munitions; in return the French might introduce consuls and missionaries, merchants would be protected, and French slaves freed. This treaty, made through the influence of Father Joseph Tremblay, had, unfortunately, but little effect in improving commercial relations.<sup>21</sup>

It was this Mediterranean situation and the colonial successes of the rival powers which turned the great cardinal to the idea of commercial companies. Spain and Portugal had found the direct state method of control too costly in garrisons and military expeditions. The method of the Dutch seemed better, as in a few years their East India Company had absorbed the old Portuguese trade in gold, ivory, leather, gums, and slaves. But Richelieu's organizations developed certain autocratic features closely in harmony with the spirit of France and his own ideas of concentrated power. Especially since the time of Henry IV protectionism and mercantilism had been growing in France. They had been advocated by Barthélemy de Laffemas, who counseled Henry IV to exclude competing manufactures, and by Antoine de Monchrétien, whose *Traicté de l'économie politique* (1615) pleaded for customs protection. He urged Louis XIII to rebuild his navy and revive colonial activity: "Fight the Turks and miscreants . . . plant and provision New France." Free trade for nationals, not really espoused in Europe until the eighteenth century, was his passion. This, he urged

<sup>20</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 681-692, gives an account of the expeditions by Razilly and the intervention of Père Joseph and lesser Capuchins.

<sup>21</sup> Père Joseph (François LeClerc du Tremblay), confidant of Richelieu, born at Paris on November 4, 1577, became a Capuchin in 1599. Becoming confessor of Mme. Antoinette d'Orléans, coadjutrix of the abbey of Fontevault, he came under the notice of Richelieu, who confided to him several missions of great importance. When this minister was exiled to Avignon, Père Joseph went to great lengths to have him recalled, and then Richelieu made him his sole confidant; he took him with him to La Rochelle, introduced him into the Council of State, and entrusted him with the most delicate affairs. It seems very certain that Richelieu was in close relations with Père Joseph until the very last; he cared for him in his last illness with a tender solicitude, and cried out, on learning of his death (December 18, 1638): "I have lost my right arm." (Abstracted from *Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne* [Paris, 1811-1828, 52v.], X, 202.) References cited: *L'histoire de la vie du R. P. Joseph LeClerc du Tremblay, Capucin . . . par l'abbé Richard* (Paris, 1702, 2v.), *Le Vénérable P. Joseph, Capucin, promu au cardinalat*, St.-Jean de Maurienne (Paris, 1704); Gustave Fagniez, *Le Père Joseph et Richelieu* (Paris, 1894, 2v.), 283, ch. 6; Richard, *Le véritable Père Josef, Capucin*, in M. L. Cimber and J. Danjou, *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France*, 2<sup>e</sup> série (Paris, 1837-1840), tome IV, 165; see also La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, IV, 422-424.

with tenacity, could be managed by the concentrated efforts of great colonial companies. This specific recommendation Richelieu adopted, to the disgust of the merchants of Dieppe, Saint-Malo, Rouen, La Rochelle, and Marseilles, who entered many a cabal and intrigue to defeat the monopolies granted by the king, particularly that of Canada. Monchrétien advocated resisting external commerce, counseled Louis XIII and his mother to build a fleet which would teach respect for the merchant marine, and urged them to found colonies which would furnish raw materials without foreign mediation and provide French markets. This advice Richelieu followed, along with the cahiers of the assemblies of his time, as bases of his commercial and colonial policy.<sup>22</sup>

The French companies had the inherent idea of special privilege, essentially medieval, which had marked the national evolution. Often constructed merely on paper, as was the Compagnie du Ponant et Levant, and often reorganized and modified, each was given a charter or contract between the government and the stockholders. The obligations were vague, but there was always a clause imposing the "advancement of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion,"—a dedication which smacked more of expediency than of zeal. As time went on, intervention by the state in company affairs increased.<sup>23</sup>

The companies all enjoyed commercial and territorial monopolies, feudal tenure, delegation of certain royal rights, and special royal subventions and subscriptions; the king managed their advertisement programs, and helped them obtain colonists. Unlike the Dutch companies, controlled by groups of merchants from several cities, these extended direct French political control; but, in common with other companies, most of them were badly administered through incompetence, dishonesty, or poor discipline; premature distribution of profits and lack of capital or credit were the rule; Frenchmen displayed an inborn prejudice against commerce, in spite of the minister's repeated declaration that nobles would not lose category by merchandising. The king or his minister too frequently manipulated company action. Finally, the monopoly, while it aided development in the beginning, proved a handicap when business had got under way, as prices were boosted and stocks of provisions withheld from the market.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> M. Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 43; Charles Woolsey Cole, *French Mercantilist Doctrine before Colbert* [1453-1629] (New York, 1931); Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de la France*, I, 239-241; Palm, *Economic Policies of Richelieu*, 23-27, 95.

<sup>23</sup> Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 14; Georges d'Avenel, *Richelieu et la monarchie absolue* (Paris, 1859, 4v.), III, 209-210, cited by Palm, *op. cit.*, 109. Cf. P. Bonnassieux, *Les grandes compagnies du commerce* (Paris, 1892), 494-515.

<sup>24</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 80-95; Henri Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Duplex* (Paris, 1887), 35.

The companies were sharply attacked as restraints upon commerce, and causes of wars and disasters. Many of the charges brought against them were of course valid against colonization itself, whether private or royal, and cannot be laid exclusively to company organization. Perhaps their most noxious feature was their limitation on the trade of non-member nationals. Most of them lost money for their stockholders, and they usually failed to complete their terms of concession on their own going force, surviving by royal subsidies.<sup>25</sup>

The Company of Morbihan, founded in 1625 for the commerce of northern Europe and America, was given the grand monopoly of the whole overseas adventure; all the ports except Morbihan protested so vehemently that it died in a year, having done nothing. Next was the Compagnie de la Nacelle de Saint-Pierre-Fleur-de-lysée (1627) for a like trade and with even greater privileges. But so little was trade in favor among the moneyed classes that this company was never even established.<sup>26</sup>

In the year 1627 the Canadian enterprise was bestowed upon the Company of One Hundred Associates. On the advice of Isaac de Razilly this new organization was planned to rival the English colonies. It was to take over and expand the work hitherto done by the De Monts (1603) and De Caen (1615) companies which had begun the fur trade in the St. Lawrence region.<sup>27</sup> It undertook to carry to America yearly two hundred artisans, and within fifteen years a total of four thousand settlers (foreigners and Protestants being excluded) who were to enjoy state support for the first three years, and then be provided with land and seed for their first crop. To the company was given in proprietorship, justice, and seigneurie, all of New France, from Florida to the Arctic Circle, from Newfoundland to the Great

<sup>25</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 182-184. Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 79, avers that Richelieu's companies were exclusively for "peuplement," and that he gave no contract with any commercial company.

<sup>26</sup> The text of the agreement for this company is in M. Mole, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1855, 4v.), I, 422-448; cited by Palm, *op. cit.*, 112. Abstract, *ibid.*, 112-113. J. Caillet, *L'administration en France sous le ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu*, II, 87-93.

<sup>27</sup> When De Caen had to give place to the Hundred Associates, he obtained a grant to unoccupied Bahama Islands, but was not allowed to use Protestant colonists. He enjoyed the empty title of "Baron of the Bahamas" (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 658-659).

Francis Parkman's volumes should be read in the following order: *Pioneers of France in the New World* (Boston, 1880); *The Jesuits in North America* (Boston, 1867); *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West* (Boston, 1910); *The Old Régime in Canada* (Boston, 1874); *Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV* (Boston, 8th ed., 1880); *A Half Century of Conflict* (Boston, 1892, 2v.); *Montcalm and Wolfe* (Boston, 6th ed., 1885, 2v.); *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (Boston, 8th ed., 1877, 2v.).

Lakes, "as much and as far as they could extend and make known his Majesty's name." The compensating obligation was merely to take oath of homage to the king's successors and see that ministers of justice on appeal should receive royal investiture.<sup>28</sup> The viceroynalty, then held by Ventadour, was bought up and abolished. The new colony was set up on a feudal model antedating the social system then existing in France, in the hope that the subtenants, who were without strong home ties, would thus be the more closely controlled. Only the whale and cod fishing rights were left open to all Frenchmen.

In spite of new organization and added capital, the colony of Canada was always in trouble. The French merchants, like the Dutch, wanted quick profits from fur, colonies being too expensive, though the company really undertook to do more than was possible in transporting and maintaining colonists. The small trade was taken by the Dutch. In 1629, during the siege of La Rochelle, the Kirke brothers, Scotchmen with a French mother, blockaded the St. Lawrence so that Champlain, governor of less than one hundred persons at Quebec, had to capitulate to a force of one hundred and fifty.<sup>29</sup> Under the Treaty of Saint-Germain in 1632, the English evacuated the country, allowing Champlain to return from France and reestablish the colony in 1633. Acadia was captured, held, and restored by the Kirkes during the same period. Since 1622 it had contained a weak Scottish settlement at Port-Royal.<sup>30</sup>

Obviously France was not keenly interested in developing Canada; when it fell to the Kirkes it was the Jesuits, not the merchants, who urged its restoration. Catholicism was earnest and active. If, after the founding of the Company of One Hundred Associates, any Protestants were incautious enough to enter the colony, they were harried into the fold of the church. The labor of the priests was largely dedicated to evangelizing redskins. Among the Hurons or Wyandots the Recollect, Le Caron, did a little. In 1635 the Jesuit Bréboeuf founded a famous

<sup>28</sup> The grant is in W. B. Munro, *The Seigniorial System in Canada* (New York, 1907), 22-24; Palm, *Economic Policies of Richelieu*, 116-117; F. A. Isambert, *Recueil général des anciens lois françaises*, XVI, 221-222; J. Caillet, *L'administration en France . . .*, II, 96-101.

<sup>29</sup> The name was spelled also Kerk, Cuer, Guer, and Kertk. Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 257, says their father was Jarvis Kirke, an Englishman of Dieppe.

<sup>30</sup> Champlain's flair for colonization was fed if not created by his impression of the Spanish overseas possessions (*Brief Narrative of the Most Remarkable Things that Samuel Champlain of Brouage Observed in the Western Indies . . . in the Years [1599 to 1602]*, Hakluyt Soc. Pubs., vol. 23, 1859); Champlain Soc. *Publications*, I. His three succeeding works, appearing in the same *Publications*, cover his activities from 1604 to 1634, and show the zeal with which "the Father of Canada" worked on Richelieu's colonial plans.

mission among these agricultural people, extending the influence of his order thus to the region between Lake Simcoe and Georgian Bay.

The Hurons were divided into the parishes of Saint-Marie, Saint-Joseph, and Saint-Louis. Schools were begun for boys and girls, a seminary, convents, and a hospital.<sup>31</sup> But martyrdom was easier to attain than success at proselyting. The Hurons soon became enervated under the impact of civilization, and were pushed north and west and finally destroyed by the Iroquois. The Jesuits, who had to bear the onus of the ravages of epidemics among their wards, adhered to the policy observed by their order in Lower California and Paraguay among the Spaniards and later in Guiana; they consistently opposed "gallicization" and built up a state within a state, subtle and pervasive in influence. The parishes of the Hurons were closed territory in which the Jesuit fathers were the sole rulers.<sup>32</sup> The missions were abandoned in 1649.

The colony began to show some qualities of permanence. *Habitants* and seigneurs, missionaries and partially gallicized Indians made up a characteristic French colonial realm. In 1633 Champlain founded, about one hundred miles up the St. Lawrence, the stronghold of Three Rivers; Fort Richelieu on the river of the same name was built to protect the Hurons and the river traffic from the terrible Iroquois; Montreal was begun about the same time, in 1642. Cultivation of the soil had begun. The heroic Champlain ended his career in 1635, after serving for thirty years in the wilderness with eminent fidelity. He was followed in 1636 by the bleak-tempered, pious Monsieur de Montmagny as governor.

The number of Canadian colonists increased but very slowly. Just after the Treaty of Saint-Germain there came a new two hundred, of whom three were women, but the number fell far short of the specified four thousand in ten years. The company's chief business became the granting of seigneuries, the grantees being obliged to effect the colonization. In 1642 there were not more than two hundred persons in Canada who had come to stay, while the West Indies had 7,000 whites.<sup>33</sup> Colonists dreaded the dreary Canadian winters. They were not ever calmly acquiescent in the policy of monopoly and absence of freedom. When Colbert began his régime (1664) the fourteen French islands in the Caribbean had 15,000 whites and almost as many

<sup>31</sup> Parkman, *The Jesuits in North America*, II, 146-217; R. G. Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, I, Introd., 21-27.

<sup>32</sup> James Douglas, *New England and New France* (New York, 1913), ch. VI.

<sup>33</sup> Caillet, *L'administration en France . . .*, II, 101-104. When Louis XIII and Richelieu died (the latter in 1642 and the former in 1643), they had been able to give Canada but a momentary attention, then followed practical abandonment; E. Salone, *La colonisation de la Nouvelle France* (Paris, 2d ed., 1907), 64.

Negroes, whereas Canada had as yet (1663) only 2,500, of whom 800 were in Quebec. So slowly grew the great project for a continental military outpost of empire to check the hated English rival!<sup>84</sup>

The habitants, desiring to control their own fur hunting, prevailed in their demand for a "New Company" for that purpose in 1645, and its members began to spread into the forests. Thus arose the *coureurs de bois*, adventurous frontiersmen who too often relapsed into barbarism instead of elevating the savages. Licensed traders from the settlements were later allowed in limited numbers. The famous traders, Radisson and Groseilliers, in the late 1650's made the explorations which added to Canada the western end of Lake Superior.<sup>85</sup>

But the "New Company" had assumed more burdens than it could carry, and proved a financial failure, while the governmental functions, which had been retained by the Hundred Associates, were laxly discharged; wherefore the king created a council to aid the governor, and gave to Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers each a syndic, who might sit but not vote with the council. They never exerted any substantial influence, as the home government discouraged autonomous activity.

Religious life was marked by a contest for the position of bishop between Père Queylus, head of the Montreal congregation of Sulpicians (founded in 1645), and the Abbé Laval, a secular priest, who in 1659 won the appointment. He was a supporter of the Jesuits, who were supreme at Quebec and maintained exceedingly polite relations with the rival Sulpicians. These seculars opposed the Jesuit Indian policy, believing with the government that the natives could be made over into Frenchmen and Christians. Laval was a scion of the Montmorcency family, which was so active in the wars of religion; his intractable disposition, his Jesuit leanings, and his battles against brandy-sales to the Indians, as well as his unquestioned piety, made him a marked figure in Canadian history.<sup>86</sup>

In 1661 French fishing activities in Newfoundland promised a new expansion when Louis XIV annexed the southwestern coast and set the governor to build a fort and settle a permanent colony at Placentia, a strong natural point. Unfortunately, the fort was neglected and fell to ruin; the place did not grow because of lack of immigrants, but

<sup>84</sup> Canada, Dept. of Agriculture, *The Census of Canada, 1665-1871* (Ottawa, 1876, 5v.), IV, 2; Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 211-235, treats this period more amply, and a bibliographical section, 370-377, indicates added pertinent literature; E. Salone, *La colonisation de la Nouvelle France*, 109.

<sup>85</sup> A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 210-211.

<sup>86</sup> Willa Cather, *Shadows on the Rock* (New York, 1931), gives a kindly interpretation of the character of the doughty and irascible old prelate. See also Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 339-351; E. M. Sait, *Clerical Control in Quebec* (Toronto, 1911); Parkman, *The Old Régime in Canada*, ch. IV.

French fishing prospered so that by 1688, just before the colonial wars began, it was employing 16,000 to 20,000 men annually.

The closing years of the period before Colbert saw a temporary respite in the incessant Iroquois warfare. In 1660 hundreds of savages, coming from the Ottawa River to fall upon the whites, were intercepted at the great falls of that stream by a quixotic young nobleman, Adam Dollard, who, with his Algonquin and Huron allies, was wiped out; he did, however, save the settlements. In February, 1663, the company surrendered its rights; it was not able to furnish three thousand soldiers, as the governor, Jean du Bois d'Avaugour, requested, to control the Iroquois. Alexander Pourville de Tracy, inspector-general of French America, marking the new Colbertian policies, arrived from the West Indies in June, 1665, and remained in Canada until August, 1667,<sup>87</sup> to inaugurate the new company's régime.

<sup>87</sup> Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, I, 286; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, V, 230; Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 350-351.

## CHAPTER VII

## THE WEST INDIES UNDER RICHELIEU AND COLBERT

In the meantime the Caribbean Islands had long felt the influence of the French buccaneers and casual settlers, upon whose activities Richelieu seized as a means of building empire. The Spaniards had been deterred<sup>1</sup> from occupying the Lesser Antilles because of the fierce Carib inhabitants and the superior attractions of the mainland.<sup>2</sup> This left a rim of small islands of great strategic value, which the rival nations began during the seventeenth century, more than one hundred years after their discovery, to cultivate and use as bases from which to attack Spanish shipping. Spain was not able to keep her enemies out, although she incited the Indians against intruders and policed the Caribbean by a coast-guard fleet, the Armada de Barlovento, which once had for its commander the famous Pedro Menéndez de Avilés.<sup>3</sup>

French corsairs had indeed practically never ceased harassing Spanish voyages since their already noticed encounter with Columbus. As early as 1513 it was necessary to send two caravels to protect the coast of Cuba from French *ladrones*. In 1516 and 1519 the English tried to sell goods in the Spanish islands. All of the activities of Jean Ango of Dieppe, which have already been narrated, were, of course, privateering enterprises. In November, 1536, an unknown French corsair took a Spanish galleon off the coast of Cuba, drowning all her

<sup>1</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, V, 227-230; Wrong, *op. cit.*, I, 350-351. Saint-Domingue was wholly Spanish from Columbus to the days of the buccaneers. In 1508 Juan Ponce de León began the conquest of Porto Rico; Jamaica was settled in 1509 by Esquivel, and in 1511 Diego Velázquez undertook to conquer Cuba. For additional material on the Antilles, see Jacques de Dampierre, *Essai sur les sources de l'histoire des Antilles françaises, 1492-1664* (Paris, 1904); New York Public Library Bulletin, vol. 16, "List of works . . . relating to the West Indies," in seven parts: pp. 7-49, 231-278, 307-355, 367-440, 455-484, 503-546, 563-621.

<sup>2</sup> Ponce de León even undertook to occupy Guadeloupe in 1522, but was unable to penetrate into the interior. There is an unverified statement that Francis I in 1523 sent missionaries to Guadeloupe to convert the natives; M. Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe* . . . (Paris, 1928), 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> The Lesser Antilles, including nearly all the Windward Islands, are the Virgin Islands, Martinique, Guadeloupe and its satellites, Marie-Galante, La Désirade, Les Saintes, Grénade, the Grenadines, and a few lesser islets. The Leeward Islands lie mostly along the Guiana shore.

crew. The corsair entered the port of Havana where he grounded, but got away unscathed and eluded his pursuers. In 1537 there were forty French priests located on Guerino, an island off the Honduran coast. In July, 1542, eight hundred Bayonne corsairs rode into Santa Marta harbor upon fly-boats and sacked the city. On July 24, 1543, three hundred French and English pirates carried off 3,500 gold pesos from Cartagena. Pirates sacked Barbacoa on the American mainland in 1546, and in 1555 Jacques Sorès and François le Clerc, a friend of Admiral Coligny, sacked Havana. In 1556, many French galleons protected themselves from the sea by hovering against the cliffs of Saint-Domingue.<sup>4</sup> Between 1571 and 1588 two hundred and sixty ships sailed from Le Havre on transatlantic voyages. Between 1581 and 1585 there were one hundred and fourteen. The religious wars intervening, there were but fifty-five such voyages between 1589 and 1598, and but forty-eight between 1599 and 1610. It requires a very simple credulity to believe that these were all simple commercial voyages. Adventurers like Laudonnière, Admiral Honorat of Savoy, Jacques de Motignon, Strozzi, François de Richelieu, and others were certainly pirates in Spanish eyes. At the moment of war all were ready to go to trade, but also "to make war on the subjects of the king of Spain, either in the Îles de Pérou or on the mainland, and to make a descent if need be." During the early years of the seventeenth century scores of them were caught and executed by the Spaniards, or chained to the galleys.

After the power of Spain had waned with the passing of Philip II, the rivals began to try for a foothold in the West Indies. The sea rovers turned fishermen, pirates, or smugglers, as occasion offered. A few left groups here and there to make tentative volunteer settlements. Rivaling the English, who were bent on similar errands in the Bermudas, one such group, organized at Havre about 1623 to undertake tobacco planting, was led by a certain Prenpain, called also Chambeau (Chambaut), to Saint-Christophe. For at least fifteen years prior

<sup>4</sup> Philippe Barrey, *Les origines de la colonisation française aux Antilles*, 41, says that two hundred and five ships left Havre between 1571 and 1610 for the transatlantic voyage. Barrey confuses his figures for 1571-1588, saying two hundred and sixty ships on page 22, and one hundred and two ships on page 27, sailed for Brazil or the Antilles. According to one of the older classifications, the Windward Islands included (from north to south) Anguilla, Saint-Martin, Saint-Christophe, Antigua, Montserrat, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Sainte-Lucie, Saint-Vincent, Grénade, Tobago, and Trinidad. The Leewards included Margarita, Curaçao, Aruba, and lesser ones along the south shoreline. The modern division is the passage between Dominique and Martinique; M. Besson, *The Scourge of the Indies* (London, 1929), 3-7. Obviously the hostility of the private Frenchman for the Spaniard was of early origin and almost continuous in manifestation in the West Indies waters.

to that time, Pierre Belain d'Esnambuc had been scouring the Caribbean as smuggler and pirate; he was not a stranger to Chambeau. Weary of filibustering, he settled on Saint-Christophe in 1625, purchasing Chambeau's establishment.<sup>5</sup>

At that time there were Frenchmen occupying the east and west shores of this islet, while some Englishmen led by Thomas Warner had in 1623 taken possession of the north and south shores.<sup>6</sup> D'Esnambuc and Warner, perplexed by their dangerous propinquity, went to Europe to obtain confirmation of the division which they had made of the islet. D'Esnambuc, reaching France with a successful cargo, obtained, on October 31, 1626,<sup>7</sup> an act of association for the Company of Saint-Christophe and grant of the unoccupied Antilles from the eleventh to the eighteenth degrees north latitude. Its declared purpose was to people and cultivate this island and Barbados and convert the natives. Richelieu called it "the entrance to Peru," and furnished ten thousand of the forty-five thousand livres capital, including three ships. D'Esnambuc and Urbain de Roissey were to represent the twenty stockholders in return for one-tenth of the production.<sup>8</sup>

They set out with five hundred colonists, two hundred of whom died

<sup>5</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 649-650, gives the first initiative to Captain Urbain de Roissey de Chardouville; "that pirate," the English called him. He took three ships in 1624 to punish English "pirates" who forbade French merchants to sail the south coast beyond the Tropic of Cancer or the first meridian of the Azores. Putting into Saint-Christophe for repairs, he found a French settlement left by Captain Chantail, who had led an expedition to Guiana. See E. Burke, *An Account of the European Settlements in America* (London, 1808 ed., 2v.), 246-262. The beginnings of the English undertakings under Warner are set forth in V. T. Harlow, ed., *Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623-1667* (London, 1925), Hak. Soc. Pubs. Ser. 2, vol. 56, Intro., xv et seq. and supporting documents. See also the "French Map of St. Christopher, published in Paris circa 1667" showing the French and English quarters on the island, reproduced in V. T. Harlow (Br. Mus. Maps), 82107 (1); Barrey, *op. cit.*, 35-37.

<sup>6</sup> In the same year Dutch, English, and French settlers made a combined occupation of Saint-Croix; presumably they were refugees. Within two decades they numbered six hundred, and were jointly governed by representatives of their homelands; C. E. Taylor, *Leaflets from the Danish West Indies* (London, 1888), 30. When the settlement broke up, one hundred and fifty Frenchmen retired to Guadeloupe; J. P. Knox, *An Historical Account of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John* (New York, 1852), 26.

<sup>7</sup> The contract is printed in P. Margry, *Belain d'Esnambuc et les Normands aux Antilles* (Paris, 1863), 99-102.

<sup>8</sup> The "Contrat d'engagement des émigrants aux Antilles" containing all terms of the agreement and the lists of engagés are in App. V of A. Anthiaume, *Cartes marines*, II, 533-537. The contract of the voyage, *idem*, 538-540; Barrey, *op. cit.*, 124-129, and chap. XI.

at sea and one hundred soon after landing on February 24, 1627. The island was divided at Pointe de Sable so as to give Warner's English a north and south strip across the islet, while the French took the eastern and western parts. Lord Carlisle befriended Warner, whose company was organized in 1637. The two settlements promised mutual aid in case of attack, but were to remain neutral in any French-English war unless special orders should come from home.<sup>9</sup> The English spread rapidly from their "St. Kitte" to Barbuda, Nevis, and Tobago. Montserrat was claimed in 1632. From Barbados also sprang another wave of island occupation, which prospered by sugar planting.

Because Warner began encroachments, Louis XIII in 1629 sent a fleet under François de Rotundy, sieur de Cahuzac, to drive the English out, or if this should be impossible, to renew the pact. He did compel them to withdraw to their old confines, at which juncture the Spaniards came and drove out both the French and English; but as Fadrique de Toledo left no garrison, the returning English again seized the whole island. The French, who had meantime occupied Saint-Martin, Saint-Barthélemy, and Antigua, delayed to return for some weeks, when D'Esnambuc came back and forced the English to restore his territory.<sup>10</sup>

In both French and British areas a chief fault was failure to raise food crops. The importation of food would pay profits, and provide cargoes for outgoing ships. France in 1629 tried to prevent Dutch interlope trade imports by a duty of thirty sols a pound on all foreign tobacco; in 1634 it prohibited all foreign vessels from the insular trade. But as no company ships came, the colony barely managed to survive by trading with Dutch smugglers, for which reason the neglected

<sup>9</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 652. In each of the Antilles, where the wind blows from east to west, one side was named Capesterre, facing the wind, and the other Basse Terre, on the leeward side. Du Roissey settled on the latter, and D'Esnambuc on the former side; J. B. Du Tertre, *Histoire générale des Antilles, habitées par les français* (Paris, 1667-1671, 4v.), II, 11; Margry, *op. cit.*, 32, quoting the king's instructions. A manuscript copy of their treaty is in Egerton MSS., Brit. Mus. 2395; it is printed verbatim by V. L. Oliver, *A History of Antigua* (London, 1890-1899), cited by V. T. Harlow, ed., *Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623-1667*, 1-4, 18-19; also printed in Barrey, *op. cit.*, 143-144.

<sup>10</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 649-658, gives interesting details. During 1627 and 1628 the English made frequent captures of Norman ships, mostly in European waters. See a list of instances in A. Anthiaume, *Cartes marines*, II, app. VII, 541-543; Margry, *op. cit.*, 34-35. The Toledo expedition was warmly resented in England, as the accord of 1630, renewing the peace celebrated by James I in 1604, was thus violated. There was to be no more enmity "by land as by sea, as by fresh water" (T. Rymer, *Fœdera* (London, 1704-1717, 17v.), VIII, pt. 3, pp. 134, 136, 140).

colonists suspended relations with the directors in 1634.<sup>11</sup> For a time failure, due to inadequate resources, seemed imminent. In the same year De l'Olive returned to France to obtain permission to colonize Guadeloupe. In 1630 the company had begun to colonize Tortuga; a similar effort on Saint-Eustatius had to be given up. In the following year, Richelieu, not discouraged, sent out Jean du Plessis d'Ossonville with De l'Olive, an aide of D'Esnambuc, to replace De Roissey and find suitable islands to annex. This led to the exploration of Guadeloupe, Dominique, and Martinique. Guillaume d'Orange, the exploring officer, "fort expérimenté en ces sortes d'affaires," advised the occupation of Guadeloupe first,<sup>12</sup> as it possessed the best living conditions.

At this time (1635) the company was reorganized and named "Company of the Isles of America," with power to colonize other islands, if not already held by Christians, from the tenth to the twentieth degree "beyond the equinoctial line." If war should come, it was to take the enemy's islands. Christian missions were to be established, and four thousand French Catholics sent out in twenty years. Colonists and converted Indians were to enjoy all the rights of freemen at home. Bestowed under the same conditions as Canada had been, the territory was to be given with title in perpetuity to the colonizing company. After twenty years, commerce was to be free to all Frenchmen.<sup>13</sup> The governor, to be named by the king, was to have no authority in granting land, nor over commerce. Many privileges were conceded, both to laborers and gentlemen. An annual assembly of the colonists was provided for their financial protection. Dutch and English, as well as French captains, began bringing in Senegalese and other Negroes for tobacco culture.<sup>14</sup>

The new company soon added four islands. Guadeloupe was in 1635 occupied by Charles Liénard, sieur De l'Olive, "d'un esprit pésant et

<sup>11</sup> Lack of food, and the selfish insistence of the merchants that it be had only from France, runs through the island history until independence. The Dutch sold food on six months' credit, taking tobacco and cotton in exchange; their enterprise saved the undertaking.

<sup>12</sup> Du Tertre, *op. cit.*, I, 65-66. The contract is also in M. L. E. Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Lois et constitutions des colonies françaises* (Paris, n.d., 6v.), I, 29; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 649-658. On Cabuzac and his fleet, Barrey, *op. cit.*, 159-162, 177-181; on Tortuga and Saint-Eustatius, *ibid.*, 184-189.

<sup>13</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, I, 210-211. The missions received papal sanction in July, 1635; this meant that the Spanish and Portuguese no longer enjoyed the sole favor of the Holy See as they had under the Bulls of Alexander VI.

<sup>14</sup> The eighteen articles of organization are summarized in Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe*, 8-13; same in Margry, *Bélaïn d'Esnambuc*, 49-51; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 661; see also Barrey, *op. cit.*, 201-205.

grossière," and his associate governor, D'Ossonville, "d'une humeur grandement douce," with five hundred and fifty settlers, including a number of *engagés* and four missionaries. This was treachery, thought D'Esnambuc, as De l'Olive should have reported at Saint-Christophe. The first establishment was at Grande Terre, separated from Basse Terre by the Rivière Salée, in order to avoid the Caribs. This was the first colonial effort which confronted a dense population of these hostile cannibals. The expedition was expected to engage in raising cotton, sugar, and tobacco. The site of settlement was ill chosen, and a five-year war with the relentless Caribs soon broke out. During the same year, D'Esnambuc on September 15, 1635, took possession of Martinique, which he determined to occupy before any new irregularity like the taking of Guadeloupe should occur.<sup>15</sup> He was prompted to this move by the fact that the English had occupied the Bermudas, Nevis, Barbados, Antigua, and Montserrat. Marie-Galante and Dominique were later occupied as dependencies of Martinique.<sup>16</sup> Dominique was too strongly held by the natives and could not be seized.

The masterful D'Esnambuc died at fifty-two years of age in December, 1636; he was at that time at the head of three islands with several hundred colonists. The king named as governor-general Philippe Longvilliers de Poincy, an old naval captain, who proved an able as well as picturesque executive.<sup>17</sup> But Jean du Plessis died of melancholy, while De l'Olive became blind, wherefore a captain Aubert was given the governorship of Guadeloupe. The new commander soon made peace with the Caribs. A nephew of D'Esnambuc, Jacques Dyel du Parquet, was made governor of Martinique.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Five years later the twenty-four original settlers of Martinique had grown to a colony of one thousand, in spite of the Caribs, whom the Spaniards incited against them; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 661-662; Pierre Margry, *Bélaïn d'Esnambuc et les Normands aux Antilles*, gives the *prise de possession* of Martinique, page 7, and that of Dominique on November 17, 1635, p. 8. On the French spread throughout the Lesser Antilles, Barrey, *op. cit.*, chap. XV.

<sup>16</sup> Pope Urban VIII granted, at the request of Richelieu, a brief authorizing the despatch of four French Dominicans to evangelize the Caribs (Bib. Nationale, Dept. des Manuscrits, *Mission française*, No. 24974, cited in Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe*, 11, 15. Margry, *op. cit.*, 50, finds that the emperor Louis-Napoleon was a descendant of Adrienne Bélaïn, sister of Pierre Bélaïn. The "pionnier" has an inscription to his memorable deeds in the church of Allouville; *Ibid.*, 73, 75, 76.

<sup>17</sup> He fought in Acadia in 1643 to prevent its loss through the La Tours to the English (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 642-648) and tried to plant a French colony in Demerara, furnishing ships for the purpose; *Ibid.*, V, 228.

<sup>18</sup> Louis-Philippe May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique, 1635-1763* (Paris, 1930), 11; Du Tertre, *Histoire générale . . .*, I, 103-105, 145. Poincy

The pirate island of Tortuga north of Haiti, where the refugees from Saint-Christophe had established themselves in 1629 and become *boucaniers*, was taken notice of by De Poincy not long after the occupation of Guadeloupe. But the settlement kept entirely free for many years from formal control.<sup>19</sup> The ten or twelve Spaniards then on Tortuga made the Frenchmen welcome for six months or so, but later regretted their hospitality. The French were increasing in number; when driven in 1635 to Santo Domingo by a Spanish attack, they waited until their enemy followed to the larger island, whereupon they outwitted their pursuers by returning to Tortuga, where they fortified themselves and sent to De Poincy asking for a governor.<sup>20</sup> In compliance he sent to them Le Vasseur in 1640, with men and supplies, but he became a tyrant and his men killed him. Poincy hoped to make Saint-Christophe a base for seizing Santo Domingo, but instead the Spaniards attacked Governor Fontenay in 1653 and took huge booty.<sup>21</sup> The international society of *boucaniers* and *flibustiers* of Tortuga long constituted a vital Caribbean question. "The governors of this island did always behave themselves as proprietors and absolute lords thereof until the year 1664, at which time the West India Com-

pany of France took possession thereof and sent thither for their governor Monsieur Ogeron." This governor's duty was to stop the hide trade with the Dutch by using marine patrols. He reported to Colbert in 1665 that between 600 and 800 French were then living along the coast of Saint-Domingue, where they committed "mille brigandages" against the Dutch and English. Urging the king to compel them to remove to Tortuga, he also asked that French vessels be forbidden to sell them anything. The transfer had become noticeable by 1671.<sup>22</sup> By 1684 some half of the flibustiers and boucaniers had assumed the status of habitants. By 1689 their small number was deplored as they were the only sure means of defense. The western one-third of Saint-Domingue was ceded to France at the Peace of Ryswick, 1697. During the earliest expansion Marie-Galante was occupied; La Grénade and the Grenadines were colonized by Philbert de Nouailly with five hundred "hommes de tout sexe." By 1642 no less than fourteen islands were under French control.

was a Knight of Malta, chief of the Bretagne squadron; he had made an enviable name fighting the Turks, capturing English vessels at La Rochelle, and whipping the Spaniards in subsequent combats in the conquest of the Lérin Islands; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 663-664; J. Caillet, *L'administration en France . . .*, I, 104-114.

Meantime, affairs on Guadeloupe under Aubert were beginning to mend, after earlier frightful miseries, when he was so unfortunate as to be visited in 1643 by Houel du Petit-prè, a director. Houel, after learning all of Aubert's plans for development, went back to France and obtained for himself the succession which Aubert had expected. Failing upon his return to be allowed to take his oath of office, Houel again returned to France and succeeded in getting his opponent condemned to death, a sentence which seems, fortunately, not to have been carried out.

Poincy, as governor-general on Saint-Christophe, was only moderately successful, and was replaced in 1645 by Patrocle de Thoisy.<sup>23</sup> But when the latter arrived at Saint-Christophe to take over the command, Poincy, having developed a valuable property which he was loath to give up, fought him off, and, in the following year, arrested him on Martinique and packed him off to France. Mazarin obliged Houel and Poincy to indemnify Thoisy, but left them in power. With its officers indulging in such antics, the discredited company felt forced to levy an assessment, which the stockholders refused to pay, and in 1648 the proprietors' rights were repurchased by the crown. In 1651

<sup>19</sup> The island was long known as Nouvelle Normandie, and was several times under control of Englishmen; one Willis or Filby, of the English Providence colony, inducted Nicholas Riskimmer as governor of Tortuga in 1635. He was succeeded in 1636 by William Rudyard; in 1640 the "captain" of the "Brothers of the Coast" here domiciled was named Flood. This English interest induced the buccaneers to ask for a French governor; M. Besson, *Vieux papiers du temps des isles* (Paris, 1925), 62-74; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 665-666; *A Relation Concerning Tortugas . . .* by Abraham Langford, 1664, in *Cal. State Papers, Col. series, America and West Indies, 1661-1668*, No. 818, cited by Pierre de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue, la société et la vie créoles sur l'ancien régime (1629-1789)* (Paris, 1909), and his pp. 7-12.

<sup>20</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 665, says nothing of Spaniards, but avers that three hundred Englishmen from Nevis were there, and, proving hostile to Le Vasseur, were driven to Santa Catalina Island; Poincy's letter to Richelieu, asking to be made governor of Tortuga in preparation for taking Santo Domingo, is in Vaissière, *Saint Domingue*, 377-378.

<sup>21</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 230; C. Fernández Duro, *Disquisiciones náuticas*, V, 36. For a brief narrative of Tortuga see T. Jefferys, *The Natural and Civil History of the French Dominions* (London, 1760, 2v.), I, 18-30. Bryan Edwards, *Histoire civile et commerciale des Indes occidentales* (Paris, 1804), published in English in 1794, is generally overrated. The French edition is here used because it contains the "Tableau historique et politique de l'île de Saint-Domingue" not found in available English editions.

<sup>22</sup> Alexandre O. Exquemelin, *The Buccaneers and Marooners of America* (London, 1891 ed., published in Amsterdam in 1678 as *De Americaensche Zee-roovers*). La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 665; Pierre de Vaissière, *Saint Domingue; la société et la vie créoles sous l'ancien régime (1629-1789)*, 19, 26.

<sup>23</sup> Long war with the Caribs had kept the French population down to three hundred until this time. Richelieu had desired to place Poincy at the head of all the continental colonies as well as of the islands, but yielded to the opinion of Fouquet; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 663.

the company ceased to exist.<sup>24</sup> Poincy ruled in Saint-Christophe with picturesque dignity and circumstance for twenty-one years, living in a château surrounded by citron and orange trees; he continuously improved sugar culture as he learned it from Brazil. Once a week he dispensed justice under a huge fig tree near the English border.

The islands attracted colonists rapidly, for the cultivation of sugar offered ample rewards. In 1642 there were more than five thousand French in the Antilles. In 1651 Martinique, La Grénade, and Sainte-Lucie were sold to Du Parquet, a nephew of D'Esnameuc, for sixty thousand livres. Guadeloupe, Marie-Galante, La Désirade, and Les Saintes were sold to Houel. Saint-Christophe, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, and Saint-Croix were sold to Poincy for the account of the Order of Malta.<sup>25</sup>

The Spaniards, realizing the folly of leaving the small islands to be occupied by the English, Dutch, Danes, and French, incited the fierce Caribs to drive their European enemies away. In the early 1650's, massacres occurred in several French islands; on one occasion Martinique was saved from two thousand Caribs by the timely arrival of Dutch ships. Mutinous colonists and rebellious slaves added to the governor's perplexities during 1657, and the Caribs had again to be beaten off in 1658.

In 1654 the fleet sent out by Oliver Cromwell appeared off Saint-Christophe and Guadeloupe, and threatened to take them; but Jamaica seemed a better base for English intentions against Spain's colonies, and it was seized (1655) instead. In 1658 Du Parquet, an able ruler, died, leaving Martinique to his widow; she encouraged intrigues, caused a revolt, and died on a voyage to France in 1659. Du Parquet's brother-in-law as new governor was so vicious that revolt became magnified. The unrest in Martinique was one of the reasons for sending out De Tracy to reorganize all the French colonies in America.<sup>26</sup>


The last important contribution by Poincy to the well-being of his government was the making of a treaty with fifteen Carib chiefs which provided that the remaining six thousand Caribs should retire to Saint-Vincent and Dominique; prisoners were exchanged, and raids were to cease. A few days afterward the old governor died, on April 11, 1660. His successor De Sales, nephew of St. Francis de Sales, in turn died in 1662.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Du Tertre, *Histoire générale*, I, 46 ff., 65, 66; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, V, 229.

<sup>25</sup> E. J. Payne, *History of European Colonies* (London, 1877), 7; J. Tramond, "Histoire général des Antilles françaises," G. Hanotaux, ed., *Histoire des colonies françaises*, I, 404.

<sup>26</sup> May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique*, 12.

<sup>27</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, I, 219; Tramond, *op. cit.*, 404-405.



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Another important event of 1660 was an agreement with the English whereby the latter confined themselves to Barbados, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and some smaller islands. The French retained Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Grénade; Saint-Christophe was still divided between the two. The so-called "neutral" or Carib islands were claimed by both at times, but the settlements on them were French. It was when West India sugar became important that the European dynastic wars reached America. The French islands, under resident planters, prospered more than the English ones, and on the whole were better managed.<sup>28</sup>

Social life in the French Antilles was characterized by the groupings into which the inhabitants fell. At the top were the officials and planters, then the merchants, then buccaneers, and small farmers. At the lower levels were the Negro slaves and white engagés. The tropical crops, tobacco, cotton, cacao, and sugar, required forced labor which neither Caribs nor Arawaks would perform, hence black slaves had to be imported. The date of the beginning of the slave trade in the French islands is uncertain; some efforts were made by Rouen and Dieppe traders in 1630 to obtain blacks from Senegal and Gambia.<sup>29</sup> They must have been supplied quite early by Dutch or Spanish traders. The planters seized slaves when they could from English or Spanish slave ships. In 1642 sixty blacks were sold on Guadeloupe at 200 francs each, for sugar raising.

Prices of slaves varied, a good one bringing as much as two thousand livres coloniales. A "pièce d'Inde" was a man or woman between fifteen and thirty years of age who was healthy, well-built, not lame, and possessing a full denture.<sup>30</sup> The unhappy Africans were Senegalese, Waloffs, Peuhls, Mandingoes, Congolese, or later the East Africans. Before the development of the great estates, the slaves were cared for by their masters better than the white engagés. After 1655 their condition grew steadily worse as planting grew in extent and became less personal in character. Fugitive slaves lived in the mountains as maroons, raiding settled parts and often leading revolts. The *Code Noir*, which prescribed food and clothing for the blacks, was widely ignored, the unfortunates being obliged to provide their own living save in sugar mills and the like.

The blacks of Guadeloupe enjoyed characteristic amusements, chief

<sup>28</sup> Payne, *European Colonies*, 75; a good secondary account is by Saint Yves, "Les premières relations des Antilles françaises et des Antilles anglaises," in *Bulletin de géographie historique et descriptive*, XVII (Paris, 1902), 207-252.

<sup>29</sup> Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe*, 85; G. Scelle, *Histoire de la traite négrière aux Indes de Castille* (Paris, 1906, 2v.), I, 125-126; II, 182-183.

<sup>30</sup> Satineau, *op. cit.*, 83, 259-309.

among them being dances such as the *colenda*, the *vaudou*, and the *Don Pedro*. Their education and Christianization were generally neglected, though they enjoyed some respite from work on Sundays. They were subjected to cruel punishments based increasingly on the fear psychology of their masters. In their turn they wreaked vengeance on the planters by revolts, poisoning, and flight to the hills. The effect of official introduction of slaves under Colbert in 1664 was to increase all these troubles, the blacks becoming a growing menace.<sup>31</sup>

The engagés were used for the first settlements by De l'Olive and Du Plessis. Urbain de Roissy brought out twenty-seven in the summer of 1628 on Saint-Christophe. These vigorous pioneers between 1642 and 1674 contributed effectively to the growth of agriculture. During their three-year contracts they worked out their passage cost; these "thirty-six monthers" were supposed to emigrate of their own free will, but the merchants made a business of recruiting them; until 1670 most of them were brought from "les côtes du Ponant." Vagabonds, defrauders, idlers, minors, and other unfortunates were shanghaied in the ports and delivered to the planters for a thousand or twelve hundred pounds of tobacco. Now and then an "enfant de maison" was included. Women engagés were excused from service if they could marry. At the end of his service, the engagé was to receive a plot of ground five hundred by one thousand paces in dimension, and a sum of money, or three hundred pounds of tobacco, but such rewards often went unpaid. Though the lot of the engagés was a hard one, and the whites, like the blacks, often revolted or ran away, the system brought good results on the whole.<sup>32</sup>

The number who could be brought to the islands had greatly decreased before 1670, and rules were passed providing that traders must import a ratio of engagés proportional to their tonnage, and that proprietors must have a certain number of engagés in proportion to their blacks, but the rules could not be enforced. The planters disliked them, alleging that whites could not perform the hard labor required, and that their cost was prohibitive. The current of engagés flowed more or less steadily for the period 1626 to 1774.

<sup>31</sup> The Negroes most highly prized were the Peuhls. Slavery in the French West Indies to 1789 is admirably described in Lucien Peytraud, *L'esclavage aux Antilles françaises avant 1789 d'après des documents inédits des Archives Coloniales* . . . (Paris, 1897), see especially his "Résumé—Conclusion," 436-462; see also P. de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue*, 165-180.

<sup>32</sup> P. Margry, *Bélaïn d'Esnambuc*, 46, points out that French engagés served less time than English or Dutch indentured servants, five and seven years respectively. Cf. May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique*, 40-41. Louis Pauliat, *La politique coloniale sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1887), 264-266, 272; Roissey's engagés, Barrey, *op. cit.*, 149-155.

Engagés who finished their terms often joined together for agricultural pursuits in communal societies which lasted until the time of Colbert. This "*matelotage*" began a local insular aristocracy. "All the best families now in the island began that way," said Du Tertre.<sup>33</sup> One individual of such humble origin became a member of the sovereign council in 1780.

The upper classes enjoyed personal freedom and success proportionate to the administrative ability of the governor, as is shown by the prosperity of Saint-Christophe under D'Esnambuc, contrasted with the poverty of Guadeloupe under De l'Olive. Social intercourse was full of ceremony and entertainments such as frequent visits from one island to another, hunting, and fishing. Eating was a favorite social activity, the viands being meats, fowl, pastry, and preserves; alcoholic drinks made from sugar cane or potatoes, or French wines and brandies, and cassava beer were popular; orange juice was a common beverage. The heads of families served as leaders of militia troops, of which there were twelve companies in Saint-Christophe by 1658; the whites also held the local offices. These "*gros blancs*" looked down upon "*petit blancs*," who formed a class of small farmers.

It is to be remarked that the French islands were opened to trade by Jews in the time of Louis XIV. One of them, Da Costa from Brazil, introduced machinery for making sugar; he also brought in the cacao tree, which by 1684 had become the chief resource of those who could not become sugar planters.

Until the ministry of Colbert the Antilles had only irregular contacts with France. As private properties, to all intents independent,<sup>34</sup> they pursued agriculture, but indolently, while their trade was almost exclusively in the hands of the Dutch, who had provided most of the capital invested in sugar. "Politically these fourteen islands were under the rule of French proprietors and were theoretically in the possession of the French king, but industrially and commercially they were in the possession of the Dutch." The buccaneers were ravaging the colonies

<sup>33</sup> *Histoire générale*, II, 453; A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 175-178; Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation* . . . , I, 161; Pierre de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue*, 154. In 1728 an order provided that every ship must carry three engagés to the islands. In 1730 a capitation of 100 pounds of raw sugar was to be paid, as before, on each engagé, as well as on free persons. In 1737 it was ordered that vessels hitherto obliged to export a fixed number of engagés might thereafter substitute an equal number of soldiers. This order was renewed in 1774. E. E. Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises, particulièrement la Guadeloupe* . . . (Paris, 1925, 3v.), II, 300.

<sup>34</sup> S. L. Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy* (New Haven, 1912), 51. From 1635 to 1652 the French ships fitted out to visit the islands, or which might have found it possible to do so, numbered eighty-five, an average of five yearly. They are named, with years and other details, in Barrey, *Les origines* . . . , 216-221.

of Spain, drawing that country's reprisals upon the French, so that the whole area was in a state of insecurity. These islands seemed to Colbert the most desirable of all colonies, because of the nature of their products, and also because, being islands, their inhabitants must remain within reach of the royal arm.<sup>85</sup> Their commerce must be recovered by France. The agent by whom the government showed its power was Alexandre Prouville de Tracy, who was in 1663 made lieutenant-general of all French possessions in America, with supreme military and judicial powers. His orders were "to purge the isles of all tyranny, reestablish good order, and cause justice to reign."<sup>86</sup> He was in the West Indies from June, 1664, to June, 1665, when he went to Quebec. On August 26, 1667, he returned to France.<sup>87</sup>

In the islands he issued laws intended to set economic and political affairs at rights as a suitable preparation for Colbert's new West India Company.<sup>88</sup> The islanders felt no joy at the change, but began marked progress after the colonies were purchased from their reluctant proprietors and placed under company control. The sugar planters rapidly grew rich. Many buccaneers gave up sea adventure to become peaceful cultivators of sugar, tobacco, and other crops. The trade with Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, and Rouen employed over one hundred ships; one hundred and thirty-one French vessels were in the West Indies in 1674; twice as much sugar was produced as France consumed.

Colbert's policy of development, which connoted subsidizing colonial enterprise for the sake of building up ocean-borne trade, had its best success in the Caribbean. Yet in ten years' time the company, burdened from the first with the cost of the repurchase of the islands from the

<sup>85</sup> "The more the colonies differ from the mother country in products, so much more nearly are they perfect, as is the case in the Antilles." Louis XIV to the governor of Martinique, 1670, quoted in José León Suárez, *Carácter de la revolución americana* (Buenos Aires, 1917), 6-7.

<sup>86</sup> G. B. Depping, "Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV," *Collection de documents inédits . . .*, series I (1850-1851), III, 339. Upon December 12 M. du Chambre, agent-general for the West India Company, took possession of Saint-Christophe with the following ceremonies which he himself described: "Having received the key, I opened and shut the doors. I entered and came out again. I went down to the offices, where I had a fire and smoked. I drank and I ate. I went into the chapel, and had mass performed after the clock had struck. I went into the guard house and I made the garrison go out, and I made them re-enter, under the authority of the West India Company. I raked the ground and took up the stones. I cut down the trees by the root and pulled up the herbs and replanted others; and at last I went upon the terrace, where I had the guns fired and cried out, God save the King and the Company." Du Tertre, *Histoire générale*, III, 252.

<sup>87</sup> Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 373-374.

<sup>88</sup> Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 60-67, 90.

proprietors, and with that of building forty-five ships, was hopelessly bankrupt. Dishonesty, incompetence, and ignorance assisted hard natural conditions in making this inevitable. But it should be emphasized that the period restored the West Indies trade to private ships under the French flag, taking it away from the Dutch, as Colbert had planned. This accomplishment left him free to inaugurate direct control without the intervention of a company. Success achieved, he felt little sensitiveness about personal losses of stockholders.<sup>89</sup>

The islanders had hoped in vain that the new régime would bring free trade; Colbert had indeed intended that the West India Company should be a step in a transition to direct crown control, and the trade of the islands was opened to all Frenchmen, and to foreigners under certain restrictions. Mutinies often broke out because the company failed to send sufficient food.

The internal history was a repetition of that which the earlier companies had experienced for twenty-five years. There were frequent fights with the English, Caribs, and maroons. Nature added the terrifying hazards of cyclones and volcanic eruptions. Food was always in precarious supply owing to the concentration on growing tobacco and sugar. Stock subscriptions were exhausted by 1665, and the business had to depend on the king's generosity and on the sugar tax collected at Rouen, which produced a million livres a year until 1684.<sup>40</sup> To repay these sums the insular trade was in 1670 closed to foreigners, and finally, the whole administration was taken over by the crown in 1674. After that year the import and export duties formerly collected by the company were changed to the often mentioned *droit du domaine d'Occident* collected by the crown.

The general administration of the colonies set up by Richelieu in 1626 lasted until 1669, when they were all put under the ministry of the marine. A series of able governors, beginning with the inspector-general De Tracy in 1663-1665, ruled the West Indies and Guiana together. Lefebvre de la Barre ruled in 1666-1667, De Baas from 1668 to 1677, and De Blénac from 1677 to 1690. There was also an intendant, and the sovereign council, first for Saint-Christophe, sat in Martinique from 1670 on. Each island, except Martinique, which housed the central authority, had a governor of its own as well. The five members of the council were increased to eleven in 1691. A chamber for criminal justice was added in 1680.<sup>41</sup> The council, which met once a month, was decidedly subordinate to the lieutenant-generals

<sup>89</sup> Mims, *op. cit.*, 179-180.

<sup>40</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, I, 222-229; Girault, *op. cit.*, I, 163, 171-172, 188.

<sup>41</sup> Girault, *op. cit.*, I, 204-210.

and intendants, while between it and the latter two officers there was the traditional friction, then thought to be the surest safeguard of efficiency.

The revenues were derived from a capitation tax, taxes on certain transactions, *corvées*, and payments of dues in kind. Officers were exempted from certain of these according to their rank. Almost no money existed, tobacco (until 1650) and sugar and tobacco (until 1670) being substituted. After 1670 sugar alone was accepted for taxes.

Payments in kind were made for free labor also, and this caused frequent trouble. Wages were set by an order of the sovereign council in 1666 to obviate disputes. Conditions of labor corresponded with the times. Work began fifteen minutes after sunrise, an hour being allowed for breakfast, and another for luncheon.

The council set weekly wages at six and one-half pounds of cassava flour, three and one-half pounds of beef, three and one-half pounds of lard, one pint of brandy, and twenty pounds of tobacco. The system turned every inhabitant into a sugar merchant, all laborers being obliged by necessity to turn their earnings over to "*regrottiers*" who took up all the sugar, and imported all foods and other merchandise from Europe, holding them at monopolistic prices. Remedies for this difficulty were tried by laws in 1670 and 1674 forbidding private persons from buying at wholesale, and making everyone declare the amount and cost of his importations. But the *regrottiers* always flourished.

Tobacco, known as "*pétun*" or "*l'herbe de Nicot*," was taken to France from Portugal in 1650, when it was used as medicine. Its increasing use, and its employment as money, led to its protection in 1629 by a duty of thirty sols per pound on foreign tobacco. Later duties, established in 1664 by Colbert, increased smuggling. In 1674 the tobacco trade was forbidden to private persons, and the right to sell or manufacture was reserved to the state. No law restricted growing until 1776. The income from this revenue amounted in 1792 to thirty-two million livres.

The insular sugar industry entered the French islands from Brazil. When England's Navigation Acts sought to force northern Europe to depend upon her for sugar, zest was given to the work of French corsairs. After the Peace of Utrecht, French refineries outstripped the English ones, the rivalry being one of the main causes of the colonial wars of the eighteenth century. Colbert's protective measures had fixed the import duty on French sugar at four livres, while foreign sugar paid fifteen livres per hundred-weight. The Rouen merchants complained that this tax allowed foreign refined sugar to com-

pete detrimentally with the national product. In 1665 the duty on imported sugar was twenty-two livres and ten sous. In 1681 a law prohibited export of raw sugar, while its price was lowered and that of refined sugar was raised. Thus incited, the planters smuggled their raw product to the English and the Dutch. In 1682 they were authorized to build refineries in the islands. This made the ship-owners protest, as their cargoes were reduced. The king's council, trying to end the vicious circle, opened the foreign market to raw sugar but put refined sugar on a premium. This system endured for a century.<sup>42</sup>

The population of the French West Indies soon after Colbert died was 47,321. Of these Martinique had 16,254, Guadeloupe 8,698, Saint-Domingue 7,993, Saint-Christophe 7,773, Cayenne 2,080, Marie-Galante 1,277, Saint-Martin 1,019. Of these, 18,888 were white, and 7,094 served in the militia. There were about one hundred monks and nuns. Among 28,534 blacks and mulattoes, 27,000 were slaves.<sup>43</sup>

The Negro slaves, though strong and full of endurance, were generally cowed by brutality. Emotionally unstable, they ran away if too severely treated. The Code Noir provided that families should not be separated and that the slaves should be instructed in the Roman Catholic faith. Their material welfare was to be looked after, they were to be provided with clothes, and their Sundays were to be free. In 1686 an important law of Martinique provided that the testimony of slaves should be accepted in all cases except against their own masters.<sup>44</sup>

Roman Catholic missions were provided for the Indians and parishes and churches for the people. The Jesuits and Carmelites worked in Guadeloupe and Saint-Christophe. Prior to 1646, the Capuchins had had charge of Saint-Christophe. In Martinique (1696) there were eighteen parishes of Jesuits, Jacobins,<sup>45</sup> and Capuchins. There was much superstition, and in 1657 a woman was burned for witchcraft. The Jesuits were the most zealous of the religious orders, helping the sick and teaching the Negroes. They were noted for their great economy and for their culture. The Jacobins, appointed by the king, served as curates of parishes.

The West Indies passed under the authority of so many European nations before the end of the seventeenth century that their respective allegiances affected to a degree their prosperity. While Cuba and

<sup>42</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 232-240.

<sup>43</sup> There were seventy-three churches, 407 sugar plantations, eight refineries, 171 indigo farms, 4,910 horses and mules, and 15,000 large and small cattle (Saintoyant, I, 241).

<sup>44</sup> The actual Code Noir is comprised within pp. 28-58 of the 1767 edition. The amplifying legislation is comprised in 446 pages.

<sup>45</sup> Dominicans established in the Church of St.-Jacques in Paris.

Porto Rico were always Spanish, the French islands were subject to greater vicissitudes. Martinique, Guadeloupe, with Les Désirades and Marie-Galante, remained in French hands from the time of their settlement. Saint-Christophe continued part English and part French until 1702, except that the latter overran the whole island in 1666; the English were restored by the Peace of Breda in 1667. They were driven out in 1689, but retook the whole island in 1690. At the Peace of Ryswick, 1697, the French possessions were restored. After 1702 the island remained English.

Barbados, Nevis, and Montserrat were English after their occupation. The Bahamas were English after their settlement; Jamaica, Anguilla, and Antigua came under the Cromwellian expansion. Western Saint-Domingue, at first Spanish, came under the buccaneers about 1630, and was made respectably French in 1697. The Dutch began their invasion in the 1630's, taking Saint-Eustace, Saba, and part of Saint-Martin. Curaçao, Bonaire, and Aruba were held by the Dutch after 1634. The Danish islands, Saint-Thomas since 1671, Saint-John since 1684, and Saint-Croix (French 1651-1733) were of little colonial importance. Saint-Barthélemy, which was French from 1651 to 1784, was then sold to Sweden.

While Canada and the Antilles were scenes of French colonial and commercial activities, contacts were being initiated with the Orient, both by land journeys eastward from the Levant, and around Africa by way of Madagascar. The first of these was through missionary enterprise. The famous Père Joseph de Tremblay, confidant of Richelieu, was in 1625 named by the pope director of missions in the Levant. This position he employed to send a number of French Capuchins into India, China, Japan, and Persia. They were not only missionaries, but diplomats. Their accounts of their journeys prove that their interests were scientific and patriotic as well as religious. Their masters in France intended that they should establish a series of missionary stations whereby land communications with the seats of Oriental trade might be rendered permanent.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>46</sup> León Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 102-103; Ch. de Rochefort, *The History of the Caribby-Islands* (J. Davies, tr., London, 1666) is a "natural and moral" history, without utility for political events, but useful for its descriptions of society and economic conditions. There is an engaging popular account of this period by Ch. de la Roncière and J. Tramond, "Histoire générale des Antilles," in Hanotaux and Martineau, *Histoire des colonies françaises . . .*, I, 389-464. For later events, *ibid.*, to p. 586.

## CHAPTER VIII

### GUIANA THROUGH THE OLD RÉGIME

The coast of South America between the Orinoco and Amazon rivers was, like the Antilles, the scene of international rivalry begun by freebooters and corsairs. Here was the home of the Ouyanas Indians, whose tribal name, Ouyano, has been given to the country in the form "Guiana," the initial G being quite liquid in Spanish. Along the shores lies a strip of alluvial detritus from twenty-five to thirty miles wide, protected against inroads of the sea by tangled masses of roots. This alluvial strip is separated by swamps from reefs of sea-shells and sand which form the original coastline. The marshes are intersected by innumerable streams, intercommunicating and affording a network of waterways navigable only by canoes. Behind the coastal fringe the land rises gradually to a dense tropical forest. Only here and there are savannahs and scrub. Through interminable forests flow the rivers which form the only means of communication with the interior; rapids render them unsatisfactory as channels of commerce.<sup>1</sup> The coastal area is, however, rich and valuable land for the production of sugar cane, cotton, and coffee.

Down to the end of the sixteenth century next to nothing was known of the coastline of Guiana, called the "Wilde Kuste" by the Dutch, although there had been some Spanish explorers in this vicinity between 1530 and 1560, constituting a basis for the Spanish claim, which was never effective eastward from the Orinoco. Sir Walter Raleigh, fascinated by the myth that in the far interior on the shores of the inland sea of Parima lay Manoa, the city of El Dorado, sent out Jacob Whidden to search for it in 1594. In 1595 he sailed along the coast himself, and made his way some distance up the Orinoco. His lieutenants, Laurence Keymis and Thomas Masham, conducted two other voyages a year later, visiting all the river mouths between the Amazon and the Orinoco.<sup>2</sup> Raleigh's narrative of his discoveries was trans-

<sup>1</sup> H. Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique sur la Guyane française*, 33-35.

<sup>2</sup> James Rodway, *Guiana: British, Dutch, and French* (London, 1912), chaps. 2-4, gives in brief, semi-popular form, the story of the international rivalry for Guiana. Later chapters carry the history to 1911, e.g., chap. VII on Cayenne. James A. Williamson, *English Colonies in Guiana and on the Amazon, 1604-1668* (Oxford, 1923), gives a scholarly account, with sources for the English story for the

lated, and its glowing descriptions aroused vivid interest and enthusiasm in Holland.

In 1597–1598 a Dutch expedition sailed in the path of Raleigh and Keymis, and from this time there was a constant succession of Dutch and English efforts at settlement in Guiana. They all failed to reckon with the difficulties of transport and communication, and with the trying nature of climate and country. The English colony set up by Charles Leigh in 1604 at Wiapoca fell as a dismal failure in 1606.<sup>3</sup> British merchants kept up a trade in salt and tobacco along the Spanish Main, visiting Trinidad and Venezuela in spite of prohibitions in their country's treaty with Spain in 1604. Several other British failures occurred within the same decade. In 1617 Raleigh's nine hundred men failed again. In was Captain Keymis' assault on San Thomé on the Orinoco which gives the undying echo in Guiana history to the tragic execution of Raleigh for piracy, to satisfy Spanish vengeance. Further attempts in 1620 were equally futile against climate and Portuguese hostility.<sup>4</sup> When Charles I, coming to the throne in 1625, began a direct offensive against Spain, the adventures on the eastern South American shore were multiplied; they continued, after failures on the Oyapok, to make attempts on the Orinoco and the Amazon, all of which failed. The final one, in Surinam, proved the most successful, but it was surrendered to Holland in the Peace of Breda in 1667. The present British Guiana was taken after the Napoleonic wars.<sup>5</sup>

The French also were intrigued by Raleigh's writings on "The discovery of the vast, rich, and beautiful empire of Guiana,"<sup>6</sup> just as that adventurer had been by the Spanish stories of fabled Manoa, wonder city of gold yearned for since the days of the Welzers and La Serpa.<sup>7</sup> After the time of Villegagnon, Norman vessels frequented the

years included. Thomas Jefferys, *Natural . . . and Civil History of the French Dominions in North and South America*, pt. II, 193–246. For further material, Victor de Nouvion, *Extraits des auteurs et voyageurs qui ont écrit sur la Guyane, suivis du catalogue bibliographique . . .* (Paris, 1844), is useful.


<sup>3</sup> Report of the U. S. Commission concerning the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana, II, No. 5, 13; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 345; see also Harlow, *Colonising Expeditions*, Introd., lxix, and his authorities; also, Sir C. A. Harris, ed., *A Relation of a Voyage to Guiana by Robert Harcourt, 1613 . . .* (London, Hak. Soc. Pubs., ser. 2, 1928), vol. 60, Introduction, for a sketch of colonization in Guiana.

<sup>4</sup> Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, I, 207–209.

<sup>5</sup> V. T. Harlow, *Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623–1667*, lxvi–xcv.

<sup>6</sup> London, 1596. A memoir submitted to Henry IV proposing its conquest pretended to locate Manoa on the Orinoco a few days' sail from the port of Canury.

<sup>7</sup> No tribes of advanced culture have ever been found in Guiana. The myth of Manoa was a fabrication of the Europeans, all of whom shared the hallucination.



coast of South America, trading with the natives. They usually left with a tribe some fearless member of the crew, who should later prove valuable as an interpreter. Trade was chiefly in dye wood, precious stones, and metals, for a share of which the French had to fight the Portuguese; having no color of legal right in the country, the intruders dealt entirely with natives hostile to the Portuguese. In 1594 Sieur Jean Riffault, the genial pirate, went out with three ships to the island of Marañón, where he traded some months with chiefs on the shore. Upon his return to France he left behind some of his men, among them one named Vaux, who joined a tribe and persuaded it to ask for French protection. Vaux then returned to France, where Henry IV agreed to the proposed "protectorate." In 1595 the king momentarily planned to send out three thousand men to conquer either the Incas or El Dorado, but showed, apparently, no interest in the Marañón.

Montbarrot, governor of Rennes, was licensed in 1602 to establish a post in Guiana; on April 9, 1604, his lieutenant, Daniel de la Touche de la Ravardière, landed on the bank of the Oyapok, and later built a short-lived post on the Marañón. With him went the scientist Jean Mocquet, to study the flora and fauna of the region while the captain of the expedition explored and traded with the Indians.<sup>8</sup> La Ravardière took possession of the island of Cayenne, and then coasted southeast past the Amazon to the Marañón.<sup>9</sup> When he returned to France, Henry IV made him lieutenant-general of the territory from the Amazon to Trinidad, which he was to explore.

In France again he enlisted a group of Hospitalers in his Guiana kingdom, but they made first for West Africa, whence their leader went on to "Oriéup" in Brazil. He left that place soon after March 2, 1610, to look for gold on the Amazon, leaving a lieutenant, Le Bret du Bosc de la Villesauges, in charge. During this period he explored

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The legend is dealt with at length in J. A. Zahm, *The Quest of El Dorado* (New York, 1917). The tribes encountered by the Spanish, English, Dutch, and French in this region were Caribs, Arawaks, and others of like culture (Ternaux-Compans, "Mémoire sur les Indiens ou naturels de la Guiane française," *Nouvelles annales des voyages*, 1842, vol. 95, pp. 257-289).

<sup>8</sup> He received some Carib Indians as a bequest from Du Plessis-Mornay (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 347). P. Yves d'Evreux, *Voyage dans le nord du Brésil fait durant les années 1613 et 1614 . . .* (Paris, 1864) gives in the Introd., ix-x, La Ravardière's letters patent dated July, 1605. This volume reprints the account of the mission of P. Yves d'Evreux, Capuchin priest with La Ravardière.

<sup>9</sup> A Saint-Malo ship was harbored during May and June, 1605, at Wiapoco. John Wilson, *Relation* [of Charles Leigh's expedition], in *Purchas his Pilgrimes* (London, 1625, 4v.), IV, 1260-1265.

the Amazon finding an English colony at its mouth. After repelling a serious attack by the Indians, La Ravardière returned once more to France, but meantime Henry IV had been assassinated and no one now had any interest in his plans. Nothing daunted, he enlisted the aid of the Queen Regent, who in 1610 authorized him, with François de Razilly and Nicolas de Harly, to seize and colonize fifty leagues of Brazil coast. Alphonse du Plessis, a young uncle of Richelieu, was also with him, as was Isaac de Razilly. They sailed from France with three vessels on March 19, 1612, and anchored off the Isle of Marañón on July 26. Protestants and Catholics were sworn "de tout faire . . . pour entretenir en paix et union une bonne société."<sup>10</sup> They found relics of an earlier French expedition from Dieppe and Havre under Captain Gerard le Roy,<sup>11</sup> and built there Fort Louis, a chapel and lodges, with Indian help. Thanks to Vaux, who understood the Indians, François de Razilly began to explore the coasts, going north-west to the Amazon and its junction with the Pará, making allies of the Indian tribes. Then Razilly returned to France for more supplies, taking with him half a dozen Indians, who made a great sensation in Paris. Royalty and nobility subscribed to his project willingly, and a ship took back two hundred colonists. But the Portuguese aroused the Tupinambas against the invaders; an offensive by Jerónimo Albuquerque led to a French defeat in November. La Ravardière was forced to agree on July 31, 1616, that if he was not succored within five months he would abandon the island. In December the French were driven out with bloody reprisals,<sup>12</sup> losing forever the Marañón region, "a land of marvels which might be called a celestial paradise." The Portuguese answer to this intrusion was the founding in 1615 of what is now Pará. Once more, in 1624, the same intrepid French leader

<sup>10</sup> P. Claude d'Abbeville, *Histoire de la mission des pères Capucins en l'isle de Maragnon* (Paris, 1614), 20, and P. Yves d'Evreux, *Voyage dans le nord du Brésil fait durant les années 1613 and 1614*, F. Denis, ed., both cited in La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, IV, 350.

<sup>11</sup> The equipment of Gerard le Roy's ships for the India voyage of 1609 is noticed in *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies* (1513-1616), 469, 473, 478. Capt. Gerard le Roy, who had been in the Orient with the Dutch, was on June 1, 1604, granted the right to form a French association for the East India trade, but failed. He tried again in 1611, and others again did the same in 1615. C. M. Guyon, *A New History of the East Indies* (London, 1757, 2v.), II, 3-4. F. Denis, *op. cit.*, 9-15. On Le Roy, see H. Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes, 1604-1875* (Paris, 1904), 56, 57.

<sup>12</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 352-360, and in Hanotaux and Martineau, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, I, 377-384. The La Ravardière episode on Marañón Island synchronized with the last fatal voyage of Raleigh to the Amazon (Williamson, *English Colonies in Guiana*, 74-75); see also R. Southey, *History of Brazil*, I, 414-422, 438-446, 452.

sought renewal of his lieutenantcy-general over "America, the Amazons, and La Trinidad," but while he was preparing for the voyage, his associate, the governor of La Rochelle, revolted, and the project was forgotten during a new war of religion.<sup>13</sup> A group of French and Walloon colonists, sent out under these letters patent, went in 1624 to New Amsterdam instead of to the Oyapok, their expected destination. During this period the Portuguese drove several Dutch and English settlements from the Amazon.

In 1626 an enterprise was undertaken by De Chantail of Lyons, who had been with D'Esnambuc and Chambaut at Saint-Christophe. De Chantail, in company with Chambaut, landed on the banks of the Sinnamari with an initial group of twenty-six colonists. In 1628 sieur Hautépine, with fourteen men, began at the mouth of the Coromana, where he was joined, in 1630, by Legrand, with fifty men. These tiny detachments were matched by, and competed with, the English posts in Surinam and the Dutch on the Berbice and the Cassipoury.<sup>14</sup> The practical-minded Dutch went so far as to offer Chambaut a thousand pistoles if he would hoist their flag! Both in Guiana and Brazil these enterprising traders exerted themselves to prevent French settlements. In 1634 three Dutch vessels attempted to prevent a solitary Marseilles merchant ship from entering Bahía, but were signally defeated!

After this none too resounding success, Richelieu contemplated planting a colony of three or four thousand poverty-stricken French farther south, on the La Plata, but the effort, finally directed to the Maroni in the north, ended in disaster. A company of Rouen merchants, organized in 1633 as the Compagnie du Cap Nord, was given the monopoly of trade between the Orinoco and the Amazon, but it was unsuccessful. Captain Legrand took sixty-six men to start a post at Cap du Nord at the mouth of the Maroni River, opposite the Dutch post. These posts merely vegetated, and in 1637 the colonists moved to Cayenne and began a palisaded house, the first one in the colony. In 1638 a monopoly was given to Jacob Bontemps to colonize the territory between the Amazon and the Orinoco with twelve hundred settlers. His promising beginning ended in placing six men at Cayenne, four on the Maroni, and seven in Surinam!

The burst of colonial effort of Richelieu's period had its counterpart in that of Charles I of England, who reversed the attitude of James I in attempting wide-reaching overseas designs. The critic who marvels at the little accomplishment of the great cardinal may find some commentary on the vicissitudes of imperial designs in the partial success of England during the same span of years:

<sup>13</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 360-362.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 668. H. Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique . . .*, 38.

. . . In addition to the East India Company's factories there were plantations existing and developing in Virginia, the Bermudas, the Pilgrims' Plymouth, Newfoundland, and St. Kitts. The new period saw the initiation or renewal of attempts upon Nova Scotia and New France, Massachusetts and the neighbouring regions, Maryland, Barbados, Nevis and the adjacent Islands, Guiana and the Amazon delta, Providence Island off the Mosquito Coast, and the African slaving stations. . . . Projects merely advocated were Sir Robert Heath's plan for planting Carolina, another for a settlement in Florida to be peopled by French Huguenots, the petition of the Mainwaringes for a grant of Fernando Noronha off the Brazilian coast, that of Daniel Gookin for the legendary isle of St. Brandan's, that of Sir William Courteen for *Terra Australis*, and finally the scheme for an aggressive West India Company on the Dutch model, to sweep Spain from the Caribbean.<sup>15</sup>

Again at Dieppe in 1643 three hundred French soldiers and colonists under Charles Poncet de Brétigny, bedecked with all the gewgaws and disporting the circumstance of a mimic court, set off for "the land of Cap Nord." Arrived at Cayenne in November, where there were still some Frenchmen without sponsors, the party soon fell prey to tragedy. Poncet showed himself a tyrant, hated by his own people as well as the Indians; his followers clapped him into chains, keeping him there for two months.<sup>16</sup> The colony became a republic, its officers forming a senate, undertook trade relations with Brazil, fought the Dutch and Arawaks at Berbice, and began to found new posts, when the governor wheedled his way out of his shackles and resumed control. His evil manners also returned, his cruelties being really such as only a madman could commit, and he was killed by vengeful savages.<sup>17</sup>

With these ever recurrent tragedies, the French gave up their slender holds on the Mobury, the Maroni, the Berbice, and in Surinam. The remnants of each post sought precarious refuge at Cayenne, in Fort Cépérou, but the howling savages followed to the attack, whereupon the Capuchins went out, crosses in hand, and drove them off just as a blessed ship anchored before the fort and took most of the sorry surviving forty men to Saint-Christophe;<sup>18</sup> a handful hung on in Fort Cépérou.

<sup>15</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 671; cf. Williamson, *English Colonies in Guiana*, 146, whose MS. source is at fault here; *ibid.*, 13-16.

<sup>16</sup> Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 39-42. J. Caillet, *L'administration en France sous le ministère du Cardinal de Richelieu*, II, 114-116.

<sup>17</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, IV, 671-673; Ternaux-Compans, *op. cit.*, 45; T. Jefferys, *The Natural and Civil History . . .*, II, 195-197; Du Tertre, *Histoire générale des Ant-isles habitées par les français*, III, 11.

<sup>18</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, IV, 673-674. The contemporary account is by Père Boyer, *Véritable relation de tout ce qui c'est fait au . . . voyage que M. de Brétigny fit à l'Amérique occidentale* (Paris, 1654).

The Compagnie de Cayenne, founded in 1651 by the Abbé de Marivault, M. de Roiville, and the Abbé de la Boulaye to follow up Poncet's design, was but another dismal failure. It was an attempt by a group of dissidents to escape from the miseries which followed the failure of the Fronde. The fatuous De Marivault, who had hoped to convert the savages, fell from the gangplank and was drowned just when his ship was starting from Paris to Rouen. De Roiville, whose daring purpose it was to rise to the grandeur of a petty sovereign in Guiana, was murdered on the voyage by his loathing associates.<sup>19</sup> The colonists were in general a bloodthirsty lot, who nagged and quarreled among themselves, and by 1653 nothing was left of the five or six hundred men but a few corpses which were taken home by Dutch ships. For forty years these deluded adventurers had treasured the gilded dreams of unhappy Walter Raleigh. Hostile Dutchmen and Portuguese, a deadly climate, and gold hunting, had wiped out some thirteen hundred Frenchmen, and not a post survived. Sad end to a project which had held out hope of three hundred per cent profits!

In 1652 the Compagnie de la France Equinoxiale was given the privileges of the ill-fated Compagnie du Cap Nord and seven hundred men were sent to Cayenne. On the little crescent-shaped harbor, they reconstructed the fort, renaming it Saint-Michel de Cépérou. But dissensions among the leaders, lack of experience on the part of the colonists, and the hostility of the natives caused this company to fail as its predecessors had done.<sup>20</sup> About this time the English took possession, installing a number of Dutch Jews under a leader called Guérin Spranger. They introduced cultivation of sugar and indigo, which did so well that Cayenne gained great repute, attracting many Jews who had been expelled from Brazil, where they had settled under the Dutch dominance. One of them, David Nassy, brought out a number of colonists in 1659, and some one hundred and fifty followed in 1660. The success of their agriculture was marked, but the colony was not well-supported.

<sup>19</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, V, 234-235. For ampler treatment of the Spanish and English voyages in Guiana, see F. A. Junker von Langegg, *El Dorado* (Leipzig, 1888), *passim*. J. A. Zahm, *The Quest of El Dorado*, adds more modern explorations. The letters patent issued to Marivault and Roiville are in *Revue de l'histoire des colonies française*, XV (1927), 581-591.

<sup>20</sup> Marivault's enterprise was recorded by Antoine Biet, superior of priests, who went with the expedition, *Voyage de la France Equinoxiale en l'Île de Cayenne . . .* (Paris, 1664). As late as 1668 Colbert, willing to use the Danes to oust the Dutch from their trade advantages, rejected Danish proposals to enter his West India trade, but turned toward purchase of the Danish post of Dansborg on the Malabar coast of India. Reciprocal advantages were outside his scope of vision (W. C. Westergaard, *The Danish West Indies . . .* (New York, 1917), 28; Jefferys, *op. et loc. cit.*).

In 1663 the sieurs Lefebvre de la Barre and Bouchardeau, joining to oust the Spranger colony, formed a new company of "Equinoctial France," which was granted all the country between the Orinoco and the Amazon. De la Barre, whose motive was "le desir de la gloire et celui de fair voir aux nations de l'Europe que les Français estoient capables de fair réussir les entreprises les plus difficiles," sailed to Cayenne to take possession in company with Alexandre Prouville de Tracy, seizing half a dozen foreign ships and giving the Dutch planters the option of departing or becoming French subjects. Several went to the Antilles, while most of the Jews went to the English in Surinam. De la Barre made a treaty with the Indians whereby the latter retired from the island, and agreed not to aid the English or Dutch. He shortly sailed away, leaving his brother De Lézy, as governor.<sup>21</sup>

Colbert, always yearning for "colonial products," and bitten with envy of Dutch success in Surinam, compelled this organization to join his West India Company in 1664, give up the hunt for gold, and set up plantations, several of which were begun on the Kourou. His faith in Negro slave labor offered a hope of profitable development of tropical lands such as Guiana.<sup>22</sup> In 1665 the English had one colony (Surinam or Willoughby Land) on the Guiana coast, and the Dutch four, while the French held only Cayenne and a small post on the Sinnamari.<sup>23</sup>

But troubles for "Equinoctial France" were not ended, as war with England came in 1666, entailing loss of Cayenne, but expulsion of the English from Saint-Christophe. In 1672 the Jesuit missionaries of Guiana besought Colbert to send them vessels and three hundred soldiers to ward off a Dutch attack, for France was now at war with Holland. The English had laid Cayenne desolate, and now the inhabitants were trying to effect an accommodation with the Dutch, who wanted to expand their own posts to create a "little Brazil" between the Orinoco and the Amazon. There were in the year mentioned only three hundred French in Cayenne and along the nearby coast. With no defenses of value, said the Fathers, they could easily be wiped out by a single ship with two hundred good fighters on board.

<sup>21</sup> Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique sur la Guyane*, 65-70. In October, 1671, Colbert wrote again to De la Barre, urging upon him the importance of Guiana to France, and encouraging him to provide for the defenses, promote colonization by marriage of the habitants, and in other ways suggesting the increase of this material holding through use of methods then being practised in Canada; *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert . . .* (Paris, 1861-1873, 7v., Index, 1882), III, pt. 2, 526.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Jefferys, *The Natural and Civil History . . .*, pt. II, 198-199.

<sup>23</sup> V. T. Harlow, ed., *Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana, 1623-1667*, 199 ff.

The colony was worth saving, it being the "seat upon which all the missions in this country depend," and "the sugar of Cayenne is white as snow and as good or better than that of Brazil."<sup>24</sup>

After the English surrendered their holdings under the Treaty of Breda, the Dutch warred on the French posts between 1667 and 1674. Cayenne was held by Holland from 1672 to 1676, when it was retaken by De Lézy. The Frenchmen frittered their energies away in adventure, shunning hard work.<sup>25</sup> In 1676 Admiral d'Estrées drove out the force of Dutch who had held Cayenne briefly. French slave-traders trespassed during the ensuing years on the Amazon, and the Portuguese Franciscans and Jesuits were employed to anticipate aggressive French missionaries in the Portuguese captaincy of Cabo do Norte.

One of the causes of somnolent economic conditions was the government policy of making huge free land grants without metes and bounds, but under provisional titles. On such insecure holdings the planters were restricted to specified crops not competing with those of France. Hence the anomaly that rich Guiana pasture lands lay ungrazed while meat was imported from France to feed the planters, whereas they might have fed not only Guiana but the Antilles as well.<sup>26</sup>

De Lézy proved a mediocre governor, but some progress was achieved. Though Jews and other foreigners were excluded, the population grew by accretions of filibusters. In 1674 two Jesuits began exploring the interior, the first French to do so. Their journey led them to the Inipi River, a branch of the Oyapok. The Indians could tell them nothing of "Lake Parima" or of "El Dorado," and they soon returned, ill, to Cayenne. A trading expedition was made in 1686.

Governor Ducasse, arriving in 1686, drew off the young manhood of the colony by a proposed attack on the Dutch in Surinam, which came to naught except to retard the progress of Guiana.<sup>27</sup> In 1688 the English turned Cayenne back to the French after brief tenure.

<sup>24</sup> "Les Jesuites missionnaires en Amérique à Colbert" (*Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV, 707-709*). Jefferys, *The Natural and Civil History*, 201-203.

<sup>25</sup> A "Recensement général de la Guyane en 1677," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1928), 354, accounts for a total population of 1515 in Guiana; of these, 1,133 were Negroes; there were about 10 engagés, 15 mulattoes, 48 Indian slaves, and 49 soldiers. On contemporary Dutch Guiana, see G. Edmundson, "The Dutch in Western Guiana," *English Historical Review*, XVI (October, 1901), 640-675; H. Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 71-75; Southey, *History of Brazil*, III, 15-16.

<sup>26</sup> J. C. Paul Rougier, *Précis de législation et d'économie coloniale* (Paris, 1895), 43-44.

<sup>27</sup> Ducéré, *Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 132-133, points out that the admiral could not find a good landing, and went away to Martinique to plan an

In 1696 M. de Gennes, a famous corsair, on his way to the Strait of Magellan in a futile effort to plant a colony there, stopped at Cayenne, describing it as a hexagonal settlement, fairly defended by two hundred men. Rain for nine months in the year provided ample moisture, permitting good crops of sugar and ground nuts, but slaves were lacking and cargoes tardy. The Portuguese were sharp rivals, for there was a general notion that silver mines could be found somewhere between the Maroni on the north, where the Dutch held Surinam, and the Portuguese on the south side of the Amazon. De Gennes had established a "county" on the Oyapok.

During these years French traders and adventurers made frequent raids on the Indians on the south bank of the Amazon, in which they were sharply opposed by the Jesuits of their own nation at Cayenne, and by the Portuguese. In 1686 the latter undertook to prevent such inroads by constructing forts on the north side of the great river. Governor de la Barre began movements to dislodge them, and in 1691 the Portuguese abandoned Fort Macapa; another expulsion occurred in 1697 after a neutral zone was established between the Oyapok and the Amazon, between which neither power was to establish either comptoir or fort. In 1700, however, the Portuguese set up a post on the right bank of the Oyapok. At the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession a convention of March 4, 1700, confirmed the neutral strip, which stood without change by international agreement for two hundred years.<sup>28</sup>

During the war, since Portugal became attached to England by the Methuen Treaty of 1703, Louis XIV planned an assault on Rio Janeiro, rich and admired outpost of an enemy. The expedition, led by J. F. DuClerc, a creole of Guadeloupe, failed to get its ships into the bay, and a landing party led by him was surrounded in the midst of the city, where the leader was soon assassinated. In the following year a fleet under René Duguay-Trouin captured the city and exacted a ransom of 610,000 cruzadas, which paid a profit of 92 per cent on the expense of the expedition.<sup>29</sup>

The Jesuits record that in 1709 that order built a mission on the

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attack upon Mexico, which he was not allowed to make (La Roncière, in Hanotaux and Martineau, I, 388).

The Dutch colony had received as members many hundred French Huguenots who settled on the lands of Aersens, lord of Sommelsdik. Others cleared and cultivated lands around Providence, which they named. (C. Weiss, *History of the French Protestant Refugees* (New York, 1854, 3v.), II, 139).

<sup>28</sup> La Roncière, in Hanotaux and Martineau, 387-388; Mario de Lima Barbosa, *Les français dans l'histoire du Brésil*, 118-128,

<sup>29</sup> Lima Barbosa, *op. cit.*, 136-156.

Kourou; in 1720 they explored the Maroni and some of its affluents, and built a mission on the upper Oyapok before 1736.<sup>30</sup> The claim is made that at this time the society controlled 10,000 converts in a "republic" like that which flourished in Paraguay. Meantime the Dutch had more solid establishments on the left bank of the Orinoco, while the Portuguese deprived the French of the navigation of the Amazon. The great expansion on the Amazon dreamed of by Governor Ferolles had faded; there was only a spindling and inert group of derelict colonials hanging on in Cayenne.

The period of peace opened by the Treaty of Utrecht unfortunately did not bring to Guiana any economic development. Even as late as 1740 Cayenne had a population of only ninety whites, some fifteen hundred black slaves, and one hundred and twenty-five Indian slaves.<sup>31</sup> In 1743 there were one hundred and fifty houses "of sufficiently bad appearance." The whole population of Guiana numbered 5,300, of whom six hundred were white, 4,300 were slaves, and there were a few hundred freedmen. The garrison consisted of three hundred men, the area cultivated was not more than thirteen hundred hectares. The crops were sugar cane, ground nut (*arnott*), indigo, cotton, and manioc. Coffee was brought in from Surinam in 1716, making Guiana the first French colony to produce it. Cacao was a fair crop by 1735. Guiana maintained only a sluggish interchange with the Antilles and North America. The imports were only the coarse necessities of planters. Horses were brought in from "Boston and New York." The slumbrous colony fortunately had not had to meet foreign hostility nor disasters from natural causes.<sup>32</sup>

A number of exploring expeditions radiated from a military post erected in 1726 on the estuary of the Oyapok. Most of them were mere repetitions of the old tragic quests for gold or precious stones, but they did reveal the richness and extent of the forests, especially those of wild cacao on the upper Oyapok. This region, however, lay beyond a labyrinth of rapids and waterfalls, the practical problem being how to reach the forest of cacao so as to exploit its crops. A number of officers undertook to do this; De la Garde, De la Haye, Caperon, D'Audifreddy, De Monty, De Chabrilion, went into the basins of the

<sup>30</sup> Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 81-83.

<sup>31</sup> La Roncière says De Gennes in the 1690's found six hundred French, and that the above figures by Barrère and Raynal are too small (*op. cit.*, 588). A brief abstract of Barrère is in A. F. Prévost, *Histoire générale des voyages*, (The Hague, 1746-1761, 61v.), tom. 54 (1753), 543-595.

<sup>32</sup> P. Barrère, *Nouvelle relation de la France Equinoxiale . . .* (Paris, 1743), quoted in Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 83-86. Three D'Orvilliers, father, son, and grandson, governed from 1700 to 1763, with Baron l'Amirande intervening, 1730-1736 (La Roncière, *op. cit.*, 589).

Camopi, the Oyapok, and the Araoua between 1729 and 1742, but as they made no maps, no benefit accrued from their work. For over a century it was believed that these rivers had never been visited by the French.<sup>83</sup> In 1744 a New England "pirate" named Captain Potter seized a fort on the Oyapok, but was unable to hold it.

From the beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession down to the Treaty of Paris, Guiana was neglected by France and overlooked by her rivals. The lack of slaves made exportable goods scarce, and few ships called other than a few slavers now and then. When the Seven Years' War began she was at the ebb tide of her misery. The governor asked the planters in vain for levies of slaves to rebuild the fortifications, and even tried to enlist the blacks for defense. He had to do without, having no provisions to feed them; he could not even pay the wages of his small garrison. The colonists had no recourse in case of attack but to retreat into the forest. In 1758 a passing ship left some supplies, and after 1759 the governor purchased provisions from the Dutch in Surinam.<sup>84</sup>

After the Seven Years' War Choiseul undertook to compensate for the loss of Canada by a stupendous but disastrous effort to plant a new South American colony which should complement and support the rich sugar islands which England always threatened. In 1765 he declared: "Le véritable affaire est la guerre aux colonies." His hope was based upon the belief that the soil of the tropics could be successfully tilled by whites. The ideal would be a colony of "tropical products"; English and Dutch success pointed to Guiana. The enterprise reversed all old French tradition by staking the issue on colonization rather than commerce. It was decided to establish the first and most important center on the banks of the Kourou, which was navigable for forty-five leagues, and where the Jesuit successes seemed to offer hope of continental expansion. The area which Choiseul and his cousin Choiseul-Praslin obtained was a concession to all the territory lying between the Kourou, the Maroni, and the ocean. It was intended to grant seigneuries of 1,600 arpents' area and subgrant to colonists, who might perfect land titles after eight years.

Choiseul chose for head of the enterprise the colonel of dragoons De Turgot, who unfortunately had no qualifications for the command.

<sup>83</sup> Ternaux-Compans, *op. cit.*, 87-88; La Roncière, *ibid.*; H. Froidevaux, "Exploration à l'intérieur de la Guyane . . . , 1720-1741 (*Bull. géogr. hist. et descr.*, 1894), 218-301, and 1902, 253-260.

<sup>84</sup> Commandant Préfontaine, in charge of northern Guiana, wrote *Maison rustique à l'usage des habitants de la partie de la France Equinoxiale . . .* (Paris, 1763). Published to win for its author appointment by Choiseul, it is an invaluable source on social conditions in eighteenth-century Guiana. See also Victor Piquet, *Histoire des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1931), 21.

His second was Thibault de Chanvalon, a former member of the sovereign council of Martinique. De Turgot began a series of tragic mistakes by creating a large staff of rapacious agents who expected to grow rich without crossing the ocean, and by loading Chanvalon with the entire work of the expedition. A scouting expedition under De Préfontaine, who had made the original proposal to Choiseul, left Rochefort on May 17 with three vessels and one hundred and twenty-seven colonists, reaching Cayenne on July 14, 1763. The governor of Guiana, De Béhague, had not been notified, and asked to be given the direction of the enterprise, but De Préfontaine, who had lived twenty years in Guiana, naturally refused and went on to Kourou, where he began by asking the Jesuit missionaries for the services of eighty slaves for one month.<sup>85</sup> He began a village, but at the end of the month the slaves were withdrawn and Governor Béhague was unable to supply others. Time slipped away and the work made no progress.

The grand enterprise received no encouragement in France, and the lack of volunteers led the administration to seek them in Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, and even Malta. Religious freedom was guaranteed, and even military prisoners were accepted. Three hundred new men were sent out in October, 1763, and in November Chanvalon took out eleven vessels with some fourteen hundred ill-chosen persons. Reaching Cayenne, he learned that the preparations on the Kourou were incomplete, and upon going there found the camp too small for the number he had at Cayenne. His rascalion followers refused to work on his material improvements. To diminish his own responsibility, Chanvalon gave concessions to several of his followers who had money. He also tried in vain to check prospective arrivals from France, and when a fourth convoy arrived in March, 1764, with fourteen hundred more, he sent them to the island now called Devil's Island; he must have been dismayed to receive word that two thousand more were on the way. They arrived in desperate health, without food or other resources. By the end of 1764, twenty-three hundred of them were helpless, while Kourou was full of sick and dying unfortunates. The throng of idlers there organized a number of amusement devices instead of working, building theaters, gambling houses, and cabarets in order to reap profits from their associates.<sup>86</sup> For some months they kept up a tragi-comic "spectacle le plus galant et le plus magnifique."

In the meanwhile, in spite of Chanvalon's remonstrances, the ministry kept on sending men until as many as nine thousand unfortunates

<sup>85</sup> E. T. Daubigny, *Choiseul et la France d'outre mer après le traité de Paris* (Paris, 1892); Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, 92-101.

<sup>86</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française*, II, 365; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, 591-593.

were dumped on the sandy banks of the Kourou. Turgot was still, at the end of 1764, in France doing nothing but drawing a princely salary of one hundred thousand livres. Ordered to go out to Guiana and take charge, he arrived in December, 1765. But learning that an epidemic was raging on the Kourou, he halted in Cayenne, where he brought charges against Chanvalon and ordered him back to France. He then decided to abandon the enterprise, and returned to France with a sorry remnant of nine hundred followers in April, 1765.<sup>37</sup>

Chanvalon was condemned in 1767 to perpetual imprisonment and confiscation of his goods, but was released and indemnified later. Turgot himself was exiled. The unhappy enterprise had cost the lives of more than fourteen thousand persons and thirty million livres! Choiseul, undeterred by this ghastly failure, formed a new company, which spent 800,000 livres with no result save the introduction of cattle. A new enterprise was undertaken by Baron de Bessner, a former associate of Chanvalon, who fancied that he could plant a colony on John Locke's plan by using some of the 20,000 maroons from Surinam and thousands of Indians.<sup>38</sup>

After the failure of this last enterprise, the government, by an ordinance of May 1, 1768, opened the colony to foreign commerce. Cultivation of spices, sent in by Pierre Poivre, began in 1773. The period beginning in 1776 was marked by the wise administration of Malouet, who knew the country. A Company of Guiana (1777) was given the slave and gum trade of West Africa in return for populating Cayenne. Malouet made a study of the highly successful methods of his Dutch neighbors, and began to drain the coastal lands and the valleys of some of the rivers. Colonists who came under contract to repay the expenses of their installation in ten years' time were placed on their lands. The most intelligent recommendation Malouet made was that the system of granting huge tracts of land to persons unable financially to exploit them be changed to one of sales of reasonable dimension to colonists who were prepared to go forward with development, a plan which had brought results for the English neighbors. But the idea fell on deaf administrative ears, and no improvement was made. Unfortunately, Malouet fell ill and had to give up his enterprise and return to France in 1778. The company engaged merely in the West Africa trade.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *Précis historique de l'expédition du Kourou* (Paris, 1842), listed in Ternaux-Compans, *Notice historique*, bibliography, 189; Daubigny, *Choiseul et la France d'outre mer* . . . , 31-116.

<sup>38</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, 594-595.

<sup>39</sup> V. P. Malouet's account of Bessner's attempts and of his own experiences is given in his *Collection de mémoires et correspondances officielles* . . . (Paris,

Baron de Bessner, still enthusiastic, replaced Malouet, and set himself anew to the fantastic task of colonizing maroons from Dutch Guiana. It need hardly be said that the plan did not work; the old governor died within a year, unregretted by his superiors. Some exploration was carried on by the naturalist, Le Blond, who traveled through the country many years looking for quinine and making discoveries on the numerous rivers. The missionary work of the Jesuits fell into decay after their general expulsion; a few remained despite it, and some Portuguese members came in, but care of the natives really was disrupted.

After a century and a half of recurrent efforts, this colony had accumulated nothing but the evils of the administrative spirit of the times. The island of Cayenne, only eighteen leagues in circumference, was still in its interior an impassible swamp, with some thirty plantations around the shores.<sup>40</sup> On the mainland a few pioneers lived on solitary plantations, the distances between them preventing organization or mutual aid. They exported not more than five hundred thousand livres worth per year, and imported six hundred and sixty-nine thousand. The colony's debt was over two million livres, and its population stagnant. From that time Guiana has had the reputation of being uninhabitable and unexploitable. In 1788 a new Company of Senegal undertook to transport four hundred blacks to Cayenne each year, but did not have time for much success before the Revolution.

When that upheaval occurred, Guiana was a vegetating colony with three classes of society, the white masters, the freedmen, and the slaves. As in the Antilles, the grands blancs were planters, the petits blancs merchants, small proprietors, traders, and artisans. There was a good deal of excitement when the law of August 9, 1790, granted political rights without racial or other distinction to all inhabitants twenty-five years old or over. When in 1794 the Convention abolished slavery, the freedmen were unduly deprived of means of livelihood, while the planters lost their labor supply. This was restored by labor-requisitions permitted by the Convention government. In 1795 political exiles from the Revolution began to arrive; of three hundred sent, half died within a few months. The restoration of slavery under Napoleon was effected by the notorious Victor Hugues, governor in 1803; the added slave labor gave impulse to exports between 1802 and 1807. Too many quarrels enervated the colony, the Portuguese came more frequently than they could be repelled, to burn and pillage. In 1809 they

an X [1802], 5v.), I, 4-44; he was in charge of checking off the supplies and personnel of the Kourou expedition.

<sup>40</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 366-369; in 1788 the population included 1,307 whites, 480 freedmen, and 10,478 slaves; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, 595.

captured the colony, occupying it until forced in 1817<sup>41</sup> to comply with the terms of the treaties which concluded the Napoleonic period. During much of the course of these South American tragedies a similar series of errors was being enacted in Madagascar, one more tropical region, where colonization of the island was sought for its own value, with entry into the Oriental trade as an ultimate objective.

<sup>41</sup> Rougier, *Précis de législation et d'économie coloniale*, 45-46; see also his discussion of slavery and the resumption of possession by the Restoration.

## CHAPTER IX

### MADAGASCAR TO THE REVOLUTION

The plans of Richelieu were by no means confined to America; numerous other attempts were made to promote companies, several being for the trade in gum and slaves on the coast of Africa which resulted in the initiation of the French tradition of rights at Saint-Louis (1638) and in the vicinity of Dakar. At the same time the untiring imperialist directed his efforts toward establishing French interests in the South Atlantic and in the East Indies.

The last of his eight great companies<sup>1</sup> was founded in the final year of his life for the exploitation of Madagascar and its use as a way-station on trading voyages to India. This island, called Menuthias by Ptolemy, and known perhaps to Marco Polo as Pipis, lying two hundred and fifty miles from the coast of Africa, is nine hundred miles long and averages two hundred and fifty miles wide, being thus somewhat smaller than California, but larger than France. Its high central tableland and tropical coastal plains have served to condition its conquest by Europeans, as has also the diversity of its part Negro and part Polynesian population.<sup>2</sup>

Though the Portuguese Díaz in 1500, or men under Francisco de Almeida, in the fleet of Tristan da Cunha, in 1506, had contacts here, and an ephemeral colony was placed on the Franchère River, their voyages were for the most part within Mozambique Channel; it does

<sup>1</sup> They were: Compagnie de la Nacelle de Saint-Pierre-Fleur-de-lysée (1625); Compagnie du Morbihan (1626); Compagnie des Cent Associées (1627); Compagnie de l'Île Saint-Christophe (1627); Compagnie des Îles d'Amérique (1635); Compagnie du Cap Nord (1638); Nouvelle Compagnie de l'Île Saint-Christophe (1642); Compagnie de Madagascar ou des Indes Orientales (1642); Léon Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 78; cf. Pierre Bonnassieux, *Les grandes compagnies de commerce*, 254-258; Étienne de Flacourt, *Histoire et relation de la grande île de Madagascar*, II, 1642-1665, in Granddier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens . . .*, VII, 32-129. The *Mémoires* of the Congregation of the Mission, vol. IX, are the only source by which to check Flacourt. They are mostly concerned with religious affairs and human relations (II. Froidevaux, "Une enquête scientifique et économique sur Madagascar," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises*, II, Paris, 1914), 262.

<sup>2</sup> For a brief note on the cartography of the island, see K. Keller, *Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Other East African Islands* (London, 1910), 7-10; A. Granddier, *Histoire de la géographie* (Paris, 1885-1892), ranks first in this line.

not appear that any serious attempts at occupation were made on the island by the Portuguese.<sup>3</sup> There is some evidence that a Dominican friar met martyrdom by poison here in 1585; a Jesuit father (Portuguese) was killed about 1616.

The population of Madagascar is interestingly varied; it is distinctly unlike that of Africa. The chief group is called Hova, who are genuine Malays from Java or other Polynesian islands. They live on the east coast at isolated points, and in the central province. The district of Sakalava on the western side is peopled by negroid stocks from southeast Africa. Both the Negroes and the Hovas are therefore immigrants of an unknown period. The name Malagasy is applied usually to both races. The Hovas, said Grandidier, ". . . are of a suspicious temper . . . temperate, and persevering in their work. They have an innate feeling of reverence for their superiors, are very amenable to discipline and are absolutely devoted to their chiefs. Their patriotism is sincere."<sup>4</sup>

The Betsileo, who in 1900 numbered some 1,200,000, are also Malay, with much foreign blood. They are darker than the so-called Hovas, or Betsimisarakas, who subdued them. They are skilful husbandmen, but quarrelsome and superstitious.<sup>5</sup> The negroid Sakalava are handsome and virile, but have been called arrogant, cunning, violent, and thievish. They bore the Hova yoke with reluctance, hating the Malayan element. After about 1730 the Hovas gathered the leading tribes successively under their hegemony.

French tradition in the island goes back to the close of the sixteenth

<sup>3</sup> There had been four attempts by French companies prior to Richelieu's to make effective use of Madagascar. On November 13, 1601, the merchants of Saint-Malo, Laval, and Mitre hoped to start there an Oriental trade. Another company in 1604, led by sieur Roy, had no success. A third in 1616 was composed of Rouen and Paris shippers and capitalists. The fourth, in 1633, was formed by Dumé d'Aplemont. None of them paid; L. Pauliat, *Louis XIV et la compagnie des Indes Orientales de 1664*, 37-38, notes; G. Fagniez, "Le commerce . . . de la France sous Henri IV," in *Revue historique*, May-June, 1881, p. 16; Henri Froidevaux, "Les préludes de l'intervention française à Madagascar au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle," in *Revue des questions historiques*, n.s., tome xlii (1909), 436-479. No French voyage had preceded the Portuguese to this island; *ibid.*, 442; A. Grandidier and others, *Collection des ouvrages anciens*, VII, 1-23; R. M. Martin, "Madagascar," in the *Colonial Magazine*, V (May-August, 1841), 278-285. The Lazarists undertook evangelization in 1648, at which time the Jesuits ceased. When the Lazarists gave up in 1674 they had lost in their work sixteen preachers and ten brothers (P. Camille de la Vaissière, *Histoire de Madagascar, ses habitants et ses missionnaires* (Paris, 1884), I, 1-19).

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in K. Keller, *Madagascar, Mauritius and the Other East African Islands*, 64-65. For a comprehensive treatment of the ethnography of Madagascar see A. Grandidier, *Ethnographie de Madagascar* (Paris, 1908, 4v.).

<sup>5</sup> Keller, *op. cit.*, 59-89.

century, when Henry IV is said to have sent missionaries and caused a fort to be built on the southeast coast in the Anse Dauphine, but without enduring results. At that time the island itself was called Dauphine, the Portuguese name having been St. Laurent.<sup>6</sup> Several Dutch and English attempts at colonizing here met with the native resistance and the handicaps of an inhospitable climate.

The approach of France to the Orient by using Madagascar, beginning with Henry IV, exhibited a strange lack of *esprit de suite*, of taste for far-off operations among the mass of the nation, indifference of will and of capital, and fatal lack of confidence in her maritime destiny. In 1601 some merchants of Saint-Malo who sailed with Spilbergen made a voyage to the East Indies, but their ships and cargo, worth two million livres, were lost on the return voyage in 1602. From 1620 to 1641 the island was not only used by English pirates, but was also visited by certain Frenchmen, among them the Dieppois Augustin Beaulieu and Alfonse Goubert. Until 1642, however, the French nation had no regular interests in the East, save those of casual but numerous Norman pirates in the Indian Ocean.<sup>7</sup>

But piracy was not a Norman monopoly, nor always without the support of kings. A notable instance of these years involved the unstable Charles I of England and his failure to support his own East India Company. In 1635 he gave a license to Sir William Courteen, well known in Guiana history, and others to trade within the company's monopoly in the East, especially at stations just opened to the English by the Portuguese. Courteen and his followers, legally mere pirates, plied their trade with some six ships from the Red Sea to Canton. After Sir William's death (1637) his son, Squire William, attempted to establish a colony of one hundred and forty people in Madagascar at Tent Rock on the south side of Saint-Augustine Bay, and held it for over a year though beset by heart-breaking miseries. At the end twenty-three survivors deserted the post, less than half of them making their way back to England. The piratical company persevered in the India trade until 1647.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The temperature on the east coast runs as high as 94° F.; the rainfall is as much as 158 inches. The plateau and west coasts have dry seasons, with much greater ranges of temperature and precipitation. January and February experience cyclones. The heat and moisture favor occurrence of fevers and dysentery. Keller, *op. cit.*, 23-25.

<sup>7</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française*, I, 327-328. This was one of the experiences which argued for the formation of the chartered company for the East Indies; Henry Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes, 1604-1875*, 54-57; F. C. Wieder and others, *De reis van Joris van Spilbergen naar Ceylon. . . .* (Linschoten Vereeniging, XXXVIII, The Hague, 1933) Introd., and p. 19.

<sup>8</sup> Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, I, 228-229; A. Grandidier and others, *Collection des ouvrages anciens concernant Madagascar*, vol. V,

In 1638 François Cauche of freebooting flair made a landing in the Mascareignes, only to find that the Dutch had anticipated him. He therefore passed over to the small island of Saint-Luce, off shore from Madagascar where, well received by the chief Dian Ramaka, who spoke Portuguese, he founded Saint-Pierre and engaged in selling woods and leather to the East India Company.<sup>9</sup> When the "new company," with its twenty-four stockholders, was formed by Richelieu in April, 1642,<sup>10</sup> Cauche turned his post over with reluctance to its governor, sieur Rigault, who had previously sailed in those waters, and had now received a ten-year concession, as a new "Compagnie d'Orient," to trade in Madagascar and the nearby islands.<sup>11</sup> Rigault's first vessel was sent out under Jacques Pronis of La Rochelle, a very turbulent and brutal Huguenot, leading forty settlers. Pronis took possession of the Rodrigues Islands in the Mascareignes, but did not occupy them; he repeated the ceremony on Bourbon, and then went on to Madagascar, where he took possession of Antongil Bay and Sainte-Marie. In September he was at Saint-Luce, where he built Fort Saint-Pierre. Another ship arrived in 1643, bringing sixty new men, but sickness made sad havoc, "tropical fevers" killing one-third of the people. For this reason, Pronis moved south to a more healthful peninsula, where Fort Dauphin was built.<sup>12</sup> It was there that Cauche

"Ouvrages ou extraits anglais," etc., 437 ff.; see also III, 184 ff., and V. T. Harlow, ed., *Colonising Expeditions to the West Indies and Guiana*, Introd., xxix and note; C. de la Vaissière, *Histoire de Madagascar*, I, 58, for further interesting details.

<sup>9</sup> Cauche was then with Alonse Gaubert, captain of the *Saint-Alexis* pirate ship. His movements before reaching Madagascar were directed against shipping in the Red Sea, but are not well verified, his own narrative being considered "d'une imagination toute marseillaise" to give respectability to irregular anti-Spanish enterprises (M. Besson, *La tradition coloniale française*, 58-61).

<sup>10</sup> Flacourt, *Histoire et relation* . . . , in Grandidier. The archives of this company do not exist; Froidevaux, in *Revue de l'histoire des colonies* . . . , II (1914), 261, "Une enquête scientifique et économique sur Madagascar au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle"; Rigault's concession was confirmed by Louis XIV after the death of Louis XIII (Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*, 73); Joseph du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire générale et particulière des finances* . . . [running title: *Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, and as such hereafter cited] (Paris, 1738), 16-20.

<sup>11</sup> Cauche left Madagascar for France January 17, 1644. His *Relation du voyage* . . . is in Grandidier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens* . . . , VII, 24-191; see also M. I. Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon et de la colonisation française à Madagascar* (Paris, 1888), 8, 41-45. Rigault's letters patent and other documents are printed in A. Grandidier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens* . . . , VII, 192-205.

<sup>12</sup> U. Souchu de Rennefort, *Histoire des Indes Orientales* (Paris, 1688), 7, emphasizes the purpose of the French administration to use Madagascar as the port of refreshment and *entrepôt* for the India trade. Froidevaux, *op. cit.*, 264; See also Rennefort, 46-47.

had aided a Danish ship in distress returning from "Cathay," and had learned of the better site.

Shortly it became possible to send home two cargoes of goods, worth nearly two hundred and fifty thousand livres each. The stockholders received six thousand livres. The leader imagined his trade would be more brisk with the natives if he would marry a niece of one of the chiefs, but the experiment was disappointing. Many colonists imitated his example. They resented, however, being compelled by Pronis to go into the prosaic labor of agriculture, and abused the Malagasy terribly; the natives struck back when Pronis kidnapped over seventy of them to sell as slaves to the Dutch in Mauritius (Île de France). The lieutenant-governor, Jean Fouquembourg, who had returned to the homeland to keep the company in good humor, had been the mainstay of the administration, but he was murdered by his traveling companion in France, all his papers were lost, and there was no one to enthuse stockholders with bright hopes. The colony at Fort Dauphin was disrupted by needless bickerings between the Catholics and Huguenots, while the character of Pronis abetted rancors rather than harmony. One of his diversions was to preach a loud sermon within hearing of celebrants of the mass. His unbalanced attempts at reform led his followers to put him in irons until, a new shipload of forty men coming, he was released and reinstated. He thereupon shipped off his rebel constituents to Grand Mascareigne (Île de Bourbon) where they perforce became the first pioneers.<sup>13</sup> Again quarreling with his followers, he was deserted by many, only twenty-nine staying with him.<sup>14</sup>

To put an end to bickering, the company in 1648 sent out eighty colonists with a stockholder, Étienne de Flacourt, to replace Pronis. The prudent Flacourt kept Pronis with him two years, but then sent him home to France to give an account of his administration. Flacourt sent out several exploring expeditions, and tried to initiate missionary work, but this was time and again made hopeless by disputes with the natives, who were "sans ambition et sans luxe." By striving for harmony among the engagés, he succeeded in improving the nerves of all the camp. At first, he used a rigorous policy toward the Malagasy, engaging in a campaign in which he destroyed fifty villages; but he finally learned that force was less effective than kindlier methods; by

<sup>13</sup> Many conjectures have been hazarded concerning the date of the discovery of the Île de Bourbon and of the other islands in the Mascareignes group. M. I. Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon et de la colonisation française à Madagascar*, studied the problem with critical interest, fixing the date (*cf.* pp. 1-19) at 1528, and the discoverer as Pedro de Mascarenhas.

<sup>14</sup> Guët, *op. cit.*, 48-49, has a kindlier recognition of the ability of Pronis, pointing to his efficiency. But *cf. idem*, 52-53, concerning his marriage and imprisonment.

changing his tactics he was able to make treaties with over three hundred chiefs.<sup>16</sup> The company sent him no ships until 1654, which prevented export of island products; naturally the directors lost interest, as the long voyages cost too much, and the neglected colonists were left in very hard straits.

Returning to France, he aroused the enthusiasm of a great corsair, Charles-Armand de La Porte, Duc de la Meilleraye,<sup>16</sup> in the Madagascar project; the somnolent company was reorganized and allowed fifteen years more of monopoly. In 1655 Pronis was again sent out, Flacourt returning to France after six years of active effort. Misfortunes followed swiftly; two fires in February, 1655, destroyed Fort Dauphin. Pronis died on the following May 23, being succeeded by several mediocre governors.<sup>17</sup> In 1660 Meilleraye sent Flacourt again to the island with two hundred colonists to develop two good ports for the East India trade. The ship was attacked by Barbary corsairs off the coast of Portugal near Lisbon, the leader was killed and the colonists enslaved. One more effort in 1660 met with shipwreck at the Cape of Good Hope. The duke himself died in 1664. This series of disasters left Madagascar in a state of abandonment, and Louis XIV bought back the company's privileges, incorporating it with Colbert's great East India Company.<sup>18</sup> Twenty years of planning and labor to make Madagascar a way-station colony for the India trade had come to naught.<sup>19</sup>

While it may be said that Richelieu's great companies had failed, one after another, it must be remembered that he brought the direct interest of the state to bear on overseas endeavor; he sketched a great

<sup>16</sup> Flacourt's *Histoire de la grande île Madagascar* (Grandidier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens*, VIII, 1-306) contains a report on his scientific and economic survey of the island—the first made. His actions as governor are touched upon in Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon* . . . , 56-61. A complete account of De Flacourt's action in Madagascar is given in Arthur Malotet's *Étienne de Flacourt; ou, Les origines de la colonisation française* (Paris, 1898).

<sup>16</sup> As mareschal of Bretagne, this eminent corsair had equipped a number of ships to make war on Spanish and English commerce (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, V, 237). He was entangled in the hazy treacheries of the *surintendant* Fouquet, a fact which did not help Madagascar.

<sup>17</sup> H. Froidevaux, "Les premiers successeurs de Flacourt à Madagascar (Février, 1655-Janvier, 1656)," *Revue de l'histoire des colonies* . . . (Paris, 1919), 6-8, for details of fire. Froidevaux gives a sympathetic interpretation of the hundred days of Pronis' second administration, *ibid.*, 11-12.

<sup>18</sup> H. H. Johnston, *History of the Colonization of Africa* . . . (Cambridge, 1913), 261-276; Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 140-144; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, V, 239-240; Du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, 17-22.

<sup>19</sup> Guyon, *A New History of the East Indies* . . . , II, 2-7; cf. Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon*, 63-65.

colonial empire in rough outline, and in two great fields, the West Indies and in Canada, it was solidly founded. His accomplishments, his tradition, give him a great place in French colonial history. Jules Harmand happily said of him:

The only French statesman under the Old Régime who seems to have understood the political importance of colonies was Richelieu. He grasped perfectly the connection between the colonies and the navy, the mutual aid which they offer each other, and the value of sea power. But Richelieu's imperialism was in advance of his times. His available means were not adequate for his genius. Furthermore, the relationship of France to Europe, the external and continental struggles in which the great minister found himself engaged, did not permit him to fix his designs on the basis he would have chosen. Public opinion, which was too narrow in his party in spite of his efforts to direct it, was too ignorant and selfish to follow him and help him.<sup>20</sup>

During 1663 the affairs of the Company of the Orient had become hopeless. The governor who succeeded Flacourt, Champmargou, indiscreetly engaged in a bitter quarrel with his chief aid, Lacase; to do missionary work he brought out a Lazarist, the fanatical Father Étienne, who, by seizing and burning amulets and idols, exasperated the natives into poisoning him, while Champmargou barely escaped the same fate through help from his despised Lacase.<sup>21</sup>

Louis XIV and Colbert had been much exercised over the fact that France had been buying one-third of the merchandise brought from the Orient by the Dutch, thus paying a handsome tribute to rival merchants. Even the Danes had a good Oriental trade. François Charpentier, the famed Academician, "a tenacious and intelligent man, a writer of good sense," in his pamphlet "Addressé à tous les Français," glorified the virtues and advantages of Madagascar and pointed out that the French ought to use that island, a "true earthly paradise, where people live one hundred to one hundred and twenty years," to control the Oriental trade, in the way the Dutch were using Java. The brochure was ably directed to the problem of raising money. The king, the queen, and the princes of the blood all subscribed. The fourth East India Company, hinting broadly at profits up to 40 per cent, yearned for purchasers of stock wherewith to establish a large settlement on this "Gallia Orientalis," as its principal base for Far Eastern operations.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Jules Harmand, *Domination et colonisation*, 77, quoted by Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 46.

<sup>21</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 48-54; Rennefort, *op. cit.*, 53-56, 67-70.

<sup>22</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française*, I, 327-335; Gabriel Gravier, *Madagascar* (Paris, 1904), 310-315. For a history of the East India Company of

The new establishment was to be governed by a council of six residing at Fort Dauphin. Laborers were offered special inducements to go as colonists. The directors were instructed to attempt no force, but gentle methods in dealing with the natives, of whom there was to be no enslavement. Intermarriage was advocated as a means of developing here a mixed race, French in loyalty but attached to the soil. This merely meant that Colbert was moved by intelligent self-interest, not humanitarian principles.<sup>23</sup> In 1665 four ships sailed from Brest bearing the sieur de Beausse as governor with nearly five hundred new colonists, mostly artisans. They were to be set down at four points: Fort Dauphin was made the seat of government, the climate there being judged suitable for cultivation of European crops; one settlement was to be in the interior to work for happy relations with the Malagasy. Another, at Saint-Augustin Bay, was to begin trade with the African coast; the fourth was to be at fertile Tamatave. These five hundred pioneers were to prepare the way for a later army of colonists. De Beausse, sixty-seven years old and decrepit, was a failure as governor, but fortunately died in December.<sup>24</sup>

His successor, Montauban, accomplished almost nothing. Religious differences and quarrels between the "marchands" and the "gentil-hommes," beginning on the ship on which he went out, continued to add to many natural handicaps.<sup>25</sup> Montauban was a second aged and infirm man, likewise incompetent, who died in 1666. Colbert's unhappy selections of leaders in the East are little short of mysterious in contrast with his distinguished choices for Canada. The colony had to fall back upon Champmargou, and thereby managed to survive through the friendly help of native women attached to the settlers; in 1666 it even sent home a shipload of leather and rare woods.

The colonization of Madagascar having been given precedence by Louis XIV over the opening of the India trade, it was next decided to appoint not a mere new director, but a viceroy.<sup>26</sup> For this office François

1664, see Jules Sottas, *Histoire de la compagnie royale des Indes Orientales* . . . (Paris, 1905).

<sup>23</sup> P. Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales et François Martin, 1664-1710* (Paris, 1908), 1-44; Du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, 56.

<sup>24</sup> Pauliat, *Louis XIV et la compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 133-152; Colbert's instructions to the expeditionaries show some advance in the art of tropical colonization; they were to avoid too much fresh fruit and raw milk (*qui est mortel*) and venereal disease; they were to beware of unauthorized expeditions; Pauliat, *op. cit.*, 149.

<sup>25</sup> Grandidier, *Madagascar*, 341, 349, 350 ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 360-369; Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*, 139-140; Pierre Clément, *Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert* (Paris, 1861-1873, 7 v.), III, pt. 2, 437.

de Lapis, marquis de Montdevergue, was sent out in March, 1666, the supreme effort beginning with ten vessels bearing seventeen hundred colonists. With them went as directors-general of commerce De Faye, a Frenchman, and François Caron, a Dutchman, who were to initiate the India trade.<sup>27</sup> The fleet sailed on March 14, 1666, after giving Colbert intense anxiety lest it be captured; Montdevergue was already quarreling with his directors.

A preliminary part of the ill-fated plan included a settlement on the tip of South Africa as a *port de relâche*; following Colbert's instructions, Montdevergue's outward bound fleet spent several months in the Bay of Saldanha, not far from Table Bay, which was then Dutch. The spot had been recommended in a report by an Englishman, Thomas Herbert, in 1634; his good opinion, translated into French, was used (and added to that made by Étienne de Flacourt in 1658) by certain officers of Montdevergue's fleet as a basis for the reconnaissance. According to orders, they set up a pillar on the shore to indicate possession, but shortly after the departure of the fleet the pillar was knocked down. The Dutch, being remonstrated with for the act, impishly averred that they had seen a lion come out of the forest and commit the deed. The Dutch coat of arms contained a lion.

St. Helena Bay was also examined at this time. But no way-station could be placed on the South African shore at this period (1666-1670) because the Dutch war became a continental one, and Louvois, the great war minister, stopped short all Colbert's new projects. De la Haye had even advised taking Table Bay by force.<sup>28</sup>

Making toward the Canaries for repairs, Montdevergue's fleet was driven onto the coast of Brazil, where it was laid up three months, arriving at Fort Dauphin in March, 1667, whereas the journey need not have taken more than four months in all. The deplorable state of the ships and passengers after this delay only added disaster, for in the interval the second and third instalments of company stock subscriptions had failed in France, and a ship sent home from the island with goods had been captured by the English.

Meantime the colony, closely besieged by the natives, had almost reached the end of its supplies, while the seventeen hundred on Montdevergue's ships were equally destitute. In order to help find provisions, Caron and De Faye had to postpone their voyage to India.

<sup>27</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 40-47, 54-62; Rennefort, *op. cit.*, 189-192; Sottas, *op. cit.*, 24-29.

<sup>28</sup> H. Froidevaux, "Reconnaissances et projets d'établissement français sur la côte occidentale de l'Afrique australe sous le règne de Louis XIV," (reprint from *Revue Coloniale*, Paris, 1899), 3-27. Montdevergue's leisurely voyage is described in Rennefort, *op. cit.*, 196-222. Herbert's description and map of Madagascar are in A. and G. Grandidier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens* . . . , II, 379-404.

Montdevergue's grand effort was thus barren at the first moment, but he worked heroically to retrieve the situation. Lacase began to win the natives back by espousing one side in a tribal war; beef animals and rice were obtained,<sup>29</sup> the fort was enlarged, its environs put under tillage, and a friendly native policy was pursued. By 1669 the great design was on the point of realization, and lands were distributed to the colonists.<sup>30</sup>

Caron had finally got off for India, but upon sailing he wrote to the company advising against colonizing Madagascar and urging the trading feature as more profitable. Montdevergue also wrote in discouragement concerning his project, and unfortunately his report leaked out to the public, the source of financial support. Face to face with ruin, the king was forced to give up the unpopular enterprise, salving his chagrin by writing the viceroy a biting reprimand, which was somewhat softened by the more adroit Colbert.<sup>31</sup> Another letter, addressed to De Faye, left to his discretion or that of the president of the council the decision as to whether Montdevergue should be recalled. The latter tried to return to France to meet his critics, but was prevented by a storm.

Meantime in Paris, the decision had been taken to accept Caron's advice to give up colonizing the island, and to change from Fort Dauphin to the Île de Bourbon for a port of call for the India trade; the king, urged by its directors, bought back the Madagascar scheme and assets from the company for a million livres. A fleet of six vessels under Admiral Blanquet de la Haye was then sent out in 1670 to oppose the Dutch in the India trade. Arriving at Fort Dauphin in November,<sup>32</sup> the commander ignored the fact that Montdevergue had now set his venture upon the road to success, and proceeded, as indeed he must, with proclaiming the change to a royal colony. Angered at the pointed absence of one of the native chiefs from the ceremony, La Haye undertook to chastise the latter, provoking a general native rebellion which cost much effort to subdue. Knowing

<sup>29</sup> According to Payne, *History of European Colonies*, 77, Carolina rice was introduced from Madagascar.

<sup>30</sup> Rennefort, *op. cit.*, is a prime source for Montdevergue's work in Madagascar, and Caron's in India. The rent for lands granted in fief had been set at six sols per arpent, or six hens and six cocks for one hundred arpents. For lands granted *en roture*, nine sols per arpent, one hen for ten arpents; the *lods et ventes* to be paid according to the custom of Paris (Du Fresne de Francheville, 39).

<sup>31</sup> The letters of each to Montdevergue are in Pauliat, *Madagascar sous Louis XIV*, 272-288.

<sup>32</sup> Pauliat, *Madagascar sous Louis XIV*, 305-324; this author believed that this fleet was responsible for bringing on the Dutch war of 1672. An account of the De la Haye expedition is given by Sottas, *op. cit.*, 43-52.

that Montdevergue was going to France, La Haye sent a complaint against him which caused his arrest and detention; he died in France in 1672 without having reached the king's ear. The victim of unhappy circumstances, his memory is respected in France as the only successful colonizer of Madagascar during the seventeenth century.<sup>33</sup>

The brutal La Haye soon had both natives and colonists by the ears. When many of the French refused to follow him to the Île de Bourbon, where there were already some good plantations, he deserted them, leaving only forty soldiers for their defense, and sailed away for Surat, leaving Beauregard, first governor of Bourbon, in charge of both islands. On Christmas night of 1672, the Malagasy around Fort Dauphin rose and avenged long mistreatment by massacre of the holiday worshipers in the little improvised church. This rising was prompted by jealousy of the Malagasy women who were set aside when a few French *jeunes filles* were brought in to marry settlers. The indecisive commander was dismayed by a more devastating massacre in 1674<sup>34</sup> in which nearly six hundred remaining households were destroyed; deciding to abandon the settlement, he took away sixty-three survivors, pitiful residue of no less than four thousand colonists who had arrived since 1642. The dismal ending was due, first, to failure to concentrate the settlers at a single point, second to dissensions and bad native policy, third to impatience. In September the last two Lazarist missionaries sailed away, ending the first Catholic mission; in the course of twenty-five years they had lost twenty-seven missionaries by death, while four seculars had also perished.<sup>35</sup>

When Madagascar was attached to the crown domain, along with all the colonies of "peuplement" in 1674, the only French holding in the Indian Ocean was then the Île de Bourbon. The Île Maurice, which had been deserted by the Dutch, was occupied and named Île de France in 1721. Although not a Frenchman was left in Madagascar, the royal government often reasserted its right to that "Grand Île," e.g., in 1686, 1719, 1720, and 1725,<sup>36</sup> but allowed it, after the first year named, to become the haunt of pirates; a vague tradition persists of their stronghold "Libertitia," but there was no genuine French

<sup>33</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, says he deserves to rank with Dupleix; see also Pauliat, *op. cit.*, 325-336.

<sup>34</sup> Pauliat, *op. cit.*, 337-345; Weber, *op. cit.*, 141-143, 148-149.

<sup>35</sup> Bonnassieux, *Les grandes compagnies du commerce*, 267-268; C. de la Vaisière, *Madagascar*, I, 19.

<sup>36</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 145-146; for accounts of English and other pirates who frequented Madagascar between the Peace of Ryswick and 1763 see Charles Pridham, *An Historical, Political, and Statistical Account of Mauritius* . . . (London, 1849), App. C, 332-342.

enterprise in the island for nearly seventy-five years. So widespread were the pirate settlements during this period that their presence modified the physical appearance of the population. The Mascareignes and Seychelles, near Madagascar, though of little importance, had also been occupied successively, especially Île de Bourbon in the Mascareignes, by Pronis, Flacourt, and La Haye.

Following the pirate days Madagascar was the objective of some most grotesque episodes. When about 1723 piracy had lost its charms, one Morgan—not the famous reformed pirate-governor of Jamaica—known as the “King of Madagascar,” induced no less a personage than the consort of the queen of Sweden to send out secretly three frigates to bring him home and find him a place to dwell in respectability and security. He was believed to be bringing home a huge quantity of gold for the royal treasury. In the same year Peter the Great of Russia also bit on Morgan’s bait, agreeing to give him a place for settlement in northern Russia. Both expeditions came to grief and the designing pirate was left to his fate.<sup>37</sup>

Although Madagascar was thus abandoned by Louis XIV after the disaster of 1674, none of his other overseas possessions retained for him so much interest. Pontchartrain the minister invited De Parat, governor of Bourbon, to give advice concerning a new attempt to settle the large island. While that official believed that such an effort might succeed, he suggested that it would be so expensive that the Île de France would prove a safer enterprise. But nothing was done; the king soon died, and the Regency had no interest; the Grand Île was forgotten for half a century. It had, however, some trade with the Île de France in food, woods, and slaves. In 1736 and again in 1746 vain attempts were made by the Lazarists to reopen missions. In 1750 the East India Company undertook to establish a naval station through the efforts of a French corporal, Le Bigorne, an interesting soldier of fortune who had married Queen Beti, and thus became head chief of the natives of the eastern coast. The company set up a comptoir on the main island, and obtained title to the small adjacent Sainte-Marie, where there was a fine natural haven.<sup>38</sup> An officer on the Île de France, Louis Laurent de Fédérbe, Comte de Maudave, obtained from the Duc de Praslin, the minister, an appointment in 1768 as “commander for the king in the Île de Madagascar.” Maudave had been a disillusioned

<sup>37</sup> Grandidier, *et al.*, *Collection des ouvrages anciens . . .*, V, 146–150. Both episodes are well authenticated. Rennefort, 390–402, recounts in detail the causes of the Madagascar fiasco, and proposes remedies.

<sup>38</sup> Jean Darcy, *Cent années de rivalité coloniale; L'affaire de Madagascar* (Paris, 1908), 9; La Vaissière, *Madagascar*, I, 21.

follower of Lally in India. His idea was to eschew the slave trade entirely, encourage marriage between whites and blacks, avoid conquest, foment agriculture—in short, indulge in a Utopian scheme of “pacific penetration.”<sup>39</sup>

Maudave’s expedition of fifty men reached Madagascar in September, 1768, and began anew in old Fort Dauphin, built a hundred years before and still undestroyed. In this happy location, surrounded by a numerous population and all the needed resources, the commander established friendly relations with the Atanosse chiefs, enemies of the Hovas, and sent an expedition to explore the coast toward the north. It made reports on all the desirable locations for expansion, six or more of which were to be occupied by posts as far as Foulepointe.<sup>40</sup> From these it was expected to work into the interior. So sure was Maudave of success that he brought his family out, to show confidence in his enterprise and faith that they would stand the strange climate. The governor of the Île de France was friendly; but soon a new governor, Desroches, was aroused to jealousy by the prospective development of Fort Dauphin. Merchants and colonists joined with him to defeat Maudave’s competition by a campaign of misrepresentation with the Duc de Praslin; at the same time they took all possible means to isolate Maudave’s colony.

Thus balked, the unhappy entrepreneur soon realized that something had gone wrong, as no colonists, materials, or money reached him, and he determined to go to Paris to ask favorable action or be allowed to retire. In October, 1770, he was ordered to give up the undertaking. Returning to France again the following year, he found Praslin superseded by De Boynes, who showed signs of readiness for a new venture. But there was now at court the picturesque figure “Count” Mauric August Benyowski, a Hungarian adventurer who had been deported to Kamchatka for conspiring to bring about Polish liberty. There he had been clever enough, he averred, to marry the daughter of the commander of the post in which he was detained, but probably this was one of his inventions; he did, however, seize a vessel and cruise along the shores of Asia and Africa to France, where he arrived in August, 1772. One of his enthusiasms was to return to Formosa and plant the French power there.<sup>41</sup> De Boynes diverted his interest to

<sup>39</sup> H. Pouget de St. André, *La colonisation de Madagascar sous Louis XV, d'après la correspondance inédite du comte de Maudave* (Paris, 1886), 7, 14–27.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* (Maudave’s letters), 32–33, 39, 44, 89.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 168–169, 187. Benyowski has given a colorful if not veritable account of his own career in his *Memoirs and Travels*, appearing in various editions; that by S. Pasfield Oliver (London, 1904), exposes many discrepancies in the *Memoirs*, which ended with 1776.

Madagascar, Maudave vainly protesting.<sup>42</sup> The adroit schemer was supplied with money and three hundred men, and promised annual additions of one hundred and twenty colonists, but to Benyowski's chagrin the venture was placed under the direction of the Île de France for victualing. He reached Port Louis (Île de France) in September, 1773, finding the intendant, the governor, and the planters all opposed to his design; but he was too clever for them, and slipped away with a small detachment which he settled at Antongil Bay in February, 1774.

With no aid from the neighboring island, such work of conquest was carried on as might be; in November, 1776, the adventurer set off for Versailles, where he offered the king of France the suzerainty of his entire island, he to be protected ruler. He represented that he had erected a post, Louisbourg, at Antongil Bay; he had built a road, drained a swamp, made treaties with nearby chiefs, beaten the warlike Sakalavas, and finally had been made "King above other kings" of the whole island. Unhappily, instead of making headway with his roseate prospect, he was accused of graft; a commission of two, Bellecombe and Chevreau, was sent out to inspect the much-boasted establishment, finding that it had been grossly overestimated and was in bad straits.<sup>43</sup> The ministry of marine had so far recognized his design as to request the Jesuits in 1775 to resume their missions.

Discredited, the count attempted to interest some English, then some Austrian capital, and finally succeeded in getting a ship and supplies from Baltimore, perhaps through the interest of Benjamin Franklin, to whom he is said to have offered his kingdom, and returned to his former activities in the early part of 1785. Possibly he was trying at this time to find an American slave market. The authorities of the Île de France looked upon him as a public enemy. When he needed supplies he tried to obtain them by force from some French merchants, whereupon sixty soldiers from the Île de France attacked him, the skirmish ending in the bold charlatan's death on May 23, 1786.<sup>44</sup> A letter addressed to Vergennes calling for help was found on

<sup>42</sup> Maudave's next venture was to head an expedition of native troops in India for the purpose of driving out the English. His fortunes waned, however, and he died in disappointment at Mazulipatam in 1778 (Pouget de St. André, *op. cit.*, 8-9).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 187-202; De la Vaissière, *Histoire de Madagascar*, I, 21-22.

<sup>44</sup> Prosper Cultru, *Un empereur de Madagascar au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Benyowski* (Paris, 1906), 4-7; M. A. Benyowski, *Voyages et mémoires* (Paris, 1791, 2v.), *passim*. Cultru supports his survey of the memoirs by documentation from the Archives Coloniales. The adventurer's own story contains more fiction than fact. Rev. Wm. Ellis, *Three Visits to Madagascar* [1853-56] (London, 1858), 184-185, after seeing some of Benyowski's documents, praised his treatment of the natives as more enlightened than that of most Europeans. See also Keller, *Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Other East African Islands*, 104-106.

his body as it lay pierced with French bullets in his fort at Am-badiatafa.

Thus fell the inglorious curtain on French endeavor in Madagascar under the Old Régime; Maudave the competent had been swept aside for Benyowski the mere adventurer, of whom nothing was known except that he had no experience as a colonizer. He had wasted two million livres while funds were denied to Maudave; it would have been comic had it not been tragic in its revelation of royal incompetence.<sup>45</sup>

Not even missionary enterprise could survive the shock of the years of the Revolution; there were no preachers in the island after 1793 until 1832. Nevertheless, Maudave and Benyowski had revived some degree of interest, and a trickling stream of immigrants from the Mascareignes settled on the east shore. In 1795 Lescallier, commissary of the Convention in the Indian Ocean, and again Bory Saint-Vincent, sent thither by Napoleon, were of the opinion that Madagascar might well serve to compensate for the loss of Saint-Domingue.<sup>46</sup> During the Napoleonic wars the Hovas began to consolidate their ascendancy over neighboring tribes, the conquest being effected by the father of Radama I, who was in 1815 the outstanding chief in the island. In the interval the English claim to the island and influence over the Hovas was being cemented.

<sup>45</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 410-411. The French enterprise in Madagascar is briefly surveyed in V. A. Barbié du Bocage, *Madagascar, possession française depuis 1642* (Paris, 1859), 179-216, and 217-278. See also J. B. Piolet, *Douze leçons à la Sorbonne sur Madagascar* (Paris, 1898), 9-23. A history of Madagascar from a Jesuit's standpoint is De la Vaissière's *Histoire de Madagascar, ses habitants et ses missionnaires*.

<sup>46</sup> R. M. Martin, in the *Colonial Magazine*, V (May-August, 1841), 282, quoting Bory de Saint-Vincent in part. The article is an argument for the British occupation of the island.

## CHAPTER X

## MAZARIN AND COLBERT

From Richelieu's death in 1642 to his own in 1661 Mazarin ruled France. The protégé of the former, and his imitator, he might have carried forward an aggressive colonialism, had not internal and European problems under the Regency of Anne of Austria threatened the life of the regency and the unity of France.<sup>1</sup> Then the Fronde, the final attempt before the Revolution to destroy absolutism, occupied Mazarin during 1648-1653. There had been, too, the participation in the Thirty Years' War begun by Richelieu; the Peace of Westphalia, closing this struggle, won for France the coveted Alsace except Strassburg, and confirmed French possession of the bishoprics and cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. From Spain, Mazarin was able, in the Peace of the Pyrenees, November 7, 1659, to wrest Roussillon on the south and Artois on the north, while Lorraine became a French protectorate; María Teresa, eldest daughter of Philip IV of Spain, was to marry Louis XIV and renounce all claim to the Spanish succession. Thus before Mazarin's death Louis XIV possessed a continental realm greater than any of his forerunners.<sup>2</sup> The national rivalry for added territory, which could no longer be gratified in Europe, was to spread across soon to newer lands.

From the early 1660's the European powers settled down to the development of definite colonial policies and commercial aims. England, during the revolution against the House of Stuart<sup>3</sup> and the establishment of the Commonwealth, had been making advance strides in her long contest with Holland. The great Protector began his fight on the

<sup>1</sup> Louis XIV began his reign (1643-1715) at five years of age. Mazarin had no time for supporting adventurers; there were no means for developing the merchant marine, and as for naval forces, these were well-nigh non-existent. Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 18.

<sup>2</sup> D. J. Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (New York, 1905-1914, 3v.), III, 2. As far as means for developing the merchant masters of navigation. New Guyenne or Acadia became Nova Scotia under the English; the Iroquois threatened to destroy Quebec; a colony in the Bahamas dropped out of sight; the West Indies were sold to the Knights of Malta; Madagascar went to ruin (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, V, 226-227).

<sup>3</sup> James I, 1603-1625; Charles I, 1625-1649.

Dutch commercial ascendancy by his Navigation Act of 1651;<sup>4</sup> this he followed by war in 1652-1654, inconclusive but crippling to the Dutch, who were to suffer two more naval wars<sup>5</sup> before yielding the premier commercial rank. Cromwell, whose general policy had been in accord with that of Mazarin, chose not to harm French ambition in 1655 when he took Jamaica instead of seizing the French islands; which he coveted for the Mexican trade; for the cession of Dunkirk by France he aided the latter to impose the Peace of the Pyrenees.<sup>6</sup> When Charles II was restored in 1660, his dowry upon marrying the Infanta of Portugal gave him Tangier and Bombay, two new commercial keys, to which he shortly added a post on the Gambia for the West African trade.<sup>7</sup> The disadvantage to France of these acquisitions was overlooked, and a decade later came the famous Treaty of Dover for combined attack on the Dutch.

Meantime, the colonial question was not entirely neglected. In 1653 Nicholas Fouquet, an ardent colonial, enemy of Dutch commercial ascendancy, and apparently loyal, though astonishingly corrupt during the Fronde, was made superintendent of finance. While he rarely neglected rewarding his own services, he did bring about a semblance of order in fiscal affairs, in France as well as in the American colonies. Nepotism and favoritism, combined with presumption and theft of public money, brought about his arrest and trial. But his activities had focused attention upon colonial affairs, while his irregularities enabled Jean Baptiste Colbert to begin a career, for it was the latter who discovered and denounced Fouquet's malversations and prosecuted him, not without solicitude for his own future. Fouquet's high crime was a deep-laid plan, with many associates and resources, to revolt against the crown in a new Fronde.<sup>8</sup> After a vindictive trial he was condemned to perpetual confinement, and Colbert took his place as superintendent of finance.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>4</sup> This act was in imitation of the French Act of 1617 (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, IV, 427-428).

<sup>5</sup> 1672-1678; 1689-1697.

<sup>6</sup> Saintbyant, *La colonisation française*, I, 53. For additional materials on this chapter see also J. H. Bridges, *France under Richelieu and Colbert* (Edinburgh, 1866); G. H. Sanderson, *Industrial Policy of Colbert* (Berkeley, 1924); J. A. Williamson, *Europe Overseas* (London, 1925), 54-57. A. Arnauné, *Le commerce extérieur et les tarifs de douane* (Paris, 1911), 1-19.

<sup>7</sup> P. de Ségur-Dupeyron, *Histoire des négociations commerciales et maritimes* . . . (Paris, 1863-1873, 3v.), I, 5-6.

<sup>8</sup> He was to have been, in 1660, the recipient of a newly erected viceroyalty of all French possessions in America, for which he had paid 30,000 écus (La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, V, 311-324); Robert Challes, *Un colonial au temps de Colbert, Mémoires* (Paris, 1931), 50-61, 69-95, 111-135.

<sup>9</sup> Albert Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 21-22; for a brief survey of Colbert see A. J. Grant, "The Government of Louis XIV, 1661-1715," in *Cambridge Mod-*

During Mazarin's ministry Colbert had been studying colonialism. An obscure youth of twenty-three when Richelieu died, in 1648 he became secretary to Michel le Tellier, head of the Levant division of navigation and commerce. Colbert's duties under Le Tellier familiarized him with affairs of war and finance, and Mazarin began to notice him. On March 16, 1661, he was made an intendant of finance; in September superintendent; in January, 1664, he became *surintendant des bâtiments et manufactures*; in December, 1665, controller-general, and in March, 1669, secretary of the marine, the grand mastership being discontinued. Colbert now had a free hand, as one month earlier he had paid 700,000 livres for a post as secretary of state.<sup>10</sup> Nearest to the king in affairs of colonies and marine, he exercised the large functions today discharged by five or six ministers.<sup>11</sup> For a time his influence was supreme; but from 1672 to 1713 France was almost continuously at war, in which the influence of Colbert's rival, Louvois, who outlived him,<sup>12</sup> was able to limit projects of expansion.

Colbert, a tremendous worker, yet not above enriching himself and family through his office, and by instinct a merchant, evolved the brand of mercantilism based on surplus of precious metals known as Colbertism. This, while by no means original with him, was, briefly, to make France more wealthy through commerce. Raw materials must be imported and turned into manufactures which, exported, would yield a net gain to French capital. All facilities favoring this must be increased: roads, canals, ports, ships, colonial raw products, and colonial markets. Private capital must be enlisted and encouraged, but managed closely by the state, checked in its greed, and limited in its power. By dint of much suggestion Louis XIV, who had in such matters no especial interest or intelligence, accepted these ideas, but never cut his own expenditures so as to assist them whole-heartedly, or consented to having his financial wants budgeted. The minister was obliged to produce more revenues by protective tariffs,<sup>13</sup> by improved communications, and by intensification of Richelieu's method of fomenting commerce through great companies. Incessant need of

*ern History*, V, 5-15. Charles Perrault, *Mémoires de Colbert*, and Moüyton, *Particularitéz sur les ministres des finances*, are early works mentioned by the *Penny Encyclopedia* (London, 1831), q.v. at "Colbert."

<sup>10</sup> Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 7-8; Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 23-24; Louis Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte et la politique coloniale sous le ministère de Colbert*, 51-60.

<sup>11</sup> Guignebert, *A Short History of the French People*, II, 107.

<sup>12</sup> Colbert's whole economic program is aptly summed up in Léon Say and Joseph Chailley, *Nouveau dictionnaire d'économie politique*, I, 430-432.

<sup>13</sup> E.g., in 1667; P. de Ségur-Dupeyron, *Histoire des négociations commerciales et maritimes du règne de Louis XIV*, I, 152.

money for interminable wars put Louis in the position of approving rather than of suggesting whatever Colbert initiated.<sup>14</sup>

Circumstances made Colbert really an innovator, for the finances of the realm had been badly handled by Mazarin, Richelieu's companies had all failed, the colonies had declined. Colbert's idea was to emphasize economic values, making secondary the political ends which Richelieu had sought. As reservoirs of raw materials, the colonies would relieve France of dependence on competing nations. For this reason, and for their value as potential markets, they must grow beyond mere trading posts. Wherever trade might be developed, France must be solidly and permanently intrenched.<sup>15</sup>

His single-minded pursuit of this policy brought him the glory of making France for a little while the greatest colonial power. Much of this he owed to Richelieu, whom he closely imitated at first, using the company system because monopolistic trade was more profitable and safe than individual trade. His new company policy was almost identical with that of Richelieu; the charters read in the same way, creating a feudal property system and commercial monopolies;<sup>16</sup> favors and privileges were given as much to the company itself as to the noble, bourgeois, or proletarian settlers. But he soon abandoned Richelieu's method once he found that the company had proved itself useful for founding a colony, but not good enough to make it prosper. Hence Colbert did not hesitate to substitute direct government in 1674. As has been seen, the industry and commerce of the West Indies had fallen into the hands of the Dutch. Under the régime of the state, Canada and the West Indian colonies were essentially assimilated as provinces of France.<sup>17</sup> In this lay Colbert's genius. Richelieu had had first in mind conquest and settlement of new lands, commercial profit being a secondary consideration. Colbert made of colonization an economic effort, consequently he desired an intensive agricultural production, to provide abundant exports. He also dispensed great favors while solic-

<sup>14</sup> Guignebert, *A Short History*, II, 110. After Colbert's death in 1683, colonial policy throughout the remainder of the personal rule of Louis was contradictory and unskilled, especially with respect to the East India Company, which barely escaped failure (Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 142-144).

<sup>15</sup> When Colbert began his work, the French navy had twenty ships, only two or three being in good condition. Six thousand French sailors had entered foreign service. Colbert's marine budgets are given in La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, V, 325, 331. The state of the navy, 1677-1683, is shown, *ibid.*, 387. By 1671 the number of vessels was 196, and in 1677 there were 270, all effective. Grant, "The Government of Louis XIV . . .," in *Cambridge Modern History*, V, 14.

<sup>16</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 145-148; Bonmassieux, *Les grandes compagnies du commerce*, 477-479.

<sup>17</sup> Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 149-151; L. Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte . . .*, 260-262.

iting private capital, to which he promised huge profits. Richelieu never created a single company as a purely commercial one; <sup>18</sup> Colbert never created or permitted one that was not commercial. His general policy had been outlined in a memoir to Mazarin as early as 1653:

. . . It is necessary to reestablish or create every industry, even the most de luxe ones; to establish protection; to organize producers and traders into corporate bodies, lightening fiscal burdens which prevent proper circulation of goods; to restore to France her commercial maritime transport; to develop the colonies and attach them commercially to France alone; to suppress all middle-men between France and India; to develop the navy for the protection of the merchant marine.<sup>19</sup>

Colonial trade had been shackled, beginning in 1626, by a veritable network of protectionist rules variously known as the "Colonial Pact," the "Colonial System," or the "Régime de l'Exclusif," a statement of principle by France, not an explicit agreement between herself and her colonies. The mother country, having founded and supported the colonies, must be enriched by them. None of them might compete with France; the colonial trade, whether import or export, must be reserved to home merchants, while foreigners and usually non-company nationals were rigorously excluded. An edict of August 27, 1698, imposed fines, confiscation, and imprisonment for infraction of this rule. Laws codified in the edict of Fontainebleau in October, 1727, solidified the exclusive principle. Everything produced in the colonies must go to France, everything they consumed must come from there; trade in either direction must be under the national flag, and all the industries which they might support were reserved for the metropole.<sup>20</sup> This was of course the animating principle of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial monopolies, and of the English Navigation Acts. The error of French policy was that Colbert and his successors forced these theories into practice so rigidly that the colonies were hindered in their development. When, as in the West Indies, monoculture brought conflict over import of foodstuffs, the revolt of the colonials was sharp and disastrous.

The Code Noir of 1685, rendered necessary by adoption of large-

<sup>18</sup> J. Caillet, *L'administration en France sous le ministère du cardinal de Richelieu*, II, 102-103; Girault, *Principes de colonisation et de législation coloniale*, I, 166-172.

<sup>19</sup> The colonial pact is ably though briefly treated in M. Satineau, *Histoire de la Guadeloupe sous l'ancien régime, 1635-1789*, 36 ff.; for a brief outline see J. C. Paul Rougier, *Précis de législation*, 159-160; Snow, *The Administration of Dependencies*, 19-22; A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 184-188; Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France*, Charles Gide, ed. (New York, 1916), chapter I.

<sup>20</sup> Girault, *op. cit.*, 18.

scale forced labor, was of his fabrication; it regulated the civil status of the slave, and specified his rights and duties toward his master and those of his master toward him. It was very mild toward the slaves, in contrast with the slavery legislation of England. There was no soft humanitarianism in this; it was "looking exclusively to the preservation of so expensive and so indispensable a kind of human beast as . . . the slave." The Code also contained provisions concerning the observance of religion, admission of non-Catholics and their control.<sup>21</sup> It must be confessed that in spite of French reputation for mild slave laws, the handling of the blacks grew to be unspeakably cruel after fear of servile wars came to be the normal psychology of colonial society.<sup>22</sup>

In regard to the weight upon the colonies of religion as being non-productive economically, Colbert's policy prevented as far as possible undue numbers of priests, nuns, and monks.<sup>23</sup> "It is enough that there should be the necessary number to care for souls and administer the sacraments." The French had much better success in restricting this drain on resources than did the Spaniards. It has even been asserted that the professed religious aims of the monarchs of France were mere lip-service to an outmoded ideal, though the devotion of the French church to its task is not questioned.

Colbert, irritated by the success of Dutch commerce, lamented that their East India Company, with assets estimated at 800,000,000 livres, had made Holland the entrepôt for European trade with the Orient, while the Baltic trade, the carrying trade of Europe, and even that of the French West Indies, had been absorbed by her.<sup>24</sup> Even when Louis began his personal rule, France was buying her Oriental imports from England or Holland, to the distress of the French commercial interests.<sup>25</sup> The French wine trade with Holland employed over seven hundred French ships in 1668, hence relations were not entirely one-sided.

<sup>21</sup> *Code Noir* (Paris, Prault, 1767), 30-31; this edition contains some colonial legislation issued prior to the Code itself. The Negroes displaced the voluntary free engagés or petits blancs, while vast *ateliers* or *habitations*, "prisons without walls," spread over the islands, for the production of tobacco, coffee, or sugar, and the consumption of slaves. Rougier, *Précis* . . . , 38.

<sup>22</sup> Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte*, 291. An analysis of Charpentier's pamphlet and of another by him in the following year is in Pauliat, *op. cit.*, 65-78, 109-124.

<sup>23</sup> Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 247.

<sup>24</sup> Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 9; all Colbert's efforts, as in his tariff legislation of 1664, were directed toward the ruin of foreign commerce, especially Dutch and English. He prohibited Dutch purchase of sugar in France for the same reason, to the hurt of French plantations (H. Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique*, 276-277).

<sup>25</sup> Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 11; "Le plus grand débit des toiles et des épiceries se faisant en France" (P. Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales* . . . , 3).

The Dutch were anxious to collect from France import duties to compensate for losses of territory to Louis XIV. On the other hand, Colbert denied himself no possible method of analyzing the causes of the success of the Dutch companies, using his ambassadors astutely to gather information which would enable him to deprive his rival of trade. With this went the policy of sharp restriction of imports where possible.<sup>26</sup>

Colbert improved on the Dutch system by enforcing a vigorous colonization program inspired by the English, whose Great Migration to New England was building up a rival commonwealth menacing Canada. Decrepit Spain, too, furnished an ideal—that of blood amalgamation with the Indians to create a half-breed race which should enter in blood and spirit into a “community of life with the French.” This, with conversion to Catholicism, was to complete the process of gallicization, making a *France d'outre mer* as ideal as the American kingdom of which Isabel the Catholic had so fondly dreamed. To this end French colonial governors and habitants must deal humanely with the Indians—a strange mildness in a minister who promoted Negro slavery in the sugar and tobacco islands of the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean.

The companies formed by Colbert, or through his influence, for these purposes were, first and most important, the West India and the East India Companies, which bought up the earlier small ones. Into these two great concerns he put all his hope for ten years; others of lesser moment, or later than Colbert, were the Compagnie du Sénégal in 1673, the Compagnie de l'Acadie, the Compagnie du Guinée, a third Compagnie du Sénégal, 1681, the Compagnie de la Chine, the Compagnie de Saint-Domingue, the Compagnie de l'Asiento, a company for the sale of beaver, and the second and the third Compagnie de la Chine.<sup>27</sup>

The East and West India Companies were intended to cover world commerce. The first was to trade eastward from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan, but especially with the Orient. The

<sup>26</sup> P. de Ségur-Dupeyron, *Histoire des négociations commerciales et maritimes* . . . , I, 198-199; L. Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte*, 62-66.

<sup>27</sup> A Company of the Pyrenees was organized in 1671 to prepare masts and lumber for French ships, which might, in case of expected war with Holland, be cut off from the usual Baltic supplies (Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 13). In 1769 the Abbé Morellet counted fifty-five companies, mostly French ones, which had utterly failed (Rougier, *Précis de législation*, 21-22). P. Boissonnade and P. Charliat, *Colbert et la compagnie de commerce du Nord, 1661-1689* (Paris, 1930), 111, 115. Joseph Chailley-Bert, *Les compagnies de colonisation sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, 1898), 21-25, 178, mentions seventy-eight French companies, but called the list incomplete.

second embraced all that was left, that is, North and South America and Africa. The West India Company had a forty-year monopoly, the East India Company fifty years, while others usually had less time. The empire of Spain plus Portugal's once vast coastal domain was not too large to be emulated by a minister who must find funds for the grandeurs of Louis XIV.<sup>28</sup> The main reliance of Colbert was upon the East India Company. He, intensely “Oriental-minded,” treasured a dream of making Madagascar the great “port de relâche” for the Eastern trade.<sup>29</sup> Blandishment and cupidity failing to elicit subscriptions for stock, “high power” methods were used. The councils, the higher courts, the chief fiscal officers, the towns, the intendants, and the clergy were bludgeoned into subscribing. Charpentier harped on the missionary and patriotic motives, broadly hinting that the best way into the good graces of the king was to invest in the India trade. But the public was slow, the Paris merchants were undisguisedly hostile, damning subscriptions as disguised levies; the old idea that commerce was degrading still lingered, and investors distrusted overseas ventures. One zealous intendant threatened with imprisonment those who declined the “invitation” to take stock, and sent troops to towns which refused coöperation. Louis was obliged to contribute three million of the total fifteen million livres himself, but this was in fact a tacit insurance against foreign attacks.

Working from Madagascar, the now bigger and better East India Company was expected to bring a success in Oriental trade missed by the earlier undertakings of 1601, 1604, 1611, 1615, and 1642. An effort was made to buy posts from the Portuguese, reestablish trade routes through Egypt and the Red Sea, or through the Persian Gulf and Syria, seize the Dutch East Indies, and “send a good war fleet to the Indies [to demonstrate] the power of the king of France to the princes of Asia.”<sup>30</sup>

The formation of the West India Company for the colonial task in America did not require so much forced enthusiasm. The capital stock was seven million livres. Fur and fish had definite, if not fabulous, prospects of returns. This company, organized in May, 1664, received the trading posts on the west coast of Africa, and another at Cayenne, with the Canadian and West Indian holdings. With no unusual support

<sup>28</sup> Kaeppelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 648, puts crown control, mediocre directors, and lack of funds as contributing factors of failure, but places the chief blame on Louis' continental wars.

<sup>29</sup> Imitating the Dutch at the Cape of Good Hope and Batavia (Kaeppelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 7). Pauliat points out that indecision as to the rôle of Madagascar in the Oriental trade was a prime defect (*Madagascar sous Louis XIV*, 164-172).

<sup>30</sup> Hardy, *op. cit.*, 63.

from the court, and no literary heralding of its advantages, it brought greater results, largely through the production of sugar.<sup>31</sup> The two great companies were unlike those of Richelieu in that subscriptions were called for on a national scale rather than from the merchants of one or two shipping centers. Hence they are known as the *Grandes Compagnies*.

State intervention was frequent and close in the conduct of actual company affairs. Louis XIV manipulated elections of directors without concealment. Colbert as the permanent councillor of the colonies dictated their policies and directed their expansion. But for a number of reasons the great companies did little better than those of Richelieu. Subscriptions were always too small; there were losses instead of profits; those of the West India Company were four millions per year, and the East India Company could pay dividends only by borrowing, or by its control of the tobacco monopoly.<sup>32</sup>

The reasons for the failure of the companies great and small were the amazing repetitions of old blunders: there were series of hasty and poorly thought-out undertakings, unhealthy regions were colonized, incessant bickerings over rank and policy marked relations between civilians and military, between company agents and colonists, between laymen and clergy; there was, too, the same old graft, and all the favoritism of the earlier days. Colbert's choice of leaders was in several cases distinctly bad. Finally he lost confidence in the Dutch system. Hence in 1674 he courageously reverted to the Spanish type of direct control, which had indeed brought losses to Spain itself, but which, given a strong government, might yet prove workable. The West India Company was reduced to a simple commercial organization.<sup>33</sup>

The purely commercial companies continued as before, while the colonies of "peuplement" were made provinces, much like those of France, but under the minister of the marine. Each had a governor, holding his position as chief administrator and lieutenant of the king. Beside each was an intendant of justice, police, and finance. There were no provincial or parish assemblies, as the colonies were not yet mature enough. Canada had become a royal colony in 1663, with a sovereign council, upon the closing out of the affairs of the Company of New France.<sup>34</sup> But it was immediately placed under the West India

<sup>31</sup> Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 11. Preambles of the edicts establishing these two great companies are in Isambert, *Recueil*, XVIII, 35-39.

<sup>32</sup> Paul Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 149.

<sup>33</sup> Kaepelin, *op. cit.*, 648; Girault, *Principes de la colonisation française*, I, 165; L. Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte*, 271.

<sup>34</sup> G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 363-368.

Company with a mischievous carefreeness which stultified the colonial intelligence of Louis XIV.

The principal officers were responsible to the king, as in France. Justice was administered by courts of two classes: the higher courts were called sovereign councils, one being organized for Canada, as has been said, and the other for Martinique, was at Saint-Pierre. They had jurisdiction in first instance, and on appeal, like the French parlements; they registered royal edicts and governors' *arrêts*, but had no veto right.<sup>35</sup> More important were their administrative functions as aids to the governors. The lower courts were of ordinary justice, the positions being open to the colonists.

Direct administration was adapted broadly to local conditions; the intendant was supposed to frame his ordinances after consulting the leading inhabitants. While the laws were those of France, the justice was based on the Custom of Paris, each modified to suit the customs, usages, and welfare of the inhabitants. Taxation, police affairs, and personal status were all regulated by *arrêts* of the king's council. The Code Noir provided guidance for much of this. In Canada the Jesuits absorbed control of the Indians and Indian property.<sup>36</sup> There was a degree of impatience to extend the government of France in its entirety to the colonies. The spirit of the administration of Louis XIV, with all its faults, was thus exemplified, or rather magnified, by transplantation to a new geographical setting where a new social *milieu* was in process of formation. Economic control remained unchanged whether the colonies were under companies or the crown. Commercial success being the end sought, the purely commercial companies were continued after 1674 under direct crown administration.

This was the Colbertian "policy of galleons and spices"; a quest for "colonial products" and a carrying trade, under the inspiration of "national economy."<sup>37</sup> Hence the tropical Antilles or India were more desirable than Canada or North Africa, just as the Caribbean Islands were held in higher esteem by Britain than was New England. The colonies kept on growing after Colbert's death in 1683, in spite of the difficulties of France in European politics. His two successors, Seignelay (his son) and Pontchartrain, continued his ideal. The system of l'Exclusif persisted with only minor relaxations throughout the Old Régime, although some merchants protested and the colonists often

<sup>35</sup> Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte*, 114-129; Isambert, *Recueil général des lois*, XVIII, 41-43, 439-441; Règlement, November 4, 1671.

<sup>36</sup> "Ordonnance de M. de Lauzon . . . , May 12, 1656," P. G. Roy, *Archives de la Province de Québec, Ordonnances, Commissions* (Beauveville, 1924), I, 12. For interesting ordinances by Talon and Tracy, see this volume.

<sup>37</sup> An early phrase for "self-sufficing empire."

complained bitterly of want of provisions which only French vessels might supply, but could not bring because of war hazards.

As exaggerated by his successors, Colbert's system excited violent criticism during the eighteenth century; the Constituent Assembly of the Revolution inveighed against it, rightly, as one of the most pernicious features of the Old Régime. It was always hated by the colonists. It, like its counterparts in the Spanish and English colonies suffered from an imperfection of administration from which no state with colonial appanages had yet successfully emerged. On the other hand, it fostered a great colonial empire second in area for a moment to that of Spain alone. Success excited the jealousy of other countries, of England especially, who formed with the Dutch that strong coalition of 1701 which wreaked commercial ruin on France. The English and Dutch willed that France should never be mistress of the Spanish Main and its rich trade, for their commerce would be destroyed if this should happen. Hence the seizure of the West Indies commerce was of keen interest to them, and featured largely in the long war which opened the eighteenth century. The marquis de Feuquières, governor of Martinique, cleverly summed up the commercial and colonial interests involved in the War of the Spanish Succession when he averred that :

. . . Two more reasons are responsible for the alliance of the English and Dutch with the Emperor against France and Spain. First, a reasonable fear lest France, with her great seapower, should take from them the enormously rich commerce which the two Powers are engaged in with Spain herself. Second, that when France has at her ease enriched herself with the treasures of the New World by her trade with Spain, she will also take from them that of the two Indies. These two reasons are sufficiently important to the English and Dutch to cause them to make all possible efforts to prevent the ruin of their commerce. . . .<sup>38</sup>

The real rivalry of the European Powers for American possessions is best portrayed by their commercial struggles, since it was chiefly for the purpose of building up trade that each of them indulged in the luxury of overseas holdings.

<sup>38</sup> Feuquières, *Mémoires*, I, 16 (édition de Londres, 1736); cited in Deschamps, *La question coloniale*, 166.

## CHAPTER XI

### COMMERCE WITH SPANISH AMERICA

For the more immediate profits of the carrying trade with Spanish America, France long successfully rivaled all comers. In the early sixteenth century she drew upon Spain for various luxuries, such as Toledo arms, worked leathers, and silks. The importation of cloth was forbidden by Francis I, to aid French industry.<sup>1</sup> The real development of Franco-Spanish commerce followed the establishment of the Spanish colonies, which created a new large market, for which Spain, without national manufactures, was forced to depend more and more upon her neighbors. Spain became then the "most vast and most profitable customer of France." The merchandise sent to Spain was grain, vegetable dyes, cloths from Brittany, salted meats, woolen goods, paper, and iron and copper utensils. In return Spain sent wool, fruits, olive oil, gold, and silver.

At first the French merchants sold goods outright to the Spaniards, but soon began sending them on their own account through agents in Seville and Cádiz. Their next effort was to share in the lucrative Indies trade for which they were supplying the merchandise. The Rouen and Saint-Malo merchants were prominent in this indirect trade, principally in Brittany cloths with Spanish ports,<sup>2</sup> under cover of Spanish houses. Probably some of their goods went direct to the Indies in spite of the monopolistic laws which forbade.

Spain never gave up the fight to keep her monopoly intact. In 1573 the representatives of the Spanish Casa de Contratación in the Indies were ordered to report to Seville all shipments made by foreigners under cover of Spanish names, in order that proceedings might be instituted against them.<sup>3</sup> In 1601 many French merchants were arrested for introducing into Cádiz merchandise for the American trade. In the decrees against this, the French and the Portuguese were the only foreigners specified. The many naturalized Frenchmen in Spain

<sup>1</sup> Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce de la France*, II, 67-70, 97.

<sup>2</sup> Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de France*, I, 200, 208.

<sup>3</sup> Clarence H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, 1918), 112-113.

probably aided their French brethren to participate in the forbidden trade.<sup>4</sup>

The association of French merchants with Spanish ones for the indirect Indies trade had no doubt originated from a decree of Ferdinand in 1505, naturalizing foreigners resident in Seville, Cádiz, and Jerez for fifteen years for purposes of trade with the New World. Later, all foreign residents of Castile were included, provided they would act not as principals but in association with Spanish merchants and use Spanish factors abroad.<sup>5</sup> This relationship became the fundamental basis of the indirect system. Under it the Spanish agent had to receive the French goods, pay duties on them, reship them, pay export duties, send his agent to attend their sale in the Indies, and bring back goods and bullion, receive returned goods and attend to the illegal reshipment to France of bullion. All duties were evaded when possible.<sup>6</sup> A less costly plan was to place a member of a French company at Seville or Cádiz, by whom the interests of the firm were better served, and the high commission of the Spanish agents avoided. Another device was that of loading directly from French to Spanish ships at Cádiz and San Lucar without registering the merchandise at the Casa de Contratación, or without allowing it to enter Spain at all.<sup>7</sup> Return merchandise and bullion were received in the same way.

The sixteenth-century wars between France and Spain affected commerce very little, as the authorities closed their eyes to flagrant smuggling.<sup>8</sup> The Treaty of Vervins (1598) brought an end to open war, but the merchant navies carried on a silent one. Henry IV complained of Spanish treatment of French ships, and finally forbade commerce with Spain. In 1601 the latter came to terms, and old relations were reestablished. But in 1603 Spain placed a duty of 30 per cent on all imports and exports, except from her allies, England and the Italian States. France retaliated by like duties and finally by absolute prohibition of commerce, and all French trade was then done through the English. France threatened Spain with war, with the result that the duty was revoked, and relations were renewed.

<sup>4</sup> Charles Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis le règne de Philippe II. . .* (Paris, 1844, 2v.), II, 222; M. Sinclair, "French Commercial Relations with the Spanish American Colonies," M. A. thesis, MS., Berkeley, 1922.

<sup>5</sup> Haring, *Trade and Navigation*, 108-109.

<sup>6</sup> Jacques Savary, *Le parfait negociant ou instruction générale pour ce qui regarde le commerce des marchandises de France et des pays étrangers*, 2e partie, liv. II, chap. V, 124, 149-153. This system is interestingly described for 1680 in P. Margry, *Relations et mémoires inédites*, by Duhalde and Rochefort, 192-228.

<sup>7</sup> Savary, *op. cit.*, II, 123; Margry, *op. cit.*, 185.

<sup>8</sup> Pigeonneau, *Histoire du commerce*, II, 98.

The dependence of Spain upon France during the sixteenth century was shown when her dearth of laborers and artisans was supplied by French immigrants, who found very remunerative wages for their work.<sup>9</sup> In the seventeenth century still a greater influx supplied two hundred thousand laborers and artisans;<sup>10</sup> Villars, writing in 1680, said seventy thousand.<sup>11</sup>

During the seventeenth century the indirect trade with the Indies was hotly contested for by the French, Dutch, English, Genoese, and Hamburgians. France controlled two-thirds of it until after the middle of the century, when the Dutch and English built up an enormous contraband trade, the Dutch having acquired Saint-Eustatius in 1633, and Curaçao in 1634, and the English, Jamaica, in 1655. The French emulated them from their own West Indies with little success, as the Dutch and the Spanish combined against them.<sup>12</sup> Spain was completely dependent upon foreign merchandise for the Seville and Cádiz export. Five-sixths of the cargoes were supplied by foreigners; it was the heyday of almost universal smuggling, which the Spanish government was powerless to stop without threatening the very continuance of colonial trade.<sup>13</sup> In the second half of the century contraband at Seville rose to the figure of ten million pesos annually. The only compensation was in levying *indults*, or heavy fines paid wholly by foreigners. This provided a convenient weapon for retaliation upon unfriendly nations, by enforcing the fine against enemies and ignoring it for friends.

Infractions of her monopoly led Spain to issue various protective decrees and confiscate merchandise, generally from shippers of hostile nations. A decree of 1614 condemned to death all persons introducing foreign goods into America; in 1624 one hundred and sixty Dutch vessels were seized at Cádiz and other ports; in the 1640's there was confiscation of all Genoese merchants' goods; and in the next decade occurred the seizure and confiscation of English goods in Cádiz and Seville.<sup>14</sup> But this competition could not be stopped; it was the result of a new era of industrial and commercial development, in which England was superseding the declining Hanseatic League; Holland had supplanted French navigation on the West African coast and had ab-

<sup>9</sup> L'asseur, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 208.

<sup>10</sup> J. H. Gourville, *Mémoires* (Paris, 1669), in Petitot et Monmerque, *Collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France depuis l'avènement de Henri IV jusqu'à la paix de Paris conclue en 1763* (Paris, 1820-1829, 130v.), ser. 2, v. 52.

<sup>11</sup> C. L. Villars, *Mémoires de la cour d'Espagne. . .* (Paris, 1893), 16; Charles Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis le règne de Philippe II*, II, 148.

<sup>12</sup> Weiss, *op. cit.*, II, 247; G. Scelle, *La traite négrière aux Indes de Castille*, II, Introd. xviii.

<sup>13</sup> Haring, *Trade and Navigation*, 63, 113; Weiss, *op. cit.*, II, 248.

<sup>14</sup> Weiss, *op. cit.*, II, 222-223.

sorbed the free commerce in Canada, while France was dedicating attention to agriculture (Sully), industry (Laffemas), and through commerce and her marine (Richelieu and Colbert) building up a colonial world.

Colbert's large-scale protective system safeguarded French products and industries in every way possible. His tariff measures of 1664 struck at England's and Holland's cloths and goods; the Spanish cloth trade was then almost non-existent.<sup>15</sup> He levied a heavy import duty on foreign cloths and silken hose competing with French manufactures, and an export duty on French manufactures of this class. The tariff was intensified in 1667 to please the manufacturers, placing almost prohibitive duties on tapestries, silk stockings, cloth, laces, and glass. Raw materials were not heavily taxed upon entry, however. Under this protection France began to manufacture fine cloths, and the hat industry increased. Workmen were imported to teach the French the manufacture of luxuries.<sup>16</sup>

To keep pace with England and Holland, Colbert had to turn his attention to the navy, the colonies, and colonial trade; French interests at Cádiz he guarded with particular care. France attempted to follow the same course as her rivals by means of the direct trade in America, but in this she was never very successful. The Dutch and the English combined to dominate the Cartagena and Portobello annual fairs, and to exclude from them most articles manufactured in France.<sup>17</sup>

The Franco-Spanish wars at the end of the century hastened the decline. When Louis XIV invaded the Spanish Netherlands, Spain tried to prevent him from seizing them by offering a favorable commercial treaty, which was refused, since by the contraband system most French goods escaped paying any duty at all. Spain, therefore, using her most convenient instrument against France, enforced the law forbidding foreign trade with her colonies. All goods consigned to France in the galleons arriving in that year (1667) were seized. French merchants were forced to pay a 14 per cent tax on all their effects in Spain. There was much bitterness at French naval attempts to protect national interests on Spanish galleons and *flotas*. In 1678 there was a general confiscation of French merchandise by Spanish authorities. French merchants took to sending their cargoes direct to the Indies, instead of using Spanish agents, preferring to

<sup>15</sup> Henri Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique et sociale de la France*, 275-276.

<sup>16</sup> This tariff brought reprisals from Holland, and then war; but it was not long in force. Sée, *op. cit.*, 276. Concessions were made to England in 1672 and to Holland in 1678 (Nimwegen). The tariff of 1699 combined the features of those of 1664 and 1667.

<sup>17</sup> Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis le règne de Philippe II*, II, 248.

take the whole risk themselves, since they found that the Spaniards often failed to give them anything upon the return of the fleets.<sup>18</sup> After 1675 France lost her dominance in the indirect trade, although Louis XIV threatened with war fleets and pirate raids to induce Spain to be reasonable in regard to a good share.

In 1680 the Spanish American trade was divided as follows: France had six million livres; England five million; Holland, Hamburg, and Danzig had ten million; Genoa, Naples, and Libourne had seven million; Portugal, Galicia, and Biscay had two million; Spain had only three million, while Flanders, Sweden, and Denmark had four. Of the total of thirty-eight million, foreigners enjoyed thirty-five and Spain only three.<sup>19</sup> When in 1686 the League of Augsburg was formed and Louis was beaten, his finances were ruined and his navy crushed. Friendship between France and England ended with the Revolution of 1688, when William of Holland as English king used his new position to oppose France, beginning the Hundred Years of the seven Colonial Wars. For a century and a quarter, until the downfall of Napoleon, France and England were in open war over half the time.

However, in the year named the annual exportation of France to Spain was valued at eighteen to nineteen million piastres, of which about fourteen millions went to the Indies.<sup>20</sup> Desmarests estimated (1686) that annually one-third of the return of the galleons and *flotas* was reaped by France; and that of the other two-thirds much was returned to her by nations purchasing French merchandise.<sup>21</sup> France thus controlled more of the Spanish American trade on the galleons than any other one nation, but had lost her old two-thirds domination of it. Her object then became to develop direct communication with Chile and Peru, for their very rich market would more than indemnify her for the decline in the West Indies trade. Once there, she could extend her trade to China and the Spice Islands. The close political alliance with Spain in the War of the Spanish Succession opened several Atlantic ports, particularly of South America, to French ships by the Asiento concession. France would have preferred reestablishment of the indirect system by a commercial treaty, giving herself the favored

<sup>18</sup> Savary, *Le parfait negociant* . . . , II, 227; Lefebvre, *Histoire du commerce*, I, 412.

<sup>19</sup> Margry, *Relations et mémoires* . . . , 187; Haring, *op. cit.*, 114.

<sup>20</sup> E. W. Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales et maritimes entre la France et les côtes de l'Océan Pacifique* (Paris, 1909), tome 1<sup>er</sup>, *Le commerce de la Mer du sud* . . . , 77.

<sup>21</sup> Imports from Spain at this time amounted to seventeen million livres. The exports were cloths, laces, silks, and wheat. The imports were woolens, wines, draperies, tropical products, and precious metals. Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique* . . . , 279.

place and restoring enforcement of the old Spanish commercial laws against England and Holland.<sup>22</sup>

Thus France took from Spain's unwilling hands the disposal of her own American trade. France never secured the desired commercial treaty, but through the direct trade with the Atlantic and Pacific ports of South America profited by the decline of Spanish shipping.

At the death of Charles II of Spain in 1700, the Portuguese still possessed the Asiento or slave trade contract. With the accession of Philip V of Bourbon to the Spanish throne, the Asiento became of international value, not so much for the slave trade, as in its opportunity for contraband in merchandise traded for precious metals.<sup>23</sup> The alliance made the French the logical successors of the Portuguese, and a new Asiento was signed in 1701 which was similar to the Portuguese treaty; it gave the French company complete monopoly of the Negro trade with Spanish colonies for ten years. The maximum number of Negroes to be imported was forty-two thousand. The kings of Spain and France became associates in it, each holding one-quarter of the stock. The French government also succeeded in 1701 in getting Spain to accept, without enthusiasm, French ships as escorts for the galleons and flotas, with accompanying permission to enter the ports of the Indies to take provisions and make repairs.<sup>24</sup> They were forbidden to trade, but as the mercantile theory opposed export of money, they were given merchandise with which to purchase provisions.<sup>25</sup> To strengthen the Asiento, the old Guinea Company was reorganized and given its privileges together with its own former rights.

The company enjoyed exemption from all French import and export duties except on cacao, on which one-half the regular duty was laid. Three stations were set up in Guinea, while Santo Domingo was made the company's West India base. Factories and agents were established throughout the Spanish American colonies, where the company was received with varying degrees of indulgence by the officials, some of whom frankly favored the English and Dutch. But it never had security in its dealing with them. The French influence

<sup>22</sup> Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis le règne de Philippe II*, II, 235, 237, 247-248. The Dutch had the Asiento right at this time, using it as a blind for much contraband, for which they had commissioners at Cartagena, Portobello, Vera Cruz, and Panama. Scelle, *La traite négrière . . .*, II, Introd. xvi, xxii, 151-152, and Dahlgren, *op. cit.*, I, 246-247.

<sup>23</sup> Scelle, *La traite négrière*, II, 107. Ch. de Lannoy, *Histoire de l'expansion coloniale des peuples Européens—Portugal et Espagne* (Brussels, 1907), 396-397.

<sup>24</sup> Bernard Moses, *The Spanish Dependencies in South America* (London, 1914, 2v.), II, 258.

<sup>25</sup> Scelle, *La traite négrière*, II, 153.

was felt more at Madrid than in the Indies, although Louis XIV ordered all ships in his royal navy in the Indies to aid the company whenever possible.<sup>26</sup>

The plan was to send three thousand Negroes to the French colonies, and five thousand to the Spanish colonies each year, but it was late in starting, and difficulty was had in procuring Negroes. To remedy this the company tried to use French and Spanish contraband traders, the old Portuguese Company of Cacheu, and the Compagnie de Saint-Domingue, but all proposals came to nothing. The next device was to buy Negroes from the Dutch and English in the West Indies. French influence in Spain obtained permission, in 1706, to negotiate with these enemies for slaves, the argument being that they would have introduced them by contraband anyway. This system in reality affirmed the Anglo-Dutch victory, for had the company been able to displace the English and Dutch traders it would not have been necessary to employ them.<sup>27</sup>

It was especially difficult to contend with contraband. Negroes smuggled in were ordered seized and turned over to the French agents, the company paying duty on them and crediting them on its contract.<sup>28</sup> Deslandes estimated the annual importation of merchandise into La Guayra by the Dutch at three thousand to four thousand piastres' worth. They carried away silver, cacao, and most of all tobacco, the French never being able to dislodge them. The English at Panama had all the trade in Negroes and merchandise. All efforts to check smugglers failing, permission was accorded to the company to use armed ships against them. If the cargo was Negroes, they went exclusively to the company; if it was merchandise, one-quarter went to the Spanish treasury, and duties were paid on the remainder by the captors.<sup>29</sup>

The company was not given the right to trade in the smaller Atlantic ports, where there were no royal customs officials. To Buenos Aires it was allowed to send two vessels annually, and it had the right to buy or build at Panama two ships for the Pacific coast trade.<sup>30</sup> Spain objected to this, hence they had to send their slaves to the South Seas on Spanish ships, while permission to buy or build the two ships was restricted to loading them only. That is to say, the company was never admitted to direct trade with the Pacific coast. Upon the initiative of the French, it obtained a contract to supply munitions to Buenos Aires,

<sup>26</sup> Scelle, *op. cit.*, II, 213, 219, 233.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 243, 272-273, 282-283, 286-287, 297-298.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 302, citing Article XVIII of the Asiento Treaty.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 327, 330.

<sup>30</sup> Article X of the Asiento Treaty; Scelle, *op. cit.*, II, 340.

by which means it hoped to open this closed port. But the Spanish governor was hostile, and the company did an insignificant regular commerce; only its contraband trade showed a profit, while this business had to be shared with numerous other French ships. Duties on Negroes had to be paid in advance to the Spanish king; they amounted to four million livres per annum on four thousand Negroes in peace time and three million on three thousand in war time, whether the actual number was introduced or not. Of course the company had to borrow to pay these advances, so that by 1708 its financial situation was precarious. Added trouble was due to weak internal administration and lack of harmony between members.

In the peace negotiations (1706-1713) England insisted on taking the Asiento for herself. The French and the Spanish suggested forming a company in which the English, Dutch, Spanish, and French should each have a quarter share. But England was now taking active governmental interest in colonies, and like Holland was determined to exclude France, and in 1710 the project of peace contained an article providing that the commerce of the Spanish Indies should be reserved to the Spaniards.<sup>31</sup> Spain obviously could not carry on this commerce herself, and England was determined to have it. Louis XIV was determined to have peace, and forced Spain to consent to all demands. Thus England got the Asiento in 1711 for a thirty years' term, during which she advanced her commerce at the expense of all rivals.

The closing years of the reign of Louis XIV were marked by a new attack by the French merchants on the protective system. Pontchartrain and Desmarets being of liberal tendencies, several of their measures reflected the freer trend. Marseilles commerce was made largely free in 1703; during the War of the Spanish Succession even the Dutch were given passports, though their commerce was forbidden in 1710-1711. The Treaty of Utrecht reestablished the tariff of 1699. England and France tried to reestablish reciprocal freedom of trade in 1713 based on the Treaty of 1664, but the English Parliament stood firm. Although France obtained no relaxation of British trade restrictions until after the American Revolution, the frequency of commercial treaties shows how deeply economic questions were affecting international policies.<sup>32</sup> In 1717 the Council of the Marine urged colonial expansion for national strength, and called for new efforts to develop North American trade.

Though the Pacific trade had been denied under the Asiento, early filibustering expeditions created a direct trade on the west coast

<sup>31</sup> Scelle, *op. cit.*, II, 379-482.

<sup>32</sup> Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique et sociale . . .*, 278; Piquet, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 20.

between 1700 and 1726.<sup>33</sup> Various memoirs advocating the conquest of South America were submitted to the French government. The expedition of 1685-1694 under the corsair Massartie went around the Horn and up the coasts of Chile and Peru, after three and a half years returning to La Rochelle. Another expedition sailed under De Gennes in 1694 to intercept the treasure galleons, but proved a failure due to bad weather.<sup>34</sup>

The next intrusion was through trading companies. Mercantile interests had been aroused by the glowing accounts of pirates which suggested a French colony at the Straits of Magellan as a point de relâche to close the Pacific to other nations. Jourdan and Danycan, two merchants, in 1698 formed a *Compagnie Royale de la Mer Pacifique* for the establishment of contraband trade, although "discovery" and "colonization" were their formally avowed objectives.

Probably this group was responsible for the Beuchesne expedition of 1698 which planned but failed to leave the colony above mentioned. The two ships finally reached the Pacific, and in spite of difficulties interposed by Spain, commerce was opened, and the vessels brought back about four hundred thousand livres in silver.<sup>35</sup>

Danycan was at the time organizing a new *Compagnie de la Mer du Sud* which, upon the advice of Pontchartrain, was united with the *Compagnie de la Chine*. As the merger was not definitive the old *Compagnie de la Chine* was now called "*Compagnie de la Chine de Paris*," while the new organization was known as the "*Compagnie de la Chine de Saint-Malo*."<sup>36</sup>

The associated companies sent out two ships for China by way of Africa, permission to go by way of South America being refused because France did not wish to antagonize her ally. Voyages to the Pacific continued, however, as often by the secret support of the French government as in spite of its prohibitions.<sup>37</sup> In 1703 the first

<sup>33</sup> Interesting details are in H. Sée, "Documents sur le commerce de Cadix," in *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1926), 465-520, and (1927) 3-80.

<sup>34</sup> For an account of the voyage see F. Froger, *Relation d'un voyage fait en 1695, 1696, et 1697 au détroit de Magellan . . .* (Paris, 1698), as cited by Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales*, I, 101, also Prévost, *Histoire générale des voyages*, XLI, 133 ff.; Alberto Fagalde, *Magellanes, el país del porvenir* (Valparaiso, 1901), I, 133-142.

<sup>35</sup> Dahlgren, *op. cit.*, I, 117, 143; Fagalde, *op. cit.*, I, 136.

<sup>36</sup> See the account of the East India trade in chapter XIV, India, 1664-1719. From 1680 dated the voyages of the English freebooters around Cape Horn (Fagalde, *Magellanes, el país del porvenir*, ch. IX).

<sup>37</sup> E. W. Dahlgren, "Voyages français à destination de la Mer du Sud avant Bougainville (1695-1749)" (Paris, 1907), vol. 14, in *Nouvelles Archives des Missions Scientifiques et Littéraires* (Paris, 1907), XIV, 425; W. Roscher, *The Spanish Colonial System*, E. G. Bourne, tr. (New York, 1904), 38.

three ships sent out by Danycan and the associated companies returned. The two sent to the Pacific Coast had been very successful.<sup>38</sup> Another expedition in 1703 sent ostensibly to China on Danycan's own account also proved successful. In May, 1703, the *Compagnie de la Chine de Paris* came under the rule of the Saint-Malo branch. Another expedition in 1706 returned in 1709 from a most profitable voyage. The wily Danycan whenever possible evaded sharing proceeds with the company. The Spanish government, having no fleet, had to rely upon French ships to bring in the colonial treasure, but very little was collected for the Spanish crown, while an enormous quantity went to the French (thirty million livres). In 1709 Frondac crossed the Pacific, going down the west coast of America. In 1709 the *Compagnie de Paris* broke with Danycan. As ceaseless quarrels threatened the China commerce, the government in 1712 sanctioned a new Company of China as the concessions to the old one were to expire in 1715. The new company sent two ships, ostensibly to China, but they went straight to Peru and Chile.<sup>39</sup>

In 1706 Colbert's heavily indebted *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* tried to retrieve its fortunes by sending three ships to Peru, but profits proved negligible, and soon the company sold its rights to a group of Malouin merchants.<sup>40</sup> In 1715 concessions were given to the New Company of China, as well as to the *Compagnie des Indes*. In 1719 a fleet of twelve or fourteen ships sailed to the Pacific Coast, but, being inexperienced in this trade, the expedition failed.

Before the Peace of Utrecht, Louis XIV had forbidden all navigation in the South Sea (1712) because the market for European goods was cut down by ships which, after selling European merchandise in Peru, went to China and brought Chinese goods to sell in the Spanish colonies. This had proved detrimental to Spain, but even more so to France. The prohibition had no effect, and South American markets were soon overstocked; hence a French ordinance of 1716 forbade the trade under pain of death, and a ship was sent to the South Sea to warn the shippers. The Spanish government strove to oust officials who had supported the French trade, and replace them by others of "spotless integrity." Four armed ships, sent in 1716 to enforce the prohibition, arrived unannounced and took easy prizes. All the French

<sup>38</sup> Dahlgren, *op. cit.*, 456.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 179 *et seq.* Among the results of this trade movement was the visit to Chile of P. Luis Feuillée, mathematician and botanist; he remained until 1711, after which he published a *Journal des observations* (Fagalde, *op. cit.*, 138). For an account of Frondac's voyage, see James Burney, *A Chronological History of the Voyages and Discoveries in the South Sea or Pacific Ocean . . .* (London, 1803-1817, 4v.), IV, 487.

<sup>40</sup> Dahlgren, *Les relations commerciales et maritimes*, I, 206.

ships left precipitately, and for several years no expeditions were risked. In 1719, Spain being again at war with France, the Malouin merchants renewed their expeditions, only to meet severe losses. In 1724 the prohibition was renewed, and this date marks the real end of eighteenth-century French commerce in the Pacific.<sup>41</sup>

To sum up as briefly as possible the effects of the French intrusion into the Spanish trade: French contraband on the Spanish flotas and galleons during the reign of Charles II of Spain has been estimated at over ten million livres. Ships which entered the Pacific in the direct trade between 1695 and 1726 are estimated to have numbered one hundred and sixty-eight, of which one hundred and seventeen returned.<sup>42</sup> The French influence on the west coast was greatest during 1707-1717. Many traders settled in Peru and Chile, where their family names still linger. There was interest in fishing and mining as well as in commerce.

Estimates of the total wealth brought into France vary. Jourdan in 1711 claimed three hundred millions of money already imported. Bernard de la Harpe, a deputy of Saint-Malo to Brittany, fixed the importations by ships from Saint-Malo alone in 1703-1720 at four hundred million livres. The total sum of money in France in 1683 was seven hundred forty million livres. A conservative estimate of the trade would be two hundred fifty million. The annual French trade with Chile alone has variously been estimated at sixteen million livres and six hundred thousand pesos.<sup>43</sup> Thus the trade with the Spanish colonies was worth more to France than the proceeds of her own colonies, outside the sugar islands. How the commercial rivalry fared during the remainder of the century, prior to the period of revolutions, is to be seen in the story of the wars for India.

<sup>41</sup> Weiss, *L'Espagne depuis le règne de Philippe II*, II, 243-246.

<sup>42</sup> Dahlgren, *op. cit.*, 206-207.

<sup>43</sup> For continuation of the commercial struggle see below, chap. XXII.

## CHAPTER XII

## THE AMERICAN COLONIES UNDER COLBERT; CANADA

Colbert's plans for developing the now royal province of Canada were comprehensive. French population was to be encouraged by increased immigration and early marriage of colonists. The men who came were oftenest from Normandy, whereas the shiploads of women, good, bad, or indifferent, came from many provinces. Bachelors who rejected the offerings were fined and denied the fur trade.<sup>1</sup> Premiums were paid to parents for the largest families, and young couples were given facilities for beginning their homes. The result was that Canada grew from within, rather than through immigration, which was active only during the brief years of Colbert's actual ministry.<sup>2</sup> There never was any official inducement to marry Indian women, and Colbert was frankly annoyed at the growth of the half-breed *coureurs de bois*,<sup>3</sup> who escaped from the rigors of moral control in the towns and descended to the Indian level of life. He would have been glad to induce the red men to work, but they served effectively only in the canoe or on the trail. So also he tried, though vainly, to keep the French farms close together for mutual protection; in the exposed villages the stockades or the militia offered fair security, and the river front became fringed with holdings of land side by side; but the urge to stray from the group was marked, and loss of life was frequently heavy.<sup>4</sup>

Two other main points mark Colbert's policy for Canada; to see that land should be adequately and promptly distributed to immigrants, as near to forts or settlements as possible; and that justice as administered by the local courts should be enlightened, impartial, and prompt.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Baron Lahontan's humorous description of the charms of these brides, in *New Voyages to North America* (R. G. Thwaites, ed., Chicago, 1905, 2v.), I, 36-37.

<sup>2</sup> [Letter] to M. Courcelles, in *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, III, pt. II, 451. The company was more concerned with the Antilles, on which its efforts were concentrated (Girault, *Principes*, I, 165).

<sup>3</sup> Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 283, 309.

<sup>4</sup> F. X. de Charlevoix, S. J., *History of New France* (Shea, tr.) (New York, 1900, 6v.), IV, 46-47. Sulte, *Histoire des Canadiens-Français*, V, 128; "Instruction pour le sieur Gaudais," in *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, III, pt. II, 444, 445.

<sup>5</sup> *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, III, pt. II, Introd. lxxi.

The new administration encouraged the development of every natural resource; iron mines if found would free France from purchasing that metal from Sweden; the forests held ample materials for ship-building; farming and even stock-raising were earnestly advocated, and tools, seeds, and breeding animals were sent out.<sup>6</sup> The minister's instructions repeatedly called for reports on agricultural progress, and urged forward the exploitation of the soil.

Grants of seigneuries were pretty freely made to applicants of even moderate category; the obligation, aside from small feudal dues, being that of clearing and cultivating the land. Seigneuries varied from large ones of a hundred square miles to those of at least a dozen square miles. The frontage on the river, usually provided, afforded a path for inter-communication. Each seigneur lived on his estate, supposedly, and subgranted his lands to those of a lesser category. They paid for their holdings a sort of quit-rent (*cens*) in perpetuity. By 1712 the seigneuries numbered ninety-three.

As the settlers multiplied, lands grew scarcer, and by the beginning of the eighteenth century it became the illegal custom to exact an entry fee. This sort of land speculation was checked in 1711 by the decrees or arrêts of Marly, the first of which empowered the intendant to intervene by giving lands freely to applicants without payments above the usual fees. Thus the seigneurs became mere agents for distributing their own lands, or would have been had the famous arrêt become known to the purchasing public. The second arrêt provided that habitants who failed to clear their lands within a year should lose them, a regulation much honored by observance.<sup>7</sup>

For the royal province the governing body was made a sovereign council, later called the superior council. This powerful body, comprising the governor, bishop, intendant, and five councillors subsisted, with enlargements in 1674 and 1703, until the fall of New France. Its duties were to enforce the laws sent from France, issue local ordinances, and serve as a court of second instance, with appeal to the king. Its administrative powers included authorization to expend public moneys, regulate the fur trade and the trade with France, and create courts of justice in the towns of New France. Its weekly meetings were the occasion of much display of consequentiality, with some bickerings over precedence, but the council was on the whole a body which repre-

<sup>6</sup> G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, 381-394; 421-438; "Instructions au sieur Talon," in *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert* . . . , III, pt. II, 393-397.

<sup>7</sup> Girault, *Principes*, I, 223; W. B. Munro, *The Seigneurs of Old Canada* (Toronto, 1914), 42-49; R. Peattie, "The Isolation of the St. Lawrence Valley," *Geographical Review*, V (1918), 106.

sented the king faithfully. Louis XIV kept up a vivid interest in Canada, and his officers were in the main well chosen.

Jean Talon, the first and most capable intendant, who came in 1665, thought of Canada as an integral part of the French empire, not as a comptoir; he had a clear idea of the American continental strategy necessary to restrain the growing English colonies.<sup>8</sup> Colbert, on the other hand, looked upon these "quelques arpents de neige" as essentially a comptoir, larger than most, on account of the character of the fur trade, but, outside its capacity to supply the sugar islands with provisions, merely an annex to the true mercantile colonies. This was an inherited opinion, voiced before him by Richelieu, to be expressed later by Voltaire,<sup>9</sup> when Canada was finally lost under Choiseul.<sup>10</sup>

The work of Talon pressed forward notwithstanding. Louis XIV had begun in 1659 to work at populating the country. Engagés were brought in, especially in 1662, 1663, and 1664, and the eleven hundred officers and men of the regiment of Carignan-Salières formed a nucleus of soldier settlement which, strategically placed on the Richelieu River, held the Indians in better control.<sup>11</sup> There were now in the colony some three thousand white settlers, the worst handicap being the severe loss of life on the ocean voyage; at the same time the British colonies had passed their critical years and were growing rapidly.<sup>12</sup>

Canada now began to produce some wheat for export, though she never became quite self-supporting.<sup>13</sup> There were growing numbers of cattle; in 1669, for instance, exports of lumber, dry and fresh fish,

<sup>8</sup> Talon's period of service, 1665-1672, is well reconstructed in E. Salone, *La colonisation de la Nouvelle France*, 143-224; R. D. Cahall, *The Sovereign Council of New France . . .* (New York, 1915), 193.

<sup>9</sup> *Candide* (Voltaire, *Œuvres* (Paris, 1877-1885, 52v.), vol. XXI), ch. XXIII, p. 196.

<sup>10</sup> Adam Shortt and A. G. Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces* (Toronto, 1914-1917, 23v.); vol. I is on discovery and exploration; vol. II deals with politics, the church, economics, and land. Later volumes also present much relevant material.

<sup>11</sup> R. de Kérallain, "Le régiment de Carignan-Salières au Canada," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1923), pt. 2, pp. 294-296. It came in 1665, and numbered twelve hundred fine soldiers. See C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country* (Springfield, 1920), 108-109. In June came De Tracy with the reorganization of the colony in hand. His arrival was marked by the crushing of the terrible Iroquois menace (Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 373-380).

<sup>12</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 54; Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 240; in 1688 the population of Canada was 11,562; in 1721 it was about 25,000, and 55,000 in 1754. *Censuses of Canada*, IV, xiv-xxiv, 61. In 1700 the British American colonies had a population of 200,000, and by 1750 over a million.

<sup>13</sup> The governor had authority to control the amount exported in case the crop was short (Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 230).

salted eels and salmon, herrings, and peas were made to the French West Indies.<sup>14</sup> Efforts were made to develop the mineral resources, but Talon missed the rich treasures of this kind which have since been taken out in huge quantities on the very ground over which he himself trod.<sup>15</sup>

Exploration leaped forward during Colbert's ministry. After the failure of the Huron mission, Father Allouez toiled in the Lake Superior country (1665); Jacques Marquette was there, also, and later among the Illinois Indians. In 1670 Saint-Lusson at Sault Sainte-Marie took possession of the new Northwest. After the coming of Frontenac, governor from 1672 to 1682, Marquette went with Louis Joliet, in 1673, by way of the Fox and Wisconsin rivers, to the upper Mississippi, which they followed to the Arkansas.<sup>16</sup> Then came the unforgettable Robert Cavalier de la Salle, moving from his famous seigneurie at Montreal in 1667 toward the Mississippi in epochal discoveries which have given him an imperishable fame. This progress into the west was made in spite of conflicts with the Jesuits and the governor. In 1682, near the mouth of the great river, he gave the country a name for his king—Louisiana,<sup>17</sup> and planned in 1684 a settlement which should give control of that inland empire to France. But of two hundred and forty persons whom he had brought in, all perished or left the country. After shipwreck and disasters which included the destruction of his Fort Saint-Louis on the Garcitas River in Texas, he was slain near the Brazos River by disaffected followers

<sup>14</sup> E. Salone, *La colonisation de la Nouvelle France*, 216; liberty of commerce was granted in 1669, to foment production (*Lettres, instructions et mémoires de Colbert*, III, pt. II, p. 449).

<sup>15</sup> During April, 1931, Ontario gold mines milled \$3,539,563 in bullion; a year earlier the average monthly production was \$2,959,905. H. W. Barrett, "Commercial Notes on Canada," May 16, 1931. In 1936 Ontario's annual production of gold was 2,369,416 ounces fine; total for Canada for the same year, 3,735,305 ounces fine (*World Almanac*, 1938).

<sup>16</sup> James H. Coyne, "The Pathfinders of the Great Lakes," in Shortt and Doughty, *Canada and Its Provinces*, I, 80-84, 99, 101-104.

<sup>17</sup> Alvord, *The Illinois Country*, 87-88. La Salle's murder on March 19, 1687, by disaffected followers as he was making his way from Texas to Canada, is recorded (page 33) by the "man with the iron hand," Henri de Tonty, "Mémoire sur la découverte du Mississippi," in Pierre Margry, *Relations et mémoires inédits . . .*, 1-36; cf. E. Lauvrière, "Les premières explorations de la Louisiane," in *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1926), especially 319-376. On the location of La Salle's taking possession, see the *Louisiana Historical Quarterly*, XIV, No. 3 (July, 1931), 301-314, "Cavalier de La Salle takes Possession of Louisiana," by Baron Marc de Villiers du Terrage, translated by André Lafargue. For the location of La Salle's fort, see H. E. Bolton, "The Location of La Salle's Colony on the Gulf of Mexico," *Miss. Valley Hist. Review*, vol. II (September, 1915), [165]-182.

in a fourth attempt to return overland to Canada. During the War of the League of Augsburg (Palatinate) and the fierce raids of "King William's War," the Louisiana expansion lay dormant, though several volunteers offered to renew the enterprise. Not until after the Peace of Ryswick was this done.

A serious problem arose out of the hostility of the Jesuits to the policy of gallicization of the Indians which had been basic with Champlain. Frontenac himself

. . . expressed to the Jesuits my great surprise at the fact that, out of all the Indians under their care at Notre-Dame de Foye, not one of them could speak French. I have told them that in their missions they should endeavour, whilst making Indians sons of Christ, to transform them also into subjects of the king. To reach this end, and give them sedentary habits, and induce them to abandon a life so opposed to the spirit of Christianity, since the best means to make Christians out of these poor creatures should be to persuade them to be men.

Mother Marie de l'Incarnation, with practical common sense, said:

. . . If by "frenchifying" [franciser] one means that Indians have become pious, good, charitable under Christian influence, we can say that our sisters have frenchified almost all young girls entrusted to their care, but . . . if by this word it is desired to convey the impression that Indians have become reconciled to the sedentary life and customs of civilized people, then it must be confessed that, . . . little progress has been made in that direction.<sup>18</sup>

The fathers frankly disbelieved that Indians could become Frenchmen, and preferred to build upon the philosophy of making better Indians instead. The struggle grew bitter when they opposed the fur traders who purchased peltries and good will from the Indians with brandy. The Jesuits had the best of the argument, but their methods annoyed Colbert, who thought they were using a mere pretext. He stuck hard by the theory, saying:

They [the Jesuits] think to conserve in the greatest purity the principles and the holiness of our religion by keeping the converts savages within their ordinary mode of life rather than by attracting them to the French. This maxim is far removed from all good conduct whether for religion or for the state. All temporal authority . . . should be used to attract them to the French, which can be done by marriage and by the education of the children.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Shortt and Doughty, *Canada and Its Provinces*, XV, 43, 45.

<sup>19</sup> On the value of the Jesuit missions, see Louise P. Kellogg, *The French Régime in Wisconsin and the Northwest* (Madison, 1925), chap. VIII. G. Hardy, "Instruction pour M. Bouteroue," in *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, III, pt. II, 404-405.

It was with this dictum in mind that Colbert counseled restricting the Jesuits to the limitations in vogue in France; he accordingly helped to bring in Sulpicians and other seculars to counteract Jesuit influence. The studied politeness between the two groups of priests is hence easily understood.

Yet the church was extremely powerful. The bishop as member of the superior council was the equal of the governor or the intendant. Church corporations held the largest share of the occupied land, about one-fourth. Church estates served nearly everywhere as models of husbandry. A tithe of one-thirteenth on farm products was paid after 1667. As in other Latin colonies, the parishes, often coterminous with the seigneuries, were the local entities for administration of justice and for defense. In each the priest, not often highly educated, ranked with or above the seigneur in influence. The habitants were generally pious, though their governors found them sometimes unstable; their interest in books was far surpassed by that in rifles. Education, newspapers, were markedly absent. Piety, industry, conformity, and endurance were the sober virtues of a colony that retains its solidarity through every change of time.

The rôle of religion in the colonial scheme has nevertheless been usually criticized as oppressive. Segregation of native neophytes was merely a clerical monopoly and modified merely, not eliminating, the disastrous attrition due to impact with the higher civilization. The solicitation of funds in France for missions and pious establishments turned investment away from solid material objects. It has also been said that the fight by the church to keep brandy out of the fur trade merely diverted that resource to Dutch and English rivals.<sup>20</sup> Large estates under church control encouraged growth of mortmain, which has always been held an evil of land tenure.

Talon also had other quarrels, especially with the fur traders, who found that the growth of population hurt their business. He became discouraged and resigned in 1672, his projects nowhere complete.<sup>21</sup> His going marked the close of a period, for the European wars imposed rigid economy on Canada.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>20</sup> LeRoy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation*, I, 148-150. J. Chailley-Bert, *Les compagnies de colonisation sous l'ancien régime*, 29-31, points out that royal instructions consistently attempted to control the religious side of the conquest. The share of the church has been brought out in this book; it is evident that French colonization was not a crusade animated by such a spirit as that of Charles V and Philip II of Spain.

<sup>21</sup> Wrong, *Rise and Fall of New France*, 381-400, 417; conditions of Canadian life of those times are interestingly described (*ibid.*, 400-416).

<sup>22</sup> Reports and despatches of Talon are in W. B. Munro, *Documents Relating to the Seigniorial Tenure in Canada, 1598-1854* (Toronto, Champlain Society Publications, III, 1908), p. 22 ff.

Expansion into the heart of the continent had been offset by internal dissension and international competition. Governor Frontenac, who ruled after 1672, was recalled in 1682 as a sequel to quarrels with the Jesuits, with Bishop Laval, the clergy in Montreal, and with the intendant, Ducherneau. Although a poverty-stricken nobleman, Frontenac stands out as Canada's most picturesque and efficient colonial governor. He knew Indians as few white men have, and managed them with consummate skill. He could dance and yell, smoke pipes of peace, or punish with lightning rapidity and *sang froid*. The English colonists pronounced his name with execrations, for his allies smote them without mercy. His authority had been divided with the council, whose share in the government and the control of the fur trade was a fruitful cause of discord. His successors had much trouble to defend the colony; Denonville in 1687 attacked the Iroquois, who fought back savagely, in 1689 compelling the abandonment of Fort Frontenac.<sup>23</sup> They were aiding the continental strategy of the English, who had in 1667 seized New Amsterdam from the Dutch, and with the control of new waterways had begun to move westward and compete with the French for furs. This colonial situation, added to the causes of conflict which in Europe brought on the War of the League of Augsburg, provoked its American counterpart, King William's War (1689-1697).<sup>24</sup>

There had been a lull in Franco-English rivalry under Louis XIV while the Stuarts ruled, for both houses desired Catholic and absolute power. But when the "Glorious Revolution" set William III on the English throne in 1689, the Dutch Netherlands found in him an effective champion against French aggrandizement. Now began that almost incessant conflict between France and England, often called the "Second Hundred Years' War." Making common cause, the enemies of Louis warred upon him; unfortunately for France, William now had two of the great navies of Europe to do his bidding.

For the defense of Canada, the hard-hearted Frontenac came back in 1689 to his old position. In 1690 he beat off a Massachusetts attack on Quebec which might have succeeded had it been better organized; a force led against Montreal under Winthrop of Connecticut did not even strike a blow. Frontenac was also able to bring the

<sup>23</sup> It was reestablished in 1695.

<sup>24</sup> This was the first of the series of four inter-colonial wars. The Peace of Ryswick left the Franco-English situation in North America unchanged, save that for the future, French policy would be to get all of Spanish America instead of taking Spanish holdings piecemeal. "The whole would be better than all its parts."

Iroquois under his power.<sup>25</sup> His war parties in 1690 burned Dover in New Hampshire, Schenectady in New York, and Groton in Massachusetts, leaving a reputation for savagery which dims the lustre of his name. His aim had been to seize New York by a joint naval and land expedition, but an Iroquois attack on Montreal thwarted him. However, his successes in New England held the Indians of the northwest from revolting. The loss in 1690 of Port-Royal in Acadia without a shot fired in its defense had been brought about by cooperation with the British army and navy by Sir William Phipps and others from Massachusetts;<sup>26</sup> American historians dwell upon such service by colonials as if it were unusual, whereas the French colonists stood guard or took the field habitually and thought of it as a diversion breaking the monotony of life. Iberville in 1697 sailed with a small improvised fleet to drive the English from the Hudson's Bay region and Newfoundland. The desultory war dragged on until stopped by the temporary Peace of Ryswick, in which all colonial holdings were mutually restored,<sup>27</sup> but the continental rivalry was merely slackened, and soon broke out afresh.<sup>28</sup> The most important move was the effective occupation of Louisiana, undertaken by Iberville, one of the eleven stalwart sons of Charles Le Moyne, a Canadian seigneur.<sup>29</sup> He was a good fighter, and a man of probity, precision, and dignity. Hearing of English designs on the mouth of the Mississippi, Pontchartrain, minister of marine, sent him in 1698 to anticipate such a calamity, which had been instigated by the renegade Father Hennepin, and was to have been made the opportunity to settle refugee Huguenots at the mouth of the Mississippi under the English flag.

The French move aroused Spain to send Andrés de Arriola to reoccupy Pensacola before Iberville could settle there. The real purpose of the French king was to occupy a strategic point controlling the

<sup>25</sup> Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, I, 444.

<sup>26</sup> The Journal of Phipps' expedition, with other materials is in the *Report on the Canadian Archives* (Toronto, 1912), App. E, 5466, 67-83.

<sup>27</sup> F. Davenport, *European Treaties*, II, 360-365.

<sup>28</sup> Thereafter, though the Treaty restored all colonial conquests, the war bitterness had been transplanted effectively to American soil; it had become a "colonial product" more potent in the allotment of empire than the spirit of avarice for sugar islands.

<sup>29</sup> Nine, listed in G. Oudard, *Vieille Amérique: la Louisiane au temps des français* (Paris, 1931), 90, were named Longueil, Saint-Hélène, Iberville, Maricourt, Sérigny, Sauvolle, Châteauguay, Bienville, D'Assigny. Charles de la Roncière, *Une épopée canadienne (La grande légende de la mer)* (Paris, 1930), is the story of Le Moyne and his sons. See also P. Heinrich, *La Louisiane sous la Compagnie des Indes, 1717-1731* (Paris, 1908), "La famille Le Moyne," 285-289.

mouth of the Mississippi to prevent rivals from entering the river. France was not yet ready for an expansive colonization there.<sup>30</sup> Iberville arrived on the coast, found the Spanish settlement at Pensacola, where he was denied entrance, and sailed on west. Entering the mouth of the Mississippi, he sailed up to the present site of Baton Rouge. Returning to the Gulf he there founded Biloxi in March, 1699. In 1702 Saint-Louis on Mobile Bay was established, and before long it became a center of a good fur trade through Indian treaties. The French hoped now to be able to take the aggressive against the English colonies of the southern coast.<sup>31</sup> The undertaking included control of the Indian tribes along the middle and lower Mississippi River.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) was the third of the great colonial wars by which France was abased from the commanding colonial position won for her by Colbert. The Spanish Hapsburgs had been the prey of France and Austria since Charles II began to reign in Spain in 1665. French plots to secure the succession from the childless and pitiful Charles led England, in a Grand Alliance, to attempt to check the ambitions of Louis XIV, by the "Second Treaty of Partition," (March 13, 1700) which named Archduke Charles of Austria as the next ruler of Spain and the Indies. Charles apparently acquiesced, but when he died in 1700 his will upheld the pretensions of France by naming Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis, his heir. "There shall be no more Pyrenees," but a united Bourbon realm. Louis XIV would, if Spain should become an appanage of France, hold the colonial world in his two hands, east and west, and the Bourbon navies would rule the seas. France was already warring upon her by encroaching in the Spanish Netherlands, cutting down French slave trade with the Spanish colonies, and absorbing the carrying trade in them, and, finally, by recognizing the son of James II as king of England. War was inevitable when Queen Anne came to the throne in 1702.<sup>32</sup>

The Grand Alliance demanded that Spain open her own colonies to European trade; Portugal was marshaled against Spain by the Methuen Treaty (1703) which allowed increased sales of cloth and

<sup>30</sup> Oudard, *Vieille Amérique*, 93-94. Sources on early Louisiana: Pierre Margry, *Découvertes et établissements des Français* (Paris, 1879-1888, 6v.); B. F. French, *Historical Collections of Louisiana and Florida* (ser. 1, New York, 1846-1853, 5v.; ser. 2, New York, 1869-1875, 2v.). Bibliography: Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 377-380.

<sup>31</sup> This was the scene of Soto's tragic failures in 1544. Priestley, *The Luna Papers*, I, xlvi. In 1706 it contained ninety settlers, who had already begun enslavement of the Indians.

<sup>32</sup> On the situation in Canada, see Shortt and Chapais, "The Colony in its Political Relations," in Shortt and Doughty, vol. II, pt. II, 363-375.

opened many colonial markets to England, and let Portuguese wines in.<sup>33</sup> This war was more widely spread than previous dynastic wars; it involved more colonies, including the West Indies, Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, and the borders of New England, Acadia, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay. New England was ravaged in renewed raids and massacres which began in several places simultaneously on August 10, 1703. Wells and Saco were destroyed on that day. During the following winter, the Connecticut valley was terrorized, Deerfield falling in February, 1704. Iberville even proposed to take Boston in 1705. For five years all New England trembled in fear of such massacres as that at Haverhill in 1708. The Canadians, and even their savage allies, looked upon these atrocities as crusades against infidels.<sup>34</sup>

In pursuit of this American version of the *Jehad* Port-Royal was assailed between 1704 and 1710 by three or four fatuous expeditions. It finally fell in 1710, from which time it continued British. Quebec and Montreal once more withstood assault by ineffective armies. The British navy, assisted by the Dutch, fought the French in the Mediterranean, capturing Gibraltar, seized the galleons of Spain near Cartagena, and "spread terror in the French West Indies, but failed to make permanent gains except in Saint-Christophe."<sup>35</sup> French privateers were driven from the seas. Keen English observers of colonial affairs believed that a resolute war policy and some vigorous campaigning would drive France and even Spain out of the continent.<sup>36</sup>

The American colonists now numbered 250,000 while the Canadians had not reached 20,000 in 1714.<sup>37</sup> The Americans were ready to aid in every way in an assault on Canada, but the English troops were diverted to Portugal. An expedition finally came, only to be dashed on the Seven Islands, near the mouth of the St. Lawrence. A thousand soldiers and sailors were left dead on the shore. Eleven thousand others, afraid of the river, sailed away to England, and Quebec was saved.<sup>38</sup>

On the Florida border the Indians were used with skill by the French, the English also using their traders to stir up other tribes,

<sup>33</sup> This treaty is in L. Hertslet, *A Collection of the Treaties and Conventions . . .* (London, 1840-1925, 31v.), II, 24-25. It is discussed in relation to its bearing on French trade in Ségur-Dupeyron, *Histoire des négociations commerciales*, II, 305-315.

<sup>34</sup> Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, II, 563-565.

<sup>35</sup> Hardy, *op. cit.*, 82.

<sup>36</sup> Wrong, *op. cit.*, II, 568-570.

<sup>37</sup> *Censuses of Canada*, IV, xxi.

<sup>38</sup> Wrong, *op. cit.*, II, 578; Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 197.

often without conclusive results; in their campaign of 1704 the southern British, using Creek allies, destroyed thirteen Apalachee missions of the Spaniards.<sup>39</sup>

The temporary solution of the Austrian menace to Europe through ascendancy in Spain came when the Emperor Joseph I died (1711) and his brother Charles gave up the Spanish succession. There was now no one to oppose the recognition of Philip V as king of Spain, since Louis XIV was ready to acquiesce in the perpetual separation of the two Bourbon thrones, which had been the chief object of a needless war for twelve years.<sup>40</sup>

The colonial provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) were the definitive cession to England of Acadia, the Hudson's Bay region, Newfoundland, and Saint-Christophe in the Caribbean.<sup>41</sup> The future of Mediterranean diplomacy was markedly affected by cession to England of Minorca and Gibraltar, and the cessions of territory commanding the St. Lawrence meant that North America could not fail to become British. New England was rewarded by having the enemy thrust farther from her shores, while old England was now able to cut Canada off by sea and begin the encirclement of New France.

A setback to French commerce with England came through rejection by the British Parliament of commercial Articles VIII and IX in this treaty, which would have given France as low rates on exports to England as any European country. Under liberal tariff regulations France had enjoyed a favorable balance, but this was stopped by England in 1678; and when again allowed, the trade was subjected to prohibitive schedules. The French expected to return to the terms established in 1664. The Tories in England would have met much of this demand, but were unable to move the general outcry of opposition, and prohibitive duties turned most of the trade between France and England into the hands of smugglers. England received from both France and Spain most-favored-nation treatment.<sup>42</sup>

France as a colonial power had received several serious checks, as has been seen, and had made no material compensating gains. The alluring St. Lawrence valley was still indeed hers with Cape Breton Island at its mouth, where Fort Louisbourg was in 1713 erected as a

<sup>39</sup> Bolton, *Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia*, 60-63.

<sup>40</sup> Lavisser, *Histoire de France*, VIII, pt. I, 127-137; Wrong, *op. cit.*, II, 582; James W. Gerard, *The Peace of Utrecht . . .* (New York, 1885), 207-212.

<sup>41</sup> Williamson, *A Short History . . .*, I, 336-337; Charles Giraud, *Le traité d'Utrecht* (Paris, 1847), 62-118; and thirteen *pièces justificatives*.

<sup>42</sup> Williamson, *op. cit.*, I, 336-337; the effect of these negotiations on the trade situation of France are discussed at length in P. de Ségur-Dupeyron, *Histoire des négociations commerciales et maritimes . . .*, II, 287-360. See chap. XI, this book.

defense; but Acadia and Newfoundland left an enemy on the flank.<sup>43</sup> The British enclaves of earlier days had now become the jaws of a nut-cracker above and below the St. Lawrence valley. The situation demanded a counter move in continental strategy, while the hold of France on the Mississippi River was yet firm. A strong line of forts, beginning at Crown Point on Lake Champlain, led toward the west through the Great Lakes region; again others on the Wabash and Illinois rivers began a second line which extended down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico. In India the fortunes of France were built up by aggressive and capable governors of the East India Company, sharp as might be their rivalries with the English company. But best of all, in the West Indies, France still possessed Guadeloupe and Martinique, with several smaller islands, forming the sugar bowl of the world.

<sup>43</sup> A. S. Aiton, "The Asiento Treaty as Reflected in the Papers of Lord Shelburne," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, VIII, No. 2 (May, 1928), 167-177. See below, for the Oriental trade, chaps. XIV-XVII.

## CHAPTER XIII

## SENEGAL UNDER THE OLD RÉGIME

The west coast of Africa was of importance to the old colonial empires principally on account of the slave trade, though the French and the English were also concerned with export of gold, gum, and some agricultural products. With the development of tobacco and sugar plantations in America, the rivalry of the Europeans became acute. The English were active on the Gambia River, the French chiefly on the Senegal. The Dutch posts were usually farther north and south but their vessels visited all parts of the coast.

Senegal, the center of French activity, lies between the Senegal and Gambia rivers, well within the torrid zone. On the north are the hot desert and steppes of the Sahara, to the east is the basin of the Niger; on the southwest are the mountains of Fouta Djallon, and on the south dense equatorial forests. The area thus roughly included contains about seventy-four thousand square miles.<sup>1</sup> The sluggish Senegal River was the only useful way of communication by which the interior could be penetrated by early explorers, and, after the occupation, the only means of getting produce from the inland comptoirs to the sea. It flows from the eastern slopes of the mountains of the Fouta Djallon, and empties its waters through shallow channels which admit only light draught vessels.

There were no fixed ports on the coast at the beginning of the seventeenth century, although intermittent trade was kept up. The old Portuguese holdings had long been somnolent. Some of the Senegal natives spoke a little French, which would seem to prove the existence of earlier contacts. There were no other Europeans in possession, though as early as 1588 some English merchants had been granted trading rights between the Senegal and Gambia rivers; about the same time the Dutch added Gorée to their earlier posts at Rufisque, Portendal, and Joal. The three nations traded amicably until about the middle of the seventeenth century, when a highly competitive period began. The Dutch posts were a menace to the French until the latter seized most of them and retained them under the Treaty of Nimwegen.

<sup>1</sup> P. Gaffarel, *Le Sénégal et le Soudan français* (Paris, 189-), 5; J. Ancelle, *Les explorations au Sénégal* (Paris, 1886), 25.

In 1612 some Normans built a post at the mouth of the Gambia, but all of them presently died of fever. Jean le Tellier of Dieppe sailed in 1619 along the coast, being followed between 1621 and 1626 by Dieppe and Rouen merchants who began seasonal voyages to the coast between the Senegal and the Gambia. In 1626 they were chartered by Richelieu as the Normandy Company, with a ten-year monopoly. Their business from the Senegal employed three or four small ships per year, with a like number from the Gambia. In 1634 a group of Saint-Malo, called the Guinea Company, directed by Jean Briant Larcy, was licensed for ten years to trade on the coasts of Sierra Leone to Cape López; another group, of Paris, received in 1635 the name of "Cap Blanc," and was to trade from the Gambia to Sierra Leone,<sup>2</sup> but not within areas of the other French companies.

The beginnings of Saint-Louis were due to the activities of Thomas Lombard<sup>3</sup> [Lambert], an old coast trader and director of the Normandy Company. He built a post at the mouth of the Senegal, and another was set up soon thereafter on Saint-Vincent Island. The post at the river mouth was carried away by a high sea, whereupon another was built a league upstream in 1638. Here Saint-Louis lies behind a sand bar which prevents it from becoming a real seaport.<sup>4</sup>

The Senegal Company existed from 1634 to 1658, after which the Compagnie de Cap Vert et du Sénégal carried on the trade until absorbed by Colbert's West India Company; the chief export was gum from the mimosa trees in the Moorish territory on the right bank. From the left bank were collected millet and slaves. This company had a prosperous trade, and was fortunate enough to sell out at a gain, for 150,000 livres. Colbert yearned to take the slave trade away from the Dutch and Portuguese, who had been too long profiting by it. These various companies had no program for permanent improve-

<sup>2</sup> About the same time, Launay Razilly was granted the trade of the coast of Mauretania from Salé to Cape Blanco (P. Cultru, *Les origines de l'Afrique occidentale; Histoire du Sénégal du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle à 1870* (Paris, 1910), 44; Léon Guérin, *Histoire maritime de la France*, I, 400; Labat, *Nouvelle relation de l'Afrique Occidentale*, I, 12-13; Caillet, *L'administration en France*, II, 117). Meantime the Dutch, renewing war against Spain in 1621, used their West India Company to oust the Portuguese from their favored position. They took Elmina on the Gold Coast in 1638, and thence controlled most of the slave trade for twenty years (Williamson, *Europe Overseas*, 68); S. P. Honoré Naber, *Geschiedkundige atlas van Nederlanders in Guinee en Brazilië* (S'Gravenhage, Nijhoff, 1931). Sources, literature, and two charts of Dutch activities in Upper Guinea (Gold Coast), Lower Guinea (Angola), and Brazil, from 1621 to 1872.

<sup>3</sup> Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, I, 13; Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 192; Bonnassieux, *Les grandes compagnies du commerce*, 223 ff.

<sup>4</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, V, 492-497, recounts the celebration of a native treaty in 1670, and details of the history of the West India Company.

ments or development of resources. They sought gum, ivory, gold, and, most of all, slaves, in exchange for glass beads and brandy, which can hardly be considered essentials of colonial growth. The French state, in exchange for monopolistic advantages in the trade, gave some protection, but its restrictions, plus poor management and interest in American affairs, made reorganization necessary. When the West India Company was liquidated in 1673, its posts were taken over by the Senegal or Africa Company.<sup>5</sup>

This was during the Dutch war, in which the French captured the Dutch trading posts, but returned them under the Treaty of Nimwegen (1678).<sup>6</sup> In 1677 the company named as governor Jean du Casse, with charge over Senegambia. Journeys were made by him into the back country, and French suzerainty, without customs dues, was imposed in Cayor and Baol, while a trade monopoly from Cape Verde to the Gambia was obtained from the chiefs. After the fall of Gorée, Du Casse took control of Rufisque and Joal. Commerce was carried on under annually arranged tariffs or "coutumes" paid to the chiefs in merchandise and arms. These the natives accepted as tribute payments. Treaties analogous to those made by the Dutch permitted the French to trade for leather, ivory, gold dust, wax, ostrich feathers, and gum. Iron, cloth, and coarse products were given in exchange at "The Desert," midway between Saint-Louis and Podor and at the two last named places.<sup>7</sup> Rival English traders also bought gum at Petit Portendik, while the Dutch at Arguin, near Cape Blanco, traded in gum, gold dust, ostrich plumes and ambergris.

In order to profit from this trade, it was necessary to make voyages upstream at flood time, once a year. The friendship of the native chiefs was as essential as it was necessary to have goods available for barter, and these were not always easy to procure. The West India Company collapsed in a few years, although merchandise imported was sold at three or four times the prices asked in France, and the merchants cleverly de-

<sup>5</sup> By an arrêt of April 9, 1672; its letters patent were issued in June, 1679. It was to trade from Cape Blanco to the Cape of Good Hope. Robert du Casse, *L'Admiral du Casse* (Paris, 1876), 16. Ducéré, *Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime*, 120-174, gives a good account of this vivid character. Gorée was taken by vice-admiral Jean d'Estrées on November 1, 1677. He had previously seized Cayenne and Tobago (Du Casse, *op. cit.*, 17-18).

<sup>6</sup> In the meantime the Royal Adventurers of Africa, soon becoming the Royal African Company, had brought on the war of 1664 (Williamson, *Europe Overseas*, 68).

<sup>7</sup> Two important sources on this period are Claude Jannequin, *Voyage en Lybie, au royaume de Sénégal* (Paris, 1643), and the *Relations des RR PP Alexis de Saint-Lo et Bernardin de Renouard*. Both are in C. A. Walckenaer, *Histoire générale des voyages; ou nouvelle collection des relations de voyages par mer et par terre . . .* (Paris, 1826), II, 304 ff., 328 ff.

frauded the Moors by false measuring when buying gum. As the West India slave market became more important, the gum trade declined.<sup>8</sup> British and Dutch competition was sharp, especially at times when the French ships had sailed home with cargoes. The Dutch could have destroyed the French post easily had they wished, but in 1678 Governor Du Casse took their post at Arguin.<sup>9</sup> Fortunately, both Dutch and English had their chief ports farther down on the Gold Coast. The latter had begun on the Gambia in 1618.<sup>10</sup>

The first effort to enter the interior in 1667 proved a disaster, as only five men out of thirty returned. Although the great Dutch admiral, de Ruyter, had devastated the English posts in Sierra Leone (1664), the English had been able to reestablish them and others on the Gambia. The coast trade after the Peace of Breda (1667) was largely in elephants' tusks, wax, skins, gold, pepper, and dyewood. With keen competition, and with its energies dissipated by affairs in two widely separated continents, the company was not able to prosper, as no attention was paid to development.<sup>11</sup> West Africa was essentially nothing but a source of labor supply. The Company of Senegal and Guinea had begun in 1679 with 600,000 livres new capital, but this was less than its debts.<sup>12</sup> Hence, in 1684 it abandoned to free trade all the coast south of Sierra Leone, but was still hindered by restricted capital and dishonest agents. In 1685 the company, now called the Guinea Company, had a monopoly contract for thirty years to supply to the Caribbean four thousand slaves annually on a subsidy of thirteen livres per head.<sup>13</sup> In the same year the director, Chambonneau, went upstream to the Peuhl town of Bitel, but returned with nothing done by

<sup>8</sup> N. Villault de Bellefond, *Relations des costes d'Afrique . . . dans le voyage qu'il a fait en 1666 et 1667* (Paris, 1669) in Prévost, *Voyages*, vol. X, p. 161 ff.; and *Les voyages du sieur Lemaire aux îles Canaries, Sénégal, et Gambie* (Paris, 1695).

<sup>9</sup> Étienne-Félix Berlioux, *André Briue, ou l'origine de la colonie française du Sénégal* (Paris, 1874), 26; Du Casse, *L'Admiral du Casse*, 23; Ducéré, *Les corsaires*, 123; Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, I, 74-75.

<sup>10</sup> Before Du Casse, little was known of the interior; Jannequin had gone seventy leagues up the Senegal in 1637, to Terrier Rouge on the right bank.

<sup>11</sup> Arcin, *Histoire de la Guinée française*, 197.

<sup>12</sup> Du Casse ended his term in 1679 and returned to France (Du Casse, *L'Admiral du Casse*, 42). He had given the French possession of fifty leagues of the coast. French territory spread over three hundred square leagues in Cayor, but Du Casse's treaty with the damel rested a dead letter for nearly two hundred years.

<sup>13</sup> The services of Du Casse in the West Indies are recounted in F. R. Hart, *Admirals of the Caribbean* (Boston, 1922), 110-129. The Declaration of the king for creation of the Guinea Company, January, 1685, is in the Code Noir, 10-27. The Senegal Company's monopoly had been revoked on September 12, 1684, but restored on January 6, 1685, for a shorter coastline south of Sierra Leone (Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, I, 30).

way of building up relations. Two years later, the Haute-Fleuve, or Galam, was penetrated. This was the farthest inland point reached for two hundred years. There was a good deal of competition by other nations, and even by the French state itself. During the late 1680's Saint-Louis was torn with dissensions which inspectors were unable to stop. Several posts were captured by the Dutch, and the company was in 1693 doing a meager business of 170,000 livres.<sup>14</sup>

In 1682 a good Negro cost ten livres in Senegal, and sold for one hundred écus (three hundred livres) in America. After 1697 the value of a slave on the Gambia was forty livres. Under Brûe, the exports of Senegal rose as high as eight hundred thousand livres in slaves, ivory, skins, and especially gum. Imports such as brandy, trinkets, cotton goods, and firearms were in negligible quantity.<sup>15</sup> In 1684 the trade of Guinea (in slaves) was separated from that of Senegal. The posts were all decadent at the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War, 1689-1697). Saint-Louis and Gorée fell to the English in 1693. The former was retaken by France in July, but not Gorée. It came back at the Peace of Ryswick, leaving the French West African posts as they had been in 1688.<sup>16</sup> The Third Senegal Company operated from 1696 to 1718.

The posts revived with the coming in 1697 of André Brûe as director-general, whose first care was to affirm French tenure of Arguin. This "creator of French West Africa" possessed outstanding good health, whereas of thirteen directors since 1626 eight had died at their posts, killed by climate or natives. To this asset he added enthusiasm, energy, knowledge of the natives, and a plan.<sup>17</sup> He had learned Africa by previous service in Tripoli. Under his instructions he was to make treaties with the native chiefs, confiscate all non-French vessels, control appointment of inferiors, and "establish French influence in all places." Saint-Louis had yet a desultory trade in gums with the Moors on the right or north bank of the Senegal, and with the black peoples of Oualo (Waloff), Cayor, and Djolof on the left. The customs dues, really tribute, were still being paid to the chiefs, as they continued to be until 1854.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Berlioux, *André Brûe*, 26-32 ff.; Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, 36.

<sup>15</sup> G. Hervet, *Le commerce extérieur de l'Afrique Occidentale Française* (Paris, 1911), 23.

<sup>16</sup> F. Ronze, *Question d'Afrique* (Paris, 1918), 27; Du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, 107-113, gives the organization of all the French slave-trade companies working in Senegal to 1737.

<sup>17</sup> Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, I, 183-184; D'Anfreville de la Salle, *Notre vieux Sénégal* (Paris, 1909), 5-6; Berlioux, *André Brûe*, 42.

<sup>18</sup> Berlioux, *op. cit.*, 41-43; Gaffarel, *Le Sénégal et le Soudan français*, 76-78, 85-88, 104-110; Brûe's commissions are in Labat, *op. cit.*, I, 48-52.

First reconstructing two old forts on Gorée, Brûe made a journey to the Peuhl (Foula) chiefs in September, 1697, stopping everywhere to pay overdue customs; he made direct contacts with the dense agricultural populations and studied trade opportunities. This journey led him as far as Guiorel,<sup>19</sup> beyond Kaldi, where the *seratik* or chief gave him the right to build a post at Goumel. After visiting Saint-Louis and Gorée, on July 27, 1698, he started upstream again, through yet unknown country, to Galam, at the junction of the Falémé with the Senegal. After making a treaty with the Mandingoes, he learned that their merchants of the town of Dramanet on the river frequently visited far-away Timbuctoo; desiring to absorb this trade, he planned to build a fort preliminary to opening a commercial route thence along the Niger. Fort Saint-Joseph was built at Dramanet, but was soon washed away by a freshet.<sup>20</sup> He left there an able Augustinian, Père Apollinaire, who explored the Falémé again before returning to France in 1700. Just then, desiring to fix terms of trade with the English, Brûe visited Gambia without succeeding; next he went to the Bissaos archipelago, where the Portuguese vainly began to prevent his renewing trade with the chiefs. In the interval he had tried to cultivate cotton, indigo, and cacao, but the slave trade yielded more allure by its quick profits. On a visit to Cayor in 1701, Brûe and his companions were arrested in June by the damel, who charged them with interfering with his foreign trade. Fortunately, two French vessels just then reached Rufisque, and the party was ransomed. He was preparing to fight the damel to recover his ransom when recalled to France to serve as central director of the nearly bankrupt company.<sup>21</sup> In January, 1704, he grappled with the problem of trying to raise money from stockholders weary of losses.

His successors in Senegal nearly ruined his constructive work. First was the sieur Lemaitre (1702-1706). The War of the Spanish Succession was going on, and some French corsairs seized the English Fort James on the Gambia, whereupon, although the English and French companies had agreed to avoid hostilities, the English aroused the Mandingoes to attack Fort Saint-Joseph, which had been rebuilt.<sup>22</sup> The French had to burn the fort and take refuge with their ally the seratik, having lost the Galam market, the Mandingo alliance, and the road to the Falémé gold mines. Lemaitre was replaced by De la Courbe, a seasoned trader, who failed to reoccupy Galam. In 1707 the

<sup>19</sup> Berlioux, *André Brûe*, 41-70; Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, I, 269; Ancelle, *Les explorations*, 29.

<sup>20</sup> Ancelle, *Les explorations*, 30.

<sup>21</sup> Berlioux, *André Brûe*, 86-97, 183-184, 188.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 191, 194-196; Labat, *Nouvelle relation*, 37-38.

company held only Gorée, Saint-Louis, Albreda on the Gambia, and Géréges, and no help came from France for two years. The defunct company was replaced in 1709 by a new one, of Rouen merchants, one of whom, Mustellier, came as director, but soon perished on a river trip in 1711 while trying to establish the post in Galam where De la Courbe had failed. His successor, Richebourg, was drowned in a shipwreck on the bar of the river in 1713.

Thereupon Brüe was sent back as governor in 1714,<sup>23</sup> and threw himself into the tasks of rebuilding Fort Saint-Joseph and strengthening the gum trade on the Falémé. The well-disposed natives there made it a profitable trade center. Compagnon went in 1717 to prospect the Bambouk gold region on the right bank of the Falémé, where white men had never been; good deposits were found seventeen leagues up the river. To establish communications and double company profits by direct mining instead of trade for the gold, Brüe asked for twelve hundred soldier-laborers, native help being unavailable; this was too extravagant an aim, and so the trade in gum and ostrich feathers became the main activity.<sup>24</sup> From this point again Brüe hoped to press on to far-away mysterious Timbuctoo. Before this could be done, it was necessary to drive the Dutch competitor out of Arguin, which he seized in 1717. The company was in 1719 absorbed by John Law's Company of the Indies, and Brüe left Senegal in June, 1720, but his influence had given the needed impulse, for the reoccupation of Bambouk was undertaken in 1724.<sup>25</sup>

Brüe had made it a point to show how effective Dutch and English competition had become. The Dutch retook Arguin and traded there until 1721, when three French vessels recovered it. Meantime a Dutch expedition seized Portendik where the Moors joined them and laid siege to Arguin, turning it over to the rival of France in January, 1722.

But the Compagnie des Indes in 1723 sent four frigates under Lieutenant de la Rigaudière with Brüe as commissary extraordinary only, to recover Arguin. The French found the wily enemy fled and the water cisterns of the fort filled with sand; this compelled them to raise their siege and send a ship for provisions. Sailing over to Portendik, now freed from its Dutch defenders, La Rigaudière left a garrison and returned to France, as did the garrison shortly. De Salvart appeared before Arguin in 1724, and disembarking before the Dutch

<sup>23</sup> Berlioux, *op. cit.*, 199; Labat, *op. cit.*, I, 43-44.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Bonnassieux, *Les grandes compagnies du commerce*, 232-233; Compagnon's journey to Bambouk is told in Labat, *op. cit.*, IV, 32-56.

<sup>25</sup> Eugène Saulnier, *La compagnie de Galam au Sénégal* (Paris, 1921), 6-11, epitomizing Cultru, *Les origines de l'Afrique Occidentale*. . . . The death of Brüe is noticed in *Nouvelles annales des voyages*, vol. 55, p. 159-160; see also Ancelle, *op. cit.*, 32-33.

could stop up the cisterns, forced its surrender. When he moved against Portendik shortly thereafter, the Dutch set fire to the post and fled. Arguin was occupied by France only a few years, economy forcing its relinquishment.

During his service Brüe explored the interior as far as Galam, Fouta, and Bambouk, beyond which no one went until the nineteenth century. He proved clearly that the Senegal was the best route to the interior, and made accurate observations concerning the native races. He revised the principal tariffs on slaves, salt, ivory, and gum, brought some order into business, and subjected the company agents to discipline. Even so, his successor, De Saint-Robert, reported the colony in a bad situation. About 1723 the establishments contained a mere hundred white men, sixty of whom were at Saint-Louis, and the others distributed among Gorée, Albreda, the Bissaos, and Saint-Joseph.

The Compagnie des Indes was in a very difficult position in India and especially in America, and valued the west coast of Africa as a station on the way either to India or to the Antilles, and profitable only for the slave trade. Nevertheless, it sent supplies to Saint-Louis and, in the year 1723, a new governor, Du Bellay.<sup>26</sup>

His subordinate, Levens, explored the Bambouk gold region again, but declared that exploitation would cost more than it would yield. So the company determined to examine mining prospects thoroughly, and induced La Monnaie de Paris to lend one of its agents, Jacques Pelay, to explore northern Bambouk. Pelay found the metal in abundance, led a large expedition into the gold region; but in December, 1732, he was ambushed and killed near Fort Saint-Joseph by the native chiefs, who preferred to retain the gold trade for themselves. The expedition was recalled and the gold hunt discontinued.<sup>27</sup>

In 1734 French West Africa consisted of Saint-Louis, Gorée, Albreda, Saint-Joseph, and a comptoir at the Bissaos. The director was assisted by a superior council at Saint-Louis. Of its ten members, four resided at the seat of government and the others in the three departments (Saint-Louis, Gorée, and Galam). The administration employed forty commissaries and two hundred and fifteen other whites. The annual trade amounted to about ten thousand quintals of gum, one hundred marks of gold, two hundred quintals of unrefined wax, ninety-seven of ivory, and about 1,450 Negroes. In 1736 Pierre David, newly made governor, displayed an energy which recalls that of Brüe.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 150-152.

<sup>27</sup> Saulnier, *La compagnie de Galam au Sénégal*, 11.

<sup>28</sup> Pierre David, "Le Sénégal et les îles orientales d'Afrique sous le gouvernement de P. David (1729-1752)," in P. Margry, *Relations et mémoires inédits*, 355-376. Saulnier, *La compagnie de Galam au Sénégal*, gives David's dates as 1734-1746.

One of his first acts (1736) was the evacuation of Bissaos, where the agents were shut in by the hostility of the natives. Then he fought the competition carried on through Arguin and Portendik. The company bought annually only ten thousand quintals of gum, all that France could consume. The demand for this material by London and Amsterdam supported a rich contraband trade through Arguin and Portendik, to which the natives brought their product to get the better prices. The French navy and company ships fought the interlopers, but at disastrous expense of profits. To cut this cost, David made an agreement with the English in Gambia to furnish them annually three hundred Negroes in exchange for 360,000 pounds of gum, which he sold in London at lower prices than those asked by the interlopers. "From this moment smugglers disappeared from our coast and we received all the gum."<sup>29</sup>

In 1744 David erected a post at Podor among the Brakna Moors to provide a better food supply for Saint-Louis. He then went into Galam, ascended the Falémé, reconstructed the post of Farbana, and visited the gold fields. Thanks to him, the west coast was freed from hostilities during the War of the Austrian Succession by a neutrality agreement with the English Gambia Company. He was just beginning to make the colony valuable when he was sent, in 1746, to the Île de France to succeed La Bourdonnais.<sup>30</sup> Following the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), the English in 1751 attempted to drive the French Company out of Gambia, but after they had done so a French squadron returned and reestablished the comptoir of Albreda. During this period Michel Adanson, the French botanist, visited West Africa on a five-year mission for the Jardin Royal. In his study of the fauna and flora he traveled from Saint-Louis to Gambia and inland as far as Podor. He was in the country from 1749 to 1753, and in 1757 published an *Histoire naturelle de Sénégal*.<sup>31</sup>

At the beginning of the Seven Years' War the forces in West Africa, numbering less than two hundred, were doubled in 1756, and a few more came in 1758. On April 23 of the latter year Saint-Louis surrendered to an English fleet, the capitulation including Podor and Galam. Gorée was obliged to surrender in December. This put a very definite check upon the growth of French West Africa, where the building of a respectable colony had really begun. England did nothing in the interior during her tenure.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> M. Besson, *La tradition coloniale française*, 69-72.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>31</sup> Ancelle, *Les explorations au Sénégal*, 36; H. Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*.

<sup>32</sup> Saulnier, *La compagnie de Galam au Sénégal*, 12; H. Dodwell, "Le Sénégal

Article X of the Treaty of Paris restored nothing but Gorée; Great Britain received full control of the shores of the Senegal, and Saint-Louis, Podor, and Galam. Nothing was said about the rundown factory at Albreda, which the English scorned, as their hold on the Senegal gave them the monopoly of the gum trade. Choiseul was able to keep the British from destroying Albreda, and won a share of the Gambia trade. Gorée in 1763 was merely a port of refreshment, with no commercial relations with the interior. After the peace, the Compagnie des Indes requested the crown to take over the administration and exploitation, reserving for itself only the port of Ouida on the Gulf of Benim. The coast trade was in June, 1763, declared open to French nationals.<sup>33</sup>

Poncet de la Rivière (1763-1764), who went out to receive the island from the English, was given the timid task of restoring French influence without antagonizing the late enemy. One of his permanent accomplishments was that of obtaining the cession of the village of Dakar, but his efforts to reanimate Albreda were without result. Unfortunately, he used his office to line his own purse, and this brought about his replacement by Mesnager, who continued the same selfish policy. His successor, De la Gastière, 1767, received instructions which illustrate the confusion of colonial ideas of the period, curiously asserting the necessity of free commerce just when a privileged company was being set up:

... This island cannot be used for any other purpose than to continue the slave trade, as an entrepôt, and as a port of refreshment for French navigators, trading in Guinea. . . . Merchants must be attracted who will buy captives along the coast. There must also be brought in all the articles which the inhabitants of the island and the French navigators may desire, but . . . His Majesty has been informed that the governors of this colony . . . have constantly restricted and taken for their own profit everything at Gorée which could be an object of commerce. . . . His Majesty desires that French navigators shall traffic here without any restrictions and with all protection. . . .

About this time was formed the Compagnie des Côtes d'Afrique, which received a number of privileges while the governor went on conducting his own business, raising taxes, and quarreling with the company; he was disgraced in 1774.<sup>34</sup>

sous la domination anglaise," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1916), IV, 267-300; Ancelle, *Les explorations*, 37.

<sup>33</sup> F. P. Renaut, *Le Pacte de Famille et l'Amérique* (Paris, 1922), 129-131; Gaffarel, *Le Sénégal et le Soudan français*, 78.

<sup>34</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 373-378.

Another governor, Le Brasseur, under the instructions given to his predecessors, conducted operations on the coast costing 200,000 livres per year, whereas the income was about 70,000; for this reason the administration was transferred to the Compagnie de Guyane. Through the period of 1778 to 1789 somewhat more effective French activities occurred on this coast. An expedition under De Lauzun received from England the capitulation of Saint-Louis in January, 1779, without a shot. Gorée was reoccupied and the commander was asked to retake French possession along the coast from Cape Blanco to Sierra Leone, and to fortify Saint-Louis. A force of six hundred was sent to the coast during the war period, but Gorée was abandoned, and taken by the English in 1780.

When the Treaty of Versailles (1783) restored to France the establishments of West Africa, more vigorous governors undertook to renew relations with the interior. Repentigny traveled to the tribes on the upper Senegal, and his successor visited the Braknas at Podor in 1787. The cession of the peninsula of Cape Verde was confirmed. Governor de Bouffles renewed relations with the Waloffs of Cayor.<sup>85</sup> One of his subordinates, Rubault, made a voyage in 1786 up the Senegal, then to the upper Gambia and east to the Falémé. He remained a year at old Fort Saint-Joseph, where he gathered a quantity of gold and ivory and one hundred slaves, calling upon Saint-Louis to send him a convoy to bring them down. When it arrived, Rubault had been killed by the slaves and his merchandise pillaged.<sup>86</sup>

At the end of the Old Régime French knowledge of West Africa was less than it had been at the beginning of the eighteenth century, because of wars, instability, and incompetent agents. Only the course of the Senegal was known. Saint-Louis then contained about seven thousand black inhabitants; it had a poorly managed hospital and a miserable port.<sup>87</sup> The only fortifications were insignificant. The administration of the colony was simple. The governor, assisted by a *commissaire-ordonnateur*, certain officers and commissaries, was the head of the establishment, limited to Gorée before 1778. The governor, as supreme judge, presided over the tribunal when native cases ap-

<sup>85</sup> The treaty of alliance and commerce made by this governor with the *bour* of Saloum marked an attempt at interior penetration not realized until after 1822; the treaty is in *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1924), 55-59.

<sup>86</sup> Saulnier, *La compagnie de Galam . . .*, 13. After this, Fort Saint-Joseph was abandoned, and trade with the interior was irregular. The company was suppressed in 1791. Saulnier, 15-16, gives an estimate of the value of the relations with the interior during the eighteenth century. See also Ancelle, *Les explorations*, 38-40.

<sup>87</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 379. On Landolphe, P. Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830* (Paris, 1908), 51-59.

peared. Cases against whites were referred to the metropole. The corps of Volunteers of Africa had fallen by the eve of the Revolution to a handful of thirty men, but infantry from France had been sent out, numbering about two hundred and forty men. Saint-Louis, Gorée, and the agencies at Podor, Joal, Portudal, and Albreda had no activities other than a small trade with the interior. West Africa never had a large place in the economy of France. French ships frequented numerous coast points outside of Senegal down to the Congo for the slave trade, which was carried on against the hostility of the natives, and no whites remained on shore except during a capture.

Ouida on the Gulf of Benim was occupied after the Treaty of Versailles, but the kings of Dahomey kept the Frenchmen close to the shoreline. In 1781 the audacious Landolphe, who had been a slave trader, interested a group of merchants in forming a Compagnie de l'Owère, from the name of the region formed by the Benim coast and the right bank of the Niger. The company had a privilege to trade for three years, during which Landolphe developed friendly relations with the native chiefs and began to develop a colonial scheme, making profitable developments until 1792. His success aroused the jealousy of the English, who, in August of that year (a time of peace) sent four vessels, whose officers, after dining with Landolphe, returned in the night, surprised the sleeping French, shot them, pillaged the storehouses and set them on fire. Landolphe himself was wounded, but was cared for and saved by the natives. A quarter of a century was to pass before West Africa was to see the reanimation of French expansion.

As has been said above, the Guinea slave trade was separated from the Senegal commerce in 1684 and thereafter. The line of division was at the Gambia, later at the Sierra Leone. Guinea also exported gold. The slave trade was a company monopoly until 1713, when it was opened to French nationals until 1720. On the eve of the Revolution the West Africa trade showed 18,000,000 livres of imports, ten millions being foreign goods sent through French ports. France received 14,000,000 livres of imports from West Africa. Thirty thousand slaves were exported annually, this commerce having grown throughout the century.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>88</sup> G. Hervet placed the exportations of Senegal in 1786, on the eve of the suppression of the privileged companies, at 7,260,000 francs; *Le commerce extérieur de l'Afrique Occidentale Française*, 24; Senegal was in French hands after 1779.

In 1788, the African coast from Arguin to the Congo sent to France five ships carrying 2,094,000 pounds of various merchandise, chiefly gum. There was exported from the metropole 18,256,000 pounds of goods on 108 vessels, which purchased slaves and carried them to the Antilles, whence they returned to France; A. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I (1921), 166, 195-196.

## CHAPTER XIV

## INDIA, 1664-1719

The political disruption of India throughout the sixteenth to the eighteenth century impelled the intrusive nations to assume a militant rôle and the direction of political action in order to safeguard commercial expansion in Hindustan.<sup>1</sup> The Mogul Empire, founded by Baber, a descendant of Gengis Khan, grew from its center at Delhi until after Aurangzeb (1659-1707) it reached its apogee. The Moslems held the control, occupied the cities, and managed commerce.<sup>2</sup> The empire then consisted of twenty-two viceroyalties governed by *subahs* under each of whom were several *nabobs*;<sup>3</sup> the only surviving Hindu institution was the ancient village. The conquered Hindus, mostly attached to the soil, had no share in government beyond the village organization.

Aurangzeb's heirs quarreled over the succession, five of them succeeding him within twelve years. The initiator of the disintegration, the famous Nizam ul Mulk, governor of Malva, was made viceroy of the Deccan in 1723 with his capital at Hyderabad; but he soon tried to augment his power by alliance with the Mahrattas, warlike Moslem tribes of the west, who rose to influence during the seventeenth century and spread over the Deccan.<sup>4</sup>

The Nizam's territory included the Deccan and the Carnatic; he also held delegated authority over Tanjore and Trichinopoly, states which maintained direct contact with the Moguls. In the Carnatic, the Deccan, and in Bengal, the attempt of the Europeans to aid rival native factions led to a bitter struggle between the French and the English which resulted in the triumph of English influence. This was a logical outcome of the commercial penetration along the coasts begun by the Portuguese immediately after the age of discovery and continued by both France and England.

<sup>1</sup> Louis Herman, *Histoire de la rivalité des Français et des Anglais dans l'Inde* (Paris, 1847), 20. Cf. his chap. I, 17-37 for the "Origines de l'Empire Mogol." A list of English sources on the rivalry available when Herman wrote is on pp. 13-14 of his Introduction.

<sup>2</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 14. The best short account in English of the French establishments in India is by Henri Froidevaux, in *The Cambridge History of India* (H. H. Dodwell, ed.), V, chap. III.

<sup>3</sup> Herman, *op. cit.*, 31-32.

<sup>4</sup> A. Martineau, *Dupleix et l'Inde française* (Paris, 1920-1928), I, 3, 6; Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 16.


After Vasco da Gama's appearance at Calicut on the Malibar (west) coast in 1498,<sup>5</sup> the economic revolution of India moved forward rapidly. The first period of intrusion lasted about two centuries, and included Dutch as well as Portuguese operations. The latter effected a military occupation, while the Dutch were simple traders, avoiding conquest as much as possible. Alfonso de Albuquerque set up the capital of the Portuguese Orient in 1510 at Goa. The dependent areas were the Moluccas and the Malaccas, while even Indo-China recognized Portuguese influence. The Oriental trade brought to Portugal her "Golden Age"; business was conducted by the crown, not by commercial companies, and other Europeans were rigidly excluded under the bulls of Alexander VI.

Vices of administration had brought her wide empire to decay when Portugal was appended to Spain in 1580, and continued in the "Babylonian Captivity" until 1640.<sup>6</sup> The Dutch, revolting from Spain, were driven to deep-sea navigation and the India trade by Philip II, when he closed Lisbon to their ships in 1595. After several failures by the Arctic route, their first Oriental voyage, under Cornelis Van Houtman in 1595-1596, was a tremendous success, and fifteen others followed before 1601.<sup>7</sup> Their East India Company began in 1602 the occupation of the larger East Indies, following that of Java in 1611. Soon they set up other posts, one at Pulicat in 1609, one at Surat in 1616, and another at Mocha on the Red Sea in 1622. Botania was founded in 1619. The English and Dutch between 1619 and 1623 tried to unite in a company for their Indian trade, until the "massacre" of Amboyna, wherein a number of Englishmen were tortured and executed by the Dutch for alleged conspiracy to surprise the garrison. The English thereafter restricted their trade to India. In 1638 the Dutch took Trincomali, and drove the Portuguese out of Ceylon entirely in 1656. In 1641 they took Malacca, founded a comptoir at Tonkin, sent an embassy to Laos, and began relations with Japan. Their insular spread drove the English and French to the Indian peninsula, where the Portuguese lost to them Cochin in 1661, and lesser posts in 1662. By 1664 the Dutch had reached their apogee, but the French

<sup>5</sup> Claude Marie Guyon, *A New History of the East Indies*, II, 154-307; Herman, *op. cit.*, 3.

<sup>6</sup> More than 500,000 Portuguese half-castes, known as *Toçasi*, remain in India as testimony to the spread of the Portuguese rule on the coasts (Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 20).

<sup>7</sup> The Dutch had been inspired to attack Portugal in the East by the publication of Jan Juyghen van Linschoten's great work on India, which disclosed Portuguese weakness there (Williamson, *Short History of British Expansion*, I, 123); Antoine Cabaton, "Les Hollandais au Cambodge," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises*, II (1914), pt. 2, pp. 129-197.



INDIA IN THE DAYS OF DUPELIX  
From A. Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie.*

wars gradually exhausted their force.<sup>8</sup> In 1725 the Portuguese posts were only Goa on the Malabar coast, Bassein, Diu, and Daman. In Bengal they had only the Candel of Hoogli, and San Thomé one league from Madras on the Coromandel (east) coast.<sup>9</sup> The Danes formed a company about 1612, and established a post at Tranquebar near Pondichéry in 1616, one on the Ganges, and another on the Malabar coast, but they had no political ambitions.<sup>10</sup>

England, the third European intruder, had at first no territorial designs.<sup>11</sup> It was her purpose to wrest trade from Portugal. In 1639 the English India Company, after founding some small posts, acquired Madras; they entered Bengal in 1634, obtaining the right to the trade in 1652. Hoogli was made a factory in 1640, and Bombay came as dowry to Charles II in 1665. The company's monopoly expired in 1698, when a new competing one was organized; the two were united in 1708.

The second period of European intrusion began with the eighteenth century, after the Dutch and Portuguese had fallen into decline, and English and French rivalries began to be influenced by political considerations hitherto absent. When the French began in India the British had only Madras, Bombay, and a few small factories. Calcutta was to be founded later.<sup>12</sup> The British began to acquire territorial possessions in 1689.

<sup>8</sup> Guyon, *A New History of the East Indies*, II, 308-404.  
<sup>9</sup> Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 14; Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 22-23.  
<sup>10</sup> Guyon, *op. cit.*, II, 567-586.  
<sup>11</sup> The English began attempts in the Orient in 1582; other voyages in 1591 and 1596 brought very meager results. The first expedition of the English East India Company was in 1601 (Williamson, *Short History of British Expansion*, I, 95). Previous to 1591 the Muscovy and Levant Companies had striven to reach Asiatic markets by land, across Persia and Turkey (*ibid.*, I, 116-117). Failing by the Northeast Passage, the English adopted the route around Africa and the Indian Ocean in the years mentioned. Drake had shown the way. Cf. Guyon, *op. cit.*, II, 405-517. Drake's voyage began the British commerce, and Stephens went to Goa by way of the Cape of Good Hope in 1579; Candish sailed around the world in 1586, and George Raymond in 1590 took three ships to attack the Portuguese in the Indies, but all of them were lost (*ibid.*, 407-408). Guyon, *op. cit.*, II, 586-594; the Swedes, *i.e.*, Gustavus Adolphus, contemplated an Indian venture in 1626 which came to nothing. In 1731 they founded a small enterprise on the ruins of the Ostend Company, founded by independent and discontented British merchants, non-members of the East India Company. In 1723 the Ostend Company was chartered by the Holy Roman Emperor (E. H. Pritchard, "The Struggle for Control of the China Trade during the Eighteenth Century," in *Pacific Historical Review*, III, No. 3 [September, 1934], 280-295).  
<sup>12</sup> Guyon, *A New History of the East Indies*, II, 2-146; Herman, *Histoire de la rivalité*, 39-61; this gives a brief sketch of the operations of the several Euro-

The French had begun early their eastward thrust. In 1503 some Rouen merchants sent two vessels from Havre to trade in the Orient which were never heard of again.<sup>13</sup> Raoul and Jean Parmentier, with the *Sacre* and the *Pensée* visited Sumatra, the Moluccas, and the Maldives, their survivors returning to Dieppe about 1529 with a rich cargo of spices. Between this voyage and the organization of Colbert's East India Company there is a long period in which the efforts on Madagascar as told above constitute the chief Oriental interest, although sea voyages and trade were urged as profitable and not derogatory by public utterances of Francis I in 1537 and 1543. Henry III voiced the same notion on September 15, 1578.<sup>14</sup>

In 1600 a merchant of Rouen, Pierre Vampenne, owned sixteen vessels which made voyages to the Indies, inferentially the Orient. In Saint-Malo, in 1601, a society was formed which sent two vessels to India. One of them, the *Croissant*, had on board François Martin de Vitré who left an account of his voyages called *Description du premier voyage fait aux Indes Orientales*. The other, the *Corbin*, under Pyrard de Laval, did not return until 1611. He published an *Histoire du voyage des français aux Indes*.<sup>15</sup> The company proposed in 1604 by Girard le Roy was authorized by Henry IV, but seems to have sent out no ships. Girard obtained in 1611 new letters patent from Louis XIII, but the privilege was extended to the Caens of Rouen in 1615, the two enterprises becoming one. The company of 1615, known as the Molucca Company, sent out two ships under Commodore de Nets, who was forced by the Dutch to leave one of his ships in the East, but even so the voyage proved a success. In 1619 this company sent another expedition of three ships, of which only one returned to Havre in 1620. The complaint of the Assembly of Notables in 1617 that voyages "beyond the line" should not be denied to private persons, that companies should not deter them, and a complaint to the parlement of Normandy dated April 16, 1622, concerning injuries committed by the Dutch against the Associés de la Navigation aux Indes Orientales, show that Frenchmen were at that time bent on

pean powers in India from 1600 to 1744; Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 30-31; see also Vincent A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (Oxford, 1919).

<sup>13</sup> G. B. Malleson, *History of the French in India* . . . (Edinburgh, 1909 [1868]), 5.

<sup>14</sup> Guyon, *New History of the East Indies*, II, 2; Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 35.

<sup>15</sup> Albert Gray and H. C. P. Bell, translators, *The Voyage of François Pyrard; . . . Du Fresne de Francheville, Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, 15-16. In his *Recueil des preuves de l'histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, the author gives all the available legislation concerning this and associated companies (pp. 160-602).

sharing in the eastern trade.<sup>16</sup> Cardinal Richelieu in 1639, with the encouragement of "His Grey Eminence," Père Joseph de Tremblay, undertook to develop the approaches to the Orient by the use of missionaries sent overland by the old trade routes.<sup>17</sup> The pioneer Capuchin named Père Pacifique de Provina visited Egypt and Syria between 1622 and 1628, and received from the Shah of Persia authority to build monasteries in Bagdad and Ispahan. From those points the missionaries moved eastward, in 1639 reaching Surat on the west coast of India, a strategic spot for spreading influence through India, Persia, Arabia, and the African coast. The Jesuits, Carmelites, and Dominicans all followed the Capuchins, establishing liaison with their home seats by intervening missions, serving as experts and interpreters for the merchants who soon followed.<sup>18</sup> Richelieu's attempts to set up posts in Madagascar as way-stations to the Orient met with ill fortune, as we have seen.<sup>19</sup> Under Colbert, the East India Company in 1664 sent three merchants, accompanied by two agents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lalin and De la Boullaye le Goût, bearing a letter from Louis XIV to the Shah of Persia, to renew the "ancient friendship" of the two realms. From Ispahan a part of the mission went in 1666 to Surat. This Mogul city was "a concourse of all sorts of nations" from October, when the monsoons began, until the end of May, and "la première ville du monde pour le commerce."<sup>20</sup> Here De la Boullaye was courteously received by the English traders, though the Dutch spread reports that the French were pirates.<sup>21</sup> Thevenot and Tavernier were in Surat also at this time.<sup>22</sup> De la Boul-

<sup>16</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 36-39; Malleson, *History of the French in India*, 6, tells of the 1604 voyages; Henry Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*, 63-65. The official connections of these voyages are obscure. They seem, however, to have been made without doubt.

<sup>17</sup> In 1629 he sent to Moscow an embassy led by Deshayes and Riesacier to establish trade with Persia (thence to India and China) by the Caspian and Baltic seas, because the Barbary pirates had broken into the Oriental trade plying between Aleppo in Syria and Marseilles (Margry, *Relations et mémoires*, 85-114).

<sup>18</sup> This interesting Capuchin dreamed of "driving the Turks back into Asia and snatching the Orient from its barbarism; the rôle of agent in this work he naturally assigned to France" (Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 373).

<sup>19</sup> Malleson, *History of the French in India*, 10; Margry, *Relations et mémoires inédits*, "L'Inde et les nations Européennes," a letter of François Martin to Jerome de Pontchartrain, 115-145. For the "second," or Rigault's, East India company, see above, chap. IX.

<sup>20</sup> F. Martin in Margry, *op. cit.*, 117.

<sup>21</sup> Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales et François Martin*, 54.

<sup>22</sup> J. B. Tavernier, *The Six Voyages of . . . Finished in the Year 1670* (London, 1678, and several later eds.), *passim*; J. Thevenot, *Relation d'un voyage au Levant . . . , 1665-1684* (Paris, 1665-1684, 3v.), III, 42-48, 74-76.

laye wrote home nothing about the double dealing of the Dutch, but merely urged preference for an eastward land route for trade, running through the Red Sea, Suez, and Alexandria, rather than through Asia Minor and Persia.<sup>23</sup> From Surat he pressed on to the capital, Agra, where he informed the Great Mogul that he was expecting the arrival of a strong French fleet—news which failed to impress that potentate as he could have wished. Thence, going on to Bengal, De la Boullaye was about to go on to China when he was killed.<sup>24</sup>

In the meantime, Colbert, emulating the Dutch preponderance in the Orient, and determined to oust all intermediaries from the India trade, had attempted in vain to buy certain strategic Portuguese posts along the sea route thither.<sup>25</sup> The “Îles de la Sonde,” or Dutch East Indies, also excited his cupidity, impelling him to send out an “escadre de la Perse” to demonstrate the power and prestige of France.<sup>26</sup> In such far waters was the resentment of Louis XIV to be shown toward the Triple Alliance, especially the Dutch.

The East India Company of 1664 had many autonomous features. For instance, it had the right to send ambassadors to the kings of the Indies, to make treaties, to declare war, use the royal flag, and establish garrisons, and was exempt from taxes on all objects necessary for the construction of vessels.<sup>27</sup> In connection with the attempt to colonize Madagascar, a voyage to India was planned for opening the trade. François Caron, a Frenchman of Dutch lineage, whom we have already seen at Madagascar, sailed from that island in November,

<sup>23</sup> On the gradual growth of the conviction in Europe that India could not be most expeditiously reached by the Arctic route or the northern land routes, see Williamson, *A Short History*, I, 121, 238. Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 362; A. Martineau, *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, I, 18; Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 74-75.

<sup>24</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 77. N. Manucci, *Storia do Mogor, or Mogul India, 1653-1708*, by William Irvine, tr. and ed. (London, 1906-1908, 4v.), II, 150-152; Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*, 133-134.

<sup>25</sup> Colbert to Saint-Roman, March 16, 1669, Colbert, *Lettres*, II, pt. 2, 456; his *mémoire* to Mazarin in 1653 had taken this view (Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*, 100).

<sup>26</sup> In a secret Treaty of Dover, negotiations for which began in 1669, between Charles II of England and Louis XIV, Charles undertook to restore Catholicism in England with financial and military assistance from his cousin Louis. For cooperation in conquering the Netherlands, Charles originally asked a share in the Spanish American colonies when Louis XIV should reduce Spain, but this was not part of the treaty. “The joint onslaught on the Dutch was to begin by England and France in 1672.” Evidently French tactics in the Far East at that time were conditioned by this secret treaty. Williamson, *op. cit.*, I, 269; D. J. Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, III, 79-82.

<sup>27</sup> Articles XXXVI, XXXVII, as condensed in Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales et François Martin*, 7; cf. *ibid.*, 35.

1667, reached Surat early in 1668, from which he began at once to establish commercial houses around the Indian Ocean.<sup>28</sup> The leader of the Surat Capuchins, Père Ambroise de Preuilly, was made head of a council to advise in this task, but Caron accused the monk of being a spy of the Dutch and English and broke with him.<sup>29</sup> Apparently fearful of being suppressed, Caron began to quarrel with De Faye, the second director, who came in 1669 also; but De Faye died in April, leaving Caron to proceed with his task.<sup>30</sup> One of his ships under François Martin visited Persia and Arabia; another, Sumatra and Java; posts were located in Ceylon, Persia, and even in Bantam, south of the Malaccan peninsula. The king of Siam offered “une maison magnifique.” Sumatra and the Celebes were to be occupied, and trade with China and Japan was to follow.

The main objective was to establish continuous trade with central India. Through a French physician, Bernier, an old servant of the Great Mogul and “first Roumi to penetrate the terrestrial paradise of India,” Caron learned to eschew religious propaganda and observe native customs and laws.<sup>31</sup> As a result the king of Golconda (Hyderabad) admitted the French to his trade, and gave them the right to set up a factory at Mazulipatam.<sup>32</sup>

Caron's continuous rows with numerous company servants brought upon him in 1671 the imposition of a sovereign council at Surat. It replaced that at Dauphin, which expired when Madagascar was given up. The new directors were François Baron, consul at Aleppo, and Barthélemy Blot, a merchant of Lyons.<sup>33</sup> In October or late September, 1671, arrived the strong fleet sent by Colbert; the five vessels brought six hundred men under Captain Turelle; as lieutenant-general came Jacob Blanquet de la Haye, Colbert's preposterous choice of

<sup>28</sup> W. W. Hunter, *History of British India* (New York, 1899-1900, 2v.), II, 371; Malleon, *History of the French in India*, 14-19.

<sup>29</sup> Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 55; Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 362-363; Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 81-83.

<sup>30</sup> De Faye called him “fort assidu au travail, n'omettant rien de ce qui se peut faire” (Kaepelin, *op. cit.*, 57; La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine*, V, 505).

<sup>31</sup> F. Bernier, *The History of the Late Revolution of the Empire of the Great Mogol* . . . (London, 1671).

<sup>32</sup> Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 61, 67-78. Mazulipatam was acquired by the efforts of Marcara, a Persian employed by Caron. Jealous of his success, the latter preferred charges against him before Colbert, but the hearing resulted in vindication of the subordinate. G. B. Malleon, *Dupleix* . . . (Oxford, 1921), 14-15.

<sup>33</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 84-86, 90-91. The letters patent of January, 1671, creating the new directorate, reproduced in the Code Noir, 1-9, name the sieurs Gueston, Caron, Blot, and Baron, and there was to be a fifth. The revocation of the Dauphin council was dated November 12, 1670 (*ibid.*).

a chief of French affairs in the Orient. "He was an intelligent officer, well known for his bravery and his skill at playing chess."<sup>34</sup>

The "escadre de la Perse" carried everything needed for building a fort or founding a colony, and most luxurious articles for trade.<sup>35</sup> The commander showed the French purpose when he made a first aggressive move in 1672 against the Dutch at Trincomali in Ceylon in an attack deliberately planned by Louis XIV to bring on war. This conquest was made impossible by the arrival of a Dutch fleet under Admiral Reycklof van Goens. Five French ships were lost, while the rest took refuge in the Danish port of Tranquebar.<sup>36</sup> Caron seemed always so unwilling to press French advantage against his own countrymen that he was arrested for treason and sent to France, but he drowned off Lisbon,<sup>37</sup> expiating his foreign birth, Protestantism, and pig-headedness, let alone any unproved disloyalty.<sup>38</sup>

He had been factor of the Dutch East India Company at Hirado, Japan, and had conquered Formosa and Ceylon for the Dutch;<sup>39</sup> but he had left the company out of pique at not being made governor of Java. Colbert evidently expected to profit from his hurt vanity and his knowledge of the East, but results were disappointing. Caron was blamed for the long, out-of-the-way journey made by Montdevergue to Brazil while on the way to Fort Dauphin, although De Faye was certainly equally responsible. He had held up the expedition against Ceylon under pretext, and the fleet upon reaching Trincomali found the Dutch ready and waiting. Whatever he undertook for France benefited the Dutch.<sup>40</sup>

De la Haye, smarting under his defeat before Trincomali, tried to redeem his reputation by seizing San Thomé on the Coromandel coast from the Dutch. This blow, which Colbert had so much desired, naturally made the king of Golconda an enemy, and in August, 1672, that ruler attacked with three thousand troops. Reycklof cruised before the post, cutting it off by sea, while the king of Golconda besieged it for more than a year. In September, 1674, De la Haye was obliged to capitulate, and retired to France.<sup>41</sup> Most of the defeated French with-

<sup>34</sup> A cavalry master-of-camp, with no knowledge of naval matters or high command (Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 63; Kaepelin, *op. cit.*, 60, 80).

<sup>35</sup> La Roncière, *Histoire de la marine française*, V, 502.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 511-517. Tranquebar was bought by the English in 1845.

<sup>37</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 97-99; Malleson, *History of the French in India*, 19; Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 89-90, 97.

<sup>38</sup> Kaepelin, *op. cit.*, 35, doubts the thesis of Pauliat, that Louis XIV wanted to force Holland into war, but admits that the situation favored it.

<sup>39</sup> La Roncière, *op. cit.*, V, 501 ff.

<sup>40</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 77-78; Du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, 40-64.

<sup>41</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 101-111; La Roncière, *op. cit.*, V, 517-525.

drew to Surat with Baron, who superseded De la Haye; but some sixty, following the foresighted François Martin, moved to Pondichéry, eighty miles south of Madras, which he had recently acquired.<sup>42</sup> Meantime, either the Dutch or the natives had destroyed the French factories at Mazulipatam, at Rubjapour and Tellichéry on the Malabar coast, Bander Abassi in Persia, and Bantam in Java. Nothing remained but the post at Surat. The task now was to recuperate losses by a well-directed "native policy," for which there was nothing available except the small holding at Pondichéry containing about one hundred and thirteen square miles.<sup>43</sup>

To further his aims, Baron made alliance in Golconda with a faction which proposed to surrender San Thomé to the French to prevent its recapture by the Portuguese. But Colbert refused to send money for bribes, so Baron sought alliance with neighboring princes who would depose the king and set up a French puppet. Again the minister was emphatically opposed, and Baron was obliged to conduct company affairs without government help. He gradually gathered about him men of kindred mind, who, as directors of the company, were later able to enforce a vigorous native policy.<sup>44</sup>

Outstanding among these was Martin, who gained the good will of the inhabitants of the territory at Pondichéry, which had the advantage of a healthful location and was easy to fortify.<sup>45</sup> In 1676 he gained control of three hundred natives, dressed them in European uniforms, and used them to till the soil adjacent to the post. He began early to develop the important native textile industry, and opened shops to sell the product in Pondichéry. Shortly he was able to promise the company an annual trade of one million francs. As a reward for averting a Mahratta attack, he obtained the right to build fortifications, and in 1674 the absolute cession of the post. When Baron in 1681 became ill, Martin became his successor. The new governor had begun his East India Company service in 1665 under De Beausse and Montdevergue in Madagascar, where he made several voyages to Ghalebouille (Févérive) on the east coast to revictual famine-smitten Fort Dauphin. He was a shipmate of De Faye in 1668 when the latter sailed to Surat. A man of rare executive ability, he knew how to command and how to inspire the confidence of the natives.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Kaepelin, *op. cit.*, 79-116, for De la Haye's career in Oriental waters. Bibliography on this voyage, La Roncière, *op. cit.*, V, 510.

<sup>43</sup> Malleson, *Dupleix*, 17-18.

<sup>44</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 117-118.

<sup>45</sup> Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 18. Meantime a post had been bought at Chandernagor in Bengal by Bourreau-Deslandes.

<sup>46</sup> Malleson, *History of the French in India*, 19-37; Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 123; Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales* . . . , 49.

The company had not proved a success; in 1671 it had a fleet of twenty-six ships, sailing from its own port of Lorient, but it lost ground seriously during the war, and in 1675 had to give up its special port. It sent out only fourteen voyages between 1675 and 1684. Export duties had to be paid to the native princes, and goods sent to France were necessarily those bringing high profits, but the company was not organized properly to develop trade. Its agents had no permanent stocks, and used their small yearly receipts to buy cargoes for France. This subjected the trade to seasonal and temporary disabilities which limited its volume, while the merchants in France were always in fear of colonial competition. Imports competing with products of France were loaded with duties or even prohibited. Indeed, the mercantile interests sought to limit the import trade to spices and tropical products, whereas the directors in India yearned for the vast general market and strove to secure a fair share of it.<sup>47</sup>

To remedy this, Martin increased the number of trading posts by restoring Mazulipatam in 1687 and by initiating regular trading calls at Cassimbazar, Hoogli, and Balassar.<sup>48</sup> Chandernagor was established in 1690. Contacts were made with Cochin China, Cambodia, and Tonkin, and also with Persia, where French influence had been felt for fifty years. This coastwise merchandising was known as the "India to India" trade.<sup>49</sup> Progress was halted by the outbreak of the War of the League of Augsburg (1689-1697), in which the Dutch took Pondichéry, where Martin, after an heroic defense by three hundred men against fifteen hundred, was obliged to surrender on September 6, 1693. In the settlement at Ryswick, 1697, Pondichéry was returned to the French company, which named Martin director-general of all its possessions in India,<sup>50</sup> totaling a mere forty-six acres.

In May, 1699, Martin received Pondichéry, paying for the restoration works already completed by the late enemy, and pushing them

<sup>47</sup> The European commerce of the company as reorganized after the Law episode, or rather, from 1727 to 1767, is described ably in *Correspondance du Conseil Supérieur de Pondichéry et la Compagnie* (Pondichéry, 1920, 2v.), I, A. Martineau, ed., *Introd.*, 3-14. See the whole Introduction, 1-59, for the various parts of the trade.

<sup>48</sup> Martineau, *Dupleix*, I, 18-19.

<sup>49</sup> Martin to Pontchartrain in "L'Inde et les nations européennes en Asie à la fin du dix-septième siècle," Pondichéry, February 15, 1700, in Margry, *Relations et mémoires*, 115-145. Martineau, *op. cit.*, 5, 17, shows how corrupt practices hurt the trade.

<sup>50</sup> By that time the post controlled over forty thousand natives engaged in cotton manufacturing and the "India to India" trade; Martin had initiated the *divide et impera* policy, later to be made famous by Dupleix (Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 137-138; Malleon, *Dupleix*, 21). At this time the French

rapidly forward. His influence kept growing through his clever arbitration of native disputes. He transferred thither in 1702 the administrative offices of the superior council from Surat, by then sadly decayed. In the midst of his energetic reconstruction program death overtook him in 1706. The recording priest of his burial wrote: "Pondichéry owes to him what it is today."<sup>51</sup>

His successors were vain, incompetent men who failed dismally. The hard-pressed company had opened its trade to all French merchants in 1701, 1703, and 1708. In 1710 the king refused its plea to be allowed to wind up its affairs. As there was a growing debt of over three million livres, the company's privilege was leased to a group of Saint-Malo merchants; this brought some return of vicarious strength, and the lease was renewed in 1715 for ten years.<sup>52</sup> In 1719, however, the Law company absorbed the old one, and when Law's system crashed in 1720 the company assumed the depreciated notes of the ruined bank, agreeing to extinguish them in annual instalments; in return, it was designated "Perpetual Company of the Indies."

French trade with China had been included in the concession to De Meilleraye, but as he did nothing, a China company was organized in 1660 "for the glory of God and the propagation of the faith," to carry several bishops and churchmen. This trade was made subordinate to the 1664 company. As no business was done, a second China company was organized in 1697. French taste for Chinese art dates from its first voyage about 1700, when a cargo of Chinese artifacts and *objets d'art* was imported. Fourteen voyages between 1700 and 1710 made the China Company unusually prosperous, but the silk industry in France objected, and got the trade prohibited.<sup>53</sup> A third China company operated, however, from 1712 to 1719, in which year it became part of Law's company. The Chinese admitted foreign trade solely for cash. They absorbed usually some two hundred thousand livres' worth. A comptoir was established at Canton in 1723. The China trade usually moved directly to and from France until 1726, when a vessel went from Pondichéry. Its fortunes were bad; that of 1727 was better, but no voyage from Pondichéry was made in 1728. Apparently no voyages

held six acres at Mazulipatam, eight acres at Surat (abandoned in 1714), Chandernagor on the Hoogli twenty-two miles from Calcutta, and six small plots in other towns (*ibid.*, 21-22).

<sup>51</sup> Castonnet des Fosses, *op. cit.*, 151; a good description of Pondichéry under Martin is in *ibid.*, 126-130.

<sup>52</sup> Kaepelin, *La compagnie des Indes Orientales*, 596 ff. The merchants were more disturbed by conditions under the new monarch than by the state of the trade.

<sup>53</sup> Martineau, *Correspondance du Conseil Supérieur de Pondichéry . . .*, I, *Introd.*, 22-24; *ibid.*, II, 1736-1738 (years).

from India were made at all after 1744.<sup>54</sup> The nations made a genuine war of the China tea trade during most of the century. The British dominated shipping at Canton with over three hundred vessels to three hundred and forty of other nations (1720-1770). Among the latter, the French during the decades indicated had ninety-two vessels entering Canton.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> A. Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie, son œuvre* (Paris, 1931), 77-78; Du Fresne de Francheville, *Histoire de la compagnie des Indes*, 88-95. Other works on this period of the East India Company are J. Sottas, *Histoire de la compagnie royale des Indes Orientales, 1664-1719*; G. Dernis, *Recueil ou collection des titres, arrêts, et édits concernant la compagnie des Indes Orientales établie au mois d'août 1664* (Paris, 1755-1756, 4v.).

<sup>55</sup> E. H. Pritchard, *op. et loc. cit.*, 286.

## CHAPTER XV

## INDIA, 1719-1754; DUPLEIX

The "Perpetual Company of the Indies," reorganized during 1723-1725, was to have no other interest than commerce, hence there was no problem of colonization, as ownership of land, laws and liberties such as became of concern in Canada or the West Indies. The company received the coffee monopoly in lieu of a payment of three millions owed to it by the crown, and the tobacco monopoly which, in 1722, was worth 2,500,000 livres.<sup>1</sup> The latter was withdrawn in 1730, its revenues being replaced by an annual income of 7,500,000 livres during the first four years and eight million during the second four. Thus the shares paid a fixed revenue of 7½ per cent during 1730-1738, but no added profits were ever distributed.<sup>2</sup> Control was held by four (later eight) directors who were members of the king's council, and six syndics elected by the stockholders. The administration was divided among six directors, four of them at Paris, one of whom controlled the lands beyond the Cape of Good Hope, another all areas bathed by the Atlantic, a third all purchases of merchandise, while the fourth had charge of accounting. The fifth, at Lorient, controlled construction, armaments, ports, and handling of merchandise. The sixth, at Nantes, had charge of commercial movement, storage, and public sale. The director-general in India had an adjoint who was to be his eventual successor, and there was a consultative superior council of five, each at the head of a service. This organization was subjected to numerous changes, but is typical. In the different posts, the personnel was composed of principal merchants, sub-merchants, commissaries of the first and second class, and sub-commissaries. None of them, below the directors-general, have been thought men of outstanding capacity. Even Dupleix was a successful merchant administrator, not a genius for government.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Cambridge Modern History*, VI, chap. XV, pt. 2, pp. 529-550, for the English and French in India, 1720-1763. The company's resources were thus greater than those of any of its predecessors. J. Tramond, *Éléments d'histoire maritime et coloniale* (Paris, 1924), 368.

<sup>2</sup> Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie, son œuvre*, 72, points out that even so, the commerce saved France from making costly purchases abroad.

<sup>3</sup> The details of the home administration are given amply in W. H. Dalglish, *The Company of the Indies in the Days of Dupleix* (Easton, Pa., 1933).

The reorganized company did nothing outside of Pondichéry until 1721, when the governorship was given to Pierre Christophe Lenoir, whose ripe experience and good judgment soon gave business an upward turn. He bent his efforts to restoring the company's credit by inducing the native merchants to be patient until cargoes and money due them should arrive from France. Receiving no funds thence for two years, he cheerfully exhausted his own means in the company's behalf.<sup>4</sup> He rebuilt Pondichéry after its destruction by storm in 1722, and labored to make it the real head of the French establishments in the Indian Ocean. His aggressive tactics aroused such deep antagonism among the directors that in 1723 he was called to Paris, charged with having assisted the rival Ostend Company, with its dissident English membership, which had been organized in 1717 and adopted in 1723 by the Holy Roman Emperor.

In 1726, having refuted the charges of his enemies, he returned to his post. His best accomplishment was to coin a colonial *pagoda* for trade transactions; he also built a hospital, and called for specialists to study tropical diseases. Fine streets were lined with trees, a governor's palace was built, and a company garden laid out. The "Missions Étrangères," the Capuchins with two parishes, and a Jesuit college were added to the religious side of life. The trade grew rapidly after 1723, three or four ships coming annually; in one season, 1729-1730, the cargoes sent to France were valued at 5,500,000 francs. In 1735 Pondichéry had 80,000 inhabitants, including one hundred European merchants trading in precious metals, iron, cloth, muslin, cotton prints, and rice and other grains. Lenoir enjoyed some luxury, with a guard of three hundred natives, and the city had a garrison of five hundred.<sup>5</sup>

French success hastened the change in European relations in the Orient that had been coming for twenty-five years. Portugal was never able to restore her ports, and Goa was in ruins. The Dutch were at Cochin, San Thomé, Negapatam, and the coasts of Ceylon, but had, as allies of England, subordinated themselves in India, meantime operating successfully in the Malay peninsula.<sup>6</sup> The Danes held Tranquebar; even Prussia and Poland tried, though in vain, for trade open-

<sup>4</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 37; H. Weber, *La compagnie française des Indes*, 332-333.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 27; in 1731 Dupleix was made director of company interests in Bengal, with his post at Chandernagor.

<sup>6</sup> Weber, *op. cit.*, 339-341. ". . . the center of their operation was slowly shifting further eastward and as the century advanced their naval power declined rapidly, falling from one hundred and fifty-one vessels of war in 1671 to forty-two in 1740" (Sir A. C. Lyall, *History of India* (London, 1906-1907, 9v.), A. V. W. Jackson, ed., VIII, 73).

ings. England, on the contrary, was busily developing strength. The British East India Company, with practically sovereign powers, showed its hostility to the French by inducing the prince of Bargaret to cancel their concession at Mahé. The French would thus have lost the Calicut trade had not Governor Du Courchant promptly sent an armed expedition which in 1726 succeeded in recovering Mahé; in 1728 this market was neutralized by mutual consent. Its trade in pepper was worth two million livres annually.

Lenoir was succeeded in 1735 by Benoît Dumas, who had been in India from 1712 to 1727, then had served for the period 1727-1735 as director-general and governor in Bourbon. Aggressive imperialism now met a practical test when Dumas in 1732 supported Dost Ali Khan, who seized the headship of the Carnatic without recognition by the subah of the Deccan. In return, Dumas obtained permission to coin rupees, which gave Pondichéry a commerce worth 400,000 livres. About 1736 one of the nabob's sons-in-law, Chanda Sahib, with at least tacit acquiescence of Dumas, seized the little nearby kingdom of Trichinopoly. This was followed by the cession of Karikal as a reward for helping Sahogy, rajah of Tanjore, to regain his lost throne. Following this policy of siding with warring factions, Dumas shortly extended French influence all along the Coromandel coast, and far into the interior.<sup>7</sup>

When in 1739 the monarch of Persia, Nadir Shah, marched into Hindustan, defeated the emperor, and sacked Delhi, the event was the signal for a general revolt of the native princes, while repeated incursions and ravaging brought such impoverishment and disintegration that for self-preservation, French and English policy alike became avowedly political. When Dost Ali Khan sought to seize the lands of the nabob of Tanjore, the latter appealed to the Moslem Mahrattas, who defeated and killed Dost Ali in May, 1740. When his widow and many native land-owners fled to Dumas for protection, and the Mahrattas came to assault Pondichéry, the moment had come to strike for French preponderance. Dumas, with twelve hundred European soldiers and forty-five hundred sepoy, awaited the attack. The Mahrattas, who had taken Bassein from the Portuguese, Cuddalore from the English, and Trichinopoly from Chanda Sahib in March, 1741, now swept on to Pondichéry and demanded its surrender. Held off from an assault by Dumas' cannon, they gave up the enterprise in May.<sup>8</sup> His success gave Dumas tremendous prestige; the Grand

<sup>7</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 28; Weber, *op. cit.*, 342-344.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 31-32, says that Dumas obtained his success by a present to the enemy leader of thirty bottles of "French cordials."

Mogul made him a *munsuḍdar* and a member of his court, while the lesser Hindu princes showed him the proper respect.<sup>9</sup>

In June, La Bourdonnais arrived from Bourbon with ships and men, enabling Dumas to save Mahé, where he defeated Bargaret for the second time and made him a feudatory. About the same time the king of Travancor south of Calicut became an ally, French influence thus being extended to Cape Cormorin. Dumas returned in 1741 to France to become a director of the company, leaving in charge his great successor, Dupleix.

Pondichéry now had good defenses and a small force of native soldiers trained in European fashion. Karikal, one hundred leagues south, had five thousand Christian Hindu inhabitants. Chandernagor had been French for ten years under Dupleix, who had greatly improved it. Mahé, Mazulipatam, and Yanaon, established near it in 1728, as well as Patna, were active centers of trade. Alliances expanded French influence over Arcot, Trichinopoly, Tanjore, Calicut, and Travancor, that is, throughout most of the Deccan. This success had been won by departure from neutrality in native politics, the price of survival of French interests, but in the sequel a grave hazard.

The company was also trading with Arabia, Persia, the Philippines, and Indo-China, and had a factory at Canton. It gave financial help to missionary penetration of China, and was finally entering Siam at Mergui. It carried to India eighteen million livres' worth of goods in 1736 and twenty-four million in 1742. Profits were from four to eight hundred thousand livres annually. The whole situation was promising, though difficult, when Dupleix became director.<sup>10</sup>

The famous empire-maker was the son of a tobacco merchant and director-general of the company. He had begun service with the company at eighteen years of age, making a voyage to India in 1716 and perhaps one later to America. In 1721 he became a commissary of the company troops. In 1722 he was made junior member of the Pondichéry council, in which position he began to study the needs of the company which he served for thirty-four years. In 1727 he quarreled while at Canton with the director there, and was accused of pecula-

<sup>9</sup> Dumas left India in October, 1741; his titles from the Mogul did not reach Pondichéry until May, 1742. John Biddulph, *Dupleix* (London, 1910), 36-37; Malleon, *Dupleix*, 33, says Dumas asked that his honors might be transferred to his successor. P. Cultru, *Dupleix, ses plans politiques* (Paris, 1901), 182, note 3, says that Dumas makes no illusion to such a transfer in his letters to Dupleix from 1741 to 1746.

<sup>10</sup> Tramond, *Éléments d'histoire maritime*, 368, says that the total trade of the company in 1740 was 162 millions, net profits being 13 millions; this was less than the trade of the English East India Company. Cf. Bonassieux, *Les grandes compagnies de commerce*, 284-286.

tion and suspended, only to be reinstated in 1729. Two years later he became governor of Chandernagor, where he smoothed out difficulties with the natives concerning company debts, and opposed the English, who objected when the French excluded the ships of the Imperial Ostend Company.<sup>11</sup> He urged his superior to establish trade between Bengal and the Far East, and when Lenoir refused, threw his own resources into it and made it a distinguished success; it employed a dozen vessels, and Dupleix made a reputation and a good fortune. When his tenure expired some seventy ships were plying in the India to India trade there.<sup>12</sup> Just before he left he married on April 14, 1741, the widow of his old friend, M. Vincens, the "Jeanne" of fabled influence in India politics, whose real ability has been much overrated. She was a half-breed who spoke Tamil.<sup>13</sup>

The French now held the advantage over the English, who had only three posts, Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta. But the latter realized that commercial war is real war, while the French company seemed lulled to inaction by success.<sup>14</sup> Dupleix prepared for the inevitable struggle by improving his troops and the crumbling fortifications of Pondichéry, and built a seawall, hitherto lacking. His sole reward was a request in December, 1743, on the eve of war, to reduce his military expenses by half, and to arrange with the English governor for neutrality, although the directors did send him the fleet of La Bourdonnais from Bourbon in case of need.<sup>15</sup> The War of the Austrian Succession began in 1744.

The English governors of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta avoided negative replies to Dupleix's overtures for neutrality, while the British navy began seizing French ships in Sumatra and on the coasts of India. Dupleix, still awaiting La Bourdonnais, disregarded his company's plea for economy, and sought support among the Hindu princes.<sup>16</sup> In the Carnatic, the nabob of Arcot, Anaverdi Khan, was

<sup>11</sup> It is not true, says A. Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie*, 10-11, 47, that Dupleix's youth was morbid or shut-in. Relations with his father were not happy. England succeeded in 1717 in obtaining dissolution of the Ostend Company (Pritchard, *op. cit.*, 282).

<sup>12</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 36-37; Weber, *op. cit.*, 345-346.

<sup>13</sup> Malleon, *op. cit.*, 38-39, and Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie*, 19-44, 45-56; Cultru, *Dupleix*, 178-180; Madame Dupleix's activities may be studied in H. Dodwell, ed., *The Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai* (Madras, 1919-1922, 2v.).

<sup>14</sup> Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie*, 73-79, shows that Dupleix in 1753 considered Pondichéry and Chandernagor the only worthwhile French posts.

<sup>15</sup> Tramond, *Éléments d'histoire maritime*, 366-384; Malleon, *Dupleix*, 41-45.

<sup>16</sup> Tramond, *op. cit.*, 383, says that the governor of Madras had promised not to commit hostile acts, but the English royal navy was not bound by this promise, and Commodore Barnet was free to make seizures. J. Biddulph, *Dupleix*, 43-44. See *The Cambridge History of India* (H. H. Dodwell, ed.), V, chap. V.

induced to warn Governor Nicholas Morse of Madras that he must not attack the French. The longed-for fleet arrived before Pondichéry in July, 1746. La Bourdonnais met the English fleet under Commodore Peyton off Negapatam on July 6, but after vain manoeuvres the two fleets separated without a decisive engagement, Peyton retiring to Trincomali, and La Bourdonnais to Pondichéry.

Dupleix looked upon this fleet as the instrument whereby to take Madras, could he first make La Bourdonnais agree to hunt down Peyton's fleet and destroy it. But La Bourdonnais hoped to pillage Madras, or exact the customary high ransom for immunity, whereas Dupleix desired its complete destruction as a continuous menace to Pondichéry. This lack of coördination of authority and will brought on a serious conflict. The two leaders had not reached an agreement when La Bourdonnais finally put to sea on August 13 to search for Peyton's fleet.<sup>17</sup> After refusing to engage it, he returned to Pondichéry to oppose Dupleix within the council, but that body gave him the choice of attacking Peyton or taking Madras. Choosing the latter, he moved against the English post and in three days forced it to capitulate.<sup>18</sup> Dupleix had promised to give Madras to Anaverdi Khan in whatever condition the French might get it; this he told La Bourdonnais, adding, however, that the post must first be dismantled, as the English could no doubt easily retake it if reinforced.<sup>19</sup>

La Bourdonnais felt that since he had taken the post with a royal fleet it was his right to make disposition of it. As a matter of fact, although La Bourdonnais was responsible to Dupleix for acts on land, he had signed with Governor Morse an agreement to restore Madras for a ransom of 1,100,000 pagodas. This meant that Dupleix could not fulfill his obligations to Anaverdi Khan. La Bourdonnais was finally disposed of by an order from Paris making him dependent on the council, and by a terrific storm which destroyed four of his eight ships, twelve hundred men, and part of his heavy artillery.<sup>20</sup> Returning to France he was thrown into the Bastille, charged with having made secret agreements with the enemy, but his trial, ending in 1751,

<sup>17</sup> Peyton succeeded Barnet, who died about the beginning of 1746. Peyton was inefficient, and did nothing with his squadron until reinforced by Commodore Griffin in November, after Madras had fallen (Biddulph, *Dupleix*, 51). La Bourdonnais and Dupleix quarreled continuously from their first meeting. Each had achieved reputation in masterful colonial careers, and neither would yield.

<sup>18</sup> Governor Morse had tried in vain to get Anaverdi Khan to restrain the French from attacking Madras, under the neutrality agreement, but neglected to send the expected bribe. Herman, *Histoire de la rivalité des Français et des Anglais dans l'Inde*, 64-65, calls this attack bad faith on the part of Dupleix.

<sup>19</sup> Malleison, *Dupleix*, 50-52; Weber, *op. cit.*, 355-359.

<sup>20</sup> Tramond, *Éléments d'histoire maritime*, 383.

resulted in acquittal.<sup>21</sup> Anaverdi Khan meantime insisted upon the transfer of Madras at once; but Dupleix refused, feeling sure that the Hindu would at once sell out to the English, as he did. While the latter were gathering at Calcutta and Bombay, Dupleix decided to eliminate the Hindu force first, and then fight the English. In November, 1746,<sup>22</sup> near San Thomé, Anaverdi's forces of ten thousand were completely routed by fourteen hundred native troops in European uniform under French officers, led by Paradis. After this amazing success the French were no longer looked upon as vassals, but as allies who had a notable asset in military prowess, which Dupleix hoped would end English power.<sup>23</sup>

After nullifying La Bourdonnais' agreement with Morse, Dupleix set about capturing Fort St. David, sixteen miles south of Pondichéry, where two hundred English from Madras had taken refuge; but De Bury, the octogenarian in command, allowed his force to be surprised; his men were seized with panic and fell back on Pondichéry.<sup>24</sup> In the following February, 1747, Anaverdi Khan renounced his English allies and confirmed French possessions of all their territory, including Madras. Dupleix then sent Paradis to take Fort St. David, but an English fleet under Boscawen arrived with one thousand reinforcements, hence the move could not be made. The fort was defended now by Major Stringer Lawrence, who had repulsed De Bury.<sup>25</sup>

Boscawen landed 3,700 troops at Pondichéry in August, 1748, and forced Dupleix out of his entrenchments, but, fearing the coming monsoons, had to seek shelter for his ships at Fort St. David. France had just become the chief European power in India when the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed October 18, 1748, restored Madras to the

<sup>21</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 87, asserts that "it is still thought . . . that he had been in English pay." Mahé de la Bourdonnais' story, in his *Mémoires historiques* (Paris, 1827) shows that he had been highly appreciated, probably spoiled, by Orry before he reached India, pp. 56, 88 ff. Pierre Crépin, *Mahé de la Bourdonnais, gouverneur général des îles de France et de Bourbon (1699-1753)* (Paris, 1921?), takes the view that his hero was the victim of the dislocation of power between the merchant and the military interest in the company scheme of the Old Régime. He points out that La Bourdonnais could have done only what he did, but that he was bound to lose to merchant Dupleix, just as warrior Dupleix was bound in turn to lose to merchant directors (*Op. cit.*, xiii, 470-479 and *passim*).

<sup>22</sup> Malleison, *Dupleix*, 53-54.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 56-57; Weber, *op. cit.*, 359-360.

<sup>24</sup> An interesting characterization of the European forces which Dupleix had to depend upon is by De Fréville, *Revue des questions historiques*, LXXVI (October, 1904), 417-443. See also Albert Depréaux, "Troupes coloniales d'autrefois," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises*, XXI (Paris, 1928), 411-432.

<sup>25</sup> Malleison, *op. cit.*, 62-63.

British, as Louis XV commanded his envoys to negotiate the peace "royally, not in merchant fashion."<sup>26</sup>

The task of seeking "le commerce pour politique" was particularly difficult, inasmuch as the director was also the representative of the wider interests of France. Baron, Martin, Lenoir, and Dumas had each in turn seen that commerce without politics meant ultimate defeat. All of them overstepped the will of the company council, because success depended upon respect for their authority. Assumption of political obligations indeed brought prestige to the company, but reduced or extinguished its dividends. Hence the directors objected to "commerce as the result of policy," while Dupleix expected his sovereign territorial rights to bring in enough revenues to overcome this defect.<sup>27</sup> Until his time, intervention in native politics had aroused little opposition; for instance, Mahé and Karikal, bought by Lenoir and Dumas, had been obtained with full company approval. The trend of Indian events had in no wise widened the views of the company, nor had Dupleix, when he took charge at Pondichéry, yet evolved the procedure which led him into conflict with his superiors. He was free from responsibility for his acts during the War of the Austrian Succession, since it was the English navy which failed to observe the nabob's stipulated neutrality.<sup>28</sup>

On the other hand, Dupleix had, between 1743 and 1748, assumed responsibilities entailing expense that could not be met from business profits, but required not only a rotating fund, but fixed revenues, and an independent budget for support of the large forces left in India after the war. The needed funds could be obtained only by territorial cessions from the native princes and tributes.<sup>29</sup> Such resources, he hoped, would make it possible for India to pay all company expenses and recover, through the growth of export trade, much of the cost of business in France.<sup>30</sup>

Practically forced to adopt the same policy as had been used by Dumas in 1738, he supported native princes with an eye to the advantage of the company. Between 1749 and 1753, by this policy, he got control of a great part of the Carnatic and the Deccan. Then the Circars on the east coast, and the Mahratta Confederacy on the west, whose chiefs opposed the native princes allied with France, were obliged to yield. Dupleix then controlled a territory twice as large as

<sup>26</sup> Weber, *op. cit.*, 361.

<sup>27</sup> Tramond, *op. cit.*, 388-389; cf. P. Crépin, *Mahé de la Bourdonnais*, Introd.

<sup>28</sup> Williamson, *A Short History*, I, 366, says that England relied on the nabob's declaration—a broken reed.

<sup>29</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 196; there were no company profits after 1744.

<sup>30</sup> Tramond, *op. cit.*, 389; Malleon, *Dupleix*, 70-71; cf. note 46.

France, containing thirty million people.<sup>31</sup> The English company, like the French, had been equally unwilling and unable to keep out of native politics. The proximity of Pondichéry to Madras, and of Chandernagor to Calcutta made the two companies rivals one of which must inevitably destroy the other. Thus the two nations were as effectively at war in India as if there were no peace.<sup>32</sup>

The company's army which in 1723 numbered a mere one hundred and twenty men, grew to several thousand in time. They were usually shabby remnants of the wars of Europe, officered by soldiers of fortune. The sepoy auxiliaries were developed into a force of several thousand, and native cavalry was employed. In the subject areas Dupleix enjoyed the sovereign rights of a subah, and as such was entitled to a tax representing half the value of the products of the soil. Wise management animated the peasants to work harder in return for security.<sup>33</sup>

In 1748 a native conflict was going on for control of the Deccan and its dependency, the Carnatic. The subah of the Deccan, Nizam ul Mulk, with his vassal Anaverdi Khan, nabob of the Carnatic, began, while seeming to accept French control, to plot independence. As they were, in fact, friends of the English, Dupleix was on the alert to find some other native ally. Nizam ul Mulk died in 1748, having disinherited his elder son, Nader Jang, and left his throne to his grandson. The disinherited son thereupon drove out Mousaffar Jang.

Dupleix naturally sided with Mousaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib. The latter, still prisoner of the Mahrattas after his loss of Trichinopoly,<sup>34</sup> purchased his liberty with money lent by Dupleix, and promised to aid Mousaffar Jang to regain the Deccan, if he himself should be made nabob of the Carnatic. The allies then marched against Nader Jang, calling on Dupleix for aid. The forces of the company, aiding Chanda Sahib, defeated and killed the treacherous Anaverdi on August 3, 1749; Mousaffar Jang then declared himself subah of the Deccan at Arcot, and installed Chanda Sahib as nabob of the Carnatic. He was then ostentatiously received at Pondichéry, and wanted to attack Nader Jang at once, but Dupleix sought first to defeat the son of Anaverdi Khan, Mehemet Ali, who was still on his flank in possession of Trichinopoly and supported by the English. Dupleix

<sup>31</sup> Martineau, *Dupleix, sa vie*, 359, points out that Dupleix's policies "se poursuivent encore de nos jours et, si les ressorts doivent un jour se distendre, nul ne peut encore prévoir ni déterminer l'heure de ce fléchissement." See also his *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, III, 88.

<sup>32</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 72.

<sup>33</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 194-200.

<sup>34</sup> In this year Governor Floyer of Fort St. David took the aggressive by seizing Devikottai as a foil for Karikal, taken by Dumas ten years before (*The Cambridge History of India*, V, 125-126).

had no desire to march into the Deccan, for the English were bringing a fleet to the coast.<sup>85</sup>

But the English fleet sailed away in October, 1749, whereupon Dupleix sent his Hindu allies to take Trichinopoly, a key position where the roads running north and south crossed those running east and west. But they were obliged to retire upon Pondichéry in disorder, leaving Nader Jang free to invade the Carnatic. Pondichéry being thus menaced, Dupleix sent the Count d'Authueil to fight Nader Jang, but some of his native officers mutinied and he had to retreat to Pondichéry. Then Mousaffar Jang, becoming disaffected, surrendered to Nader Jang. Thus the French protectorate over the Deccan faded, while Pondichéry was still in danger.

Meantime, Mehemet Ali, rival of Chanda Sahib for the Carnatic, occupied and garrisoned Jinji and Trichinopoly. He would have attacked Pondichéry, but his English allies retired to Fort St. David. Thereupon the French attacked him and drove him out of the region on September 1, 1750. The protégés of Dupleix now controlled all the Carnatic except Trichinopoly.<sup>86</sup> The Marquis de Bussy was then sent to attack Jinji, which commanded important routes leading northward. The brilliant officer forced its capitulation in September, 1750, giving the French the best fortified post in the Deccan.

When Nader Jang was killed in battle, Mousaffar Jang was proclaimed subah of the Deccan at Pondichéry. The French thus gained several new posts, the use of Pondichéry currency throughout northern India, and advisory relations with the government of the Deccan. Each success by the French was countered by occupation of a new post by the British.

Now the ambitious Mousaffar Jang yearned to take possession of Aurengabad, his capital of the Deccan, and troops under De Bussy were sent inland with him in January, 1751. After a month of marching, Mousaffar Jang was killed in a small mutiny. This left the Deccan with five contestants for the throne, while De Bussy was a month's journey from his base. He acceded, after consulting Dupleix, in the nomination of Salabat Jang. The new subah confirmed the earlier concessions to the French, while Ragnoldas, a confidant of Dupleix, was continued as the subah's adviser.<sup>87</sup> De Bussy then resumed the march toward Hyderabad, and finally Salabat Jang entered Aurengabad in June, and was there crowned.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 71-73.

<sup>86</sup> Weber, *op. cit.*, 365-368.

<sup>87</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 207-210.

<sup>88</sup> "All that you ask from Delhi will come immediately," wrote the pleased general to Dupleix in the fall of 1751. A. Martineau, *Dupleix et l'Inde française*,

Next it became important to take Trichinopoly, where the English were still upholding Mehemet Ali; Jacques François Law, nephew of the adventuresome financier, with great sluggishness decided to lay siege instead of attacking. Meantime Clive moved from Madras to attack Arcot, Chanda Sahib's capital, and took it on September 11, 1751. This success, followed by Clive's later brilliant defense, gave the English great prestige. This did not deter Dupleix from his purpose of capturing Trichinopoly; but Law, still irresolute, allowed himself to be drawn into a *cul de sac* on an island between two channels of the river Cavery, and surrendered to Lawrence on June 13, 1752. This was a tremendous English triumph; Chanda Sahib had been murdered, and Mehemet Ali was master of the Carnatic.<sup>89</sup> To this surrender of Trichinopoly the fall of Dupleix was chiefly due.

Dupleix was now in bitter straits, with a bare hundred white soldiers at Pondichéry; the northern Carnatic was held by Mehemet Ali at Arcot, while in the Deccan, Gaziudin was gathering an army to march against De Bussy.

Meantime the English were able to take Tiravady, from which they launched a futile attack on Jinji. Dupleix had now restored his prestige, and received proffers of coöperation from the Mahrattas if he would but leave Trichinopoly to them. Mehemet Ali then sought from Salabat Jang confirmation of his possession of Trichinopoly, but that wily subah referred him to Dupleix, who, instead, gave the position of vice-nabob of the Carnatic, now vacant through the murder of Chanda Sahib, to the rajah of Vellore, in exchange for maintenance for his troops. In the southern Carnatic the Mahrattas had Mehemet Ali and an English detachment besieged in Trichinopoly. Kerjean marched to cut off their supplies, but was defeated by Major Lawrence, and his panic-stricken soldiers fled to Pondichéry. Here was a crisis<sup>40</sup> which reversed the recent successes.

In the Deccan, De Bussy was discouraged because Ragnoldas, the adviser, had been assassinated and replaced by Saïd Lasker Khan, a traitor to the French, while Gaziudin was marching from Delhi with one hundred thousand men. Salabat fled toward Pondichéry with De Bussy.

Meanwhile the English, with the help of Mehemet Ali, destroyed a village of twelve hundred weaving establishments under the eyes of

III, 259, justifies Law's actions before Trichinopoly, saying that "he had for six months maintained himself against an army four times larger than his own.

<sup>89</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 113, 123, and his "Dupleix et l'Inde française," in *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1926), 3.

<sup>40</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 127-130.

the garrison of Pondichéry.<sup>41</sup> Amid such disasters, Dupleix received from Paris letters answering his of 1751, disapproving his policy, refusing him added troops, and ordering him to make peace. His reply was to send the Count d'Autheuil to France to plead his cause, and in the meantime to persist in his program.<sup>42</sup>

Upon the flight of Salabat Jang, Gaziudin had marched into Aurenghabad, at the moment when Lasker Khan was endeavoring to get rid of Salabat and drive out the French. The assassination of Gaziudin at this juncture improved the position of Dupleix, as the Mahrattas with their fine cavalry became his allies, while the rajah of Mysore agreed to help provision the French troops in exchange for the promise of Trichinopoly. When De Bussy fell ill and went to Mazulipatam to recuperate, his enemy, Lasker Khan, began negotiating with Governor Saunders to be made subah of the Deccan. Dupleix ordered De Bussy, though still ill, to rejoin his forces with Salabat at Aurenghabad, and he moved forward to Hyderabad. Shortly afterward Lasker Khan, knowing that his enemy Balagdi Rao of Poona was marching to kill him, threw himself into the arms of the French. Thereupon De Bussy went forward to Aurenghabad and made a treaty with Salabat whereby the French were to receive the revenues of four new provinces.

Dupleix now began the year 1753 by renewing attacks on the English and their native allies in the Carnatic. His attack on Trichinopoly during the night of November 27-28 failed. He then laid siege, during which both the English and the French were seriously exhausted. The French at first held the advantage, but Lawrence signally defeated Astruc in October, 1753. In January, 1754, Dupleix met Governor Saunders at Sadras, midway between Madras and Pondichéry, to discuss peace, but no terms could be reached because Dupleix insisted upon acknowledgment of his office as nabob of the Carnatic, which the English refused. The exhaustion of both sides continued, the French suffering rather more than the English, when on August 1, 1754, Godeheu unexpectedly arrived at Pondichéry to supplant Dupleix.<sup>43</sup> Here was the entire reversal of French policy in India.

Dupleix's recall was due entirely to the fact that the company directors could not appreciate the need of protecting commerce by maintaining political prestige among the shifting native states. Their correspondence with Dupleix shows their increasing impatience at his political activities which cost them men and the decrease of the trade. "Your successes," they wrote, "do not prevent us from desiring a state

<sup>41</sup> Malleison, *Dupleix*, 131, 135.

<sup>42</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 215-223.

<sup>43</sup> Malleison, *Dupleix*, 151, 153.

of things less brilliant and more peaceful. . . . We want nothing but a few trading stations and some rise in dividends."

The French court itself had no India policy other than that of wanting peace at almost any price. For this reason the influence of Dupleix had been steadily diminishing since 1751, although he had been strong and reasonably successful in his campaign. Godeheu was ordered to begin his work by arresting him and his family "on account of the danger which might come from leaving at liberty persons so immensely rich, who might undertake anything in order to set the sieur Dupleix free."

When Godeheu arrived, he showed marked coolness, refusing Dupleix's proffered hospitality, and ordered the latter to assemble the council to register new orders.<sup>44</sup> The deposed governor had advanced from his own fortunes over eight million livres, but was unable to get an accounting, and sailed away after thirty years of service in October, 1754, arriving in France in 1755.<sup>45</sup> His remaining years were spent in vain effort to obtain justice from the company. He died in 1764 in comparative poverty.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> Tramond, *Éléments d'histoire maritime*, 391-392.

<sup>45</sup> Malleison, *op. cit.*, 159; cf. Christian Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème colonial* (Paris, 1907), 11-13.

<sup>46</sup> Dupleix's career is extolled by Tibulle Hamont, *Dupleix d'après sa correspondance inédite* (Paris, 1881). Prosper Cultru, *Dupleix, ses plans politiques*, who examined Dupleix's papers with care, discovered in them no trace of any great pre-arranged plan. In his Preface he says: "Je crois avoir démontré: 1° que la Compagnie n'avait pas les moyens de suivre une politique, et n'en a jamais eue aucune; 2° que Dupleix, avant 1749, n'en eut pas plus qu'elle; 3° que l'entreprise qu'il a tentée alors, née des circonstances, ne devait pas avoir de lendemain et n'a été poussée qu'au hasard; qu'il a agi au jour le jour et n'a pas eu de plan arrêté avant 1753; 4° que, par suite, il a manqué des ressources nécessaires; et quant à ses chefs, ils n'ont pu apprécier à temps le valeur de projets tout à fait contraires à leurs traditions." Farther on, he deprecates the popular conception of "ce Dupleix légendaire, sans vice et sans faiblesse, presque divin," and asserts that the Governor of Chandernagor is revealed by his own letters as "un commerçant actif mais malheureux, un homme ambitieux, non de conquérir un empire, mais d'aller vivre bourgeoisement en France." Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, pt. I, 361, 372.

## CHAPTER XVI

## FALL OF FRENCH INDIA

Godeheu's instructions were to cease to interfere in the quarrels of the country, send no troops into the interior, avoid inciting the natives to war, propose truce with the English, and end the war between the companies by retaining only a post well-suited for a point d'appui.<sup>1</sup> The new director brought two thousand European soldiers, more than Dupleix had ever had, and could have forced Lawrence to surrender Trichinopoly;<sup>2</sup> of course when he abandoned native alliances French prestige rapidly fell. The allies of Dupleix gave up the attempt to take Trichinopoly, and Godeheu raised the siege, whereupon the English granted a two-months' truce and offered a conference at Madras. The end of the second period of rivalry in India was closed.

Dupleix in the meantime had, in a letter of October 16, 1753, for the first time explained his policies adequately to the directors, but this missive had reached France just after Godeheu's departure. Upon its receipt the company wobbled, and sent word to Godeheu to hold on to Mazulipatam and continue relations with the Deccan.<sup>3</sup> But Godeheu preferred his first instructions. Saunders, governor of Madras, agreed that both companies should eschew native titles and all participation in native politics; that all territories held by either should be renounced except those around the old posts on the Coromandel coast. While such an agreement seemed reciprocal, only the French possessed great territories in full proprietorship with collection of taxes, and thus gave up more than England. They renounced the Northern Circars, the native alliances, the claim to the Carnatic—in fact, in the

<sup>1</sup> H. Dodwell, *Dupleix and Clive* (London, 1920), 79–80; Malleison, *History of the French in India*, 420–428.

<sup>2</sup> Malleison, *Dupleix*, 160.

<sup>3</sup> This letter explains Dupleix's philosophy as an opportunist one, and not preconceived. "A chain of circumstances which could scarcely have been foreseen led to an end which had long been sought. Occasions were seized as they presented themselves." Quoted by Tramond, *Éléments d'histoire maritime*, 389. The English were not strong enough to demand De Bussy's retirement from the Deccan (Dodwell, in *The Cambridge History of India*, V, 134–135).

Deccan was the only remnant of all Dupleix's operations and claims.<sup>4</sup> This meant the negation of the hopes of the Frenchmen in India for the sake of the company merchants at home. The treaty, signed on December 26, 1754, never had effect, as it was rejected by both companies.<sup>5</sup> Godeheu returned to Europe in February, 1755, being succeeded by De Leyrit, former governor of Chandernagor and opponent of Dupleix, who realized, once in charge of the larger interests of his company, that he could not survive without native alliances, especially as the English were not observing the Treaty of Pondichéry.<sup>6</sup>

Godeheu's intervention might have proved merely a passing misfortune but for the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. The formal declaration of hostilities gave the English the advantage of using their superior seapower as they could not in time of peace. This obliged the French to confine their action to the land. The question of the tenure of the Deccan was of prime importance. De Bussy was deprived of his functions in the subah's court and requested to depart to Pondichéry. He did retire to Hyderabad, but wrote to Leyrit asking help. Reinforcements were sent, and De Bussy was restored to his old functions during the summer of 1756.

When war was declared Leyrit sent D'Autheuil against Trichinopoly, but that gouty old fighter preferred siege methods to assault; he was driven back to Pondichéry and replaced by Saubinet, who took a number of towns in the Carnatic, while the English had only Arcot, Trichinopoly, and Madras.<sup>7</sup>

Meantime, in Bengal, at the death of Alivardi Khan in 1756, the English held Calcutta, Patna, Cassimbazaar, Dacia, and Hoogli, and were gathering forces at Madras to attack the French in the Deccan. After the awful episode of the Black Hole, when Suraja Dowlah took Calcutta, they prepared to send strong forces into Bengal. In October Clive, now returned from England after two years' absence, moved to

<sup>4</sup> Malleison, *Dupleix*, 167; the purpose of the treaty was to restore the *status quo ante bellum*; the renunciation of native alliances struck at a policy more highly developed by France than by England. E. J. Rapson, *The Struggle between France and England for Supremacy in India* (London, 1887), 81–82.

<sup>5</sup> Williamson, *A Short History*, I, 372. The English at once joined Mehemet Ali as allies to put down some minor princes, thus violating the treaty (Rapson, *op. cit.*, 88).

<sup>6</sup> De Bussy had contemplated leaving when Godeheu came, but remained because Dupleix urged it strongly (Malleison, *op. cit.*, 162–163). His withdrawal would have provoked general disorder (Rapson, *op. et loc. cit.*).

<sup>7</sup> Lyall maintains that the only real disadvantages incurred by the treaty were the removal of Dupleix and the recognition of Mehemet Ali in the Carnatic (Dodwell, in *History of India*, ed. by A. V. W. Jackson, 133).

<sup>8</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 245–246; The British had now committed themselves to the development of political control.

the mouth of the Hoogli and forced Chandernagor to capitulate in March.<sup>8</sup> In the following June, 1757, he won against the subah Suraja Dowlah in the decisive battle of Plassy, thus establishing his own reputation and dating the beginning of the British empire in India.<sup>9</sup> The small French forces there retired into the Deccan under Jean Law.

Near the end of 1756, the French decided to send to India a military leader, Count Lally, Baron de Tollendal, to drive England out of India once for all. A member of an Irish family which had gone to France with the Stuarts in 1688, he had served in Russia, had fought in the War of the Austrian Succession, and had a part in the expedition of Charles Edward in Scotland. He had no knowledge of colonial questions, which he undertook to study by the aid of directors of the company. His project was to destroy the English company without native coöperation, renounce all the scattered French possessions located from two to four hundred leagues away, as some were, divided into four large territories, and to substitute for them by exchange with the princes a compact domain surrounding Pondichéry.<sup>10</sup> It seemed logical to employ the company to destroy its English rival, and the government and directors adopted Lally's idea with enthusiasm.<sup>11</sup>

The instructions of Lally, who was made inspector-general and superior to the governor, were to prosecute the war with energy and to reform the administration of the company. The great object should be to expel the English.<sup>12</sup> He was not to give to the Deccan the importance it had received previously. Salabat Jang, whom De Bussy had installed as nizam, was considered an arch trouble-maker, who never would have been put into power by the native court of Delhi, but Lally was to use his discretion as to whether the troops should be recalled from the Deccan or not. Governor Leyrit had perhaps been unduly impressed by the value of that region, and Lally was to look for an agent less attached to the ideas of Dupleix.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Eugène Guénin, "Chute de Chandernagor et perte du Bengale," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1914), 291-329.

<sup>9</sup> Rapson, *The Struggle between England and France*, 90. According to a document in Archives Coloniales C<sup>2</sup> Inde., 2<sup>e</sup> série, t. 12, quoted in *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises*, XXI (Paris, 1928), 455, the French establishments in Bengal had in 1757 the following personnel: Chandernagor, 642 persons; Cassimbazar, 73; Daka, 118; Patna, 55; Jougdiá, 28; Balassor, 26.

<sup>10</sup> Malleson, *Dupleix*, 169, says that he was "universally regarded in France as the man who could take up the thread of the work of Dupleix and carry it to a successful issue"; but D'Argenson called him a stiff-necked martinet.

<sup>11</sup> See A. C. Lyall, *History of India*, VIII, chap. VI.

<sup>12</sup> For Lally's instructions see Tibulle Hamont, *Lally Tollendal d'après des documents inédits* (Paris, 1887), 66-71.

<sup>13</sup> Lally has been called "a violent and masterful personality, unbalanced, though tinged with genius, unaided and even thwarted by subordinates, [struggling]

Active war, except for the capture of Chandernagor, began in India only after Lally reached Cuddalore on April 28, 1758. Had he come a year earlier he might have prevented Clive from winning Bengal for England, for the natives had in 1756 driven the English out of Calcutta. His first military success was the capture of Cuddalore on May 2. Then, without seeking the coöperation of the councillors, whom he openly called rogues, he began operations against Fort St. David, the strongest English post, which capitulated to him on June 2, 1758. He spent no time studying the customs of the natives or the transport of supplies, and he snubbed the council,<sup>14</sup> yet his destruction of the fort which Dupleix had vainly attacked four times gave him enormous prestige.<sup>15</sup>

Lally next prepared to take Madras, Trichinopoly, and Arcot, but paid no attention to control of his lines of communication nor to obtaining supplies and transport service from the natives. He recalled De Bussy from the Deccan on June 13, 1758, saying: "I limit myself to recalling to you my policies in a few words, which are sacramental: 'No more Englishmen in the peninsula.'" <sup>16</sup> First Lally undertook to attack poorly defended Madras. Trying to obtain the coöperation of the fleet commander, Comte d'Aché, he found the latter cruising off Ceylon and able to do nothing against an English fleet off Madras under Pocock two hundred leagues from the French ships, and had to give up the project until the monsoon should oblige the English vessels to leave. Next, the indifferent Governor Leyrit made the startling announcement that he had only sufficient funds to maintain the army for another two weeks. This made a military program impossible; offended, the subordinates would not move as directed.<sup>17</sup>

against a combination of sane and level-headed mediocrities [the English]" (Williamson, *A Short History of British Expansion*, I, 379).

<sup>14</sup> Lally's conviction that all the company officers were crooked, and his disdain of the natives, were the original causes of his failure. He "committed the crime of crimes by blowing six Brahmins from guns." Rapson, *The Struggle between England and France*, 95; cf. *Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*, XI, 278.

<sup>15</sup> Lally's obsession was that his troops were "Negroes," and he refused to think of them except as "gens de rien." His concentration on expelling the English without native aid was equaled only by his belief that all company officials were grafters. Even Dupleix had not objected to personal use of company opportunities, and corruption was inveterate (Dodwell, *op. cit.*, 110).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Lyall, *op. cit.*, 138-139. The English henceforth held the dominant influence in the Deccan (*ibid.*, 143).

<sup>17</sup> He treated the Council "with the grand air of a master of a *lit de justice*, and would not converse informally with his officers" (Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 277). Thus he was driven to make confidants of the Jesuits, who worked throughout Hindustan from Pondichéry, favoring the French penetration by showing that their country was a guarantor of order, respect for privileges, and stability in social

They were an incompetent lot who had no knowledge of the strength of the English forces, or initiative.<sup>18</sup>

Thus thwarted, Lally accepted the advice of the Jesuit Father Lavaur, who suggested recourse to a surprise attack upon the rajah of Tanjore, who had in 1750 agreed, when Chanda Sahib and French allies were besieging him, to ransom his city for fifty-six lacs of rupees, but had never paid. Accepting the hazard, Lally dashed off through Karikal during a hot spell which obliged his troops to march by night.<sup>19</sup> The country rose against the expedition, the rajah refused to pay, while at the end of July Lally heard that the French fleet had been defeated. After taking vengeance with insane severity, he then retreated to Karikal, only to learn that no naval combat had occurred. Thereupon he returned to Pondichéry in August, determined to restore his lowered prestige by capturing Madras.<sup>20</sup>

But the incompetent D'Aché, who had been worsted in a small action on August 3, sailed away to the Île de France in September, 1758, to escape the monsoon, taking with him large stores of supplies. The urgent need of money now determined Lally to seize the Carnatic for its revenues. Arcot was easily taken in September, but furnished no money. An expedition against Chingleput and the northern Carnatic, the sources of supply for Madras, had to be given up in October because the unpaid sepoy mutinied. Many hundred thousand francs were due them, and supplies from Arcot were barely sufficient day by day. Lally knew that Lawrence was preparing at Madras to move against him, and decided to crush the English before they could assume the offensive. Although it was the rainy season, Lally marched his forces upon Madras without food or munitions on December 11, and undertook to besiege it.<sup>21</sup> But the English, though yet without reinforcements, were more resolute than when they had been beaten by La Bourdonnais, yet the discontented, unpaid, and badly fed French troops did in the end effect a breach, and Lally had decided to assault, when an unexpected English fleet appeared upon the horizon, and Lally

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rank. They all knew numerous native dialects, and most of them were active in charity and religious instruction, and were known as peaceful men of good judgment who enjoyed the respect of the Hindus. Some of them, knowing many languages, became useful to the French as negotiators with the Hindus. Others developed a sense of importance and a spirit of intrigue (Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 278).

<sup>18</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 171; Lyall, *op. cit.*, 144.

<sup>19</sup> Hamont, *Lally Tollendal*, 103-104, declares that Lavaur was a dangerous intriguer, but Dodwell calls him sincere at the moment (Dodwell, 155, cited by Williamson, *op. cit.*, I, 381).

<sup>20</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 172-173; Dodwell, in *The Cambridge History of India*, V, 160-161.

<sup>21</sup> Lyall, in Dodwell, *op. cit.*, 142-143.

had to raise the siege. This was another tremendous loss of reputation.

After this failure at Madras, Lally was forced to try Hindu mercenary cavalry, and asked De Bussy to bring him two thousand Marhattas. De Bussy was busy helping the princes of Bengal against the English in the hope of driving them out of Chandernagor and Calcutta; his recall, he knew, would throw Salabat over to the English and render impossible any French campaign outside of the Carnatic, yet he obeyed, pointing out to his superior that native alliances were indispensable, especially that of Salabat, as the company received from him many million rupees, and finally, that the whole of India was ready to fall to some European nation, preferably France.

Lally, reiterating "je fais la guerre aux Anglais," was not to be moved until De Bussy pointed out that he could obtain from Salabat notable advantages for himself. Lally then wrote to Paris, characterizing De Bussy as "the most avaricious, the biggest liar and thief, among men," and thenceforth he thrust De Bussy aside, although the latter had informed him that the rajahs of the Circars owed the company a tribute, which they would not pay until an armed force should come to claim it.<sup>22</sup>

The Circars, occupied by the inexperienced Marquis de Conflans with five hundred French and six thousand sepoy, now became the scene of sharp fighting. In September, 1758, the rajah of Visianagram rose against the French and called upon Clive, who was in Bengal, for support. By that time the English had retaken Calcutta, had set up a new nabob attached to themselves, and had driven the French entirely out of Bengal.<sup>23</sup> The contest was now in its last stage, with all the advantage in favor of England. In October, 1758, Clive sent to the Circars five hundred English and two thousand sepoy under Colonel Forde. Conflans allowed the English to cut his line of retreat, was defeated, and fell back to Mazulipatam, which Forde also captured on April 10.<sup>24</sup> This destroyed De Bussy's prestige at Hyderabad, cost Lally much in resources, and paved the way for revolt in the Deccan, where Salabat Jang offered the Circars to the English and promised to drive the French out of his service within two weeks in return for British protection. The fate of French India had been settled; the English took over the protectorate of the Deccan.

At the beginning of 1759 four vessels bearing seven hundred men and three million livres appeared at Fort Louis, Île de France, sent by the French government for Lally, but D'Aché would dispatch only a

<sup>22</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 264.

<sup>23</sup> Lyall, in Dodwell, *History of India*, VIII, 141.

<sup>24</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 174; Rapson, *The Struggle between England and France*, 96, says that Forde took three thousand Frenchmen prisoners.

single vessel carrying one million livres and nineteen soldiers, which reached Pondichéry just before the end of the siege of Madras.<sup>25</sup>

During September, 1759, D'Aché arrived off Trincomali, fought an indecisive battle with Pocock's nine English vessels, in which he lost nine hundred men, and had to retire to Pondichéry; there he turned over to Lally fifty soldiers and six hundred thousand livres, but set sail at once to avoid the monsoon, and never returned. The French capital was thenceforth to be blockaded at will by the English.

The money which D'Aché had brought was in bars, and the coining was systematically delayed. On October 17, the best regiment revolted for their pay. Lally was able to send them 250,000 livres, and the soldiers returned to their posts, giving him twenty days in which to make full payment. De Bussy had been on the point of concluding a treaty with Bassalet Jing, when that prince heard that the French troops had revolted, and would not sign the treaty, declaring that he had no need of it.<sup>26</sup>

Lally, with the remaining force, rejecting De Bussy's advice, now tried to drive the English out of Wandiwash, and was able to take the town, but not the citadel. On January 22, 1760, an English army under Colonel Eyre Coote inflicted a stinging defeat, in which De Bussy was made prisoner. This battle, fought principally by French and British troops, turned the tide of the war, French losses continuing as Lally showed his panic by ordering a retreat as far as Pondichéry, though only native cavalry pursued him. His associates considered him insane; he raved and swore, and showed his hatred for De Bussy by refusing to exchange him.<sup>27</sup> This was the last pitched battle of the war. Defeat was largely due to Lally's unhappy traits as an officer.

The English then laid siege to Arcot, taking it just as an English fleet appeared before Pondichéry, which at once became the British objective. Coote began to encircle this post at a great distance; Karikal was taken in April. The unpaid troops became mutinous. In September, Lally made an unfortunate sortie, being obliged to return in January, 1760, to isolated Pondichéry, where he now had a mere twelve hundred starving men to oppose five thousand English and ten thousand sepoys.<sup>28</sup>

Coote then demanded unconditional surrender, agreeing that private property should not be pillaged and that the town should not be de-

<sup>25</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 265-268.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 269-271.

<sup>27</sup> Rapson, *The Struggle between England and France*, 97; Tibulle Hamont, *Lally Tollendal*, 241-249; Lyall, *op. cit.*, 146.

<sup>28</sup> Hamont, *op. cit.*, 267-268.

stroyed. On January 16, 1761, the English colors floated over Pondichéry.<sup>29</sup> Lally, bedridden, was taken to the enemy camp under protection of English soldiers lest his own should shoot him.<sup>30</sup> Shortly afterwards, Jinji fell, and on February 13 the English took Mahé, the last French establishment. English success had come from continual superiority of seapower.

The Treaty of Paris, 1763, restored all the French posts on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts and in Bengal as they were at the beginning of 1749. France renounced all acquisition on the Coromandel and Orissa coasts, and promised to maintain no fortifications or troops in Bengal. Both nations recognized Mehemet Ali as legitimate nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabat Jang as subah of the Deccan. The towns returned to the French had their defenses dismantled and henceforth could be only commercial comptoirs. From this moment the desire for "revanche" in Asia became one of the abiding motives of French colonial history. The later efforts to regain seapower by rebuilding the navy, to break the provisions of the Treaty of 1763, by recovering India, and to seize Indo-China, were all components of the French expansionist idea of compensation for the losses of the Old Régime which survived the Revolution.<sup>31</sup>

The company was itself abolished on August 13, 1769, and its business was taken over by the crown. Its shares, worth 2,100 livres in 1743 were by 1762 worth only 725; no further dividends were paid. The fixed charges of the concern between 1764 and 1769 were about 8,750,000 livres, which would have required twenty-eight to thirty million livres' volume of business, whereas the amount done was about eighteen millions. When the crown took over the Mascareignes the company was relieved of two millions of expense, but it had lost in India, the Canadian fur trade was gone, and the African slave trade was precarious. In France the idea of company monopolies was being rudely attacked by the economist Gournay and his school since 1755. When the company was ended in 1769 the trade was opened to na-

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 254-270; the promise not to raze the town was broken.

<sup>30</sup> Malleon, *Dupleix*, 175. He was taken to England and released on parole in 1761. After reaching France, he lay in the Bastille eighteen months untried; De Bussy and Choiseul had caused this. The parlement of Paris condemned him to death and he was executed in May, 1766 (*ibid.*, 8; Hamont, *op. cit.*, 271-321).

<sup>31</sup> "The great fault of Lally was in not knowing the situation in India, and in obeying the orders of the government . . . If he had thrown his instructions into the sea, resumed the policy of Dupleix, and been guided by the advice of De Bussy, it would not be the queen of England who today wears the diadem of Empress of India" (Hamont, *op. cit.*, 321). The French company had never paid genuine dividends, averred Voltaire, either to shareholders or creditors. The Abbé Morellet estimated its losses at 169,000,000 francs. He was making his figures argue for company dissolution (Lyall, *op. cit.*, 147).

tionals beyond the Cape of Good Hope; the crown took over the ports and the thirty vessels and the other materials on hand, but by 1785 the stockholders succeeded in having their privilege restored, and operated several posts on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts and in Bengal. The trade in 1787 totaled twenty millions.<sup>82</sup> "The repeated shocks which the company suffered were caused less by the variations of its commerce than by the wars which the state had to carry on, the terrible financial condition of the state, and perhaps the effect of the authority which always directed and often ordered its operations."<sup>83</sup> It was still in process of liquidation of its affairs at the beginning of the Revolution, the Constituent Assembly closing its process in 1790.<sup>84</sup>

It was only under the pressure of *force majeure* that the French finally gave up the idea of restored political power in India. Their efforts in this direction helped to keep the peninsula in turmoil, but in most cases served rather to hasten English predominance because they helped to identify the ill-disposed native princes while offering no effectual French aid because England held the seas. During the American Revolution this idea of driving the English into the sea obsessed Chevalier, head of French affairs in Bengal, who planned two such projects in 1772 and 1775. While Jean Law de Lauriston was governor (1765-1777) the English company assumed the prior French policy exemplified by Dupleix. It controlled the collection of imposts, forbade the natives to work for the French or the Dutch until its own labor needs were satisfied, even prohibited delivery of goods to its competitors. It inspected foreign ships under pretext of collecting taxes. An incident at Chandernagor concerning a moat which drained stagnant waters was magnified into a French attempt to restore fortifications, and nearly brought war.

Relations with the natives brought incessant revolts, chiefly by the Mahrattas and the nabob of Mysore, Hyder Ali, the latter being the most troublesome. At the outbreak of the American Revolution the English surprised Chandernagor, and rapidly took also Karikal, Mazulipatam, Yanaon, and Surat. Bellecombe, the able governor of Pondichéry, facing 20,000 English under General Monroe and bombardment from a hostile fleet, had to capitulate on October 17, 1778, and Mahé, last of the posts, fell in March, 1779.

French adventurers who had not left the peninsula, or who came

<sup>82</sup> Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VIII, 349-350.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*; Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 104; other companies re-established were: the Company of Africa or . . . of the Bastion de France, 1770; of Cap-Nord or Guiana, 1777; the Senegal Company, 1784 (L. Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, Paris, 1898, 26-27).

<sup>84</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 386-388.

after the loss of 1763, were strong at the courts of the hostile native princes, where they trained sepoys in hope of regaining French dominion or of amassing private fortunes. Famous among them were René Madec, Sombre, De Bussy, and others who gloated at opportunities such as offering assistance to Hyder Ali. The younger Law, Raymond, De Boigne, Perron, Dudrenec, all supported Ali or Sindia or Holkar in revolts.<sup>85</sup> Hyder Ali had part of De Bussy's old troops, armed with contraband French guns; he forbade the English to take Mahé, and when they disregarded him he joined the Mahrattas and the Nizam with 100,000 men and one hundred cannon. The English had failed him in 1770 when he was attacked by the Mahrattas.<sup>86</sup> His son Tipu Sahib defeated the English in 1780, while he besieged Arcot and overran the Carnatic; his proposal to ally with the French was not accepted by the timid Louis XVI.

When Bengal revolted against Hastings the English anticipated the French in action by seizing the holdings of the Dutch (allies of France) on the Coromandel coast and in Ceylon. General Eyre Coote hurried from Bengal to fight Hyder Ali in the Carnatic through 1781 and 1782. He was saved from utter defeat by the fact that D'Orves, commander of a French fleet, sailed away without preventing him from obtaining supplies at Madras. An expedition under the old Marquis de Bussy came to clinch anew the hold of France, but before it could do anything the peace of 1783 had been signed.

On the sea the fear of loss of the Cape Colony by the Dutch ally induced France to send their greatest admiral, Suffren, to hold it and to fight in Eastern waters. After preventing Commodore Johnstone from taking the Cape, Suffren sailed to Île de France and thence in December to Madras. There he began demonstrating his prowess by defeating Admiral Hughes and by landing forces at Cuddalore for De Bussy and Hyder Ali.<sup>87</sup> Suffren's later successes, especially at Cuddalore, restored native hopes in the French just as the American Revolution was ending. On August 31, 1782, he took Trincomali from the English as they had taken it from the Dutch; on September 3 he administered a new drubbing to Hughes, and then retired from the monsoons.<sup>88</sup>

Hyder Ali, dying, was succeeded by his son Tipu Sahib in December, 1782; he was an ardent hater of England. Tipu was stupid enough

<sup>85</sup> G. B. Malleison, *Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian Seas* (London, new ed., 1884), 2.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>87</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 390-393; De Bussy, now sixty-four years old, was gouty and quite unlike his dashing self of the days of Dupleix; cf. Dodwell, in the *Cambridge History of India*, V, 324.

<sup>88</sup> Malleison, *op. cit.*, 40-56.

to alienate the Mahrattas, who with the English attacked Mysore. Tipu had to recall most of his troops from the Carnatic, leaving only 9,000 men to help De Bussy meet 20,000 men under General Stuart at Madras. De Bussy was blockaded in Cuddalore from May to June, 1783. Suffren, now with fifteen ships against eighteen English, manoeuvred to a position between shore and the English fleet, obliging it for the fifth time to retire to Madras. Stuart, harassed by native troops on his rear, was in danger of defeat when on June 29, 1783, news of the peace reached India. Suffren's partial successes were largely due to failure of his captains to understand and obey his strategy. Had De Bussy retained his old spirit he might have defeated Stuart, and India might have been re-won for France.<sup>39</sup>

After the treaty, Tipu Sahib obliged Colonel Campbell to capitulate on January 2, 1784, and effected a peace on the *status quo ante bellum*. In 1787 he sent an embassy to France asking for three thousand men with which to restore the French to their old position; but France had just signed her commercial treaty with England, and hesitated to forego the expected recuperation of treasure lost in the American war, so Tipu got nothing but kind words and future hopes. The French minister, De Castries, was even then ready to abandon Pondichéry and fall back on Trincomali, his Dutch ally's port, in case of war with England.

General Conway, at Pondichéry in 1787, recommended practical giving up of the India posts at the same time that he discouraged the idea of a descent upon Cochin China. In the following year he tried to revive interest in colonizing Madagascar. But when Conway's men in 1790 undertook to carry away the munitions from Pondichéry, the colonists began a counter movement in which they deposed Governor Montigny and organized a general assembly; the population was divided, but the revolutionaries held the power until the English took the place in 1793.<sup>40</sup>

The impossibility of sea communication with India during the French Revolution prompted the Egyptian campaign of Napoleon, who was working on an idea suggested by *mémoires* dating as early as 1770. French treaties in 1785 with the beys of northern Africa looking to an eastern approach were upset by the jealousy of the Porte. Napoleon's descent in 1798, failing to break English communications

<sup>39</sup> Malleon, *op. cit.*, 74-75. Suffren ranks with Nelson in his strategy of giving up the single-line battle formation, he preferring close quarters. His rigid discipline of timid officers won him many enemies.

<sup>40</sup> The period is well described by H. Castonnet des Fosses, "La Révolution et les clubs dans l'Inde Française," *Revue de la Révolution*, I (1883), 232-238, 333-337, 383-392.

with the East, was followed by the idea of coöperation with Russia; but by that time Tipu Sahib had fallen and French adventurers at Hyderabad had been dispersed.<sup>41</sup>

French plans in India were frustrated by the Marquis of Wellesley, who compelled Tipu to dismiss his French allies. Wellesley, who came to govern in 1798, even contemplated seizing Bourbon and Ile de France, but had to give that up, as he did an attack on the French in Batavia in 1801. The French party in India had ceased to exist. The Peace of Amiens saw the French back in their old position of non-political merchants in India. When Napoleon's governor-general Decaen attempted to repossess Pondichéry under the Amiens agreement, renewed war was so clearly foreseen that he was refused, and upon the outbreak of hostilities the troops he had left were obliged to surrender. Between 1792 and 1802 India had become an English holding. Decaen's efforts to arouse the Hindu princes met failure chiefly because English fleets could keep French troops out of the peninsula.<sup>42</sup> The volunteer corsairs from the Mascareignes who scoured the Indian Ocean caught many private and company ships of the English, but they were of no value for transporting or landing troops, had any been available. Napoleon tried in 1805 to send 20,000 men by sea; again in 1807 a joint land and sea expedition aided by Persia was contemplated but abandoned. By 1809 the Corsican had given up hope of retaking India. In 1810 the menace by sea to the English power was removed when Admiral Bertie and General John Abercromby took the Mascareignes by means of an overpowering expedition. The treaties of 1814 and 1815 repeated the limitations on the India posts imposed by the Treaty of 1763. There was to be no further menace from Europe to English sovereignty.<sup>43</sup> Worse than this, thought Castonnet des Fosses, the Jacobin policy had deprived France of expansive power.

<sup>41</sup> Dodwell, in *The Cambridge History*, V, 327.

<sup>42</sup> H. Prentout, *L'île de France sous Decaen* (Paris, 1901), 437. The projects of Napoleon to conquer India are surveyed in Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 349-424; on the French adventurers in India after 1815, *ibid.*, 425-466.

<sup>43</sup> Dodwell, *op. cit.*, 331-332; Castonnet des Fosses, "La Révolution et les clubs dans l'Inde Française," *Revue de la Révolution*, II, 91-97.

## CHAPTER XVII

## THE MASCAREIGNES, 1640-1810

This group of islands east of Madagascar, conspicuous in strategic importance during the modern epoch, was frequently of interest to men of ancient times, if allusions in old books are adequate indications. The Mascareignes came to the notice of the modern nations coincidentally with their trade movements into Oriental waters. Mention has already been made of the discovery of part of the group by Pedro de Mascarenhas, the Portuguese navigator, in 1528. The Portuguese apparently had little if any further contact here, as their voyages usually followed the Mozambique Channel.

The earliest serious attention by the French was bestowed upon the island known as Bourbon (Réunion) by those Rouen and Paris merchants who were the immediate predecessors of Richelieu's East India Company of 1642. It was stated by François Cauche that his first visit was in 1638;<sup>1</sup> but it has been shown by Paul Kaepplm that the first voyage of the *Saint Alexis* under Alfonse Goubert was sent to the Red Sea to prey on Spanish ships in 1638, and that upon that voyage Goubert, with Cauche on board, spent six months on Maurice (Île de France), cutting ebony, returning to France in 1639. On a second voyage in 1640 the returning French took possession of Rodriguez and Mascareigne (Bourbon). They found the Dutch ahead of them on Maurice, however, and sailed away in a few weeks to set up an establishment at Saint-Pierre on the islet Sainte-Luce, off Madagascar.<sup>2</sup> Then followed the events concerning the establishment

<sup>1</sup> F. Cauche, "Voyage," in Grandidier, *Collection des ouvrages anciens*, VII.

<sup>2</sup> The date 1638 is followed by I. Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon et de la colonisation française à Madagascar*, 8, 41-47. The island of Rodriguez in this group was visited at various times by Europeans, first the Portuguese, then the Dutch. In 1685 a small group of French Huguenots from Holland began a colony. They "had not come to a deserted island through despair or from not having a place whereon to rest the soles of our feet." This advance guard of a proposed colonial movement lasted only until 1693. (Ch. de la Roncière, *Histoire de la Marine*, VI, 28-30). Bourbon and Mauritius were occupied by the French by 1721. Leguet's attractive account drew numerous vessels to Rodriguez, and in 1725 it was occupied for Louis XV. It was used by the French neighboring islands for its store of tortoises. A small settlement was made in 1760. In 1803 General Decaen withdrew most of the colonists to prevent their proving a menace by revictualing British ships.

of a post on Madagascar by Pronis. Pronis visited Mascareigne and Rodriguez in 1643, taking possession. In 1646 the dozen exiles punished for putting Pronis in chains were set ashore on Bourbon by Le Bourg, becoming its first colonists, though they were taken back to Madagascar in 1649 by Flacourt. In 1654 Flacourt exiled seven other Frenchmen and several Malagasy,<sup>3</sup> who made their way from Bourbon to India. Other derelicts from time to time led isolated lives on Bourbon.

It was a fateful contact with Maurice (later Île de France) when the cargo of slaves from Madagascar was sold by Pronis to the Dutch, as the enmity of the Malagasy was earned by that act, which served merely to promote the welfare of a weak settlement which the Dutch shortly abandoned (1658). Rigault, head of the Madagascar project, died in 1652, after which the islands were generously neglected by the company. Bourbon was visited once again in 1662, when a malcontent from Madagascar was exiled there with a French companion and ten Negroes, three of whom were women. The Negroes began breeding a race of maroons as dangerous to the French as were the runaway blacks left on Maurice by the Dutch when they deserted that island.

Upon the organization of Colbert's East India Company and the reoccupation of Madagascar, a fleet of vessels was sent to Bourbon to establish there a health resort for colonists. There were then about a dozen French living free lives on the little island. The sieur Étienne Regnault landed in July, 1665, from which time the real occupation of Bourbon dates. The De Beusse attempt on Madagascar speedily failed, as has been seen. During its brief year, Champmargou visited Regnault on Bourbon, explored the island, and made its first map. The Montdevergue voyage in 1667 called also, leaving two hundred sick, three-fourths of whom promptly died. Among the survivors were five white women.<sup>4</sup> There was now a tiny nucleus for occupation, a good commandant, twenty pioneers, and a small group of Negroes.

When De la Haye was on Bourbon in May, 1671, on his way to India, he made Regnault governor, but that capable officer was soon replaced by the sieur de la Hure, whose cruelty soon drove his colonists to take refuge in another part of the island. There were by this time four little villages, around which were fields of wheat, rice, sugar cane and cotton. In 1673 the fortunes of the islanders were promised betterment when sixteen very young women were sent out to become brides. They were landed instead by De Beauregard on Madagascar, where their presence and marriage caused the massacre of the colony at Fort

<sup>3</sup> G. Azéma, *Histoire de l'île Bourbon* . . . (Paris, 1862), 10-11. Farm animals were left by these expeditions to multiply on Bourbon.

<sup>4</sup> Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon*, 54, 61-62.

Dauphin and the scattering of the survivors, some of whom went to Bourbon. Beauregard was to have named a governor for Bourbon to replace the vicious De la Hure, but De la Haye in 1674, returning defeated from India, anticipated him, and placed the sieur d'Argeret in charge.<sup>5</sup> Madagascar being given up, Bourbon remained as the only French colony in the Indian Ocean.

D'Argeret was an intelligent ruler who undertook to formalize and regulate the ragged Edenic society over which he ruled. At his death in 1678 the colony numbered one hundred and fifty settlers. The tiny villages received no attention from the company save the prohibition to export or import on any save company ships, though these called but once in two or three years. The spirit of monopoly thus helped the colonists little, but did less for the company. The isolated Frenchmen varied the monotony of their field labors by fighting maroons, or destroying the hordes of rats which consumed their crops. Their plea, addressed to Colbert in 1678 for attention,<sup>6</sup> reveals a sad little corner of the world, neglected for posts of more certain commercial profit.

In 1682 their Capuchin priest, Père Hyacinth Bernardin, seized Governor Auger, put him in prison, and ruled in his stead by common consent four years. In 1686 he went to France, arriving there a year later, to ask for a governor, clergy, and commercial contacts with the outside world for their "New Eden."<sup>7</sup> M. Hubert de Vauboulon as governor, and two priests, arrived in 1689, at which time the inhabitants of Bourbon numbered 269 souls. The new governor proved so bad that his colonists jailed him; he died in confinement, while his impromptu judges were sent to France and punished.<sup>8</sup>

At this time the habitants were forced to raise the crops specified by the company governor, who reserved for his organization the rights over wood cutting, hunting, and fishing. The colonists were obliged to pay to the company annually two hogs, or a dozen fowls, or a hundred pounds of rice—not very profitable revenues with which to maintain a colony four thousand leagues from France!

M. Pierre Antoine de Parat, governor in 1710, began some progress in spite of his flair for gambling and women. A council of three civil and five criminal magistrates was created, with appeal to the sovereign council in Pondichéry. It served also as the governor's administrative council. The Lazarists were given the missionary enterprise of the two islands in 1712. An allotment and record of land was begun. In 1714

the Île de France was taken by the French, it having been deserted by the Dutch in 1710. The latter had held a post on it from 1638 to 1658, and from 1664 to 1710.<sup>9</sup> The Seychelles were added in 1742. The population of Bourbon in 1715 was seven or eight hundred. About this time certain pirates, weary of the sea, made inhospitable by vengeful English ships, began to settle down on Bourbon and join its planter class.

Up to this time there was no formal granting of land; titles and contracts were merely verbal. There were no enclosures, and cattle roamed in common herds, distinguished only by brands. Nor were there even any jails. With the coming of Governor Beauvillier de Courchant in 1718, jails were set up in the four already existing parishes, and a militia was created to protect the island against the growing swarms of pirates and the ever-menacing maroons.<sup>10</sup>

Land grants which had been irregular and objects of open graft, particularly under Governor Vauboulon who ruled after 1689, were ordered subjected to measurement by order of the provincial council in 1715. The unit was a perch (*gaulette*), fifteen feet long which continued in use for many years. Land grants unimproved for a specified term escheated to the company for redistribution. The plots ran from the shore to the summits of the mountains, the form of the declaration leading the colonists to construe the concession as extending to the highest points. The matter was settled in 1728 by a declaration that "since the island is round, every ravine which flows (contains water) or is not cultivable to its depths, shall be held and reputed as the *summit of the mountains* for all lands which extend to them from the edge of the sea."<sup>11</sup>

The most interesting event of these years was the introduction of coffee plants. The Saint-Malo Company, then operating the affairs of the East India Company, brought the first ones in on the ship *L'Auguste*. The six Arabian plants introduced by this means proved to the habitants of Bourbon that a wild tree on the island was of a similar species, indicating that the culture would thrive. Five of the plants died; the sixth in 1718 bore flowers and fruit, and from it sprang the coffee plantations which made French Mocha famous. Coffee planting was legally imposed on everyone, even the blacks. Parat went himself to France to obtain the company's consent to the new agricultural venture. The colonists were not all favorable at first, and many pulled

<sup>5</sup> Guët, *Les origines de l'île Bourbon*, 77-79, 103.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>7</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, I, 387-388; Castonnet des Fosses, *L'Inde française avant Dupleix*, 173-174; Azéma, *op. cit.*, 21.

<sup>8</sup> Guët, *Les origines*, 137-139, 174-207.

<sup>9</sup> Paul Kaeppelin, *Les escales françaises sur la route de l'Inde* (Paris, 1908), 88-98.

<sup>10</sup> Azéma, *op. cit.*, 23-24.

<sup>11</sup> Azéma, *op. cit.*, 25-26. On land grants and troubles, Guët, *op. cit.*, 178-181, 198-199, 223, 246-247.

out the trees they had been forced to plant. But by 1723 the coffee trees were reported to number 1,406, and within a few years there were many thousands. Here was a happy end to desperate penury and a quick change to the highest prosperity. The East India Company obtained the monopoly of the French coffee trade in 1723. As it was still buying coffee from Holland, the new monopoly gave great impulse to the Bourbon plantations. By 1730 enough coffee was produced to supply all France.<sup>12</sup>

In 1717 there were nine hundred free persons and eleven hundred slaves on Bourbon. Very soon more blacks were brought in from Madagascar, branded on the left shoulder by the company so as to prevent smuggling of slaves. The effect was to extend and generalize the institution of slavery, and a Code Noir was introduced in 1723. It was based on Roman law and Colbert's Code Noir of 1687. This progress was due to Governor Benoît Dumas; he brought in a garrison and coffee specialists, built ships for the public service, and organized the commercial service, regulated the exchange of money, and suppressed payment of imposts in kind. He also objected that the company forced the coffee producers to sell at the low price of six sols per pound from 1732 to 1738.

The prosperity of the island continued to the end of the Old Régime, notwithstanding the fact that a good port could be obtained only by extending French control to Île de France, which the Dutch had abandoned in favor of their Cape Colony. The initiative was taken by the planters of Bourbon, while company ships also arrived in 1721, when Port Louis was made a port of call.<sup>13</sup> A governor subordinate to the governor of Bourbon was installed; the provincial council of Bourbon was replaced by a superior council in 1723, while a provincial was set up in the Île de France.

Perhaps the most important event of the early 1730's was an uprising of the blacks, who tried to massacre the whites and seize the colony. The conspirators were discovered and condemned by the superior council to be broken on a scaffold, exposed on a wheel for ten hours, and strangled. Those who escaped to the mountains held the colony in such terror that they had to be promised immunity, and Dumas had to establish a night patrol and curfew regulations.

Dumas being promoted in 1735 to serve as governor of Pondichéry,

<sup>12</sup> In 1715 Parat ordered that any man, slave or free, who stole or destroyed animals or crops or burned pasturage on the plantations should be hanged. Infanticide was similarly punished (Azéma, *op. cit.*, 31-34).

<sup>13</sup> Guët, *op. cit.*, 262-266; Kaëppelin, *Les escales françaises*, 95-99; G. M. Theal, *History of South Africa under the Administration of the Dutch East India Company* (London, 1897, 2v.), I, 417. Possession was taken by the French in 1715 and again in 1721. The "act of possession" is in Azéma, *op. cit.*, 43.

the islands were placed under the command of Bertrand François Mahé de la Bourdonnais,<sup>14</sup> "a man of eminent talents and virtues," who governed for eleven years. He made Île de France (1735) the seat of government and improved Port Louis on the northwest coast, with all the equipment of a marine base, for communications with India.<sup>15</sup> The habitual license and idleness of a refugee colony were changed to order and industry. Port Louis was organized as a city, lands were distributed, and the cultivation began of coffee, sugar cane, cotton, indigo, and manioc. Many beef animals were raised. The governor sought to make the islands rival the Dutch establishments on Cape of Good Hope. Whereas in 1735 Île de France had only about eight hundred inhabitants, by 1740 they numbered three thousand, of whom 2,600 were black. Île de France became the point of greatest strategic value in the Indian Ocean during the wars which lasted until 1815.<sup>16</sup> The fortunes of La Bourdonnais have been followed in connection with his services in India.

In 1746 Pierre David, gentle-mannered governor of slave-trading Senegal, succeeded to the chief post in the Mascareignes. The islanders were delighted with him. He built the first stone house, and did his best to encourage industry and agriculture. The sugar plantations were then fairly prosperous, although the planters had burdened themselves with too many slaves to be able to feed them. David's administration was marked by the return of La Bourdonnais from his unhappy experiences at Madras, and by an attack from the English fleet under Admiral Boscawen.<sup>17</sup>

During the Seven Years' War the islanders lamented the appearance of French ships of war, for their crews consumed all the provisions; more devastating was the tremendous hurricane in January, 1758, which tore thirty-two ships from their anchors in Port Louis and spread desolation through the Île de France, the effects of which remained visible for three months.

In 1764, after the disasters of Canada and India, the Mascareignes were ordered taken under crown administration as a prelude to the suppression of the East India Company. This change was delayed until 1767. The islanders were commercially the victims of the policy of the company, which had used the Mascareignes as an entrepôt, ships from India there meeting ships from France and exchanging

<sup>14</sup> Azéma, *op. cit.*, 33-35.

<sup>15</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 159-163; Charles Pridham, *An Historical, Political, and Statistical Account of Mauritius and its Dependencies*, 13, 14-31.

<sup>16</sup> La Bourdonnais gives ample account of his improvement works in his *Mémoires historiques*, 11-43; also see Pridham, *op. cit.*, 13-42; Pierre Crépin, *Mahé de la Bourdonnais*, gives a good survey of his government (pp. 65-90).

<sup>17</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 34-39.

cargoes. Excluded from this commerce by company merchants, they devoted themselves to agriculture with but indifferent success owing to mistakes in cultivation, land distribution, and agricultural loans; the company's policy of "buying low" the produce of the islands and "selling high" their imports prevented solid gains by the habitants.<sup>18</sup> Assumption of responsibility by the crown brought to Île de France as governor M. Jean Daniel Dumas, and Pierre Poivre as intendant. The governor held the military command, acting so arbitrarily, for instance in his exile to Rodriguez of a member of the superior council, that he was recalled at the end of a year. The remarkable intendant, Poivre, who managed finances, taxation, agriculture, and commerce, justice, and police, had the important interests of the islands at heart.<sup>19</sup> He had traveled over much of Asia as a naturalist, intent upon fighting the destructive Dutch monopoly of the trade in spices by introducing pepper, cloves, and other tropical crops. Surmounting the dangerous seas, the hostile governors, and the enmity of many colonists, he succeeded in restoring prosperity, which had disappeared with the going of La Bourdonnais; <sup>20</sup> his six years served as a fitting complement to the energetic work of that indefatigable engineer.<sup>21</sup> The two islands were redoubtable fortresses for France and commercial centers of first rank. Not only were they "French pistols aimed at British India," but necessary supports to future expansion in Madagascar, to which

<sup>18</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 42-43; some details of company liquidation are in Azéma, *op. cit.*, 88-90.

<sup>19</sup> The functions of governor and intendant are differentiated in Azéma, 90-91. Dumas had served in Canada during the Seven Years' War as major-general and inspector of troops.

<sup>20</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 47.

<sup>21</sup> Poivre was born in Lyons in 1719 and had expected to become a foreign missionary. At the age of twenty he went to China and learned the language. After two years he went to Cochin China. Embarking in 1745, he returned to France from Canton. His ship was attacked by the English. During the fight he lost his right arm, and was sent as a prisoner to Batavia. Five months there gave orientation to his life. Studying the Dutch commerce and production, he noted that their crops were concentrated on certain islands, but that other ones, uninhabited, might be reached without danger, and plants be taken from them which the Dutch were so unwilling to see carried to other colonies. Full of information, he left Batavia, reaching the Île de France in 1746, convinced that the French islands would produce all the crops of the Dutch ones. Returning to the Far East, he traveled eight years through China, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies; frequently returning to the Île de France, he took there the products of his searches. Returning to France, he retired at Lyons, where the Duc de Choiseul-Praslin called him to service again. Returning to the Île de France, he resumed the work which he had undertaken, organizing two research groups which he sent into the countries he himself had visited between 1769 and 1772. They brought back pepper trees, cinnamon, nutmegs, cloves, and dye-woods (G. Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 104-105; Azéma, *op. cit.*, 91-97).

island the Paris government from time to time issued declarations reasserting its national claim.<sup>22</sup>

The Île de France had now become the more important of the two islands, on account of its strategic position, the activity of its excellent Port Louis, and, especially, because it was the seat of French government in the Indian Ocean. It produced cinnamon, nutmeg, and vanilla, which the Dutch had long monopolized.<sup>23</sup> The coffee crop, however, did better on Bourbon, which also excelled in crops with which to revictual calling vessels. In 1776 the Île de France contained 6,386 white inhabitants, 2,950 of them being soldiers and sailors; there were 1,100 free colored people, 25,150 slaves. The Île de Bourbon, with over three times the area (2,500 square kilometers), contained 6,340 whites and 26,175 slaves.<sup>24</sup> In 1788 the exports from the group to France amounted to a value of 2,700,000 livres, chiefly in coffee, as the crops introduced by Poivre had not yet come into commercial bearing. Imports from France were 4,600,000 livres.

Draconian laws restricted the activities of the habitants, that is in case the governors could count upon the loyalty of their guards. Those who were forbidden the chase, the pursuit of commerce, or other activities had three recourses: to go into contraband trade, to take to the mountains, or to rebel openly. The history of Bourbon during the time of the East India Company's monopoly has been said to have been that of "arbitrary rule tempered by insurrection."<sup>25</sup>

After the crown took them over the islands were under free commerce for French nationals, even after a new privileged company was erected in 1785. The arrêt of that year allowed the islanders to import from France all goods required and to send their products to France through Lorient; they might engage in the slave trade, and in the India to India trade except in the Red Sea, China, and Japan, save that they might not reexport goods from France, nor send to Europe products other than their own; this was to prevent their competition with the privileged company.<sup>26</sup>

The Mascareignes, being plantation colonies, have certain similarities with the West Indies. Both are in the torrid zone; the climates, though reversed in seasons are similar. They rise from the ocean as continental peaks, are rugged, with well-watered valleys, and subject

<sup>22</sup> M. Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 177.

<sup>23</sup> The transfer of these new wealth-producing plants to Bourbon was prohibited in 1770 as an act of treason until the central government removed the restriction (Azéma, *op. cit.*, 94).

<sup>24</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 104-105.

<sup>25</sup> R. Barquissau and others, *L'île de la Réunion* (Paris, 1925), 46-47.

<sup>26</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 53; Azéma, *op. cit.*, 120-121.

to the same kinds of storms and earthquakes. Both were practically without a native labor supply, although the Antilles had a few Indians while the Mascareignes had no indigenous people. They procured their slaves from Madagascar, or the East Coast of Africa, where the trade had been carried on for many centuries by the Arabs.<sup>27</sup>

When the islands were taken under crown administration in 1767 a new superior council was created which was in turn suppressed in 1771, at which time royal jurisdiction was introduced. The new court, accepted on Bourbon, consisted of one judge, his lieutenant, a king's procurer, and one clerk of court (*greffier*). The court had cognizance of civil and criminal actions in first instance, with appeal lying to the superior council. It also functioned as an admiralty court. The superior council on the Île de France was composed of the governor, the intendant, the two immediate subordinates of each, and six councillors, each of whom was at the head of a public service. A superior council on Bourbon was similarly organized. It was obviously detrimental to justice to have administrators as members of the courts, for they restricted liberty unduly, being so far away from France. Quarrels between the executive and the councils over administrative faculties were frequent occasions for the superior intervention of the department of marine.<sup>28</sup> A land court was set up in 1767, and a registry of deeds and titles for the islands was created in Versailles in 1776.

Arbitrary governors and intendants had by 1789 caused many inhabitants to desire to be rid of them. When news came in 1790 of the successes of the National Assembly in Paris, the people on Bourbon received it with interest and reserve, while the cockade was generally adopted in the Île de France. A group of wastrels, derelict from Suffren's squadron, dubbed themselves "Les Refraîchisseurs" and began agitation for assemblies. Governor Conway, full of the spirit of the

<sup>27</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 402. The population of the Île de France was given by Pridham as:

Year	Whites	Free colored	Slave	Total
1767	3,163	587	15,027	18,777
1777	3,434	1,173	25,154	29,761
1787	4,372	2,235	33,832	40,439
1807	6,237	3,703	49,080	59,020

Bourbon's population in 1767 was 5,237 whites, 25,047 blacks; in 1777, 6,612 whites and 28,457 blacks, totaling 35,069. In the first mentioned year there were 1,352,500 coffee trees, 2,570,000 lbs. of wheat, 1,909,000 lbs. of rice, 10,236 lbs. of maize, and 106,600 lbs. of vegetables. Cattle numbered 11,241 beeves, 5,642 sheep, 13,855 goats, 15,000 hogs, and 2,593 horses. All animals and products showed large increases in the census of 1777 except sheep (Azéma, *op. cit.*, 144-145). In 1782 the royal magazines contained 16,526,174 lbs. of food grains which were sent to France, used by the fleets, or sold in India (*ibid.*, 146).

<sup>28</sup> Azéma, *op. cit.*, 108-109.

Old Régime, arrested them, but the populace freed them and compelled the governor to don the hated cockade himself.<sup>29</sup>

Under authority given by the National Assembly, an assembly of fifty-one members was organized; the garrison of the post joined the Revolution. When Macnamara, commander of the India fleet, arrived in 1790, he reported their defection to the minister of the marine, and his letter was discovered. The grenadiers seized him on his flagship and haled him before the new assembly for punishment. When he attempted to escape from a prison sentence the soldiers cut off his head and paraded it through the streets. The democrats on March 25, 1790, set up an assembly at Saint-Denis in Bourbon as well, challenging the local royal government. The National Assembly of France had ordered that colonial assemblies in existence should continue,<sup>30</sup> while the one on Île de France issued decrees forbidding mutilation of captured maroons, abolishing the slave trade, and establishing equality between whites and free *hommes de couleur*. Revolutionary enthusiasm next led to organization of a Jacobin club, the Chaumière, which set up a guillotine for the edification of the authorities, whose power it rivaled. The Chaumière sent to Bourbon to bring back for trial the deposed officials of the Old Régime, accused of negotiations with the English. The governor, Malartic, and the colonial assembly, had to permit the Chaumière to send the Bourbon Island dignitaries to jail, where they remained some six months. Finally the assembly was able to abate the Jacobin enthusiasm, and arrange for a delay in the trial of the arrested officers, who were finally released without formality.<sup>31</sup>

In the midst of these events came tidings of the decree of 16 pluviôse, an II (February 4, 1794), by the National Convention, abolishing slavery and the slave trade in all the colonies. This legislation had the immediate effect of quenching revolutionary ardor. When Robespierre and the Jacobin clubs were known to have been defeated, the colonial assembly broke up the Chaumière by arresting its leaders and closing its meeting place. The unused guillotine was taken down, and thirty Jacobins were deported to France.

The mother country was unable to exert any force, protective or oppressive, in these islands, which were left to Governor Malartic and the colonial assemblies. The former assumed responsibility for executing all laws, while the assembly resolved that no law sent from

<sup>29</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 55-57; P. Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 303.

<sup>30</sup> The National Assembly's decrees of May 13 and 15, 1791, provided that no laws should be passed concerning non-free people save on request of the colonial assemblies, nor should the status of those not born of free parents be discussed save in accord with the wish of the colonies (Azéma, *op. cit.*, 163).

<sup>31</sup> Azéma, *op. cit.*, 169-175.

France should be promulgated without its own sanction. No revolutionary decree was published or enforced in the Île de France. During 1794 the island broke an English blockade of Port Louis, and its corsairs made the flag of France respected in the neighboring ocean.

The planters continued to be seriously disturbed over abolition, as well they might, for of the 70,000 population, 55,000 were slaves, who might at any time try to reproduce the horrors of 1791 in Saint-Domingue. Nor were the mercantile interests less concerned to delay execution of the decree, though their personal fortunes were less involved.<sup>82</sup> Suspense was increased on July 18 when two Revolutionary commissioners of the Directory, Bacot and Burnell, arrived under naval and military protection to proclaim emancipation and reduce the island to the control of the homeland. Landing without either permission or opposition, the commissioners were received with a suspicion which became open hostility when they began to move toward deposing the governor. In a few days the insular militia, four thousand strong, deported them to the Philippines, and they only escaped arriving there by inducing the crew of the ship which bore them away to sail for Madagascar.<sup>83</sup>

The next danger, even more serious, burst upon the islanders when the soldiers of the garrison formed a plot to set free the Negro women; the menace was averted by sending the disaffected troops to Batavia, Holland being an "ally" of France at the time, the latter part of 1797. When the British commander in Indian waters offered the protection of his flag to the colony which had not only his hostility but that of the French Directory to fear, the insular patriots refused the proffer and augmented their defenses in every way possible. Twenty creole privateers were sent out, and brought in numerous East Indiamen as prizes. The island even sent its regular troops to France, to Batavia to help the Dutch, and to Mysore to fight for Tipu Sahib. The Île de France for a time was looked upon as an independent state; the motion made in the colonial assembly in September, 1797, to declare the colony free from France was defeated after debate in February, 1800; several foreign agents of areas threatened by the English applied to the colonial assembly for military help during 1798.<sup>84</sup>

In May of that year a new internal struggle developed when the remnant of regular troops threatened again to proclaim emancipation. It was decided to deport them on a vessel then ready for a cruise; but

<sup>82</sup> Pridham, *An Historical, Political, and Statistical Account of Mauritius*, 60; Gaffarel, *op. cit.*, 305.

<sup>83</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 61-62; A. Cochin, *The Results of Emancipation* (Boston, 1863), 38-39.

<sup>84</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 63; Azéma, *op. cit.*, 199-202; Gaffarel, *op. cit.*, 306.

the grenadiers, encouraged by radicals, and fearing they were being sent to Batavia or Mysore, mutinied and seized the military supplies. Their officers, all of the Old Régime, held them in check, preventing violence. The colonial assembly and the governor, backed by the national guard and many country volunteers, finally induced the grenadiers to desist and go aboard the ship, under promise that it would take them to France.<sup>85</sup>

Still another crisis came when the insulars split over the proper method to pursue with regard to the depreciation of the insular paper money. A law was about to be passed prescribing that all debts should be paid in assignats, which had fallen to about one-thousandth of their face value. The creditor class demanded that holders of debts should be paid full value, while the debtors demanded that the depreciation should not be recognized. The colonial assembly voted for concessions favoring the debtors, whereupon the creditors conspired to dissolve the assembly. Public disorder broke out in November, 1799. The conspirators seized Port-Louis and compelled Malartic to dissolve the assembly, but were soon overpowered by volunteers from the outside communes, who deported forty-six conspirators to France on November 15. In December a new colonial assembly was organized, its numbers being reduced from fifty-one to twenty-one. Governor Malartic died in July, 1800, after eight years of successful resistance to the revolutionary movement.<sup>86</sup> In the following year, the same policy was pursued when, under Governor le Comte Magallon de la Morlière, the insular assembly deported one hundred and eight republicans to France. Most of them were lost in shipwreck on the coast of their mother country.

The social order in these islands long remained very simple. Before the introduction of coffee, the islanders were uncouth husbandmen. The first settlers on the Île de France, who came from Bourbon, were simple rustics, usually men of good faith who loved hospitality and were not avid for wealth. When the East India Company became interested in the Île de France, its agents there lived aristocratic lives, controlling not only trade but affairs of justice. They early became speculators in real estate. The military officers of the company held aloof from the less aristocratic merchant class, in poor but dignified isolation. Officers of royal troops suffered from practically identical social prejudices. A late-coming group of small merchants who monopolized petty articles of trade became known as "Banians," and were cordially hated.

The passage to and fro of troops during the wars in India filled

<sup>85</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 64-66.

<sup>86</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 66-71.

society with the dregs of both Europe and Asia, wastrels who did their best to reduce society to their own level. When royal administration was introduced the old adherents of the company grumbled because retainers of the government came out to make profit from the new situation. There were local manifestations of the animosities which prevailed in France, such as those between naval and military officers. Everyone wanted to get rich and leave, some chronic malcontents announcing such an intention annually for thirty years on end. Languor overcame the military officers; soldiers were dissolute and criminal. The presence of Negro women checked the number of marriages. The planters lived apart on their estates, their women-folk seldom entering the town unless for balls or at Easter.<sup>37</sup> They were conveyed in palanquins, as were all the members of their families, some by four to eight blacks in loin cloths. Europeans and creoles disdained each other in the universal colonial fashion. Children of good families ran about naked, their mothers often being in their earliest teens.

The home of a planter is described by the visiting littérateur, Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, as follows:

We were met [he says] by a black belonging to M. Normand, whose house, from which we were a quarter of a league distant, we proposed to make our quarters for the night. As we went down the hill, another negro approached us with water, and informed us that we were impatiently expected. We found the house to be a long building formed of palisades, the roof of which was covered with the leaves of the latanier. There was only one room, in the middle of which was the kitchen, at one end the stores, and here the servants slept; at the other was the bed of the planter and his wife, which was covered with a cloth by way of tester, upon which a hen was setting; under the bed were some ducks; pigeons harboured among the leaves of the roof, and at the door were three dogs. All the implements, both of the house and the field, were hung against the walls. What was my surprise at finding the mistress to be both a handsome and genteel woman. Both she and her spouse were persons of condition in France. . . .<sup>38</sup>

Education, especially of girls was greatly neglected. A royal college was founded by the colonial assembly in 1791; its plant was wrecked by hurricane in 1799. It attracted students from neighboring foreign countries, and at one time enrolled four hundred students.

Religion was cared for at first by the Lazarists; their power over the people decreased as the population spread. The settlers did not pay much attention to religion, and provided its consolations very

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 170-179; cf. P. Crépin, *Mahé de la Bourdonnais*, ch. III, "La vie à l'île de France et à Bourbon à l'arrivée de la Bourdonnais," 39-64.

<sup>38</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 181; P. Crépin, *op. cit.*, 42-43; J. H. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, *Voyage à l'île de France* (vol. 142, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1818), 153.

scantly for their slaves; in fact, they objected to instruction of Negroes in religion beyond baptism. Of a population of 75,000 Catholics in 1843, only 2,500 worshipers were regular.

The greatest danger to society was the maroons of the mountainous forested interior, escaped Malagasy and Negroes who existed from very early Dutch times on Île de France, and on Bourbon from the time of the introduction of slaves. Their raids and depredations on the plantations aroused white hatred, and they were hunted like wild animals. La Bourdonnais curbed them by sending against them young Negroes selected in Madagascar, but they increased after his departure. The Code Noir inflicted a whipping and the loss of an ear when a renegade slave was caught for the first time. For the second offense hamstringing was employed, and for the third the culprit was hanged or broken alive.<sup>39</sup> These regulations subsisted until 1790.

Slaves might not appear on the streets after eight at night; they went barefoot, being thus distinguished from free hommes de couleur. The slaves knew the use of poisonous plants, and often used them to destroy master and mistress. There were few cases of Negro uprisings; such disorders "generally arose from the licentious conduct of the military."

A favorite pastime was hunting. Partridges, monkeys, wild goats, the Senegal antelope brought in by Governor David, "maroon hogs" descended from Portuguese importations, and deer were hunted with guns and hounds. The whole colony enjoyed races in June on the Champ de Mars. The horses were good, the audience was colorful in costume and varied in nationality and race.

The social season began in June and lasted until October, when "winter" was over. Balls and dinners were the chief amusement, the colonists excelling at dancing, for which they had a passion:

. . . The celebrated Fête de Dieu, in which the most beautiful young girls, clad in white robes, walk bareheaded in procession, strewing flowers before the Host, is an occasion of great rejoicing. . . . A mass of people are then collected. Flags wave in every direction, and a blaze of bright colors shines around, while the streets and cathedrals are lined with troops, and the batteries fire salutes. . . .<sup>40</sup>

Though the greater part of the inhabitants were illiterate, the intellectual life was not entirely wanting. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, a visitor in 1768, was inspired by the wreck of the *Saint-Géran* in 1744

<sup>39</sup> Code Noir, Art. XXXII. Pridham, *Mauritius and Its Dependencies*, 346. This code limited lashes to thirty, but it was customary to inflict as many as sixty at the master's discretion.

<sup>40</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 199-202.

in which two young girls were rescued, to compose his famous *Paul and Virginia*.<sup>41</sup> Evariste Désiré Parny, a creole native of Bourbon and author of numerous elegiac poems, was embraced by Voltaire as "my dear Tibullus," and hailed as a genius by the distinguished writers of his epoch. He was elected to the French Academy in 1803. His compatriot, rival, and friend, the chevalier Antoine Bertin, enjoyed only a little less favorable reputation for his poetry, which appeared in 1782.<sup>42</sup>

For the six years after the republican commissioners were deported, the islands governed themselves through storm and calm, as a part of the vanished monarchical France. There were no serious risings, though there were but 16,000 whites to 44,807 blacks.

After the rupture of the Peace of Amiens, Napoleon sent to the Île de France Captain-General Decaen to rule the two islands and the India posts. The situation under him was characterized by his famous decree of 30 floréal in the tenth year of the Republic (May 20, 1802), wherein he restored slavery and the slave trade, and suspended for ten years the constitution which the islands had received. Needless to say, there was no opposition from the Assembly of the Île de France.<sup>43</sup> Decaen landed on September 26, 1803, took possession of the government, and dissolved the colonial assembly, which had sat for twelve years. He "abolished the whole existing system by a proclamation of twelve laws, and promulgated the new Constitution formed for the colony by the consuls—in virtue of which all the executive, legislative, and judicial powers were committed to the captain-general, colonial prefect, and commissary of justice."<sup>44</sup> Decaen's measures were largely in vain, as the renewal of war deprived him of seapower. He served ably and faithfully, with loyalty to the empire, while the English cruisers gradually closed in around him. An Indian army of 11,500 men under General Abercrombie and a fleet of twenty ships of war besides fifty East Indiamen and transports took the Île de France in September, 1810, Bourbon having fallen in July.

When the colonies were restored in 1814, only Bourbon was turned back. There was an opportunity to repossess Île de France instead of

<sup>41</sup> S. B. de Burgh-Edwardes, *The History of Mauritius*. . . . (London, 1921), 17, 22.

<sup>42</sup> Azéma, *op. cit.*, 147-162.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 74; contains in the Appendix the act of taking possession of the Île de France, September 20, 1715 (315-316); an abstract of the constitutional ordinance of 1767 for Bourbon and Île de France (316-321); the constitution of April 25, 1791 (321-322); and the constitution of 13 pluviôse, an XI (322-323).

<sup>44</sup> Pridham, *op. cit.*, 76-126; Decaen's reorganization of the insular government, the "Code Decaen," is described in Azéma, *op. cit.*, 203-217; H. Prentout, *L'Île de France sous Decaen, 1803-1810*.

the India posts, which the Restoration government did not appreciate. This was a serious strategic mistake, which Gaffarel, ardent colonialist, was not unwilling to lament.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 326.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### LOUISIANA AFTER 1713

After the Treaty of Utrecht, Louisiana became a special bone of contention between the English and the French. To ward off this new enemy, Louis XIV entrusted an active occupation, following the meager successes of Iberville, to private initiative as prosperity had not arrived under state control. In 1712 Antoine Crozat, a wealthy business man was, by reason of his "zeal and special knowledge of maritime commerce," forced to accept a monopoly of this huge area, running west from the Carolinas to New Mexico and south from the Great Lakes, with the right to bring in a cargo of slaves every year from Guinea. Intrigued by the hope of trade with Mexico, Crozat paid little attention to colonization or agriculture, although he had agreed to send out ten young men or women on each of two vessels annually. The struggling colonists had kept up a desultory trade with Florida and the Antilles, and the new governor, Lamothe Cadillac, tried to attract new commerce from Texas and New Mexico.<sup>1</sup> For this he sent Saint-Denis to found Natchitoches in 1713. But the four hundred settlers were forced to sell their wool, pelts, and other produce at fixed low prices and buy their necessities at high ones for the benefit of the stockholders. Of course they resorted to smuggling from the English; the move toward Texas had only caused the Spaniards to undertake more effectively to occupy it; Crozat was obliged to admit failure and give up in 1717.<sup>2</sup> Cadillac had found his unruly colony a "monster without head or tail," and his settlers had ridiculed him out of countenance as a martinet "Knight of the Golden Calf." By that time the colony numbered some seven hundred.

Toward the English side, Fort Toulouse on the Alabama, built in 1714, had become a center for fur trade with the Creeks and for the work of the Jesuits. Forty miles away on the Talapoosa was the Eng-

<sup>1</sup> For beginnings of Louisiana, see above, 148-150. P. Heinrich, *La Louisiane sous la Compagnie des Indes, 1717-1731*, lxiv-lxv. W. A. Goodspeed, ed., *The Province and the States; a History of . . . Louisiana . . .* (Madison, 1904, 7v.), I, 134-152.

<sup>2</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 78; Isambert, *Recueil des lois, 1686-1715*, XX, 576-582, No. 2194; "Lettres patentes . . . au sieur Crozat . . ."; Heinrich, *op. cit.*, lxix. The *lettres* are also in A. Fortier, *A History of Louisiana* (New York, 1904, 4v.), I, 57-60; R. Challes, *Un colonial au temps de Colbert, Mémoires*, 234-246, 251-260.



LOUISIANA AS DEPICTED BY LE PAGE DU PRATZ, 1757

lish Fort Okfuskee, where the Georgia settlers encouraged the Creeks to drive the Jesuits out. A revolt of their Yamassee allies in the Carolina back country deprived the English of an opportunity to seize the French posts while they were still weak. Fort Rosalie on the bluff of the present site of Natchez was set up to control the tribe of that name, but Governor Bienville was not able to subject them entirely.


After Crozat's failure, John Law, the Scotch financier, acquired his privileges for the *Compagnie d'Occident* or Mississippi Company, for twenty-five years, with the fur trade rights in perpetuity. Here was to be the heart of that wonderful colonial empire which was to sustain all his financial dreams. The resources of his great bank were to furnish the sinews for a vast development. The idea was to be energized by bringing in six thousand whites and three thousand black slaves. Law's hope was to give his paper money intrinsic value through the exploitation of the rich mines which must certainly be found in this over-advertised Eden. When nothing but some small lead mines proved the greatest mineral resource, main reliance had to be placed on Indian trade.<sup>3</sup>

To entice the needed human material for building this keystone of his economic arch, Law flooded France and neighboring states with propaganda representing Louisiana's swamps as an earthly paradise. Titles of nobility and huge land grants were the bait. Several well-known noblemen took advantage of the glowing offers. For a duchy of his own, Law began to recruit ten thousand Rhinelanders and German Swiss, only about two thousand of whom ever arrived. They were to be put in colonies on the Red, Arkansas, and Ohio rivers, and in the Illinois.<sup>4</sup> In 1718 some eight hundred of them reached Biloxi, doubling the white population, but no care had been taken for their reception, and many starved before they were taken up river by the Indians; large numbers of these "Law people" returned disgusted to France. Others founded families now aristocratic and flourishing. On the "Chapitoula Coast" running fifteen miles northward from New Orleans, the land holdings were large, and in the hands of absentees. The slaves cut cypress lumber in riverside sawmills during off-seasons of plantation work. The Germans, settling the "Côte des Allemands" on both sides of the river above New Orleans, soon made a stretch of forty miles or so a veritable garden spot of small farms worked by the owners. Fifty years later more Germans settled "Dutch Highlands" near Hackett's Point.<sup>5</sup> The "Acadian

<sup>3</sup> Cf. P. Heinrich, *op. cit.*, lxvii, lxix, lxxii, 2-3; L. A. Thiers, *The Mississippi Bubble; a Memoir of John Law* (New York, 1859), *passim*.

<sup>4</sup> J. Law, "Mémoires justificatifs," in E. Daire, *Économistes-financiers du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* . . . (Paris, 1843), 643; Goodspeed, *op. cit.*, I, 190-193.

<sup>5</sup> J. H. Deiler, *The Settlement of the German Coast of Louisiana* . . . (Philadelphia, 1909), 17-18; Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 262-263.



THE WEST INDIES AS MAPPED BY BRYAN EDWARDS

Coast" above the Germans was likewise an area of small proprietors who worked.

The Pointe Coupée region became an aristocratic area by immigration of refugee planters from Saint-Domingue after the massacre of 1791. When Law's company found itself embroiled in 1719 in war between Spain and a Franco-English alliance, the French took Pensacola and Santa Rosa<sup>6</sup> from the Spaniards, lost them in August, but retook them in September. Pensacola was returned to Spain in 1723. The Spaniards also lost eastern Texas, while French allies defeated Villazur on the Platte River. The peace was made on the basis of pre-war possession. The collapse of the Law system in 1720 removed this colony from its place at the center of French overseas empire, but the company was refurbished during 1722-1725, and went on with reasonable success, its inhabitants now numbering about five thousand. A number of land grants were made, while two hundred and fifty new slaves aided agricultural development. The company urged cultivation of wheat, rice, silk, and most of all, tobacco, which soon became the chief product.<sup>7</sup>

Fort Chartres, built in 1718 where the Kaskaskia joins the middle stretch of the Mississippi, was the first armed post between Detroit (1701) and New Orleans.<sup>8</sup> Begun as part of Canada, the Illinois country was made a part of Law's Louisiana. Thanks to the cession there of lands *en franc alleu* rather than the feudal grants farther south, the Illinois developed an unusually successful agriculture which saved the lower colony more than once. The Jesuits led in this activity, with the largest holding at Kaskaskia. This village, with Cahokia, Vincennes, Sainte-Geneviève, and other settlements administered from Fort Chartres, formed the heart of an inland domain which stretched westward from the Alleghenies beyond the Mississippi and northward from the Ohio. The eastern frontier was held by Ouatanon and Miami on the Wabash, and by Vincennes and Massac on the Ohio. The habitants, the rough *voyageurs* who hunted the upper waters, and the Indians, all received spiritual nourishment from Jesuits and Sulpicians. The "hardi pionniers" were more like peasants than the settlers on the lower Mississippi. Their remoteness freed them from the odious control which enervated much eighteenth-century colonial growth. Yet, like Canadians or Spanish, they loved going to law in preference to the soul-releasing fist-fight which saved the *amour propre* of the English fron-

<sup>6</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 79-80; Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, I, 65-67, 69. For Boulogny's "Memoir on Louisiana in 1776," *ibid.*, II, 20-55.

<sup>7</sup> A. Franz, *Die Kolonisation des Mississippitalen bis zum Ausgange der französischen Herrschaft* (Leipzig, 1906), 114-120, 391-392.

<sup>8</sup> C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country*, chap. X; P. Margry, *Découvertes et établissements des français*, VI, xvii; E. G. Mason, *Chapters from Illinois History* (Chicago, 1901), 212-249; Heinrich, *op. cit.*, 4, 21-25.

tiersman. Lawyers were taboo; and litigants conducted their own cases under the Custom of Paris, that memorable code which France carried throughout her colonial world, and retained at home along with over a hundred other local codes until the eve of the Revolution.<sup>9</sup> The notary in Illinois was quite as important as Longfellow thought he was "in the Acadian land on the shores of the Basin of Minas." The government physician, unharassed by ethical limitations or professional technique, rubbed shoulders with the *garde-magazin*, who had better opportunities for accumulating pelf than anyone except the commissaire ordonnateur; these two handled the supplies.

The bishop of Quebec supervised the labors of the Jesuits and Sulpicians. Parishes at Chartres, Cahokia, and Kaskaskia were erected in 1720. There were three or four Indian churches, in which the neophytes wearied their spiritual fathers by their flair for study, singing, and confession. In each of the French parishes, apparently, there were lay trustees, or *marguilliers*, elected in rotation each January first. They had a special pew and great local dignity, being in charge of the fiscal affairs (*fabrique*) of the parish. Lay control vanished with the coming of the American régime.<sup>10</sup> Of education there was little, of art or literature none. Social gatherings for billiards, dancing, church festivals, and feasting, were varied by fishing, boating, and hunting. Gay costumes indicated the modest gradations in society, with robed priest and uniformed officer at the top. Communal land-holding restricted initiative, but nature and industry provided ample crops.<sup>11</sup>

New Orleans, founded with the aim of escaping the Gulf Coast hazards of the earlier Mobile, was of slow initial growth. Charlevoix, who saw it in 1722 four years after its founding, noted "a hundred or so huts placed without order or beauty," but prophesied a brilliant future for the nascent city. It had become the capital a year earlier, and was soon laid out in blocks or islets, a drainage ditch surrounding each, which had space for twelve houses. These were built high from the ground, of cypress logs, and with steep roofs. Many of these old homes survived until the great fire of 1794, after which brick houses predominated. At the cession to Spain in 1763, New Orleans numbered thirty-two hun-

<sup>9</sup> See the chapter on the West Indies for the position of lawyers. For relations between the Illinois country and Louisiana, see Nancy M. M. Surrey, *The Commerce of Louisiana during the French Régime . . .* (New York, 1916), 92, *passim*; P. Pittman, *The Present State of the European Settlements on the Mississippi . . .* (London, 1770; Cleveland, 1906), 41, *passim*; A. Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, I, chap. X [Laws, 1719-1729].

<sup>10</sup> Gilbert J. Garraghan, S.J., *Saint Ferdinand de Florissant, The Story of an Ancient Parish* (Chicago, 1923), 142-154.

<sup>11</sup> Priestly, *The Coming of the White Man*, 277-282; Franz, *op. cit.*, 415-416.

dred people, of whom over half were free.<sup>12</sup> Voluntary colonization fell off with the passing of the myth of easy fortune awaiting the eager hand, the French were unmoved by the idea of Law's personal participation, and forced emigration was used for a time. Soldiers, "bandoliers du Mississippi," raided the gutters of cities of France for prostitutes, vagabonds, and criminals. Children were snatched away, and private vengeance sent many to die on the shores of the Gulf. Parents of unruly youths seized upon the chance to impose a salutary discipline. It is said that this sorry stock was remarkably sterile, and left few descendants; at any rate, such recruiting was given up in 1720.<sup>13</sup> Early arrivals included some Jews, but they were kept out after 1724. Huguenots were excluded from the first, in answer to a petition of four hundred of them in Carolina, as their utility to the English was feared, and their strength in Carolina afforded an ever present menace.<sup>14</sup> More than a thousand exiled Acadians were received and located among the Opelousas and Attakapas in five or six settlements in all. Under Spanish rule three hundred families of them were sent from Spain and France.<sup>15</sup> They made a good deal of trouble, demanding more help than the officials could give, but they made good cattle raisers and developed excellent plantations. Few of the "Cajuns" rose socially; indeed, they continue to form a distinct element in Louisiana society today.


The settlers took narrow strips of land two miles or so in depth (usually forty arpents) from the river to the cypress swamps. Many of the grants were made to sites of former Indian villages, obviating the hard work of making clearings. The flood plains were subject to recurrent inundations, hence levees for protection from overflow early rose to twenty or thirty feet in height. By 1770 the levee reached fifty miles, from English Turn to the upper German Coast. Floods, crevasses, hurricanes, heavy rains, fierce Indians, and wild beasts varied the monotony of clearing and planting land without farm animals in a hot, humid climate. Yellow fever in 1701 and 1704 took its toll, as often later until

<sup>12</sup> Pittman, *Present State of the European Settlements*, 41-44, 83-86; F. A. Ogg, *The Opening of the Mississippi, a Struggle for Supremacy in the American Interior* (New York, 1904), 208-211; Fortier, *A History of Louisiana*, I, 70-74.

<sup>13</sup> André Pénicaut, "Relation," in Margry, *Découvertes*, V, 581, describes the coming of a shipload of marriageable women. See also Iberville's "Journal," *idem*, IV, 395. The shipments of 1719-1721 are characterized in G. Oudard, *Vieille Amérique, la Louisiane . . .*, 142-156. The last shipment of wives came in 1751. The bandoliers are described in Heinrich, *op. cit.*, 33-36. On the quality of the women imported see P. Heinrich, *Prévost, historien de la Louisiane; étude sur la valeur documentaire de Manon Lescaut* (Paris, [1907]), and his sources.

<sup>14</sup> Charles Weiss, *History of the French Protestant Refugees*, 333, 342-343.

<sup>15</sup> *Archivo de Indias, Papeles de Cuba*, 86-6-6, MS transcript in Bancroft Library; Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 264; D. J. Le Blanc, *The True Story of the Acadians* (Lafayette, 1932), 65-68.



OF NORMAN'S  
PLANTATIONS ON  
MISSISSIPPI RIVER,  
THE GERMAN  
LAND OCCU-

after the American occupation. Tonty, La Salle's old lieutenant, died of it in Mobile in 1704. Rice, tobacco, cotton, and indigo were the main crops, while trade constituted a major industry. Sugar culture began in 1751, but did not assume importance until the close of the century. Corn was always a basic subsistence crop, and, with beans, was exported in small lots to the West Indies. Land soon became scarce, and large feudal holdings were discouraged, were indeed forbidden below Manchac by 1728. Bienville and other governors managed to accumulate large holdings in spite of the prohibition.<sup>16</sup>

Success in Louisiana was built upon the slavery of Negroes, who thrived under tropical conditions too enervating for white field-labor. They became, as elsewhere in the south and in the Caribbean, a tremendous social problem. The fear of servile war was ever upon the colony. Creole families made unceasing war upon miscegenation, but race mixture was a characteristic of the whole period. The Code Noir, introduced in 1724, mitigated the brutalizing effects of racial attrition, but failed to preserve white society untouched.<sup>17</sup> While the Code prohibited the blacks from bearing arms, there was often need to arm them to help fight the Indians; though it prevented them from gathering in assemblies, yet they must be fed, clothed, and protected; anticipating servile revolts, it provided that they might be punished with death for certain offenses, and under fear of uprisings the masters were often severe with them. The colony had a government similar to that of early Canada; the governor had the usual quarrels with the intendant over attributes, the council was not a free agency; there were nine judicial districts for as many centers of population, and three ecclesiastical ones. These were served by Carmelites, Capuchins, and by the Jesuits and the Sulpicians in the Illinois.

Edging the slender wedge thrust down from Canada was the Spanish realm on the west and southwest with the yearned-for silver country never out of French minds. Along the river the riparian colonists stood directly in the path of the westward-moving English, whose traders and trappers from the Carolinas and Georgia involved the Illinois, Natchez, Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee tribes of the eastern bank in a perpetual pressure on Louisiana, where life was always conditioned by Indian policy. The Illinois tribes quickly became the friends of the French; the

<sup>16</sup> E. Bunner, *History of Louisiana . . .* (New York, 1855), 72, 152; Deiler, *The Settlement of the German Coast . . .*, 69.

<sup>17</sup> Norman, *Chart of the Plantations on the Mississippi River . . .* (1858). In the prairies of southwest Louisiana the grants were more nearly rectangular. The greater number of the crops were brought in from the West Indies. For multiplied illustrations of social conditions see P. Alliot, "Historical and Political Reflections on Louisiana," in J. A. Robertson, *Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France, and the United States* (Cleveland, 1911, 2v.), I, 145-232.

Creeks and Cherokees on the southern and eastern slopes of the Alleghenies turned to the English. The Choctaws on their western and southern flanks extended to the Gulf. For more than a century these were harried by the Natchez<sup>18</sup> and Chickasaws, who moved to the east side of the Mississippi to escape Spanish domination. The tribes on the east side within the French sphere accepted nominal French suzerainty. To the west of the river, the Osages, Missouris, Pawnees, and Paducahs in 1724 accepted a peace treaty which prevented clashes with the French. Beyond the settled region the *coureurs de bois*, as fur-bearing animals receded under constant hunting, continued to demand pelts from the Indians at the low prices current when furs were near at hand. The English habitually encouraged trouble between the French and the Indians over the fur trade. As early as 1712 they succeeded in arousing the Fox tribes and their allies near Lake Michigan against the French, in the hope of separating Canada from Louisiana. The whole area from the Illinois to the Ohio was scourged by the bitter and destructive redskins.

Governor Alexander Spotswood, ascending the James River and crossing the divide to the Susquehanna in 1716, took possession for his king, and proposed opening a route to trade with the Indians of the Great Lakes where he would have supplanted the French.<sup>19</sup> To put an end to the Fox raids, Governor Beauharnais of Canada in 1728 sent a force of Canadian militia and Indian allies to drive them into the plains (1729); during the following two years the Indian allies of the French cleared the Foxes out of the Lakes route region.<sup>20</sup>

The Natchez held fertile lands above the mouth of the Red River which attracted white settlers who finally roused them to rebellion. As early as 1700 the English traders, led by a French renegade, had reached the Arkansas by way of the Tennessee and Ohio rivers, intent upon cutting off French expansion south of the Ohio.<sup>21</sup> Maryland and

<sup>18</sup> J. Swanton, *Indian Tribes of the Lower Mississippi Valley and the Adjacent Coast of the Gulf of Mexico* (Washington, Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 43, 1911), *passim*.

<sup>19</sup> F. A. Ogg, *The Opening of the Mississippi*, 215-218, citing *Virginia Historical Society Collections*, N.S., II, 336. Leonidas Dodson, *Alexander Spotswood, Governor of Virginia: 1710-1722* (Philadelphia, 1932).

<sup>20</sup> C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country*, 148, 160-165. This success brought most of the Indians of the northwest into alliance with the French.

<sup>21</sup> V. W. Crane, "The Tennessee River as the Road to Carolina," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, III, 3-38. The advance of the English and Americans into Louisiana is a subject just beyond the scope of the present work. It may be studied in a host of writings by American historians; among these are: F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920); *The Rise of the New West* (New York, 1906); A. Henderson, *The Conquest of the Old Southwest* (New York, 1920); F. A. Ogg, *The Old Northwest* (New Haven, 1919); C. L. Skinner, *The Pioneers of the Old Southwest* (New Haven, 1919);

Virginia were vitally interested and aggressive. When the French officer at Fort Rosalie in Natchez territory decided to drive the Indians off their cleared lands in a village which he wanted to colonize, they fell upon the fort in November, 1729, killed the commander and two hundred and thirty-eight of his men, and enslaved many women and children. The Chickasaws, traditionally English in sympathy, had planned to join the Natchez, but when they saw that the latter had failed, they remained quiet; the Choctaws joined the French. In 1730 and 1731 the Natchez were defeated, and were finally scattered in 1742. Some were enslaved in Louisiana; four hundred braves were even sold in Saint-Domingue.<sup>22</sup> But expenses incurred in these operations led the company to give up its fruitless monopoly in 1731. The unhappy colony was in a critical condition after fourteen years of unsuccessful company rule. Laborers in New Orleans could get no work, and felt they must desert or die of starvation. It had not been possible to build up trade with the West Indies, and that with France was feeble.<sup>23</sup>

Chickasaw hostility, encouraged by the English, led Bienville, returning to succeed the exterminator-governor, De Périer, to march against them. Forced in 1736 to retreat, in the following year he brought them to terms, though they still held the middle course of the Mississippi. Fort Assumption, at the present site of Memphis, held the Choctaws in check. After his attempts to solve the Indian problem, which had cost 3,000,000 livres, Bienville gave up the governorship again in 1743 after forty-four years of service to the colony. The white population near the Gulf had been reduced to 3,200; the Illinois held only about fifteen hundred inhabitants. For the next twenty years the colony vegetated.

Bienville was followed by Vaudreuil, son of the "ancien" governor of Canada, who likewise failed to settle the Chickasaw problem, but his term was on the whole more prosperous. He went to be governor of Canada in 1752, being followed in Louisiana by the chevalier de Kerlérec, who tried in vain to reach New Mexico by ending Comanche enmity. The Seven Years' War had practically no effect in Louisiana, as

E. E. Sparks, *Expansion of the American People . . .* (Chicago, 1906); F. A. Paxson, *The Last American Frontier* (New York, 1918).

<sup>22</sup> A. Baillardel and A. Prioult, *Le chevalier de Pradel; vie d'un colon français en Louisiane au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1928), is one of the few intimate pictures of that colony, in letters of a well-known merchant and Indian fighter, who saw Louisiana develop between 1714 and 1767; on the Chickasaws and Choctaws, Ch. E. Gayarré, *Histoire de la Louisiane* (New Orleans, 1846-1847, 2v.), chaps. XVI, XVII; B. F. French, *Historical Collections of Louisiana and Florida* (New York, 1869), I, 40.

<sup>23</sup> Heinrich, *op. cit.*, 263-266; Franz, *op. cit.*, 397, 407-409. On Vérendrye, see Justin Winsor, *The Mississippi Basin; the Struggle in America between England and France, 1697-1763* (Boston, 1898), chap. X.

the governor was able to keep most of the Indians quiet, and the campaigns were confined to Canada.<sup>24</sup>

West of the Mississippi the extent of French interest was always beyond the line of authority. During the first half of the eighteenth century lead mines and saline deposits were worked in Missouri. From 1723 to 1746 exploitation of mines was carried on by an important entrepreneur, Renault. The farther west was reached intermittently by parties from the Illinois who wanted to enter the trade with New Mexico. The early attempt by Saint-Denis, already mentioned, was repeated in 1717 in an expedition from Mobile to the Rio Grande. At the same time, Bénard de la Harpe prepared to set up a post among the Cadadachos as a station on the Santa Fe road. He also made excursions to Galveston Bay and up the Arkansas River in search of appropriate sites for new posts. These were to keep the Spaniards away from the Mississippi, but to facilitate trade with them. In 1723 Bourgmont, after exploration of the Missouri and Kansas rivers, built Fort Orleans in the present Carroll County, Missouri, and made treaties with several tribes which lay between Louisiana and New Mexico. During the same years similar expansion occurred in Texas, the northeastern part of which was practically an annex of Louisiana.

The road to the silver mines and the South Sea was obstructed on the Red River by the Apaches, and on the Arkansas and Missouri routes by the Comanches. Not until 1746 was the Arkansas route made safe for travel, through a treaty arranged by French voyageurs between the Comanches and their eastern savage enemies. In 1751 the Missouri route was traversed by traders, and in the following year the Platte was the highway used. Governor Kerlérec's proposal to open a regular trade aroused the Spanish to greater attempts to fend off the French.

In the far northwest the French attempts to progress to the Pacific had to be postponed until 1733 because of the Fox wars. About that time began the travels of the La Vérendryes, father and son, who built a succession of forts leading to the upper Missouri. Their expeditions brought them within sight of the Rockies in 1743; in 1752 their successor, Legardeur, built a fort at the Saskatchewan River and the foot of the Rockies. By this time the search for the Western Sea begun by Cartier in 1535 had brought his countrymen to the Cordillera by way of most of the important streams; although none of them reached the Pacific, it is undeniable that north of the Red River the French influence was paramount.

<sup>24</sup> On the government of Kerlérec, see M. de Villiers du Terrage, *Les dernières années de la Louisiane française* (Paris, 1904), 38-166; this valuable work contains sources through to the American occupation. Grace King, *Jean Baptiste le Moyne, Sieur de Bienville* (New York, 1893).

The advance of the French into Texas was contested by the Spaniards in numerous expeditions, campaigns, arrest of intruders, and in opposing Indian policies. In general, the Spanish were more successful than the French, but the latter had, by the middle of the eighteenth century, made enough headway to dispute the territory between the Mississippi and the Trinity River. The tacitly accepted boundary of the Arroyo Hondo was not official, as the Spanish monarch declined to make a treaty of limits. The question was obliterated by the cession of Louisiana to Spain at the close of the Seven Years' War.<sup>25</sup> By this treaty France disappeared from the continent.

During the French occupation there grew up a strong racial solidarity and identity with the soil throughout the whole region within the old Crozat grant, the real Louisiana. With its diversity of population, including aristocratic planters, thousands of black slaves speaking their soft *patois*, the sturdier farmers of the Illinois, and the voyageurs of the north and northwest, an inland empire was in the building, as hundreds of French place-names surviving today testify. "The children, even of the best sort, [knew] how to fire a musket, or shoot an arrow, catch fish, draw a bow, handle an oar, swim, run, dance, play at cards, and understand paper notes before they knew their letters or their God."<sup>26</sup> France was drawn inland by her tenure of the great waterways threading the richest belts. But waterways do not form, rather do they eliminate, natural barriers. The fur trade ever beckoned too far away, leaving an attenuated line of influence but not of strength behind it. The age was growing to be agricultural, in which self-sustaining communities might develop. But the Frenchman became Indianized as he touched the farthest reaches, and identified with the passing, not the coming, culture. To this transitory essential of his tenure were added the hazards of European conflict.

It was due to England's command of the sea, and to her yearning to control the fur trade, that the final struggle for North American possession should take place outside of the Mississippi Valley, although the movements of both nations into the Ohio Valley, tributary to the west, set off the spark of war. Had not the British colonies suffered from mutual jealousies, they would have been able to check the French

<sup>25</sup> The French-Spanish conflict is described in H. E. Bolton and T. M. Marshall, *The Colonization of North America . . .* (New York, 1929), 289-301; for the development of the Spanish-Indian policy after the transfer, see H. E. Bolton, *Athanase de Mézières and the Louisiana Texas Frontier, 1768-1780* (Cleveland, 1914, 2v.), I, *Introd.*, especially 61-122.

<sup>26</sup> G. W. Cable, *The Creoles of Louisiana* (New York, 1885), *passim.*; J. H. Finley, *France in the Heart of America* (New York, 1915), 246-269; *The Present State of the Country and Its Inhabitants . . .* (London, 1744), 11-13, 27-29, cited in Ogg, *op. cit.*, 234.

encircling movement begun by the governors of Canada, Jonquière and Duquesne. Advances by the French and by Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia followed the marking off of the French claims by Céleron in 1748. Then followed the rapid building of stockades by both competitors at the junctions of the rivers, and the opening of the conflict in the Great Meadows known in America as the French and Indian War.<sup>27</sup>

When Louis XV induced Spain to join him against England in 1761 under the Pacte de Famille, he promised to compensate her possible losses by ceding French territory.<sup>28</sup> At the peace in 1763, England, having taken Cuba and Manila from Spain, returned both in exchange for the juncture of the two crowns in the peace, Sainte-Lucie and the sugar islands, and the cession of Florida, in compensation for which France ceded Louisiana to Spain. This secret transfer aroused the planters to remonstrate when it became known to them in April, 1764. But in spite of their opposition, the governor, Aubry, was obliged to turn over the lands east of the Mississippi to the English, and those to the west of it and the city of New Orleans to Spain.<sup>29</sup>

The Spanish commissioner, Antonio de Ulloa, a talented but ugly-visaged and undiplomatic *hidalgo*, arrived on July 10, 1766, and began a harsh rule. He lacked all the graces which the king of Spain should have sought in his representative in so difficult a post. He refused to treat with the council, but dealt only with Governor Aubry. The trouble grew when adjustments of money values from French to Spanish promised great losses by French merchants, whose new allegiance was a matter of interest, not enthusiasm. It came to a climax when it was learned that the new sovereign would not concede free commerce. The acts of Ulloa quickly led the planters into opposition, which he characterized as rebellion, and he returned to Spain in October, 1768. The Spanish government then sent out as governor O'Reilly, who, arriving on the scene in July, 1769, arrested a dozen of the leading planters, and as presiding officer of the court trying them for their opposition to Ulloa, condemned five to death and others to exile in Havana. The French council was eliminated and a *cabildo* and system of Spanish courts was set up. After this ill-received gust of severity, O'Reilly changed his tactics and governed with liberality and efficiency. All the old French institutions were respected, and the population received additions by the arrival of numbers of Acadians. The

<sup>27</sup> Ogg, *The Opening of the Mississippi*, 260-272.

<sup>28</sup> G. Oudard, *Vieille Amérique: la Louisiane*, 235.

<sup>29</sup> A. S. Aiton, "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," *American Historical Review* (July, 1931), 701-720; W. R. Shepherd, "The Cession of Louisiana to Spain," *Political Science Quarterly*, XIX (September, 1904), 439-458.

governor served until 1770; when he was replaced, the planters exiled to Havana were released.<sup>30</sup>

Reluctant as was Spain in 1764 to assume sovereignty over this vast empire, and unpopular though the cession was with the resident French, the thirty-four years under Spanish administration brought unheard-of prosperity. Commissioner O'Reilly began, once possession was assured, to use competent Frenchmen as subordinates; French traders, not missionaries, ruled the Indians, and determined Indian policy. Louisiana was governed in direct contact with the Spanish Council of the Indies until 1771, when it was attached to the captaincy-general of Havana; its higher court was at first at Santo Domingo, and after the Treaty of Basle, at Havana. Florida was put under the Louisiana government in 1783. In 1778 the Illinois came under the control of the American George Rogers Clark, and the church control was exercised after 1785 by the Bishop of Baltimore without dissension.<sup>31</sup>

Louisiana trade was at first restricted to Spain, but this led to smuggling with the English, so that in 1776 commerce was permitted with the French West Indies and two years later with France and the United States. The English were thus entirely excluded from this trade region. There was trouble over the Mexican tobacco monopoly, but this was arranged to the satisfaction of all parties.<sup>32</sup> The prosperous rule of Spain brought in a large population from that country and Mexico; there were even Filipinos, Canary Islanders, and others added to the already heterogeneous population, which numbered fifty thousand by the time of the American occupation. The Treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795 opened the Mississippi to the exit of American exports, and the citizens of the United States had been trickling into Spanish territory. The problem of a buffer state or defection to Spain of the American southwest was thereby avoided.<sup>33</sup> Very shortly the American republic

<sup>30</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 90; O'Reilly, "Le procès qui a été fait à cours du soutènement . . ." [decree setting up a *cabildo* in New Orleans], Nov. 25, 1769, in Bancroft Library.

<sup>31</sup> R. Thwaites, ed., *Kaskaskia Papers*, II, Virginia Series (Springfield, 1909), Introd., xxxiii.

<sup>32</sup> H. I. Priestley, *José de Gálvez, Visitor-General of New Spain, 1765-1771* (Berkeley, 1916), 153.

<sup>33</sup> The problems involved here receive extensive treatment in most works in American history. For a detached view, see F. P. Renaut, *La question de la Louisiane, 1796-1806* (Paris, *Soc. de l'Hist. des Cols. françaises*, 1918), *passim*.

The position of France regarding the colonies of Spain was indicated in 1793 when Jefferson wrote to the American minister in Spain: "It is intimated to us in such a way as to attract our attention that France means to send a strong force early this spring to offer independence to the Spanish American colonies,

became heir to a civilization built up by the two chief rivals of the Anglo-Saxons for a hold on the continent. In spite of their fear and dislike of the American frontiersmen, the Latins accepted a blending with the third stock without excessive friction. The newcomers found their places, while the creoles remained the early aristocracy. Their insularity has not held them as much aloof as has that of the French in Canada, perhaps because of the greater race admixture. The creole has won an acceptance not unanimously conceded in the colonial days;<sup>34</sup> his mother tongue continues to be spoken; his parishes take the place of the counties of the other States of the Union; his modification of Roman law and the Code Napoléon supplant the English common law of his neighbors; his place-names are spread afar over the territory once roamed by his hunters and traders. Yet Louisiana is a thoroughly American part of the "Old South."

beginning with those on the Mississippi, and that she will not object to receiving those on the east side into our confederation. Interesting considerations require that we should keep ourselves free to act in this case according to circumstances . . . you should not by any clause of treaty bind us to guarantee any of the Spanish colonies against their independence, nor indeed against any other nation" (J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, Washington, 1906, 8v., VI, 369).

<sup>34</sup> Berquin-Duvallon, "Vue de la colonie espagnole," in Robertson, *op. cit.*, I, 186-204. Goodspeed, ed. *op. cit.*, "Treaty of Retrocession, 1800," II, 104-141. On the part played by France in the formation of North American society, see Finley, *op. cit.*, and G. Hanotaux, *La France vivante en Amérique du Nord* (Paris, 1913). For further treatment of Louisiana diplomacy, see below, chap. XXII.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE FALL OF NEW FRANCE

After the Treaty of Utrecht, New France enjoyed a relative stability during what is called by Canadian historians, "The Grand Peace." French policy settled to steady resistance to British expansion, both for the sake of European affairs and American. The elder Vaudreuil was governor until October, 1725, being followed by Beauharnais, incumbent until 1745. They were masters over Cape Breton Island, Prince Edward Island, the basin of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes, with no boundaries toward the northwest. Louisiana, really separate, lay between the Spanish frontier on the west and south and the aggressive English on the east.<sup>1</sup> During the first half of the century the latter were pressing into the area west of the line of the falls of the rivers which drain into the Atlantic; they were gathering force with which to throw farther westward the hostile tribes of New England, the Susquehannahs, Tuscaroras, and Yamassees of Virginia and the Carolinas; soon the European rivals were to meet in a final struggle for the dominion over the continent, the "Half Century of Conflict."

Governors Vaudreuil and Beauharnais both bent their efforts to the advancement of the colony. Vaudreuil induced the home government to call in its depreciated card money at 50 per cent of its face value, an act which restored business confidence, though at distinct loss to creditors as a class.<sup>2</sup> By an order prescribing that ordinances and instructions must be registered by the superior council before enforcement, he tried to reduce the number of legal controversies, and sought to render land tenure more fluid by limiting the number of large seigneuries, of which there were now ninety-one.<sup>3</sup> Security of the habitants against hostile Indians was sought by a provision that no house might be built on a piece of land smaller than thirty hectares. The settled region was strengthened by a road built from Montreal

<sup>1</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 25-26; Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 215-216.

<sup>2</sup> Shortt and Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces*, II, 499, 514-524.

<sup>3</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Seigneurial System in Canada*, 44-46; and his *Documents Relating to the Seigneurial Tenure in Canada* . . . , lxxvi-lxxviii, and the "Historical Introduction." J. W. Gerard, *The Peace of Utrecht*, 285-286; D. J. Hill, *History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe*, III, ch. 1-4, a clear outline.

to Quebec between 1720 and 1734. The Iroquois were, if possible, to be induced to reject the British sovereignty over them conceded by the Treaty of Utrecht; other Indians were to be subsidized for loyalty wherever possible, and the fur trade jealously guarded. Fort Niagara, built in 1720, was used for separating the English from the western tribes.<sup>4</sup>

Exploration was likewise pushed forward along the upper and middle Mississippi River. In 1718 Lepage Dupratz made a voyage in each of these parts to study the flora and fauna.<sup>5</sup> During 1720-1722 Father Charlevoix visited the regions previously seen by Marquette and La Salle, studying the missions established there, the customs of the Indians, and the products of the country.<sup>6</sup> Beauharnais confided to La Vérendrye and his sons the exploration of the northwest which has already been noticed above. The *coureurs de bois* who had preceded them had inherited a distorted idea of the west based on the traditions going back to the maps of Verrazano's brother. Even down to the second half of the eighteenth century the atlases<sup>7</sup> placed a great replica of Hudson's Bay in what are now Alberta and British Columbia. In their search for this water, the Vérendryes were the first white men to sight the Rockies. This was their sole recompense after fifteen years of explorations and the exhaustion of their family fortune.<sup>8</sup>

Farming and industry made some progress. Beauharnais introduced wheat-growing into the Illinois, and soon export of about six thousand quintals became regular.<sup>9</sup> Ginseng, a medicinal herb, discovered in 1716 by one of the Jesuits in the Canadian forests, created a temporary economic flurry; it was exported to China, the annual value of the crop amounting to 500,000 francs, but the La Rochelle merchants made the Indians gather the plants while green and tried to hurry the process of drying it, whereupon the Chinese refused to buy it, and the trade was ruined.<sup>10</sup> A few iron mines began to be worked regularly. During the War of the Spanish Succession the colonists found that flax and hemp could be easily grown, and when a shipment of cloth

<sup>4</sup> Shortt and Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces*, II, 365-367.

<sup>5</sup> Lepage Dupratz, *Histoire de la Louisiane* . . . (Paris, 1758, 3v.), I, 118 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Abbé Charlevoix, *History and General Description of New France*, VI, *passim*, covering the period to 1736.

<sup>7</sup> N. Sanson, *L'Amérique en plusieurs cartes nouvelles* . . . (Paris, 1656), shows the continent closed in just west of Hudson's Bay, by a "Mer glaciale." See T. Jefferys, *The Natural and Civil History of the French Dominions in North and South America*, map facing p. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Shortt and Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces*, I, 117-144.

<sup>9</sup> Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 282; Alvord, *The Illinois Country*, 208; H. Lorin, *Le travail en Amérique avant et après Colomb* (Paris, 1930), 229.

<sup>10</sup> Shortt and Doughty, eds., *op. cit.*, II, 513-514; E. Salone, *La colonisation de la Nouvelle France*, 380.

was seized by the English, they were granted the unusual privilege of making up these crops into fabrics. Thus originated the Canadian weaving industry. Prohibitions against creating industries were really not very effective. There were small beginnings, for example, in weaving, metallurgy and ship-building, but they came to little because of lack of capital and of skilled labor.<sup>11</sup>

There was always dearth of laborers. The Indians rarely settled in any numbers near the French villages and towns.<sup>12</sup> Their fading from the white man's path was hastened by their frequent employment as allies and by the sharpening of inter-tribal hostilities through the advance of the whites, which thrust the tribes back upon each other. Civilization pursued them at the hands of the Black Robes, who really preferred isolation for their neophytes.<sup>13</sup> Decrease of the native population became noticeably rapid by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Governor Vaudreuil drew attention to it and urged increase of white settlers, but he obtained no real help from home. The colony grew from its own force rather than from immigration. There were 34,000 Canadians in 1734, and 70,000 in 1759, which was an increase of more than 100 per cent in less than thirty years, and was approaching the rate of increase in the British colonies. The population in 1735 was distributed among some eighty parishes, these numbering about one hundred at the end of the French occupation.<sup>14</sup>

The struggle with England had meantime lost none of the intensity created by the overlapping boundaries on the New England and Louisiana frontiers. France felt that the English "sea to sea" charters should not conflict with her occupation of the Mississippi Valley, and prepared her encircling movement through the Ohio Valley to retain it. Attempts of the British to divert Canadian furs from Montreal and Quebec to Albany was another cause of mutual jealousy. Cheaper British rum and trade articles usually won. The aggressions of the Hudson's Bay Company after its foundation in 1670 were likewise annoying, but they were countered by the activities of French Jesuits in the Bay region. The English in turn were dissatisfied because they had not obtained Canada, St. John, and Cape Breton Island in the Peace of Utrecht, and must sooner or later get them to remove the threat to the Atlantic colonies.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>11</sup> E. Salone, *La colonisation de la Nouvelle France*, 247-329, 330, 383-389.

<sup>12</sup> Salone, *op. cit.*, 323-326.

<sup>13</sup> Lorin, *Le travail en Amérique*, 178-189.

<sup>14</sup> *Censuses of Canada*, IV, 61, give 55,000 total in 1754; by 1750 the English colonies numbered a million inhabitants, although the United Kingdom had only six millions population in contrast to the twelve millions of France (Shortt and Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces*, XV, 59, say Canada "had not reached 100,000").

<sup>15</sup> G. M. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, II, 633-635.

Violent clashes between the traders of the two nations were in full swing before 1684. In 1697 D'Iberville drove the English out of their Fort Nelson; but the French tenure, never very successful, had been relinquished in 1713. Inasmuch as Vaudreuil could command only 4,400 habitants between fourteen and sixty years of age, and some six hundred marines, scattered over a hundred leagues in which there was not one decent fort, he was forced in 1714 to more energetic development of his defenses. The French government undertook to fortify the entrance to the St. Lawrence, protect Quebec from the English, and maintain communications between Canada and the Mississippi Valley.

Cape Breton Island, between Acadia and Newfoundland, had hitherto been entirely neglected, although Raudot had in 1706 pointed out its value. After the Peace of Utrecht, an eminent French engineer, Varville, was employed to build near the southeast corner of the island a great defensive port; and bleak but ice-free Louisbourg, "Gibraltar of the West," was built at a cost of thirty million francs. It was to have been a great port of trade and a "pistol held at England's head," but was never adequately provisioned or manned (in sharp contrast to Halifax, begun as a counter threat in 1749 by the British).<sup>16</sup>

The island was settled by people from Newfoundland who wanted to escape English dominion. A few Acadians also settled on (Saint Jean) Prince Edward Island, but most of them stuck to their well-tilled acres, where they proved of great value as produce raisers for the fort. Cape Breton developed a population of some four thousand, mostly at Louisbourg,<sup>17</sup> and at the close of the French period the two islands had from nine to ten thousand habitants. Louisbourg traded freely with New England, to their mutual advantage, and ships on long voyages called. The shore fisheries in 1738 engaged over one hundred boats, and were valued at three million livres. The French insisted that Acadia included only as far as the isthmus of Shediac, leaving the Abenakis under their control. The treaty had provided for a boundary commission, and the French hoped to control the disputed area pending its report, whereas the English hastened to make their occupation effective.

The English, when in 1702 they planned to drive the French out of the Newfoundland fisheries, sent Captain John Leake to raid the island coasts, while the French and Abenakis raided the New Hampshire and Massachusetts settlements. Repeated efforts to draw them from French allegiance failed. In 1704 the towns, even to the vicinity of Boston, were burned and plundered, while the corsairs harried the sea line. The New Englanders retaliated by sending Captain Benjamin Church to sack the Acadian settlements; he drove the poor Acadians of the Bay of Fundy

into the woods but stopped short of attacking Port-Royal, the seat of government, and won no prestige for his brutality. The New Englanders then set about capturing Port-Royal in 1707, two ill-prepared expeditions ending in ludicrous fiascos. Raids on Newfoundland by Captain Underwood extinguished many villages.

In 1709 the British formally adopted a plan suggested for driving the French off the continent, beginning by capture of Quebec and Montreal. This plan failing for the time being because of non-coöperation by the British army, the colonies in 1710, renewing the attack on Acadia, sent Francis Nicholson to accompany British marine forces which took Port-Royal. The town was then named Annapolis, and Acadia became Nova Scotia. Its boundaries in the Treaty of Utrecht included within "the ancient limits the warlike Abenakis, extending the English claim to the southern shore of the Gulf of St. Lawrence."<sup>18</sup>

The French troops besieged at Port-Royal were granted the honors of war and promised repatriation; the habitants were allowed to retain their property upon taking oath to the king of England, or, if they declined to do this, to have two years' time in which to sell their property and depart. The Treaty of Utrecht guaranteed them religious liberty, and finally, in 1713, they obtained the right to leave the country, without limitation of the time in which they might dispose of their property.

In 1714 the second governor, Nicholson, urged the Acadians to take the oath of allegiance. They refused and threatened to leave the country, but the governor prevented this by keeping them from securing ships. The Acadians naturally protested that the lack of facilities for their removal absolved them from taking British allegiance. Nicholson then proposed that the Acadians recognize the king of England as their sovereign and promise not to take arms against either monarch.

The Abenakis, encouraged by Father Rasles, refused to acknowledge the king of England. The English thereupon promised them a military post, and in 1717 made a treaty with them. But in 1721 the English ordered the Abenakis to withdraw to the west of the Connecticut River, their boundary, under pain of pillage and destruction. Vaudreuil prevented the English from carrying out this threat, whereupon the English made a prisoner of their doughty chief, the Baron de Saint-Castin, and burned the village of Father Rasles in January, 1722. In retaliation the Abenakis destroyed two New England villages, whereupon the British colonists in August, 1724, sent three hundred whites and eight

<sup>18</sup> Shortt and Doughty, *op. cit.*, XIII, 65. British authority, with governor, councils, and justices of the peace, was not very powerfully exerted; the Acadian peasants were singularly obstinate in their allegiance to France, but they prospered and multiplied. The population estimated at 2,500 in 1714 increased to perhaps 10,000 in 1755.

<sup>16</sup> Shortt and Doughty, eds., *op. cit.*, I, 201-210.

<sup>17</sup> Wrong, *op. cit.*, II, 637-639.

hundred natives to kill Father Rasles and massacre the French villagers.

Although this happened during the Franco-English alliance, France merely protested, and abandoned the Abenakis, who ravaged northern New England from 1725 to 1727. Their activity kept the British from spreading northward to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where they would have been able to cut off communication between Canada and France. Some of the Acadians assisted France in the War of the Austrian Succession in spite of the British. To balance this, Lord Halifax in 1749 founded the city which bears his name by planting 2,500 colonists, while Fort Lawrence on the isthmus provided effective control.

During the War of the Austrian Succession in 1744 an expedition from Louisbourg was sent by the governor of Cape Breton to attack Annapolis and recover Acadia. The Indian allies began with an independent attack on Canso in July, but the English were quickly able to repel the assault on Annapolis. The ill-starred attempt caused Governor Cornwallis to demand that the unfortunate Acadians again swear to British allegiance. This many refused to do, over three thousand taking the option of emigrating in preference. The French policy was to work for retaining the loyalty of the conquered Acadians, keep the Indians stirred up against the British, and hold the latter within the Shediak peninsula by strengthening Fort Beauséjour, while Louisbourg received additional armament.

Governor Shirley of Massachusetts, whose forces had saved Annapolis, then proposed to attack Louisbourg, after prisoners taken at Canso by the French returned to Boston giving an account of the wretched state of that frontier. The troops led by Colonel William Pepperel numbered four thousand militia from four New England colonies. Louisbourg was defended by only six hundred soldiers and eight hundred militia; but even these small forces had been demoralized by lack of discipline and the corruption of the administrator, Bigot, who had let their pay fall in arrears. For forty-seven days neither side made any headway. Finally, after a vessel from France with five hundred troops and munitions had been taken by the enemy, Duchambon, the French commandant, capitulated on June 28. Saint-John Island (Prince Edward) also was soon taken, leaving both shores commanding access to Canada in the hands of the English.

In 1746 eleven ships under command of D'Anville were sent from France to retake the fortress. He was also to take Port-Royal and harry Boston, but storm delayed his arrival, while he and many hundred of his men died in an epidemic. Jonquière, named to replace Governor Beauharnais in Canada, coming with six warships escorting thirty vessels was met off Cape Finisterre by the English, who captured his fleet

and made him prisoner. M. de la Galissonnière, then made ad interim governor, arrived shortly before the close of the war.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in restoring to France Cape Breton Island and Prince Edward Island, including Louisbourg, was a hard blow for the New Englanders, who had won the Canadian victories and hoped to extend their frontier to the St. Lawrence, Lakes Ontario and Erie, and to the Mississippi. No wonder the treaty did not stop hostilities.

The Acadian quarrel had two effects, an economic struggle with New England, and a contest with Virginia for the Ohio Valley. The English always tried to win the fur trade of the western tribes from the French posts on the St. Lawrence or Lake Ontario by charging low prices for arms and rum, and by arming their allies against any who traded with the French. After the Peace of Utrecht the English cut their prices for foodstuffs so low that the French merchants smuggled them from the English by way of the Sorel, both for their own living and for the Indian trade. This of course ruined French import at the gain of New England. The authorities of both colonies permitted this trade, as of mutual advantage, until in 1720 the English put a sudden stop to it. Prices promptly doubled in Canada, whereupon the governor reciprocated by prohibiting export of Canadian products to New England. Thus an inter-colonial bitterness was engendered; the English wanted war and the French could not escape it.

The English colonists had by this time pressed into the Ohio Valley; in 1748 the Ohio Land Company was organized to colonize the region, and in 1750 it was granted sixty thousand acres of land (c. 24,000 hectares) and was preparing to take possession. Other companies received grants, and settlers began to appear on the trail which later became Cumberland Pike. Governor de la Galissonnière renewed his efforts to defend this French-claimed territory. The French line of forts opposing the enemy included two on the isthmus of Acadia, Beauséjour and Gaspereau; on Lake Champlain and the Sorel River were Chambly and Carillon; on the St. Lawrence above Montreal were La Présentation and Frontenac or Cataracui; thence a series stretched toward New Orleans through Toronto, Detroit, Miami, St. Joseph, Chicago, Crèvecoeur, and Chartres. Another followed the English frontier through Ontario, Niagara, Presqu'île, Rivière-aux-boeufs, and Machault. There were still others at intervals extending west as far as Lakes Superior and Winnipeg.<sup>19</sup>

Galissonnière in 1749 sent Céleron de Bienville to take possession and

<sup>19</sup> Louis Antoine de Bougainville, "Mémoire sur l'état de la Nouvelle France," in Margry, *Relations et mémoires inédits*, 37-84, describes the state of Canadian defense in 1757.

leave plates marking French territory, though he found that the English influence had preceded him: Jonquière resumed command in 1752; but he died very soon, being followed by the vigorous Duquesne, who added a new fort named for himself at the strategic junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers and brought on the final conflict.

Its commander demanded that the settlers withdraw, and when this was refused he drove them out. England in 1753 called on Virginia to retaliate. Duquesne added twelve hundred troops to the defenders of this region, while the English raised forces and sought the help of the Iroquois to drive the French out.<sup>20</sup>

In 1753 George Washington, under orders from Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia, marched to request the French to withdraw. When this was refused, he returned and reported that force would be needed. Dinwiddie then sent a force to evict the French. Washington, in command through the death of his leader, began to build Fort Necessity at Great Meadows, but the French destroyed it and drove him back. Then De Jumonville was sent to require Washington to retire from French territory, but was killed while trying to deliver his message and his force was destroyed or taken prisoner. The French bitterly insist that this gallant officer was moving under a flag of truce; that Washington was not ignorant of the character of his mission or of the fact that his small escort was only a personal guard. Washington's hastily built Fort Necessity was quickly destroyed by seven hundred men under De Villiers, and he capitulated on July 2, 1754, signing terms in which De Jumonville's death was characterized as "meurtre"; he then retired to Virginia under one year's parole.

The British colonists were slow to react against this defeat, but finally voted meager funds and prepared for joint defense. In June, 1754, delegates of the several colonies met at Albany, where Benjamin Franklin proposed a plan of colonial union which was rejected though it contained ideas later used in forming the American Union. The British meantime sent troops to be assisted by colonial militia and Indian allies, especially the Iroquois. The latter had been fighting the French since early in 1754 in the upper Ohio Valley. The plan adopted for the first campaign embraced three operations: General Braddock came from England to take Fort Duquesne and drive the French from the Ohio; Governor Shirley of Massachusetts was to capture Fort Niagara; while General William Johnson was to attack Crown Point, and Monckton was to take Fort Beauséjour in Acadia.

To meet these moves which were made without declaration of war, the French sent to Canada fourteen vessels bearing three thousand

<sup>20</sup> The Five Nations had made a formal treaty with Governor Dougan of New York in 1684, after which time they remained allies of the English.

men under Baron de Dieskau. A new governor, the second De Vaudreuil, replaced Duquesne. General Braddock assembled his army at Fort Cumberland in July, 1755, and marched on Fort Duquesne with two thousand men, but was ambushed and killed by eight hundred French and Indians who took his cannon and all his papers. The crushing defeat threw many Indians onto the French side.<sup>21</sup> Washington for the second time led a beaten force home, and assumed the task of building new forts and meeting Indian raids.

General Johnson with three thousand men marched up the Hudson, halting to build Fort Edward. Meantime the French fleet with welcome reinforcements reached Canada. Dieskau had already sent forces toward Fort Frontenac, when Johnson obliged him to withdraw toward Lake Champlain.

On September 7 a part of Dieskau's forces, marching from Carillon, encountered eight hundred English; pursuing this force, they arrived before Fort Edward worn out, and failed in an assault upon it, while Dieskau was taken prisoner. Johnson, however, had been wounded and remained behind his works rather than attack Crown Point. Shirley, who was marching northward with troops from Fort Niagara, learning that Johnson's column had halted, also stopped to construct Oswego not far from the French fort, where he left seven hundred men and returned to New England. It being October, both sides went into winter quarters. The French Canadians and Indians terrorized the English villages, whose inhabitants were driven to the Atlantic.

The Acadians by 1749 numbered twelve thousand, mostly living at a distance from the English posts at Canso and Annapolis. After a strong center of English population was planted at Halifax, the new governor, Cornwallis, informed the Acadians that they could not retain their religious liberty and their property unless within three months they would take complete oath of allegiance.

Governor Lawrence in 1754 demanded that they should accept priests not subordinate to the bishop of Quebec, form a militia for defense against the Indians, and agree that the period within which they might leave the country had ended one year after the Treaty of Utrecht. The habitants appealed in vain to their former sovereign to force the English king to revoke these orders, and extend the period for their withdrawal for a year.<sup>22</sup> Their priests, such as Father Joseph

<sup>21</sup> The impassive Chesterfield is said to have cried in despair: "It is over now, we are no longer a nation" (quoted in Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 240).

<sup>22</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 53; text of the petition in excerpt quoted, from E. Rameau de Saint-Père, *Une colonie féodale en Amérique; (L'Acadie, 1604-1710)* (Montreal, 1889, 2v.), II, 384.

Louis le Loutre, were active propagandists and agents of French loyalist action. By urging the Acadians to emigrate or else move into French territory beyond the isthmus, this priest made the expulsion inevitable.

While this struggle was raging, during 1755, the two thousand British colonials under Colonel Monckton easily took Forts Beauséjour and Gaspereau on the isthmus of Shediac, as has been told. Upon Braddock's shocking defeat in the Ohio Valley, Governor Lawrence moved promptly to carry out a decision of his council to deport Acadian neutrals.<sup>23</sup> On August 11 he ordered the unsuspecting male habitants to convene at Fort Beauséjour, where they were informed that their goods were confiscated and that they were to be exiled. In September at Grand Pré and other towns the same order was repeated. Some six thousand of the unfortunate Acadians were dispersed along the Atlantic colonies; some were taken to France and later went to Saint-Domingue and Louisiana. Two shiploads mutinied at sea and reached the Antilles. Some evaded the summons, and stayed in Acadia or took refuge with the Indians; now and then captured, they were sent away, as were four thousand French on Cape Breton and Prince Edward islands after the fall of Louisbourg. The total expulsion, estimated to have included ten thousand persons, is known in Canadian history as the "Grand Dérangement."<sup>24</sup> The British justified it as a military necessity; it was not unlike the expulsions inflicted by Louis XIV on the Huguenots or by the United States on the "Loyalists" during the Revolution. The expulsion was followed by retributive Indian raids in which many New Englanders were scalped or haled off to Quebec to languish in jail until ransomed.

These American conflicts, with the fighting in India already described, involved Europe also. Prussia took the side of England, and carried on the struggle with money supplied by Pitt. Europe was in a new alignment, as Prussia deserted her old allies, France and Spain, while Austria and Russia were now foes. England was anxious to preserve her monarch's interest in his hereditary principality, Hanover:

. . . On the head of Frederic is all the blood which was shed in a war which raged during many years and in every quarter of the globe, the blood of the column of Fontenoy, the blood of the mountaineers who were slaughtered at Culloden. The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands where

<sup>23</sup> Rameau de Saint-Père, *op. cit.*, II, 154-155; cited, Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 54.

<sup>24</sup> Carl Wittke, *A History of Canada* (New York, 1928), 38. Émile Lauvrière, "Le peuple Acadien au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1924), 429-444, gives a brief portrayal of the qualities of these unfortunate people.

the name of Prussia was unknown; and, in order that he might rob a neighbor whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America.<sup>25</sup>

The state of war which actually existed in America and India was openly declared by the English on May 18, 1756, and by the French on June 9. France had then to meet attacks on three fronts in America with barely ten to fifteen thousand troops, of which all save three thousand were militia; all lacked equipment and provisions; but their leader, Montcalm, never despairing at the odds, used rapid movements to compensate for lack of numbers, for three years facing all fronts with success.

He had to contend with the incompetence of Governor Vaudreuil and the grafting of Bigot, the intendant, and he had to meet invasion by English and colonial troops numbering up to twenty thousand. Yet he was able in August, 1756, to capture forts Oswego and Ontario, which gave him a generous advantage. But European campaigns compelled France to leave her colonies to their own resources, whereas Pitt replacing Newcastle as minister, sent over ten thousand reinforcements.<sup>26</sup>

The campaign of 1757 was marked by Vice-admiral Holburn's failure to take Louisbourg, in connection with a projected attempt by land under Loudoun, and by Montcalm's destruction of Fort William Henry, which he forced to capitulate on August 9. Terrifying Indian raids frightened the whole New England front. Pitt's war in America was going badly, while successes in India had brought most of the Deccan and Bengal into English hands as a result of the battle of Plassy. In the spring of 1758 a fleet of thirty-six vessels with men and supplies left France, but twenty-two of them were captured by the English. For the renewed campaign the total resources of the English included an army of one hundred thousand and small and large fleets on all seas. Those of Montcalm included only six thousand soldiers, but he was still able to hold Ticonderoga and western New York. His Indian allies, gathered in a mighty powwow at Montreal, saw in his eyes "the strength of the oak and the swoop of the eagle."<sup>27</sup>

The master mind on the British side was William Pitt. He served

<sup>25</sup> "Frederick the Great," in Macaulay, *Works* (New York, 1866, 8v.), VI, 660.

<sup>26</sup> When he became Secretary of State, William Pitt is said to have declared: "It is my intention to get England out of this state of weakness in which she allows 20,000 Frenchmen to trouble her." Quoted in Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 240.

<sup>27</sup> Shortt and Doughty, eds., *Canada and Its Provinces*, I, 257.

for a brief period from November, 1756, to April, 1757, when he was forced out of the cabinet. But, returned to office from June, 1757, to October 5, 1761, he drove the contest to its logical conclusion with relentless vigor. During those years he almost welded the British into an empire. His able naval assistant, Admiral Anson, brought to the war on the sea the victories marked by the capture of Louisbourg, Quebec, Montreal, Martinique, Manila, and Havana.<sup>28</sup> For the campaign of 1759 Pitt successfully circumvented the elaborate plans of the astute French minister Choiseul for a descent in force by 50,000 French upon England itself. His enthusiasm and energy drew the American colonials to the imperial standard with the fervor of a holy war on the papacy which had so often incited attacks on their frontiers. "He stood like a battlefield commander whose right was in America, whose left was in Asia, whose front was in France, and whose base was England. With this whole field continually before him, he told off the right flank of his united service to effect the conquest of Canada."<sup>29</sup>

Pitt, wrathful at the dilatory tactics of Loudoun, replaced him by General James Abercrombie with twenty-two thousand soldiers and twenty-eight thousand militia. Then began a triple campaign which included expulsion of the French from the Ohio Valley, the clearing of Lake Champlain by Abercrombie and Howe preliminary to the latter, and movements against Montreal and Quebec; Admiral Boscawen with over a hundred and fifty vessels besieged Louisbourg for two months and took it at the end of July, 1758, with six thousand prisoners; Canada was thus cut off from communication with France.

In the interior, Montcalm was able to repulse in the same July the formidable bayonet attack on Fort Ticonderoga by Abercrombie, but the latter with twenty-five hundred men captured Fort Frontenac on Lake Ontario, which had only a hundred defenders. It had been the strategic point for getting supplies into Canada, for contact with the eastern Ohio forts and for the Indian trade. This was followed in November by General Forbes' advance on Fort Duquesne; the garrison fled to the more western posts, while the English renamed the famous post Fort Pitt. England had begun to win by throwing superior forces into every field of conflict. Only in Louisiana did the French hold the English in check until 1761 by Governor Kerlérec's clever use of Indian allies. The Creeks and Choctaws were especially effective in repelling English traders and armed forces. But in 1761 the Cherokees, who had also fought for three years for the French, were obliged to sue for peace by British troops from South Carolina.

<sup>28</sup> Shortt and Doughty, *op cit.*, I, 261-262.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 269-271.

To stem the tide of British successes, De Bougainville and Doreil were sent to France to obtain reinforcements, but Canada, now cut off by sea from the home country, had become quite secondary to the European troubles of Louis XV. To send reinforcements or supplies would only mean that they would fall into English hands.<sup>30</sup> The only hope was for the Canadians to hold out as long as possible, then retire through the Great Lakes into Louisiana. Meantime, some brave corsairs, returning with Bougainville, succeeded in getting supplies and a few hundred men into Quebec, and Governor Vaudreuil raised new militia by a levy of all men between sixteen and sixty years of age. But the French area had now shrunk to a strip of ill-fed villages along the St. Lawrence, a few outposts on Lake Champlain, and the grim but isolated fortress of Quebec:

Late in 1758 British reinforcements were sent to the West Indies to attempt the capture of the French island possessions, twenty-five vessels being gathered under Commodore John Moore. In January an attempt was made to take Martinique, but the French force of ten thousand regulars and militia prevented the occupation. During the following months Guadeloupe, Marie-Galante, the Saintes, La Désirade, and Petit Terre surrendered to the English.<sup>31</sup>

The campaign of 1759 was begun with renewed dissension between Montcalm and Governor Vaudreuil. The latter wanted to retake the Ohio Valley and spread from the region, while Montcalm felt that the English would certainly attack the lower St. Lawrence area. When Bougainville returned he brought news that the English were preparing such a movement. The whole French force was then less than 20,000 men, of whom 5,500 were regulars and 13,000 militia.

The English plan of campaign for 1759 included: (1) a movement from Louisbourg against Quebec, (2) a march up the Hudson against the Champlain posts, and (3) a movement to cut the French line in two by forces moving under Prideaux from Pennsylvania against Niagara; this was to be followed by crushing the French defenses of Ontario and a convergence on Montreal. For these movements the English had 40,000 effectives, in all nearly as great a total force as Canada had inhabitants. The vital blow was to be struck at the heart of French North America, Quebec. An English fleet under Vice-admiral Saunders reached it at the end of June with over two hundred ships, one fourth of the whole navy, and 27,000 men. Montcalm had, in spite

<sup>30</sup> Minister Berryer is reputed to have replied to Bougainville with the famous *mot*: "My good sir, when the house is on fire, one does not bother about the stables." Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 233.

<sup>31</sup> Bolton and Marshall, *The Colonization of North America*, 379.

of dishonest and jealous associates, added some redoubts on the open ground between the Montmorency and the Saint-Charles which would cover any attack by land. Living on four ounces of horse flesh daily ration, the French troops and starving habitants awaited the final blow.

After long delays, the English commander of the nine thousand land forces, General Wolfe, issued a demand to the habitants to surrender, repeating it on July 25, but with no result. Failing to draw Montcalm out of his works, he then threatened to destroy the town and ravage the outlying country. But Montcalm, with smaller forces, awaited a direct attack. This Wolfe delivered near Montmorency on July 31, but was obliged to fall back, losing four hundred and fifty men. The siege was apparently at a stalemate, as Montcalm could not drive the English away, but they were equally unable to crush his defenses. The defenders had to release many militiamen to gather the harvest, while Wolfe through August feared that Quebec could not be taken before the river should freeze over. Before giving up, he decided to resort to stratagem for an assault.

On the night of September 12-13 Wolfe landed above Quebec at Sillery in command of five thousand men who gained the Heights of Abraham unmolested, and at daybreak were drawn up for battle. Shortly the heterogeneous French forces began to flee into Quebec. General Wolfe was mortally wounded at the beginning, Montcalm a short time after. By mid-day the assault was victorious, Wolfe expiring as the French fled, and Montcalm during the night:<sup>82</sup>

. . . The death which conquered both, and the enduring monument now marking the needless sacrifice of two valiant lives, are perpetual testimonials to the fact that political dominion of Britain does not absorb the old French colony, isolated but enduring, on its frost-bitten promontory. Men like Montcalm and Wolfe should have been spared for nobler phases of empire building, and the rivalry of the two powers on the frontiers of civilization has always been a sorry waste of the energy, courage, and skill of each.<sup>83</sup>

His successor, De Lévis, had not taken part in this battle, having been sent to Lake Champlain. Before his return, Vaudreuil's troops decided to abandon Quebec and retire upstream to Jacques-Cartier, on the left bank. Sixteen hundred men, left at Quebec under De Ramesay, surrendered the great citadel on September 17.

Meantime General Amherst, on the shore of Lake Champlain, had forced Bourlamaque to blow up Forts Carillon and Saint-Frédéric.

<sup>82</sup> Shortt and Doughty, *op. cit.*, I, 275-308, "Mortem virtus communem, famam historia, monumentum posteritas, dedit."

<sup>83</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 85.

Unable to advance, he rebuilt Fort Carillon, naming it Ticonderoga, and Saint-Frédéric, which he called Crown Point. But, Bourlamaque holding him back at the north end of Lake Champlain, he was unable to join General Wolfe with his eleven thousand troops. In the Ontario region, Captain Pouchot at Fort Niagara called upon the commanders of five other frontier forts to join him. The garrisons called in were ambuscaded and dispersed, and Pouchot had to surrender Niagara on July 25. This defeat left the Ohio Valley without a French effective.<sup>84</sup>

The Canadian forces were now limited to a triangle formed by the north end of Lake Champlain, the rapids of the St. Lawrence, and the village of Jacques-Cartier with Montreal as the last line. The Mississippi Valley and the Great Lakes had been isolated; but the able De Lévis undertook a campaign nevertheless; attempting on April 27, 1760, to recover Quebec, he defeated General Murray at Saint-Foy and took all his cannon, but had to raise his siege in May when English instead of French ships arrived. De Lévis fell back upon Montreal, upon which three English columns were now able to converge, and Governor Vaudreuil ordered it to capitulate. On September 8, 1760, the white and gold flag of the fleur-de-lis was burned by De Lévis; the few small western forts soon surrendered. The same year saw the end of French power in India at Wandiwash and Pondichéry. Vergennes is reputed to have declared: "The counsellors of the king of England are grievously deceived if they persuade themselves that we regret the loss of Canada as much as they will repent having acquired it."<sup>85</sup>

In 1762 Admiral Rodney took Martinique, and several smaller islands surrendered. Havana was taken in August, and Manila in the Philippines in October.

The Treaty of Paris, 1763, renounced all French rights in Acadia and Canada, Cape Breton and all islands in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, while French fishing rights in Newfoundland were modified to include "liberty" for fishing and drying on the part of the coasts specified in Article XIII of the Treaty of Utrecht, now renewed except as to Cape Breton and the islands in the St. Lawrence. They might also fish in the Gulf of St. Lawrence at a distance of three leagues from British coasts, insular or continental, but fifteen leagues from Cape Breton. Tiny Saint-Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to France as fishing stations, all that now remained of France in America outside the Caribbean. The whole east of the Mississippi River except the islet of Orleans was also ceded to England, western Louisiana going to

<sup>84</sup> Shortt and Doughty, *op. cit.*, I, 273, 311.

<sup>85</sup> Quoted in Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 244.

Spain.<sup>86</sup> The terms of the treaty affecting India and West Africa have already been noticed.

<sup>86</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 73-77; on the preliminary negotiations for peace in 1761 on the basis of the *uti possidetis*, see A. Bourguet, *Études sur la politique étrangère du duc de Choiseul* (Paris, 1907), "La mission de M. Bussy à Londres," 179-236.

## CHAPTER XX

## THE FRENCH ANTILLES, 1674-1763

The Antilles saw frequent clashes with the English during the "Half Century of Conflict." In the Lucayas or Bahamas, left deserted for a long time after 1672, Guillaume de Caen received a grant to colonize, but he effected no settlement; nor did D'Ogeron, governor of Tortuga and Saint-Domingue, though he had the opportunity. No power, indeed, held any of the Bahamas down to the end of the seventeenth century, though British proprietors held grants in them, and settlement was attempted in 1672 and 1690 on Providence. Until about this time, buccaneering was a casual pursuit, but now it became a surreptitious mode of private war. In 1719 Nassau became a colonial seat as a defense against the sea robbers. Jamaica (taken by Cromwell's fleet in 1655) during the War of the Spanish Succession became a nest of English pirates preying upon Spanish shipping between Santo Domingo and Cuba. At the conclusion of peace they attacked both French and Spanish vessels, and the two governments joined to punish them. When the "pirats, robers and vilians" turned against English ships, policing of the Caribbean was made more effective and piracy declined after about 1718, when both the British and French governments offered general amnesty. Although few accepted it, the future saw fewer raids. One crew of fifty-two was hanged in 1722.<sup>1</sup>

The Spaniards still held the larger islands, while the best of those not Spanish, Martinique and Guadeloupe, with a number of dependencies, were French. The English held Saint-Christophe and several small islands, while the Caribs had been recognized as an insular power when England and France in 1660 agreed to leave Dominique and Saint-Vincent to the actual occupier.<sup>2</sup> England yearned for con-

<sup>1</sup> C. H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies . . .*, 249-257; Henri Malo, "Episodes de navigation aux Antilles," in *Revue de l'histoire des colonies françaises* (1914), 5-30, and various annexes, *ibid.*, 31-40; Great Britain, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies* (1714-1715), Art. 499; (1716-1717), Arts. 203, 328, 595; (1717-1718), Arts. 64, 566, 575; C. H. Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies* (New York, 1910), 270-271; J. Burney, *History of the Buccaneers of America* (London, 1816), 326; M. Besson, *The Scourge of the Indies*, 3-25; T. Coke, *History of the West Indies* (1808-1811, 3v.), III, 196-197.

<sup>2</sup> T. Southey, *A Chronological History of the West Indies* (London, 1827, 3v.), II, 33-34.

trol over these "neutralized" islands, and tried to seize them just when France, as an ally in the War of the Spanish Succession, was least able to object. During the ensuing years, while the sugar islands were prosperous, international rivalry to possess them was as sharp as was that on the mainland borders. Sainte-Lucie had been occupied in 1639 by the English, but the Caribs drove them out in 1640. Three years later, Du Parquet sent thither forty colonists from Martinique, but they abandoned the island in 1663, and the English took possession the following year. The French were holding the island in 1686, when the English drove them out, but shortly abandoned it. The Dutch were nearly continual enemies of the French holdings during the 1670's. In 1676 Governor De Baas received eight companies of infantry to be distributed for insular defense.<sup>3</sup> In 1674, when the West India Company was dissolved, private enterprise took over all trade except that in slaves, which was carried on by companies or contractors.<sup>4</sup> In 1718 the Regent (the duke of Orléans) gave Sainte-Lucie to the Marshal d'Éstrées, but when England objected this plan was given up. In spite of agreements, the islands of Sainte-Lucie, Dominique, and Saint-Vincent were seized by the English. In January, 1723, the chevalier de Feuquières, governor of the French Antilles, under superior orders to preserve the neutrality of these islands for the Caribs, leading a force of fifteen hundred men, forced the English to evacuate Sainte-Lucie. In 1733 both powers agreed to evacuate Dominique and Saint-Vincent.

The English also tried to seize Saint-Croix, held since 1660 by French smugglers who had incurred the wrath of the Compagnie des Indes. By 1696 their number had fallen from eight hundred to one hundred and fifty, and shortly thereafter they left Saint-Croix for Guadeloupe. To forestall its seizure by the English, Maurepas, the French minister, sold the island in 1733 for 300,000 livres to Denmark, possessor of Saint-Thomas since 1671. The Danes occupied a third island, Saint John, in 1716-1717, which they had claimed since 1683.<sup>5</sup> With Tobago France did nothing until the English were about to seize it, whereupon Governor Champigny of Guadeloupe formed a company of Marseilles merchants to occupy and develop it.<sup>6</sup>

After Colbert, colonization slackened. Toleration for Huguenots would have brought in a good stream of immigrants, but such generosity was reserved for another time, race, and religion. In May, 1671,

<sup>3</sup> *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert* . . . , III, pt. 2, 602.

<sup>4</sup> Mims, *Colbert's West India Policy*, 225.

<sup>5</sup> W. C. Westergaard, *The Danish West Indies*, 2, 28, 35 ff.; E. E. Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises, particulièrement la Guadeloupe*, II, 298.

<sup>6</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 117-120.

the king wrote to De Baas, lieutenant-general of the islands, that the Jews might exercise their cult freely, as they had spent much money on agriculture in Martinique and other islands.<sup>7</sup> No disruption of the state would be likely to follow, as might have been caused by Protestants. In 1664 De Tracy legislated against Huguenots, denying them the right of assembly, or of avoiding Catholic worship. In 1683 the Lutherans were forbidden public exercise of religion, or to enter the French islands without royal permission, though Huguenot property-owners already present were not ousted. Soldiers were billeted on heretics until they recanted, as in Canada, while confiscation of the goods of stubborn Protestants was another bit of logic intended to promote conformity.<sup>8</sup> This policy reduced the proportion of whites to blacks, and caused the regency to relax the rules concerning recruitment of engagés, the obligation upon ship captains to carry a certain number being commuted to a fine.<sup>9</sup>

Parishes were erected in the islands in 1687, and served by the Jesuits, Capuchins, and Jacobins, who controlled the teaching of reading and writing in the parochial schools. The Capuchins gave up the parishes on Saint-Domingue in 1704 to the Jesuits.<sup>10</sup> The latter were given exclusive rights at Cap Français. Landholding by the church was curbed when a law of 1705 limited each order to such area as could be worked by one hundred Negroes; another of 1721 prescribed that all land grants to clerical bodies must be authorized by the king.

An admiralty court was established in 1718 at Martinique with jurisdiction over all the islands. The colonists had developed a flair for needless lawsuits, hence it was ordered that no one might enter the islands except to develop plantations, "for [lawyers] are very dangerous for the colonies, where affairs require to be dealt with summarily, to which the governor must incite the officers of justice."<sup>11</sup>

Judicial officers of the councils and lower courts were not of very high class or education. Some were recruited even from the filibusters and mechanics "sans étude et sans éducation." The chamber of justice might often exhibit a crude judge "rendering sentence with pipe in mouth" to litigants who freely called him a rogue, thief, and villain.

<sup>7</sup> *Lettres, instructions, et mémoires de Colbert*, III, pt. 2, 522-523. An edict of March 6, 1689, ordered extension to "nos Isles" of that of April 23, 1615, which provided for expulsion of all Jews there fixed in residence, within three months (*Le Code Noir*, 30).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Priestley, *The Coming of the White Man*, 212, 216, 219.

<sup>9</sup> L. P. May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique, 1635-1763*, 37.

<sup>10</sup> M. Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Lois et constitutions des colonies françaises de l'Amérique sous le vent . . .*, II, 2, 18-20.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted, Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 123. Similarly in Canada and Louisiana lawyers were excluded; P. de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue*, 91-92.

Amid general laxity a sub-engineer at Cap Français asked to be sent back to France because it "was impossible for him to do his duty as a Christian in Saint-Domingue," as he feared he would succumb to the bad examples about him.

Several unsuccessful companies held the French Lesser Antilles until 1727. The regency had to wink at the trade with the English and Dutch islands for provisions as the companies cold-bloodedly neglected their duty. In 1715 the minister of marine was replaced by a council of marine.<sup>12</sup> It contained a colonial commission composed of Marshal d'Estrées and two merchants of Paris, but no colonial representative.<sup>13</sup> This commission took Governor Duquesne of Martinique to task for condoning the Dutch trade, and disapproved his permission to the habitants to make exchanges with Barbados. But nothing was done to furnish supplies. When Governor De la Varenne prohibited all traffic with foreign islands, the colonists put him and the intendant on board ship, packed them off to France, and forced their officers to permit foreign trade; the alternative was starvation. Yet Governor de Feuquières, accused of having permitted the entry of one hundred and eighteen English vessels between 1723 and 1726, was replaced in 1727 by Champigny, formerly governor of Guadeloupe.<sup>14</sup> The islands were then placed under free commerce for nationals, although French merchants were more concerned with carrying to Europe products of the islands than with satisfying the colonists. To France, as a rule, were sent all raw products of first quality, contraband traders getting the second class, especially rum and tafias.<sup>15</sup>

During the War of the Spanish Succession, Martinique was the haven of the French corsairs, over twelve hundred of whom centered there in 1706.<sup>16</sup> Between 1715 and 1740 it was a busy island; being the seat of the general government, ships from France made it their

<sup>12</sup> Isambert, *Recueil*, XXI, 38, 56-61; on January 1, 1710, the two bureaux of Levant and Ponant were superseded by the Bureau of the Colonies, for the first time liberating overseas holdings from the confusion of administration incidental to admixture of their affairs with those of the navy. This may be called the beginning of the slow development of a ministry for the colonies (A. Duchêne, *La politique coloniale de la France*), 34-35.

<sup>13</sup> The heads of the Bureau of the Colonies were: 1710-1725, Moïse Augustin Fontanieu; 1725-1738, Pierre de Forcade; 1738-1756, Arnaud de La Porte; 1756-1764, Aécaron; 1764, Jean Baptiste Dubuc. A brother of the last named, Dubuc de Ferret, was chosen by the colonists in 1766 to represent them in the committee of commerce. Another Dubuc, Louis François, was chosen by his compatriots to negotiate the surrender of Martinique to the English during the Revolution (Duchêne, *op. cit.*, 47-49).

<sup>14</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 123-125.

<sup>15</sup> See below, page 265.

<sup>16</sup> Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies*, 271.

terminus, while transports carried goods thence to the other islands, to Guiana, Canada, Louisiana, and West Africa. Martinique sent to North America all the insular products and received in exchange cod-fish, dried peas, flour, and lumber.<sup>17</sup>

Martinique soon exceeded all the others in sugar production and took more of the exports of the mother country. In 1722 duties on Martinique goods entered in French ports amounted to 2,500,000 livres. The fertile island was frequently attacked by enemies (the English in 1666, the Dutch in 1674). To preserve the insular possessions, a treaty of neutrality with England had been made on November 16, 1686, by which European war should not be extended to the islands. This did not prevent English attacks in 1693. At the Peace of Ryswick (1697) the French tried hard to obtain new areas in the Spanish Caribbean or Newfoundland, but Spain was obdurate,<sup>18</sup> conceding only the western portion of Saint-Domingue.

The buccaneer settlements on that island had never ceased to distress the Spaniards and the English. In January, 1691, the two powers joined in sending some 2,600 men to drive the French filibusters out of the Cap Français district and clean up Tortuga. The French appealed to Versailles, and Jean Baptiste du Casse was given charge of a relief expedition which first repulsed an English attack on Guadeloupe and then bore its commander to Saint-Domingue to assume the governorship. He compelled respect from the Spaniards, reorganized the government, controlled the filibusters. In 1694 he made a raid on Jamaica that netted 25,000,000 livres' profit. The English reciprocated by laying waste most of the Saint-Domingue plantations. In 1697 he led the assault on Cartagena which has ever been famous in Caribbean annals. During the war he convoyed the Spanish galleons to Panama. His term as governor seems to have ended about 1702.<sup>19</sup>

Saint-Domingue was not disturbed during the War of the Spanish Succession as the English were now allies. The population was sedentary and the pursuit of agriculture thrived remarkably, the soil being exceptionally fertile. The government was subordinate to that of the Antilles, which had its seat at Martinique. Saint-Domingue had a governor, an intendant, and a sovereign council. Inhabitants capable of bearing arms numbered six thousand and there were fifty thousand slaves. In 1714 the island was placed under the direct administration

<sup>17</sup> About 1740 its ports received more than two hundred ships a year from France and about fifty from Africa and Canada. There were in the inter-island trade some one hundred and thirty-six vessels of about seventy tons (Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 125-126).

<sup>18</sup> May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique, 1635-1763*, 295; Placide Justin, *Histoire politique et statistique de l'île d'Hayti* (Paris, 1826), 90-91.

<sup>19</sup> Besson, *The Scourge of the Indies, 165-215*.

of the ministry of marine, the first governor-general being De Blénac, with his seat at Petit Goave. Governor De Larnage moved the capital to Léogane in 1737, where he presided over a sovereign council of twelve. The intendant had the usual cognizance of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and heard cases appealed from the lesser courts in four towns. In 1724 the island was divided into (1) the province du Nord, which included Tortuga and the north shore, with Cap Français as the chief town; (2) the province de Sud, which embraced the Île des Vaches, and the south shore, with Saint-Louis as the chief town; and (3) finally, the province de l'Ouest, which lay between the two foregoing provinces, the Golfe de l'Ouest, and the Spanish frontier. Each province had a governor, and parishes under either secular priests or regulars who had civil jurisdiction. The financial resources were the customs receipts and the capitation tax, fixed in 1720 at eight livres for an adult slave and five for a young Negro; one-fourth of this went to the church, and the remainder to governmental uses. The military forces comprised from fifteen hundred to three thousand royal troops, and militia organized by parishes and *quartiers*. The police, controlled by white officers, were free mulattoes or blacks. In 1721 a company of gendarmerie was formed to check marauding maroons.<sup>20</sup>

The southern province began in 1715 to be exploited by the Company of Saint-Louis, which had a monopoly for thirty years, under obligation to import within five years fifteen hundred whites and twenty-five hundred blacks, and to develop commerce with the Spanish colonies. To attract colonists the company offered free land and slaves on credit; good progress was being made until the governor forbade the capture of fugitives without his authorization. Thereupon the sovereign council in turn asserted its authority over the governor. This was only one episode in the long antagonism of the colonists and company control; they had been held in hand by Du Casse in the 1690's only by that governor's astuteness; when they were taken under the Law Company, their rebellious natures found the monopoly offensive in the extreme.

The coin used was almost exclusively the Spanish peso, brought in by filibusters. Exports were heavy, but imports were supplied mostly by contraband. The company paid for products in bills on the treasury or on Law's bank, so that when his system fell, the planters' losses were heavy. The government, to remedy this, ordered in 1720 that

<sup>20</sup> Recaptured maroons were held for the owners; notice was published on the church steps on Sundays requesting masters to identify their slaves (if not branded) and take them away (Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Lois et constitutions*, II, 8). Levies of police, thirty-six men in each quartier, were raised in 1705 to hunt maroons (*ibid.*, II, 25-27).

company agents must make payments in goods at scheduled rates. The company complied but half-heartedly, and discontent was bitter over the terms upon which it furnished a meager supply of slaves, for which it demanded prompt payment in "unsweated pesos of standard weight."<sup>21</sup>

This exaction aroused such a fury at Cap Français and Léogane that the company agents were deported, Governor Sorel was arrested, and the company's vessels were ordered back to France. The governor was then set free and was apparently restored when a company slaver reached Cap Français with three hundred blacks. The still recalcitrant habitants ordered it to quit the island within four days, and a secret meeting of delegates of the quartiers demanded that the governor discontinue the company's slave-trade monopoly and suspend work on fortification of Petit Goave. The governor naturally refused, asked for his recall, and was deposed by the mutineers. Opposition to company control took the form of rebellion led by an anonymous masked "Général Sans Quartier" who posted warlike bulletins and led night riders who none too gently persuaded timid colonists to revolt. This popular vindicating champion of local liberties appeared first in 1722, and at intervals thereafter down to the Revolution.<sup>22</sup> His prowess is still legendary.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the rough society of the first hundred years in Saint-Domingue had been elevated by the gradual immigration of noble families. They came usually in military or other like positions, driven from home by extreme poverty; once they saw the opulence of the planters they made haste to join that group to make new fortunes. Frequently these men became so attached to their properties that they refused promotions which would cause them to leave their homes.

When the intendants were introduced, and especially during the eighteenth century when the civil control was growing, the military officers were continually in opposition to them. Their membership in the superior councils gave power to military control which the intendants steadily resented. Vaissière believed that the strength of this class was a resource which the crown's rejection turned into a cause of final loss of the island.

Martinique was also the scene of a revolt of the planters in 1717; they were enraged at the king's decree ordering reduction of over-large clerical estates, reduction of sugar areas, and suppression of contraband. The governor and the intendant were arrested and sent to

<sup>21</sup> P. de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue*, 128-142.

<sup>22</sup> "Mélanges Historiques," in *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises*, XXI (1928), 104-110.

France. The crown thought best to grant an amnesty and send a new governor, Feuquières.<sup>23</sup>

By 1717 one hundred sugar mills were operating. Coffee was introduced in 1723, bananas and cotton in 1735. Free trade with France brought great prosperity. Le Havre had a huge slave trade. By 1740 the opulent island possessed a population of 11,540 whites, 14,060 free mulattoes, and 117,400 slaves. There were 3,448 indigo factories and 450 sugar mills, on whose product all the profit went to nationals. The French Antilles provided a large portion of the commerce of the kingdom at the outbreak of hostilities with England. In 1730 the general commerce of France amounted to one hundred and seventy-seven millions, of which one hundred and six were exports and seventy-one were imports. The commerce of the islands amounted to one-sixth of this or nearly thirty millions, twenty of which were imports into France and ten exports. Between 1730 and 1740 six hundred vessels annually carried to France the sugar for refining at Rouen, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, and Marseilles. The product in excess of home use found foreign markets, driving the English sugar out. So much prosperity led to the evil of monoculture, for the islanders never produced the necessary foodstuffs and imported all supplies. The exclusive use of slave labor led to a dangerous increase of blacks who thus early threatened the existence of white society.

When the War of the Austrian Succession broke out, the colonists resorted to corsair warfare because the English fleet cut them off from home. Governor-general Champigny (in office since 1727) promptly seized Sainte-Lucie in June, 1744. Saint-Barthélemy and Saint-Martin fell into the hands of the English. La Grenade remained French. At the beginning of 1745, Champigny became a commander in the royal fleet, his successor being the Marquis de Caylus. In the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle the question of the ownership of strategically placed Sainte-Lucie was not settled, but the French stayed on, and the Anglo-French rivalry continued keen. In 1755, English corsair raids caused Governor de Bompard of Martinique to authorize reprisals, while Governor Vaudreuil of Saint-Domingue destroyed a nest of English pirates in the Bahamas.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> E. Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises*, II, 283-292. This steady movement toward autonomy in the West Indies had at least occasional counterparts in France. As early as 1689 the *Soupirs de la France esclave*, perhaps written by Michel Levasor, complained that "le roi est tout et l'état n'est rien," and plead for popular sovereignty. Kings who consume the people's liberties and goods should be controlled by assemblies (H. Sée, *L'évolution de la pensée politique en France au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1925), 23).

<sup>24</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 130-137; Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises*, II, 301.

The fight for the islands was thenceforth defensive. The government managed to send a fleet with supplies during the period of anticipation of war. Governor de Bompard began to repair the defenses of Martinique, Sainte-Lucie, and Guadeloupe, and opened the insular ports to the Dutch, thereby eliciting from England the famous "rule of 1756." Notwithstanding that internal conditions had grown worse with the increase of slaves, Bompard felt warranted in using some of them in militia companies.<sup>25</sup> In Saint-Domingue the outnumbered whites only held their own through organization and greater moral force. During a foreign war the slaves had to be kept free from the rebellious influence of the maroons in Spanish territory. In 1756 the governors-general were changed, De Vaudreuil being succeeded by Captain Bart, and De Bompard by Beauharnais who found the planters torn by old quarrels and their families diminished by poisoning by their slaves. He created a provost's court to handle slave troubles and added to the number of corsairs, returning to Martinique at the close of the year bearing numerous complaints about the poverty of the islands.

Toward the end of the year, the English Admiral Moore tried vainly to take Martinique, where the corsairs swarmed in the bay of Fort Royal. As he was obliged to retire to Barbados to await new forces, the Dutch brought in welcome supplies from Saint-Thomas, and at the close of 1758 France sent out a small convoyed provision fleet. To Saint-Domingue during 1758 corsair raids against ships from Jamaica brought in sixty-two vessels. On January 14, 1759, Moore's long-delayed fleet from Barbados reappeared before Martinique, but failing to break the resistance of the insular militia, it then attacked Guadeloupe, where Governor Nadau de Teil was defeated. His planters and Negroes fought bravely; one French wife led her slaves in several fierce skirmishes, but the sluggish Beauharnais was unwilling to help him; finally, in April, 1759, through at last with dallying at the marriage ceremonies of a favorite nephew, Beauharnais sent twenty-six hundred men, after the English had taken all ports through which he could receive supplies; Basse Terre surrendered on April 23 and Grande Terre on May 1.<sup>26</sup> Guadeloupe then became the base of English operations against Martinique. An English fleet took Fort Royal on February 5. Shortly, Grenade, Saint-Vincent, and Sainte-Lucie also

<sup>25</sup> An ordinance of 1709 at Cap Français had permitted this, promising the Negroes "that they will be rewarded according to their merit by gifts, pensions for life, and even by freedom for distinguished service" (Moreau de Saint-Méry, *op. cit.*, II, 167-168).

<sup>26</sup> He was cashiered in 1761 (Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises*, II, 312).

fell.<sup>27</sup> General Monckton, war governor of the two islands, hoping for a permanent cession, undertook to win over the colonists by urging them to increase their plantations; no changes were made in their civil life, and the superior council continued to serve. Guadeloupe was made independent of Martinique. The English remained until July, 1763, by which time they had imported 18,721 Negroes.<sup>28</sup>

In Saint-Domingue the maroons waged savage war during 1761. The English in Jamaica, having subdued their own wild Negroes in 1760, were prevented from attacking Saint-Domingue by a new black revolt at home, but after the English took Martinique their forces renewed their offensive. Meantime Admiral Pocock took Havana on August 13, 1762. News of the preliminaries of the peace arrived just in time to save the quarrel-torn and starving Saint-Domingue from impending attack. The treaty, which displeased the English planters, gave Grenade, the Grenadines, and Tobago to England, as well as the "neutral" islands of Dominique and Saint-Vincent. Some seven hundred square miles of territory were thus acquired. Martinique and Guadeloupe were returned to France in exchange for Minorca; Sainte-Lucie, in spite of its strategic value, was ceded to France.<sup>29</sup> The perplexity of the English as to whether they should take Canada or the French West Indies was matched by the anxiety of France to recover her sugar islands.<sup>30</sup>

The English triumph checked France in overseas growth, much of her territory being swept into the British Empire, whose American colonies, like her possessions in India, were continuous and consolidated. The Union Jack dominated on the African coast and in the West Indies. Britannia ruled the waves:

<sup>27</sup> Southey, *Chronological History of the West Indies*, II, 327-334.

<sup>28</sup> Thomas Jefferys, *The West India Atlas* (London, 1775), 25.

<sup>29</sup> F. W. Pitman, *The Development of the British West Indies, 1700-1763* (New Haven, 1917), 335. Since 1720 the British planters had looked upon sugar expansion as a menace to their glutted market, whereas public opinion favored greater insular conquests (*ibid.*, 336-338). The Spaniards had renewed their claims to most of the Lesser Antilles, and Choiseul made the concession of Louisiana to them in compensation for French tenure of Sainte-Lucie and their adhesion to the Family Compact (A. S. Aiton, "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," *American Historical Review*, XVII (July, 1912), 701-720; W. L. Grant, "Canada versus Guadeloupe, an Episode of the Seven Years' War," *ibid.*, XVII, 735-743).

<sup>30</sup> May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique . . .*, 295-307. In 1716 the West India islands imported goods only to the value of 16,700,000 livres, and exported to France about nine millions; but by 1774 the export to France was one hundred and twenty-six millions. In 1788 exports to France were one hundred eighty-five millions of colonial products, French exports to the islands being worth seventy-eight millions. Of these values one hundred and thirty-four millions were in sugar and coffee (H. Sée, *L'évolution commerciale et industrielle de la France* (Paris, 1925), 235-237).

The Seven Years' War is . . . a turning point in our national history [and] . . . the history of the world. . . . Till now the relative weight of the European states had been drawn from their possessions within Europe itself. . . . Mistress of Northern America, the future mistress of India, [England] suddenly towered high above nations whose position in a single continent doomed them to comparative insignificance in the after history of the world.<sup>31</sup>

In spite of all this, an entire section of English opinion was not yet satisfied; it would have been pleased at the total ruin of the French colonial empire. To this end the reorganization of the British Empire was bent. The adversaries both knew that one side or the other must suffer the complete defeat implied in the commercial warfare whose philosophical basis was the mercantile system.

The French merchants continued to assert their trade monopoly over the islands, but were powerless to prevent smuggling of lumber, flour, and salt fish from North America, especially after the loss of Canada, while the English colonies needed French sugar, coffee, and indigo. After 1763 the "pacte coloniale" was relaxed when Choiseul permitted import of mackerel. In 1784 he even allowed foreign ships to trade in certain ports of the Antilles, to the grief of French merchants. The independence of the British and Spanish American colonies grew out of the breaking of the colonial monopoly—one of the biggest events of universal history.<sup>32</sup> The fall of New France was a symbol, rather than an actuality, in the shift of world power:

Commerce with the Antilles made the Atlantic ports of France prosperous. In 1788, according to *La balance du commerce*, by Arnould, 185 millions' worth of colonial products were received by them, and 78 millions in merchandise were sent to the Antilles, not counting the slave trade, which occupied 2,173 ships; the traders, as well as the colonists, were deeply concerned by the emancipation movement, which was beginning in 1789.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> John Richard Green, *History of the English People* (London, 1878-1880, 4v.), IV, 194-195.

<sup>32</sup> Henri Sée, *Esquisse d'une histoire économique et sociale de la France*, 331-332.

<sup>33</sup> Sée, *L'évolution commerciale et industrielle de la France*, 236.

## CHAPTER XXI

## THE FRENCH ANTILLES, 1763-1789

After the Seven Years' War, the Antilles were given a new military organization and a change in government. The militia had felt such deep disgust at its neglect by the home government that it was largely this which had obliged the governors to surrender. In 1763 regular permanent troops were sent, and in 1766 quartering of soldiers on the habitants was stopped. In 1772 four regiments were sent to Saint-Domingue, and one each to Martinique and Guadeloupe.<sup>1</sup>

It had been intended to dispense with the insular militia, but in 1765, 1768, and 1769 the latter had to be called out to forestall servile war. Every parish had one or more companies under a captain; many whites evaded service, those who paid over two hundred livres in taxes might be exempted. Security from the dreaded black menace required large militia enrollment. In 1775 Saint-Domingue mustered thirteen thousand men, Martinique seven thousand, and Guadeloupe four thousand.<sup>2</sup>

Government reorganization was for the purpose of preventing Martinique, the seat of administration, from imposing upon the other islands selfish restrictions. The governors-general obliged all vessels from overseas to put in there first, and later take their unsold residues to the other islands. This gave Martinique special revenues and trade, with advantages which Guadeloupe had fought for fifty years; the harm done was made evident when the English, while in possession during the war, abolished the system.

At the close of the war the English strengthened their acquisitions from France by putting Grenade, the Grenadines, Saint-Vincent, and Tobago under a general government centered on Grenade. A special

<sup>1</sup> A comprehensive literature on the Caribbean area will be found listed in F. Cundall, *Bibliography of the West Indies* (Kingston, 1909); the *List of Works in the New York Public Library Relating to the West Indies*, begins in its *Bulletin*, January, 1912 (vol. XVI) and runs through these for the year. Later materials in J. L. Ragatz, *Bibliographie d'histoire coloniale, 1900-1930* (Paris, 1932), and Ragatz, *A Bibliography of Articles . . . on Colonies . . . through 1934* (London, 1935, 2v.).

<sup>2</sup> P. de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue, 120-128*, names several officers, who served well and enjoyed great social prestige.

government was set up by the French for Martinique, with Sainte-Lucie adjoint, while the Saintes, La Désirade, Marie-Galante, Saint-Barthélemy, and the French part of Saint-Martin were attached to a separate government for Guadeloupe. The general military direction was given to Martinique. When war with England threatened in 1769 again, each island controlled its own government.

Vehement complaints by the planters finally led the royal government to modify certain economic regulations. An old edict of Louis XV in 1727 had forbidden import of slaves or goods except in French ships or from French ports;<sup>3</sup> it was still in force in 1763, causing actual loss. The residue from sugar manufacture, syrups or molasses, from which rum and tafia were made, were excluded from France to prevent competition with the national brandies, and could only be sold surreptitiously to foreigners, whereas in the English islands these waste products yielded one-fourth of the revenues.<sup>4</sup> Lord Grenville's Sugar Act forbade import of foreign rum or spirits; French textile import was highly taxed while indigo was protected as an aid to South Carolina. Furthermore, the prevention of revictualing the French islands, except by national vessels and goods, became more obnoxious as the islands grew in wealth and numbers of slaves. Lack of food crops, lack of imports, and high prices for those admitted, characterized the continuous problem of food supply.

As the loss of Canada cut off the foods and timber formerly received from there, the islanders wanted foreign ships admitted to the trade.<sup>5</sup> But the home merchants bitterly opposed English and Dutch competition, and the dilemma was how to please the sugar planters without injuring the national trade. In 1763 foreign import of live-stock, lumber, grains, fruits, and bricks was permitted in exchange for syrups and tafias. Mackerel, added in 1765, was removed in 1766 on complaint of the French fisheries. Finally a free port was established at Môle Saint-Nicolas for Saint-Domingue, and another for careening ships (Le Carénage) at Sainte-Lucie; from these two places commodities might be exported on payment of 1 per cent duty, known as the "droit du domaine d'Occident" (July 29, 1767).<sup>6</sup> Import was

<sup>3</sup> The edict is given in brief in Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France*, 19-21. It represents the climax of the Exclufif under the Old Régime.

<sup>4</sup> The English islands were, however, past the zenith of their sugar production, which was centered in the Leeward Islands and Barbados. In 1762 the white population of Barbados numbered some 18,000 and the blacks 70,000. In 1744 Antigua, Saint-Christophe, Nevis, and Montserrat had 11,000 whites and 60,000 Negroes. Barbados was producing annually about 14,000 hogsheads of sugar.

<sup>5</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 320.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 189; Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France*, 24-25. The obvious connection between the tariff policy of France

allowed, however, only of urgent necessities not obtainable in France, while syrups and tafias were still excluded from France. Thus the free ports made a breach, however slight, in the Exclusif system; "they were rather a feature complementary of the colonial pact than a step toward its abolition."<sup>7</sup>

Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Sainte-Lucie progressed rapidly after the Treaty of Paris, the first two struggling to possess the general government. Martinique and Sainte-Lucie were impoverished between 1764 and 1775 by swarms of ants which destroyed all the sugar crops. A hurricane in August, 1766, wrecked Martinique. The bankruptcy of the banking house of Saint-Pierre created a serious situation. In 1755 the bank director, Father La Valette, S.J., sent to France a cargo of many million livres intended to cover letters of exchange he had drawn on Marseilles. The cargo was captured by the English, La Valette declared his house bankrupt, and the Jesuit order refused to cover the deficit. The Parlement of Paris in May, 1761, ordered it to do so, and then, angered by opposition, ordered general cremation of Jesuit publications. This incident largely inspired the royal edict of 1764 by which the Jesuits were suppressed in France.<sup>8</sup> Spain banished them from all her possessions in 1767.<sup>9</sup>

The American Revolution increased the prosperity of the West Indies, as the French fleets found them an excellent base of operations. France challenged England's "Rule of 1756" by opening her insular commerce to neutrals, making former contraband trade legal. The United States profited by entry into the French West Indies trade, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1778 aiding the situation. Vergennes invited the Americans to come to French ports to make up their cargoes, and to exchange their products in the French islands. In 1784 the permission was limited by decree of August 30 to specified ports and conditions.<sup>10</sup> In 1789 alone, out of a total of 4,170 ships entering and leaving Saint-Domingue, 2,519 were from the United States and 897 from France. France sold to the Antilles annually merchandise to the value of seventy-eight million livres, and bought


and that of Spain at this moment is shown in Priestley, *José de Gálvez*, 25-40, 172-209.

<sup>7</sup> May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique*, 118-123; Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 103; Christian Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème colonial*, 28.

<sup>8</sup> Priestley, *José de Gálvez*, 211, note 4; F. Rousseau, *Règne de Charles III d'Espagne* (Paris, 1907, 2v.), I, chaps. IV-XIII; Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, VIII, pt. II, 320-325. The sources for the expulsion from France are listed, *idem*, 319.

<sup>9</sup> B. Moses, *Papers on the Southern Spanish Colonies of America* (Berkeley, 1911), 103-126.

<sup>10</sup> Schefer, *op. cit.*, 29-30.



eighty-five millions' worth of colonial commodities; sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, and dyestuffs, of which a portion, transformed in French factories, furnished another one hundred and fifty millions for French exportation.<sup>11</sup>

Commercial policy through the period under survey was based on a niggardly modification of the colonial pact inaugurated by Richelieu. The edict of 1664 and the ordinance of 1686 were rigidly exclusive. In 1698 an edict of August 30 codified prior laws and imposed a penalty of three thousand livres on shippers who loaded vessels in foreign countries for the insular trade.<sup>12</sup> Letters patent in 1717 revived and reasserted the troublesome principle, specifying ports and tariffs. In 1727, under stress from the French chambers of commerce, restriction of foreign trade was placed in the hands of the sovereign council.<sup>13</sup> At that time, Martinique was itself given a chamber of commerce.

The importation of salt beef from Ireland in French ships was at that time permitted, if the beef was loaded in France. But this was less liberal than formerly, for in 1681 it had been permitted to send to the Antilles in French bottoms all foreign merchandise loaded in France. White sugar had been sent to Spain, as that country paid for

<sup>11</sup> The figures for 1779, according to Necker, were:

	<i>Whites</i>	<i>Free Mulattoes</i>	<i>Slaves</i>
Saint-Domingue .....	32,650	7,055	249,098
Martinique .....	11,019	2,892	71,268
Guadeloupe .....	13,261	1,382	85,327
Sainte-Lucie .....	2,397	1,050	10,752

In 1789 they were:

Saint-Domingue (according to Ducoeurjoly) .....	30,826	27,548	465,429
Martinique .....	10,634	5,779	83,965
Guadeloupe .....	13,712	3,058	89,523

	<i>Exports from the Antilles to France</i>	<i>Imports from France to the Antilles</i>
1762-1776 .....	111,605,000	74,234,000
1777-1783 (War Period) .....	108,710,000	50,630,000
1784-1789 .....	193,250,000	93,056,000

Tables from J. Tramond, in Hanotaux and Martineau, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, I, 498-500. Figures for Guadeloupe in 1767 in Thomas Jefferys, *The West India Atlas*, show that the island possessed 10,025 horses and mules, 17,378 horned cattle, 14,895 sheep and goats, and 2,669 hogs. There were 1,582 plantations raising cotton, coffee, cacao, and provisions; 401 were growing sugar, 150 having mills, 21,474 "squares of land" were in sugar. There were twelve million cotton plants and nearly six million coffee trees. Martinique figures were comparable. Each island contained more slaves alone than the total population of Canada when it was lost.

<sup>12</sup> Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Lois et constitutions*, I, 599; the earlier rules are given by the same author; Schefer, *op. cit.*, 22.

<sup>13</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 21 and note 2; text, in Moreau de Saint-Méry, *op. cit.*, III, 224, is quoted in Schefer, *op. cit.*, 23.

it in cash, a circumstance which favored mercantilism. When free trade was opened to all friendly nations during the Seven Years' War, the clamor of the French merchants caused permission to be limited to neutrals provided with passports, and Martinique was closed to foreign vessels.

As no neutrals sought passports, trade with foreign colonies was permitted under restrictions; in January, 1759, neutrals and French ships carrying foodstuffs were admitted free of duties for four months to several ports of the French Antilles, the exchange exports being no longer limited to tafias and syrups. This was in direct contravention of the 1680 exclusive principle avowed by Colbert. In July, 1759, the governors of Guadeloupe and Martinique were ordered to collect no higher harbor dues from neutrals and other colonials than from French vessels, and to make no discrimination in entries.

These instructions were confirmed by ministerial order in 1760. At the peace in 1763 the same provisions were continued, although in August of that year trade was concentrated at Sainte-Lucie. In 1765 dried mackerel was also admitted to Martinique, and to Saint-Domingue in 1767. In 1784 the king opened Saint-Pierre to foreign trade, as it had been in 1759. It was, therefore not by the celebrated arrêt of August 30, 1784, that the *Exclusif* received its mortal blow, but in 1759, and by the general ordinances of 1763.<sup>14</sup>

In Saint-Domingue the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was followed by marked prosperity; new towns and roads were built, irrigation was developed, and ports were improved. Port-au-Prince was constructed, though not without much waste and graft and increase of taxes. Governor Belzunce, crabbed and nervous, quarreled with the superior council and the intendant, De Clugny, in the traditional manner. The governor died in 1763, leaving the colony in the midst of war and jangled by the constant fear of the maroons and slaves; he was succeeded by the Count d'Estaing.<sup>15</sup> The colony yet held vast untitled areas; there were no whites in the interior, nor seagoing folk along the coast. Provisions were scant for the king's garrisons or even for the people themselves.

In 1763 four million livres were levied on Saint-Domingue for administration expenses and support of regular troops. To sweeten the dose, new municipal liberties were conceded, under the control of the two councils which existed at Cap Français and at Port-au-Prince; a Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture was founded, and the councils

<sup>14</sup> May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique*, 118-123; Girault, *The Colonial Tariff Policy of France*, 24-25. The arrêt of August 30, 1784, marks the highest point of liberal tariff attained under the Old Régime.

<sup>15</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 325-326.

were each given a deputy at Paris. The councils, unmollified, protested lustily against the new tax. In Saint-Domingue the king's orders had to be registered by each of the two councils. When the Cape council met in June, 1764, to study the taxes, reorganization of the militia, and the creation of a council of conciliation between merchants and planters, the governor managed the skittish body by dealing with individual members. But at Port-au-Prince the council openly revolted. When D'Estaing grandly threatened to dismiss the body, it complained to the king, whereupon the intendant, Magon, and also D'Estaing, asked to be recalled. A new governor, Prince Rohan-Monbazon, and an intendant, the chevalier de Bongars, undertook to straighten out the situation. Before Prince Rohan arrived, a royal ordinance came specifying rules of discipline for the two councils; it was registered by the Cap council, but not by that at Port-au-Prince, which was considered to be a revolt. Rohan came out in July, 1766, with a fleet, and his powers were promptly registered.

Saint-Domingue should have been able to get provisions from the Spanish part of the island, as the Treaty of Ryswick had made that commerce free. But the Spaniards had nothing except hides to offer.<sup>16</sup> Naturally the insulars took freely to contraband, but hated the home government nevertheless. When in April, 1768, an ordinance was issued reconstituting the militia, the whites refused to obey it because they were required to serve with the colored men, while the latter preferred not to serve at all. The militia officers, disliked generally for their airs of authority, were no doubt responsible for much of this attitude. It is to be remarked, however, that it was the marriage alliances of important families in France with daughters of these officers, enriched from their plantations, which formed the basis of the "colonial party" recognized as a powerful influence during the Revolution.

The council at Port-au-Prince delayed to register the decree, while the mulattoes and lower element joined hands against the ordinance and demanded independence.<sup>17</sup> The proprietors made no effort to check the revolt. The council at Port-au-Prince, by the following December, saw their mistake and deported the mutineers to France in March, 1769, while the mulattoes were quelled by royal troops. The king, however, in order to satisfy discordant elements, reinstated the council at Port-au-Prince and sent a new governor, De Nolvos, who had some knowledge of local conditions.

<sup>16</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 328-330. The Spanish population numbered some 150,000, of whom 60,000 were creoles, 60,000 free colored people, and 30,000 were slaves, a few of the latter being employed in cultivation.

<sup>17</sup> Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue*, 355-357 ff.

While the closing years of the Old Régime witnessed concessions to the rising colonial spirit, there never was any essential deviation from autocratic rule.<sup>18</sup> Thus the crown in 1787 abolished the council at Cap Français giving its functions to that at Port-au-Prince. As this impeded the execution of justice, not only a second, but a third, council was later created in the south.

The economic situation of Saint-Domingue during the later years of the Old Régime was not bad. About 1775, according to Raynal, the surface of the colony was 27,000 square kilometers; the population, 32,650 whites, 6,000 free colored people, and 300,000 slaves.<sup>19</sup> The liberalized commercial rules of 1784 left the colonists discontented, for imports were still closely limited, and might be paid for only in syrups and tafias not wanted in France, or else in cash. This vicious system obliged the planters to receive in kind the payment for their crops, on the voyage following the shipment thereof to France. They were thus little more than *métayers*, raising crops on precarious shares for the merchants. Their frequent demands for relief did not keep them from seeking other liberties looking toward total independence. But for the Revolution, imitation of the movement in the United States might have brought either separation or autonomy.<sup>20</sup> England was

<sup>18</sup> Military officers were always indignant at the independent spirit of the planters of Saint-Domingue, even in the face of foreign attacks. But in their turn they emulated the colonists when the royal will crossed their own; for instance in 1780 the marquis de Grasse de Tilly encouraged his Negroes to avoid the corvée for building defenses (*Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1928), 346-354, documents).

<sup>19</sup> See above, note 11. Figures given by Vaissière, *op. cit.*, 152, from P. Boissonade, *Saint-Domingue à la veille de la Révolution* (Paris, 1906) are somewhat higher, but the census of 1787 in Archives du Ministère de Colonies gives hommes de couleur 19,632, slaves 364,196, whites 27,717.

Figures for 1790 (from Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises*, x) were: La population de la partie française, suivant Bryan Edward[s] et les états fournis à l'Assemblée Constituante, et celle de la partie espagnole, suivant les géographes et *l'Annuaire historique universel* de 1824, était, en 1790, tout au plus de:

	Partie française	Partie espagnole
Blancs .....	40,000	
Gens de couleur libres .....	24,000	110,000
Noirs .....	480,000	15,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	544,000	125,000
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total		669,000

<sup>20</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 25. By 1789 the planters owed their exploiters five hundred million livres (*ibid.*).

The trade with France was of prime importance, as may be seen from the figures presented by Raynal. The ports of France in 1774 received 562 ships from

able to take Sainte-Lucie, it is true, but she lost Dominique, Saint-Vincent, La Grenade, Nevis, Montserrat, Saint-Christophe. At the close of the war Sainte-Lucie and Tobago were restored to France.<sup>21</sup>

The two clouds on the horizon were soil exhaustion and the slavery problem. Slavery had long had enemies. Pastor Morgan Goldwyne in England opposed it in 1640; the papacy condemned it repeatedly, in 1482, 1557, 1639, and again in 1741. On the other hand, Colbert provided the Code Noir to control a labor system which he deemed essential. He strove to regulate slavery without raising the question of its moral righteousness. By the end of the Regency (1715-1723) indifference had disappeared; philosophers said in the *Grande Encyclopédie*:

Slavery is the establishment of a right founded upon force, a right which renders a man so much the master of another that the former is absolute master of the latter's life, of his goods, and of his liberty. . . . Liberty in society is to be subject to a legislative power established by the consent of the community, and not to be subject to the fantasy, the inconstant will, uncertain and arbitrary, of a single man in particular.<sup>22</sup>

This conception, aided by growth of ideas of human dignity as the basis of individual liberty, and civil and racial equality, met the natural opposition prompted by economic determinism; the non-slave holders became great humanitarians, while those who depended upon slave labor stuck close to practical issues. Importation of blacks in 1771 numbered 10,000; in 1786, 27,000; in 1787, over 40,000. Merchants and planters believed that freedom for the slaves would ruin the

the islands, 353 being from Saint-Domingue, 122 from Martinique, 81 from Guadeloupe, and six from Cayenne. The value of this trade was 126,400,000 livres, sugar accounting for 62 millions, coffee for 30 millions, indigo for 17 millions, while scattering "colonial products" totaled 2,600,000 livres, not including direct trade to foreign ports or contraband. The island crops were reexported to the amount of 73,500,000 livres, sugar accounting for 39,000,000, coffee 23,700,000 and indigo 9,600,000. The revenues obtained amounted to 15,200,000 or 4,200,000 on export from the islands, 4,600,000 upon entry into France, and 6,400,000 upon home consumption. Of the total exports 92 millions came from Saint-Domingue, 20 from Martinique, 14 from Guadeloupe, and only 500,000 livres from Guiana (Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 335).

<sup>21</sup> In 1788 the movement of trade between France and the islands amounted to 274,693,200 livres. The whole exterior commerce of the country was then 696,893,000 livres, of which 319,265,000 were imports and 357,628,000 exports; of the latter two-fifths were in goods originally produced in the islands. In a word, the favorable balance of trade depended on them. During the Revolution discussion of colonies hinged on the conviction that they provided employment to some 6,000,000 inhabitants of France (Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 344-345).

<sup>22</sup> *Grande Encyclopédie* at the word "Slavery."

colonies, as free Negroes would never work, and that the whites would lose their power over blacks from five to ten times more numerous than themselves.<sup>23</sup> In exculpation they ingeniously argued that the slaves were no worse off than when savages in Africa; they did not object to general improvement in the condition of the blacks, and better facilities for manumission; but as for emancipation, what was rather needed was a vast increase in the number of forced laborers. In 1788 the atrocities wreaked on his slaves by the planter Le Jeune aroused the island and France to realization of the problem.

The liberals had no practical solution to offer; Montesquieu straddled by opining that slavery should be condemned, except on plantations. "One can hardly conceive that God, who is a very wise being, can have placed a soul, especially a good soul, in a body entirely black. . . . Small spirits exaggerate too much the injustice which has been done to the Africans. . . ." <sup>24</sup> Turgot talked abolition, but had no plan; Abbé Raynal and Pastor Schwartz suggested gradual emancipation through several generations, with measures regulating laboring conditions. Schwartz demanded subdivision of large properties and cultivation of the land by its owners, with disposal of produce through communal management.

The Frenchman Benazet, a Quaker of Philadelphia, about 1780 obtained lands in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts where his plan of emancipation would antagonize no prejudice; he failed entirely in the southern states, where climate and custom had favored slavery. In England, Granville Sharp, and later Thomas Clarkson, and at last the great Wilberforce, then a young member of Parliament, fought to secure the abolition of slavery in England.<sup>25</sup> The House of Commons could not, in 1787, pass an emancipation vote. The first nation to abolish the trade was Denmark, in 1792. The British had voted more humane laws for treatment of slaves in 1788; they abolished their slave trade in 1807, about the same time as the United States, and in 1811 made it a felony. The movement in France was popularized in 1787 by the Society of Friends of the Blacks, formed by Brissot de Warville, Sieyès, and Condorcet.<sup>26</sup> Slave interests centered in "The Society of French Colonists" or the "Club Massiac" named for the hotel where they met; it was joined by landed proprietors resident in France and the Revolutionary deputies from the islands. They were

<sup>23</sup> Christian Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème colonial, 17-21*; P. de Vaissière, *Saint-Domingue*, 164.

<sup>24</sup> Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des loix* (Amsterdam, 1784, 4v.), livre xv, ch. V.

<sup>25</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 348-349.

<sup>26</sup> Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, says that it was founded by mulattoes. Other members were Mirabeau, Lafayette, Clavière, and Pelletier de Saint-Fargeau. Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation*, 115-116.

not a little disturbed by constant attacks of idealists; worse yet, even the slaves absorbed the excitement aroused in their behalf.

Insular society reflected changing economic interest. The first adventurers had learned by necessity to get down quickly to cultivating small plots of foodstuffs. How many succumbed to the climate, no one will ever know, but the survivors proved that the white man can work in the tropics, although it is not shown how many successive generations could have kept it up. But tobacco, then sugar, gave rise to the great proprietors and created demand for slaves. Shortly the small landholder was eliminated, monoculture meant that food had to be imported, and the colonies became plantations.

By the end of the Old Régime there were three groups of society in Saint-Domingue, Martinique and Guadeloupe, namely, the whites, the free colored people, and the slaves. The whites were of two castes, the "grands blancs" and the "petits blancs." The officials were usually temporary; those few who settled and married, or afterwards returned, became "grands blancs," while the official class held aloof somewhat as in the Spanish colonies.

The grands blancs paid a very large part of the taxes, and enjoyed special social advantages such as holding all militia offices and places in the councils and colonial assemblies. Plebeian as a rule, many of them were ennobled by the companies, while others assumed nobility merely by taking the name of a plantation. The officers of the military establishment who accumulated wealth on plantations reinforced the absentee landlord element in France. They grouped themselves about the minister of the marine to conserve the interests of the grands blancs and their own.

The grands blancs in Saint-Domingue came to be known as "seigneurs," in Martinique as "messieurs," and in Guadeloupe as "bourgeois." Reveling in show and pomp, they surrounded themselves with many slaves or traveled in France to prove their importance. When the Prince de Rohan came out in 1769 as governor he was warned against the "dissolute habits of high society" as one cause of trouble in the colony.

They were in chronic debt for development of their properties, purchase of slaves, and living until the first crops should mature. The creditors, shippers, and merchants of coastal France waxed vociferous when the planters declined to pay up when they had grown rich. The incompetent naval officers who, as governors, quarreled with the intendants and councils, soured the social atmosphere. The home country helped little in time of war, and paid niggardly attention to the needs of this ruling class. When the Revolution began the planters had quite taken on an air of independence. The chambers of com-

merce and agriculture (1759) which in 1763 were made mere chambers of agriculture, never really gave the planters local control of economic affairs. There was, however, one deputy for each colony in the French parlement, who enjoyed access to the minister of the colonies. The planters made no bones about opposing Turgot's *laissez-faire* ideas while loudly protesting loyalty to the crown. The independence of the United States had a very profound effect upon them, in spite of the differences in the composition of the two social entities.<sup>27</sup>

The more numerous petits blancs were managers of plantations; small proprietors descended from engagés, merchants or artisans. Unfortunately, there were among them many rascals always ready for trouble.<sup>28</sup> They left the management of affairs to the grands blancs, although both groups had common interest in joint opposition to the slaves and free blacks. The petits blancs were violent haters of the free hommes de couleur, or mulattoes, who on their side hated their fathers and despised their mothers.

The hommes de couleur were descended from freedmen, or from unions between white men and colored women, the offspring being known by a number of class names indicating the degree of blood mixture. Mulattoes were children of a white and a black, as *métis* had been Indian halfbreeds in the earlier days. Quadroons had one-fourth black blood, "capres" had three-fourths black, and "griffes" seven-eighths.<sup>29</sup> Many of them succeeded in business, in the trades, or as agents or commission merchants. About the close of the Old Régime they owned some two thousand of the eight thousand estates. They formed one of the prosperous elements of society, but the whites kept them in subordination. Naturally this antagonized men who felt themselves the equals of their fathers or of their white brothers.<sup>30</sup> Colored people had to attend separate religious services and sit in public in assigned seats. Those who were sons of whites, a growing group, were kept apart from their fathers under the conditions of a despised race. Colored people were debarred from the professions of law or medicine,

<sup>27</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 349-354. There were two chambers of agriculture in Saint-Domingue, one in Martinique, and one in Guadeloupe; each had a representative in Paris.

<sup>28</sup> The use of engagés for populating the islands had looked toward creating a colonist society capable of self-defense. Unsuccessful and unpopular after 1690, the system was abandoned about the mid-eighteenth century (L. P. May, *Histoire économique de la Martinique*, 40).

<sup>29</sup> Other mixtures received designations comparable to some of the nineteen varieties early differentiated in Mexico. A "marabou" was a child of a "grif" and a Negro; a "tierceron" sprang from a white and a quadroon; a *méti* from a white and a tierceron, and a memlouc (*cf.* Brazil) from a white and a *méti* (Abbé Gregoire, *Mémoire en faveur des gens de couleur ou sang-mêlés*, Paris, 1789).

<sup>30</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 19.

positions as druggists and jewelers, and from public office. In 1778 marriage between the races was entirely forbidden, lest amalgamation might lead to loss of the colony. Many mulattoes who had lived in France had heard the discussions there concerning liberty and equality. After all these expressions of their aspirations, they naturally felt a great discontent when excluded from the colonial assemblies.<sup>31</sup>

The slaves, living in huts and on the plantations under their *commandeurs*, each had a little plot of land on which to raise produce for sale. In the villages they kept up some of their old African chants and dances, but as a rule they lived in an apathy unbroken until the middle of the eighteenth century. There was a great society of the "Vaudoux" or Voodoo, whose rites came from the forests of Africa; nearly all the slaves belonged to it. Agitators who had been to France spread knowledge about the much-talked-of abolition movement. They idealized the good Negro in contrast to the bad man of the white race, which was becoming divided over the slavery problem.<sup>32</sup>

Thus social conditions of the islands in 1789 reflected a complex of antagonism. Each class expected benefit from impending change; the grands blancs hoped for the return of an aristocratic régime, the free colored people hoped for equality with the whites, while the great black mass yearned for emancipation.

Nor were the grands blancs or the royal administrators ready to allow the hommes de couleur to enjoy civil and social equality and thus present an effective opposition to the rising tide of discontented slaves. France had not yet learned racial toleration.

The social problem could have been met in the spirit of concession by a strong central government and a tenacious, competent set of colonial officials, but it was precisely its poverty in these assets which brought France at last to the brink of revolution.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> P. Nicholson, *Essai sur l'histoire naturelle de l'isle de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1776), has a brief description of society; it also has data on all the settlements in gazetteer form.

<sup>32</sup> Lucien Peytraud, *L'esclavage aux Antilles françaises avant 1789*, has an exhaustive treatment.

<sup>33</sup> The difficulties faced by governors and intendants are well described by Albert Depréaux, "Le Commandant Baudry des Lozières et la phalange de Crête-Dragons . . ." *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1924), 1-42; this was a volunteer cavalry troop which tried during 1789-1792 to uphold the governor and planters against the "rising tide of color."

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE SITUATION OF FRANCE AFTER 1763

England was now supreme in North America, free to expand territorially in India, and ready to renew her economic absorption of Spanish America. But there were obvious dangers to her supremacy; France, yet intact in Europe, still had great recuperative powers, and the Bourbon Pacte de Famille held economic as well as political menace.<sup>1</sup> On the other side, the French had been humiliated by a pointless continental war; incompetent colonial officials and scandals at court had made all classes yearn for peace, while the Treaty of Paris had taken little area outside Canada, the loss of which was not vital.<sup>2</sup> The transfer of Louisiana was a liberation from a liability rather than a loss of opportunity. The remaining North Atlantic fisheries, the India trade, and the West Indies, the latter richer than the British islands, were all capable of great development. The French people expected to find leaders<sup>3</sup> who would restore the country to its old prestige, make the dynasty again master of European diplomacy.<sup>4</sup>

Choiseul made those aims the keystone of his colonial policy; in 1761 he assumed the ministries of war and marine, called on the country for money, and set to building up fleets and equipment.<sup>5</sup> In 1764

<sup>1</sup> Sister Mary Austin (Collins), "The Reforms of Charles III in the Light of the Pacte de Famille," Ph.D. thesis, MS (Berkeley, 1927), *passim*. On the workings of the Pacte to 1763, see F. P. Renaut, "Études sur le . . . Pacte de Famille et la politique coloniale française (1760-1792)" *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises* (1921), 1-52. On the policy of England during these years, *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*. . . (Cambridge, 1922-1923), I, *Intro.*, and chap. I.

<sup>2</sup> Voltaire, *Candide*, chap. XXIII; W. R. Shepherd, "The Cession of Louisiana to Spain," *Political Science Quarterly*, XIX, 439-458.

<sup>3</sup> After Maurepas fell in 1749, the ministers successively in charge of the colonies were Rouillé, Machault, Moras, Massiac, Berryer, Choiseul, Praslin, De Boynes, Turgot, Sartines, and Castries (1780). All were victims of court intrigues, none of them left completed reforms, hence colonial affairs were subject to the delays and weaknesses of bureaucrat administration (Duchène, *La politique coloniale*, 49, 52). Montmarin, La Luzerne, and Fleurieu followed.

<sup>4</sup> E. S. Corwin, "The French Objective in the American Revolution," *American Historical Review* (October, 1915), 33-61; A. S. Aiton, "Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," *ibid.* (July, 1931), 701-720.

<sup>5</sup> Duchène, *La politique coloniale*, 99, quoting Barbier's journal.

he placed Jean Baptiste Dubuc, creole planter of Martinique, in charge of the new Bureau of Colonies. The Pacte de Famille had brought to his aid the Bourbons of Spain and Italy, a fact which saved France some of the drubbing which Spain received, and the latter was given Louisiana at the peace, avowedly to indemnify her for loss of Florida, but in reality because France did not want the position of buffer state along the western front of the advancing wave of British occupation of the Mississippi Valley, but did want to retain strategic advantage in the Caribbean for control of the sugar industry.

Both Bourbon courts looked upon the peace of 1763 as a mere truce. The whole French nation thirsted for a revanche. The British were wary and prepared, for their preponderance insured the envy of their defeated competitors and their dominion over the sea made all Europe hostile. The economic features of the Pacte de Famille were based on a thorough study of Spanish trade and colonization through Choiseul's agents, the Abbé Béliardi and his associates, who visited Spain and made voluminous reports on her economic laws and resources.<sup>6</sup> Other agents visited the coasts of Africa, America, and India to investigate English commerce, ascertain the weak spots in the enemy's holdings, and advise the capable minister when to launch his economic attack.<sup>7</sup> Spies were sent in 1764 and 1766 to the thirteen British colonies to keep the minister informed on the progress of the American revolt.

The economic dependence of Spain upon France had been sought of course from the moment of the Bourbon accession. Louis XIV had urged upon Philip V rehabilitation of his new realm, and the French public servants, chief among them Orry, toiled definitely toward an entire administrative and economic revamping of the old Spanish machine of state and business. The program culminated in the sweeping reforms of Charles III (1759-1788),<sup>8</sup> who believed implicitly in the value of close coöperation with France.

<sup>6</sup> Louis Blart, *Les rapports de la France et d'Espagne après le Pacte de Famille jusqu'à la fin du ministère du Duc de Choiseul* (Paris, 1915), 170-194. The Pacte de Famille dated from 1733, was renewed in 1743, and greatly expanded in scope as an offensive and defensive alliance in 1761; the secret convention of Aranjuez, 1779, renewed certain features.

<sup>7</sup> Idée générale du commerce de toutes les Indes Espagnoles: royaume de Mexique, MS., F. Fr. 10769, Bib. Nat.; Transcript in Bancroft Library. Daubigny, *Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer après le traité de Paris*; F. P. Renaut, "Études sur le Pacte de Famille," 1-52, 91-121. On the later application of the Pact see also his *Le Pacte de Famille et l'Amérique; la politique coloniale franco-espagnole de 1760 à 1792*. Blart, *op. et loc. cit.*, *passim*, for elaboration.

<sup>8</sup> Priestley, *José de Gálvez*, 14-15. Explication du Pacte de Famille, F. Fr. 10766, Bib. Nat.; Transcript in Bancroft Library. Avantages que retire la France du système proposé, MS., F. Fr. 10769, *idem*. See also *Recueil des instructions*

For the Spanish colonial world these reforms included more rapid communications, the breaking of the trade monopoly of Cádiz, shifts of the incidence of taxation and tariffs, development of agriculture and mining; for defense, the extension of the American boundaries south into the Argentine and north into California. Easter Island was to be occupied; Tahiti might be taken; voyages must expand Spanish influence in the Pacific<sup>9</sup> and hold that vast basin if possible from hostile powers. Close relations with France must be maintained to avoid war with England, but not too much commercial advantage should be given to the ally.

The efforts of Choiseul, through Orry, the Abbé Béliardi, and other agents in Spain, were directed toward winning dominance over the trade with Spain and her colonies, assimilation of the tariff systems of the two countries, and laws favoring French commerce with the Spanish Indies. The Pacte de Famille was the outcome of years of intensive argument and propaganda to dispel hostility and suspicion against France in Spain. The commercial plan developed by Choiseul was curiously like the earlier one by Duplessis-Mornay and Coligny, and the later one evolved by Vergennes and Napoleon I. In brief, the idea was to establish an all-round-the-world trade for the French by obtaining from Spain a transit across Mexico, a port in the Philippines for Oriental connections, and in the Red Sea and Egypt those ports needed. When this Pacte proved a dismal military failure during the Seven Years' War, the two Bourbon-led countries were brought closer together than ever by joint need to overcome the new and startling English predominance. To this end were bent all the reforms of Charles III after 1763.<sup>10</sup>

Choiseul's plans included using Martinique and Guadeloupe as future military bases of operations. If war should come, these islands could support twenty-four battalions which would require from France little save war *matériel*. Coincidentally with the reforms urged upon the Spaniards to raise their colonies to the highest efficiency by administrative reforms on the French model, he set about a general overhauling of the French colonial institution itself. The most conspicuous

*donnés aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France . . .*, XII bis. (tome troisième, Paris, 1899), 353-357.

<sup>9</sup> B. G. Corney, *The Quest and Occupation of Tahiti by Emissaries of Spain during the years 1772-1776* (London, Hak. Soc. Pubs., 2d series, 1913-14-18, 3v.), Nos. 32, 36, 37.

<sup>10</sup> Priestley, *José de Gálvez*, 25-32, 37-43; Pierre Muret, "Les Papiers de l'Abbé Béliardi et les relations commerciales de la France et l'Espagne . . .," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, IV (Paris, 1902-1903), 657-669. F. Rousseau, *Un réformateur français en Espagne au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Corbeil, 1892), *passim*.

change was to do away with the privileged trading companies,<sup>11</sup> believed by some critics to have been chiefly responsible for the loss of India and Canada. Not only were they disliked by philosophers and economists, who saw that they checked development and restrained liberty,<sup>12</sup> but they had always operated at a loss, providing for France a prestige and glory which were poor compensation for failure of dividends.

"The nature of the great companies," wrote Montesquieu in *The Spirit of the Laws*, "is to give to private wealth the power of public wealth; this power should not be found save in the hands of the Prince." Two of the new economists, Gournay in 1755, and a few years later the Abbé Morellet, demanded that the company system give way to a commerce open to all French nationals;<sup>13</sup> for the cost of operating companies was generally too high; they wasted their capital, their directors and agents did business for their own account in direct competition with the companies. The reform demanded "would notably increase our navigation, our manufactures, and the cultivation of our soil; all these things are the sources of wealth; they depend upon each other, and naturally contribute to freedom in commerce; they cannot be pledged to an exclusive trade."<sup>14</sup> It is to be noted that, save under war conditions, the Old Régime never went as far as actual free trade in its legislation, however practice may have met the need.

After the Compagnie des Indes, all the others but the Company of Barbary disappeared in turn. The stockholders ceded their rights to the king, who took over their accounts for his own. In 1770 the representatives of the chief cities of France sharply fought a proposed revival of the company. They were justified by the fact that the India trade soon tripled in importance and became more stable and regular than it had ever been under monopoly. The ill-fated return of the monopoly to this company in 1785 has already been noted.

At the same time the administration of the colonies was changed; it had indeed not awaited the suppression of the Compagnie des Indes. In 1763 Choiseul gave direct government to the comptoirs of the Compagnie Gorée in Gambia and Ouidah on the Gulf of Guinea, and

<sup>11</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 182-184; Christian Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème colonial, 1815-1830*; Dubuc had charge of liquidating the affairs of the India Company; Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 47-48.

<sup>12</sup> G. Schelle, *Vincent de Gournay* (Paris, 1897), 221, 259, 270; Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 91.

<sup>13</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 196.

<sup>14</sup> Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws* (The World's Great Classics), I, and livre XXI. J. Tramond, *Le régime commercial des Antilles au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, cited by Christian Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème colonial, 1815-1830*, 21.

he bought Dakar for the king's account. In 1767 he took over the Île de France and Bourbon with their dependencies, the Seychelles and Sainte-Marie. All the posts in India were put under crown administration, and a bureau of the Indies was created within the ministry of the marine.<sup>15</sup> Government in the colonies was also made more liberal, a sort of representation in chambers of commerce and of agriculture being set up.

The crown assumed all the obligations of the old companies, undertaking to forward supplies, provide slaves, recruit colonists, control towns, and improve ports. Great public works were undertaken, especially in the West Indies. Many measures to increase colonization were begun. The ordinances were renewed which allowed colonial artisans to become master workmen after ten years' residence, and Jews and Protestants were given freedom to observe their worship in the colonies.

Even in the Mediterranean, where relations between Islam and Europe had become difficult, the reign of Louis XVI was a period of relative prosperity for French commerce. A Royal Company of Africa, created in 1741 and reorganized in 1767, held a monopoly of the commerce with the French posts of North Africa and of the coral fishing; it was really a Marseilles group, who, under this firm name, directed French policy in the Mediterranean and did excellent business in the Berber countries. It bought grain, especially, and exported all sorts of European products; in 1789, even after distributing large dividends, it had a reserve of more than three millions, a fact rare enough in the history of French companies to be emphasized.

In Morocco, the sultan Mohammed, grandson of Moulay-Ismaïl, and a confirmed Anglophobe, revived the traditions of his grandfather and sought throughout his reign, 1757-1790, not only an alliance with France, but to organize his empire on the French model. Two Marseilles merchants, Rey and Salva, served as intermediaries; a treaty signed in 1767 regulated the ports and reestablished the consulate of France. Relations, taken as a whole, were good. In 1789, when the Algerians asked him to join with them against France, the sultan answered that he would not, nor would he ever permit a French prize to be sold in his ports.

Choiseul saw that his failure to command the seas had been at the root of all his losses and must be remedied. A new navy had been begun even during the closing phases of the war, when various civil and commercial bodies "offered the crown fifteen ships of the line carrying one thousand cannon"; this effort was the beginning of the naval reconstruction which served to give France command of the sea during the American Revolution. In 1765 the sea force numbered

<sup>15</sup> Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 102.

only forty-four ships and ten frigates of indifferent quality; in 1770 they had grown to sixty-four and fifty respectively, all ready for sea service, so that the navy was stronger than it had been since Fleury's ministry.<sup>16</sup> At the same time the army was improved, especially by reforms in the artillery.

For control of the sea and recuperation of colonial territory, Choiseul planned three great undertakings, all of which ended in non-accomplishment; one, the Kourou expedition to Guiana, as we have seen, proving a major colonial disaster. The second was an attempt, like that of De Gennes in 1696, to hold the Strait of Magellan for command of navigation into the Pacific. The Falkland Islands, known to France as the Malouines, from their purported discovery by mariners of Saint-Malo, were to be made a base for refreshment on the way to the Chilean nitrate beds. An attempt to do this before the Seven Years' War had failed. In 1764 Bougainville landed on Soledad, one of the two large islands of the group, instructed by Choiseul to found there a colony. Spain's protests were for the nonce silenced in 1767, when France paid her 600,000 livres for Bougainville's improvements and gave up the project.

The wide spread of the English-French rivalry is shown by the fact that the former in 1766 set up Port Egmont in the northeastern part of the archipelago for the same reason as France's; the Spaniards took it from them in 1770, and they evacuated the archipelago in 1774. It was the task of Bougainville to turn the islands over to Spain himself; this he did during his famous voyage around the world, on which he visited many of the South Sea Islands.<sup>17</sup> The third enterprise was the Madagascar venture by Maudave.<sup>18</sup> During these same years came the great recuperative effort of Spain in which the occupation of California and attempts in the Pacific matched the French effort in a grand coöperation under the Pacte de Famille to check England. It is perhaps more than coincidence that this same time saw also Pigneau de Béhaine's missionary enterprise in Indo-China reanimating French ambitions there dating back to Colbert's East India Company and François Martin.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire maritime*, 442; see his whole chapter V, on the naval recovery of France at this time.

<sup>17</sup> He left France on November 5, 1766, gave possession of the Falklands on April 1, 1767, visited the southern islands during 1768, and reached Saint-Malo on March 16, 1769 (L. A. Bougainville, *Voyage autour du monde . . .*, (Paris, 1771), 46 et passim). On the Falkland dispute, see Paul Groussac, *Les Îles Malouines; nouvel exposé d'un vieux litige* (Paris, 1910).

<sup>18</sup> For Maudave in Madagascar, see above, 121.

<sup>19</sup> Rafael Altamira y Crevea, *Historia de España y de la civilización española* (Barcelona, 1900-1911, 4v.), IV, 49-53.

Here it is in point to digress briefly on several great French voyages. After the Peace of Ryswyck and the Bourbons acquired Spain, voyages into the Pacific took on more definite purpose and character than in filibustering days. Scientific rather than practical was the French interest in the tradition of a great Australian continent, Magellanica, which had survived from the epoch of the great discoveries. Lieutenant Kerguelen was sent in 1771 at his own request to investigate the mystery. He left the Île de France in 1771, in the month of February sighting, near 49° south latitude and 67° east longitude, a cape which he took for a part of the supposed continent; sent out again in 1773, he found that his discovery was a volcanic island, with strange fauna and flora,<sup>20</sup> the center of an archipelago. The commander sailed away in January, 1774, leaving no occupants. His voyage had led also to the discovery of Marion and Crozet islands, while New Amsterdam and Saint-Paul were refound. All were now seen to be but summits of subterranean plateaus, and the idea of finding a vast Australian continent was given up.

The personal interest of Louis XVI in geography had kept him informed concerning the work of Bougainville, and of James Cook. He observed that scientific voyages were in vogue, and yearned to find the Northeast Passage. The eminent Galoupe de La Pérouse was sent out with the *Astrolabe* and the *Boussole* in August, 1775. His duty was to go over Cook's routes and bring knowledge of the Pacific down to date. He passed Cape Horn, and after visiting the Hawaiian group, reached the coast of California. Then passing west, he touched the Mariannes, and stayed at Macao from February to April, 1787. For six months he made observations in the Sea of Japan and on the coasts of China, touching Kamchatka. After exploring the Asiatic coast, he went on to Samoa in December, where his second in command, De Langle, was killed. Unable to retaliate, La Pérouse sailed on to Botany Bay, reaching it in February, 1788. There he wrote the last letter ever received from him, for his vessels sank at sea. His disappearance was complete, though in 1791 Rear-Admiral d'Entrecasteaux left Brest and his expedition spent three years in scientific exploration without finding a trace of his predecessor. It was not until 1826 that Captain Dillon of the East India Company bought from some South Sea islanders a sword point which he knew had come from the wreck of two ships on the Island of Vanikoro. In 1827 he went there,

<sup>20</sup> Eighteenth century exploration of the Pacific is briefly surveyed in Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France*, 423-440; in H. E. Russier, *Le partage de l'Océanie* (Paris, 1905); E. Heawood, *A History of Geographical Discovery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, 1912). An early study is Ch. de Brosse, *Histoire des navigations aux Terres Australes* (2v., Paris, 1756), on the search for Magellanica.

and found the relics of the expedition of La Pérouse which are still preserved at the Louvre.<sup>21</sup>

The Pigneau de Béhaine episode alluded to above had a long prelude. French foreign missions installed in Indo-China in the seventeenth century were maintained there during the eighteenth, although persecutions were numerous in Siam, Annam, Tonkin, and Cambodia. The French governors of India had sent out various expeditions, Poulou-Condor was visited by Renault in 1721; and during the period of 1741 to 1748 the possibilities of making an establishment in Cochin China were studied by Laurent, Friell, and Dennoret. The same was done in Annam by the interesting Lyonnaise Pierre Poivre, who was at Tourane and Hue in 1749. He had obtained permission to establish a post at Fai-Fo, but the suppression of the company in 1769 nullified his negotiations. Dupleix would have induced his company to buy Macao from the Portuguese, for they were allowing it to decay, but they would not sell to him and it was a quarter of a century before activity was renewed, this time by reason of troubles in Annam. A revolt in that country spread to Cochin China, where Duc Tong the governor was assassinated along with his son. His nephew, Nguyen Anh, seized the leadership and held his own near Saigon for a time, until driven to asylum with the king of Siam. There he encountered Pigneau de Béhaine, bishop of Adran,<sup>22</sup> who was at the head of missionary work in Annam and Cochin China. The imperially minded bishop saw his chance and went to France, and in 1787 procured a treaty giving France the Bay of Tourane and the island of Poulou-Condor for aid in reinstating Nguyen Anh. Conway (he of the "Conway cabal" against George Washington) was sent at the head of the expedition, but reported that the concession was valueless, to the distress of Béhaine, who hid himself to his merchant friends and obtained two ships with which he reinstated his protégé (1789-1790). Nguyen Anh, victor over all his enemies, had himself proclaimed emperor under the name of Gia-long, and maintained a friendly attitude toward France until his death in 1820. When the bishop died he gave him a magnificent funeral. Later, a splendid monument was erected over the grave. The fall of the Old Régime made it impracticable for the French to obtain satisfactory possession of Poulou-Condor and Tourane.

To return to the main narrative: Choiseul had to fight for his

<sup>21</sup> J. F. La Pérouse, *Voyage autour du monde* (Paris, 1798, 4v.); P. Dillon, *Voyage aux îles de la Mer du Sud* (Paris, 1830, 2v.), I, Introd., has a brief account of La Pérouse's route; on the search see also J. S. Dumont D'Urville, *Voyage pittoresque*. . . (Paris, 1834, 2v.), I, 131 ff.

<sup>22</sup> Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830*, 462-487.

program against tremendous odds; enemies in power handicapped him, Maupeou, the chancellor in 1768, and Terray, controller-general of finances in 1769. His opposition to Madame Du Barry brought about his ruin when, in 1770, the question of the defenses of Chandernagor appearing a suitable cause, he counseled renewed war in alliance with Spain against England, but Louis XV, weary of wars and struggles with the parlements, chose the moment to dismiss him.<sup>23</sup>

The ministers of Louis XVI (1774-1792) strove to carry on the ideals of Choiseul; Maurepas as acting prime-minister, Vergennes in foreign affairs, Turgot as controller of finance, Sartines as minister of the marine, and Du May and Saint-Germain successively (1775) in the war ministry.<sup>24</sup> Vergennes in particular expected war with England and strove to keep France free from continental entanglements on that account.

The army was built up by wise choice of officers, reforms in tactics, and improvements in arms. Saint-Germain in particular struggled valiantly to increase revenues; in the king's household budget, which consumed four-fifths of the war funds, he was able to effect retrenchments. Too rigorous economies made him enemies, however, and the constructive secretary was dismissed in 1777.

Sartines was equally valuable for the marine, choosing such men as Fleurieu to control the ports, D'Ennery to manage the colonies, and chiefs of squadron like Suffren, Bougainville, and D'Orvilliers. He built up the navy so that in 1779<sup>25</sup> it contained seventy-eight ships of the line and one hundred and eighty-six frigates and other craft. Sartines succeeded in securing repeated increases in the naval budget, which had been but twenty-five million livres in the last year of Louis XV; in 1775 Sartines had thirty-five million, one hundred and one in 1778, and one hundred and sixty-nine in 1780. The result was that the French navy was superior to the English during the War of American Independence. De Castries reorganized colonial administration by combining its three bureaus in one; in 1783 an intendency of colonies was created which in 1786 became one of four "directions" under the ministry of marine. The intendency was given three bureaus, namely, of correspondence, artillery, and contentious affairs.<sup>26</sup> Vergennes was equally happy in foreign relations. By refusing Joseph II of Austria aid in his expansionist designs, a neutral France was able to effect the Treaty of Teschen (May, 1779) between Prussia and Bavaria, which

<sup>23</sup> Choiseul, *Mémoires* (Paris, Plon, 1904), 270-271.

<sup>24</sup> Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 105.

<sup>25</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 302; Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France*, 448.

<sup>26</sup> A. Duchêne, *op. cit.*, 52. Naval forces, Tramond, *op. cit.*, 442-445.

removed the threat of European war just when a free hand was needed on the continent in order to oppose England in the American revolt.

Then, too, the reign of Louis XVI was marked by relaxation of the rigidity and strongly centralized character of colonial administrative mechanism with a beginning of the use of colonial local representation. The chambers of commerce and agriculture of 1759 had permitted only very limited expression of local insular opinion. In 1763 the commercial chambers were abolished on account of quarrels between the planters and the merchants, the latter being creditors of the former. Chambers of agriculture were then set up in Martinique and Guadeloupe. To these in 1788 were added, for Saint-Domingue, Martinique, and Guadeloupe, colonial assemblies formed on the model of the French provincial ones. They were empowered to send representatives to the Conseil de Commerce of Paris.<sup>27</sup>

Commerce was expected to benefit by the shift from the older ideas of Colbert, founded on monopoly and privilege, as governmental policies became more imbued with the new philosophy. Louis XVI relaxed still more generously the old protectionism when, on August 30, 1784, free trade of foreigners with each larger island of the French West Indies was conceded for a restricted list of products.<sup>28</sup> These modifications were characterized as "l'Exclusif mitigé." The trend was toward a liberalization not at all accidental, but the result of the separatist proclivities of the island planters.

Colonial activity was marked during the reign. The disastrous Seven Years' War, jealousy of England, and desire to promote French commerce created an interest in oversea affairs reflected in publication of numerous accounts of voyages, by the colonial flavor of the philosophical *Lettres Persanes* of Montesquieu, or the *Lettres Chinoises*, *Indiennes*, et *Tartares* of Voltaire, by the colonial romances like Saint-Pierre's *Paul et Virginie*, or of Oriental dramas like some of Voltaire's tragedies. Indeed, most of these philosophers opposed colonization, yet as the question entered into their debates, they made opportunity for Jean Baptiste Dubuc, a deputy of Martinique, the Abbé Raynal, and Malouet, once governor of Guiana and Saint-Domingue, to argue the value of overseas possessions.<sup>29</sup>

Outstanding in this process of recuperation was, of course, the aid given to the Americans in their war of independence. This was, on broad terms, a war to dismember the British Empire by imposing the economic interests of the dominant faction of the American colo-

<sup>27</sup> Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises*, I, 348-350. For a survey of insular colonial administration, *ibid.*, I, 343-413.

<sup>28</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 190.

<sup>29</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 295-301; Hardy, *op. cit.*, 96-97.

nists, whose aims for the moment coincided with the dynastic and diplomatic aims of Vergennes.<sup>30</sup> In French colonial history the American Revolution figures as the sixth great war since 1688 for overseas dominion.

The schism was hastened by the imperial designs of England after the Peace of Paris in 1763. While it was vital to Britain's success to call on her colonies for aid in solving the national debt problem, the real driving force behind the Parliamentary acts passed between 1763 and 1774 was George III's ambition toward absolutism. The Stamp Act of 1765 marked the beginning of the revolt of the Americans against bearing the costs of the empire. France watched with keen interest. Louis XVI, beginning his reign in 1774, vacillated between courses. His minister, Turgot, pointed out that the decrepit finances of France would not permit war at that time, but Vergennes, foreign minister, wedded to recuperation of French prestige, urged the king to accept the alliance sought by Franklin. After two years of secret aid, Louis espoused an offensive and defensive alliance with the young United States of America in 1778. The campaign ending at Saratoga (June-October, 1777) proved that armed intervention had a reasonable prospect of humbling England.<sup>31</sup> Although the French cabinet was divided, public opinion warmly supported the American alliance as a means of evening the score with England. The treaties of 1778 promised that France would seek no continental American territory; this was necessary in order to remove American fears.

Under the influence of Benjamin Franklin, whose arrival in Paris in 1776 was said by Lord North to counterbalance the English capture of Long Island, the marquis of Lafayette led two thousand volunteers to the United States in 1777;<sup>32</sup> they were poor of quality, it is true, and returned to France some months later; but Lafayette's personal friendship for Washington breathed idealism into the American conflict. Spain and Holland soon clashed with England for reasons of their own. The formation in 1780 of the League of Armed Neutrality, led by Catherine of Russia in protest against British search of neutral vessels, completed the isolation of Great Britain during the final years of the struggle.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. A. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History* (New York, 1922), 162.

<sup>31</sup> E. S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance of 1778* (Princeton, 1916), 1-26; L. J. Davitt, *A Re-study of the Movement toward American Independence* (Washington, 1929), 135-150; Renaut, *Le Pacte de Famille et l'Amérique*, 255-310; Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire*, chap. VI.

<sup>32</sup> J. B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution* (Boston, 1911), C. H. Van Tyne, "Influences which determined the French Government to make the Treaty with America, 1778," *Amer. Hist. Review* (April, 1916), 528-541.

The French share in the war was largely maritime and circumscribed to the West Indies. Sartines had built up a good navy, whose first act was the seizure of Dominique from England by the Marquis de Bouillé. In October, 1778, Admiral d'Estaing brought twelve ships to the American coast, but he moved so slowly that he missed an opportunity to fight Admiral Howe off the Delaware River. He took Grenade, but natural obstacles prevented his attacking New York; he agreed with Washington to cooperate in an attack on Newport, but his ships were dispersed by storms before he could engage an English fleet under Howe which D'Orvilliers had vainly tried to prevent crossing the ocean. D'Estaing wintered in the West Indies, being joined by five ships under Count de Grasse. The French in June and July, 1779, took Saint-Vincent and Grenade and thereupon returned to Europe, while the English took and retained Savannah. The strategy of the French navy was marked by irresolution and a desire to please the home public by brilliant but immaterial dashes. There was one futile try at the grand program which Count Maurice de Broglie had proposed in 1765, of making a descent in force upon England.

The Spanish having joined the war in April, 1779, after an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the fleets of the two nations undertook to transport 40,000 troops to England to carry the war to the enemy; arriving in front of Plymouth, they were dispersed by a storm and gave up the enterprise in September. Thereafter, an adventitious naval policy was pursued. Washington in 1780 hoped that the French fleet would help his campaigns, but Rochambeau bringing six thousand troops was blockaded for months at Newport. In the Antilles, Admiral Rodney fought three indecisive battles with the allied fleets, but these effected a juncture at Havana and were able to take Rodney's prizes from him. In 1781 a French fleet retook Tobago, and in the following year Saint-Christophe and Guiana were recovered. The only outstanding naval contribution to American success was the French cooperation in taking Yorktown. Rochambeau helped Washington organize his forces for an active campaign in 1781, and with Lafayette assisted him to surround Cornwallis by land, while De Grasse, after driving off an English fleet, blockaded the stronghold by sea. The surrender by Cornwallis on October 14, 1781,<sup>33</sup> left England still in control of Savannah, Charleston, New York, and the Hudson Valley, but Whig opposition to the crown was growing, and no further American campaigns were fought. The defeat of De Grasse by Rodney off the Saintes in April, 1782, ended the French naval supremacy which had hitherto characterized the war, although Rodney was unable to recover any of the islands.

<sup>33</sup> Tramond, *op. cit.*, 474, 490-508.

The war at sea continued, however; the Hudson's Bay holdings of the British were destroyed, France winning other brilliant successes, while Spain, and Holland after December, 1780, continued in alliance with her. For the first time in one hundred years England had been outmatched at sea; her communications were insecure, her exchange rates fell off one-third, her port movement declined one-sixth, and she was glad to seize upon Rodney's victory in the Antilles as an occasion to enter peace parleys. Lord North resigned on March 20, 1782, and the Rockingham ministry began to move for peace.

France, though her allies Spain and Holland were no longer assets, would have been in good trim for further fighting had it not been for the deplorable state of her finances. Furthermore, rivals of France in the Near East were working for advantages which required freedom of French participation in the scramble. When, therefore, the Americans forced the separate peace, Vergennes was equally ready to end the war, though its objectives had not all been won.<sup>84</sup>

Negotiations ending in the Treaty of Versailles opened in Paris in October, 1782, their progress being kept secret from Vergennes. The American commissioners in effect overstepped the late instructions of Congress not to make a separate peace, for they feared that France, in supporting Spanish claims in the Mississippi Valley, would injure their cause. Their negotiations at London, signed in November, 1782, became the basis of the final treaty recognizing American independence signed at Versailles on September 3, 1783. Franklin thought he could have done as well through coöperation with the French minister, but he had been over-ridden by John Jay and John Adams, who distrusted Vergennes.

Spain recovered Minorca and Florida from England, but not Gibraltar, though France had agreed to fight till it should be won. England returned to Holland her old posts in India except Negapatam. France received her posts in India as they had been left in 1763, those of

<sup>84</sup> The following contemporary commentaries on the commercial treaty are interesting: *A Complete Investigation of Mr. Eden's Treaty, as it may affect the Commerce, the Revenue, or the General Policy of Great Britain* (Anonymous) (London, 1787); J. Mackenzie, *A Woolen Draper's Letter on the French Treaty, to his Friends and Fellow Tradesmen all over England* (2d ed., London, 1786); Denis O'Brien, *A View of the Treaty of Commerce with France, signed at Versailles, September 20, 1786, by Mr. Eden* (2d ed., London, 1787); Matthew Robinson, *An Address to the Landed, Trading and Funded Interests of England on the Present State of Public Affairs* (1st ed., London, 1786); *Helps to a Right Decision upon the Merits of the late Treaty of Commerce with France* (Anonymous) (London, 1787); *An Answer to the Complete Investigation of Mr. Eden's Treaty* (Anonymous) (London, 1787); *An Answer to the Woolen Draper's Letter on the French Treaty; to which is added an Explanation of the Nature of Protection; and a Copy of the Treaty* (Anonymous) (London, 1787).

Gorée and West Africa, Tobago, and Sainte-Lucie, and, by modification of Article XIII of the Treaty of Utrecht, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, with favorable changes in her fishing rights on the north shore of Newfoundland from Cape Saint John to Cape Ray. Aside from her loss of the thirteen colonies, England suffered little colonial readjustment.

France had her prestige restored, and the resounding exploits of Suffren in sea warfare in the Orient had astonished the world,<sup>85</sup> but aside from revanche her gains under the treaty were few, and the French people were not pleased. They were especially critical because the ministry had not made the most of the successes of Suffren, and that it had not demanded more in India than the *status quo ante bellum*. Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, Tobago, and the posts in Senegal seemed a small return for five years of warfare and an expenditure of over a thousand million francs. It was also claimed that the Newfoundland fisheries clause had given up one location for another of greater extent but with fewer fish. But Vergennes, only mildly interested in colonization, was satisfied, as he wished to be free to check Austria, Prussia, and Russia, who were hewing out enlarged spheres for themselves in the Levant.

The momentary though fatal inferiority in seapower which had contributed decisively to the loss of her American colonies, England was prompt to remedy; her naval policy from that time undertook to make it impossible for combinations of European navies to equal her own. In the economic field Vergennes and Shelburne began in 1782 on the heels of the peace to seek a tariff adjustment. As a result, England concluded in 1786 a commercial treaty with France,<sup>86</sup> breaking with her old protectionist policy by joining in reciprocal concessions.<sup>87</sup> This was the practical result of the teachings of Quesnay and the Physiocrats in France, and of Adam Smith and David Hume in England.

The treaty was expected to allay the rivalry, by providing reciprocal liberty of navigation and commerce in all classes of merchandise

<sup>85</sup> Tramond, *Manuel d'histoire maritime de la France*, 509-523.

<sup>86</sup> Tramond, *op. cit.*, 531. The benefits thereby afforded to England were notable; new markets were opened for her cotton, iron, and hardware. But in spite of the clamor of French industrialists the new commercial régime was initiated in 1787, and trade treaties were made with Russia, the United States, and Switzerland. Liberalism affected French trade with England, which rose from its pre-war level of five or six millions to ninety-six millions in 1787 and to one hundred and forty-five millions in 1792 (*op. et loc. cit.* Levasseur, *Histoire du commerce de la France*, I, 536-547).

<sup>87</sup> See above, note 34. The "Wm. Eden Treaty" was signed September 27, 1786; Aug. Arnauné, *Le commerce extérieur et les tarifs de douane*, 90-94. Hume's pertinent essays appear in French in E. Daire, *Mélanges d'économie politique* (Paris, 1847-1848, 2v.), I, 9-103, with comments.

in all the European territories of either power, most-favored-nation treatment, and free trade. For a time the new burst of England's commercial expansion seemed to carry France along with it. But French exports were fewer in relation to her imports than were those of England. Indeed, French industry was then so backward that it was not possible to organize production so as to compete with the rival. The French cloth trade received a setback from which it had not recovered before the Continental Blockade against Napoleon was established. Hence, as soon as the treaty of 1786 was put into operation, the French market was flooded by British manufactures. In three years English export to France grew from twenty-four to sixty-three millions, while that of France to England attained scarcely thirty.<sup>88</sup> The peace policy was only a degree better in results than open rivalry.

The trade of France during the reign of Louis XVI with Africa, Asia and America grew to 250 millions per year, or equaled one-third of the French European trade. These figures are to be augmented by those of the profits accruing from the reëxportation of manufactured goods. From the point of view of external commerce France was much more a colonial than an agricultural nation. She held first rank among states possessing colonial empires because of the value of her domains and the profits to be obtained from them.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Tramond, *op. cit.*, 534-535; Lefebvre, *op. et loc. cit.*

<sup>89</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, citing A. M. Arnould, *De la balance du commerce* (Paris, 1791, 2v.).

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE COLONIAL WORK OF THE OLD RÉGIME

It remains to evaluate the colonial institution of the Old Régime as an ideal and as an accomplishment. In so doing, we must bear in mind the limitations imposed by comparison of the French with other contemporaneous colonies, and those arising from the time perspective of today. It is customary to judge the political and economic policies of nations by comparing them with those of competitors; and it is a truism that the "judgment of history" must vary according to the ideals and appreciations of the moment of writing.

So it may be said of the colonial enterprises of Spain, England, and France that some were "successful" and others not; if we seek for a permanent relationship under the motherland flag, each of them failed. But if we view each nation as having developed a huge instrument and method for the Europeanization of the world, we shall be fain to record that each of them contributed an appreciable element to that process, as did Portugal and Holland. Assuming Europeanization to have been desirable and valuable, we shall have to say that in perpetuating its own institutions and culture over seas, each of these nations was successful. If we insist that success is measured by the valuable material and political returns on blood and treasure spent, we shall find ourselves weighing ponderables and imponderables together, and so be left without standard of measure or equation.

French expansion under the Old Régime was respectably comparable with that of contemporary rivals, and its results at the opening of the Revolutionary period left the French heritage and tradition established in five or six important spots about the world, from which the new and modern empire was in time to evolve. England at that moment had little more, and most of the colonial nations, save Spain, showed less accomplishment. In actuality, no European power emerged from the Revolutionary period with overseas political holdings very much larger or worth much more than any other, and none held territory sufficient to compensate for money and men and effort expended.

To particularize: France owed her colonial impulse and success to deep-seated and abiding geographical and historical influences. Her home territory, lying between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and

her rivers, affording communication between the northern and southern seas, made her a great land bridge for the movement of peoples and the transmission of material things and cultural influences in four principal directions. Sharing the Mediterranean littoral, France was influenced by and in turn exerted influence on the whole periphery of the great inland sea, from the fringes of which she was bound, in the evolution of Europe, to have concern with expansion toward the Near East, Middle Asia, Africa, and the Orient. Her shores laved by the waters of the Atlantic and the North Sea, her eyes must be turned in the directions of both. Lacking perfect confines on the north and easy access by land into Spain, she must be involved in dangerous political relations with the peoples of each region. France has thus had to obey the imperious demands of geographical position and topographical formation.

Her people, reasonably homogeneous at the dawn of her history, suffered the onslaught of numerous invasions which in blending a great barbaric stock with the more sophisticated Romans, changed the character of the racial element; in due time they evolved a language current over a widely extended area, made a new religion valid over an imperial domain, lent military tradition to the whole, and thrust their commercial influence into every cranny of the known world. The inroads of barbarism, disintegrating the empire, left most of those influences and group habits intact, differentiations of local power creating traditions attached to the land bridge area and ready to expand in and suffuse the "native" kingdoms of the Merovingians, Carolingians, and the confused feudal states. Nationalism, growing under the Capetians, brought the modern state into prospect, a series of great kings retaining the Roman tradition, imposed absolutism just before western Europe as a whole was ready to launch into the outer seas in the period of the great discoveries.

Preponderance of France in the crusading movement gave her power and influence in the Levant and North Africa, and a share in the transmission of Asiatic culture to Europe. The seafaring traditions of her ocean coast allowed her to contribute, though tardily, to the westward turn of the course of empire. While the Mediterranean was not forgotten nor given up entirely under the impact of Islam, the corsairs of Normandy began to creep down the coast of Africa, hang upon the trade of Spain and Portugal, share the Newfoundland fisheries, and create a tradition in Canada. Their congeners the Huguenots began to colonize Brazil and Florida. However dismal their failures at colony planting then, they were quite as successful as their sixteenth-century English cousins.

With the growth of central autocracy the problem of state finance became acute. Ambitious kings like Louis XI and Francis I felt the need of whipping into company organization the resources of the merchants and the benefits of overseas trade to furnish means to govern and defend the nascent nation-state. Discoverers like Verrazano and Cartier began the French quest for the Spice Islands; their disciples indulging a habit of stopping to make a little money on the way while in America. This dilatory practice in time gave birth to Canada, Acadia, West Indian plantations, Guiana, which had but slow progress while European problems overshadowed overseas development.

Colonial enterprise outran institutional organization. Real development came under Henry IV, prior to whom overseas interest was sporadic, individualistic, minus combined effort or state policy. Attrition with the Hapsburgs taught its lesson of needed unity of effort. Henry was a forerunner, ignorant of technique and conscious chiefly of the value of "le long cours" for future trade welfare. Economists advised a settled program and concentration of commercial energy, but politics held the ascendant, for European rivalry bounded the horizon of a Sully who boasted that he could thwart the dissipation of effort on the impractical Canadian experiment.

Sixteenth-century failures of France were matched by those of England, while the crown monopolies of Portugal and Spain began to lose their driving power. Richelieu, bent on the creation of a powerful kingdom placed between two vindictive Hapsburg realms, saw the value of overseas dominion for the sinews of European war, and realized that the colonial impulse, hitherto disorganized, must be coordinated under and into policy of state. He gave to France not only nationalism but a realizable colonial program. Weak in technique and futile in execution, one by one his eight colonizing companies crashed because French merchants could not learn cooperation, because his nationals were not interested, preferring their own sun-lit acres to torrid islands or frozen forests, because the way to India was so long. But he accentuated the policy of dragooning the merchants' resources for state purposes overseas, hitched colonies, commerce, and navy side by side under a ministry of state, and identified naval and colonial purpose with the growing mercantilist philosophy.

Coming into the colonial enterprise in the century of the decadence of the crusading spirit, he avoided the fanatical religious motivation, but like Portuguese and Spaniards, found advantage in complying with the international law requiring recognition of papal authority and in using the parlance of proselytism to win support from the clergy and pious laity. The church was, however, to be used as servant of the state,

not master.<sup>1</sup> With this reservation, the mission of France was to Christianize and Frenchify the overseas world. Custom of Paris and laws of France were carried to the heathen by the colonist, who was to amalgamate with native society everywhere, creating a new half-breed blend on the Spanish model. French civilization must preserve and impose its traditional habiliments in the creation of an other-world society quite as Procrustean as any missionary or legalist could fancy. But the cardinal kept his eye on colonies and commerce.

During Colbert's ministry, the "Grande Compagnie" idea worked but poorly. The interference of the royal administration in company affairs was continuous and imperious; for instance, in 1671 Colbert ordered the Compagnie du Nord, operating in the Baltic, to distribute fictitious dividends, and the company went bankrupt shortly afterward.<sup>2</sup> In 1685 Louis XIV gave a charter to the third Senegal company, its preamble containing the words: "He has chosen those among his subjects who have appeared to him the most appropriate, and has formed of them a new company." In 1700 he directly nominated certain members of the Guinea Company to replace deceased members. Such interference destroyed confidence in success.<sup>3</sup>

After long campaigns to oust the ubiquitous Dutch traders, followed by gross neglect of the island trade by the company, the opening of the Antilles to free commerce for French nationals pleased the shippers and merchants of the large ports of France, who were organized for mutual benefit and opposed the monopolistic company privileges. This hostility naturally weakened newly organized companies; it often appeared, although there was little commercial competition. Recruiting of stockholders was difficult because of the misfortunes of the past and the ostracism practiced by the excluded merchant classes; thus it became next to impossible to collect the capital needed to form new combinations. Boards of company directors were largely composed of persons of social rank and importance at court; but because the powers granted them were too great for the size of their investments, they were

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 119-120. See also note 20, p. 151 above. This chapter follows closely Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 429-473.

<sup>2</sup> P. Boissonade and P. Charliat, *Colbert et la compagnie du commerce du Nord*, 82, and *passim*, for troubles of the company and crown interference. Tariff war and naval war were prime causes of disaster. The whole problem of the Great Companies is discussed in P. Bonnassieux, *Les grandes compagnies du commerce . . .*, 477-516, in the light of their revived use in the nineteenth century.

<sup>3</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 143-144, on the king's intervention in company affairs; see also J. Chailley-Bert, *Les compagnies de colonisation sous l'ancien régime*, 53-76, on the same phase of the topic.

never able to exercise their full rights. Being unable to conceive of operations on a grand scale, they often misused the organization merely to shelter their own personal business.<sup>4</sup>

Whether acting directly or through lessees, the companies never went beyond small commercial operations. They exported from the colony only what could be sold at the highest profit in France, neglecting second-class products. They paid the lowest prices possible for colonial products, and failed to supply colonial needs save with expensive French goods, and kept their colonial stores notoriously low as an habitual practice. The colonists naturally regarded the company as their enemy, and gladly smuggled with the Dutch or the English, who sold supplies cheap and bought colonial produce at good prices.<sup>5</sup> Frequently the agents themselves smuggled on their own account, or disposed of company merchandise in collusion with crown officers. In a word, no company ever distinguished itself by achieving conspicuous commercial success, let alone building up a great colony. This was in sharp contrast with the experience of the Dutch and English.

Colbert, with some accrued knowledge of the conflict with savage men and hostile climate in the New World, broadened the bases of financial resource by creating companies with nation-wide membership, and commercial rather than colonial aim, though his term was the sole epoch of vigorous official colonization. He improved very little on Richelieu's technique, and his colonial philosophy was informed with the same spirit. A round century of Colbert's intensity and fearlessness might have made a colonial world. The key to the distinction between Richelieu and Colbert was that the latter put commerce in the first rank of importance while the former made it secondary. Seignelay, son of the great mercantilist, shared to a degree his father's constructive insight and ability, but succeeding ministers and agents could not envisage the imperialistic ideal, and adopted mechanical mercantilistic rules for wringing quick wealth from trade.

Whether the small company or the large one was used, the essential difficulty inherent in human nature was that investors wanted profits from every voyage, and continuing dividends. The state, on the other hand, looked forward to the advantages of new establishment overseas as a political asset and for future prestige. It needed no present profit if it could coerce private capital. This made a clash of interest between company and state. The ruthlessness with which investors

<sup>4</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale en France*, 219; Saintoyant, *La colonisation française sous l'ancien régime*, II, 452.

<sup>5</sup> For example, the company bought their sugar at twenty-three francs a quintal, while the interlopers paid thirty francs. Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 453.

were fleeced to provide funds which the state lacked is one of the marvels of those times. The logical effect was to make capital chary and timid, and defeated the royal purpose.<sup>6</sup>

Down to 1690, the colonies produced no marked effect on French economy, national or governmental; they were of far less public interest than the senseless wars of Louis XIV. John Law's chimera raised them to a momentary importance, but the popular notion that colonies cost more than they were worth long survived him. Contemporary writers vented a militant anti-colonialism which mirrored the sentiment of the educated class. For instance, Montesquieu in 1721 in his *Lettres Persanes* opposed colonization because of the endless wars it entailed. His oft-repeated expression, "The ordinary effect of sending out colonists is to weaken the country from whence they are drawn without populating the lands to which they are sent," anticipated Adam Smith. This literary antagonism disappeared, however, when the tropical colonies began to pay. Attention became fixed upon dividends, enthusiasm over revenues from plantation colonies being quite detached from criticism of colonies of settlement.

Thirty years later Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois* voiced a decided predilection for plantation colonies whose commerce should be the exclusive monopoly of the mother country, trade with them by other European powers being only under treaty stipulation.<sup>7</sup> Voltaire, likewise both an anti-colonial and a strong defender of plantations,<sup>8</sup> lavished praise on Colbert for having given his country a great overseas domain, and was enthusiastic about Louisiana and development of trade with Mexico.<sup>9</sup>

The pre-revolutionary *Grande Encyclopédie* voiced the exploitative ideal of the time in its article on "Colonies," the argument being: The transportation of people from one country to another for commerce and cultivation entails the need of conquering lands and supplanting the primitive inhabitants. Colonies, established for the benefit of the home country, should be dependent immediately upon it and under its protection, while their commerce should be the exclusive privilege of the founders, for they would no longer be useful if they should pass out of the hands of the homeland; hence they should be held to the production of objects suitable for France. Moreover, for a colony to develop commerce with a foreign country would be a step toward political separation.

<sup>6</sup> For discussion of the companies, see above, 70-72, 127-128, the parts of this book dealing with the companies at work, and J. Chailley-Bert, *Les compagnies de colonisation sous l'ancien régime*, especially 75-188; also L. Cordier, *Les compagnies à charte et la politique coloniale, passim*.

<sup>7</sup> Montesquieu, *De l'esprit des lois*, Livre 21, chap. XXI.

<sup>8</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 429-430.

<sup>9</sup> Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830*, 167.

Finally, a colony would be the more useful the more densely it was populated and the more intensively its lands were cultivated, but its commerce must never compete with the products of the homeland.<sup>10</sup> This essence of Colbertism prevailed to the end of the Old Régime, whether crown or company administered the colonies.

The slow results of ten years' trial by Colbert of the great company plan led to the adoption in 1671-1672 of direct crown control. This had been well prepared for by continual royal interference with the companies. There was no great change in actual conditions. In fact, the disastrous effect of company monopoly drove him to adopt the national principle.<sup>11</sup> Colbert's successors imagined that the state could of its own will control economic phenomena. Hence they often quarreled with manufacturers in attempts to control production, and with the various corporations over restriction of their powers or limitation of new industries. The early eighteenth century produced a group of writers like Fénelon, Vauban, and Boiguillebert, who all argued strongly for free competition. The national assembly of commerce of 1701 was admonished that company monopolies were basically wrong, but those who aired such opinions were voices crying in the wilderness until the middle of the century, when the school of Gournay studied industry and commerce, advocating the principle of "Laissez-faire, laissez-passer"; that of Quesnay, called the "Physiocrats," studied agriculture. Morellet, Raynal, Condillac, all championed entire liberty of production and sale, trusting competition to effect equilibrium in price and quantity under the law of supply and demand. The days of "rugged individualism" were at their dawn.

The most outstanding advocate of this philosophy among officials was Turgot, whose duties gave him opportunity to intervene in the colonial economic field. During the American war he plead with the king for complete free trade for the colonies for the purpose of "making them contribute to their own defense and administration," not as subordinate provinces, but as friendly states. Such a program pointed inevitably toward a colonial autonomy far ahead of his generation, which had not advanced beyond Richelieu, the creative mind of French expansion, or Colbert, who inherited that drive for empire and reaped its first harvest. Louis XIV had been personally interested in the East India Company, but court habitués and nobles supported that flair merely to satisfy the royal whim. When Colbert died and the king's attention waned, all this good will changed to indifference. The bourgeoisie and the common people had too little information to be colonially minded.

<sup>10</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 432; Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 101-192, on the ideal of Choiseul; and Daubigny, *Choiseul et la France d'outre-mer*, 239.

<sup>11</sup> Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 149.

A few of Colbert's collaborators understood his convictions; some of his governors and directors were particularly well chosen; De Tracy, De Courcelles, Frontenac, Talon, De Baas, and Baron were all first-class men, though not so much could be said for Caron, De la Haye, and others. A good many of the port merchants backed him, while others opposed commercial privilege or the intrusion of the state into business.

The birth of eighteenth-century economic philosophies brought opposing ideas and interests into sharp conflict when the anti-slavery and the slavery parties clashed and free trade theorists created an epoch and a school. The pro-slavery faction, developed under English influence, included the traders, merchants, and colonials interested in island labor, while the free trade party, composed of shippers, merchants, and manufacturers of France, wanted free trade for themselves, but not for the colonies; the planters and merchants of the islands demanded on their own behalf suppression or at least modification of the *Exclusif*.<sup>12</sup>

We have seen how, after the Treaty of Paris, 1763, the Antilles planters and merchants asked for free ports, arguing that the *Exclusif* was created only to satisfy the special interests of the merchants of France and not the mass of consumers. Choiseul placed colonial control under Dubuc, a deputy of the chamber of agriculture of Saint-Domingue, thereby favoring the colonists; but he went only half way in opening Môle Saint-Nicholas and Carénage to restricted foreign commerce. This measure mollified the colonials but did not stop their campaign for free commerce, while the protectionists in France were equally determined. Dubuc expressed the colonial point of view vigorously when he said:

... The colonists . . . have prospered . . . not because of the *Exclusif* . . . but rather in spite of it. There is no pact which unites them to the metropole and obliges them to work and live for her. The colonies are provinces of the kingdoms of France, just as French in sentiment as the others. . . . With their wonderful aptitude for converting the products of the metropole into others more useful or easily merchandisable, they ought and do actually aid the commercial prosperity of the state; but this is under the condition that the state should aid and favor them as much, if not more, than the ports of the kingdom. It is, indeed more strictly true to say that Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre, are more effectively made by the colonies than to say that the colonies themselves are made by the metropole. . . . The port merchants are only the agents of those who produce crops and manufactures. They are, on account of their large profits, enemies rather than makers of commerce. Who, then, ought to be listened to, the colonists or the merchants? Surely the colonists. . . . It ought to suffice to point out that the merchants

<sup>12</sup> Duchêne, *La politique coloniale*, 100-104.

have mercilessly exploited the colonies and never supplied their needs, to conclude that the colonies ought to be liberated from ruinous exploitation and turned over to their own management.<sup>13</sup>

It was Dubuc who in 1784 secured the suppression of the free port at Saint-Nicholas and its replacement by three others, one in each of the provinces of Saint-Domingue, while the home merchants howled "colonial conspiracy" and "treason."<sup>14</sup> They gradually calmed down, though they kept on scheming ways to compensate for their loss, such as seizing Egypt from Turkey.<sup>15</sup>

Throughout the whole century, the government adhered to the policy contained in the instructions given in 1765 by the minister of the marine to D'Ennery, the new governor of Martinique:

... The colonies founded by the powers of Europe have all been established for the benefit of their metropoles, but in order to be useful they should be better understood, whereas they were really occupied by hazard, then established without knowledge of their usefulness, and are still today, after a century of possession, very imperfectly understood, and are, in reality, quite unknown by most of their possessors. . . .

The first consequence is that it would be a mistake to consider the colonies as provinces of France merely separated by the sea. They are in reality nothing but commercial establishments. . . . Indeed, the administration of this kingdom strives to use their advantages exclusively for the nation . . . and this is the sole object of their establishment, and they should by all means be abandoned if they should cease to fulfill it. The second consequence is that the more the colonies differ from the metropole in products the more are they perfect, since it is only on account of this difference that they are adapted to their purpose. Such, in fact, are the colonies in the Antilles. They possess none of our articles of trade, but have only those which we lack and which we would not [otherwise] know how to get.<sup>16</sup>

The free ports were conceded most grudgingly, to check serious discontent in Saint-Domingue. The governor-general ad interim, Du Chilleau, again opened the ports to foreign trade on May 9, 1789. The intendant, Marbois, considered the ordinance illegal and appealed to the minister, whereupon Du Chilleau was removed and his ordinance annulled within six months.

The principles of colonization developed during the middle of the century never varied; the attempts in Louisiana by Law and on the

<sup>13</sup> Deschamps, *La question coloniale en France*, 316; Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 438.

<sup>14</sup> See chap. XXI, 268.

<sup>15</sup> C. L. Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question* (New York, 1932), 92-100.

<sup>16</sup> A. Dessales, *Histoire générale des Antilles* (Paris, 1847-1848, 5v.), V, 456, quoted in Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 439. See previous chapter where the same idea is contained in a dispatch by Choiseul. On Du Chilleau see below, chap. XXIV.

Kourou by Choiseul were each conceived in the restrictive spirit, the persistence of which not only explains numerous administrative acts, but throws light on the lack of crown interest in expansion during the period.<sup>17</sup>

Based on the energetic spread of the seventeenth century, France had good prospect of growth in North America through control of the St. Lawrence; in South America, she might have gone inland from the Guiana coast or the Amazon, the left bank of which she held for a hundred years; and in West Africa from Saint-Louis. But in North America there was little organized exploration under the companies after Champlain; the *coureurs de bois* who went into the interior haphazard were good guides and interpreters, not trail blazers. Those who did go, for instance to Santa Fe, were in search of trade, not new territory. The missionaries on the contrary showed purpose and continuity, building missions farther and farther in the wilderness to become fixed centers of exploration and aid in solving the problem of the west, that is, of the existence of and the course of the Mississippi. After one hundred and fifty years, far from having found any great road to the Pacific, France knew very little beyond the great midland valley. In South America nothing was done in the Amazon basin. In Guiana in the middle of the eighteenth century, certain officers made some important explorations, but the results were not recorded on maps or used for further progress. In West Africa the course of the Senegal was known, but no expansion was effected, even between its left bank and the ocean, before the Revolution. Finally, in Madagascar, only the environs of Fort Dauphin and the coast region northward to the islet of Sainte-Marie were known. This is in sharp contrast with the activity of Spain in expansion during the second half of the century. On the other hand, the Academy of Science of Paris, founded in 1668, was active in organizing ocean voyages for astronomical and geographical studies.<sup>18</sup>

None of the rival nations envisaged the colonial problem any more clearly than did France; Spain lost her grip on her exploited colonies, which were merely delayed in getting their freedom until after the Napoleonic period; Holland got better results from her trading companies than France, but she had always to repress revolts in Java; England lost her first colonial empire as the result of failure to inte-

<sup>17</sup> J. Chailley-Bert, *Les compagnies de colonisation sous l'ancien régime*, 158-159, lists eighty laws and orders, dating from 1634 to 1785, prohibiting or restricting foreign participation in free commerce with the French colonies. The close adherence of France to protectionist commercial legislation through most of the nineteenth century is deplored in Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, I, 236-246.

<sup>18</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 440-443; see also his I, 382-385 for notice of these.

grate it when her success against France left her the apparent winner. Politically all the old colonial ventures failed, the new empires of today still exist only by sufferance while the bases of world society are being reorganized.

When the political institutions for the colonies were set up, they conformed with contemporary ideals of government; it was not thought possible to have any form of administration save that of France, hence an unpremeditated assimilation was used. There was settled hostility to making use of the experience gained by the colonists; *e.g.*, when in 1672 Frontenac proposed a meeting of the States General in Canada, he received a categorical squelching from Colbert:

It is well to note that . . . our kings have thought it well for their service, for a long time past, not to assemble the States General of their kingdom, perhaps to eliminate that old form; [hence] you ought to give very rarely, and perhaps never, that form to the body of habitants. . . . It will even be necessary a little later, when the colony shall have become stronger than it now is, to suppress very gradually the syndic who represents requests in the name of all habitants, for it is well for each one to speak for himself, and for no one to speak for the whole body.<sup>19</sup>

It was not until the Seven Years' War (1759) that "chambers of commerce and agriculture" were created in the Antilles; even then they were merely advisory bodies, and were restricted to agriculture after the Treaty of Paris. In 1787 colonial assemblies were set up with fiscal powers, but servile wars and the Revolution made it impossible for them to become effective.

The colonial governors were chosen from the navy or army, and even if they possessed the ability necessary to discharge their offices, they could not avoid acting in the autocratic spirit of the military profession. Owing to distance and slow communication, most of the governors paid no attention to wordy laws from France; the intendants were prone to do the same.<sup>20</sup>

At the head of each colony, after 1665, was a governor and an intendant, although the former was sometimes called a "commandant for the king," and the latter a commissaire ordonnateur. The governor always ranked the intendant, but curiously enough, the latter was not dependent upon him, both being directly responsible to the minister and the king. Each received instructions similar in form to those for ambassadors. As neither could free himself of the influence of the other, they worked best when in accord. Predominant power depended rather on force

<sup>19</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 210.

<sup>20</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 13; compare the "Obedezco pero no cumpro" of the Spanish viceroys.

of personality than on legal provisions. Even so, the energetic Frontenac found the archbishop and intendant in 1675 absorbing many of his earlier functions.<sup>21</sup> At the close of the eighteenth century the instructions of D'Entrecasteaux gave him military command over the troops from France and the local militia. He also had charge of the ships in case of war, and could requisition merchant vessels. His police power covered surveillance of newly arriving and departing persons. He inspected the courts, without power to affect their judgments, though he might sit to regulate procedure and point out abuses. Malouet in Guiana thought the system workable as complementary rather than disruptive.

The intendant had multiple and minute functions; he was chief civil administrator, collecting, managing, and distributing the taxes under the ordinances of 1766, and correcting irregularities in them. As president of the superior council, he was in charge of the administration of justice, with power to suspend judgments contrary to public welfare, and to call the attention of governor and procurer-general to any matters which seemed to need it. His power over public funds allowed him to meddle constantly in the field of the governor, while the latter could never be free from financial limitations, hence coöperation was imposed by law as well as by circumstances. Both officers had to agree on land grants, emancipations, church control, budget, and general police. Although they were in reality a double head of government and could correspond independently with the minister, they had to join in signing despatches to him, and received from him his replies as "lettres communes."

Few of the colonial chiefs achieved the outstanding reputations won by Champlain or Talon. None of the West Indies governors could be rated as great. No one ever gave Madagascar a creditable government, whatever Montdevergue's latent capacity, and no one in the Mascareignes exceeded the efficiency of La Bourdonnais. Dumas and Dupleix alone brighten French Indian history with a glint of administrative skill surpassing plain business judgment. Bougainville and Suffren had few equals on the sea. Montcalm in Canada was surrounded by grafting Bigots and jealous Vaudreuils. Yet there were many "good" men, capable and reasonably honest builders of roads, bridges, and public works, who raised some of the principal colonial towns to creditable cities for their time. There was general indifference toward developing a corps of officers with colonial traditions, professional competence, and moral fiber—too little evolution of colonial esprit, and little ripening of experience. Difficulties between royal officers and colonists on the eve of the Revolution were of the same order as those which existed about 1650 between the colonists and company agents. The colonial

<sup>21</sup> R. D. B. Cahall, *The Sovereign Council of New France*, 51-52.

institution of the Old Régime reflected all the weaknesses of the home government; we shall see how in the vengeful days of the Revolution it suffered the effects of impractical idealism as seriously as did continental France.

Quarrels over precedence and powers hampered action in all spheres, military, civil, or religious; governors fought intendants, or combined with each other against the sovereign council in issuing emergency rules which must wait for months pending the royal approval. Such tricks were easy on account of the lack of presses for publication of laws and decrees. All laws originating with the crown were supposed to be registered by the sovereign councils before becoming applicable in the colonies, except in Canada. An officer, upon receiving new laws, published them within his immediate vicinity and then filed them away in his archives, of which he knew nothing save the laws sent during his own term. Colbert's general ordinances were probably fairly well known,<sup>22</sup> but many lesser ones were completely buried or enforced in one colony and not in another. This situation was often protested against by the magistrates. In 1761 a commission was appointed to make a general study of colonial legislation, but its life was too short and nothing came of the undertaking. In fact, the execution of the law continued in confusion during the entire régime.

Both governor and intendant sought local advice; in the Mascareignes certain prominent settlers were consulted concerning the incidence and use of the taxes. In Saint-Domingue the imposts known as "octrois" were collected only by the consent of the habitants, who met in local assemblies to give it. In 1787 the West Indian chambers of commerce and agriculture were replaced by colonial assemblies like those in France. They were composed of officials, magistrates, and elected deputies who enjoyed relatively extended powers with some rights of decision, as a response to revolutionary aspirations, though they had not begun to operate successfully before the storm burst. They really constituted a break from the continual reassertion of the absolute rule of the king, notwithstanding that he was sometimes forced to recognize the recommendations of the chambers of agriculture, and of the "notables" of Saint-Domingue and the Mascareignes.

The ministry of marine and colonies continued in control from Richelieu's time until the close of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, colonial administration underwent numerous modifications not all deriving from the disuse of company rule. Many of these were applied to only one colony, being revamped for wider application. For instance, the Antilles were reorganized by a regulation of March 24, 1763, but this law was modified on February 1, 1766, for Saint-Domingue, and

<sup>22</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 456-457.

in its new form was applied to the Mascareignes on September 25. On May 25, 1775, the ordinance of 1766 was in part changed, leaving the government of Martinique under the regulation of 1763, while Île de France was under that of 1766. In general principles, however, the same kind of government was set up in America, Africa, and the Indian Ocean.<sup>23</sup>

The judicial organization was based on that of France, naturally. There were two courts of special character, the *tribunal terrier*, or land court, which controlled land grants and roads, and the courts of admiralty, which had cognizance of infractions of commercial laws. Besides these, though under varying names, were the royal judges of first instance, above which sat as courts of appeal the superior councils or the sovereign councils. The rôle of these councils was not definitely determined during company control, but as they were then thought of as government councils, they so remained when the crown took control notwithstanding later limitations. Counterparts in a way of the French parlements, they managed to participate in administration, encroaching upon the powers of the real executives. They did not hesitate, in registering royal ordinances, to modify these at pleasure; for instance in Saint-Domingue the superior council of Cap Français modified the great organic act of 1763 mentioned above. The king revoked their action and insisted that the councils were to confine themselves to affairs of justice; but he was obliged, short of using force, to tolerate similar actions by the colonial magistrates which he utterly denied to the parlement of Paris, although they flaunted him by their expressions of opinion and aspirations for increased autonomy.

The order of 1766 which imposed the qualifications for membership in the councils declared that the king would give preference to "habitants of proper age and experience"; as "habitant" in the Antilles meant "planter," the councils were composed not of legally trained persons, but of sugar growers who formed a sort of aristocracy differing somewhat in each island, but all of similar ideas and social slants. They all rebelled against the *Exclusif*, which denied them the benefit of cheap purchases from neighboring powers. Their slogan: "The colonies for the colonists," was as fiery as the crown's adherence to absolutism was stiff-necked.<sup>24</sup>

It does not seem to have disturbed the colonists, before the development of the theory of separation of powers, to have to bear with con-

<sup>23</sup> Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème colonial*, 33-35, citing Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Lois et constitutions*, IV, 538, V, 13; see also E. Petit, *Droit public ou gouvernement des colonies françaises* (Paris, 1911) (which concerns only the West Indies), and Boyer de Peyreleau, *Les Antilles françaises*.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. above, chap. XX, pp. 267, 271, and below, chap. XXIV.

tinual confusion of functions and encroachments of one power upon another. There were plenty of precedents: the companies had an agent whose duty it was to act in concert with the governor-general named by the king; governors and intendants existed side by side in France; in the navy, which controlled the colonies, it was the practice to place an administrator beside the commander. Thus it was not only tradition, but a definite purpose, to maintain dual arrangement in the colonies so as to overcome distance and slow communications by getting information from colonial deputies in Paris, by demanding reports from chambers of agriculture, by balancing the governor against the intendant, and the superior councils against these two. This system was made more effective by the admixture of the functions of colonial officials and by the necessity of coöperation in serious matters in lands too remote for close observation. While this theory was nowhere explicitly set forth, its operation is shown in numerous state papers, though as time went on and the theory of government developed under Montesquieu's idea, separation of powers grew with more exact knowledge of colonial conditions, and none of the conflicting positions was ever done away with entirely. The idea was never to relax central control; indeed, in the transplantation of the intendant system to Spain during the long struggle of Charles III to assimilate the French idea in his own empire, we see determination to unify all of Spanish and French America under a single type of administration as a means of obtaining the greatest efficiency for the purpose of opposing England.

The subordination of the colonies was pressed so far as to keep the national military forces in them distinct, both in control and in maintenance, from any colonial basis. As the ministry of marine governed the colonies, these were considered analogous to ships at anchor, and subject, like ships, to set rules wherever they might be. With minor variations, this administration of the colonies adhered to three main ideas: limitation of the naval establishment, outright assimilation, and an unrelieved flair for centralization. Local autonomy was considered more preposterous than in France, where local privileges were tolerated as vestiges of an unorganized past. Hence the unceasing issue of special laws. For instance, Malouet, going in 1780 to govern Guiana, found that little colony of seventeen hundred people provided with no less than three hundred and sixty superior orders and laws, but they were all pigeonholed in dust and unknown to the colonists or even to the officials. The Canadian council for years concealed land laws in this way.

As there was no means of making laws known save registration of them by the councils, the king's council, in fact, sometimes condoned acts completely at variance with the laws because litigants had been

ignorant of their provisions. For instance, under the Custom of Paris, creditors might seize the property of debtors; but this cost a great deal, and in addition, created difficulties greater than would have occurred in France; for while the process was under way, the property concerned lay idle and so lost the greater part of its value. Thus there was reason for the declaration of April 24, 1726, providing special handling of such property. Similar legislation, as that of November 24, 1781, was required in the administration of vacant successions; so the king sometimes issued special laws, or the local administrators decided unforeseen cases according to their best knowledge and judgment. All this had the effect of extending and confusing the legislative powers of colonial magistrates.

Something of this same improvisation occurred in the administrative organization and political government. In spite of itself, the central government had to leave to the local authorities at least a provisional initiative, allowing exceptions in special circumstances. Characteristically, the central government tried to adapt general rules to special moments or places. For instance, the Organic Act of 1763 was supposed to serve all the West Indies; but as it made trouble in Saint-Domingue, ordinances of 1766 changed the rules for that colony, while the original text continued in force for Guadeloupe and Martinique. Desire for uniformity impelled the application of the ordinances of 1766 to the Mascareignes, but in this piece of legislation the traditional privileges of the superior councils of Cap Français and Port-au-Prince had been recognized, whereas they had not existed in the Mascareignes. So some thirty articles were omitted when it was applied to Bourbon and Île de France. There it worked very well, but on the other hand, it had to be amended again in 1775 for Saint-Domingue. Multiplicity of organic acts created confusion in penal and civil legislation, however simple the colonial organization seems when sketched in broad lines. This fault was quite as characteristic in the Spanish colonies.

Although successive ministers knew that simplification or codification was needed, they could find no way of getting it. Their ideal was a group of colonies intensively exploited for the sole benefit of the metropole, hence administered entirely autocratically. But in practice the colonies resorted to infractions of taxes and tariffs, bending to authority when they must, but working always toward autonomy. As no definite formula was ever reached, the colonial institution was in its final form a thing yet incoherent and unfinished.<sup>25</sup>

There was little legislation indeed on the subject of land. The king,

<sup>25</sup> The foregoing pages are based on Christian Schefer's *La France moderne et le problème colonial*, 33-53. Schefer lauds the attitude of the Old Régime toward the colonies, whereas Saintoyant is critical.

as proprietor of the soil, delegated his rights over definitely named territory to particular persons whom he wished to reward, or made grants to privileged feudal companies. Letters patent to private persons, or charters of companies, specified duties to be performed in exchange for this delegation of rights, such as clearing and settling the land. Proprietorship being theoretically retained by the king, the grantees divided up their lands into variable areas which they transferred, not by sale, but under perpetual payments<sup>26</sup> and with the obligation to cultivate the soil. Not until the eighteenth century was crown sale of land seriously advocated. The recipient could not alienate his grant in turn until he had actually cleared and occupied it.

Although the principle was established that no concession should be for an area larger than what a single family could work, the governors or directors continually made very large grants. Favorites received huge parcels and did odd trading in them. To prevent speculation, an arrêt of 1680 prohibited grantees from making transfers until they had lived upon their land for six years and had cleared and begun cultivating one-third of it. The arrêts of Marly (1711), reflecting royal impatience at the slow settlement of Canada, imposed the obligations of residence and effective cultivation,<sup>27</sup> and required the seigneurs to grant without bonus every request for uncleared land. Forfeiture was the penalty, the two arrêts protecting the habitant against extortion and the seigneurs against speculation. Abuses were exceptionally flagrant in Saint-Domingue, where even on the eve of the Revolution more than half the soil was yet royal domain and uncultivated.

Subtenants of the companies or great proprietors were either discharged engagés or volunteer freemen from France. All the rights and duties of engagés were definitely stated; they must be under control of company or seigneur during three years with a right to a grant at the end of service, on an annual payment. To counteract the pre-dominance of blacks, an order was issued in 1687 in Saint-Domingue requiring every plantation to possess as many engagés as slaves, but this law was greatly honored in the breach.

The white colonial group thus contained both free and forced laborers. In either case, their going was the result of propaganda by special agents, the parish priests or agents of some company. Recruiting was irregular, and efficacious only until the end of Colbert's ministry. It was especially hard to obtain enough women.<sup>28</sup> Communication

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 16. Ownership *en franc alleu* existed in limited extent in the West Indies, Louisiana, Canada, and probably in the Mascareignes. Grants *en censive* were the rule.

<sup>27</sup> W. B. Munro, *The Seigneurial System in Canada*, 41-44.

<sup>28</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 459-461; see above, 146 for Canada; 209, the Mascareignes.

between France and every colony was difficult; in Canada the population was badly provisioned, and always menaced by the Iroquois or the English. The climate was more severe than the people of France realized. But the sunny sugar islands drew a large immigration after the Indians were harried out; during the middle of the eighteenth century a heavy movement was directed to Saint-Domingue, not by the company or the state, but rather through attraction of new people by the planters from their old homes.

As soon as slavery developed, the proprietors abandoned use of engagés, who, as free men, were more difficult to manage than the blacks. Estates with several hundred slaves often had only two engagés, the sugar refiner and the steward. The governors of course ignored laws requiring them because they hurt the interests of the only productive element in the colony. In the early eighteenth century the institution became practically inoperative save through fines.<sup>29</sup>

Few of the traditional causes of emigration subsisted in France. Richelieu avoided using any class of malcontents. From 1700 to 1789 the average population of France was over twenty millions. Even today, with about twice that number, the nation strives toward increase, and has never been really overpopulated, but she had sufficient numbers to have given a fairly forceful current of emigration,<sup>30</sup> and should have made a better showing. The masses were never interested in the subject. Recruiting of "vagabonds, idlers, vagrants, either in town or country, or people condemned to perpetual banishment from the kingdom," was generally used for France only in conscripting troops or laborers; the practice of getting colonists by the same kind of seizure, from the time of Roberval down to the Kourou expedition, deterred men of better character, who suffered loss of prestige by emigrating.<sup>31</sup>

Probably the chief reasons for slight interest in colonization were the lack of great coal and iron deposits to urge industrialization, and the absence of a great maritime tradition. While there was no marked shift in social relations, religious persecution did oblige about one million Protestants to leave the country. But whereas the oppression of Puritans created an English state in North America, the Huguenots were excluded from the colonies by the French. Had they been allowed to go they probably would have done so in large numbers, but their lack of national feeling would have made them allies of England or Holland. Even so, France could not have lost its colonies any more effectively

<sup>29</sup> See above, Chapter VII.

<sup>30</sup> Schefer, *op. cit.*, 9. Interesting contrasts in the modern French idea of colonies may be made by comparing Joseph Chailley, "Colonies," in the *Nouveau dictionnaire d'économie politique*, I, 432-446, with parts of this chapter.

<sup>31</sup> Chailley-Bert, *Les compagnies de colonisation sous l'ancien régime*, 106.

than it did, while overseas centers of French culture would have grown more powerful. As it turned out, the Huguenots dispersed over America contributed a conspicuous element to the population of the United States, but their culture and traditions are Anglo-Saxon.

The exclusion of foreigners was theoretically as rigid as the earlier policy of Spain. In 1729 the king forbade his subjects to bring into his colonies from foreign possessions any Negroes, or to permit any to be sent out. Foreigners were not allowed to enter colonial ports, nor sail within a league of their shores. Those who might slip through this prohibitive barrier could not become merchants or business agents, under penalty of banishment. The relaxation of this regulation, which was merely another expression of the *Exclusif*, was frequent in the cases of those, such as the Jews and the Dutch, who made large investments in the sugar islands.<sup>32</sup>

Expansion of capital was almost the only cause during the eighteenth century which developed spontaneous emigration. Money sought the flourishing West Indies, thus adding to prosperity, but only slightly to the number of whites.<sup>33</sup>

It cannot be said that French treatment of natives was essentially superior to that of Spain. They had no *Las Casas* to bruit their cruelties abroad. The chief difference was that the Spaniards had mostly to do with sedentary tribes, whom they made herculean efforts not only to Christianize but to settle in formal towns, bestowing an autonomous local economy, hospitals, and schools.<sup>34</sup> The French dealt mostly with nomads, who at the worst brought them raids and rapine, and at the best took European culture very lightly. The generalization that France was conspicuously successful in dealing with the backward peoples hardly bears scrutiny in early Canada, Louisiana, the West Indies, the India posts, Madagascar, or Guiana. Such success as was won depended upon the wisdom of the individual French administrator or commander, upon identity of economic interest as between the fur traders and chiefs,

<sup>32</sup> Schefer, *op. cit.*, 24-25.

<sup>33</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 466. At the time of its loss, French Canada contained 70,000 people, while the British colonists then numbered 1,200,000. In 1871 the French-Canadians numbered 1,082,000 while their British compatriots numbered 2,110,000. In 1931 they numbered about 3,000,000 with a million more in New England, Nova Scotia, and Louisiana, nearly all descended from immigrants who came during the short campaign of colonization under Colbert. They constitute 28 per cent of Canada's population, and are increasing in every province except Quebec. The weakness of Canada was due to the slowness with which it was peopled. The rigorous winters, the feudal land-system, the horrors of Indian wars, and monopoly rule, all contributed to this basic defect.

<sup>34</sup> Lesley B. Simpson, "Studies in the Administration of the Indians in New Spain," *Ibero-Americana*: 7 and: 13 (Berkeley, 1934, 1938), Parts I-III. Lewis Hanke, *The First Social Experiments in America* (Cambridge, 1935), *passim*.

or upon contrast of French camaraderie with English hauteur, the latter never a great asset in native relations. It is generally conceded that French treatment of Negro slaves was more mild than the English, though the results in Saint-Domingue in 1791 were not unlike contemporary servile wars in the English islands.

Although land for granting soon became scarce in Canada, the extremely arduous labor of forest clearing, and the shallowness of the soil of the Laurentian Basin, when contrasted with the lure of the beckoning waterways leading to fur trade and western adventure, left cultivation in a backward state. Canada never was able, in spite of occasional exports, to supply her own food. The mercantile urge for quick gain prevented the investment of money in the solid improvements which prospering agriculture required.

Possibly absence of town and provincial liberties kept colonists away. Canada is not as good an illustration of colonial discontent as were the West Indies, where complaints were rather directed against economic restrictions than political ones, at least until the Revolution. It is to be observed that in small isolated settlements the colonials of every nation have usually engaged in petty jealousies and misunderstandings, caused not so much by class or official distinctions as by the common isolation, privation, and monotony which beset high and low alike.

The fur trade led the Canadians into far-reaching explorations which they could not follow up with settlements.<sup>85</sup> The lapse of time between the explorations of Nicholas Perrot in the Wisconsin country in 1671 and those of the Vérendryes more than a half-century later is a case in point.

Étienne de Bourgmont's travels on the Platte River, and his "Fort Orléans" five hundred kilometers from the Mississippi, were never followed up. Such lapse of time cannot be cited as a unique fault of the Old Régime; it was one of the outstanding traits of the opening of America. Europe had not yet developed into an active market for American agricultural goods, and transportation would have been lacking in any case, had excess production occurred. Mention has often been made of the weak strategic position of the French colonies in North America. The Lake region was fortified during the late seventeenth century, but the lower Mississippi not until the eighteenth. In the Upper Country and along the Illinois and Ohio, lonely posts and missions could hold the good will of the natives, but the intervening stretches were not filled up with settlers; ambition out-

<sup>85</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 91-92. J. C. Paul Rougier, *Précis de législation et d'économie coloniale*, 22.

reached the means of accomplishment. Of royal troops there were never enough in Canada, and the soldiers were kidnaped wastrels or jailbirds, who did the colonies little good even though they stayed. During the colonial wars the troops were demoralized by the favoritism of the authorities, such as the rascalities of the intendant Bigot and his accomplices. Honest officials like Montcalm, De Lévis, or De la Galissonnière and Duquesne, often used severe measures to effect reform.

The early defense was by militiamen chiefly, but during the eighteenth century, troops were sent from France to match the fine English regiments, especially during the last war. All males between sixteen and sixty were subject to militia service, which in war time was burdensome, as all the home work was done by women and children. Montcalm's successful campaigns of 1757 and 1758 were cut short because the men were obliged to go home to the harvests.

The Indian menace was ended in the West Indies by the exterminations and treaties of the mid-seventeenth century. It decreased more gradually in the older parts of Canada, where many natives became Christians or allies. The fur posts were apt instruments for developing Indian trade and policy. Their commanders were clever at handling red men, keeping much of their trade from the English and holding their alliance for war. The facility with which the French adopted Indian life gave to many of them great prestige; the Baron de Saint-Castin, a noted French chief of the Abenakis, who set up a sort of dynasty among them, was an outstanding case. The red men on the march guarded the advance and the flanks, and plunged savagely into the English settlements, spreading terror as they pillaged and burned. The English used Indian allies to do the same thing when possible.

The long thin line of French occupation in North America contrasted sharply with the English concentration east of the Alleghenies. The towns and farms on the St. Lawrence were nearly three thousand miles from the sources of the Missouri, two thousand from New Orleans, and about one thousand from Fort Duquesne. The Gulf of Mexico was useless for receiving supplies or military reinforcements while the St. Lawrence opened on the sea through Cabot Strait, a veritable bottle-neck, through which enemy fleets might escape from defending ships in the habitual fogs.<sup>86</sup>

The loss of Newfoundland, Cape Breton Island, and Acadia by the Treaty of Utrecht put the enemy on the Canadian flank and made it necessary to build Louisbourg. When that fortress was lost in 1758,

<sup>86</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 92-102.

the last port of entry to Canada was closed. This of course crippled all the frontier posts, which depended on supplies from Quebec or Montreal.

The French consoled themselves in 1763 with the firm belief that England, by removing fear of the French from the minds of the Americans, was hastening the day when these would themselves secede, but no one at that time felt that France was losing territory of great value.<sup>87</sup> The English probably would have taken Guadeloupe rather than Canada, had not their West Indies planters hotly opposed expansion into competitive sugar producing areas.<sup>88</sup>

Mention has already been made of graft as a contributing cause of French failure in the Seven Years' War. Bigot was notorious for corruption of his subordinates when in command of Louisbourg during the War of the Austrian Succession. This was the chief cause of the shameful surrender of the fortress to the New England expedition. Actually promoted to be intendant of Canada, Bigot continued his malversations through the years 1748 to 1758, many millions being misappropriated.<sup>89</sup> After the fall of Canada, fifty-five of the grafters were tried, and though a dozen were acquitted, Bigot and his chief accomplice were banished and heavily fined.<sup>40</sup> Governor Vaudreuil, "who never failed except in a crisis," indulged in petty enmity toward Montcalm, plaguing him by exaggerating quarrels between the militia and the regulars. His refusal to keep the commander informed concerning operations and supplies was responsible for the defeats at Frontenac and Duquesne in 1758.

The Old Régime was successful enough in acquiring possessions; its great misfortune was its little wit to retain them. During the reign of Louis XV losses by the Peace of Utrecht were met by plans for defense, while cardinal Fleury urged<sup>41</sup> economic development. The trouble was that plans and projects were rarely carried out, or tardily pursued. For instance, Louisbourg was never properly garrisoned,

<sup>87</sup> Girault, *Principes de colonisation*, I, 193; Voltaire, *Candide*, chap. XXIII.

<sup>88</sup> F. W. Pitman, *The Development of the British West Indies*, 335, 351 ff., shows how the influence of the planters caused neglect to seize the French islands, allowed France to keep England out of the continental sugar trade, encouraged the smuggling with the West Indies which centered in Rhode Island, and contributed to the disruption of the British Empire.

<sup>89</sup> Saintoyant, II, 109-111.

<sup>40</sup> L. Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 9-11, points out other defects of administration of the colonies. The official personnels were too numerous and costly; in Saint-Domingue the cost of administration was seventy livres per colonist. Salaries of intendants were 40,000 to 80,000 livres. There was a tremendous amount of graft, poor administration, and some actual oppression.

<sup>41</sup> Fleury's ministry, 1726-1742, was of almost the same duration as Walpole's, 1721-1742.

nor were the frontier forts. Dubois, the minister of marine, as a friend and ally of England, thought France could have no marine enemy save that power, and, so long as he governed there could be no war with her. Under the Regency the navy declined even below its weak position under Louis XIV. The navy was habitually unprepared when war began. At the beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession, an expedition sent from Louisbourg to retake Port-Royal lacked ships to carry the troops and cannon to attack the town; the same fault caused the loss of forty vessels in the West Indies.<sup>42</sup>

England won her struggle of one hundred and fifty years, begun in 1688, by the strategy of wearing her enemy down and then striking opportunely. She always tried to weaken France by wars on the continent conducted by her allies, as, for example, Frederick of Prussia. During the Seven Years' War Louis XV kept 300,000 men under arms, but only a few hundred were sent to the colonies, save when Lally and Montcalm were given some 10,000 effectives. If France had adopted a genuine colonial defense strategy and adequate seapower, she might have won in America and India without giving up the Prussian campaigns; but this would have demanded imperial-mindedness, which was hardly to be expected, given the small handful of colonials and their ineffective public opinion.

Treaty-making on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, or the exchange of colonies won for those lost, observed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, wasted effort and disheartened the colonials, but it is not true that France maintained her continental integrity at the expense of her colonies, save in the case of Newfoundland, which England obtained from Louis XIV even after being evicted from it by force.<sup>43</sup>

Louis XV's continental policy was much less aggressive than that of Louis XIV, and he let slip advantages of first importance between wars. When his armies had to meet the English-Prussian alliance, their military leaders in Germany were quarreling and weak in discipline. Germany and France were at a practical stalemate at the end of the struggle, while England had taken all the French colonies, leaving nothing to trade back for losses. Louis XIV and Louis XV had little more capacity for sustained support of overseas empire than had Henry IV or Francis I. Leroy-Beaulieu forcefully says:

. . . A nation always frivolous and changeable, like France, seldom denies its historical antecedents and as little, it seems has she profited by experience, being quite as prompt to throw herself into an enterprise without prepara-

<sup>42</sup> See this incident in Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France*, II, 671.

<sup>43</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 290-292.

tion, as to withdraw at the precise moment when success is in her hand. She made all manner of difficult and slow sacrifices at first, then she withdrew, leaving to others the harvest almost ripe. With what carelessness of old she abandoned Canada, Louisiana and Saint-Domingue! What have these "arpents of snow" which surrounded the Great Lakes and marshy plains which covered the banks of the Mississippi become in other hands! . . . Every French patriot's heart bleeds today because of it, and now, in spite of the striking lessons of history, we would be ready to make the same mistakes over again.<sup>44</sup>

. . . One could not too strongly point out to France . . . what it was which ruined her colonial system in the New World, where she should have predominated. The failure of association in the mother country so as to encourage agricultural emigration, the absence of liberty, and the love of arms widespread among the colonists, such are the principal causes which have made Canada languish.<sup>45</sup>

During the last quarter-century of the Old Régime the only happy feature of colonialism was the conduct of international politics. Vergennes realized that he must direct his diplomacy to keeping out of European wars until the ministers of war and marine could organize their forces. When the revolting American colonies made their appeal for French aid he was ready, and helped to make England capitulate. In the Antilles and the Indian Ocean the navy acquitted itself creditably, and showed England that she could not deny other European nations their place as seapowers and colonizers.

But just when the French fleets were gaining victories, an Austro-Russian alliance began to threaten the dismemberment of Turkey and a new European war. He therefore listened readily to peace proposals after Rodney's defeat of De Grasse near the Saintes. While the war ended without all the gains hoped for, England soon had to free the American colonies and give France certain colonial advantages which restored some losses by the peace of 1763.

Up to the Treaty of Paris, the conduct of colonial affairs had gone through two diplomatic phases. The first was that in which overseas interests lay on the periphery of interest; the second was that in which they attained a decisive importance. During this last period Great Britain was on the colonial offensive, while France, with only a mediocre and badly organized defensive, maintained her continental interests by sacrificing maritime and colonial ones. European events between 1763 and 1774 showed that she must hold first rank in colonial policy or compromise her European position. Vergennes tried to

<sup>44</sup> Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes*, I, xvii; *ibid.*, I, 151.

<sup>45</sup> F. X. Garneau, *Histoire du Canada* (Paris, 1913-1920, 2v.), II, 175.

shape his diplomacy so as to include colonial as well as European affairs. To that end he checked the move toward implicating France in a contest with Austria and Russia for dismembering Turkey. But the régime fell before he could win his ends.<sup>46</sup>

In 1789 the colonial empire was the same as it had been left by the Treaty of Paris, except that the Versailles agreement modified the fishing zone around Newfoundland, restored West Africa and the island of Tobago, and gave France rights of possession in the more recently discovered archipelagoes of Kerguelen and Crozet. Saint-Barthélemy had been ceded to Sweden in 1785. The total area comprised about 136,000 square kilometers, of which only eleven or twelve thousand were under cultivation. The inhabitants numbered about a million, of whom 110,000 were white, 50,000 were mulattoes and free Negroes, 100,000 were Hindus, and 780,000 black slaves.<sup>47</sup> The colonies produced annually for the crown 17,550,000 livres; the returns were 7,170,000 in various imposts on reëxport and over 17 millions in customs duties. This favorable trade balance gave France first economic importance in Europe.

<sup>46</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, II, 424; Lokke, *op. cit.*, 92.

<sup>47</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, I, 297; his figures are from Levasseur, *La population française*, III, 419. Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 288-296, gives the estimates of all the writers of the late eighteenth century, of the population of all the French colonies and commercial data. At the same moment, England had three times the colonial area and twice the colonial population of France (*ibid.*, 2). See Deschamps' table, reproduced at the end of this book.

## CHAPTER XXIV

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE COLONIES

The downfall of the Old Régime as a result of a long series of events, which included cost of participation in the great colonial War of American Independence, was clearly foreshadowed when the crown decided to seek the aid of the long-neglected States General. Public affairs had grown so delicate that when Necker summoned that body in May, 1789, one of his requests was for a thorough discussion of colonial affairs through the *cahiers*. In these memorials to the deputies the colonies received comparatively wide consideration.<sup>1</sup> Curiously enough, no one seemed concerned about the criticisms of the philosophers who had so roundly condemned colonization. Not only did the great commercial and maritime cities take up colonial questions, but several inland towns, like Nantes, Château-Thierry, Laon, and Senlis, included the overseas problem in their survey of the general situation, and voted in accord with their interest in it. The grocers of Montauban, for instance, demanded a return to the principles of the colonial pact, and asked that admission into the colonies be forbidden to all foreign nationals; the nobles of Paris, in particular, took the opposite tack by asking that the colonies be "considered henceforth as French provinces, released from the arbitrary control of the Department of the Marine, assimilated with the other provinces, and allowed to participate . . . in all the advantages of constitutional laws and be suitably represented in the States General."<sup>2</sup> Of the fifty to sixty thousand cahiers still preserved, no less than three hundred and sixty touched on colonial affairs. Not only was there discussion of the question of the colonial pact, but also of that of slavery, while for the sake of France itself rather than that of the

<sup>1</sup> Necker's opening speech is in *Archives parlementaires*, VIII, 17-21. The colonial domain in 1789 was not large; there were fifteen possessions in all, comprising 136,000 square kilometers, and some million inhabitants, counting the slaves. Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 1. The value at that time was estimated at three milliards (*ibid.*, 3). A liberal estimate claimed that more than 3,000,000 French subsisted through the colonial commerce (*ibid.*, 7). France in 1785 took 240,000,000 francs in trade from the islands, and sold them 150,000,000; nearly half the national exports in 1789 were to the Antilles (A. Zimmerman, *Die Kolonialpolitik Frankreichs* (Leipzig, 1905), 253. Cf. his pp. 252-280).

<sup>2</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution; la Constituante et la réforme coloniale*, 38-49, based on the cahiers found in *Archives parlementaires*, I-VI.

colonies interest was shown in problems of the monopolistic companies and the existing commercial treaties.<sup>3</sup> Thus the Revolution was not at first hostile to colonization, but tried to adapt the old institution to new ideas consonant with Revolutionary principles. The liberal tendency was checked by the war with England, while effective control of the remnant of empire was made impossible by the loss of many old colonial administrators who became *émigrés*. Forty-four of the cahiers favored the abolition of the slave trade and slavery, and invoked "natural rights," "the sacred rights of liberty and humanity." Many of them expressed the idea, iterated to satiety ever since Henry IV, that possession of colonies was essential to development of commerce, without which there could be no navy. This association of the three essentials, colonies, commerce, and navy, characterizes the whole story of French expansion from its beginning to the present.<sup>4</sup> There was a large amount of hostility to privileged commercial monopoly by companies and ports, but no one spoke of opening the trade to foreign nations, as the national commercial monopoly was still held to be the formula for preserving the permanent interests of the nation. Slavery, though no less serious in its economic aspect, was a new issue raised by the humanitarians during the years just before the National Assembly.

Few cahiers demanded instant and complete emancipation; generally, they advocated the "means" of "preparing" for abolition of slavery "as soon as possible," in the interval insuring to all blacks mild treatment and a large share in the consolations of religion and humanity.<sup>5</sup> Thus the demands that the Code Noir should be revised and political interest harmonized with the "right of nature" were safeguarded by pleas that "all the precautions of wisdom and justice must accompany such a great benefaction, and it should be arranged that the labor supply of the colonies should not be lessened." Humaneness and common sense were combined in most of these votes, the Third Estate of Amiens summing up very neatly the combined tendencies:

The Assembly [it declared] having taken into consideration the commerce between the African coast and our colonies, believes that the slave trade is the cause of the most atrocious crimes; that a man cannot, under any title, become the property of another man; that justice and humanity alike cry out against slavery. The Assembly, convinced at the same time

<sup>3</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 15.

<sup>4</sup> Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 39; Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 187.

<sup>5</sup> This was demanded by the commune of Saint-Malo (*Cahiers de doléances de la Sénéchaussée de Rennes* . . . , H. Sée and A. Lésort, eds., (Rennes, 1909-1912, 4v., III, 24, cited by C. L. Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 273).

that a reform of this nature cannot be the work of one day, and that its oath cannot ignore the cultivation of the colonies and the property of the colonists, . . . charged its deputies . . . to consider the most suitable means of diminishing the slave trade and of preparing for abolition of slavery.

The Constituent Assembly, which sat from June, 1789, to October, 1791, showed its interest in general colonial affairs by continuing the pensions of the heirs of Poivre and Montcalm, sending an expedition commanded by d'Entrecasteaux to find the lost La Pérouse, and voting funds to print his maps and writings. Soon it organized a "Colonial Council" to study overseas questions;<sup>6</sup> it debated the creation of a separate ministry of colonies, and might have formed one had not the colonial domain then been so small that marine and colonies could very well remain under one office. In June, 1791, it entertained a project for a colonial constitution which looked toward assimilation.<sup>7</sup>

It had among its members rather a large number of "colonists or men worthy of being such," to quote Gouy d'Arcy, himself one of them, such as Moreau de Saint-Méry, deputy from Martinique, historian and remarkable jurist; or Malouet, previously governor of Guiana.<sup>8</sup> Opposing these were several of the famous *Société des Amis des Noirs*, founded in 1787 on the model of those Masonic and pseudo-Masonic bodies which had so much influence during the Revolution.<sup>9</sup> Closely associated with anti-slavery societies in Philadelphia and London, its membership included men like Condorcet, Brissot, Siéyès, Clavière, Mirabeau, Abbé Grégoire, and Robespierre.

The aggressive Société demanded abolition of the slave trade, gradual suppression of slavery, and establishment of civil liberty in the colonies as in France. While its sentiment was largely humanitarian on the slavery question, in order to impede the coalition of the special colonial interests the Société opposed representation of the colonies in the Assembly.<sup>10</sup>

The Colonial Committee of la Rue de Provence, organized in July, 1788, headed by the turbulent marquis Gouy d'Arcy, and representing the whites of Saint-Domingue, was ready to modify the colonial laws, but opposed disturbing the planters' privileges. The slave trade, pro-

<sup>6</sup> Its twelve members were all favorable to the white planters (Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 80-81).

<sup>7</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 194-203.

<sup>8</sup> V. P. Malouet, *Collection de mémoires et correspondances officielles sur l'administration des colonies et notamment sur la Guiane française et hollandaise*.

<sup>9</sup> E. Rüsich, *Die Revolution von Saint Domingue* (Hamburg, 1930), 31.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 51. It was associated with the central committee of the Grand Orient. Anti-slavery in France sprang into public interest between 1780 and 1788; prior to that the question had been one for free-lance philosophers (Cf. Deschamps, *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 59, 318-330).

ducing a circulation of fifty-nine million livres per year, had also warm defenders in the Club of the Hôtel Massiac, composed of planters and higher nobles, who fought to maintain old institutions and white domination. They worked mostly in secret, but openly controlled movements of persons to and from the West Indies. Their influence with minister La Luzerne was great. The shippers and merchants of the channel ports, who lived by the slave trade, sale of colonial commodities, and sugar refining, were narrowly conservative, and even demanded repeal of the law of 1784 on commercial liberties.<sup>11</sup> The Jacobins were also fiery debaters on colonial questions between February, 1790, and the end of 1791. Their fall was largely due to their split on colonial and commercial questions on September 25, 1791. Barnave, the Lameths, Moreau de Saint-Méry, Gérard, for example, were Jacobins with planter interests.

Nobody contemplated breaking too sharply with colonial tradition. The famous *mot* of Robespierre, "Perish the colonies, rather than a principle," has been lifted out of its original setting and given a distorted meaning; indeed, on May 13, 1791, the Constituent Assembly passed to print a speech by l'Abbé Maury which shows an attitude quite opposite to the principle of "scuttle":

We have been threatened with the secession of our colonies. I like to hope that France will never experience such a great misfortune, which, whatever one says, would reduce us to the rank of a third-rate power. . . . Remember, that if you had not the commerce with your colonies to sustain your manufactures and to support your agricultural activity, the kingdom would be lost.<sup>12</sup>

One of the first questions which confronted the Assembly was that of providing for representation of the colonies. The islanders had not been invited by the royal order of January 24, 1789, to send representatives to the States General, although they had for some time agitated for local assemblies. Finally, a self-constituted group of the big planters of Saint-Domingue, encouraged by the Colonial Committee of la Rue de Provence, held elections for deputies to the States General who were, after some debate, seated on an equality with the deputies of the home provinces. Their election had been entirely irregular; they did not represent more than a third of the colonists of Saint-Domingue, but they convinced La Luzerne that they were "patriots" and could hardly be left out, so their admission was regularized in spite of the fact that they were aristocrats. Six out of eighteen applicants were

<sup>11</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 20, 23, 53. The decree of May 15, 1784, is in Isambert, *Recueil général*, XXVII, 406.

<sup>12</sup> Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 321-322, shows that the fate of the colonies under Revolutionary ideals had often been debated.

seated on July 4, 1789, while deputies from other islands were admitted later.<sup>13</sup> They represented the white planters, but not the land- and slave-owning mulattoes, who demanded a share in state affairs on the same footing as the whites. Here was a quandary: Should the Assembly perpetuate the color prejudice which one of its members called the "aristocracy of skin"? Many "patriots," Barnave in particular, believed with the white colonists that the mulatto planters were not yet ready for political rights; but his view did not fit the principle of equality which dominated the Assembly; hence no clear-cut decision on mulatto rights was reached in the debates on civil status.

Thus, a decree of March 8, 1790, providing for insular assemblies, admitted that the islands were part of the French empire, but were not to be under the new constitution; tacitly recognizing the political rights of the mulattoes, it limited them, without expressly saying so, to local representation in the colonial assemblies.<sup>14</sup> It was this half-hearted measure which really incited the disorders which soon broke out in the West Indies; one of the two irregularly elected assemblies of Saint-Domingue, that of Saint-Marc, with over two hundred members, began to legislate independently, disowning the National Assembly, and moving toward separation from France. As a result the National Assembly in October deprived the Assembly of Saint-Marc of its powers, refused to heed the petition which its members came to France to present, and set about forming a new one supported by its own troops. It also retracted the political rights granted in principle to the mulattoes on March 8.<sup>15</sup> As a result Saint-Domingue was torn by factions of whites who sided either with the Old Régime or with the Revolution. Troubles in Guadeloupe and Martinique were similar but less violent.

As the disappointed mulattoes revolted in August, the Committee on the Constitution and the Committee on Colonies joined to demand some improvement in the condition of the mulattoes and free Negroes (*affranchis*).<sup>16</sup> Clermont-Tonnerre, Malouet, and Abbé Maury heatedly

<sup>13</sup> Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 62, 71-73; also Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la Révolution, 1789-1799* (Paris, 1930, 2v.), I, 57-64. The Saint-Domingue planters later demanded twenty deputies (Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 67).

<sup>14</sup> The decree, in *Archives parlementaires*, XII, 73, is reproduced in Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la Révolution, 1789-1799*, I, 380-381, and Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, App. VI; and the accompanying instructions, *ibid.*, 382-387. Cf. A. Cochin, *The Results of Emancipation* (Boston, 1863), 30.

<sup>15</sup> Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 176-179, 191-193. The colonists of Pondichéry and Senegal were not granted assemblies by the decree of March 8, but promptly petitioned for and received the right to name them (*ibid.*, 94).

<sup>16</sup> The decrees suspending the colonial assembly of Martinique and sending commissaires thither and to Saint-Domingue and Guiana are reprinted in Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 392-393. That of May 15, 1791, *ibid.*, I, 127.

opposed this as they feared an end of white domination and loss of the colonies, and reminded the Assembly that it would be unwise to assimilate them, or grant them ". . . laws incompatible with their local and particular needs." Barnave then proposed a half-way measure, contained in a decree of May 15, 1791, which accorded political rights to free colored men whose fathers and mothers had both been free. This only angered the white planters without satisfying the mulattoes.<sup>17</sup> Barnave himself therefore proposed repeal of the law, and it remained a dead letter as it could not be enforced. The white planters had apparently won, for although the plight of the slaves mentioned by Necker as a humanitarian problem when the States General was convoked was debated in the National Assembly at the same time as that of the mulattoes, no decision was reached on either question.

Now as to slavery: near the close of 1789 a member of the Amis des Noirs made a motion for its prompt abolition. Upon news of this, the slaves of Martinique, allegedly stirred up by the Amis des Noirs, revolted, whereupon the merchants of Bordeaux and Marseilles complained that the Assembly was menacing "the property and life of our compatriots and the fortune of the state." Their interests lay almost entirely in slave labor for the sugar and coffee planters, who owed them money.<sup>18</sup>

The Amis des Noirs, Brissot at their head, renewed the fight, however, and on February 5, 1790, demanded the abolition of the slave trade outright.

. . . This traffic has existed for a long time. But is brigandage made legitimate by prescription? . . . It is worthy of the first free Assembly of France to consecrate the principle of philanthropy which makes of the human race one family, and to declare that it holds in horror the annual carnage on the coasts of Africa, and that it intends to end it, to soften the slavery which results from it, and to seek to prepare the means of doing so from the present time.

The motion failed, as the planters would be ruined without slave labor; hence they pressed the Assembly for support, and it did then declare that in the decree of March 8, 1790, "it had intended no innovation in any branches of commerce, either direct or indirect, between France and her colonies; it had put the colonists and their prop-

<sup>17</sup> The Abbé Grégoire wrote to the mulattoes concerning this decree in most extravagant terms; his letter is in App. to M. Rainsford, *An Historical Account of the Black Empire of Hayti* (London, 1805). Gouy d'Arcy urged his friends in Saint-Domingue to resist the decree by all possible means, and worked hard to delay its transmissal (Deschamps, *op. cit.*, 234).

<sup>18</sup> *Archives parlementaires: première série 1787-1799* (Paris, 1867-); Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la Révolution*, I, chap. V, 305-336.

erty under the special safeguard of the nation; and that whoever should work to excite risings against them would be declared a public enemy."<sup>19</sup> Then, in October, following the troubles in Saint-Domingue, Barnave and the Committee on Colonies got a decree providing that no law on the state of persons not free in the colonies would be voted on in the Assembly except upon formal demand by the colonial assemblies.<sup>20</sup> This was done out of solicitude for the slave owners, whites, and free blacks who made up the colonial assemblies.

Although the Assembly consented, on May 13, 1791, to some concessions in favor of the mulattoes, at the same time it reiterated the declaration that slavery, at least provisionally, was essential. It was then that Robespierre uttered the ringing words which his enemies maliciously misinterpreted. "From the moment," he cried, "when you pronounce the word 'slavery' in one of your decrees, you will have pronounced your dishonour and the reversal of your Constitution. . . . Let the colonies perish, if you save them at that price! I declare that we shall not sacrifice to the colonists the nation, the colonies, or all of humanity." This was uttered in the heat of debate, against the determination of the planters to prevent the mulattoes from winning political rights. But the colonial deputies were quick to identify the principle of colonial expansion with their own interests.<sup>21</sup> They hotly interrupted Robespierre, distorted his original meaning, and some time afterward used the incident to secure the passage of a new decree particularly favorable to the colonists. The trick succeeded, but the Assembly failed to advance from its equivocal position regarding mulattoes;<sup>22</sup> it adjourned without having settled the question of slavery, or even debating the trade. The general desire to do so was thwarted by the fact that the problem of the freedmen complicated every proposal. But even the Amis des Noirs acknowledged that emancipation would be fatal for colonists and Negroes alike.<sup>23</sup>

To turn now to the problem of commerce: Necker had said in his call

<sup>19</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 381. At this time the power of the Amis des Noirs had considerably diminished in the Assembly, because they had to take the blame for the race war in Martinique (J. P. Brissot de Warville, *Mémoires*, Paris, 1832).

<sup>20</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 386; the planters had as allies the home mercantile classes, which would be affected indirectly by disturbance to crops and the carrying trade (A. Cochin, *The Results of Emancipation*, 31).

<sup>21</sup> Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 136-137.

<sup>22</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 317-321; see the discussion in *Archives parlementaires*, XXXI, 241 ff.

<sup>23</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 207. The bloodshed in Saint-Domingue during 1790, 1791, and 1792 was caused by conflict between the whites and the free hommes de couleur; each side was helped by slaves, but the proposal to free the latter had not yet passed (Cochin, *op. cit.*, 32).

to the States General that the time for free trade had arrived. This problem came second in the list of colonial questions which faced the Assembly. In August, 1789, it proposed to abolish the Exclufif, which had not been completely destroyed by the order of 1784, or at least to allow the colonies to buy supplies abroad for six months of the year. The home merchants fought the idea with their old selfish gain at stake. Yet a serious drought in France had made it necessary to open the ports of Saint-Domingue in May, 1789, to provisionment from foreign ports, but this temporary liberality was annulled in the following July,<sup>24</sup> and the colonies were soon forced to trade where they could. On April 3, 1790, the commerce of the West Indies was declared free and open to all; the import and export duties which had embarrassed American commerce were suppressed or reduced, and liberal customs legislation was enacted in June and July, 1791. But there the Constituent Assembly stopped under the influence of the doctrines of philosophers and economists.<sup>25</sup>

As to territory, the Assembly wanted to hold on to every part of the colonial domain.<sup>26</sup> It sent commissaires to the Antilles and the Indian Ocean to gather information, study policies, and extend French influence. For example, Lescallier, when ordered to visit the Seychelles and India, ought:

. . . to go first to Madagascar, to consult with the chief traders and the chiefs of the country around Foulpointe with regard to French plans. . . . He will leave there an honest and enlightened man . . . to explore the island, its ports and the lay of the land, to learn the disposition of the people, teach the natives to love the word "French," inspire in them confidence in the nation and prepare all possible instructions for the return of civil commissioners to that island.

Lescallier reported that Madagascar would become French whenever the government might be ready to occupy it, but the inhabitants must be allowed to enjoy French law, and profit by the favor of the French; for the promoters of enterprises in Madagascar in the past "had been too

<sup>24</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 339.

<sup>25</sup> The decrees opening the commerce of Saint-Domingue (May 9, 1789) and closing it (July 2, 1789) are reprinted in Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 452-453. On the tariffs of 1791, see Aug. Arnauné, *Le commerce extérieur et les tarifs de douane*, 110-129.

<sup>26</sup> As soon as England's philanthropists began the slave refuge of Sierra Leone, French humanitarians wanted to imitate them. The ministry of marine in December, 1791, was interested in a proposal to replace the sugar islands with a cane-bearing holding nearer to France (Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 175, 178).

busy with profits for the Europeans and never with the well-being of the natives."<sup>27</sup> This was two oceans removed from the attitude of the planters of Saint-Domingue. When, indeed, the Assembly adjourned, in October, 1791, it left to its successor a whole colonial situation aggravated by indecision at home and disorder in the islands.

When the short-lived Constitution of 1791 appeared on September 14, its two guarded provisions concerning colonies were, first: an inference that they might possibly be represented in the *Corps législatif*; and second: a statement that although the colonies were part of the "territorial unity of France and its possessions," they were not to be included under the Constitution.<sup>28</sup> Small wonder the planters thought of separation!

The Legislative Assembly, which convened on October 1, 1791, followed its predecessor's ideas on slavery, but was a little more categorical. On March 28, 1792, on the proposal of Gensonné, it extended to all free blacks equal civil and political rights. This was followed on August 22 by a vote according representation in the National Assembly to all the colonies, the slaves to be enumerated for the purpose as part of the population. Although the members were predominantly anti-slavist, looking upon the institution as a dying one, they moved, as did the proponents of emancipation everywhere, to an attack upon the slave trade rather than against the institution itself.<sup>29</sup>

Amid growing disorder of the populace of Paris at the near approach of the Prussian army, the Legislative Assembly disbanded without definite action on colonies. It was followed on September 21, 1792, by the National Convention. This republican body, on the proposal of Abbé Grégoire, abolished in July, 1793, the per capita slave-trade premium voted by the Council of Trade in 1784, but it still rejected the proposals of the Amis des Noirs. When Brissot was tried before the revolutionary tribunal he was accused, among other crimes, with having plotted the ruin of the colonies by the suppression of slavery.<sup>30</sup> Thus even the radical Convention shunned *a priori* reasoning indifferent to cause and effect. It was Robespierre, notably, who opposed the projects of Brissot as

<sup>27</sup> M. Dubois and A. Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale* (Paris, 1902), 36.

<sup>28</sup> Duchêne, *La politique coloniale de la France*, 128-129; Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 117-118.

<sup>29</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la Révolution*, I, 320-322; *Archives parlementaires*, XL, 581-598; XLVIII, 621. In the preceding March, Christian VII of Denmark had decreed abolition of slave-trading by his countrymen; his credit for this act is much reduced by the fact that the trade was not to be entirely ended until 1803, and in the meantime to be given special incentives (Southey, *Chronological History of the West Indies*, II, 50, quoting the king's decree).

<sup>30</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, I, 204-327, 336; Cochin, *op. cit.*, 33.

dangerous, believing that sudden emancipation would mean quick and terrible servile war. For example, in his notes against the Dantonists, the leader of the Terror averred that Danton had said to him one day: "It is vexing that one cannot propose to cede our colonies to the Americans; it would be a means of making an alliance with them." What happened was that Danton, who had always been an open partisan of Barnave, suddenly changed sides, and on February 4, 1794 (16 pluviôse, an II), aided by Delacroix and de Lévasséur, won by acclamation a surprise decree abolishing slavery in the colonies; amid wild enthusiasm the two colored deputies embraced each other before the tribune, and each deputy gave them a fraternal kiss.<sup>31</sup>

This surprise decree was at serious fault because it offered no transitional method to bring about abolition. The Convention had continually looked toward gradual action, not a sudden break;<sup>32</sup> the result, of course, was immediate renewal of riots in the islands.

In commercial matters, the Convention followed the principle already enunciated by the Constituent Assembly when it abolished customs between the mother country and the colonies, and decreed in the Navigation Act of September, 1793, that all the national colonial commerce should be under the French flag. This was a final blow at the colonial pact, but as far as the nation was concerned, fundamentally protectionist.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, a sudden swoop of the Convention's naval force upon the English slave refuge at Freetown, which it demolished in September, 1794, showed that the radical group was quite as much concerned over the commercial ascendancy of England as over the humane ideals of emancipation.<sup>34</sup>

The Constitution of An III (August 22, 1794) confirmed the foregoing application of the principles of the Revolution, which had been won against strong opposition and largely nullified by the Convention. Article XV of the Declaration of Rights renewed the abolition of slavery: "Any man may pledge his time and his services, but he cannot sell himself or be sold; his person is not alienable property," and articles VI and VII of the first title again asserted the principle of political assimilation of the colonies to the mother country which the Conven-

<sup>31</sup> The abolition decree is printed in Saintoyant, I, 438; account of the vote, *ibid.*, 329-330; Cochin, *op. cit.*, I, 35-36.

<sup>32</sup> Saintoyant, I, 330; C. Schefer, *La France moderne*, 57.

<sup>33</sup> The two decrees of September 21, 1793, restricting the trade to nationals, are in Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la Révolution*, I, 435-437. That of February 19, 1793, opening French West Indian ports to the United States trade, *ibid.*, I, 424-425. The action taken was for the purpose of injuring England, and to create a French merchant marine.

<sup>34</sup> Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, citing C. B. Wadström, *Précis sur l'établissement des colonies de Sierra Leone et Boulama* (Paris, 1798), 51-55.

tion had received from the Constituent Assembly: "The colonies are integral parts of the Republic and are subject to the same constitutional laws. They are divided into departments."<sup>35</sup>

The Directory (October 26, 1795, to November 5, 1799) served through a period of great continental military plans and activities, but saw no marked changes in colonial policy. Efforts were made to control the colonial remnant remaining to France and to improve French commerce at the expense of England. The proposal of the Swedish emancipationist Wadström to set up a slave refuge in West Africa like Freetown was rejected, after consideration, in favor of Napoleon's descent upon the more profitable and strategically valuable Egypt.<sup>36</sup>

Meantime in Saint-Domingue and the Lesser Antilles the Revolution worked havoc. Echoes of conditions in France stirred all the sugar colonies, events in Saint-Domingue after December, 1788, being typical. First the whites, then the mulattoes, and last the slaves made war. In this largest and richest colony it was the choice of a delegation to the States General and its admission to seats which agitated planter society. More pressing upon the recently arrived Governor du Chilleau was the ever new problem of a food supply, for the last crops had been bad, and shipments from France, where actual want prevailed, grew smaller. As an emergency measure du Chilleau, prevailing upon the reluctant intendant, Barbé-Marbois, opened three ports for three months to import of bread stuffs from the United States.<sup>37</sup> This trade began well, but the Americans soon gave it up because they could not get return cargoes, and the dearth remained unbroken. The governor tried extending the period of opened trade until October 1, permitting payment in kind, but this violated the legislation of 1784, and the intendant refused to concur.<sup>38</sup> To add to the administrative confusion, the committee which had chosen the deputies who had gone to France now arrogated to itself authority over the colony, and the discouraged governor sailed home in July, 1789, without having been relieved of his position by La Luzerne. Du Chilleau had on May 9

<sup>35</sup> The departmental partition of the colonies provided four or five departments for (1) Guadeloupe, Marie-Galante, Désirade, Saintes, and the French part of Saint-Martin; (2) Martinique, French Guiana, and Cayenne; (3) Sainte-Lucie and Tobago; (4) the Île de France, Rodriguez, and Madagascar; (5) Réunion, Indo-China, Pondichéry, Chandernagor, Mahé, Yanaon, Karikal, and lesser establishments. This movement was prompted by fear that the action of Réunion in driving the commissaires away would be followed by the other islands.

<sup>36</sup> Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 181-182.

<sup>37</sup> *Correspondance de . . . du Chilleau . . . avec de la Luzerne, relative à l'introduction des farines étrangères* (Paris, 1789), Sept. 16, 1789, 37 pp. and reply to the Deputies, October 9.

<sup>38</sup> N. de Cocherel, *Réplique . . . aux inculpations du commerce contre . . . du Chilleau* (Paris, 1789).

opened three ports for a five-year period, but Barbé-Marbois protested so vehemently that the governor was at last dismissed,<sup>39</sup> the Count de Peynier succeeding him.<sup>40</sup>

Governor or no governor, the white planters and their mulatto supporters were determined to wield the power, the mulattoes to obtain political rights. Both believed that the National Assembly was hostile to their aspirations, the news from France coming only piecemeal and badly distorted. When the islanders heard of the opening of the States General they rushed to adopt the tricolor, began to organize parish committees, and set about controlling the governor's acts, as already told. When news came of the fall of the Bastille there was much pillaging and rioting. The governor, though sure that his government must have at least a partially thought-out plan of liberal reforms, had no definite instructions as to his own policy and was perforce almost completely inert against the rebellious planters. When the Amis des Noirs evinced determination to extend the Declaration of Rights to the colonies, the planters at Cap Français lost no time in striking for control of Saint-Domingue by driving Barbé-Marbois out. On November 1 they called together the "Provincial Assembly of the North [Province]" and made their leader, the troublesome Baron de la Chevalerie, its president. Very shortly they assumed political control of the province, emulating the course of the British colonies now become the independent United States. Their purpose was to establish their own white rule, free from home control. This they began by disbanding the hated militia, substituting for it "patriotic" troops, giving orders to the new intendant, and defying Governor de Peynier. Next, hastening their action because the Revolutionary government at home was taking steps to organize a colonial assembly for them, the planters induced the two provinces of the West and South to follow their example. The South did so at once under the lead of Baudry de Lozières, a grand blanc of Léogane, who headed their assembly.<sup>41</sup>

In the West, where the old insular officials held on, the governor had been admitted to the planters' committee, which he dominated. However, early in 1790, the combination of South with North province brought West into line to form a colonial assembly, and this upstart body was called to meet in Saint-Marc on March 25, but was

<sup>39</sup> *Mémoires et observations du sieur Barbé de Marbois . . . sur une dénonciation signée par treize de . . . les députés. . .* (Paris, 1790).

<sup>40</sup> Saintoyant, II, 9-11; the following pages are based on Saintoyant's study.

<sup>41</sup> T. G. Steward, *The Haitian Revolution, 1791 to 1804 . . .* (New York, 1914; 2d ed., 1915), is written with much understanding of events, and reproduction of documents; but these are not authenticated, and the work is that of a pro-Haitian propagandist.

delayed until April 15. Governor de Peynier at long last saw that his power would have to be regained by force if at all. Of this he possessed none, and was soon disowned by the Assembly of the North, as was the old imperial council, which hastened to report to the National Assembly in Paris how the insulars had rebelled. But the Saint-Marc General Assembly dominated the situation throughout April to August, 1790.<sup>42</sup> It called itself "The General Assembly of the French Part of Saint-Domingue," but in popular parlance it was "The Assembly of Saint-Marc." From the first this truculent body assumed equality with the National Assembly of France and ignored the home government, which complained that its assumption of powers transcended even the pretensions of the National Assembly.<sup>43</sup>

But the ambitious planter-assembly did not enjoy as much popular confidence as it had expected; the *Assemblée du Nord*, finding its functions invaded by the General Assembly, adhered rather closely to the cause of governor and king, and refused to accept the insular constitution which the Saint-Marc General Assembly framed in May, 1790, and sought to impose. It was a document which avoided declaring, but clearly envisaged, independence.<sup>44</sup> The planters who espoused it wore red cockades, those who opposed, white ones, the "pompons blancs." After antagonizing the planters of North Province by a whirl of aggressive legislation, the rebellious General Assembly seized the magazine at Léogane and the king's ship *Léopard* at Port-au-Prince. De Peynier denounced them as traitors, began hostilities against them, and finally succeeded in compelling the remnant of eighty-five members of the General Assembly to embark upon the *Léopard*, really for safety as much as to sail to France for the purpose of obtaining approval for their acts.<sup>45</sup> In this it was entirely unsuccessful, as the National Assembly in October entirely repudiated the "Léopardins," while the turbulence continued in Saint-Domingue. De Peynier's efforts to reestablish the royal authority by force were marked by lack of adroitness or skill. The parishes began to form federations against him, and anarchy threatened, just when the mulattoes began to make trouble. This dark progeny of French fathers had long been watching events interestedly; they had not shared in choosing the deputies to France in 1788, nor had they had any hand in making up the local committee in the summer of 1789. Now, inspired by

<sup>42</sup> Saintoyant, II, 15-22.

<sup>43</sup> Its constituent decree of May 28, 1790, is reproduced in Bryan Edwards, *Relation de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue*, in his *Histoire*, 428-431.

<sup>44</sup> It certainly thrust aside the local royal officers.

<sup>45</sup> T. L. Stoddard, *The French Revolution in San Domingo* (Boston, 1914), 101-102, disputes this and points to planter allegiance to the king. The May 10 document is in Rainsford, *op. cit.*, App. II.

the movement in France, they began to demand recognition in local politics, against which the frightened whites resisted solidly, terrorizing any whites or mulattoes who encouraged such a change. The three provincial assemblies formed by the planters were a unit in condemning the idea supported in France of giving the mulattoes representation in colonial bodies. One mulatto, Lacombe, who urged it, was promptly hanged as a rebel. When the local committees were once more closed to them there were more signs of trouble in the early months of 1790, but the mulattoes as a whole decided to await some favorable action by the National Assembly,<sup>46</sup> led by the *Société des Amis des Noirs*.

This they felt they had obtained in Article IV of the Instructions of March 28, 1790, which made them voters on the same terms as the planters, but which the latter had refused to accept. Amid the confusion of these hostile factions, the mulattoes in West and South provinces began to hold meetings; two mulattoes, Fleury and l'Hirondelle, came from France to begin an appeal to force, while James Ogé brought in arms and munitions from the United States.<sup>47</sup> Ogé in October began the second mulatto uprising to obtain political rights near Cap Français, burning plantations and killing whites, and proclaiming that recognition of the March decrees would help both whites and mulattoes equally with respect to slavery and the general welfare. His movement gathered little support, however, and the planters and troops drove him into the Spanish part of the island, while in the West and South the uprising quickly collapsed.

But De Peynier, accused by the whites of double-dealing and irresolution, gave up and went to France in November, 1790, leaving his post to Blanchelande, ardent partisan of stern loyalist measures.<sup>48</sup> Ogé and his partisans were haled back from Santo Domingo and savagely broken on the wheel; many executions took place in the provinces, and a brutality in quelling the revolt was displayed which made the mulattoes thirst for vengeance.<sup>49</sup>

To meet the situation, the National Assembly sent civil commissioners to restore order. When the white planters learned in December that the Saint-Marc Assembly had been abolished on October 12, those who had been its partisans talked openly of separating from France. The governor was unable to erect the new Colonial Assembly which the decrees had commanded because the whites would not listen

<sup>46</sup> P. Gafferel, *La politique coloniale en France de 1789 à 1830*, has a general survey of this revolution to 1825, pp. 118-166.

<sup>47</sup> Ogé and Raymond had been leaders in Paris of the mulatto club, "Colons Américains" (Rüsch, *Die Revolution*, 33, 35, 37).

<sup>48</sup> Rüsch, *op. cit.*, 41-42.

<sup>49</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 219.

to giving the vote to the mulattoes. The latter insisted that the October 12 decree reaffirmed the March decrees, and demanded their rights. The tension was so great that the elections could not be held, and, while there was no overt rebellion, the air was crisp with possibilities of anarchy.

The whites of Port-au-Prince, in their wrath at the pretensions of the mulattoes, were convinced that the National Assembly's decrees would ruin them and that Governor de Blanchelande was hostile to planter interests. When a small fleet with reinforcements arrived in February, the planters sought to use them against the governor. Failing to divert the new troops to the Môle Saint-Nicolas, De Blanchelande was equally unable to prevent their joining his enemies, the "Red Pompons," who were ready to avenge the loss of the Assembly of Saint-Marc and fight the mulattoes.<sup>50</sup> Incited by a false decree attributed to the National Assembly and purporting to have ordered an inquiry into an *émeute* by the regiment of Port-au-Prince, the soldiers killed their colonel, and set all the prisoners in the jails at liberty. This March 4 affair was a victory for the Red Pompons, who speedily set up their own government in West Province. De Blanchelande had fled from Port-au-Prince to the Cap, where the White Pompons, or adherents of the Old Régime, were stronger, but as most of the troops there were aligned with the revolted West, he had to submit to control by the Assemblée du Nord, playing thereafter but a sorry rôle as a figure-head.

Under a patched-up truce, elections for the Colonial Assembly began in June, mulattoes still being excluded, when, on June 30, news came of Barnave's half measure under date of May 13-15, decreeing that sons of free parents must be given political rights in the primary and colonial assemblies.<sup>51</sup> But these decrees withdrew from most of the mulattoes those rights which they considered that the decrees of March, 1790, had conceded. A storm of rage swept the white colony; the acts of the National Assembly were repudiated in several parishes; the newly elected Colonial Assembly met in Léogane on August 1, 1791, showing a marked division into an Eastern or semi-loyal, and a Western or independence group. An independentist presiding officer was chosen while an oath of loyalty to France was taken. In order to prevent quarrels with the North, the seat of its sessions was moved to Cap Français; the governor continued to be amenable to control, and quiet seemed predictable when suddenly, while the legislature was moving to the Cap, a slave uprising burst out in North Province. It seems that the planters had never dreamed, in spite of many dire in-

<sup>50</sup> Saintoyant, II, 41.

<sup>51</sup> See above, 320-321.

dications, that the mulattoes would stir up the slaves against them, and they were taken unawares by this most formidable revolt. The blacks were led by a slave Vaudoux "priest," Boukmann, who began incendiary work in mid-August; within a few days the whole eastern part of North Province was in ruins. There were not over fifteen hundred French troops in the island. The planters urged De Blanchelande to call on the Spaniards, the English of Jamaica, and on the United States for men, arms, and provisions. Aid was obtained from Martinique. It was strongly suspected that the servile war had been incited by "philosophers" sent from France to do so.<sup>52</sup>

Early retributive actions were successful. Slaves taken in battle were hanged, burned, or broken on the wheel. But more than a thousand whites had been killed before the end of October, while two hundred sugar plantations and twelve hundred coffee plantations had been burned. So great were the crimes of the black monster Jeannot that he was finally put to death. While the governor fought in the field, the Assembly made every effort to give the mulattoes, who were helping to suppress the Negroes, practically all they had been demanding. The incentive which moved the whites to such generosity was desire to prevent certain mulattoes in the West from joining the blacks. But when De Blanchelande called upon the mulattoes in armed camp ready for eventualities at Port-au-Prince to disperse to their homes, they refused, and on September 11 made demands on the whites which the latter felt forced to accept, but which had to be exacted from them anew on October 19.<sup>53</sup> Late in November the National Assembly sent out three commissioners, De Mirbeck, Roume, and De Saint-Léger, to attempt to reestablish law and order.

After the massacre the planters had to face the specter of famine; usually provisions were never more than three months ahead of consumption, even in peaceful times. The Spanish colonists, however, ran in cattle when they could, the frontier being poorly guarded.<sup>54</sup> Rather than depend too much upon the mulattoes, the planters made a new appeal to the British, but Lord Effingham, governor of Jamaica, could send only arms and munitions, while the halfbreeds met and chose leaders, some of whom distinguished themselves later as men of capacity, such as Rigaud and Pétion. The seat of their resistance was at a small town, Croix-des-Bouquets, not far from Port-au-Prince. After some passages at arms, the planters won support among the mulattoes and agreed that the Port-au-Prince garrison should be composed of as

<sup>52</sup> Rüsçh, *op. cit.*, 46-47.

<sup>53</sup> Saintoyant, II, 48-63; Edwards, *op. cit.*, 447.

<sup>54</sup> Lt. Breux, Letter, November 5, 1791, in *Revue de la Révolution*, I (1883), Docs. 91-92.

many blacks as whites and that the Colonial Assembly should be re-organized. But that body met soon and repudiated this agreement, causing further dissension within the ranks of the whites. On March 28, 1792, the combined forces of Negroes and mulattoes defeated the whites, driving them from the fields back into Port-au-Prince. Elsewhere in Saint-Domingue the royalist troops met success, until finally the Revolutionary commissioners had to admit they could do nothing and returned to France. Roume, the last of them, had violently opposed the planters, and upon leaving advised his successors to pursue the same course.

The Legislative Assembly on March 28, 1792, approved the agreements reached by the whites and mulattoes of Saint-Domingue, but on April 4 it reasserted the rights of the latter to share in the government. At the same time it sent out three new commissioners, Jacobins all of them, Ailhaud, Polverel, and Santhonax, and some six thousand troops.<sup>55</sup> Santhonax shortly announced that the plan was to preserve slavery but to admit the rights of the mulattoes; as a consequence, the latter adhered to the forces of the commissioners when they arrived at Cap Français on September 17th. By this time the General Assembly was modestly willing to be named Colonial Assembly and submit to the National Legislature under reserve of the preservation of slave labor. The provincial assembly at the Cap was dissolved, while that at Port-au-Prince, besieged by forces under Rigaud and blockaded by Revolutionary vessels, was obliged to surrender, some of its leaders flying to Jamaica. The commissioners, appointees of Brissot and the Abbé Grégoire, persevered in favoring the mulattoes as against the "aristocrats of the skin" who were defended by the commander of the military forces, Esparbès, whose tendencies were royalist. When the latter failed to work up a counter-revolution and returned to France, the commissioners went each to a province on November 2, 1792. The rather negative Ailhaud in South Province wanted simply to restore order, but without sufficient forces he gave up and went back to France, while fanatical but sincere Polverel and the sinister, unscrupulous Santhonax pursued their policy of hostility to the planters. Meanwhile, Rigaud and other mulatto generals so harassed the Negroes that some fourteen thousand of them accepted amnesty from General de Laveau. Peace might have been restored had the commissioners acted resolutely, but unfortunately war with England and Spain began in May, 1793.<sup>56</sup> At that time General Galbaud arrived to serve as governor, whereupon the commissioners began a quarrel

<sup>55</sup> Rüsck, *Die Revolution von Saint Dominique*, 64; Samuel Hazard, *Santo Domingo Past and Present* (New York, 1873), 125.

<sup>56</sup> Hazard, *op. cit.*, 126; Stoddard, *op. cit.*, 182-183.

with him which led to the admission of several thousand revolted slaves into Port-au-Prince, where they perpetrated a horrible massacre and burned the city. Millions of livres in property were lost, and ten thousand French fled to the United States, where they settled in the South. The Negroes, who had been freed by the commissioners for helping them, now moved into the country to join the ravaging bands there.<sup>57</sup> After the disaster, some of the planters went to England, where, war now existing against France, they secured orders to the governor of Jamaica to accept the allegiance of French planters who might offer it, and to occupy certain ports in Saint-Domingue. To meet this new danger, Santhonax and Polverel decreed the abolition of slavery and armed hundreds of black supporters who fled to the hills with their weapons.<sup>58</sup> When Louis XVI was executed, Jean-François and his congener Biassou gave up the fight and entered the Spanish service. With them was the yet inconspicuous Colonel Toussaint L'Overture.<sup>59</sup>

The Spaniards and English were now able to overrun most of the French territory; they had agreed to divide Saint-Domingue between them. When they captured Port-au-Prince the commissioners escaped and returned to France. The English, after making an agreement on September 3, 1793, to protect the planters, captured much of the island and held it precariously until 1797, when the French were willing to trust their fortunes to Toussaint, whom they had induced to desert the Spaniards. In 1798 the English were obliged to give up the island, General Maitland and his troops withdrew, and England made a treaty recognizing Toussaint as independent and neutral.<sup>60</sup>

The National Convention, in charge in France since September, 1792, as has been said above, hardly pursued a constructive colonial policy. Anxious to avoid heated discussions, it failed to do anything during its three years of power other than accept the course of events in Saint-Domingue. Not until February, 1795, were representatives sent to take up the responsibilities abandoned by Santhonax and Polverel in June, 1794. During that interval the only contact with the great island was kept up through United States and Danish vessels, leaving the colony to its own disruptive influences.

Tardily then in July, 1795, General de Laveau was confirmed in his de facto governorship, while the mulattoes Rigaud, Beauvais, and Villate were, with the black Toussaint, made brigadiers. In January, 1796,

<sup>57</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la Révolution*, II, 124-131; Rainsford, *op. cit.*, 163-164.

<sup>58</sup> Rainsford, *op. cit.*, 164-166.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. G. Roloff, *Die Kolonialpolitik Napoleon I* (Leipzig, 1899), 12.

<sup>60</sup> Hazard, *op. cit.*, 131.

the Directory sent five commissioners, among whom were Roume and Santhonax. They reached the island in May, bringing three thousand troops under General Rochambeau. Through various vicissitudes Santhonax very shortly came to wield the whole power of the commission, and it was his determination to set aside the whites and mulattoes and give the blacks the upper hand which now characterized the troubled course of the island's miseries. First he made Toussaint general of division and Rigaud ranking officer among the mulattoes; then he caused further trouble by sending into South Province a committee of three men hostile to the mulattoes, whose main strength was there. Conflicts ensued in August between blacks and mulattoes during which many whites were massacred. Out of the disorder Rigaud rose to exercise the chief power in the South, while Toussaint affirmed his power over Santhonax. General Rochambeau was sent home, and Toussaint emerged as the chief power of the North and West.<sup>61</sup>

In the spring of 1797 Toussaint drove the English west in South Province, cutting their communications with the Spanish port of the island, but they held on to their positions on the extreme west coast and made war on Rigaud. Toussaint, named chief of the French forces in May, gathered the population under him in a general economic recuperation through active resumption of agriculture. Sternly repressing mulatto opposition, and manoeuvring Santhonax out of power and compelling him to sail for France in August, Toussaint affirmed his own power by numerous acts, such as sending his own sons to France to be educated and offering to be personally responsible for the good behavior of the ex-slaves, and by beginning a campaign to drive the English entirely out. This movement General Maitland succeeded in delaying by an offer that England would recognize the Negro as king of Saint-Domingue if he would declare separation from France and give his commerce as a monopoly to England.<sup>62</sup> Noting the flattery heaped upon Toussaint by the English, and feeling hampered by its own lack of intimate knowledge of affairs in Saint-Domingue, the Directory sent Hédouville to check the Negro's ambitions and bring him back to French control. General Hédouville landed in March, 1798, at the city of Santo Domingo to confer with Roume, who was there under Spanish protection as the only commissioner of France in the island. Toussaint, taking this as a slight to his actual authority, received Hédouville with coolness, and the latter was unable to intervene in the English evacuation, which was agreed upon on May 2, 1798, under such favorable terms that it was obvious that Toussaint's ulterior conditions would be furthered by England, who

<sup>61</sup> Edwards, *Relation*, 473, 477.

<sup>62</sup> Saintoyant, II, 161-165; Roloff, *op. cit.*, 17-18; Edwards, *op. cit.*, 487.

did not recognize the French Republic.<sup>63</sup> Hédouville tried to harmonize the rivalries of Toussaint and Rigaud by bringing them together at the Cap, but without success. He was more successful in getting terms of evacuation from Maitland, but here Toussaint protested that he had been overlooked, and induced Maitland to refuse to surrender Môle Saint-Nicolas and Jérémie to any save himself, and Hédouville, lacking physical power, was forced to accede. On October 2, Toussaint received the surrender and witnessed the evacuation. He then systematically pushed his reconstruction plans, while Hédouville, having no support save that of the few whites, undertook to increase his strength by conversations with Toussaint and Rigaud; but Toussaint obeyed the summons to the Cap by bringing with him a regiment of Negroes who had revolted at news that Hédouville was planning to reestablish slavery, and once again the direct representative of the Republic was forced to go, taking with him some fifteen hundred refugees from black rule on October 22. Toussaint invited Roume to take charge of the government, and he did so on January 12, 1799.

Then burst out a great quarrel between the blacks and the mulattoes, each group seeking to control the island, and each ignoring the whites. The Directory, having to face the Second Coalition of Europe, had to be content with leaving Toussaint as general-in-chief responsible for the welfare of the colony. Rigaud was technically left as his subordinate. The mulattoes came to his support, but the blacks began a war of extermination which lasted until September. Toussaint's success was in no small part due to the coöperation of the Americans and British in supplying his part of the island with provisions. Although the informal maritime war between the United States and France had caused President Adams to forbid on June 13, 1798, American trade with any French ports, a lively clandestine trade was carried on. This trade was legalized when Adams, acting upon the theory that Saint-Domingue had cast off French allegiance, construed the embargo not to apply to the island and sent a consul-general, Edward Stevens, with diplomatic powers to Cap Français. Stevens' activities helped Toussaint to crush his southern rival, Rigaud, thus assisting the cause of Negro independence.<sup>64</sup> The year closed with the French part of the island in complete control of the able Negro chief whose ambition was now ready for another step.<sup>65</sup>

This was to take over possession of the Spanish part of the island

<sup>63</sup> Saintoyant, II, 166-168; T. L. Stoddard, *French Revolution in San Domingo*, 269-275.

<sup>64</sup> "Letters of Toussaint L'Ouverture and of Edward Stevens, 1798-1800," in *American Historical Review*, XVI, No. 1 (October, 1910), 64-97.

<sup>65</sup> Saintoyant, II, 175-181.

under the terms of the Treaty of 1795. Roume gave consent, though he realized that Toussaint was aiming at independence. But the Frenchman at the same time secretly advised the Spanish governor not to surrender his office until a force could be brought from France to receive it. Discovering this double-dealing, Toussaint packed Roume in his turn off to France. He then marched upon Santo Domingo, where he took over the power nominally in the name of France, on January 2, 1801. Six months later he threw off all fiction and declared his independence.<sup>66</sup>

But Napoleon was first consul since November 9, 1799, and ready for his great New World adventure. In 1800 he made the convention with the United States whereby that power tacitly recognized Saint-Domingue as French and left Toussaint without diplomatic support. In January, 1802, his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, entered Samaná Bay at the head of 25,000 troops and soon got possession of the chief ports. The Spanish part of the island was promptly occupied, but resistance was immediate in the French part under Toussaint. Leclerc failed to win him by negotiations and had to resort to war. He was making some progress and winning some support, when he was so rash as to proclaim in March that the slaves should be returned to their former owners. This new turn gave the Negroes such solidarity that they were able to drive all the French of North Province into Cap Français, where Leclerc, cornered, attempted to carry out Napoleon's instructions by getting control of the person of Toussaint. This was accomplished after the Negro chief had made a treaty acknowledging French supremacy and had retired to his estate. There he was seized at midnight and sent to France to languish in the dungeons of Joux and then to die April 27, 1803, in those of Besançon.

His fight against Leclerc was carried on by the Negro Dessalines, who, aided by yellow fever, which carried off more French than the Negroes killed, defeated Rochambeau after Leclerc, fallen a victim of the pest, had written to Napoleon that conquest of the island would require 70,000 troops. On January 1, 1804, Dessalines took command of an "independent Haiti" as its governor-general for life.<sup>67</sup>

Meantime the trend of affairs in the other islands had been similar. Four hundred out of a total of eight hundred naval officers joined the émigrés, crippling the navy, lessening hope of success at sea, and ending the supply of colonial administrators who had been chosen from it.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Roloff, *op. cit.*, 46-48.

<sup>67</sup> Hazard, *op. cit.*, 147; L. Dubroca, *Leben des J. J. Dessalines, oder Jacob's des Ersten Kaysers von Hayti* . . . , K. M. Mueller, tr. (Leipzig, 1805).

<sup>68</sup> Deschamps, *Les colonies pendant la Révolution*, 160.

England had waited anxiously for her revenge for the Treaty of 1783. Her animosity gives a thread of unity to French colonial history from the beginning of the revolutionary wars to the fall of the Empire: William Pitt adopted a policy which sought to cripple France in her economic and colonial power; the secret or open action of the "merchant isle" turned the servile wars of the West Indies into separatist movements. In several cases the English planters intervened with joyous alacrity at the request of the French ones, for international enmities broke down before the rising tide of black revolts.

The Convention tried to use the old alliance of 1778 with the United States to save the islands, sending Citizen Genêt in 1793 to arouse enthusiasm, as Franklin had aroused the French during the 'seventies. Citizen Genêt not only tried to coerce the United States into observing the 1778 treaties and get Louisiana, but also to foment revolution among Canadians supposed to be ready to revolt against British rule. In 1794 and again in 1797 conspicuous efforts were made to raise a Canadian force which should seize Quebec; the Vermonters were supposed to be willing to enter the project. Propaganda literature sent in by ministers Fauchet and Adet had very little effect, however, as the Canadian government was able to apprehend the persons responsible, who seem to have been neglected by the authorities in France; although the project of creating disaffection in Lower Canada was revived again as late as 1801, it never had the actual numerical backing in the Province which would have been necessary to give the enterprise any color of success. It was of course distinctly a war measure; had it acquired any momentum, it would have revived the French colonial question in North America, which was probably one of the chief reasons why the American pro-French party gave the matter little support.<sup>69</sup> About 1794 a break seemed imminent between England and the United States, but Jay's Treaty temporarily stopped the war drift, and the United States engaged in undeclared naval war with France instead. The war in the Lesser Antilles followed much the usual form of earlier struggles.

In 1793 the English, to break up French corsair holds, took Tobago, which had only become French in 1783, and which still had many English colonists, and the attack spread quickly in 1794 to all the French Antilles. Thus the decree emancipating the slaves had no time

<sup>69</sup> Carl Wittke, *A History of Canada*, 70; see also "French Republican Designs on Canada," in Note D, *Report on Canadian Archives by Douglas Brymner, Archivist*, 1891 (Ottawa, 1892), 57-84. These documents show that the French revolutionists were depending almost entirely upon the possibility of arousing the Canadian population to revolt, and had little means of supporting defection by sending forces from Europe.

to show results before the enemy appeared.<sup>70</sup> On Guadeloupe a party of white planters of Grande Terre, led by Governor d'Arrost, refused to recognize the Republic and called in the English. The colonists who opposed such treason organized militia, drove out the friends of the foreigners, and permitted the installation of a republican governor, General Callot, in January, 1793.<sup>71</sup> At Martinique, Governor Béhague raised the white flag, but a group of "patriots" drove him out, while Rochambeau, commissaire of the Republic, took command. But the English, with a fleet and twenty thousand soldiers, easily took Guadeloupe and Martinique in April, 1794.<sup>72</sup>

The Convention retaliated in June by sending the redoubtable corsair and Jacobin, Victor Hugues, to Guadeloupe with a thousand men to retake the islands from the English. That famous champion of the Convention abolished slavery, armed the blacks, and by terrorist methods reconquered the entire island by September 29. He then sent out corsairs from Pointe-à-Pitre who retook Sainte-Lucie, Grenade, Dominique, and Saint-Vincent. The English tried to resume the offensive in 1796, but were able to hang on in Martinique alone; <sup>73</sup> there they stayed until the Peace of Amiens, 1802.

In Tobago the many English in 1789-1790 upheld the reactionary governor against the colonists who espoused the Revolution; <sup>74</sup> in Cayenne the partisans were divided, but the winners kept French troops from landing in late 1791. The five India posts had only conflicts of small importance.<sup>75</sup> They shortly fell into the hands of England, as did Saint-Pierre and Miquelon; Guiana and Senegal, which were attacked by the English in 1793 and 1794, did not fall until 1800.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Henri de Poyen, *La guerre des Antilles de 1793 à 1815*, cited in Saintoyant, I, 476.

<sup>71</sup> See Noel Pardon, *La Guadeloupe depuis sa découverte jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1881).

<sup>72</sup> Cochin, *The Results of Emancipation*, 38, says Martinique was taken on March 22; Roloff, *op. cit.*, 19.

<sup>73</sup> Noel Pardon, *La Martinique depuis sa découverte jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris, 1877).

<sup>74</sup> Cf. F. J. Klingberg, *Anti-slavery in England* (New Haven, 1926), 103-104; Lokke, 122.

<sup>75</sup> Affairs in India had not been going well since the Old Company was revived in 1785. Serious charges had been lodged against it. The sale of company goods by the agents of the state, the notorious trial of Fabre d'Eglantine, De Delaunay d'Angers, and De Chabot (its directors) had seriously compromised the prestige of France in India. Moreover, quarrels over precedence were dividing Pondichéry and Chandernagor. In August, 1793, after a month of siege, the English had forced the capitulation of Pondichéry, which was not restored to France until 1819 (Hardy, *op. cit.*, 124).

<sup>76</sup> Roloff, *op. cit.*, 19.

When the Directory came into power in 1795, it continued the old policy of the Convention against England. The one new departure of importance was the expedition to Egypt, where Austrian and Russian ambitions pointed the way. France was ready to despair of holding the war-torn West Indies, where emancipation had long been pre-saged, and looked to some nearer area where tropical products might be had. Even Tasmania had been under consideration,<sup>77</sup> or some new area in West Africa. In the end, Egypt seemed to answer obvious colonial and more recondite political aims.

The dramatic Egyptian episode thus had its origin not only in the ambitions of Napoleon and the jealousy of him felt by the Directory, but also in the disappointing end of the West Indies warfare. After the Treaty of Basle, 1795, England, the only Power at war with France, also desired peace; conferences, fruitless in the end, were held in Lille in 1797. It was then obvious that England's control over Holland's colonies, established since 1789, had almost secured to the hated rival the dominion of the seas. The long line of ports reaching to the rich East Indies must be broken.<sup>78</sup> The Directory wanted Bonaparte, after his successful campaign in Italy, to make a descent on Great Britain, but he advocated instead an attack on her posts in India. He proposed to seize first of all Egypt, on the way to India, a nominal dependent of France's ancient ally, Turkey, but actually only a military tyranny under the Mamelukes.

Such a step had been urged by many of the old imperialists throughout the 'seventies and 'eighties who thought an adventure on the Nile would be profitable; it would not only injure the British, but gratify the personal ambition of Bonaparte, who all his life hankered to emulate Alexander the Great. The Directory was glad to see the popular and independent general go far away. The venture was decided upon even before the Peace of Campo Formio, which explains the seizure from Venice of the Ionian Islands in May, 1797. Control of the Mediterranean to the Red Sea had been a French ambition since the days of Richelieu, who in 1626 received a mémoire on the subject. Less than half a century later Leibnitz wrote his famous project for the same enterprise. Colbert himself, and after him Seignelay, tried in vain to interest Louis XIV in this shorter trade route. Ten years earlier a great fillip had been given to dreams of revanche for French losses in India when De Castries had ordered investigation of Pigneau de Béhaine's desire to intervene in Indo-China for a port, Tourane.<sup>79</sup> The story of Napoleon's try is not strictly a colonial one, but it is

<sup>77</sup> Lokke, *op. cit.*, 21-92.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 102-105, 182-210.

worth while to know why this famous effort to break the communications of the British Empire came to nothing.

The French army, embarked in May, 1798, with great secrecy, escaped the English fleet cruising in the Mediterranean, and, after seizing Malta, landed near Alexandria and took it. The Mameluke cavalry was crushed at the Battle of the Pyramids in July, and the seizure of Cairo in the same month completed the immediate task.<sup>80</sup> Bonaparte at once organized the country as a base of operations against India. While respecting the customs and religion of the people, he began to reform the courts and the collections of imposts, developed the irrigation system, and fostered the cause of science by establishing the Institute of Egypt.

But meantime Nelson had destroyed the French fleet. The French army could not get out of Egypt except toward India. To do that, Syria must be won. After taking Gaza and Jaffa, Napoleon defeated the Turks at Mount Tabor. But this ended his good fortune, for at Saint-Jean-d'Acre defeat came on account of lack of artillery; an epidemic threatened the army; Turkish troops undertook to aid the English. He was obliged to fall back upon Egypt, fighting the Turks at Aboukir, more than ever cut off. To realize his political ambitions, Napoleon seized his quandary as a pretext for meeting the Second Coalition, and abandoned Egypt in October, 1799, leaving the command to Kléber.

In spite of military successes, Kléber's losses of soldiers and trouble in collecting taxes made his task a hard one. His remaining armed force had to ward off attacks by sea and from the isthmus, and police the great valley. His own morale was broken by the dissatisfaction and criticism of his officers. In the fall of 1799 he reported to the Directory his conviction that since the fleet had been lost, the only thing left was to make peace with the Porte and get out of Egypt.<sup>81</sup> Unfortunately, his discouraged report was captured by the English, who ordered their naval commander in the Mediterranean to accept no terms short of unconditional surrender, although a previous evacuation had been agreed upon. Kléber had actually given up, and was preparing to leave, when these terms animated him to reoccupy the whole country. A ringing defeat of the Turks at Heliopolis brushed the gloom from his despondent mind. In the midst of his successes he was murdered by a fanatical Turk from Aleppo on June 14, 1800.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>80</sup> A. Boulay de la Meurthe, *Le directoire et l'expédition d'Égypte* (Paris, 1885), 29, 39-41.

<sup>81</sup> Berthier, *Campagne d'Égypte*, 205-220, cited by J. Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la période napoléonienne, 1799-1815* (Paris, 1931), II, 105-106.

<sup>82</sup> Las Cases, *Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène*, cited *ibid.*, 121.

Napoleon at St. Helena always declared that Egypt could have been held for France if Kléber had promptly defended it.

England meantime sent a fleet to blockade Malta in 1800.<sup>83</sup> The inhabitants had expected autonomy under the Republic, but they were unable to rise against the repressions of the over-zealous Revolutionary authorities until the Battle of Aboukir gave England control of the seas; whereupon she blockaded the island and forced the French garrison to surrender in September.

Kléber's successor in Egypt, Menou, a disciple of Abbé Raynal, but without much capacity, was forced by Abercrombie to capitulate at Alexandria in 1801 and evacuate Egypt. The project had resulted in a huge expenditure of blood and treasure. Not much sympathy need be wasted on the despoiled Turk, nor perhaps on the Egyptians themselves, whose fortunes were not diminished. As a war measure the campaign had justification. But as a step in the colonial career of France, it deserves no more commendation than the later seizure of Egypt by England. Had France then shaken England's hold on India, the whole story of European expansion would have been changed.<sup>84</sup> Its most important effect was to put the French in contact with Islamic North Africa and give birth to the idea of a French protectorate there and a sort of modern crusade to "restore" the influence of the "Roumi." Most important of all, however, were the contacts with Oriental culture and the discoveries of French scholars, notably of the Rosetta stone.<sup>85</sup>

Charles-Roux points out, after summing up Napoleon's many attempts on the several kingdoms of North Africa, that none of them would have been successful, inasmuch as there was yet no peace with England, which that country became anxious to preserve after 1815. Nor was there yet the assurance that France would not acquire greater European territory; having failed there, the later African ventures were not impeded. Nor was there, until after Napoleon's time, anyone who knew how to adapt military strategy to local necessity—as did Bugeaud.<sup>86</sup>

The English had now won too much success to please Paul I, who was a great admirer of Bonaparte. The neutral league menaced England's vaunted supremacy of the seas. But Nelson bombarded Copenhagen—a severe blow—Paul was assassinated in a conspiracy in which England may have been interested, and the league was discov-

<sup>83</sup> Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 258-275.

<sup>84</sup> Lokke, *op. cit.*, 211-212.

<sup>85</sup> H. Froidevaux, "La politique coloniale de Napoléon 1<sup>er</sup>," *Revue des questions historiques*, LXVIII (Paris, 1901).

<sup>86</sup> Charles-Roux, *France et l'Afrique du Nord*, 493.

ered. Thereupon Bonaparte renewed the project of a descent upon England and assembled his forces at Boulogne. Nelson tried twice to burn the "cockle shells" intended to transport the French troops. England was frightened, but could do little because of her financial situation. The Pitt government was ruining the country; to carry on the war the debt had almost doubled, and the people complained of high taxes. Pitt was dismissed and succeeded by the Addison ministry, which was more than ready for peace.

The Peace of Amiens of 6 germinal, an X (March 27, 1802), restored Martinique, Gorée, and the India establishments, confirmed French sovereignty over Guiana north of the Arawari shore, and recognized French fishing rights on the coast of Newfoundland. England promised to return the Dutch colonies except Capetown and Ceylon on the road to India, and to evacuate Malta and Egypt. As Spain had ceded the eastern end of Saint-Domingue to France in 1795 and surrendered Louisiana in 1801, the colonial domain of France was greater in 1802 than it had been in 1783 under Louis XVI. But Saint-Domingue was getting farther and farther away from the French authority; all the Antilles were ruined; the return of Louisiana created a delicate situation between France and the United States, even though a good part of this wide domain was only nominally French. The colonial clauses of the Peace of Amiens could have no value unless the consulate could enforce them.

To sum up: the Revolutionary period is of main interest to the colonial story in that the idealism of those years was impotent to break the exploitative habit of centuries. France had no great concern for a new social order in the sugar islands because slave labor ran counter to the burning political philosophy she had espoused. It is not possible to say that she lost her colonies in the 1790's because of the contradiction between philosophy and practice; they were lost because England took them. Nor did the emancipation movement do more than accelerate a process long before initiated. The quandary of France in the Antilles remains today—no longer acute but vital—what to do with the blacks and the industry of the decadent relics of her day of greatest colonial prosperity.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE COLONIES UNDER CONSULATE AND EMPIRE

Napoleon, whatever his original opinions were, became a traditional colonial almost as soon as he seized the power. He shared the old Latin tradition of domination, and realized that to make France a great industrial and commercial power, he must be provided with raw materials not produced in France and markets for her wares; these would in turn make for a bigger navy and merchant marine.<sup>1</sup>

Colonial careers seemed to offer, as Talleyrand suggested, an outlet for men of action, or a refuge for those whom accidents of the Revolution had left without work. Talleyrand, on returning from a voyage to the United States, on July 3, 1797, read before the French Institute an "Essay on the Advantages to be derived from New Colonies under the Present Circumstances." This clever essay began a revival of colonial interest, which had waned for a decade under the assaults of the philosophers. The idea appealed to the First Consul, who declared: "If there are yet men tormented with desire to hate others, or who are embittered by their losses, immense countries await them. Let them go there and search for wealth and forget misfortune and trouble. The best wishes of the country go with them."<sup>2</sup>

The Egyptian campaign, aside from its theatrical motivation, proved his ability to grapple with colonial strategy. When it failed, Napoleon turned to the idea of restoring French power in Saint-Domingue, with Louisiana as a second part of a great movement for recuperation. His negotiations for the Peace of Amiens showed, too, that he could keep England out, for a future descent himself; he really never gave up his desire, born in 1797, for Oriental domination based on Egyptian conquest;<sup>3</sup> it was meat to his appetite to humble the Briton, whom he

<sup>1</sup> P. Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale, 1789-1830*, 12; Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la période napoléonienne*, 57.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. C. L. Lokke, *France and the Colonial Question*, 166-168. Answering Talleyrand's essay, a former consul at Tunis, Barthélemy de Saizieu, presented a memoir suggesting "the invasion and colonization of the civilized states of Africa," especially Tunis, for the seizure of the "greniers de Carthage." A few weeks later the Egyptian campaign began (F. Charles-Roux, *France et Afrique du Nord avant 1830*, 375-381).

<sup>3</sup> Marcel Dubois, *Systèmes coloniaux et peuples colonisateurs, dogmes et faits* (Paris, 1895), 274-275.

always sought to reduce to nonentity, as "this wart which we always have under our nose." An English diplomat declared about 1802: "You are destined to be the most powerful nation on the continent, as we are on the sea." But Napoleon waved aside such a tacit partnership, aspiring to preponderance on the sea as well as on the land. After failure to negotiate England out of Gibraltar, the obvious recourse was to renew French power in the Levant and North Africa. Hence his overtures to native princes of North Africa, Asia Minor, and India, and the missions to trustworthy men like Sebastiani and Decaen.<sup>4</sup> These and the Dominican project bear witness to Napoleon's triple colonial objective of restoring prosperity to the West Indies, making the Mediterranean a French lake, and dominating the Levant.<sup>5</sup> With these ends in view, peace in Europe was essential; first, to get all of Saint-Domingue, which Spain had been forced to give up in 1795, but which the war had prevented being transferred; then Louisiana, sought since 1798. His failure was due to neglect to keep up an adequate navy, though his stupid reactionary colonial legislation had the added effect of alienating the West India planters.

Most of his official entourage, save perhaps the jealous Ducrès, minister of the marine,<sup>6</sup> were in favor of maintaining and developing a colonial empire. This group had thoroughly creole colonial ideas. De Fleurieu, at the head of the council of marine, Malouet, Moreau de Saint-Méry, and Barbé-Marbois, officials of the Old Régime, stuck to the old economic and political doctrines, as did admirals Latouche-Tréville and Bruix. Above all, Napoleon's first wife, Josephine de Beauharnais, a relative of Moreau de Saint-Méry, was of creole origin and swayed by color prejudices. Through her family Napoleon was well informed on conditions in Martinique.

In all probability these personal influences were merely supports, rather than initiators, of his colonial aims. Although he was the smug "child of the Revolution," he could not conceive of government without absolute power; he believed in a social hierarchy of which the old colonial régime was an essential part.<sup>7</sup> Naturally, then, he thought

<sup>4</sup> A. Auzoux, "La Mission de Sebastiani à Tripoli," *Revue des études napoléoniennes* (1919), II, 225; Tessier, "Le général Decaen aux Indes," *Revue historique*, XV (1881), 349-381.

<sup>5</sup> Hardy, *Histoire de la colonisation française*, 130-131; Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 12; H. Adams, "Napoléon I<sup>er</sup> et Saint-Domingue," *Revue historique*, XXIV (1884), 92-130.

<sup>6</sup> Ducrès would not even answer the pleas of the colonial governors for ships when they were badly harassed by England (Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 13). This was understandable, for usually he had none.

<sup>7</sup> H. Froidevaux, "La politique coloniale de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>," *Revue des questions historiques*, LXIX (1901), 608-619.

that assimilation of the colonies to the mother country was a Revolutionary error;<sup>8</sup> the colonists must not enjoy the rights of French citizens, elect assemblies, or in any way drift toward autonomy. Nor could he envisage a slave population suddenly thrust into full liberty, at the risk of ruin. Hence his prompt move to revoke emancipation. Possession of colonial domain must provide not only economic advantage, but political points d'appui for the purpose of domination. There was nothing altruistic; all was for efficiency. In union with Spain he could operate Choiseul's old idea of the family compact to the destruction of the British seapower.

Once in the saddle, he began to call for reports on the colonies, especially Saint-Domingue, and to plan a restored control based on his ideas of authoritarian rule. Application of such principles wiped the work of the Revolution off the slate, taking its inspiration from the spirit of the Directory. The idea of "laws" voted by the Assembly disappeared within two years; in 1802 it was decided that "disregarding all previous laws, the colonial régime is to be subjected for ten years to regulations which will be made by the [home] government." This of course deprived the colonies of the last shadow of political guarantees. The resumption of war with England prevented Napoleon's senate from completing a provisional governmental system for them. At the moment there was only one colony, Guadeloupe, which was not held by England or torn by revolt. They lost even their colonial assemblies and town councils, while their administration was given to officers whose spirit was at one with that of the Old Régime; the captains-general, like the old governors, commanded the land and sea forces, named the employees and dealt with political affairs; the colonial prefects, charged with financial administration and economic development, had all the functions and troubles of the former intendants; and commissioners of justice supervised the courts and wrote the laws.<sup>9</sup> The captains-general were adroitly relieved of any temptation to regard themselves masters of their colonies, and it was made

<sup>8</sup> Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 12, sharply criticizes Art. 91 of the Constitution of An VIII, which provided for special colonial legislation, thus reversing the Revolutionary policy of assimilation. An interesting account of the relations of the Directory and First Consulate with North Africa, at the time when the Committee of Public Safety sent Herculais to the three Barbary states, is contained in François Charles-Roux, "Les travaux d'Herculais, ou une extraordinaire mission en Barbarie," *Revue d'histoire des colonies françaises*, XV (Paris, 1927), 1-32, 201-258, 321, 368, 543-580.

<sup>9</sup> Saintoyant, *Les colonies françaises pendant la période napoléonienne*, 60-63, 87-93; cf. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 280-292. The regulations were first enacted for Saint-Domingue, and later extended with modifications reflecting the relative importance of the other colonies; Schefer, *La France moderne*, 62-63, 67-68.

very clear to them that colonial administration had but one center, Paris. The local ordinances of the Old Régime were restored to operation.

The anti-slavery policy of the Revolution had brought such chaos that Napoleon, after several changes of mind, decided upon reestablishing, by the law of May 20, 1802, slavery and the slave trade, for it had been abolished by political manoeuvre rather than as a popular movement. "It is but a necessary evil," he said to the law-makers; "if, as rulers, we shed tears over the slave trade, we shall be like a general who weeps before the battle over those who are going to be killed." His partisan, Regnaud, declared before the legislative body that it was altogether "necessary, just, and honorable to turn back, in the political interest of France, in the interest of colonial agriculture and industry, and in the interest of humanity and an enlightened philosophy." It was also necessary to prevent a black republic in the Antilles from becoming a supporter of the United States.

His return to "laws and regulations in force before 1789" not only withdrew the freedom of the blacks, but the citizenship granted to mulattoes. To permit a Negro government in Saint-Domingue would wreck the whole colonial plan. Slavery and the Black Code were restored by General Richepance in Guadeloupe and by Hugues in Guiana. Moreover, in 1802 the government forbade free entrance into France of any colored people, and in 1803 prohibited marriage between blacks and whites.<sup>10</sup>

The principles of the Revolution were thus completely reversed. During the Hundred Days (March 20 to June 22, 1814) Napoleon flirted with a proposal to suppress the slave trade, in a momentary attempt to conciliate England, which had abolished the trade in 1807, under the impulse of humanitarianism collaborating with economic interests which saw that universal emancipation would net the British Empire a distinct gain over all competitors.<sup>11</sup>

Commerce was also remanded to the prohibitive system of the Old Régime under the regulations of April 30, 1784, and the navigation act of September 13, 1793; while the *Exclusif* was not restored, all colonial products were hit by terrific duties; four hundred to eight hundred francs were charged on one hundred kilos of cotton, sugar

<sup>10</sup> Emancipation had been nullified even by the Convention. But Napoleon had himself asserted shortly after his *coup d'état* that "liberty and equality of the blacks will not be modified." This was an intentional deception. Saintoyant, 77-78, summarizes French emancipation legislation to 1848.

<sup>11</sup> As Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 13, points out, this was of dubious wisdom once these rights had been extended. The anti-slavery writers were still active. Cf. Grégoire, *Littérature des nègres*, 1810, Sismondi, *De l'intérêt de la France à l'égard de la traite*, 1814; and his *Nouvelles réflexions sur la traite*, 1815.

paid one hundred francs, coffee one hundred and fifty francs, and cacao two hundred francs. While these were war measures primarily, the fisheries of whale and mackerel were regranted the old premiums. Preferential treatment was given to French colonial imports, and thirteen French ports were made entrepôts. On the whole, disdain was shown for the anti-colonial ideas of Adam Smith which Say generalized in France in his *Traité d'économie politique*, published in 1803.

It was necessary to wait until the Peace of Amiens before applying these principles, as they might cause resistance, and Napoleon delayed enforcing them in the colonies until he could do so with full use of his war forces. The peace with Austria made at Lunéville on February 9, 1801, and that of March 25, 1802, with England, both favored France by restoring to her the colonies, *i.e.*, Saint-Domingue, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Guiana, Sainte-Lucie, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, the Mascareignes, and the five posts in India. To these were added the eastern part of Saint-Domingue and Louisiana, ceded by Spain. Indeed, only Canada and India were missing, but those had been the best areas of possible expansion.

During the brief peace, Napoleon planned a general campaign to dominate the colonial situation, but renewed war brought his ventures to the same mishap as had attended the Guiana enterprises of 1796-1798, or the Saint-Domingue undertaking of 1797.<sup>12</sup> To establish himself in the Mediterranean, he sent General Brune as ambassador to Constantinople in 1802, "to restore by every means the supremacy which France had held there for two hundred years," to "maintain his rank among ambassadors of all nations," and "take back under his protection all the hospitals and the Christians of Syria and Armenia, especially in the Holy Places." Colonel Sebastiani was sent to Tripoli, Egypt, and Syria in 1803 to study the chances for an expedition to preserve Malta from English control.<sup>13</sup> At the same time, he entered into relations with the Barbary States, signed treaties of peace with Tripoli and Tunis, and sent a naval division to Algiers to compel the dey to restrain the corsairs (1802).

Renewal of action in the Orient was planned on a grand scale. Cavaignac, a former member of the Convention, was sent to establish commercial relations with Muscat on the Gulf of Oman, with the idea of winning the friendship of the *imam*, but the proposed *rapprochement* failed in 1803, and again in 1807.<sup>14</sup> He also helped his ally, Holland, to reestablish herself at the Cape of Good Hope and in the East

<sup>12</sup> Gaffarel, *La politique coloniale*, 14; Dubois and Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, 52-53.

<sup>13</sup> Hardy, *op. cit.*, 134; Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, 19, 94, 435.

<sup>14</sup> Saintoyant, 408, 426-429.

Indies, thus obtaining command of two strategic Oriental points. Decaen, sent out as captain-general of the five India posts, was to make preparations for driving the English out of the peninsula by setting up, in contrast to the British tyranny, a régime of "sweetness, dissimulation and simplicity." But as England shilly-shallied about restoring the posts, Decaen never got beyond the Île de France (1803) and had to be content with reorganizing the military government there. A move wider afield was the despatch of Captain Baudin to Australia, ostensibly on a scientific expedition, but in reality to anticipate the hated rival England in this new possibility of expansion. In 1800 Great Britain had already placed a convict colony at Port Jackson, where there were five thousand Australian "pioneers." They were absolutely without naval defenses, and the French might have taken them had they been able to send vessels from Mauritius.<sup>15</sup> In 1810, Napoleon made some preparations to capture Port Jackson, but as the British had taken the Cape of Good Hope his expedition never set sail.

Baudin's enterprise of 1802 was unable to do any real exploration because his crew was stricken with scurvy. His researches covered only fifty leagues of the Australian coast, and of his scientific staff of twenty-three, he sent back only three men to France. The British East India Company detailed to watch Baudin, Captain Flinders of the *Investigator* who showed the Frenchman many courtesies. The expedition did bring home a large collection of minerals, animals, and plants. The *Carte Générale* of 1807 by Baudin's cartographer presented for the first time a good delineation of Australia. Much of the information taken was obtained from Captain Flinders while he was imprisoned by General Decaen on the Île de France. The war-time ethics was not solicitous for scientists. It was under fear of Napoleon that the British seized Tasmania in 1803; but having won at Trafalgar in 1805, they had no further apprehension from the French and delayed their colonization of that island. Again in 1820-1826, the presence of French vessels in Australian waters impelled the English to settle the Swan River Colony.<sup>16</sup> Settlements were made at Derwent, Tamar, and Port Philip.

To turn from policies and plans to actual efforts in the field: in Napoleon's scheme of conquest it was of prime necessity to recover the

<sup>15</sup> In 1804 the British had actually scared Rear Admiral Linois, who was attempting to capture sixteen British merchantmen from India, by using flags and painted gun embrasures to make their vessels look like warships.

<sup>16</sup> Ernest Scott, *Terre Napoléonienne, A History of French Explorations and Projects in Australia* (London, 1910), 12-43, 248-275; Perron, *Voyage de découvertes aux terres australes* (1824), cited by Scott; M. Verdat, "Le Pacifique français," in Hanotaux and Martineau, VI, 440-441.

"Old Colonies" and set up his own governmental machinery in them. The three large Caribbean islands, especially Saint-Domingue, he planned to make the center of a great domain reaching south to Guiana and north throughout Louisiana; success in either North or South America would mean a new chance at expansion over a huge unpre-empted midland valley,<sup>17</sup> and free the Caribbean colonies from dependence upon the United States for food supplies. Especially should Louisiana play the rôle of granary for the Antilles.

Following the Peace of Amiens, Martinique and the Lesser Antilles were restored by England without complications, but reassertion of control of Guadeloupe was difficult, as that island had become a quasi-republic. In May, 1802, thirty-five hundred white troops were landed there under General Richepance, whose subordinate, a mulatto, Colonel Pélage, induced most of the inhabitants to submit without fighting. The others were harried into acquiescence, and slavery was restored, in conformity with Napoleon's design.<sup>18</sup>

The French design, beginning in 1798 to reduce the United States to sweet reasonableness by regaining control of Spanish Louisiana, advanced a definite step in the secret Treaty of San Ildefonso, but it was also necessary that war with the United States, already proved disastrous in the Caribbean during the short undeclared naval conflict, should not return to vex by distraction the untenable peace of Europe. Hence the rapidity and ease with which the Convention of 1800 was made with the United States.

But in Saint-Domingue, center of the Napoleonic dream of western colonial expansion, genuine restoration was impossible, for the reopening of the war in Europe and the failure of General Leclerc to dominate the island dislocated all plans for reconstruction. Toussaint had shown surprising capacity as an organizer. Using only his own resources, in 1801 he ended the Spanish domination in the eastern end of the island, which was swarming with trouble-makers. Assisted by an assembly of twelve, mostly white men, he proclaimed a constitution which Napoleon pretended at first to accept. Officially, Saint-Domingue was a "colony making part of the French empire, but with its own government, made up essentially of a central assembly and a governor." Toussaint soon became governor for life, with the privilege of naming his successor; it is interesting to observe that his accession to power had its analogies in the rise of Napoleon himself.

<sup>17</sup> M. Besson, *Histoire des colonies françaises*, 196; H. Adams, "Napoléon 1<sup>er</sup> et Saint-Domingue," *Revue Historique*, XXIV (1884), 93.

<sup>18</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la période napoléonienne*, 297-301. A number of rebellious mulattoes were imprisoned in France, but were liberated in 1803.

Toussaint used his real power to the best interest of his country, not overlooking personal ambition, nor successfully concealing disdain of white control. His finances were in good condition, his army of fifteen thousand well-disciplined men kept order everywhere, and in spite of their emancipation, he kept the blacks on the soil in a transitional condition of forced labor which the National Assembly had so often attempted in vain. Foreign commerce was being resumed, merchants and planters were going back to their places, and prosperity seemed to return. During the spring of 1801 Napoleon favored Toussaint, intending to utilize his very valuable capabilities.<sup>19</sup> But later when he evolved his scheme to use Saint-Domingue as the center of a vast expansion in the New World, Napoleon stopped at nothing to reestablish the national authority.

Although Toussaint announced his admiration, as "the first of the blacks" for the "first of the whites," the diminutive Corsican decided to break the greatest of the Caribbean patriots. The constitution drafted in 1801 by Toussaint's assembly, revealing the idea of a nominal allegiance cloaking real autonomy, showed that action by France would need to be taken at once.<sup>20</sup> Hence a strong expedition of about twelve thousand veterans of the Egyptian and Spanish campaigns was sent at the end of 1801, under command of General Leclerc,<sup>21</sup> to effect the rapid conquest of Toussaint's troops.<sup>22</sup>

When the fleet reached Samaná Bay (January 29, 1802) Captain-General Leclerc found Toussaint ready, with twenty thousand troops in various parts of the island, to resist his landing. When Leclerc landed his forces, General Christophe, under Toussaint's order, destroyed Cap Français and withdrew to the mountains. General Boudet took Port-au-Prince from General Agé, Toussaint's chief of staff, while the Negro leader Dessalines burned Saint-Marc and moved from Léogane into the interior. South Province and the Spanish part of the island surrendered without resistance. In three weeks, Leclerc was master of the parts mentioned, but, finding that Toussaint was being supplied with arms from the United States, he ordered a blockade.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> *Correspondance de Napoléon 1<sup>er</sup>* . . . , VII (Paris, Impr. Imp. 1861), 78. Auguste Nemours, *Histoire militaire de la guerre d'indépendance de Saint-Domingue* (Paris, 1925-1928, 2v.), I, 69-93; II, 170-199; T. L. Stoddard, *The French Revolution in San Domingo*, 283-295.

<sup>20</sup> Adams, *op. cit.*, in Note 5, quoting the notes written at St. Helena.

<sup>21</sup> Besson, *Histoire*, 197-198, says eighty vessels.

<sup>22</sup> Forty-five thousand troops were used before the affair ended. Napoleon's attitude in the relation to Saint-Domingue is disclosed in his *Correspondance*, VII; see especially 377, 381, 388, 406, 410, 547, 640, 676.

<sup>23</sup> Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 285-286; Adams, *op. et loc. cit.*

Toussaint had, thinks Saintoyant, brought on the conflict because he refused to surrender first place in the island or see it restored to French control—attitudes due to vanity and ambition. This author omits the secret orders to Leclerc published by Lokke, which show that Napoleon was, with Leclerc as his mouthpiece, following a two-faced policy with Toussaint, whom he intended ultimately to destroy. "Evidently," says Adams, "the most important part of the mission given to Leclerc was to arrest and exile the Negro chiefs."

On February 18, 1802, Leclerc declared Toussaint and Christophe rebels, and resumed hostilities, which had been suspended during a four days' truce. Toussaint resisted with fire and blood in savage abandon. The European troops fought with courage and persistence, but the tropical climate and the yellow fever caused them tragic losses. In the end the blacks, having burned all the coast towns and made a heroic resistance in the interior, were crushed; Toussaint was forced in May, 1802, to conclude a peace convention and accept amnesty. He then retired to Gonaives, and Dessalines to Saint-Marc, without military rank.<sup>24</sup> Then, in violation of the agreement, first by the Negro himself, who was hoping for relief from the invasion by French losses from yellow fever, then by the discouraged Leclerc, Toussaint was made prisoner in June and deported to France, where he died in April, 1803, as has already been told. Christophe and Dessalines had also surrendered.<sup>25</sup> Although beaten, the blacks kept up in secret a resistance which burst into flames through the entire island upon news of the decree of April 27, 1802, restoring slavery in Guadeloupe.<sup>26</sup> Incendiarism and assassination were rife. The harassed Leclerc, who had now as many as two thousand men each month in hospital, was bitter over neglect by the minister of France. His men resorted to ferocious punishments of the Negroes; dogs were set upon their trails, black men were hanged, poisoned and asphyxiated by sulphur; but the terror only excited worse extremes.<sup>27</sup>

Leclerc was able after the deportation of Toussaint to reorganize French control in some degree, observing the Spanish system long in

<sup>24</sup> Leclerc's letter, in Adams, *op. cit.*, 107.

<sup>25</sup> Hardy, *op. cit.*, 136; Besson, *Histoire*, 198; Adams, *op. cit.*, 109.

<sup>26</sup> Adams, *op. cit.*, 103.

<sup>27</sup> Stoddard, *The French Revolution in San Domingo*, 342, 347; Saintoyant, 203-206, points out the mistakes made by Toussaint, and finds him guilty of treason. He indisputably was ambitious and burned with zest for power. His loyalty to his race, which Saintoyant shows included their resubjection to nominal slavery, was certainly as great as French solicitude for their welfare. His family was interned at Agen, where his wife died in 1816. His son received a pension until 1854, and his widow half of it after that year. Adams, *op. cit.*, 111-113, exposes the bad faith of both Napoleon and Leclerc toward Toussaint.

use in the eastern part of the island. The Spaniards helped with supplies and arms, but the English, and especially the United States, displeased at the prospect of French expansion, would render no aid. The whites now foolishly boasted that reestablishment of French control was a race victory. The creole planters made haste to recuperate their fortunes and subject the blacks. Bands of Frenchmen ran about robbing, and indulging in an orgy of speculation and gambling. "The affairs of the sheep are never those of the dogs" (*Z'affé mouton pas z'affé cabrite*) complained the Haitians in their patois, despairing of justice and order.

When slavery was restored according to the consul's orders, a new furore began. The frightened Leclerc begged Decrès to go slowly; but a few days later the law was passed. By mid-September, 1802, revolt had spread over the whole island. Along with it marched the dreaded fever, an epidemic having begun in the spring. By June four generals had succumbed; by August four thousand troops had died.

Leclerc, himself stricken, and anxious to win peace for a successor before death should claim him, complained: "Les ravages de la maladie sont ici au delà de toute expression; since I have been here I have seen nothing but incendiarism, insurrections, assassinations, deaths, and dying; my spirit is exhausted." He tried to check the general desertions by disarming the blacks, but this only brought new revolts. He died on November 2, 1802, after painful incidents with General Humbert, who had alienated his wife. The incompetent Rochambeau, who succeeded him, vainly tried to compel order by continuing the wholesale executions Leclerc had begun. "The Saint-Domingue expedition has been a thing unheard of," wrote Bishop Mauviel; "a French country has been treated as an enemy by Frenchmen."<sup>28</sup> It was at this time that General Victor was sent to receive the ceded Louisiana and Florida from Spain, giving Napoleon a region from the Saint Mary's River on the Atlantic to the Rio Grande on the Gulf, to keep the United States from extending to that strategic shoreline.

Dessalines was chosen head of the insurrection in December and an offensive begun in which blacks and whites vied in ferocity. Even with nine thousand reinforcements, the French general was unable to conduct more than a guerilla warfare. Rochambeau strained every resource to evacuate the white civilian population; then, war being reopened with England in May, 1803, he surrendered on November 30 to Commodore Loring, after being prevented by head winds from departing under a capitulation given to Dessalines. General Nouailles at Môle Saint-Nicolas thereupon destroyed his supplies and fled to

<sup>28</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la période napoléonienne*, 208-209; Adams, *op. cit.*, 123-125, has several of Leclerc's last letters to Napoleon.

Cuba, eluding the British fleet on December 4-5, 1803. At that moment the French flag disappeared from the once richest colony. The remnant of the forces left in the Spanish colony hung on without effect for six years more at Santo Domingo, until the Spanish inhabitants helped to drive them out.<sup>29</sup>

Meantime Dessalines, Christophe, and Clervaux had, on November 30, 1803, proclaimed the independence of the island and restored its old name of Haiti. In 1804 Dessalines was made emperor, and on April 20, 1805, he ordered the massacre of all whites except the priests, doctors, and Americans who remained on the island. The black population itself had been reduced by half in a few short years. The French story in Haiti had but one more sorry chapter, that of the later attempts to regain power there.

It is not hard to point out now the many reasons for the colonial failures of the empire. The first mistake in Saint-Domingue had been the assumption that Toussaint was a mere malcontent who would succumb to Leclerc's cajolery. Next, the general himself knew little about the island, and was, like many of his officers, a partisan of the whites in the race war. Instead of being able to wipe out old causes of friction by studious surveys, he hurled himself into a military campaign which combined deceit and force, but with insufficient troops. Furthermore, even though the First Consul could not foresee the scourge of yellow fever, he should have the elemental wit to avoid restoration of slavery in Guadeloupe while Saint-Domingue was in the balance. It was this, rather than the tricky arrest of Toussaint, which drove the blacks to revolt. Neglect to send the whole force of forty-three thousand men employed on this errand at the very first, to make the subjection quick and complete, was the real cause of the military failure. The blacks were given time to develop a great solidarity and sense of power. But lying behind all that, of course, was the neglect to build up a united society out of elements so discordant that harmony could scarcely have been expected, granted the agencies and ideals of the Old Régime.<sup>30</sup> The New World still bears deep scars from the wounds of the exploitative ideas of the old colonial system. Haiti and all the Caribbean Islands still groping toward national entity suffer the evils of the conquest and of the forced immigration of the Negroes.

Discouragement over Saint-Domingue made Bonaparte give up his plans for Louisiana, the loss of which was more keenly regretted than that of Canada, because it would not compete with home products and would obviate need to purchase in foreign markets the domestic

<sup>29</sup> Besson, *Histoire*, 199; Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la période napoléonienne*, 228-229, 233.

<sup>30</sup> Rüsich, *Die Revolution von Saint Domingue*, 181, 205-206.

requirements in sugar, tobacco, coffee, and cotton. Therefore, when Spain joined the First Coalition in 1793, the hour for French recovery seemed to have struck. The Convention sent Genêt to the United States "to sound the attitude of the Louisianians toward the French republic." The United States had promised to repay its war debt of twenty-eight million livres, but had not done so, and it seemed in 1786 as though the Confederation might break up.<sup>31</sup> The Federal Union began payments in 1790, but the necessity of feeding refugees from Saint-Domingue in American towns led to application of some of the debt payments there instead of sending the money to France.

When Genêt brought prizes taken from the English into American ports and had them condemned by Convention consuls, and when he sent agents to Louisiana, the American government seized the corsairs and set about defeating his designs. The Kentuckians were ready to help him, and he raised volunteers in Carolina and Georgia. The cost of provisions he hoped to meet from payments on the war debt.<sup>32</sup> As Washington asked his recall, Fauchet replaced him and disavowed his policies, but he continued to urge recovery of Louisiana through diplomacy, and his volunteers created complications for some months.

Since 1785 conflict over the use of the mouth of the Mississippi by the western settlers of the United States had been growing more acute. In 1788 Moustier, French minister to Washington, advised Madrid to relax her rules at New Orleans, whereupon Spain sought to detach the western states from the Union in return for free exit to the Gulf. In 1791 the United States tried to negotiate terms concerning the navigation problem, and these conversations were going on while Genêt was offering to drive the Spaniards out. The Americans got the Treaty of San Lorenzo finally in 1795, opening the river for three years. This contributed to peace, but also gave impetus to the westward movement, so that when Napoleon began to want Louisiana, there were 800,000 Americans west of the Alleghenies.

Meantime the freedom of the seas for Americans had raised another set of acute problems. When England began seizures and impressments during the French Revolution, the Americans were urged by France to compel respect for the principle that "neutral ships make neutral goods." England made concessions to the Americans in the Jay Treaty intended to injure the French trade in the Antilles, in return for which

<sup>31</sup> Marcel Marion, in *Revue des deux mondes*, August 15, 1928.

<sup>32</sup> *Archives parlementaires*, Ser. I, LXXXIX, 402, Robespierre's condemnation of Genêt's activities; F. J. Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams," in *Amer. Hist. Review*, Jan., 1905, 249-279; A. P. Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803*. . . (N.Y. 1934), 101-129, 237-253.

the United States conceded the right to search neutral ships and confiscate goods on the high seas. This violated part of the terms of the French alliance, and the Convention complained, whereupon an accord was reached on November 18, 1794; but when the Jay Treaty became known in Paris, the Convention broke the accord. The Directory protested that the Jay Treaty broke the Alliance, and announced its determination to treat neutrals as they permitted England to do. Informal naval war between France and the United States followed, and the American Congress in July, 1798, declared the Alliance ended.

At the end of 1799, both sides seeing the futility of fighting, envoys of the United States met Napoleon in Paris. The latter, hoping for a maritime league against England, in December, 1799, restored neutral relations to their status under the treaties of 1778. In September, 1800, he celebrated with the United States a convention which ended difficulties by canceling mutual claims.<sup>33</sup> He then forced Godoy to cede Louisiana in October at San Ildefonso, by a treaty secretly ratified in March, 1801. He also tried to get Florida, but Great Britain and the United States objected.

To take possession of Louisiana, General Victor was sent, with a prefect, Laussat, and a judge, Aymé, in February, 1803. Victor, with only three thousand soldiers, found the people of New Orleans cold with regard to the change. When the Americans had their right of deposit withdrawn and a new depot refused, they tried to purchase the island of New Orleans, hoping that it could be obtained for the yet unpaid indemnities agreed upon in the convention of Martrefontaine of September 30, 1800. The American government was disturbed because the Westerners threatened secession unless they could have their "natural right" of free navigation of the Mississippi. In the United States Senate, Ross demanded seizure of New Orleans before a French occupation could occur. President Jefferson made still another effort to buy a part of the territory controlling the river, and Napoleon, seeing sentiment against him growing in both England and the United States, suddenly resolved to sell all of Louisiana to the latter to prevent its seizure during hostilities with the former. This was the practical end of a long policy, continuing that of the Bourbons, to restrict the United States to the Alleghenies and make her an appanage. After all, Louisiana without Saint-Domingue was a liability, not a colonial asset. In fact, Napoleon had declared at Saint-Cloud on April 10, 1803: "I consider the colony as already lost. [The sale] will be more

<sup>33</sup> G. N. Tricoche, "Une page peu connue de l'histoire de France: la guerre franco-américaine (1798-1801)," *Revue historique*, LXXXV (1904), 288-289; G. W. Allen, *The Naval War with France* (New York, 1909).

useful to the policy and to the commerce of France than it would should I try to hold it." Livingston and Monroe, who had gone to Paris to demand retention of the commercial privileges which American citizens had enjoyed under the Spaniards, or even to buy the Island of Orleans, rose to the occasion. Barbé-Marbois (Talleyrand being in eclipse over the XYZ affair) represented the French government. Napoleon finally received out of the eighty millions agreed upon, only about fifty million francs.

War was resumed in 1803; the famous Battle of Trafalgar, on October 21, 1805, destroyed the French fleet and made further colonial enterprises impossible. England, for a time delayed in more serious and profitable affairs, in 1809 set definitely about ending French overseas tenure. In Martinique, Villaret-Joyeuse, the captain-general, had only two thousand men against eighteen thousand English, and capitulated in February, 1809. Guadeloupe gave up in 1810. Guiana was attacked at the same time by an English squadron and an army from Brazil, and Victor Hugues surrendered to the Portuguese rather than to the British. Senegal, which had not been attacked during the Revolution, was occupied at about the same time. There was by the end of 1810 nothing left to France, either in America or in Africa.<sup>84</sup> Only the frame of overseas government was preserved, ready, as it transpired, to be utilized under the restorations of 1814 and 1815.

But the never discouraged Napoleon began again to plan reconquest of India. General Decaen, sent to make observations in India and the Mascareignes, supported the project although he could not get beyond the Île de France. Most of the Hindu princes were ready to aid a European Power like France who would offer escape from English dominion.

In 1804, when forced to give up his planned descent upon the British Isles, Napoleon wanted to attack India with twenty thousand troops; but Decrès convinced him that he had no fleet capable of such a campaign. Decaen felt confident that three or four thousand men would suffice to crush the British domination in India; in 1807 the emperor was again preparing to send twenty-nine vessels into the Indian Ocean, but war with Spain prevented. Meanwhile, the English reinforced their garrisons in India and pacified the country, so that Napoleon had to give up this project.<sup>85</sup>

The emperor then wanted to make Persia an ally against Russia as well as against England, and so permit him to fulfill his dominant passion of getting into India. A treaty of alliance with Persia, which

<sup>84</sup> Saintoyant, 284-333; Schefer, *La France moderne*, 69.

<sup>85</sup> Saintoyant, 374; 1805 project, *ibid.*, 431-434.

he had sought since 1805, was signed at Finckenstein<sup>86</sup> in May, 1807, but Napoleon made peace with Russia in the Treaty of Tilsit, and the shah of Persia, left thus isolated, made peace with England and not with the Mahrattas, as had been planned.

The same dream inspired relations with Russia. In 1808 Napoleon conceived of a combined French and Russian army marching through central Asia or Syria and Mesopotamia.<sup>87</sup> The project of 1811 contemplated the great Moscow campaign, which apparently was only the first step of a march on India.

Decaen succeeded for seven years in making the Mascareignes well guarded, prosperous possessions, fortifying them with great care, creating a network of roads, and developing cultivation. He established at Tamatave, on Madagascar, a commercial post which prospered under the care of Sylvain Roux.<sup>88</sup> The Mascareignes were thus made a naval base where French vessels revictualled and carried on an active struggle against the English. The latter, in order to get rid of this menace, sent large forces which took Rodriguez in 1809, Bonaparte or Bourbon in 1810, and in the same year the Île de France, which then became Mauritius. The Seychelles succumbed in 1811, as did Tamatave, which had only fifty men with which to beat off a whole English naval division.<sup>89</sup>

Napoleon seems to have considered all these colonial losses as merely temporary, which England would be obliged to restore at the end of the war. The *Moniteur* acknowledged the situation as inevitable, but declared that the ties of sentiment which attached the colonies to the mother country would be reknit, and their pride aroused under the domination of the enemy.

Thus the last of the French colonies was in England's hands five years before Napoleon fell, the key to every loss being lack of seapower or faulty slavery policy. The first Treaty of Paris, on May 30, 1814, returned to France some fragments: (1) in the Antilles, the possessions of 1792, save for Sainte-Lucie and Tobago, ceded to England; and Guiana, retained by the Portuguese; (2) fishing rights in Newfoundland, under the conditions of January 1, 1792; (3) in Africa, the Senegal establishments; (4) in the Indian Ocean, the five villas of India, while the Seychelles, Rodriguez, and Île de France remained

<sup>86</sup> H. Déherain, *Les préliminaires de l'alliance Franco-Persane sous le premier empire*, reviewed in *Académie des sciences coloniales, Comptes Rendus*, VI (1925-1926), 241-253.

<sup>87</sup> Dubois and Terrier, *op. cit.*, 57-58.

<sup>88</sup> Tessier, "Le général Decaen aux Indes," *Revue historique*, 1881; Henri Prentout, *L'Île de France sous Decaen*.

<sup>89</sup> Saintoyant, *op. cit.*, 384-426.

English.<sup>40</sup> These were the colonies returned to Louis XVIII before the Hundred Days. The second Treaty of Paris and the Treaties of Vienna confirmed the restitution, after the second exile of Bonaparte, of an area of about 100,000 square kilometers. This "shadow of colonial domain" had been ruined by war and revolt, and there seemed no prospect of improvement. Prohibition of the slave trade, which did not embarrass the English colonies, abundantly provided with Negroes, left the French islands with insufficient labor supply. Moreover, the staple products of the Antilles had henceforth to compete with those of Brazil and Insulinde, where large-scale production of tropical crops had begun, and with European beet sugar. Furthermore, the scattered French islands were all dominated strategically by the English in Canada, India, and Australia, West Africa, and at the Cape, while the islands taken by England like Sainte-Lucie, Tobago, Île de France, and Trinidad, were all of high strategic importance.<sup>41</sup>

Historians generally look with little favor upon the colonial work of Napoleon. Léon Deschamps says, for example, that he "bears almost alone the responsibility for our ruin and our colonial antipathies."<sup>42</sup> Others claim that Napoleon was "almost the only one of many leaders save Richelieu to grasp the political importance of our colonies, above all in our conflicts with British power"; but "embracing the whole world in his measureless combinations he had neither time nor means to execute them."<sup>43</sup> His reestablishment of the institutions of the Old Régime should not be regarded as a political error, for :

The experience of atrocious discords which distracted our Antilles and assured the rapid triumph of our enemies in India was, alas, sufficient to cause legislators . . . to be anxious for a respite for accomplishment and a new study; the experience of Saint-Domingue . . . revealed all the imprudence of the revolutionary leveling process in countries poorly developed. And if it is correct to recognize that the politicians of the Revolution neither uttered nor applied the absurd dictum: "Let the colonies perish rather than a principle" justice demands the acknowledgment that these violent applications of principles had not caused them to perish, and yet we had lost them. It was, then, proper to take up again the work of organization and bring it to a point.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>40</sup> The treaty is in A. J. H. de Clercq, *Recueil des traités de la France* (Paris, 1864-1917, 24v.), II, 414-427. Saintoyant, 462. Schefer, *La France moderne*, 70-85, discusses the features of the treaty and the value to France of the tropical colonies restored; Hardy, *op. cit.*, 141.

<sup>41</sup> A. J. Grant and H. W. Temperley, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1928), 389.

<sup>42</sup> *Histoire de la question coloniale*, 347 ff.; Saintoyant is also critical both of the Old Régime and of Napoleon.

<sup>43</sup> Harmand, *La domination et la colonisation*, 86; Saintoyant, II, 453-462.

<sup>44</sup> Dubois and Terrier, *Un siècle d'expansion coloniale*, 49.

It is, therefore, very difficult to make a just evaluation of the colonial work of Napoleon; his vast projects must be considered sincere, but quite subordinated to the military exigencies of his campaigns; in his plans for American and Indian colonization he hoped to found "a greater France"; but all of them failed because of his foreign policy, and because of his final defeat.<sup>45</sup>

Drawing a sermon from the experience of France with the negroid colonies of the Old Régime, Saintoyant points out that "any sovereign state which, instead of seeking exclusively to find in its colonial natives collaborators in its economic work, seeks to make of them soldiers for its defense and neophytes for its political parties, is [only] preparing for troubles and insurrections."<sup>46</sup> The colonial story throughout the nineteenth century and the first third of the twentieth, shows the sovereign states still groping for solutions of the same problems of dependencies.

<sup>45</sup> He himself seemed sure that the old colonial system, for England as well as for France, had definitely disappeared; his prognostications were at least premature if we bear in mind the "temporary" revivals of colonial empires during the nineteenth century. See Maurice Gagneur, *Napoléon d'après le Mémorial de Saint-Hélène* (Paris, 1921), *passim.*, and especially chap. XI, for his many "it might have beens."

<sup>46</sup> Saintoyant, *La colonisation française pendant la période napoléonienne*, 496. Prosper Germain, *La France Africaine* (Paris, 1907), in an elaboration of his thesis that France should exchange all her non-African overseas holdings and concentrate in Africa, fears lest other policies, including neglect of the navy, may compel France to do again what Napoleon did in relinquishing Louisiana (345-349).

	SAINT-DOMINGUE	MARTINIQUE	GUADELOUPE	SAINTE-LUCIE	TABAGO	CAYENNE	SAINT-PIERRE ET MIQUELON	COLONIES D'AFRIQUE	ILE DE FRANCE et BOURBON	INDE
<b>3° DÉTAIL DES DÉPENSES CIVILES DES COLONIES</b>										
Officiers d'administration.....	233,866	125,500	93,900	27,400	26,800	32,300	12,352	15,660	113,400	58,800
Intendant.....	80,000	60,000	40,000	1 commissaire ordon. 12,000	1 commissaire ordon. 12,000	Commissaire général. 14,000	1 contrôleur..... 4,480		Intendant..... 40,000	
Commissaire ordonnateur.....	18,000	12,000	24,000	2 contrôleurs..... 1,600	2 contrôleurs..... 1,000	Commissaire ordon. 6,000	2 écrivains..... 5,874		2 commissaires génér. 22,000	
9 commissaires.....	58,000	25,000	7,500	3 écrivains..... 3,000	3 écrivains..... 3,000	Contrôleur..... 4,500	Commis..... 1,902		2 commissaires..... 6,000	
1 contrôleur.....	8,000	2 contrôleurs..... 1,100	3 écrivains..... 16,400	3 —..... 2,400	2 —..... 2,400	1 écrivain..... 3,000			1 contrôleur..... 8,000	
10 écrivains.....	34,000	6 écrivains..... 34,000	Frais de bureau..... 2,000			2 —..... 4,800			5 écrivains..... 9,000	
13 —.....	37,866	13 —..... 37,866							6 —..... 14,000	
Tribunaux de justice.....	290,000	19,568	10,573	4,693	800	265,480	»	»	157,976	52,638
Président.....	15,000	police	police	police	police	Doyen..... 2,400			2 conseils supérieurs	
Procureur général.....	15,000	(1 sergent et 19 archers)	(1 sergent, 1 caporal et 11 archers)	(1 brigadier et 4 archers)		Procureur général..... 2,400			(24 membres)	
18 conseillers.....	162,000					5 conseillers..... 9,400			2 juridictions royales	
3 substituts.....	8,000					1 greffier..... 4,000			(8 membres)	
30 conseillers sénéchaux.....	90,000					1 huissier..... 300			Police..... 53,176	
						Police..... 2,740				
Gardes-magasin.....	22,586	»	»	»	»	»	»	»	19,000	4,600
(14 titulaires)									(14 titulaires)	(2 titulaires)
Receveurs du domaine.....	27,134	55,526	70,933	19,300	16,767	33,190	»	29,100	»	11,860
(15 titulaires et 3 commis)	(16 titulaires et 25 commis)	(50 titulaires)	(9 titulaires)	(8 titulaires)	(15 titulaires)					
Commis de différents bureaux.....	180,344	»	»	»	»	»	»	»	73,800	»
(45 titulaires)										
Officiers de santé.....	15,668	»	10,800	3,900	2,566	15,880	5,568	3,000	32,400	19,800
(15 titulaires)		(6 titulaires)	(2 titulaires)	(1 titulaire)	(17 titulaires)	(4 titulaires)			(45 titulaires)	
Aumôniers.....	12,533	28,193	12,277	11,217	2,000	51,820	3,976	1,800	28,000	9,200
(18 titulaires)	(41 titulaires)	(dominicains, capucins et carmes)	(11 titulaires)	(2 titulaires)	(23 titulaires)				(27 titulaires)	
Divers entretenus.....	47,695	82,793	64,760	23,920	26,833	17,042	3,352	»	22,800	29,932
7 piqueurs et gardiens.....	3,000	6 gardes-magasin. 1 arpenteur. 2 tonneliers. 2 concierges.	3 gardes-magasin. 2 gardes-artilleurs. 1 arpenteur. 1 tonnelier. 4 gardes-bureaux. Concierges. Commis.	1 garde-magasin. 1 garde-artilleur. 1 arpenteur. 4 gardes-bureaux. Commis..... 16,800	1 garde-magasin..... 3,000 1 garde-artilleur..... 1,500 1 arpenteur..... 2,800 1 tonnelier..... 800 Commis..... 14,400 Garçon de bureau..... 1,200 Gardiens. 3 nègres..... 2,733	1 charron. 1 forgeron. 1 caïfat. 3 charpentiers. 2 armuriers. 2 gardes-jardins. 1 vétérinaire. 4 inspecteurs de la pêche de la tortue. 3 économes. 2 archers.	(7 titulaires, dont 1 juge) 840		Résidents et commissaires aux Seychelles, à Rodrigue à Madagascar 1 directeur de jardin. 6 imprimeurs. 6 ouvriers à Madagascar. 4 ouvriers à Rodrigue.	
1 botaniste.....										
1 aumônier.....										
2 tonneliers.....										
2 charpentiers.....										
2 maçons.....										
1 forgeron.....										
12 —.....										
8 matres canonnières.....										
Indemnités.....	40,344	48,578	3,333	»	»	»	»	»	»	»
(6 artilleurs)	(6 établissements charitables)	(1 établissement charitable)								
Ateliers de nègres du roi.....	112,080	»	»	»	»	34,419	»	»	30,000	»
(357 nègres, 1 inspecteur, 2 économes et 3 piqueurs)						(Etablissements royaux à Vincent-Pinçon, Oyspok, Iles-la-Mère, Kourou, Sinnamaria, Iracoubo, Francoubo.)				
Dépenses diverses et extraordinaires.....	1,376,000	226,294	136,320	109,460	107,930	122,370	32,980	73,300	1,522,620	244,188
Etablissement des Gonaïves.....	19,000	Bagne..... 17,294	Bagne..... 11,320	Bagne..... 2,300	Loyers..... 39,330	Loyers..... 3,600	Envois de France.... 10,000	Envois de France.... 8,700	Bureaux..... 35,000	
Édifices royaux.....	240,000	Loyers..... 25,000	Loyers..... 50,000	Loyers..... 12,000	Frais de bureaux..... 6,000	Transports..... 6,000			Transports..... 12,000	
Loyer de l'inspecteur des milices.....	50,000	Frais de bureaux..... 18,000	Frais de bureaux..... 6,000	Frais de bureaux..... 24,000	Transports..... 12,000	Hôpitaux..... 6,000			Hôpitaux..... 120,000	
Fournitures dans les magasins.....	18,000	Transports..... 15,000	Transports..... 8,000	Transports..... 800	Travaux..... 28,000	Travaux..... 50,000			Prisons..... 12,000	
Transports dans les quartiers.....	20,000	Journées d'ouvriers..... 12,000	Journées d'ouvriers..... 6,000	Journées d'ouvriers..... 5,000	Imprévu..... 18,000	Imprévu..... 10,000			Envois de France... 636,870	
Voyages.....	6,000	Hôpitaux..... 8,000	Prisons..... 25,000	Prisons..... 5,000	Canot du port..... 600	Envois de France... 117,242			Achats de vivres... 20,940	
Journées d'ouvriers.....	6,000	Prisons..... 44,000	Travaux de port..... 12,000	Travaux de port..... 30,000		Achats de vivres... 20,940			Baleaux..... 20,000	
Luminaire du corps de garde.....	10,000	Fort-Royal..... 18,000	Imprévu..... 20,000	Imprévu..... 20,000		Indiens..... 4,800			Mines de fer..... 19,200	
Indemnités pour déplacements.....	10,000					Milices des mulâtres. 4,800				
Frais de capture des déserteurs.....	50,000									
Frais d'impression.....	39,000									
Imprévus.....	40,000									
Travaux de voirie et construction d'un palais de justice.....	808,000									

	SAINT-DOMINGUE	MARTINIQUE	GUADELOUPE	SAINTE-LUCIE	TABAGO	CAYENNE	SAINT-PIERRE ET MIQUELON	COLONIES D'AFRIQUE	ILE DE FRANCE et BOURBON	INDE
<b>4° DÉTAIL DES DÉPENSES MILITAIRES PAR COLONIE</b>										
Etat-major.....	311,032	119,200	117,600	36,600	36,600	32,500	4,900	24,000	82,400	24,000
(24)	(6)	(9)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(1)	(4)	(2)	
Gouverneur.....	100,000	80,000	60,000	24,000	24,000	24,000	2,720	24,000	30,000	18,000
Infanterie.....	1,543,010	506,200	510,356	228,673	269,573	153,709	17,928	100,000	1,108,312	
2 régiments Port-au-Prince. 132 officiers. 2,296 soldats.	1 régiment, dont 2 bataillons dans l'île: 66 officiers. 1,148 soldats.	2 bataillons: 66 officiers. 1,148 soldats.	1 bataillon du régiment de Martinique: 31 officiers. 573 soldats.	1 bataillon: 31 officiers. 572 soldats.	1 bataillon: 25 officiers. 458 soldats.	4 officiers. 60 soldats.	1/2 bataillon: 15 officiers. 398 soldats.	2 régiments Pondichéry. 132 officiers. 2,296 soldats.		
Artillerie.....	282,525	149,639	44,243	»	»	»	»	»	268,631	
4 compagnies: 20 officiers. 352 soldats.	3 compagnies: 19 officiers. 276 soldats.	1 compagnie: 5 officiers. 88 soldats.							3 1/2 compagnies: 20 officiers. 352 soldats.	
Génie.....	77,167	»	8,450	3,450	3,450	13,850	»	»	220,705	
Troupes noires ou indigènes.....	»	10,000	15,000	»	»	»	»	»	»	130,000
Envois de France.....	»	560,421	440,000	169,550	174,003	138,063	»	34,950	305,600	»
300 hommes.	300 hommes.								5 compagnies de pipaves.	

	SAINT-DOMINGUE	MARTINIQUE	GUADALOUPE	SAINTE-LUCIE	TABAGO	CAYENNE	SAINT-PIERRE ET MIQUELON	COLONIES D'AFRIQUE	ILE DE FRANCE et BOURBON	INDE
<b>5° DÉTAIL DES DÉPENSES DE LA MARINE PAR COLONIE</b>										
Officiers de port.....	39,400	7,000	9,500	5,500	6,080	5,800	2,984	1,200	15,900	23,682
(44)	(3)	(4)	(7)	(6)	(4)	(2)	(1)	(7)		
Entrepôts.....	25,000	»	»	»	»	»	»	»	»	»
Stations navales.....	250,000	»	»	»	»	»	»	»	543,500	»

## INDEX

- Abenakis, 240, 241, 242, 311  
 Abercrombie, James, 248  
 Abercrombie, John, 207, 222, 341  
 Aboukir, Battle of, 340, 341  
 Abyssinia, 19  
 Academy of Science of Paris, 300  
 Acadia, 52, 55-64, 72, 153, 155-157, 240-244, 251, 293, 311  
 "Acadian Coast," 225-226  
 Acadians in Louisiana, 227, 228, 234; in New France, 240-242, 246  
 Aché, Comte d', 199-202  
 Acre, 17  
 Adams, H., 351  
 Adams, John, 288, 335  
 Adanson, Michel, 166  
 Addison, 342  
 Adet, 337  
 Admiral of Bretagne, 66; of France, 66, 67; of Guyenne, 66; of Levant, 66  
 Admiralties, 22  
 Adran, Bishop of, 283  
*Affranchis*, 320  
 Africa, 19, 25, 31, 33, 143, 272, 275, 290, 292, 304, 356, 357; trade, 109, 110, 131, 158, 203, 206, 216; voyages, 35-36, 53, 92, 121  
 Africa Company, 160  
 African coast, 175, 262; coast trade, 116; slaving stations, 98; ventures, 341  
 Agadir, 32  
 Agde, 2  
 Agé, General, 350  
 Age of Discovery, 29-43, 170  
 Agrah, 176  
 Agriculture, 15, 21, 27, 47, 57, 86, 89, 118, 127, 138, 290, 297, 307, 314, 319, 346; in Africa, 158, 163; in Canada, 147, 148, 151, 310; in Guiana, 93, 99, 100, 103, 106, 107; in India, 170, 179; in Indies, 77, 79-81, 84-88, 128, 255, 257, 273, 274; in Louisiana, 224, 226, 233; in Madagascar, 113, 121; in Mascareignes, 209, 211-214, 219; in New France, 61, 69, 71, 73, 238, 240  
 Aigues-Mortes, 28  
 Ailhaud, 332  
 Aix-la-Chapelle, peace of, 166  
 Alabama River, 224  
 Albany, 239, 244  
 Alberta, 238  
 Albreda, 164-167, 169  
 Albuquerque, Alfonso de, 171  
 Alburquerque, Jerónimo, 96  
 Aleppo, 177, 340  
 Alexander VI, Pope, 171  
 Alexander the Great, 339  
 Alexandria, 7, 26, 176, 340, 341  
 Algerians, 58, 68, 280  
 Algiers, 31, 32, 68, 347  
 Algonquins, 62, 75  
 Alivardi Khan, 197  
 Alleghenies, 226, 230, 311, 354, 355  
 Allegheny River, 244  
 Allouez, Father, 149  
 Almeida, Francisco de, 109  
 Alsace, 124  
 Amalfi, 7  
 Amazon River, 35, 93-98, 100-103, 122, 300  
 Ambadiatafa, 123  
 Amboise, Conspiracy of, 56  
 Amboyna, 171  
 America, 33, 34, 35, 40, 43, 46, 59, 71, 75, 77, 84, 88, 97, 109, 131, 144, 160, 162, 247, 248, 251, 277, 290, 304, 305, 309, 310, 312, 313, 356; trade, 135, 137, 138  
 American, 125, 235, 236, 262, 278, 285-286, 287, 289, 297, 314, 323, 325, 326, 335, 356, 359  
 American Revolution, 142, 204, 205, 266, 277, 280, 284-287, 316  
 American Union, 244  
 Americans, 288, 312, 335, 353, 354  
 Amherst, General, 250  
 Amiens, 3, 15, 207  
*Amis des Noirs*, 318, 322, 324, 327, 329

- Amsterdam, 64, 166  
 Anaverdi Khan, 187-189, 191  
 Andalusia, 13  
 Ango, Jean, 25, 35, 37-40, 44, 76  
 Angoulême, 30; Marguerite d', 39  
 Anguilla, 92  
 Anjou, Duke of, 52  
 Annam, 283  
 Annapolis (Port-Royal), 60, 241, 242, 245  
 Anne of Austria, 124  
 Anne, Queen, 154  
*Annona*, 3  
 Anse Dauphine, 111  
 Anson, Admiral, 247  
 "Antarctic France," 47, 50  
 Anticosti Is., 41  
 Antigua Is., 79, 81, 85, 92  
 Antilles, 35, 37, 79, 84, 85, 87, 92, 100, 101, 103, 107, 133, 165, 216, 224, 246, 253-263, 264-275, 287, 288, 298, 299, 301, 303, 304, 314, 323, 326, 342, 346, 349, 355, 357, 358; Lesser, 76, 256, 326, 337, 349  
 Antioch, 15  
 Antongil Bay, 112, 122  
 Antonio, Dom, 52, 54  
 Anville, D', 242  
 Apaches, 232  
 Apalachees, 156  
 Apollinaire, Père, 163  
 Apulia, 13  
 Aquitaine, 14  
 Arabia, 175, 177, 186  
 Arabian coffee, 211, 212; knowledge, 18  
 Arabic invasions, 4  
 Arabs, 5, 13, 19, 216  
 Aragon, 29  
 Araoua, 104  
 Arawaks, 85, 98  
 Arawari, 342  
 Arcin, A., 23  
 Arcot, 186, 187, 191, 193, 197, 199, 200, 202, 205  
 Arctic Circle, 71; route, 171  
 Argall, Samuel, 61  
 Argentine, 278  
 Argeret, sieur d', 210  
 Arguin, 160-162, 166  
 Arkansas River, 149, 225, 230, 232  
 Arles, 3, 5  
 Armada de Barlovento, 76  
 Armed convoys, 27, 45  
 Armenia, 347  
 Arms, 9, 160, 162, 229, 243, 284, 314, 329, 331, 350  
 Arnauld, 263  
*Arnott*, 103  
*Arrêts*, 133, 147, 215, 268, 307  
 Arriola, Andrés de, 153  
 Arrost, Governor d', 338  
 Arroyo Hondo, 233  
 Artois, 124  
 Aruba, 92  
 Asia, 34, 121, 131, 203, 214, 219, 248, 282, 290, 292, 357  
 Asia Minor, 33, 176, 344  
 Asiento, 139, 140, 142  
 Assemblée du Nord, 328, 330  
 Assembly of Notables, 67, 174  
 Assembly of Saint-Marc, 320, 328, 329, 330  
 Assizes of Jerusalem, 18  
*Associés de la Navigation aux Indes Orientales*, 174  
*Astrolabe*, 282  
 Astruc, 194  
 Atanosse, 121  
 Atlantic, 34, 39, 55, 67, 139, 141, 183, 237, 239, 245, 263, 266, 276, 291, 352  
 Atlas Mountains, 31  
 Attakapas, 228  
 Aubert, Captain, 81, 83  
 Aubry, Governor, 234  
 Audifreddy, D', 103  
 Auger, Governor, 210  
 Augsburg, Peace of, 55  
*l'Auguste*, 211  
 Augustinians, 163  
 Aurangzeb, 170  
 Aurengabad, 192, 194  
 Australia, 282, 348, 358  
 Austria, 65, 154, 246, 284, 289, 315  
 Austrian, 122, 156, 314, 339  
 Autheuil, Count d', 192, 194, 197  
 Avangour, Jean du Bois d', 75  
 Aversa, 13  
 Aymé, 255  
 Azores, 33, 35, 36, 38, 53  
 Baas, Governor de, 89, 254, 255, 298  
 Baber, 170  
 Bacot, 218

- Bagdad, 175  
 Bahama Channel, 50  
 Bahamas, 92, 253, 260  
 Bahía, 36  
 Baie de France, 23  
*Baillis*, 8  
 Balagdi Rao, 194  
 Balassar, 180  
 Balboa, Vasco Núñez de, 34  
 Baldwin, Count of Flanders, 16  
 Baltic trade, 129, 294  
 Baltimore, 122; Bishop of, 235  
 Bambouk, 20, 164, 165 (*See also* Gold in Africa)  
 Bananas, 260  
 Bander Abassi, 179  
 "Bandoliers du Mississippi," 228  
 "Banians," 219  
 Bantam, 177, 179  
 Baol, 160  
 Barbacoa, 77  
 Barbados, 78, 79, 81, 85, 92, 98, 256, 261  
 Barbarossa, brothers, 31  
 Barbary, 26, 31, 58, 67, 68, 114, 347  
 Barbé-Marbois, 326, 327, 344, 356  
 Barbuda, 79  
 Barcelona, 7  
 Bargaret, 185, 196  
 Barnave, 319, 320, 321, 322, 325, 330  
 Baron, François, 177, 179, 190, 298  
 Barre, sieur Lefebvre de la, 89, 100, 102  
 Bart, Captain, 261  
 Basques, 159  
 Bassalet Jing, 202  
 Basse Terre, 81, 261  
 Bassein, 173, 185  
 Bastille, 188, 327  
 "Bastion of France," 32, 58, 68 (*See also* La Calle)  
 Batavia, 207, 218, 219  
 Baton Rouge, 154  
 Battle of Aboukir, 341  
 Battle of the Pyramids, 340  
 Battle of Trafalgar, 356  
 Baudin, Captain, 348  
 Baudry de Lozières, 327  
 Bavaria, 284  
 Bay of Biscay, 21  
 Bay of Fundy, 61, 240  
 Bayeux, 14  
 Bayonne, 14, 35, 77  
 Beaucaire, 9, 10  
 Beauchesne, 143  
 Beauharnais, Governor, 230, 237, 238, 242, 261  
 Beaulieu, Augustin, 111  
 Beaugerard, 119, 209, 210  
 Beausse, sieur de, 116, 179  
 Beauvais, Vincent de, 18  
 Beauvais, mulatto brigadier, 333  
 Beauvillier de Courchant, Governor, 211  
 Beaver, 130  
 Béhague, 105, 338  
 Béhaine, Pigneau de, 281, 283, 339  
 Belgic Gaul, 2  
 Belgium, 105  
 Béliardi, Abbé, 277, 278  
 Bellecombe, 122, 204  
 Bellefond, Villault de, 24  
 Bellenger, Étienne, 52  
 Belzunce, Governor, 268  
 Benazet, 272  
 Benevento, 14  
 Bengal, 170, 173, 176, 187, 197, 199, 201, 203, 204, 205, 247  
 Benyowski, "Count" Mauric August, 121, 122, 123  
 Berber, 58, 68, 280  
 Berbice, 97, 98  
 Bermudas, 77, 81, 98  
 Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, J. H., 220, 221  
 Bernier, 177  
 Bertie, Admiral, 207  
 Bertin, chevalier Antoine, 222  
 Besançon, 336  
 Bessner, Baron de, 106, 107  
 Betancuria, Santa Maria de, 25  
 Bethencourt, Jean de, 24, 25  
 Beti, Queen, 120  
 Betsileo, 110  
 Betsimisarakas, 110  
 Beusse, De, 209  
 Biassou, 333  
 Biencourt, 61  
 Bienville, Governor Céléron de, 225, 229, 231  
 Bigot, 242, 247, 302, 311, 312  
 Biloxi, 154, 225  
 Biscay, 139  
 Bissaos archipelago, 163, 165, 166  
 Bitel, 161

- Black Robes, 239  
 Black Sea, 53  
 Blanche of Castile, 10  
 Blanchelande, 329, 330, 331  
 Blénac, De, 89, 258  
 Blot, Barthélemy, 177  
 Boigne, De, 205  
 Boiguillebert, 297  
 Bois le Comte, 47, 48  
 Bombay, 125, 173  
 Bompard, Governor de, 260, 261  
 Bonaire, 92  
 Bonaparte Is., 357  
 Bongars, chevalier de, 269  
 Bontemps, Jacob, 97  
 Bordeaux, 2, 11, 49, 51, 88, 260, 321  
 Bory Saint-Vincent, 123  
 Boscawen, Admiral, 189, 213, 248  
 Boston, 155, 242  
 Botania, 171  
 Botany Bay, 282  
*Boucaniers*, 82, 83 (*See also* *Buccaneers*, *Piracy*)  
 Bouchardeau, sieur, 100  
 Boudet, General, 350  
 Bouffles, Governor de, 168  
 Bougainville, De, 249, 281, 282, 284, 302  
 Bougie, 27  
 Bouillé, Marquis de, 287  
 Boukmann, 331  
 Boulaye, Abbé de la, 99  
 Boullaye le Gôût, De la, 175-176  
 Boulogne, 342  
 Bourbon, Antoine de, 32  
 Bourbon, Cardinal of, 56  
 Bourbon Is., 112-113, 118-120, 185-187, 208-212, 215-217, 219, 222, 280, 306, 357  
 Bourbons, 56, 154, 156, 277, 282, 355  
 Bourges, fairs, 2, 25  
 Bourgmont, Étienne de, 232, 310  
 Bourlamaque, 250, 251  
*Boussole*, 282  
 Boynes, De, 12  
 Braddock, General, 244, 245, 246  
 Brakna, 166, 168  
 Brandy, 74, 150, 151, 160, 265  
 Brazil, 34, 36, 38, 44-54, 84, 87, 90, 95-99, 101, 117, 178, 265, 356  
 Brazos River, 149  
 Bréboeuf, 72  
 Brest, 46, 116, 282  
 Bréton Coast, 51  
 Bretons, 21, 35, 37; in Newfoundland, 59  
 Brienne, Jean de, 16  
 Brisson de Warville, 272, 318, 319, 324, 332  
 Bristol, 34  
 Britain (*See* *England*)  
 British, in Canada, 153, 157, 288; colonies, 148, 233; East India Company, 185; fleet, 353, 356; in India, 178, 218, 348; in Indies, 79; manufacturers, 290; in New France, 237, 238, 239, 241-244, 246, 247; in North America, 62, 67; trade, 161, 182 (*See also* *English*)  
 British Columbia, 238  
 British Empire, 262, 263, 285, 340, 346, 356  
 British Guiana, 94  
 Brittany, 6, 10, 45, 135, 145  
 Broglie, Count Maurice de, 287  
 Brouage, 62-63  
 Briie, André, 162-165  
 Bruix, 344  
 Brune, General, 347  
 Buccaneers, 76, 85, 87-88, 92, 253, 257, (*See also* *Boucaniers*, *Flibustiers*)  
 Buenos Aires, 141  
 Bugeaud, 341  
 Bulgais, 17  
 Burdigala, 2  
 Bureau of Colonies, 277  
 Burgundians, 13  
 Burgundy, 6, 10, 29  
 Burnell, 218  
 Bury, De, 189  
 Bussy, Marquis de, 192-194, 197-199, 201, 202, 205, 206  
 Byzantine emperors, 5  
*Cabildo*, 234  
 Cabo do Norte, 101  
 Cabot, John, 34  
 Cabot, Sebastian, 34  
 Cabot Strait, 311  
 Cabrillo, 35  
 Cacao, 87, 103, 140, 141, 163, 347  
 Cadachos, 232  
 Cadillac, Lamothe, 224

- Cádiz, 135-138, 278  
 Caen, De, Company, 71  
 Caen, Emery de, 62; William de, 62, 253  
 Caen fairs, 10  
 Caen family of Rouen, 174  
 Caesar, 2; and Pompey, 3  
 Cesarea, 19  
*Cahiers*, 316, 317  
 Cahokia, 226, 227  
 Cahuzac, sieur de, 79  
 Cairo, 19, 340  
 "Cajuns," 228  
 Calabria, 13  
 Calais fairs, 27, 55  
 Calcutta, 173, 187, 189, 191, 197, 199, 201  
 Calicut, 171, 185, 186  
 California, 109, 278, 281  
 Callot, General, 338  
 Calvin, John, 55  
 Calvinists, 48  
 Cambodia, 180, 283  
 Camopi, basins of, 104  
 Campania, 13  
 Campbell, Colonel, 206  
 Campo Formio, 339  
 Canada, 42, 43, 46, 55-75, 80, 92, 104, 115, 127, 130, 132, 133, 137, 138, 146-157, 183, 203, 213, 226, 229-232, 234, 236, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 248, 249, 251, 255, 257, 262, 263, 265, 276, 279, 292, 293, 301, 302, 305, 307-309, 311, 312, 314, 347, 353, 358  
 Canadians, 226, 243, 245, 249, 251, 293, 310, 337  
 Canals, 58, 126  
 Canary Is. (Fortunate Is.), 24, 25, 117  
 Canary Islanders, 235  
 Candel, 173  
 Canso, 242, 245  
 Canton, 111, 181, 182, 186  
 "Cap Blanc" (company), 159  
 Cap des Aiguilles, 36  
 Cap Français, 255, 256, 257, 259, 268, 270, 304, 306, 327, 329, 330, 332, 335, 336, 350  
 Cap Nord, 97, 98  
 Cape Blanco, 33, 160, 168  
 Cape Bojador, 24, 25  
 Cape Breton Is., 34, 156, 237, 239, 240, 242, 243, 246, 251, 311  
 Cape Colony, 205, 212  
 Cape Cormorin, 186  
 Cape Finisterre, 242  
 Cape Frio, 53  
 Cape Hatteras, 34  
 Cape Horn, 143, 282  
 Cape López, 33, 159  
 Cape of Good Hope, 33, 36, 40, 114, 130, 183, 204, 213, 347, 348, 358  
 Cape of Storms (Good Hope), 33  
 Cape Race, 36  
 Cape Ray, 289  
 Cape Saint John, 289  
 Cape Verde, 23, 33, 160, 168  
 Cape Verde Is., 33  
 Caperon, 103  
 Capet, Hugh, 7  
 Capetians, 6, 7, 8, 292  
 Capetown, 342  
 "Capitulations," 22, 33, 58  
 "Capres," 274  
 Capuchins, 44, 91, 92, 98, 175, 177, 184, 210, 229, 255  
 Caravel, 37, 76  
 Carbilo, 2  
 Carénage, Le, 265, 298  
 Caribbean, 49, 73, 76, 78, 82, 85, 88, 130, 133, 156, 161, 229, 251, 253, 257, 277, 349, 353  
 Caribs, 76, 81, 84, 85, 89, 253, 254  
 Carignan-Salières, 148  
 Carlisle, Lord, 79  
 Carmelites, 91, 175, 229  
 Carnatic, 170, 185, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200, 203, 205, 206  
 Carolina, 54, 98, 155, 228, 354  
 Carolinas, 40, 224, 225, 229, 237  
 Carolingians, 4, 6, 8, 12, 292  
 Caron, François, 117, 118, 176, 177, 178, 298  
 Carpini, John de Plano, 18  
 Cartagena, 39, 77, 138, 155, 257  
*Carte Générale*, 348  
 Carthage, 2  
 Cartier, Jacques, 38, 41, 42, 43, 59, 62, 232, 293  
 Cartographers, 19  
*Casa de Contratación*, 34, 135, 136  
 Casais, 20  
 Caspian Sea, 13  
 Cassava beer, 87; flour, 90  
 Cassimbazaar, 180, 197

- Cassipoury River, 97  
 Castile, 13, 24, 25, 33, 136  
 Castilians, 21, 37  
 Castonnet des Fosses, 207  
 Castries, De, 206, 284, 339  
 Catalan Atlas of Charles V, 20  
 Catalonia, 26  
 Cataracui (Frontenac), 243  
 Câteau-Cambrésis, 49, 57  
 Cathay, 40, 113  
 Catherine of Russia, 286  
 Catholic, League, 53, 58; Party (French), 52  
 Catholicism, 72, 130  
 Catholics, 17, 48, 56, 57, 60, 62, 70, 80, 91, 96, 113, 119, 221, 255  
 Cattle, introduced to Guiana, 106; in Louisiana, 228; in Mascareignes, 213; smuggled in Santo Domingo, 331  
 Cauche, François, 112, 208  
 Cavaignac, 347  
 Cavery River, 193  
 Cayenne, 91, 95, 97-103, 105-107, 131, 338  
 Caylus, Marquis de, 260  
 Cayor, 160, 162, 163, 168  
 Celebes, 177  
 Céléron, 234  
 Celts, manufacturing and agriculture, 2  
*Cens*, 147  
 Central America, 34  
 Centurions (family), 20  
 Cépérou, Fort, 98  
 Ceuta, 33  
 Ceylon, 171, 177, 178, 184, 199, 205, 342  
 Chabot de Brion, 38, 39  
 Chabrilion, De, 103  
 Chagres, 39  
 Chambaut (Chambeau), 77, 78, 97  
 Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture in Saint-Domingue, 268  
 Chambers of commerce and agriculture, 267, 268, 273-274, 280, 285, 298, 301, 303, 305  
 Chambonneau, 161  
 Champ de Mars, 221  
 Champagne, fairs, 9  
 Champigny, Governor, 254, 256, 260  
 Champlain, Samuel de, 60-62, 65, 72, 73, 150, 249, 300, 302  
 Champmargou, 115, 116, 209  
 Chanda Sahib, 185, 191, 192, 193, 200  
 Chandernagor, 186, 187, 191, 197-199, 201, 204, 284  
 Chantail, De, 97  
 Chanvalon, Thibault de, 105, 106  
 "Chapitoula Coast," 225  
*Chardon*, 52  
 Charlemagne, 4, 5, 6, 7  
 Charles I (England), 94, 97, 111  
 Charles II (England), 125, 173  
 Charles II (Spain), 140, 145, 154  
 Charles III (Spain), 277, 278, 305  
 Charles V (Spain), 22, 30, 32, 33, 38, 41, 45, 46, 55, 65  
 Charles VI, 22, 23, 24  
 Charles VII, 20-22, 26, 31  
 Charles VIII, 22, 27, 29, 35, 55  
 Charles IX, 51, 56  
 Charles of Austria, Archduke, 154  
 Charles the Bold, 29  
 Charles Edward (Scotland), 198  
 Charles-Roux, 341  
 Charlesbourg Royal (Quebec), 42  
 Charlesport, 50  
 Charleston, 287  
 Charlevoix, 227, 238  
 Charpentier, François, 115, 131  
 Chartres, 227, 243  
 Chastes, Aymar de, 59  
 Château-Thierry, 316  
 Châtillon, 21; house of (Coligny), 55  
 Chaumière, 217  
 Chauvin, Pierre, 59, 60  
 Cherokees, 229, 230  
 Chesapeake, 34  
 Chevalier, 204  
 Chevreau, 122  
 Chicago, 243  
 Chickasaws, 229, 231  
 Chile, 143, 144, 145; nitrate beds, 281  
 China, 39, 40, 92, 139, 143, 144, 176, 177, 181, 182, 215, 238, 282  
 China Company, 181  
 Chio, 26  
 Choctaws, 230, 231, 248  
 Choiseul, 104, 105, 106, 148, 167, 248, 263, 276-281, 283, 284, 298, 300, 345  
 Christianity, 3, 5, 6, 15, 67, 150  
 Christianization, 86, 294, 309  
 Christians, 19, 20, 33, 68, 74, 80, 150, 186, 311, 347  
 Christophe, General, 350, 351, 353  
 Church, Benjamin, 240

- Cinnamon, 215  
 Circars, 190, 196, 201  
 Cities of refuge for Huguenots, 57  
 Citron, 84  
 Clark, George Rogers, 235  
 Clarkson, Thomas, 272  
 Clavierre, 318  
 Clermont-Tonnerre, 320  
 Clervaux, 353  
 Clive, 193, 199, 201  
 "Closed economy," 4  
 Cloth, English, Dutch, Spanish, 138; exchanged for lead and tin, 14; Gaul, 2; in New France, 238-239; in Orient, 184; trade in, 135, 138, 154, 160, 290; from West, 5  
 Clothaire I, 4  
 Cloves, 214  
 Clovis, 4  
 "Club Massiac," 272, 319  
 Clugny, De, 268  
 Cluny, Abbé of, 1, 13  
 Cochin, 171, 184  
 Cochin-China, 180, 206, 283  
 Code Napoléon, 236  
*Code Noir*, 85, 91, 128, 129, 133, 212, 221, 229, 271, 317, 346  
 Coeur, Jacques, 25, 27, 31  
 Coeur, Pierre, 25  
 Coffee, 93, 103, 183, 347, 354; in Antilles, 260, 263, 267, 321, 331; in Mascareignes, 211, 213, 219  
 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, 54, 73, 74, 76-92, 100, 114-118, 120-134, 138, 144, 146-157, 159, 174-179, 209, 210, 212, 254, 268, 271, 281, 285, 292, 295-297, 303, 307, 339  
 Colbertism, 126, 296  
*Colenda*, 86  
 Coligny, Gaspard de, 45-48, 50, 52, 55, 56, 77, 278  
*Collegia*, 3  
 Colonial Assembly, 320-322  
 Colonial Committee of la Rue de Provence, 318, 319  
 "Colonial Council," 318  
 "Colonial Pact," 128  
 Columbus, Christopher, 22; voyages of, 33, 34, 36, 76  
 Comanches, 231, 232  
 Commerce, 2, 3, 5, 12, 21, 26, 30, 57, 65-67, 70, 71, 77, 124, 131, 279, 280, 285, 289, 290, 292, 294, 295, 298, 317, 319, 322, 323, 325, 326, 334, 346, 356; Dutch, 129; English, 156, 277; Gauls, 2, 3; Guiana, 103, 106; in Indies, 80, 88, 127, 134, 256, 258, 260, 266, 269; Levant, 5, 58; in Louisiana, 224; with Mascareignes, 214, 215; Mediterranean, 3, 4, 15, 25, 31, 58; with Orient, 115, 143-144, 170, 175, 190, 204; with Spanish America, 135-145; under Colbert, 126, 128; West Africa, 160, 167, 169; world, 130  
 Commercial expansion, 21, 170, 290  
 Commercial organizations, 28 (*See also* Gilds)  
 Commercial relations, 5, 33, 69, 136, 158, 167, 347  
 Commercial treaties, 26, 27, 58, 138-140, 142, 206, 289-290, 317  
*Commissaire-ordonnateur*, 168, 227, 301  
 Committee on Colonies, 320, 322  
 Committee on the Constitution, 320  
 Commonwealth (English), 124  
 Communications, 7, 30, 92, 93, 94, 126, 147, 158, 164, 199, 206, 213, 242, 248, 278, 292, 301, 305, 307-308, 334  
 Compagnie Gorée, 279; de Cap Vert et du Sénégal, 159; de Cayenne, 98; de Guyane 168; de l'Acadie, 130; de l'Asiento, 130; de la Chine, 130, 143; de la Chine de Paris, 143, 144; de la Chine de Saint-Malo, 143, 144; de la France Equinoxiale, 99; de la Mer du Sud, 143; de la Nacelle de Saint-Pierre-Fleur-de-Lysée, 71; de l'Owère, 169; d'Occident, 225; "d'Orient," 112; de Saint-Domingue, 130, 141; des Côtes d'Afrique, 167; des Indes, 164, 165, 167, 254, 279; des Indes Orientales, 144; du Cap Nord, 97, 99; du Guinée, 130; du Nord, 284; du Ponant et Levant, 70; du Sénégal, 130 (*See also* Company of Senegal); Royale de la Mer Pacifique, 143  
 Compagnon, 164  
 Company of Barbary, 279; of Cacheu, 141; of Guiana, 106; of the Indies (John Law), 164; "of the Isles of America," 80; of Morbihan, 71; of New France, 132; of One Hundred Associates, 71, 72, 74; of the Orient,

- Company (*continued*)  
 115; of Saint-Christophe, 78; of Saint-Louis, 258; of Senegal, 107; of Senegal and Guinea, 161
- Condillac, 297
- Condorcet, 272, 318
- Conflans, Marquis de, 201
- Congo River, 33, 169
- Congolese, 85
- Connecticut River, 155, 241
- Conrad III, 16
- Conseil de Commerce of Paris, 285
- Conspiracy of Amboise, 56
- Constantine, 3
- Constantinople, 7, 16, 31, 68, 347
- Constituent Assembly, 134, 204, 318-320, 323-325 (*See also* National Assembly)
- Constitution of 1791, 324; of An III (1794), 325
- Consulat de Mer of Marseilles, 18
- Consulate, 343-359
- Continental Blockade, 290
- Contraband trade, 138-143, 145; in Antilles, 137, 256, 258, 259, 266, 269; in Mascareignes, 215; in Senegal, 166
- Convention of 1800, 349
- Conway, General, 206, 216, 283
- Cook, James, 282
- Coote, Eyre, 202, 205
- Copenhagen, 341
- Copper, 1, 3, 135
- Corbin, 174
- Cordillera, 232
- Corfu, 14
- Corn, 229
- Cornwallis, Governor, 242, 245, 287
- Coromana River, 97
- Coromandel, 173, 178, 185, 196, 203, 204, 205, 247
- Corps législatif (Legislative Assembly), 324
- Corsairs, 45, 46, 49, 58, 76, 77, 90, 102, 114, 143, 163, 207, 249, 256, 260, 292, 338, 347, 354 (*See also* Piracy)
- Corsica, 26
- Corsican, 207
- Cortés, Hernán, 37
- Corvées, 90
- Costa, Da, 87
- "Côte des Allemands," 225
- "Côtes du Ponant," 86
- Cotton, 346, 354; in Antilles, 260, 267; in Cayenne, 103; at Guadeloupe, 81; in Guiana, 93; India prints, 184; in Louisiana, 229; in Mascareignes, 209, 213; in Senegal, 162, 163
- Council of the Indies, 235; of Lyons, 18; of the Marine, 66, 142
- Council of Trade, 324
- Courbe, De la, 163, 164
- Courcelles, De, 298
- Coureurs de bois, 74, 146, 230, 238, 300
- Courteen, Sir William, 98, 111
- Cousin, Jean, 35, 44
- Creeks, 156, 224, 225, 229, 230, 248
- Crépy-en-Laonnois, 38
- Cresques, Abraham, 20
- Crèvecoeur, 243
- Crignon, Pierre, 40
- Crignon, René, 36
- Croissant, 174
- Croix-des-Bouquets, 331
- Cromwell, Oliver, 84, 92, 125, 253
- Crops, 18, 47, 79, 101; in Antilles, 85, 265, 266, 270, 273, 298, 326; in Cayenne, 102, 103; at Fort Dauphin, 116; in Guiana, 93; in Louisiana, 227, 229; in Mascareignes, 210, 211, 214, 215; in New France, 238, 239, 250
- Crown Point, 62, 157, 245, 251
- Crozat, Antoine, 224, 225, 233
- Crozet Is., 282, 315
- Crusades, 15-18, 31, 32
- Cuba, 46, 76, 91-92, 234, 353
- Cuddalore, 185, 199, 205, 206
- Cumberland Pike, 243
- Cunha, Tristan da, 109
- Curaçao, 92, 137
- Curia regis, 10
- Currency, *see* Money
- Custom of Paris, 133, 227, 294, 306
- Cyclones in Indies, 89
- Cyprus, 17
- Dacia, 197
- Dahomey, 169
- Dakar, 109, 167, 280
- Daman, 173
- Damel, 163
- Danes, 84, 113, 115, 173, 178, 184, 254, 333

- Danish Indies, 92
- Danton, 325
- Danube River, 30
- Danycan, 143, 144
- Danzig, 139
- Daper, 24
- Dauphine, 111
- David, Pierre, 165, 166, 213, 221
- Decaen, Governor-General, 207, 222, 344, 348, 356, 357
- Deccan, 170, 185, 186, 190-194, 196-199, 201, 203, 247
- Decrès, 352, 356
- Deerfield, 155
- Delacroix, 325
- Delaware River, 34, 287
- Delhi, 170, 185, 193, 198
- Denmark, 53, 139, 254, 273
- Dennoret, 283
- Denonville, 152
- Denys of Honfleur, 36
- Derwent, 348
- Deschamps, Léon, 358
- "Desert," 160
- Désirade, La, 84, 249, 265
- Désirades, Les, 92
- Deslandes, 141
- Desmarets, 139, 142
- Desroches, 121
- Dessalines, 336, 350, 351, 352, 353
- Devil's Is., 105
- Dian Ramaka, 112
- Díaz, Bartolomé, 33, 109
- Dieppe, 12, 22, 23, 32, 35, 39, 40, 43, 44, 59, 70, 76, 85, 96, 98, 159, 174
- Dieskau, Baron de, 245
- Dijon fairs, 10
- Dillon, Captain, 282
- Dinwiddie, Governor, 234, 244
- Directory, 218, 326, 334, 335, 339, 340, 345, 355
- Diu, 173
- Djolof, 162
- Dogs, hunting, 5, 221
- Dollard, Adam, 75
- Dominicans, 19, 110, 175, 344
- Dominique, 80, 81, 84, 253, 254, 262, 271, 286, 338
- Don River, 13
- Doreil, 249
- Dost Ali Khan, 185
- Dover, 153
- Draconian laws, 215
- Drake, Sir Francis, 44, 53, 54
- Dramanet, 163
- Droit du domaine d'Occident*, 89, 265
- Du Barry, Mme., 284
- Du Bellay, Governor, 165
- Dubois, 313
- Dubuc, Jean Baptiste, 277, 285, 298, 299
- Ducasse, Governor (Cayenne), 101
- Du Casse, Jean, 160, 161
- Du Casse, Jean Baptiste, 257, 258
- Duchambon, 242
- Ducherneau, 152
- Du Chilleau, 299, 326
- Du Clerc, J. F., 102
- Du Courchant, Governor, 185
- Ducrès, 344
- Duc Tong, 283
- Dudrenec, 205
- Duguay-Trouin, René, 102
- Dumas, Benoît, 185, 186, 190, 212
- Dumas, Jean Daniel, 214, 302
- Du May, 284
- Dunkirk, 125
- Du Parquet, Jacques Dyel, 81, 84, 254
- Dupleix, 183-195, 196-199, 204, 283, 302
- Du Plessis, Alphonse, 96
- Duplessis, Jean, 45, 81, 86
- Du Plessis-Mornay, Philippe, 53, 278
- Dupratz, Lepage, 238
- Duquesne, Governor, 234, 244, 245, 256, 311
- Dutch, 54, 58, 59, 62, 63, 69, 91, 99, 132, 134, 140, 152, 155, 160, 294, 295, 309; in Africa, 158, 162, 164, 165, 342; companies, 67, 70, 142; in Indies, 79, 80, 84, 87, 89, 92, 127, 137, 254, 256, 261, 265; in Madagascar, 111, 117; in Mascareignes, 112, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 221; in Mauritius (Maurice), 113, 119; in Orient, 115, 118, 171, 174-180, 184, 204, 205, 214, 215; in South America, 24, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103; trade and commerce, 85, 103, 125, 129, 130, 138, 141, 151, 161, 173
- Dutch East Indies, 131, 176
- Dutch Guiana, 107
- "Dutch Highlands," 225
- Du Tertre, 87
- Dye wood, 95, 161
- Dyes, 135, 267

- Earthquakes, 216  
 East Africans, 85  
 East India, trade, 114  
 East India Company, British, 98, 111, 185, 191, 204, 282, 348; Dutch, 69, 129, 171, 178; French, 58, 64, 112, 114, 115, 120, 130, 131, 132, 157, 174, 175, 176, 179-191, 208, 209, 211, 212, 215, 219, 281, 297  
 East Indiamen, 218, 222  
 East Indies, 64, 109, 171, 339, 347-348  
 Easter Is., 278  
 Eble II, 13  
 Ebony, 208  
 "Échelles du Levant," 58  
 Edict of Nantes, 57  
 Edrisi, 14  
 Education, among Hurons, 73; in Canada, 151; in Louisiana, 227; in Mascareignes, 220; in Orient, 184  
 Effingham, Lord, 331  
 Egypt, 26, 27, 31, 131, 175, 206, 278, 299, 326, 339, 340-342, 347, 350  
 El Dorado, 93, 95, 101  
 El Ksar es Seghir, 32  
 Elmina, 23  
 Émeute, 330  
 Émigrés, 317, 336  
 En franc alleu, 226  
 "Enfant de maison," 86  
 Engagés, 307, 308; in Antilles, 81, 85, 86, 89, 255, 274; in Canada, 148; at Madagascar, 113  
 England, 3, 15, 50, 55, 57, 65, 86, 100, 124, 134, 136, 138, 168, 233, 281, 284-287, 291, 292, 300, 305, 313, 314, 317, 325, 326, 332, 333, 337, 339, 341-345, 349, 355-358; in Antilles, 253, 254, 260-263, 270-272, 334; Navigation Acts, 90, 125, 128; in North America, 154, 156, 234, 239, 246, 248, 251, 276, 289, 312; in Orient, 170, 173, 204; trade and commerce, 137, 139, 140, 155, 290 (*See also* Great Britain)  
 English, 35, 58-59, 74, 83, 85, 91, 106, 122, 134, 138, 140, 141, 148, 151, 152, 184, 277-278, 292, 294, 298, 313, 334, 338, 343-344; in Africa, 158, 160-164, 166, 169, 340; in Caribbean, 73-81, 83, 85, 89, 92, 137, 253-254, 256-257, 260, 262, 264-266, 287, 331-333, 337; at Madagascar, 111, 123; in Mascareignes, 213, 217, 222; in Malta, 347, 348, 352; in North America, 54, 61, 72, 224, 225, 229-230, 236, 240-245, 247, 249, 250, 308, 310-311; in Orient, 170, 173, 175, 177, 185, 187, 189, 190, 192-194, 196-197, 199-205, 207; in South America, 94, 96, 97, 99-101  
 English Channel, 1  
 English Turn, 228  
 Ennery, D', 284, 299  
 Enquêteurs, 10  
 Entrecasteaux, D', 282, 302  
 "Equinoctial France," 100  
 "Escadre de la Perse," 176, 178  
 Escalon, 19  
 Esnambuc, Pierre Belain d', 78-81, 84, 87, 97  
 Esparbès, 332  
 L'Espoir, 36  
 Estaing, Count d', 268-269, 287  
 Estates General, 21, 29, 62 (*See also* States Général)  
 Estrées, Admiral, Marshall d', 101, 254, 256  
 Estrozi, Nicholas, 51-52  
 Estrozi, Philippe, 52 (*See also* Strozzi, Philippe)  
 Étienne, Father, 115  
 Eudes I, Duke, 13  
 Eugenius IV, Pope, 25  
 "Exclusif," 128, 133, 268, 298, 304, 309, 323, 346; "Exclusif mitigé," 285  
 Exploration, in Africa, 163, 165; in Canada, 149, 310; on Madagascar, 113, 121; in New France, 238, 300; of South America, 95, 96, 103, 107  
 Extra-territorial Rights, in the Levant, 5 (*See also* "Capitulations")  
 Fabrique, 227  
 Fai-Fo, 283  
 Fairs, 2, 3, 9, 10, 21, 27, 138  
 Falémé River, 163, 166, 168  
 Falkland Islands, 281  
 Famine, 7, 47  
 Far East, 33, 40, 115, 187  
 Farbana, 166  
 Fauchet, 337, 354  
 Faye, De, 117, 118, 177-179  
 Fénelon, 297  
 Ferdinand, 136

- Fernando Noronha, 98  
 Ferolles, Governor, 103  
 Ferrelo, 35  
 Fête de Dieu, 221  
 Feudal, colony in New France, 72, 147; grants in Louisiana, 226; lords, 8, 15; régime, 12; society, 66; spirit, 8; states, 292; tenure of companies, 70  
 Feudalism, 4, 7, 17, 21, 27, 29, 57  
 Feuquières, Marquis de, 134, 254, 256, 260  
 Févériver, 179  
 Fez, 27, 32  
 Filibusters, 101, 257, 258, 282 (*See also* Filibustiers)  
 Filipinos, 235  
 Finckenstein, 359  
 First Coalition (1793), 354  
 First Consul, 343, 353  
 Fish, 11, 131, 148, 263  
 Fisheries, 21, 61, 265, 276, 292  
 Fishing, 75, 87, 145, 227; rights, 72, 74, 210, 227, 251, 289, 315, 342, 357  
 Flacourt, Étienne de, 113-115, 117, 120, 209  
 Flanders, 9, 10, 21, 27, 139  
 Flax, 238  
 Fleurieu, 284, 344  
 Fleuriot de Langle, 24  
 Fleury, 281, 312, 329  
 Fleury, 281, 312, 329  
 Filibustiers, 82, 83, 255 (*See also* Filibusters, Buccaneers)  
 Flinders, Captain, 348  
 Florence, 22, 26, 39  
 Florida, 44-54, 61, 71, 98, 155, 224, 234, 235, 277, 288, 292, 352, 355  
 Flotas, 138, 140, 145  
 Flour, 257, 263  
 Fontainebleau, Edict of, 128  
 Fontenay, Governor, 82  
 Food, 47, 79, 85, 90, 265, 268, 273; in Canada, 310; in Guiana, 101, 104, 105; in India, 89, 128, 260, 326, 349; in Madagascar and Île de France, 120; in Senegal, 166  
 Forbes, General, 248  
 Forde, Colonel, 20  
 Formosa, 121, 198  
 Fort, Assumption, 231; Beauséjour, 242, 243, 244, 246; Carillon, 243, 245, 250, 251; Caroline, 50, 51; Cépérou, 98; Chambly, 243; Chartres, 226; Coligny, 47, 48; Cumberland, 245; Dauphin, 112-114, 116-119, 121, 177-179, 209-210, 300; Detroit, 226, 243; Duquesne, 244, 245, 248, 311, 312; Edward, 245; Frontenac, abandoned, 152, 243, 245, 248, 312; Gaspereau, 243, 246; James, 163; Laurence, 242; Louis, 96, 201; Louisbourg, 122, 156, 240, 242-243, 246-248, 311, 312; Macapa, 102; Necessity, 244; Nelson, 240; Niagara, 238, 243-245, 249, 251; Okfusku, 224; Ontario, 243, 247-249, 251; Orléans, 310; Pitt, 248; Richelieu, 73; Rosalie, 225, 231; Royal, 261; St. David, 189, 192, 199; Saint-Joseph, 163, 164, 168; Saint-Louis, 149; Saint-Pierre, 112; Toulouse, 224; William Henry, 247  
 Fortunate Isles, 24 (*See also* Canaries)  
 Foula, 163  
 Foulépointe, 121  
 Foulques, curé of Neuilly, 16  
 Fouquet, Jean, 113  
 Fouquet, Nicholas, 125  
 Fouta Djallon, 158, 165  
 Fox River, 149  
 Fox (tribe) 230, 232  
 Franche-Comté, 30  
 Franchère River, 109  
 Francis I, 22, 30, 31, 32, 35, 38-40, 42, 43, 46, 55, 58, 59, 63, 65, 174, 293, 294, 313  
 Francis II, 55  
 Francis, Duke of Guise, 55  
 Franciscans, 18, 101  
 Franco-English Alliance, 226, 242  
 Franco-Spanish Wars, 138  
 Franklin, Benjamin, 122, 244, 286, 288, 337  
 Franks, 4, 17  
 Frederick Barbarossa, 16  
 Frederick of Prussia, 313  
 Freedom of the seas, 40, 49-50, 57, 289, 354  
 Freetown, 325  
 Frejus, 3  
 French Company, 166  
 French-Indian War, 234  
 French Institute, 343  
 Friell, 283  
 Fronzac, 144  
 Fronde, 99, 124, 125

- Frontenac, 149, 150, 152, 298, 301, 302  
 Fruits, 135, 265  
 Fuerteventura, 25  
 Fur, 2, 59-63, 71, 72, 74, 130, 131, 146-148, 150-152, 154, 203, 224-225, 230, 233, 238, 243, 260, 309-311
- Gaffarel, Paul Louis Jacques, 223  
 Gago, 20 (*See also* Gao)  
 Galam, 162-167  
 Galbaud, General, 332  
 Galicia, 139  
 Galissonnière, Governor de la, 243, 311  
 "Gallia Nova," 40, 50  
 "Gallia Orientalis," 115  
 Galveston Bay, 232  
 Gama, Vasco da, 22, 171  
 Gambia, 85, 125, 158-169, 172, 279  
 Gambia Company (English), 166  
 Gambling, in Guiana, 105; in Mascareignes, 210; on Saint-Domingue, 352  
 Gamboa, Sarmiento de, 53  
 Ganges River, 173  
 Gao (Gago), 20  
 Garcitas River, 149  
 Garde, De la, 103  
*Garde-Magasin*, 227  
 Garonne River, 1  
 Gascons, 14, 35  
 Gascony, 21  
 Gaspé Basin, 41  
 Gaspé Peninsula, 62  
 Gastière, De la, 167  
 Gaul, 1-4  
*Gaulette*, 211  
 Gauls, commerce, 2  
 Gaza, 340  
 Gaziudin, 193, 194  
 "General Assembly of the French Port of Saint-Domingue," 328, 332  
 "Général San Quartier," 259  
 Genêt, Citizen, 337, 354  
 Geneva, 27, 47, 48  
 Genghis Khan, 170  
 Gennes, M. de, 102, 143, 281  
 Genoa, 18, 26, 139  
 Genoese, 19, 20, 137  
 Geoffroy, Guy, 13  
 George III (England), 286  
 Georgia, 225, 229, 354  
 Georgian Bay, 73  
 Gérard, 319  
 Gêrêges, 164  
 German Coast, 228  
 German Swiss, in Louisiana, 225  
 Germanic invasions, 4  
 Germany, 30, 55, 105, 313  
 Ghaleboul (Févérive), 179  
 Gia-long, 283  
 Gibraltar, 53, 155, 156, 288, 344  
 "Gibraltar of the West," 240  
 Gil, Gilbert, 51, 52  
 Gilds, 16, 27  
 Ginseng, 238  
 Girard le Roy, Captain, 96, 174  
 Glass, 138  
 "Glorious Revolution," 152  
 Goa, 171, 173, 185  
 Godeheu, 194-197  
 Godfrey of Bouillon, 16-18  
 Godoy, 355  
 Golconda (Hyderabad), 177-179  
 Gold, 2, 42, 69, 100, 120, 135; in Africa, 20, 158, 161, 163, 165-166, 168; in America, 41, 94, 99, 103, 169  
 Gold Coast, 161  
 "Golden Age" in Portugal, 171  
 Goldwyne, Pastor Morgan, 271  
 Golfe de l'Oest, 258  
 Gonaives, 351  
 Gonneville, Binot Paulmier de, 35, 36, 44  
 Gookin, Daniel, 98  
 Gorée, 158, 160-169, 289, 342  
 Goubert, Alfonso, 111, 208  
 Goumel, 163  
 Gourges, Dominique de, 51  
 Gournay, 203, 279, 297  
 Gouy d'Arcy, 318  
 Grain, 135, 280  
 Grand Alliance, 154  
 "Grand Dérangement," 246  
 "Grand Île," 119, 120 (*See also* Madagascar)  
 Grand Mascareigne (Île de Bourbon), 113  
 Grand Mogul, 185-186  
 "The Grand Peace," 237  
 Grand Pré, 246  
 Grand Saut-Saint-Louis, 60  
 Grand Sestre, 23  
 Grand Tartary, 18, 19

- "Grande Compagnie," 284  
*Grande Encyclopédie*, 296  
 Grande Terre, 81, 261, 338  
 "Grandes Compagnies," 132  
 Grandidier, A., 110  
*Grands blancs*, 107, 273, 274, 275, 327  
 Grasse, De, 287, 314  
 Great Britain, 167, 286, 314, 339, 355  
 (*See also* England)  
 Great Design, 57  
 Great Khan, 42  
 Great Lakes, 71-72, 157, 224, 230, 237, 247, 249, 251, 310, 314  
 Great Meadows, 234, 244  
 Great Migration, 130  
 Great Mogul, 176, 177  
 Greece, 14  
 Greek Catholics, 17  
 Greeks, 2, 13, 17  
*Greffier*, 216  
 Gregoire, Abbé, 318, 324, 332  
 Grénade, La, 83-85, 260-262, 264, 271, 287, 338  
 Grenadines, 83, 262, 264  
 Grenville, Lord, 265  
 "Griffes," 274  
 "Gros blancs," 87 (*See also* Grands blancs)  
 Groseilliers, 74  
 Grotius, Hugo, 58  
 Groton, Mass., 153  
 Gua, Pierre de, sieur de Monts, 60  
 Guadeloupe Is., 80-85, 87, 91-92, 102, 157, 249, 253-254, 256, 261, 262, 264-266, 268, 273, 278, 285, 306, 312, 320, 338, 345-347, 349, 351, 356  
 Guerino Is., 77  
 Guiana, 73, 89, 93-108, 111, 257, 281, 285, 287, 293, 300, 302, 305, 309, 318, 338, 342, 346-347, 349, 356-357  
 Guienne, 10  
 Guinea, 22-25, 32, 35, 140, 162, 167, 169, 224  
 Guinea Company, 140, 159, 161, 294  
 Guiorel, 163  
 Guipúzcoa, 46  
 Guiscard, Robert, 13  
 Guiscard, Roger, 13  
 Guise, House of, 53, 55, 56  
 Gulf of Benim, 167, 169; Gulf of Guinea, 279; of Mexico, 34, 154, 157, 227, 228, 230, 231, 311, 352, 354; of Oman, 347; of St. Lawrence, 41, 241, 242, 251  
 Gum, 69, 106, 109, 158, 162, 164, 166  
 Guyenne, admiral of, 32
- Habitants*, 73-74, 83, 130, 151, 210-211, 214-215, 237, 240, 241, 245, 250, 256, 259, 264, 301, 303-304, 307  
 Hackett's Point, 225  
 Hague, 57  
 Haiti, 82, 336, 353  
 Haitians, 352  
 "Half Century of Conflict," 237, 253  
 Halifax, 240, 245  
 Halifax, Lord, 242  
 Hamburg, 139  
 Hamburgians, 137  
 Hanover, 246  
 Hanseatic League, 28, 137  
 Hanses, 9, 21  
 Hapsburg, House of, 29-30, 33, 65, 154, 293  
 Hardy, Georges, 24  
 Harly, Nicholas de, 96  
 Harmand, Jules, 115  
 Haroun-al-Raschid, 5  
 Hastings, 215  
 Haute-Fleuve, 162  
 Hautépine, sieur, 97  
 Hauteville, 13  
 Havana, 39, 46, 77, 234-235, 248, 251, 262, 287  
 Haverhill, 155  
 Havre (Havre de Grace), 32, 43, 44, 67, 77, 96, 174, 260  
 Hawaii, 282  
 Hawkins, John, 50  
 Heath, Sir Robert, 98  
 Hédouville, 334, 335  
 Heights of Abraham, 250  
 Heliopolis, 340  
 Hemp, 238  
 Hennepin, Father, 153  
 Henry II, 15, 44-46, 49, 55  
 Henry III, 53, 56, 174  
 Henry IV (of Navarre), 56-58, 59, 61, 63-65, 69, 95-96, 111, 136, 174, 293, 313, 317  
 Henry VII (England), 34  
 Henry VIII, 30, 38  
 Henry of Lorraine, 3  
 Henry of Montmorency, 56

- Henry the Navigator, 25, 33  
 "Herbe de Nicot," 90  
 Herbert, Thomas, 117  
 Hindus, 192, 315; princes, 186-189, 201, 207, 356  
 Hindustan, 170, 185  
 Hirado, 178  
 Hirondelle, 329  
 "His Grey Eminence," 175 (*See also* Tremblay)  
 Hochelaga, 41  
 Hoggar, 20  
 Holburn, Vice Admiral, 247  
 Holkar, 215  
 Holland, 65, 67, 94, 100, 124, 129, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 212, 218, 286, 288, 291, 300, 347  
 Holy League, 56  
 Holy Places, 5, 15, 19, 58, 347  
 Holy Roman Emperor, 184; Empire, 7, 15  
 Holy Sepulcher, 6, 13  
 Holy War, 31, 248  
 Hommes de couleur, 217, 221, 274, 275  
 Honduras, 77  
 Honfleur, 32, 36, 44  
 Honorat, Admiral, of Savoy, 77  
 Honorius, 3  
 Hoogli, 173, 180, 197, 198  
 Hospitals, among Hurons, 73; among Spanish colonies, 309, in Syria, 347  
 Hospitalers, 17, 95  
 Houel du Petit-prè, 83, 84  
 House of Commons, 272  
 Hovas, 110, 121, 123  
 Howe, Lord, 248, 287  
 Hudson River, 40, 245, 249, 287  
 Hudson's Bay, 153, 155, 156, 238, 239, 288  
 Hue, 283  
 Hughes, Admiral, 205  
 Huguenots, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 60, 62, 98, 112, 113, 153, 228, 246, 254-255, 292, 308-309  
 Hugues, Victor, 107, 338, 346, 356  
 Humber, General, 352  
 Hume, David, 289  
 Hundred Days, 346, 358  
 Hundred Years' War, 8, 20-22, 28, 29, 31, 139  
 Hungarian, 7, 121  
 Hunting, in Antilles, 87; in Louisiana, 227, 230; in Mascareignes, 210, 221  
 Hurons, 62, 63, 72, 73, 75, 149  
 Hurricane, in Antilles, 266; in Louisiana, 228; in Mascareignes, 213, 220  
 Hyder Ali, 204, 205  
 Hyderabad, 170, 177, 194, 197, 201, 207  
 Iberville, 153-155, 224, 240  
 Iceland, 35  
 Île de France (Mauritius), 113, 119-122, 166, 200-201, 205, 207-209, 211-215, 217, 219, 221-222, 280, 282, 304, 306, 348, 356-358  
 Îles de Pérou, 77  
 "Îles de la Sonde," 176  
 Île de Vaches, 258  
 Illinois (River) (Country), 225-227, 229, 230, 232, 235, 238, 310  
 Illinois (Indian tribe), 149, 229, 231  
 Imam, 347  
 Imbert, Paul, in Timbuctoo, 19  
 Imperial Ostend Company, 187 (*See also* Ostend Company)  
 Incas, 95  
 India, 19, 33; Capuchins sent to, 92; fall of French India, 196-207; French fortunes built up, 157, 170-182; Lally in, 121, 133; routes, 39; trace, 111, 114, 116-117; under Duplex, 183-195; voyage of Caron, 118; voyages for trade, 109; wars for, 145, 209, 213-215, 217, 219, 222-223, 246-247, 251, 252, 262, 263, 276, 279, 280, 288, 293, 309, 313, 323, 339-343, 344, 347, 348, 356, 358  
 India Company (English), 173  
 Indian Ocean, 40, 119, 123, 130, 177, 184, 207, 210, 213, 304, 314, 323, 356, 357; Norman pirates in, 111  
 Indies, 34; exports to, 139; French cargoes direct to, 138; French influence in, 141; French intrusions in, 49, 53-54, 56; search for, 36; Spanish, 46; vessels fitted for, 43; voyages to, 174, 280  
 Indigo, in Antilles, 260, 263, 267; in Cayenne, 99, 103; in Louisiana, 229; in Mascareignes, 213; in Senegal, 163  
 Indo-China, 171, 186, 203, 281, 283, 339  
 Indults, 137

- Industry, 7, 21, 26-27; development of, 137; factories in Spanish America, 140; in France, 5; French colonial, 138, 346; Gaul, 2; in Mascareignes, 213; in New France, 238, 239, 297, 308; silk, 181, 290; sugar refineries, 90, 135; textile in India, 179; under Colbert, 127; of West Indies, 91, 127, 267  
 Infanta of Portugal, 125  
 Inipi River, 101  
 Innocent III, 16  
 Institute of Egypt, 340  
 Instructions of March 28, 1790, 329  
 Insulinde, 358  
 Investigator, 348  
 Ionian Islands, 339  
 Irish, in India, 198  
 Iron, deposits, 308; in Gaul, 2; in India, 184; mines, in Canada, 147; mines in New France, 238; in Senegal trade, 160; utensils to Spain, 135  
 Iroquois, 61, 62, 73; warfare, 75, 152, 153, 238, 244  
 Isabel, daughter of Philip II, 56  
 Isabel, the Catholic, 130  
 Isalgner, Anselme, 19-20  
 Islam, in Central Asia, 21, 280, 292, 341  
 Ispahan, 175  
 Isthmus of Panama, 53  
 Isthmus of Suez, 53  
 Italian, colonists, 17; experts help Ango, 39; fleet defeated by Barbarossas, 31; merchants, 2  
 Italian states, ally of Spain, 136  
 Italians, Jewish, exploration of Africa by, 19  
 Italy, French loss of possession in, 55, 277; Hungarian raiders into northern part of, 7; Moslem pirates trade relations, 28; *point d'appui*, 33, 55; struggle for possessions in, 29  
 Ivory, 69, 160 (elephants' tusk), 161, 162, 168  
 Jacobin Club, in Mascareignes, 217, 319, 322, 338  
 Jacobin order, in Antilles, 255; in Martinique, 91, 207  
 Jacques-Cartier (town), 250, 251  
 Jaffa, 340  
 Jamaica, 84, 92, 125, 137, 253, 261, 262, 333  
 James I (England), 97  
 James II (England), 154  
 James River, 230  
 Jamestown, founded, 61  
 Japan, 171, 177-178, 215; Capuchins sent to, 92  
 Jardin Royal, 166  
 Java, 110; Dutch in, 115, 171, 177-179, 300 (*See also* "Îles de la Sonde")  
 Jay, John, 288  
 Jay Treaty, 337, 354, 355  
 Jean-François, 333  
 "Jeanne," 187  
 Jeannot, 331  
 Jefferson, Thomas, 355  
 Jérémie, 335  
 Jerez, 136  
 Jerusalem, kingdom of, 16, 17; conquered, 15; French nobles directed from, 16; monks of, correspondence with Charlemagne, 6; shrine, 12  
 Jesuits, 107, 149-152; on Amazon, 102-103; in Antilles, 255, 256; in Brazil, 48; in Canada, 61, 133; in Guiana, 100; on Kourou, 104, 105; in Louisiana, 224-225; on Madagascar, 110, 122; in New France, 238-239; in Orient, 175, 184, 200; in Portugal, in Cabo do Norte, 101; at Quebec, 63, 72-74; in West Indies, 91  
 Jewelry, Gaul, 2  
 Jews, in Antilles, 255, 280, 309; in Arles, 5, 7, 14; in Cayenne, 99, 100; in island trade, 87; in Louisiana, 228  
 Jinji, 192, 193, 203  
 Joal, 158, 160, 169  
 Johnson, General William, 244, 245  
 Johnstone, Commodore, 205  
 Joinville, Treaty of, 53, 56  
 Joliet, Louis, 149  
 Jonquière, 234, 242, 244  
 Joseph I, of Austria, 156  
 Joseph II, of Austria, 284  
 Jourdan, 143, 145  
 Joux, 336  
 Julius II, Pope, 30  
 Jumonville, De, 244  
 Kaepelin, Paul, 208

- Kaldi, 163  
 Kamchatka, 121, 282  
 Kansas River, 232  
 Karakorum, 18  
 Karikal, 185, 186, 190, 200, 202, 204  
 Kaskaskia River, 226, 227  
 Kentuckians, 354  
 Kerguelen, Lieut., 282  
 Kerguelen Is., 315  
 Kerjean, 193  
 Kerlérec, chevalier de, 231, 232, 248  
 Keymis, Laurence, 93, 94  
 "King of Madagascar," 120  
 "King William's War," 150, 152, 162  
 Kirke brothers, 72  
 Kléber, 340, 341  
 "Knight of the Golden Calf," 224  
 Knights, French, in Crusades, 15  
 Knights of Malta, 84  
 Knights Templars, destruction of, 10  
 Kourou River, 100, 106, 281, 300, 308;  
   Jesuit Mission on, 103, 104, 105
- Labat, Père Jean-Baptiste, 23  
 La Bourdonnais, 166, 186, 187, 188, 189,  
   200, 213, 214, 221, 302 (*See also* Mahé  
   de la)  
 Labrador, 34, 37, 41, 42  
 La Calle, 32, 68  
 Lacase, 115, 118  
 Laces, 138  
 La Chevalerie, Baron de, 327  
 Lacombe, 329  
*Ladrones*, 76  
 Lafayette, Marquis of, 286, 287  
 Laffemas, Barthélemy de, 69, 138  
 La Guayra, 141  
 La Harpe, Bernard de, 145, 232  
 La Haye (Jacob Blanquet) de, 103, 117,  
   118, 119, 120, 177, 178, 179, 209, 210,  
   298  
 La Hure, Sieur de, 209, 210  
 Lake Champlain, 157, 243, 245, 248, 249,  
   250, 251  
 Lake Huron, 61  
 Lake Michigan, 230  
 Lake Parima, 93, 101 (*See also* Parima)  
 Lake Simcoe, 73  
 Lake Superior, 74, 149, 243  
 Lake Winnipeg, 243  
 Lalin, 175
- Lally, 121, 200, 201, 202, 203, 313  
 La Luzerne, 319, 326  
 Lambert (Thomas Lombard), 159  
 Lameths, 319  
 La Milleraye, Vice Admiral, 41  
 La Mine (Elmina), 23  
 La Monnaie de Paris, 165  
 Land, allotment in Mascareignes, 210,  
   211, 213, 214; distribution to colo-  
   nists in Fort Dauphin, 118; to immi-  
   grants under Colbert, 146; French  
   principle of inheritance, 8; held by  
   church in Antilles, 255; held by  
   church in Canada, 151; legislation,  
   306-307; tenure in Louisiana, 227; in  
   New France, 237; titles, etc., in Mas-  
   careignes, 216  
 Land grants, in Guiana, 101, 104, 106;  
   (seigneuries) in Antilles, 255; in Ba-  
   hamas, 253; in Canada, 147, 310; in  
   colonies, 302, 304, 307; in Louisiana,  
   225, 226; in New France, 243  
 "Land of Parrots, The," 36  
 Landolphe, 169  
 Langle, De, 282  
 Languedoc, Moslem pirates in, 13, 15, 27  
 Laon, 316  
 Laos, 171  
 La Pérouse, Galoupe de, 282, 283, 318  
 Lapis, François de, Marquis de Mont-  
   devergue, 116-117  
 La Plata River, 36, 37  
 La Porte, Charles-Armand de, duc de  
   la Meilleraye, 114  
 La Présentation, 243  
 La Ravardière, Daniel de la Touche de,  
   95-97  
 Larcy, Jean Briant, 159  
 La Rigaudière, Lieutenant de, 164  
 Larnage, Governor de, 258  
 La Rochelle, 10, 12, 21, 24, 35, 67, 70;  
   governor of, 97, 112, 143, 238, 260;  
   siege of, 72; trade with Indies, 88  
 La Roncière, Charles de, 20, 24  
 La Salle, Robert Cavalier de, 149, 229,  
   238  
 La Salle, Gadifer de, 24, 25  
 Las Casas, 309  
 La Serpa, 94  
 Lasker, Khan (Saïd), 193, 194  
 Latin "Empire," in Constantinople, 16  
 Latin kingdoms, 17

- Latins, in Louisiana, 236  
 Latouche-Tréville, 344  
 Laudonnière, René de, 50, 51, 77  
 Laurent, 283  
 Laurentian Basin, 310  
 Laussat, 355  
 Lauzun, De, 168  
 Laval, Abbé, 74  
 Laval, Bishop, 152  
 La Valette, Father, 266  
 Lavour, Father, 200  
 Laveau, General de, 332, 333  
 Law, Jacques François, 193  
 Law, John, 164, 181, 225-226, 228, 258,  
   296, 299  
 Law, Raymond, 205  
 Law de Lauriston, Jean, 198, 204  
 "Law people," 225  
 Lawrence, Governor (of Canada), 245,  
   246  
 Lawrence, Major Stringer, 189, 193,  
   194, 196, 200  
 Lazarists, 115, 119, 120, 210, 220  
 Lead, Britain, 3, 14; mines in Louisi-  
   ana, 225, 232; silver-bearing, 2  
 League, Catholic, 60  
 League of Armed Neutrality, 286  
 League of Augsburg, 139  
 Leake, Captain John, 240  
 Leather, 5, 69; hides trade, 83; Spanish,  
   135; trade in Madagascar, 112, 116;  
   trade in West Africa, 160  
 Le Bigorne, 120  
 Le Blond, 107  
 Le Bourg, 209  
 Le Brasseur, Governor, 167  
 Le Bret du Bosc de la Villesauges, 95  
 Le Caron, Père, 72  
 Le Clerc, François, 77  
 Leclerc, General (1803, '04, etc.), 350,  
   351-353  
 Legardeur, 232  
 Legislative Assembly, 324, 332  
 Legrand, 97  
 Leibnitz, 339  
 Leigh, Charles, 94  
 Le Jeune, 272  
 Lemaître, sieur, 163  
 Le Mayne, Charles, 153  
 Lenche, brothers, 32  
 Lendit fair, 9  
 Lenoir, Pierre Christophe, 184, 185, 190
- Leo (Pope), 30, 32  
 Léogane, 258, 259, 327, 328, 330, 350  
*Léopard*, 328  
 "Léopardins," 328  
 Lepanto, victory of, 32  
 Leroy-Beaulieu, 313  
 Lery, Jean de, 46  
 Lescallier, 123, 323  
 Lescarbott, 61  
 Lesser Antilles, 76  
 Le Tellier, Michel, 126, 159  
 Letters of marque, 40  
*Lettres Chinoises, Indiennes, et Tar-  
 tares*, 285  
 "Lettres communes," 302  
*Lettres Persanes*, 285, 296  
 Levant, 5-7, 15, 17, 18, 22, 26, 31; eco-  
   nomic decline, 33; French ambitions  
   in, 55; land journeys from, 92; navi-  
   gation and commerce, 26, 289, 292,  
   344  
 Levantine ports, 53  
 Le Vasseur, 82  
 Levasseur, De, 325  
 Levens, 165  
 Lévis, De, 250-251, 311  
 Leyrit, Governor de, 197-199  
 Lézy, De, 100, 101  
 "Libertitia," 119  
 Libourne, 139  
 Liénard, Charles, sieur De l'Olive, 80  
 Lille, 339  
 Line of Demarcation, 36  
 Linen, 2  
 Lintgens, Pieter, 64  
 Lisbon, 48, 114, 171, 178  
 "Little Brazil," 100  
 Livingston, 356  
 Locke, John, 106  
 Loire River, 1, 6, 16, 55  
 Lokke, C. L., 351  
 Lombard, Thomas (Lambert), 159  
 Lombardy, merchants, 5  
 London, 288, 318; demand for gum, 166,  
   288, 318; hanse, 9; Rouen wharf at,  
   12  
 London Company, 61  
 "Long Cours," 19, 293  
 Longfellow, 227  
 Longjumeau, André de, 18  
 Lorient, 180, 183, 215  
 Loring, Commodore, 352

- Lorraine, 55, 124  
 Loudoun, 247, 248  
 Louis VI (the Fighter), 8  
 Louis VII, 8, 16  
 Louis IX (the Saint), 10, 17, 18  
 Louis XI, 21, 27, 28, 29, 31, 293  
 Louis XII, 22, 27, 28, 30, 31, 55  
 Louis XIII, 65, 69, 70, 79, 174  
 Louis XIV, 74, 87, 102, 114-116, 120, 124, 126, 129-133, 138, 139, 141, 142, 144, 148, 152, 154, 156, 175, 176, 178, 224, 246, 277, 294, 296, 297, 313, 333, 339  
 Louis XV, 190, 234, 249, 265, 284, 312, 313  
 Louis XVI, 205, 280, 282, 284, 285, 286, 290, 342  
 Louis XVIII, 358  
 Louisiana, 149, 150, 153, 155; after 1713, 224, 236, 237, 239, 246, 248, 249, 251, 257, 276, 277, 299, 309, 314, 337, 342, 343, 344, 347, 349, 352, 354, 355  
 Loutre, Father Joseph Louis de, 245, 246  
 Louvois, 117, 126  
 Louvre, 283  
 Low Countries, 30  
 Lower California, Jesuits in, 73  
 Lower Canada, 337  
 "Loyalists," 246  
 Lucayas, 253  
 Lumber, exported from Canada, 148; in Antilles, 257, 263, 265  
 Lunéville, 347  
 Lutherans, in Antilles, 255  
 Lyons, 2, 21, 26-28, 39, 45, 97, 177; treaty, 38  
 Macao, 282, 283  
 Machault, 243  
 Macnamara, 217  
 Madagascar, 92, 108, 109-123, 131, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 206, 208-210, 214, 216, 218, 221, 281, 300, 302, 309, 323, 357  
 Madec, René, 205  
 Madeira Is., 33, 38, 52, 53  
 Madras, 173, 179, 188-191, 193-194, 196-198, 200-202, 205-206, 213  
 Madrid, 141, 354  
 Magallon de la Morlière, le comte, 219  
 Magellan, 34, 37  
 Magellanic Sea, 282  
 Magon, 269  
 Mahé de la Bourdonnais, Bertrand François, 185-186, 190, 203-205, 213  
 Mahrattas, 170, 179, 185, 190, 191, 193, 201, 204, 205, 206, 357  
 Maine, coast, 61  
 Mainwarings, 98  
 Maitland, 333-335  
 Majorca, 53  
 Malabar, 173, 179, 203-204  
 Malaccan Peninsula, 177  
 Malaccas, 171  
 Malagasy, 110, 113, 116, 119, 209, 221  
 Malartic, Governor, 217, 219  
 Malay, Peninsula, 184  
 Malays, on Madagascar, 110  
 Maldives, 174  
 Malfante, Antonio, 20  
 Malibar, 171  
 Malouet, 106-107, 302, 305, 318, 320, 344  
 Malouin, merchants, 144, 145  
 Malouines (Falklands), 281  
 Malta, 22, 340-342, 347; colonists sought for Guiana from, 105  
 Malta, Order of, 46, 84  
 Malva, 170  
 Mamelukes, 339, 340  
 Manchac, 229  
 Mandingo, kingdom, 20, 85, 163  
 Mangou Khan, 18  
 Manila, 234, 248, 251  
 Manioc, in Cayenne, 103; in Mascareignes, 213  
 Manoa, 93, 94  
 Manufacture, 21, 290, 298, 319; for Spain, 135, 138; of tobacco, 90; under Colbert, 126, 138  
 Marabouts, 31  
 Marañón Is., 95, 96  
 Marbois, 209  
 "Mare liberum," 40  
 Margry, Pierre, 23-24  
 Marguilliers, 227  
 Maria Teresa, 124  
 Mariannes, 282  
 Marie de l'Incarnation, Mother, 150  
 Marie-Galante Is., 81, 83-84, 91, 249, 265  
 Marignans, 30  
 Marion Is., 282

- Maritime codes, 18, 67  
 Marivault, abbé de, 99  
 Marly, Arrêts of, 147, 307  
 Maroni River, 97-98; Jesuits explore, 103, 104  
 Maroons, 89, 106, 107, 258, 261-262, 268; in Mascareignes, 209-211, 217, 220-221  
 Marques, Governor, 52  
 Marquette, Jacques, 149, 238  
 Marseilles, 2, 3, 7, 18, 26, 28, 32, 58, 70, 97, 142, 254, 260, 266, 280, 321  
 Martel, Charles, 4  
 Martin V, Pope, 25  
 Martin, François, 177, 179, 180-181, 190, 281  
 Martinique, 80-81, 83-85, 89, 91-92, 105, 133-134, 157, 248-249, 251, 253-257, 259-262, 264-268, 273, 277-278, 285, 299, 304, 306, 318, 320-321, 331, 338, 342, 344, 347, 349, 355  
 Martrefontaine, 355  
 Mary Stuart, 55  
 Maryland, 98, 230  
 Mascareignes, 112, 120, 123, 203, 207, 208-223, 302-303, 306, 347, 356, 357  
 Mascarenhas, Pedro de, 208  
 Masham, Thomas, 93  
 Masonic order, 318  
 Massachusetts, 98, 152, 244, 272  
 Massertie, 142  
 Massilia, 2  
 Matane, 62  
 "Matelotage," 87  
 Matthew, 34  
 Maudave, Louis Laurent de Féderbe, Comte de, 120-123, 281  
 Maupeou, 284  
 Maurepas, 254, 284  
 Maurice, Prince, 63-64  
 Maurice (Île de France), 119, 208-209  
 Mauritius (Île de France), 113, 348, 357  
 Maury, 319-320  
 Mauviel, Bishop, 352  
 Mazarin, 83, 124-134  
 Mazulipatam, 177, 179, 180, 186, 194, 196, 201, 204  
 Medici, Catherine de', 45, 51-54, 56  
 Medici, Henri de', 45  
 Medici, Marie de', 65  
 Medicinal plants, 5  
 Mediterranean, 1, 280, 291, 292, 339, 340, 344, 347; British and Dutch vs. French, 155; coasts, 67; commerce, 25, 26, 28; piracy in, 68, 69; ports, 22; Saracen raiders, 7; trade, 21; trade under Francis I, 31, 32, 58, 63; traders, 2  
 Mehemet Ali, 191-193, 203  
 Meilleraye, duc de la, 114, 181  
 Melilla, 31  
 Mem de Sá, 48  
 Memphis, 231  
 Menéndez de Avilés, Pedro, 51, 76  
 Menou, 341  
 Menuthias, 109  
 Mercers, 22  
 Merchant marine, 66, 70  
 Mergui, 186  
 Merovingian dynasty, 4, 292  
 Mesnager, 167  
 Mesopotamia, 357  
 Metals (goods), 9, 42, 61, 63, 126, 136, 140; in Orient, 184; trade in South America, 95  
*Métayers*, 270  
 Methuen Treaty, 102, 154  
*Métis*, 274  
 Metz, 124  
 Meuse River, 1  
 Mexican, tobacco monopoly in Louisiana, 235  
 Mexico, 37, 60, 125, 224, 235  
 Miami, 226, 243  
 Millet, in Senegal, 159  
 Mineral resources, of Canada, 149; in Louisiana, 225  
 Mines, 26; interest on Pacific Coast, 145  
 Ming dynasty, 21  
 Minho Basin, 13  
 Minorca, ceded to England, 156, 262, 288  
 Miquelon Is., 251, 289, 338, 347  
 Mirabeau, 318  
 Mirbeck, De, 331  
*Miroir historique*, 18  
 Missionaries, 18, 19; in America, 300; in Cabo do Norte, 101; to Canton, 186; on Guadeloupe, 81; Jesuits' decline, 107; Jesuits in Guiana, 100; Jesuits on Kourou, 105; journeys, 92; Lazarists at Ft. Dauphin, 119, 122-123; in Louisiana, 234; to Madagascar, 111, 115; in Mascareignes, 210;

- Missionaries (*continued*)  
 in Morocco, 69, 73; in Orient, 131, 175, 283  
 "Missions Étrangères," 184  
 Mississippi Company, 225  
 Mississippi River, 149, 153, 154, 157, 226, 230-233, 238-240, 251, 277, 300, 310, 314, 354, 355  
 Missouri, 232, 311  
 Missouriis (tribe), 230  
 Mobile Bay, 154; (city) 227, 228, 232  
 Mobury River, 98  
 Mocha, 171, 211  
 Mocquet, Jean, 95  
 Mogul Empire, 170, 175  
 Mohammed, Sultan, 280  
 Mohammedans, 20, 22  
 Mohawk Valley, 62  
 Molasses, 265  
 Môle Saint-Nicolas, 265, 298, 330, 335, 352  
 Molucca Company, 174  
 Moluccas, 40, 53, 171, 174  
 Monchrétien, Antoine de, 69, 70  
 Monckton, 244, 246, 262  
 Moner, Guillaume de, 45  
 Money, 20, 26, 65, 145, 163, 202, 321; in Antilles, 255, 258; for Benyowski, 122; for colonial expansion, 309, 310; exported from colonies, 140; in India, 90, 184, 185, 192; in Louisiana, 234; in Madagascar, 115, 121; in Mascareignes, 212, 218; public, 125, 147  
 Mongols, 17  
*Moniteur*, 357  
 Monongahela River, 244  
 Monopolies, 14, 70, 73, 111, 137, 151, 262; coffee, 183, 212; of companies, 71, 127, 131, 203; Iberian, 37, 57; in Indies, 90, 258, 334; in Levant, 58; in Louisiana, 224, 231; in Madagascar, 114; in Mascareignes, 210; in Orient, 173; Portuguese, 49; Spanish, 54; of spices, 214, 215; tobacco, 132, 183, 235; trade, 59, 60, 62, 97, 135, 140, 169, 259, 278, 279, 285, 293, 296, 297, 317; in West Africa, 159, 160, 161, 167  
 Monroe, General, 204  
 Monroe, James, 356  
 Mont-Desert, 61  
 Mont Saint-Michel, 12, 13  
 Mont Saint-Michel du Gargano, 13  
 Montagnais, 62, 63  
 Montaigne, 52  
 Montauban, 116, 316  
 Montbarrot, Governor, 95  
 Montcalm, 247-250, 302, 311-313, 318  
 Montdevergue, François de Lapis, Marquis de, 117-119, 178, 179, 209, 302  
 Monte Casino, 12  
 Montesquieu, 272, 279, 285, 296, 305  
 Montigny, Governor, 206  
 Montluc, Peyrot, 52  
 Montmagny, Monsieur de, 73  
 Montmorency (town), 250  
 Montmorency, Henry of, 56, 67; family, 74  
 Montpellier, 18, 26  
 Montreal, 41, 73, 74, 149, 153, 155, 237, 239, 241, 243, 247, 248, 251, 312; clergy in, 152  
 Monts, De, Company, 71  
 Monts, Pierre de Gua, sieur de, 60, 61  
 Montserrat, 79; English occupancy, 81, 85, 92, 271  
 Monty, De, 103  
 Moore, John, 249, 261  
 Moors, 1, 159, 161, 162, 164  
 Morbihan, Company of, 71  
 Moreau de Saint-Méry, 318, 319, 344  
 Morellet, abbé, 279, 297  
 Morgan, "King of Madagascar," 120  
 Morocco, 19, 20, 31; corsairs, 32, 68; treaty with, 69, 280  
 Morse, Governor Nicholas, 188, 189  
 Moscow campaign, 357  
 Moslem pirates, 13, 58; provinces, 15, 185  
 Moslems, 6, 170; attack Salerno, 13, 14, 16; capture Acre, 17, 19  
 Mosquito Coast, 98  
 Motignon, Jacques de, 77  
 Motives for expansion, 15  
 Moulay el Oualid, 69  
 Moulay-Ismaël, 280  
 Mount Tabor, 340  
 Mousaffar Jang, 191, 192  
 Moustier, 354  
 Mozambique Channel, 109, 208  
*Munsubdar*, 186  
 Murray, General, 251  
 Muscat, 347  
 Muscovy, route to India, 39

- Muslin, in Orient, 184  
 Mustellier, 164  
 Mysore, rajah of, 194, 204, 206, 218, 219  
  
*Nabob*, 170, 185, 187, 190, 191, 194, 201, 203, 204  
 Nadan de Teil, Governor, 261  
 Nader Jang, 191, 192  
 Nadir Shah, 185  
 Nantes, 11; shipping, 12; trade with Indies, 88, 183, 316  
 Naples, 13, 22, 29; share in Spanish American trade, 139  
 Napoleon Bonaparte, 53, 123, 139, 206, 207, 222, 278, 290, 326, 336, 339, 340-359  
 Napoleonic wars, 94, 123; period, 300  
 Napollon, Sanson, 68  
 Narbonne, 2, 3, 7, 18  
 Nassau, 253  
 Nassy, David, 99  
 Natchez, 225; tribe, 229-231  
 Natchitoches, 224  
 National Assembly, 216, 217, 317, 320-324, 327-331, 337, 345, 350 (*See also* Constituent Assembly)  
 National Convention, 217, 324-326, 333, 338, 339, 347, 354, 355  
 National Legislature, 332  
 Nationalism, 27  
*Nautæ*, 3  
 Navarre, King of, 13, 32  
*Navicularii*, 3  
 Navigation Act of September, 1793 (French), 325, 346  
 Navigation Acts (England), 90; of 1651, 125, 128  
 Near East, 287, 292  
 Necker, 316, 321, 322  
 Negapatam, 184, 188, 288  
 Negroes, 52, 74, 80, 85; blacks and mulattoes in population, 91; cost of, 162; duties on, 142; in exchange for gum, 166; in slavery in Antilles, 255, 258, 261, 262, 272, 275, 309, 310, 315, 320, 322, 331-333, 335, 336; in Louisiana, 229; in Mascareignes, 209, 218, 220, 221; in Saint-Domingue, 346, 350-351, 353, 358; on Madagascar, 109, 110; slave labor, 100; to colonies, 141; trade in Senegal, 165; trade in Spanish colonies, 140  
 Nelson, 340-342  
 Netherlands, 30, 54; Dutch, 152; United, 57  
 Nets, Commodore de, 174  
 Nevis, 79; English occupy, 81, 85, 92, 98, 271  
 New Amsterdam, founded, 62, 97; seized from Dutch, 152, 282  
 "New Company," 74  
 New Company of China, 144  
 "New Eden," 210  
 New England, 104, 130, 133, 153, 155, 156, 237, 240-243, 245-247, 312  
 New France, 60, 71, 98; encirclement by Britain, 156; fall of, 147, 237-252, 263  
 New Hampshire, 153  
 New Mexico, 224, 231, 232  
 New Orleans, 225-227, 231, 234, 243, 311, 354, 355  
 New Spain, 51, 246  
 New World, 63, 65; trade in, 136, 295, 314, 336, 350, 353; treasures of, 134  
 New York, 153, 247, 287  
 Newcastle, 247  
 Newfoundland, 34-37, 41, 42, 46, 49-50, 61, 71, 98, 153, 155-157, 240, 241, 257, 292, 311, 313, 315, 342, 357  
 Newport, 287  
 Newspapers, in Canada, 151  
 Nguyen Anh, 283  
 Nice, 2  
 Nicholas V (Pope), 25  
 Nicholson, Francis, 241  
 Niger River, 20, 158, 163, 169  
 Nile River, 339  
 Nîmes, 3; fairs, 9  
 Nizam ul Mulk, 170, 191  
 Nolivas, De, 269  
 Nombre de Dios, 44  
 Norman, admiral, 38; in Brazil, 48; colonists and laborers to Canaries, 25; government, 14; mariners, 23; pirates in Indian Ocean, 111; sailors in Brazil, 44; settlements in Italy, 13; tenure in England, 21; vessels to South America, 94, 95  
 Normand, M., 220  
 Normandy, corsairs of, 292; dukes of, in England, 8; Parliament of, 174; ports, 67; settlers to Canada from, 146

- Normandy Company, 159  
 Normans, 11, 12, 14-15, 35; in Africa, 159; in Brazil, 48, 53; in Newfoundland, 59; at Sable Is., 59; at St. Lawrence, 37  
 Norse, pirates, 12  
 North, Lord, 286, 288  
 North Africa, 19, 133, 280, 292, 341, 344; Charles V in, 32  
 North America, Anglo-Saxons in, 236, 247, 249, 257, 263, 300, 308, 310, 311, 337, 349; British possession of, 156, 233; map of, by J. Verrazano, 41, 103; trade developed, 142; trade with, 131; west coast discoveries, 35  
 North Province, 328, 330, 331, 336  
 North Sea, 13; fisheries, 21, 292  
 Northeast Passage, 282  
 Northmen, 6, 7, 14  
 Northwest, 149; Passage, 40, 41  
 Notre-Dame de Foye, 150  
 Notre-Dame de Vésely, shrine, 12  
 Notre-Dame-des-Anges, 63  
 Nouailles, General, 352  
 Nouailly, Philibert de, 83  
 Nova Scotia, 98, 241  
 Nubia, 19  
 Nutmeg, 215
- Occident, opened, 33  
 "Octroi," 303  
 Odo, Count, 6  
 Ogé, James, 329  
 Ogeron, Monsieur, 83, 253  
 Ohio Land Company, 243  
 Ohio River, 225, 226, 230, 233, 239, 243, 244, 246, 248, 251, 310  
 Oil, from West, 5  
 "Old Colonies," 349  
 "Old South," 236  
 Oldenbarnevelde, 63  
 Olive, Charles Liénard, sieur de l', 80, 81, 86, 87  
 Olive oil, from Spain, 135  
 Opelousas, 228  
 Oran, 27  
 Orange, Guillaume d', 80  
 Oranges, price, 87; trees on Saint-Christophe, 84  
 O'Reilly, Governor, 234, 235  
 Organic Act of 1763, 306
- Orient, 63, 111, 115, 129, 130, 278, 289, 347  
 Oriental, culture, 341; domination, 343; dramas, 285  
 "Orioup," 95  
 Orinoco River, 93, 94, 97, 100, 103  
 Orissa, 203  
 Orléans, fair, 2; trade center, 10  
 Orléans, Duke of, 254  
 Orléans Is., 251, 356  
 Orry, 277, 278  
 Orves, D', 205  
 Orvilliers, D', 284  
 Osages (tribe), 230  
 Ossonville, Jean du Plessis d', 80  
 Ostend Company, 184, 187  
 Ostrich feathers, 160, 164  
 Oswego, 245, 247  
 Otto I, 7  
 Ottawa River, 75  
 Ottoman, 32, 33  
 Oualo (Waloff), 162  
 Ouïatanon, 226  
 Ouida, 167, 169, 279  
 Owyano (Guiana), 93  
 Oyapok River, 94, 95, 97, 101, 102; Jesuit mission on, 103, 104
- Pacific, coast trade, 141, 143, 144, 145, 232, 278, 282, 300; ocean, 34, 53; ports, 140  
 Pacifique de Provina, Père, 175  
 Pacte de Famille, 234, 276-278, 281, 345  
 Paducahs (tribe), 230  
 Pagoda, 184  
 Palatinate, 150  
 Palermo, Medical school, 14  
 Panama, English at, 141, 257; Isthmus, 53, 54  
 Pantagruel, 43  
 Papal bulls, 25, 35, 171  
 Paper, to Spain, 135  
 Paper mills, 26  
 Papyrus, 5  
 Pará, 96  
 Paradis, 189  
 Paraguay, Jesuits in, 73, 103  
 Parahiba River, 53  
 Parat, Governor De, 120, 210, 211  
 Parima, lake, 93, 101  
 Paris, 3; besieged by Northmen, 6, 9;

- interests in Africa, 159, 183, 184, 189, 194, 201, 208, 215; Maudave to, 121; merchants hostile to companies, 131; merchants in Antilles, 256, 288, 304, 316, 324, 328, 346, 356; South American Indians in, 96, 99, 118; threatened, 38; trade center, 10  
*Parlement de Paris*, 61, 266  
 Parliament, English, 142, 156, 272  
 Parmentier, Jean, 40, 174  
 Parmentier, Raoul, 40, 174  
 Parny, Evariste Désiré, 222  
 Patna, 197  
 Paul I, 341  
*Paul and Virginia*, 221, 222, 285  
 Pawnees (tribe), 230  
 "Pax Romana," 3  
 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 268; of Amiens, 207, 222, 338, 342, 343, 347, 349; of Augsburg, 55; of Breda, 92, 94, 161; of Campo Formio, 339; of Paris, 286; of the Pyrenees, 124, 125; of Ryswick, 83, 92, 150, 153, 162, 180, 257, 269, 282; of Utrecht, 90, 144, 239, 240, 243, 312; of Westphalia, 124 (*See also* Treaty of Paris)  
 Pearls, 5  
 Peas, in Antilles, 257; exported from Canada, 149  
 Pélage, Colonel, 349  
 Pélays, Jacques, 165  
 Pennsylvania, 249, 272  
 Pensacola, 153, 154, 226  
 Pensée, 174  
 Pepin, 5  
 Pepper, trade in Africa, 161; in India, 185, 214  
 Peppel, Colonel William, 242  
 Perfumes, 5  
 Périer, De, 231  
 Periods, in navigation, 22  
 Pernambuco, 53  
 "Perpetual Company of the Indies," 181, 183  
 Perron, 205  
 Perrot, Nicholas, 310  
 Persia, 175-177, 179, 180, 185, 186, 207, 356, 357; Capuchins sent to, 92  
 Persian Gulf, trade routes, 131  
 Peru, communications with, 139; "entrance to," 78; expedition to, 143-145  
 Peter the Hermit, 15
- Pétion, 331  
 Petit, Maxine, 24  
 Petit Dieppe, 23  
 Petit Goave, 258, 259  
 Petit Paris, 23  
 Petit Portendik, 160  
 Petit-Terre, 249  
 "Petits blancs," in Antilles, 273, 274; in Guiana, 107; in Saint-Christophe, 87  
 "Pétun," 90 (*See* Tobacco)  
 Peuhls, 85, 161, 163  
 Peynier, Count de, 327, 328, 329  
 Peyton, Commodore, 188  
 Philadelphia, 318  
 Philip I, 8, 16  
 Philip II (Spain), 8, 32, 35, 49, 50-54, 56, 57, 171  
 Philip VI (the Fair), 10  
 Philip IV (Spain), 124  
 Philip V of Bourbon (Spain), 140, 156, 277  
 Philip VI, 19, 21  
 Philip of Anjou, 154  
 Philip Augustus, 16  
 Philippines, 186, 218, 251, 278  
 Phipps, Sir William, 153  
 Phocians, 2  
 Phoenicians, 2  
 Physiocrats, 289, 297  
 "Pièce d'Inde," 85  
 Pilgrimages, 12  
 Pillars of Hercules, 19  
 Pipis, 109  
 Piracy, 30; in Antilles, 253, 260; Barbary, 58, 67; Barbary corsairs, 114; Captain Potter seizes fort on Oyapok, 104; in Caribbean, 78; English Hawkins, 50; English on Madagascar, 111, 119, 120; English *vs.* Acadia, 61; French and English at Cartagena, 77; French corsairs *vs.* Spanish Americans, 32, 37-39; French in Orient, 175; in Mascareignes, 211; Moslems in Italy, 13; protection from, 68; Raleigh executed for, 94; in Saint-Domingue, 83; Sieur Jean Riffault, 95; threatened by Louis XIV, 139; at Tortuga, 82; Villegagnon *vs.* Spanish and Portuguese, 47  
 Pisa, in Levantine trade, 18; maritime trade with Southern France, 7

- Piton, Colonel, 32  
 Pitt, William, 247, 248, 337, 342  
 Placentia, 74  
 Plantagenets, 8, 15  
 Plassy, battle of, 198, 247  
 Platte River, 226, 232, 310  
 Pliny, 4  
 Plymouth, 98, 287  
 Pocock, 199, 262  
 Podor, 160, 166-169  
 Poincy, Philippe Longvilliers de, 81-84  
 Point-à-Pitre, 338  
*Point (Port) de relâche*, 117, 131, 143  
 Pointe Coupée, 226  
 Pointe de Sable, 79  
 Poivre, Pierre, 106, 214, 215, 283, 318  
 Poland, 184  
 Polish liberty, 121  
*Politiques*, Catholic, 56  
 Polo, Marco, 18, 22, 109  
 Polverel, 332, 333  
 Polynesian, on Madagascar, 109, 110  
 "Pompons blancs" (White Pompons), 328, 330  
 Poncet de Brétigny, Charles, 98  
 Poncet de la Rivière, 167  
 Pondichéry, 173, 179, 180, 181, 184-194, 197, 198, 200, 202-204, 206, 207, 210, 212, 251  
 Pontchartrain, 120, 133, 142, 143, 153  
 Pontgravé, monsieur, 59, 60  
 Poona, 194  
 Port, -au-Prince, 268-270, 306, 329-333, 350; Egmont, 281; Jackson, 348; -Louis (Île de France), 122, 212, 213, 215, 218, 219; Philip, 348; Royal, 51; -Royal (Annapolis), 60, 61, 72, 153, 155, 241, 242, 312; Royal Sound, 50  
 Porte, 58, 206, 340  
 Portendal, 158  
 Portendik, 164-166  
 Portobello fair, 138  
 Porto Rico, attacked, 46, 92  
 Portolan, map of Brazil, 44  
*Portolani*, 18  
 Portudal, 169  
 Portugal, 45, 46, 49, 52, 56, 69; Ango preys on, 39; attacked by England, 102, 114; Canaries sold to, 25; English troops to, 155; formed, 13; "Golden Age" in, 171; Infanta marries Charles II of England, 125, 131; in Orient, 184, 291-293; invaded by French knights, 1; share in Spanish American trade, 139; tobacco from, 90; trade returns, 28; use of ports by French, 37; *vs.* Spain, 154  
 Portuguese, 45, 94, 95, 96, 99, 128, 131; on Amazon, 103; Ango attacks on, 40, 44; in Bassaos, 163; in Brazil, 47, 48; colonial activity, 35, 36; corsairs *vs.*, 32; drive Dutch and English from Amazon, 97; French successors to, 140, 155; hostility and navigation on Guinea coast, 23, 25, 33, 35; Jesuits enter Guiana, 107; on Madagascar, 109, 111; *marabouts* against, 31; in Mascareignes, 208; monks in Cabo do Norte, 101; monopolies in Brazil, 49, 53; in Orient, 170, 171, 173, 179, 185, 283; pillage Guiana, 107; posts on Indian route, 176, 221, 292, 356, 357; rivals in Cayenne, 102; in South American trade, 95; on Ste. Luce, 112; traders at Spanish ports, 135; in West Africa, 158  
 Potatoes, alcoholic drinks made from, 87  
 Potter, Captain, 104  
 Pottery, Gaul, 2  
 Pouchot, Captain, 251  
 Poulo-Condor, 283  
 Poutrin-court, De, 61  
 Praslin, Duc de, 120, 121  
 Precious stones, quest for in Guiana, 103; trade in South America, 95  
 Préfontaine, De, 105  
 Prenpain, 77  
 Presqu'île, 243  
 Prester John, 19  
 Preuilly, Père Ambroise de, 177  
*Prevôts*, 8  
 Prideaux, 249  
 Primogeniture, law of, 8  
*Prince*, 52  
 Prince Edward Is., 237, 240, 242, 243, 246  
 Pronis, Jacques, 112-114, 120, 209  
 Protectionist, 27, 66, 69, 289, 298  
 Protector (Cromwell), 124  
 Protectors of the Faith, 31  
 Protestant Union, 56  
 Protestantism, 178  
 Protestants, 52, 55, 56; in Antilles, 255,

- 280; in English colonies, 308; excluded from French America, 71, 72; from Geneva to Brazil, 47, 48; to Marañon, 96  
 Provence, annexed, 29; Hungarian raiders into, 8; Moslem pirates at, 13, 15, 22, 28  
 Providence Island, 98, 253  
 "Provincial Assembly of the North," 327  
 Prussia, 184, 246, 247, 284, 289  
 Prussian, 313, 324, 338  
 Ptolemy, 109  
 Pulicat, 171  
 Puritans, 308  
 Purple stuffs, 5  
 Pyrad de Laval (François), 174  
 Pyrenees, 55  
  
 Quaker, 272, 337  
*Quartiers*, 258, 259  
 Quebec, 42, 61-63, 72, 74, 227, 245, 246, 248, 249, 251, 312; attack on, 152, 155, 238-241; De Tracy to, 88  
 Quesnay, 289, 297  
 Queylus, Père, 74  
 Quinine, sought in Guiana, 107  
  
 Rabelais, Fourth book, 43  
 Radama I, 123  
 Radisson, 74  
 Ragnoldas, 192, 193  
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 50, 93, 94, 99  
 Ramesay, De, 250  
 Rasles, Father, 241, 242  
 Raudot, 240  
 Raw materials, 70, 126; in Antilles, 256, 343; not taxed, 137; under Colbert, 127  
 Raynal, 270, 272, 285, 297, 341  
 Razilly, François de, 95  
 Razilly, Isaac de, 68, 69, 71, 96  
 Recife, 48, 53  
 Recollect priests, 62, 63, 72  
 "Red Pompons," 328, 330  
 Red River, 225, 230, 232  
 Red Sea, 11, 19; trade routes through, 131, 176, 208, 215, 278, 339  
 Reformation, in Germany, 30  
 "Refraichisseurs, Les," 216  
 Regnaud, 346  
 Regnault, sieur Étienne, 209  
 "Regrotiers," 90  
 Religious wars, 50, 55, 77; new outbreak, 97  
 Renaissance, 29  
 Renault, 232  
 Rennes, 95  
 Repentigny, 168  
 Réunion (Bourbon), 208  
 Revolution, of 1688, 139  
 Rey, 280  
 Reycklof van Goens, Admiral, 178  
 Rheims, trade center, 10  
 Rhine River, 2; country, 55  
 Rhinelanders, in Louisiana, 225  
 Rhoda, 2  
 Rhodiens, 32  
 Rhône Valley, 1, 2  
 Ribaut, Jean, 50, 51  
 Rice, in India, 184; in Louisiana, 226, 229; in Mascareignes, 209, 210  
 Richard the Lion-hearted, in 3rd crusade, 16  
 Richebourg, 164  
 Richelieu, Cardinal Armand du Plessis de, colonial policy, 65-75, 96, 97, 109, 112, 114, 115, 124, 126, 127, 132, 138, 148, 159, 175, 208, 267, 293, 295, 297, 303, 308, 339, 358; West Indies under, 76-92  
 Richelieu, François de, 77  
 Richelieu River, 148  
 Richepance, General, 346, 349  
 Riffault, sieur Jean, 95  
 Rigaud, 331, 332-335  
 Rigault, sieur, 112, 209  
 Rio de Janeiro, 47, 102  
 Rio Grande, 232, 352  
 Rio Sestos, 23  
 River May, 50  
 Rivière-aux-boeufs, 243  
 Rivière Salée, 81  
 Roads, 2, 7, 9, 21, 27, 58; in Antilles, 268, 302, 304; in India, 192; in Louisiana, 232; on Madagascar, 122, 126, 163; in Mascareignes, 357; in New France, 237  
 Roanoke, 54  
 Robert the Strong, 6  
 Roberval, sieur de, 42, 43, 308 (*See also* Jean François de la Roque)

- Robespierre, 217, 318, 319, 322, 324  
 Rochambeau, 287, 334, 336, 338, 352  
 Roche, Troilus du Mesgouëz, sieur de  
 la, 59  
 Rochefort, 105  
 Rockingham, 288  
 Rocky Mountains, 232, 238  
 Rodney, Admiral, 251, 287, 288, 314  
 Rodrigues Islands, 112, 208, 209, 214,  
 357  
 Roger II (king of Two Sicilies), 14  
 Rohan-Monbazon, Prince, 269, 273  
 Roissey, Urbain de, 78, 80, 86  
 Roiville, Monsieur de, 99  
 Rolls of Oleron, 18  
 Roman, law, 10, 236; occupation of  
 Gaul, 3  
 Romans, military posts, 2, 292  
 Rome, wheat from Britain, 3  
 Rome (shrine), 12; pilgrims to, 13  
 Roque, Jean François de la, sieur de  
 Roberval, 42  
 Rosetta stone, 341  
 Ross, United States Senator, 355  
 Rotundy, François de, sieur de Cahusac,  
 79  
 Rouen, 10, 12, 22, 23, 32, 39; merchants,  
 44, 45, 49, 52, 62, 70, 85; trade with  
 Indies, 88, 90, 97, 99, 135, 159, 164,  
 174, 208, 260  
 Rouen-Saint-Malo Company, 62  
 Roume, 331, 332, 334-336  
 Roumi, 177, 341  
 Rousselan, 37  
 Roussillon, 29, 124  
 Routes, in Africa, 163, 165; Arctic, 171;  
 Caravan, 20; to Cathay, 40; in India,  
 192; to "Indies," 36; Muscovy  
 route to India and China, 39; to Orient,  
 53  
 Roux, Sylvain, 357  
 Rubault, 168  
 Rubjapour, 179  
 Rufisque, 158, 160, 163  
 "Rule of 1756," 261, 266  
 Rum (contraband), in Antilles, 256,  
 265; British, in New France, 239;  
 trade in New France, 243  
 Russia, 120, 198, 207, 246, 289; allied  
 with Austria, 314, 315, 356, 357  
 Ruyter, de, 161  
 Ryswick, Peace of, 83  
 Saba (taken by Dutch), 92  
 Sable Island, 59  
 Sable, Pointe de, 79  
 Saco, 155  
 Sacre, 174  
 Sadras, 194  
 Saffi, 32  
 Sahara, 158  
 Sahogy, 185  
 Saïd Lasker Khan, 193, 194  
 Saigon, 283  
 Saint-Alexis, 208  
 Saint-Alexis Island, 36  
 Saint-Augustine Bay, 111, 116  
 Saint-Barthélemy Island, 79, 84, 92,  
 260, 265, 315  
 St. Bartholomew's massacre, 52  
 St. Bernard, 16  
 Saint-Brancard, 36  
 St. Brandan's, 98  
 Saint-Castin, Baron de, 241, 311  
 St. Charles River, 41, 42, 250  
 Saint-Christophe, 77, 78, 81-85; enga-  
 gés brought to, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, 97,  
 98; English expelled from, 100; lost  
 to England, 155, 156, 253, 271, 287  
 Saint-Clair-su-Epte, peace of, 6  
 Saint-Cloud, 355  
 Saint-Croix Is., 60, 84, 92, 254  
 Saint-Croix River, 60  
 Saint-Denis (Bourbon), 217  
 Saint-Denis, Louis de, 224, 232  
 Saint-Domingue, 77, 83, 91, 92, 123, 218,  
 226, 231, 246, 253, 255-257, 259, 261,  
 262, 264-266, 268-270, 273, 285, 298,  
 299, 303, 304, 306, 307, 310, 314, 318,  
 319, 320, 322, 324, 326-328, 332-336,  
 343-345, 347, 349, 350, 352-355, 358  
 Saint-Eustatius, 80, 92, 137  
 Saint-Foy, 251  
 St. Francis de Sales, 84  
 Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point), 250,  
 251  
 Saint-Géran, 221  
 Saint-Germain (city), Treaty of, 72, 73  
 Saint Germain (war minister), 284  
 St. Helena, 341  
 St. Helena Bay, 117  
 Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island),  
 240  
 Saint-Jean-d'Acre, 340  
 St. John Island, 92, 239, 242, 254

- St. John's River, 50  
 Saint-Joseph (Africa), 165  
 Saint-Joseph (parish), 73  
 "St. Kitt," 79, 98 (*See also* Saint-  
 Christophe, English on)  
 St. Laurent, 111  
 St. Lawrence River, 37, 41, 59, 60, 62,  
 155-157, 237, 240, 243, 249, 251, 300,  
 311; blockaded, 72, 73  
 Saint-Léger, De, 331  
 Saint-Louis (Africa), 109, 159, 160,  
 162-165, 167-169, 300  
 Saint-Louis (on Mobile Bay), 154  
 Saint-Louis (parish), 73  
 Saint-Louis (St. Domingue), 258  
 Saint-Luce, 112, 208  
 Saint-Lusson, 149  
 Saint-Malo, 41, 43, 59, 62, 70, 111, 135,  
 159, 174, 181, 281; Compagnie de la  
 Chine, 143, 144, 145  
 Saint-Malo Company, 211  
 Saint-Marc (St. Domingue), 320, 327,  
 329, 350, 351  
 Sainte-Marie (parish), 73  
 Saint-Martin Is., 79, 84, 91, 92, 206, 265  
 Saint-Martin de Tours, shrine, 12  
 St. Mary's River, 352  
 Saint-Michel de Cépérou, 99  
 Saint-Michel de Gargano, 12  
 Saint-Paul, 282  
 Saint-Pierre (author), 285  
 Saint-Pierre (on Martinique), 133, 266,  
 268  
 Saint-Pierre (on St. Luce), 112, 208  
 Saint-Pierre Is., 251, 289, 338, 347  
 Saint-Robert, De, 165  
 Saint-Saveur, 61  
 Saint-Thomas Is., 92, 254, 261  
 Saint-Vincent Is., 84, 159, 253, 254,  
 261, 262, 264, 271, 338  
 St. Yuste, Convent of, 31  
 Sainte-Geneviève, 226  
 Sainte-Lucie, 37, 84, 234, 254, 260-262,  
 265, 266, 268, 271, 289, 338, 347, 357,  
 358  
 Sainte-Marie (Mascareignes), 112,  
 120, 280, 300  
 Santa Maria de Betancuria, 25  
 Saintes Is., 84, 249, 265, 287, 314  
 Saintonge, Jean Alfonse de, 24, 43, 44  
 Saintoyant, J., 24, 351, 359  
 Sakalavas, 110, 122  
 Salabat Jang, 192, 193, 194, 198, 201,  
 203  
 Saldanha, Bay of, 117  
 Salé, 68  
 Salerno, attacked, 13  
 Sales, De, 84  
 Salt, in Missouri, 232; tariff on in Seneg-  
 gal, 165; trade in, 11, 19, 26, 94  
 Salva, 280  
 Salvert, De, 164  
 Samaná Bay, 336, 350  
 Samoa, 282  
 San Agustín, 51  
 San Lucar, 136  
 San Mateo, 51, 52  
 San Miguel, 53  
 San Salvador, Columbus to, 33  
 San Thomé, 94, 173, 178, 179, 184, 189  
 Santa Elena (Port Royal), 51  
 Santa Fe, 232, 300  
 Santa Marta, Bayonne corsairs sack, 77  
 Santa Rosa, 226  
 Santhonax, 332-334  
 Santiago de Compostela, 12; pilgrims  
 to, 13  
 Santo Domingo, 82, 141, 235, 253, 329,  
 334, 336, 353  
 Saône, 1, 2  
 Saracen, hostility, 5, 7  
 Saratoga, 286  
 Sarmiento de Gamboa, 53  
 Sartines, 284, 286  
 Saskatchewan River, 232  
 Saubinet, 197  
 Saunders, Governor, 194, 196, 249  
 Savannah, 287  
 Savary de Brèves, 58  
 Savoy, 22  
 Savoy, Admiral Honorat of, 77  
 Saxony, 5  
 Say, 347  
 Schenectady, N. Y., 153  
 Schismatics (Greek), 14  
 Schools, among Hurons, 73; in Span-  
 ish colonies, 309  
 Schwartz, Pastor, 272  
 Scotchmen, in Louisiana, 225; at Rio de  
 Janeiro, 46, 72  
 Scotland, 198  
 Sea of Japan, 282  
 Sebastian, Dom, 52  
 Sebastiani, 344, 347

- Second Coalition of Europe, 335, 340  
 "Second Hundred Years' War," 152  
 "Second Treaty of Partition," 154  
 Seignelay, 133, 285, 339  
 Seigneuries, 15, 147, 237  
 Seine River, 1, 6  
 Senegal, 32, 85, 158-169, 213, 289, 338, 356, 357  
 Senegal Company, 159, 160, 294  
 Senegal River, 158, 159, 162, 163, 165, 167, 168, 300  
 Senegalese, imported to Indies, 80, 85  
 Senegambia, 160  
 Senlis, 316  
 Sepoys, 185, 191, 200-202, 205  
*Seratik*, 163  
 Seven Islands, 155  
 Seven Years' War, 104, 166, 197, 213, 231, 233, 263, 264, 268, 278, 281, 285, 301, 312  
 Seville, 135-137  
 Seychelles, 120, 211, 280, 323, 357  
 Shah of Persia, 175  
 Sharp, Granville, 272  
 Shediak, 240, 242, 246  
 Shelburne, 289  
 Shipping, 67; Spanish in Caribbean, 76  
 Shirley, Governor, 242, 244, 245  
 Siam, 177, 186, 283  
 Sicily, 13  
 Sierra Leone, 159, 161, 168, 169  
 Sièyès, 272, 318  
 Silk, 5; factory in Florence, 26; industry in France, 181; in Louisiana, 226; manufacturing, 27; Spanish, 135, 138  
 Sillery, 250  
 Silver, from Indies, 141; from Pacific, 143; from Spain, 135, galleons, 50; in Cayenne, 103; in Gaul, 2; in Louisiana, 229, 232  
 Sindh, 205  
 Sinnamari River, 97, 100  
 Sixtus IV, 25  
 Skins, 161, 162  
 Slaves, 2; in Antilles, 86, 254, 257-259, 261, 263, 265, 268, 270-275, 280, 298, 308, 310, 315-317, 319, 321, 322; asked for by De Préfontaine, 105; blacks from Senegal to Cayenne, 107; in Cayenne, 102; freed in Morocco, 69; labor, 100; lack of in Cayenne, 104; lack of in Guiana, 104; for Louisiana, 224-226, 229, 233; in Mascareignes, 220, 223; to Mascareignes, 209, 216; Negro, 85; none in Madagascar, 116; rebellions in Martinique, 84; slaving stations, 98; sold to Dutch in Mauritius, 113; in sugar and tobacco islands, 130; tariff on, 166; trade, 50, 69, 120, 165, 213, 215, 217, 218; trade on African coast, 109; trade in West Africa, 106, 167-169, 325, 326, 329-335, 337, 338, 344, 346, 349, 351, 353, 357, 358; under Code Noir, 129; on West African coast, 158-163  
 Smith, Adam, 289, 296, 347  
 Smugglers, between French and British, 156; Dutch, in French Indies, 79; in Antilles, 254; in Caribbean, 78; in Senegal trade, 166; in West Indies, 77  
 Smuggling, in Antilles, 263, 295; between French and Spanish, 136, 137; in Louisiana, 224, 235; in Mascareignes, 212; in New France, 243; of Negroes, 141; of sugar, 91; of tobacco, 90  
 Smyrna, trade with South France, 7  
 Societies, communal, in Antilles, 87  
 "Societies of Mercers," 22  
 Society, Frankish, 4; life in Antilles, 85, 87, 260, 273, 274, 304, 326, 353; in Guiana, 107; in Louisiana, 227, 228; in Mascareignes, 219-221; transitional from feudal to national stage, 66  
 "Society of French Colonists," 272  
 Society of Friends of the Blacks, 272  
 Sokoto, 20  
 Soledad Is., 281  
 Sombre, 205  
 Somme River, 6  
 Songhai (empire), 20  
 Sorel, Agnes, 26  
 Sorel, Governor, 259  
 Sorel River, 243  
 Sorès, Jacques de, 46, 77  
 Soudan, Europeans in, 19  
 Sound, the, 53  
 South Africa, 117  
 South America, 34, 93-95, 104; markets, 144, 300, 349; trade of West India Company in, 131, 139, 143  
 South Atlantic, 109

- South Carolina, 248, 265  
 South Province (Saint-Domingue), 334, 350  
 South Seas, 141, 144, 232; islanders, 282; islands in, 281  
 Spain, acquired by Bourbons, 282; alliances, 284, 286, 288, 291, 292, 293, 300, 305, 309; annexes Portugal, 171; Caliph's interests in, 5; cedes colonies, 342-345, 352, 354, 356; Charles I (English) *vs.*, 95; colonies ravaged by buccaneers, 87, 88; conflict with, 40; empire, 131, 134; expeditions *vs.* Barbary states, 32, 37; galleons seized, 155; in Antilles, 257, 266, 277; in Louisiana, 226, 228, 234; invaded by French knights, 1; Normans in, 13; protects French in Falklands, 281; Roussillon and Artois taken from, 124; sends Arriola, 153; threatened in America by Villegagnon, 49, 50, 54, 58, 65, 67, 69; to be swept from Caribbean, 98; trade, 28, 218; under Charles V, 30; war with, 45, 46, 77  
 Spaniards, Anjo's attacks on, 49; in Antilles, 253, 257, 269; capture *Prince*, 52-54; in Canaries, 25; distressed by Canada colony, 42, 44; drive out French and English from Saint-Christophe, 79; driven from Algiers and Tunisia, 31, 35; exclusion of priests, 129; French traders caught by, 77; incite Caribs, 84; Jesuits among, 73, 78; in Louisiana, 224, 232, 233; in Pacific, 281-293; on Tortuga, 82; supply arms, 359; treatment of natives, 309  
 Spanish in Antilles, 253, 257, 258, 261, 269, 273; claims in Mississippi, 288, 294; colonial activity, 35; colonial empire, 278, 287; colonial monopolies, 128; colonial system, 132; colonies, 134; colonists, 331, 334, 335; colonists and laborers to Canaries, 25; enemies in Morocco, 69; execute Raleigh, 94; exploration of Africa by, 19; explorers in Guiana, 93; fleet defeated by Barbarossa, 31; fort in Florida, 51, 52, 53; frontier, 237; hospitals and schools in colonies, 309; in Indies, 91, 92; in Louisiana, 226, 228-230, 234, 235, 349; in Santo Domingo, 329; slave ships and traders, 85; success in West Indies and Mexico, 60; succession, 124; system, 351; voyages harassed by French corsairs, 76  
 Spanish America, colonies, 263, 276, 305; commerce, 135-145; under Charles V, 30  
 Spanish Indies, 39, 46; commerce of Spanish America, 135-145  
 Spanish Main, 94, 134  
 Spanish Netherlands, 138, 154  
 Spice Islands, 139, 293  
 Spices, 5, 26; cultivation in Guiana, 106; fleet, 38; oriental, 174, 180, 214, 216; trade in, 53, 58  
 Spilbergen, 111  
 Spotswood, Governor Alexander, 230  
 Spranger, Guerin, 99, 100  
 Stadacona, 42  
 Staden, Hans, 44  
 Stamp Act of 1765, 286  
 States General (Canada), 301  
 States General (French), 316, 319, 321, 323, 326, 327 (*See also* Estates General)  
 Stevens, Edward, 335  
 Strait of Magellan, 53, 102, 130, 281  
 Strassburg, 124  
 Strozzi, Philippe, 52, 53, 77  
 Stuart, General, 206  
 Stuarts, House of, 124, 152, 198  
*Subah*, 170, 185, 191, 192, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203  
 Sublime Porte, 58, 206, 340  
 Suez, Isthmus of, 53; trade routes via, 176  
 Suffren, 205, 206, 217, 284, 289, 302  
 Sugar, alcoholic drinks made from cane, 87; in Antilles, 259, 260, 263, 265, 267, 273, 277; areas, 312, 321, 331, 346, 354; (beet), 358; of Cayenne, 101, 102; duty on, 91; at Guadeloupe, 81; in Guiana, 93; introduced to Cayenne, 99; in Louisiana, 229; in Mascareignes, 209, 213; planters grow rich, 88; planting in Indies, 79; planters, 304; production, 132; production in Antilles, 257; refiners, 308; substitution for money, 90; taxes on, 89; trade in West Indies, 20; West In-

- Sugar (*continued*)  
 dia, 85; of West Indies, 157, 158  
 Sugar Act, 265  
 Sugar islands, 104, 130, 145, 148, 234, 254, 262, 326, 342  
 Sully, duke of, 57, 63, 65, 293  
 Sulpicians, 74, 151, 226, 227, 229  
 Sumatra, 40, 174, 177, 187  
 Suraja Dowlah, 198  
 Surat, 119, 171, 175-177, 181, 204  
 Surinam, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106  
 Susquehanna River, 230  
 Susquehannahs, 237  
 Swan River Colony, 348  
 Sweden, 139, 147, 315; aid to "King of Madagascar," 120; Saint-Barthélemy sold to, 92  
 Switzerland, colonists sought for Guiana, 105  
 Syria, merchants of, 5; Latin seigneuries in, 15; trade routes through, 131, 175, 340, 357  
 Syrians, belonging to Roman church, 17  
 Syrups, 265, 266, 270  
 "Tabagerres" (Tabayaras) visiting Rouen, 45  
 Tabelbala, 19  
 Tabelbert, 19  
 Table Bay, 117  
 Tadoussac, 59, 60  
 Tahiti, 278  
*Taille*, 21  
 Tafia, 256, 265, 267, 270  
 Tafilelt, 20  
 Talapoosa River, 224  
 Talleyrand, 343, 356  
 Talon, Jean, 148, 149, 151, 298, 302  
 Tamar, 348  
 Tamatave, 116, 357  
 Tamayo, Indians, 53  
 Tamil, 187  
 Tangier, 125  
 Tanjore, 170, 185, 186, 200  
 Tapestries, 138  
 Taprobane Is. (Sumatra) 40  
 Tariff, in Antilles, 267, 278, 306; customs and duties in colonies, 323, 325, 346; customs dues paid to Senegal chiefs, 162, 163; regulations by Treaty of Utrecht, 156; on slaves, etc. in Senegal, 165; under Colbert, 126, 138, 142; in West Africa, 160  
 Tasmania, 339, 348  
 Tavernier, 175  
 Taxes, 5, 7, 10, 21, 22, 27, 65, 79, 89, 91; in Antilles, 258, 269, 273, 278, 302; in colonies under Colbert, 133, 136, 140; in England, 342; in Egypt, 340; in Indies, 90, 91; in Mascareignes, 214, 303; in West Africa, 167, 176, 191, 196, 204, 306, 315  
 Tea, trade in China, 182  
 Tellichéry, 179  
 Templars, 17  
 Tennessee River, 230  
 Tent Rock, 111  
 Teresa (daughter of king of Castile), 13  
*Terra Australis*, 98  
*Testament Politique* of Richelieu, 66  
 Testu, Guillaume le, 44-46  
 Texas, 149, 224, 226, 232, 233  
 Theaters, in Guiana, 105  
 Thevenot, 175  
 Thevet, André, 44-46  
 Third Estate, of Amiens, 317  
 Third Senegal Company, 162  
 Thirty Years' War, 124  
 Thoisy, Patrocle de, 83  
 Thomas Aquinas, 20  
 Three Rivers, 73, 74  
 Ticonderoga, 247, 251  
 Timbuctoo, 19, 20, 163, 164  
 Tin, 2, 3, 14  
 Tipu Sahib, 205-207, 218  
 Tiravady, 193  
 Tlemçen, 32  
 Tobacco, 77, 79, 86, 89, 90, 130, 132, 183; in Antilles, 273, 354; at Guadeloupe, 81; from Indies, 141; in Louisiana, 226, 229; planting in West Indies, 77; trade in, 94  
 Tobago, 79, 254, 262, 264, 271, 287, 289, 315, 338, 357, 358  
 Toeni, Roger de, 13  
 Toledo, arms, 135  
 Toledo, Fadrigue de, 79  
 Tollendal, Baron de, 198  
 Tong, Duc, 283  
 Tonkin, 171, 180, 283  
 Tonty, 229

- Tories, 156  
 Toronto, 243  
 Tortuga, 80, 82-83, 253, 257, 258  
 Touareg, 20  
 Touat, 19, 20  
 Toul, 124  
 Toulouse, fair, 2, 10  
 Tour, Charles de la, 61  
 Tourane, 283, 339  
 Tours, invasion by Arabs, 4  
 Toussaint l'Ouverture, 333-336, 349, 350-351, 353  
 Towns, Flanders, 9  
 Tracy, Alexander Pourville de, 75, 84, 88, 89, 100, 255, 298  
 Trade, 2, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 21, 23, 38, 62, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 76, 90, 128, 178, 260, 276, 278, 279, 290, 292, 294, 297-300, 307, 315, 322; in Africa, 32, 33, 106, 109, 116, 125, 131; in America, 77, 93, 98, 131, 134, 135-145; American, 35, 46; in Antilles, 87, 254, 256, 261, 262, 267-268, 272; Brazilian, 44, 101; British, 94, 125, 142, 156; in Canada, 59, 137, 147; furs, 59, 62, 63, 71, 72, 146-148, 150, 151, 154, 203, 230, 238, 243, 309, 310, 311; with India, 114, 115, 117, 118, 129, 130, 137, 171, 174, 176, 177, 179-180, 181-182, 184-185, 187, 190, 204, 208, 214, 215; in Indies, 79, 80, 83, 88, 89; Levantine, 7, 18, 26, 58; in Louisiana, 224-225, 231-233, 235; Madagascar, 112, 113, 120; Mascareignes, 219; Mediterranean, 10, 15, 20, 27, 28, 31, 43, 58; merchant marine for, 66; monopoly, 278; Moroccan, 32; in New France, 239, 240, 248; with Orient, 108, 111; Portugal, 69; slave, 50, 69, 85, 98, 101, 104, 106, 109, 120, 121, 140, 154, 158, 162, 203, 213, 263, 317, 318, 321, 324, 326, 358; under Colbert, 133; in West Africa, 158, 161, 163, 164, 167, 169  
 Trade corporations, 8, 14, 35 (*See also Guilds*)  
 Trade routes, 18, 47, 131, 171, 175, 176, 230, 339  
 Trafalgar, 348  
 Tranquebar, 173, 178, 184  
 Transportation, 2, 21, 26, 94  
 Travancor, 186  
 Treaties, 154, 176, 206, 232, 347; commercial, 26, 28, 58; in West Africa, 160  
 Treaties of Vienna, 357  
 Treaty, between Abenakis and England, 241; of Aix-la-Chapelle, 189, 243, 260; at Algiers, 68; of Amity and Commerce, 1778, 266; of Basle, 1795, 235, 336, 339; of Benyowski in Madagascar, 122; of Breda, 101; British with Spain, 94; with Cairo chiefs, 84; of Câteau-Cambrésis, 49, 57; of Dover, 125; with Henry VII of England, 29, 30; of Joinville, 53, 56; of Lyons, 1536, 38; with Malagasy, 114; with Mandingoes, 163; Methuen, 102; Napoleonic treaties, 1814, 1815, 207; neutrality with England, 257; of Nimwegen, 158, 160; of Paris, 104, 167, 203, 207, 251, 276, 298, 301, 314, 315, 357, 358; of Pondichéry, 197; with Portugal, 140; of St. Germain, 72, 73; of San Ildefonso, 349, 355; of San Lorenzo, 235, 354; Spanish, 1526, 37; with Sultan of Egypt, 26; with Sultan of Morocco, 69; of Teschen, 284; of Tilsit, 357; of Tordesillas, 35; of Utrecht, 103, 142, 156, 224, 237, 245, 251, 289, 311, 337; of Verdun, 7; of Versailles, 1783, 168, 169, 288; of Vervins, 49, 57, 136; of Westphalia, 49 (*See also Peace of Breda and Peace of Utrecht*)  
 Tremblay, Père Joseph de, 69, 92, 175  
*Tribunal terrier*, 304  
 Trichinopoly, 170, 185, 186, 191-194, 196, 197, 199  
 Trincomali, 171, 178, 188, 202, 205, 206  
 Trinidad, 94, 95, 97, 358  
 Trinity River, 233  
 Triple Alliance, 176  
 Tripoli, 162, 347  
 Troilus du Mesgouëz, sieur de la Roche, 59 (*See also de la Roche*)  
 Tropic of Cancer, 49, 57  
 Troyès, 49  
 Truce of God, 15; of Nice, 38; of Vauxcelles, 46, 49  
 Tunis, 27, 31-32  
 Tupinambas, 45, 96  
 Turelle, Captain, 177

- Turgot, De, Colonel, 104-106, 272, 274, 284, 286, 297  
 Turkey, 58, 299, 314, 315, 339  
 Turks, 15, 17, 26, 30-33, 38, 45, 53, 58, 69, 340, 341  
 Tuscaroras, 237  
 Two Sicilies, 14
- Ulloa, Antonio de, 234  
 Underwood, Captain, 241  
 Unguents, 5  
 United States, 235, 246, 266, 270, 273, 274, 286, 309, 326, 327, 329, 331, 333, 335-337, 342-343, 346, 349, 352, 354, 355  
 Upper County, 310  
 Urban II, French pope, 15
- Vaissière, 259  
 Valladolid, Ordinance of, 25  
 Valois, 21, 56  
 Vampenne, Pierre, 174  
 Van Houtman, Cornelis, 171  
 Vanikoro, Island of, 282  
 Vanilla, 215  
 Varville, 240  
 Vau, Jacques de, 53  
 Vauban, 297  
 Vaubulon, Hubert de, 210, 217  
*Vaudoux*, 86, 275, 331  
 Vaudreuil, 231, 237, 239-241, 245, 247, 249, 250-251, 260-261, 302, 312  
 Vaux, 95, 96  
 Vauxcelles, 46  
 Venetians, 16, 32, 53, 58  
 Venezuela, 94  
 Venice, 18, 26-27, 33, 58, 339  
 Ventadour, 72  
 Verdun, Treaty of, 7, 124  
 Vérendrye, La, 232, 238, 310  
 Verenne, de la, Governor, 256  
 Vergennes, 122, 251, 266, 278, 284, 285, 288, 289, 314  
 Vermonters, 337  
 Verragnan, Jerome, 41  
 Verrazano, Giovanni, 34, 38-40, 238, 293  
 Versailles, 122, 257, 315  
 Vervins, 49, 57  
 Victor, General, 352, 355  
 Vilaldestes, Mecia de, 20
- Village, Jean, 26  
 Villaret-Joyeuse, 356  
 Villars, marquis of, 52, 137  
 Villate, 333  
 Villazur, 226  
 Villegagnon, Nicholas Durand de, 45-48, 53, 94  
 Villiers, De, 244  
 Vincennes, 226  
 Vincens, M., 187  
 Virginia, 54, 61, 98, 231, 234, 237, 243, 244  
 Visianagram, 201  
 Visigoths, in Gaul, 4  
 Vitre, François Martin de, 175  
 Vivaldi, 19  
 Volcanic eruptions, in Indies, 89  
 Volga River, Norman voyages to, 13  
 Voltaire, 148, 222, 285, 296  
 Volunteers of Africa, 169  
 Voodoo (Vaudoux), 275  
 Voyages, 33, 36, 77, 278, 281, 282, 285, 295; to America, 186, 343; to China, 143; to East Indies, 111; English to the West, 34; to Florida and Acadia, 52; to Guiana, 93; to Guinea Coast, 23, 24; to India, 109, 117; from Levant and around Africa, 92; to Madagascar, 114; Mascareignes, 209; Norman, 13, 19, 22, 25; to Orient, 171, 174, 176, 181-182, 186; Portuguese, 33; in Senegal, 160; Spanish harassed by French corsairs, 96; to West Africa, 159  
 Voyageurs, in Louisiana, 232, 233
- Wabash River, 157, 226  
 Wadström, 326  
 Walloon, colonists to New Amsterdam, 97  
 Waloffs, 85, 168  
 Wandiwash, 202, 251  
 War of Austrian Succession, 104, 166, 187, 190, 198, 242, 260, 312, 313  
 War of the League of Augsburg, 150, 152, 162, 180  
 War of Spanish Succession, 102, 134, 139, 142, 154, 163, 238, 253, 254, 256-257  
 Warner, Thomas, 78-79  
 Wars of Religion, 8

- Washington, George, 244, 245, 283, 286  
 Wax, 160, 161, 165  
 Wellesley, marquis of, 207  
 Wells, 155  
 Welzers, 94  
 West Africa, 19, 95, 106, 125, 158-169, 252, 257, 289, 300, 315, 326, 339, 358  
 West India Company, English, 98; French, 59, 82-83, 88-89, 100, 130-133, 159, 160, 254  
 West Indies, 39, 54, 60, 73, 75, 144, 149, 155, 157, 161, 183, 215, 229, 231, 249, 262, 266, 276, 280, 285, 287, 293, 302, 303, 306, 309-313, 319, 320, 323, 337, 339, 344; commerce seized by English and Dutch 134, 137; decline of trade, 139; rivalry for, 77; sugar, 85; trade, 88, 89; under Richelieu, 76-92  
 West Province (Saint-Domingue), 330  
 Western Sea, 232  
 Whaling (voyages), 22, 35  
 Wheat, Britain to France and Rome, 3; from Canada, 148; in Louisiana, 226; in Mascareignes, 209; in New France, 238; from West, 5  
 Whidden, Jacob, 93  
 Whig, 287  
 White Sea, Normans in, 13  
 Wiapoca, 94  
 Wilberforce, 272  
 "Wilde Kuste," 93  
 William III of England, 152
- William the Conqueror (Duke of Normandy), 8, 14  
 William of Holland, 139  
 William of Rubruck, 18  
 Willoughby Land, 100  
 Wine, 11; in Antilles, 87; exchanged for lead and tin, 14; Gascon, 21; Portuguese, 155; trade in Holland, 129; from West, 5  
 Winthrop, Governor, 152  
 Wisconsin River, 149, 310  
 Wolfe, General, 250, 251  
 Woods, trade in Madagascar, 112, 116, 120  
 Wool, 2; in Louisiana, 224; from Spain, 135; trade and manufacture in Flanders, 21  
 Woolens, 9; English, 11; manufacturing, 27; to Spain, 135  
 Wyandots, 72
- X Y Z Affair, 356
- Yamasees, 225, 237  
 Yanaon, 186, 204  
 Yellow fever, in Louisiana, 228  
 Yorktown, 287
- Zara, 16